1. ASSESSING THE PERIOD OF 1969 UNTIL 1998: CAN THE PROVISIONAL MOVEMENT BE
ACCUSED OF ABANDONING REPUBLICANISM IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL
MOVEMENT THEORY.
Andrew English
School of Politics and International Relations
University College Dublin
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Arts in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict.
April 2016

2. i
DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Melanie Hoewer, for her
invaluable comments, advice and enthusiasm for the subject matter. I would also like to
thank Professor Jennifer Todd for her assistance. A special thanks goes to a family
friend, Anna Brennan, who introduced me to my first interview participant, which
essentially led to the research project taking off. I sincerely appreciate the help of Orna
Bannon, Robert Neary, Ciaran Driver, Orla Daly, Tadhg O’Sullivan, Annie McBride,
Fergus English and Gavin Clerkin who provided me with books from universities and
institutions all across the country when I was not able to obtain them from UCD. A
heartfelt thanks goes out to Gerry and Dolores English who supported me throughout
the project. I am also grateful to Brian Kieran, James Doherty and Amy Begley for
enduring my passion and preoccupation with this study. Lastly, I would like to thank the
interviewees who took part in the project. Without all these individuals mentioned
above, this project never would have happened.

3. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................ i
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. iii
1.1.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1
1.2.1 Methodology ............................................................................................................................ 4
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................... 6
2.1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 6
2.2.1 Social Movement Theory Framework ............................................................................... 6
2.3.1 Republicanism and the Provisionals .................................................................................. 8
2.4.1. Compromise/Abandonment of Irish Republican Ideals and Principles ................. 11
2.5.1 The Incorporation of the Provisional Movement Into Constitutional Politics ....... 14
2.6.1 Literature Review Conclusion ......................................................................................... 17
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY .................................................................................... 19
3.1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 19
3.2.1 Why A Qualitative Approach was Chosen ................................................................... 19
3.3.1 Semi Structured Interviews ............................................................................................... 20
3.4.1 Cohort .................................................................................................................................... 21
3.5.1 Data Sources: Gatekeepers and Stakeholders ............................................................... 22
3.6.1 Sampling ................................................................................................................................ 23
3.71. Data Collection ..................................................................................................................... 24
3.7.2 Pilot Study and Results ...................................................................................................... 24
3.8.1 Ethical Considerations ....................................................................................................... 25
4.1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 27
4.2.1 The Compromise/Abandonment of Republican Values .............................................. 27
4.3.1. Principles or Tactics? ........................................................................................................ 29
4.4.1 Abstentionism and Partitionist Parliaments .................................................................. 29
4.5.1 Armed Struggle .................................................................................................................... 30
4.6.1. Negotiations and Settlements ........................................................................................... 32
4.7.1 Pan Nationalism ................................................................................................................... 33
4.8.1 Good Friday Agreement .................................................................................................... 34
4.9.1 Post 1969 Republican .......................................................................................................... 35
4.10.1 The Provisional Movement and Social Movement Theory ...................................... 36
4.11.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS ......................................................................................... 37
5.1.1 Limitations ............................................................................................................................ 38
6.1.1 Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 39
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 40
APPENDIX SECTION ........................................................................................................ 45
7.1 Topic Schedule ...................................................................................................................... 45
7. 2. Letter of Research Introduction .................................................................................... 47
7. 3 Consent Letter ...................................................................................................................... 50

4. iii
ABSTRACT
This paper offers a deep examination of how a social movement organisation such as the
Provisional movement in Northern Ireland transforms, changes and essentially abandons its
operational agenda before being incorporated into the political system. The paper seeks to
trace this transformation using a social movement theory framework of incorporation, which
Marco Giugni argues can happen from within the movement or externally, and usually means
the movement becomes part of the political system without really changing it. Using the
central arguments from Anthony McIntyre and Kevin Bean, the researcher is able to show
how Republicans themselves (within), along with the British state and its various agencies
(without) were able to steer the movement into a settlement that has quite literally stripped the
Republicanism from the Republicans. This is also facilitated with 8 expert semi structured
interviews with individuals who were, at one time or another, part of the Provisional IRA,
Sinn Féin or both organisations simultaneously. The data collected from the interviews was
then triangulated against the secondary literature in order to give a deeper understanding of
Republicanism and the concepts of change and abandonment within the social movement
theory framework. The research showed how much of the allegations of abandonment were
warranted and how endogenous and exogenous factors both contributed to the incorporation
of the Provisional movement into institutionalised realm of electoral politics.

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1.1.1. INTRODUCTION
From decades of research on social movements, a great deal is known about the conditions
and dynamics of mobilisation, but less is known about how contentious actors demobilize
and what this means for the movement, its supporters and society in general (Tarrow and
Tilly, 2007: 97 and Giugni, 1998: xii). Rucht argues by becoming a player in the
conventional political process, social movement organisations lose their initial character as
challengers to the status quo and the forces in power (Rucht, 1999: 153). For Tarrow, these
same forces of power, along with the dominance of capitalism were able to domesticate
and institutionalise those involved in ‘contentious politics’ (Tarrow, 1994: 9). The
phenomena defined as abandonment, defection, decline or defeat has been little explored in
sociological literature (Della Porta, 2013: 264). The idea of ‘abandonment’, whether that
be in the form of violence or a belief system can be either voluntary or forced and depends
on whether an ‘individual or organisation makes a choice or is constrained to adopt a
certain behaviour’ (Della Porta, 2013: 264). Using Northern Ireland as his case study and
the social movement theory framework aforementioned, this researcher hopes to highlight
how some social movements change and abandon certain belief systems and characteristics
that were once central to the movement’s original organisational agenda. In this case, the
social movement being examined is the Provisional movement (both Sinn Féin and the
IRA) during the period of sustained conflict in Northern Ireland more widely known as
“The Troubles” commencing in 1969 and ending in 1998.
The researcher focuses on specific issues and events during the prescribed period that are
widely accepted in the literature as having transformed the Provisional movement from an
anti state insurgency group with claims to a revolutionary leadership, to a partner in
governing a state it once pledged to destroy. In doing so, the researcher hopes to show how
the now ‘pragmatic’ Provisional movement has capitulated on principled issues and
compromised hugely on Republican values in return for a power sharing assembly, a far
cry from the 32 county socialist Republic once envisioned.
In arguing this case, the researcher has selected 3 pieces of literature that he deems to be
central to his argument. Anthony McIntyre’s Good Friday and the Death of Irish
Republicanism takes aim at certain aspects of the Provisional movement whilst also

6. 2
ridiculing the path being followed by Sinn Féin. Kevin Bean’s The Politics of New Sinn
Féin maps the ideological shifts that have occurred within the ‘new’ Sinn Féin party since
the 1980’s. Marco Giugni et al From Contention to Democracy provides a mechanism that
explains the incorporation of social movements into political structures.
Irish Republicanism has been notorious for its internal divisions and feuds, but one
unifying belief has been that it is part of a broader Republican mainstream founded on
ideas of the popular sovereignty of free, equal and self governing individuals (Patterson,
2009: 147). With the peace process and the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, ‘the
internal dynamics of mainstream Irish Republicanism have been altered out of recognition’
(Frampton, 2009: 1). The War of Independence, the signing of the 1921 Anglo Irish Treaty
and the bitter civil war that followed suit resulted in many Irish Republicans mistrusting
conventional politics, something that still resonates with a minority of Republicans to this
day. Republicans, who remained true to the first Dáil and the IRA, held a set of beliefs and
principles that distinguished them from those supporting the new Free State and the
creation of Northern Ireland. Firstly, they rejected normal constitutional politics. The then
IRA viewed itself as the true government of Ireland, temporarily overthrown by Britain
who failed to acknowledge Irish sovereignty expressed in the All Ireland election of 1918.
Thus, those who had adhered to the first Dáil saw Stormont and Leinster House as
partitionist parliaments. Armed struggle was deemed as legitimate and any deviation from
its use was strategic rather than principled. Electoralism was a tactic, which had to be
accompanied by abstention from any parliament that claimed jurisdiction over part of
Ireland, as the claims of such parliaments were illegitimate.
Come 1969, the so called ‘Official’ IRA split on the issue of formulating a national
liberation front, which would run in tandem with other revolutionary movements and
would require the dropping of abstentionism. The new Provisional movement, still
somewhat of a pejorative term in 2016, received the backing of Tom Maguire, a former
Commandant General of the IRA and the last surviving member of the 1922 Dáil. (Bishop
and Mallie, 1987: 104). Maguire, in 1970, judged that it was the Provisional Army
Council that retained the deeds to the Republican tradition and declared that the ‘Official’
IRA had ‘neither the right nor the authority to pass a resolution to end abstentionism’
(Bishop and Mallie, 1987: 105). However, when Maguire declared 16 years later that the

7. 3
move to abandon abstentionism in the South ran counter to Republican teaching, the
Provisional leadership chose to overlook his judgement. It was now the case that the
‘ambitious subjectivity of the historical Republican project was replaced by a much
narrower set of aims that redefined revolutionary transformation in the gradualist language
of transition’ (Bean, 2007: 180).
Those remaining in the Provisional movement after a further split in 1986 talked about an
era of pragmatism and were enthusiastic about the dual role of politics and armed struggle.
After the infamous Hunger Strikes of 1981, the leadership realised that there was a
yearning for politics and a support base that was ready to be embraced1
. Despite this, the
Armalite and ballot box approach was not sustainable and pragmatism soon turned into
reformism in many cases. The revolutionary, Republican movement of the Provisionals
soon morphed into the institutionalised political party of ‘New Sinn Féin’, a transformation
that Ruairí Ó’Brádaigh, the former president of Sinn Féin warned about in the 1986 Ard
Fheis. Ó’Brádaigh believed that recognising Leinster house would lead the movement
down a constitutional path as opposed to a revolutionary one. With the signing of the
McBride principles along with the Mitchell principles, the Provisional movement lost
much of its identity and it became clear that they would fall significantly short of what
many had killed and died for. Moreover, the acceptance of the Good Friday Agreement
calls into question the usefulness and the purpose of the IRA post 1974. Not only have
Republicans been consigned to administer British rule for the foreseeable future, their
‘acceptance of decommissioning has served to delegitimize and criminalise the previous
Republican struggle’ (McIntyre, 2008: 9).
The idea behind this dissertation is also very fitting as we approach the centenary of the
1916 rising. The idea of Republicanism has gone through somewhat of a renaissance and it
has been widely discussed and debated across all fora. The year of 2016 is of huge
significance as elections take place both north and south of the border meaning there is a
symbolic nature for Republican parties in particular. Considering Sinn Féin is the only all
1 There were many mass protests and marches in solidarity with the hunger strikers both north
and south of the border. It suggested to the leadership that there was an opportunity to convert
this mobilisation into seats in parliament.

8. 4
Ireland party with elected representatives in both the Dáil and Stormont, the onus is on
them to increase its voting share and continue to be the largest all island party in Ireland.
The nature and meaning of Republicanism is now a matter of particular interest to the
general public as we submerge ourselves in a period of remembrance and commemoration.
However, there is also a common theme with Republican parties and groups. It seems that
there is an issue of systematic compromise and concession, which has stemmed the success
of Irish Republicanism. Republicans only have to look to history in reminding themselves
of the failed attempts of uniting the island. Thus, the relevance in asking whether or not the
Provisionals can be accused of abandoning Republicanism follows an established tradition
of Republican leaders conceding on Republican issues. In this context, it may appear to
Republican critics that the Provisionals have joined the long list of Irish people who have
taken English gold whilst being bought off by the state (Bean, 2007: 6). For others, there is
now a system in place where a united Ireland is possible, once it is the will of the people.
1.2.1 METHODOLOGY
The methodology for this dissertation involves a qualitative approach using the Framework
Method for analysis. This method sits within a broad family of analysis methods often
termed thematic analysis or qualitative content analysis (Gale, Heath, Cameron, Rashid
and Redwood, 2013). Such approaches identify commonalities and differences in
qualitative data, before focusing on relationships between different parts of the data,
seeking to draw descriptive and/or explanatory conclusions clustered around themes.
(Gale, Heath, Cameron, Rashid and Redwood, 2013). Jane Ritchie and Liz Spencer from
the Qualitative Research Unit at the National Centre for Social Research in the UK
developed the Frameworks Method for use in large-scale policy research (Ritchie and
Lewis, 2003). Its defining feature is the matrix output: rows (cases), columns (codes) and
‘cells’ of summarised data, providing a structure into which the researcher can
systematically reduce the data, in order to analyse it by case and by code (Ritchie and
Lewis, 2003). A ‘case’ is usually an individual interviewee, but this can be adapted to other
units of analysis, such as predefined groups or organisations. (Gale, Heath, Cameron,
Rashid and Redwood, 2013). While in-depth analyses of key themes can take place across

9. 5
the whole data set, the views of each research participant remain connected to other aspects
of their account within the matrix so that the context of the individual’s views is not lost.
Comparing and contrasting data is vital to qualitative analysis and the ability to compare
with ease data across cases as well as within individual cases is built into the structure and
process of the Framework Method.

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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.1 INTRODUCTION
The literature review will be divided into 4 metathemes, which quickly became apparent
when analysing the literature investigated in this dissertation. These include the Social
Movement Theory Framework, Republicanism and the Provisionals,
Compromise/Abandonment of Irish Republican Ideals and Principles and The Incorporation
of the Provisional Movement Into Constitutional Politics. For the purpose of this dissertation,
Northern Ireland is the case study where the social movement theory framework is being
applied. The researcher realises that there are several other possible categorizations that may
be included, but due to the word length of the dissertation, the 4 most prevalent metathemes
were selected. The sources contained within this literature review use a broad form of analysis
through various types of political systems, international authors with divergent backgrounds
and span from the 1980’s up until the present year. Many concepts and constructs of
Republicanism, including traditional Republicanism and Provisionalism are definitionally
problematic. This dissertation however, seeks to comprehensively understand these concepts
and constructs which, in turn, addresses whether or not Sinn Féin and the IRA can be accused
of abandoning Republicanism within the context of social movement theory.
2.2.1 SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY FRAMEWORK
Social movement theory is organic. One of the most highly politicised examples of this is the
Republican tradition within the Irish, Northern Irish and British political infrastructure. It has
already been mentioned how many social movement groups lose their character when they
become involved in the political process after initially setting out to change society (Tarrow,
1994, Rucht 1999). Most typically, movements gradually become incorporated in existing
structures and procedures without transforming the basic rules of the game (Giugni, 1998:

11. 7
xv). Ideally, what distinguishes incorporation from transformation is whether there is a
transfer of power that fundamentally alters the distribution of power within society. In the
Provisional movements case, there is no question that they facilitated in changing the
Northern state, but the sovereignty of the British state still remains and the Provisional
movement under Sinn Féin now administrates British rule. Giugni claims that this transition
can occur from without (endogenous), or from within (exogenous). There are examples of
both features when assessing the Provisionals. On the one hand, Bean, O’Dochartaigh and
Craig suggests it was shaped by various forms of British state strategy throughout the
Troubles (Bean, 2005, O’Dochartaigh, 2015, Craig, 2014). On the other, McIntyre argues that
the demise of the Republican movement initially came from within before the British regime
realised the potential of including Republicans in some form of a process (McIntyre, 2008).
For Cronin, there are at least 7 critical elements in the decline of “terrorist” groups in the
modern era. These include (1) the capturing or killing of a leader, (2) failure to transition to
the next generation, (3) achievement of the groups aims, (4) transition to a legitimate political
process, (5) undermining of popular support (6) repression, and (7) transitioning from
terrorism to other forms of violence (Cronin, 2006: 17). The abandonment path can be fairly
long and difficult. At the organizational level, it often involves experiments with various
strategies, splitting the movement into those who favour increased militarization and those
who opt instead for moderation (Della Porta, 2013: 265). It can also mean renouncing the use
of weapons or abandoning the organisation completely and the two rarely coincide. Taking
inspiration from point 4 of Cronin’s analysis on the demise of terrorist groups, the Provisional
movement can claim to have transitioned to a legitimate political process with the help of
Sinn Féin under the Good Friday Agreement and the institutions created in 1998. Tensions
arise however, on the basis of this agreement and whether or not it will ever achieve a 32
county Republic. Sinn Féin and its supporters argue there is now a legitimate political process
in place with a road map towards a 32 county Republic, a road map which enabled the IRA to
end its military campaign in accordance with its own constitution2
. Whilst it is true that Sinn
Féin have entered a legitimate political process, it is precisely this political process, which has
2 Article 8.5.5 of the IRA Constitution only permits the decommissioning of the IRA once the
objective of the First Dáil has been met. O’Leary argues that this has been achieved as a
settlement has been agreed and implemented leading to a united Irelandn(O’Leary, 2005: 145).

12. 8
led the Provisional movement to abandon Republican values and principles. Within the
context of social movement theory however, it is not surprising that revolutionary
organisations such as the Provisional movement enter political processes which fall
dramatically short of aims once envisioned. Factors such as war weariness, genuine belief that
a political process is good for the movement, along with continued repression as Cronin
points out, are important when assessing why social movements change, adapt and sometimes
abandon central values and ideologies. Groups such as ETA and the PLO have dealt with
similar scenarios where cessations and negotiations have led to settlements and agreements,
which do not represent the aims and objectives of the movement. Such processes also seek to
dilute the essence of the movement, incorporating it instead into an institutionalised entity,
ridding it of its revolutionary nature.
2.3.1 REPUBLICANISM AND THE PROVISIONALS
There is no unified or set definition for Irish Republicanism. Those who lay claim to the
Republican tag do so under debated circumstances and can be described as aspirational,
constitutional and militant in their approach. Honohan argues that the ‘most common
understanding of Irish Republicanism since the mid twentieth century has been as a
commitment to separatist nationalism, in particular the end of British government
involvement in Northern Ireland and the pursuit of this aim through a campaign of armed
force’ (Honohan, 2008: 1) Following a similar definition, Garvin suggests that the term
‘Republicanism in Ireland is generally understood as a sort of shorthand for insurrectionist
anti British nationalism rather than any particular ideological or philosophical principles’
(Garvin, 1996: 11).
Despite this being a reasonably fair assessment of how Republicanism would be portrayed by
the general public in Ireland, there are some Republicans and academics who take issue with
the inclusion of nationalism within these definitions of Republicanism along with the
omission of principles such as the common good, individual freedom, the sovereignty of the
people and the opposition to monarchy (Stokes, 2008). Since the mid 1990’s there has been a
sustained effort to distance the Republican ideal from the concerns of nationalism (Ivory,

13. 9
2008: 102). For Cullen, ‘the Republican principles of democracy, citizenship and
internationalism challenge the usurpation of nation and nationality as principles by
nationalism’ (Cullen, 2000: 13). According to Tom Hartley, former Sinn Féin General
Secretary, Republicans themselves claim that their beliefs derive from the Enlightenment
tradition (embodied in the French revolutionary goals of liberty, equality and fraternity) rather
than in the explicitly romantic forms of cultural nationalism (Bean, 2005: 144). The
democratic allocation of sovereignty in the Republic means that each person has the right to
be self-determining and a right to a share in government. Nationalism, on the other hand,
denies these rights, incorporating them into the rights of the nation instead. The idea of
nationalism also pits ethnicities against one another, creating an environment that is
unsuitable for the common good, the corner stone of classical Republicanism. Former IRA
Hunger Striker, Tommy McKearney, defines republicanism as a system of government where
the people are sovereign and no other authority such as a monarch, pope, banker or speculator
is recognised (McKearney, 2012).
Interestingly however, according to Bosi, the choice of joining the Provisional movement was
justified not as a mere reproduction of an ‘ideological alignment to the traditional Republican
aim of achieving Irish reunification but as part of a recognition struggle’ (Bosi, 2012: 348).
Fitting into the anti British sentiment as explained by Garvin, Bosi’s 25 interviews with
former volunteers suggests that their call to arms began with ‘experiencing state repression or
violent sectarian attacks by loyalists rather than the holy grail of the Republic of 1916’ (Bosi,
2012: 350). Bean reiterates this point and explains how ‘the ashes of Bombay street were
more important in shaping the outlook of the young volunteers who flocked into the ranks of
the IRA than the faintly glowing embers of the GPO’ (Bean, 2007: 56). McIntyre, a former
IRA volunteer explains how for ‘many of (us) who were solely Provisional in constitution and
outlook, 1916 and the values that traditional Republicanism engendered, while honourable,
are hardly what shapes our political perception or activity’ (McIntyre, 2008: 135). From a
social movement perspective however, reasons for joining social movements differ from
member to member as does the aims and objectives of each member within their respective
movements. In the more wider sense and across Northern Ireland, the Provisional IRA were
seen first and foremost as defenders of the catholic community and initially were a direct
result to state brutality and inequality as opposed to any ideological sentiment regarding

14. 10
Republicanism. McIntyre insists that it was anti British policy rather than a British presence,
which led to the influx of volunteers joining the Provisionals.
The limitations of power sharing along with the confines of the Good Friday Agreement have
meant that the catholic and protestant communities in the 6 counties now vote en bloc for
those who represent their religious backgrounds and communities specifically. A ‘society
whose politics and consociational institutions are structured around communal division will
ensure that the politics of Provisionalism will follow patterns laid down during the peace
process and will continue to revolve around resource allocation and the recognition of
identities’ (Bean, 2007: 7). Unfortunately for Sinn Féin and other Republicans, this is not a
Republican approach and further ostracizes the Unionists and Loyalists, decreasing the
likelihood of a united Ireland and a Republic. The institutionalisation of Sinn Féin into the
current community politics system as reinforced by the Good Friday Agreement has created
an ‘us and them’ situation where the ideals of Republicanism is subservient to an ethno
national agenda. A particular problem for Sinn Féin now is their support base in the north is
very comfortable with the continued existence of the Northern state and its political apparatus
(Evans and Tonge, 2013: 55). Again, this plays into the idea of Sinn Féin being able to protect
the community from the Unionist and Loyalist threat and the ability of
Nationalists/Catholics/‘Republicans’ being able to prosper in the newly reformed state.
According to Bean, this was a product of political strategy by both Sinn Féin and the British
state and the dominant position of the British state in Northern Ireland (Bean, 2014: 725).
British state policy facilitated in the emergence of a ‘new nationalist middle class employed in
the public sector alongside a new class of nationalist business and social entrepreneurs’
(Bean, 2014: 725). Bean concludes his argument stating that the political and organisational
transformation of the Provisional movement is a product of the social and economic change
that has transformed the nationalist population since the late 1980’s (Bean, 2014: 725).
Despite this, O’Leary argues that the Good Friday Agreement recognises the present partition
as an Irish and not a British decision and Republican reunification can be achieved through
consent in both jurisdictions. He also suggests that the Good Friday Agreement has created
institutions within the north and cross border all Ireland arrangements that may be
legitimately construed as harbingers of a federal Ireland. O’Leary’s assessment supports
Cronin’s concept of a legitimate political process where the goal of a 32 county Republic is

15. 11
firmly in sight. However, McIntyre would probably take issue with O’Leary’s assertion that
unification could be achieved through consent in both jurisdictions. He believes that the
consent principle is the Unionist veto dressed up in politically correct language whilst also
condemning those who now take their seats in Stormont.
2.4.1. COMPROMISE/ABANDONMENT OF IRISH REPUBLICAN IDEALS AND
PRINCIPLES
The dramatic transformation of Sinn Féin from IRA support group to highly competitive
electoral force and partner in government obliged the movement as a whole to trade its
ideological purity for a series of compromises (Tonge, 2009: 165). Sinn Féin has crossed
numerous rubicons to arrive at the position it did in 1998 as the supposed embodiment of all
that was once articulated via the IRA’s militarism. Tonge refers to this as ‘new
Republicanism’ which has ‘ditched much of the ideological baggage with which it was
associated from 1916 until 1998’ (Tonge, 2009: 165). Numerous authors have taken on the
task of highlighting the various changes and transformations within the Provisional movement
(Bean, 2007, McIntyre, 2008, Malliot, 2005, O’Boyle, 2011, Tonge and Evans 2013). Each
author seeks to understand the patterns of thought and the structures of meaning that underpin
mainstream Republicanism and access how the Provisionals have transitioned from the early
1970’s to where they are today. In doing so, they show the inconsistencies and summersaults
performed by the Provisional movement. Looking at the authors of social movement theory
however, this process of compromise and concession seems almost inevitable for
revolutionary social movements (Della Porta, 2013, Larson, 2007). Groups such as the PLO
have found themselves in a similar position to that of the Provisionals, entering into peace
processes, which make it almost impossible to achieve their operational agendas. Bean also
tries to situate this transformation in the global context where the demise of the left could be
seen falling along with the Soviet Union and how allied groups had to make huge concessions
for paltry gains. O’Dochartaigh however, argues that the Provisionals always had an
acceptable compromise as their prime objective. He insists that after the collapse of Stormont
and the cessation of violence that soon followed afterwards, the IRA leadership were more
than willing to make compromises in order to obtain a peaceful settlement (O’Dochartaigh,

16. 12
2015: 204). This is in complete contradiction to declaration of withdrawal from Ireland that
the Provisionals sought from the British up until the early 1990’s but it follows the theme
shared by McIntyre that the struggle was nothing more than a civil rights issue3
.
While tactics and strategies are necessities for fighting a war, some Republicans would
question the route followed by the Provisionals after 1981. It was on the issue of
abstentionism that the Provisional movement came into being. Yet, the IRA was persuaded to
accept the end of abstentionism by Sinn Féin in the belief that the army would not be run
down (O’Leary, 2005: 241). O’Brien suggests that the thinking of the leadership was that,
‘whatever else, the movement had to remain strong enough to become part of the ultimate
political solution when the time came; that meant getting into elections, maximizing their
political support north and south, to arrive, finally, at the negotiating table with the strongest
possible mandate’ (O’Brien, 1999: 119). This mentality of remaining relevant and effective
seems to take precedence amongst many, if not all forms of social movement organisations
and incorporation into the political system is usually the end product even if it means diluting
values and principles once deemed as fundamental (Giugni, 1998). O’Dochartaigh continues
on with this line of thought suggesting that the Provisionals were prepared to compromise and
negotiate a settlement, once it included them (O’Dochartaigh, 2015: 207). This perhaps
explains why there was no settlement with Sunningdale, as the Provisional movement was not
included in the negotiations. It also calls into question the sincerity of the leadership regarding
Republicanism and what would be deemed as an acceptable compromise. For Bean, the result
was that the Republic was now a political option that the people could be persuaded to take,
rather than ‘a tradition sanctified by esoteric constitutional scholasticism’ (Bean, 2007: 181).
By the 1990’s the Provisionals were much less revolutionary and becoming noticeably more
constitutional, a dramatic change that many social movement theorists point to in tracing
social movement transformation (Giugni, 1998, Della Porta, 2013, Cronin 2006, Tarrow,
3 During the Provisional movement’s negotiations with Whitelaw and the British government in
1972, Martin McGuinness later explained how the sole aim of the Provisional negotiators was
to secure an agreement from the British of their intention to withdraw from Ireland at some date
in the future (Smith, 2002: 109). The declaration of intent to withdraw was for a time, one of the
fundamental demands of the Provisional campaign up until negotiations began to surface in the
early 1990’s.

17. 13
1994). Not only had the military – political campaign failed to obtain a British declaration to
withdraw, but by the late 1980’s this seemed even further away than it had in the early 1970’s
(Bean, 2007: 184). The Provisionals were ‘obliged to accept difficult political and
institutional arrangements in return for the conflict ending measures of prisoner releases and
policing changes’ (Evans and Tonge, 2013: 42). This fits into Della Porta’s notion of social
movements being constrained into accepting certain behaviours and measures by opposing
state actors and usually occurs when movements recognise a military stalemate, an inability to
defeat their opponent or find an ‘honourable’ way out in the form of a political process or
agreement (Della Porta, 2013: 264). O’Leary claims that political agents inside and outside
the Republican movement persuaded sufficient IRA leaders, volunteers and prisoners that a
peace process, building up a wider alliance of nationalists, was the best way to advance the
IRA objectives even if that meant the IRA’s disbandment (O’Leary, 2005: 242). Interestingly,
McIntyre had always believed that the demise of the Republican movement came from
within, arguing that ‘Republicanism can withstand inordinate amounts of pressure from
without. But it is always vulnerable to the false messiah, the leader who thinks we exist as
playthings in his little dance of deceit’ (McIntyre, 2008: 116). When looking at the cases of
Denis Donaldson and Sean O’Callaghan for example, it is understandable as to why McIntyre
would make this claim4
. Others, such as ‘Stakeknife’ have infiltrated the IRA at a much
higher level, calling into question the involvement of the British state into IRA activities5
.
The language of communal unity began to replace that of class struggle also. The concept of
pan nationalism came to the fore as a means of reinvigorating the Republican struggle by
reaching out to new layers of support. Bean discusses how certain groups within the
movement argued that Republican socialism was incompatible with nationalism and alliances
with mainstream parties (Bean, 2007: 187). Despite the declining salience of socialism as an
ideological force internationally, it still acted as an important ideological framework for some
sections of the Provisional movement. The Republican magazine, Irish Bheag, wrote that
4 Both men were high-level informers and provided information on IRA activities and members
to the Irish and British authorities.
5 Apparently, ‘Stakeknife’ is the code name of a spy who infiltrated the PIRA’s internal security
department, more widely known as the ‘nutting squad’. It is alleged that ‘Stakeknife’ was
working for the Top Secret Force Research Unit of the British Army.

18. 14
‘Constitutional nationalism would always remain an essentially middle class Catholic
Hibernianism whose interests inevitably made them neutral to partition and open to
collaborate with the British’ (Iris Bheag, 1987). The orientation towards the ‘green’ wing of
the SDLP and the ‘traditionalist’ Republicans in Fianna Fáil was in marked contrast to the
early 1980’s when these parties had been ridiculed as ‘servants of the queen’ and ‘imperialist
lickspittles’ (Campbell et al, 1994: 261).
By the early 1990’s, the Provisional movement hoped to use the position they had gained
through the struggle to obtain a result that could be presented positively as an honourable
compromise to party members, volunteers and supporters alike (Bean, 2007: 183). Spencer
correctly points out that had they set out their aims of what they were going to settle for in the
Good Friday Agreement in the 80’s or 93 or 94, they would have never got the support from
the Republican movement (Spencer, 2010: 439). This calls into question what the leadership
knew about the impending negotiations and suggests that they knew all along that their
demands of a 32 county socialist Republic would not be achieved. Once more, Spencer’s
claims reinforces O’Dochartaigh’s argument were the Provisional leadership understood from
a very early stage that the struggle would ultimately produce a settlement that fell
significantly short of the aspirations of their supporters in important ways (O’Dochartaigh,
2015: 214). McIntyre insists that the question of why the Provisional movement fought such a
long futile war only to get brought back to accepting less than what was on offer in 1974 is
one of major importance and an issue that is forgotten by many historians and political
analysts (McIntyre, 2008: 295). Even though a legitimate political process was available in
1974, O’Brien’s assertion that the movement had to become part of the political solution
seems like the most plausible explanation in dealing with the issues surrounding Sunningdale.
2.5.1 THE INCORPORATION OF THE PROVISIONAL MOVEMENT INTO
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
Social movements find it very hard to remain relevant and effective over sustained periods of
time without changing certain elements of their organisation or being involved in some form
of electoral process. The standard interpretation of the Provisional movement’s transformation

19. 15
and the development of the peace process revolves around the 1981 Hunger Strike and the
discovery of electoral politics afterwards (O’Boyle, 2011: 594, O’Kane, 2004: 78, Frampton,
2009: 16, Bew, 2009). Bean argues that the 1986 abolition of abstentionism is the starting
point for the revisionist process within Provisionalism and notes how this is seen as pragmatic
switch in tactics or the beginning of the fatal embrace with constitutional politics, depending
on ones political taste and preference (Bean, 2007: 180). Thus, in the majority of cases, the
literature points to Provisionals becoming more pragmatic, more politically aware and more
constitutional during the 1980’s (Bean, 2007, Rafter 2005, Tonge, 2009, Evans and Tonge
2013, O’Boyle 2011). Of course, these events were of huge significance in the abandonment
of certain Republican beliefs and principles, but they follow a path that was created during the
1970’s by members within the Provisionals and within the British regime also. Once more,
this highlights Giugni’s approach to exogenous and endogenous factors, which facilitate in the
explanation of social movement incorporation, change and abandonment. This researcher
believes that the institutionalisation of Republicanism and the reformist agenda of the
Provisional movement began much earlier during the 1970’s with the emergence of the
ceasefire incident centres and the realization that IRA could not beat the British themselves,
culminating in the Provisional leadership having to settle for less than a 32 county socialist
Republic. Craig and O’Dochartaigh offer good examples of how states quell the threat of
revolutionary social movements endogenously, forcing them to make changes which may be
detrimental to the organisation. On the other hand, McIntyre highlights the exogenous factors,
which incorporation and capitulation of the movement from within.
The purpose of Craig’s article is to elucidate the incident centres set up during the ceasefire
gave Sinn Féin and IRA volunteers practical political and representatives experience for the
first time, particularly in Belfast and Derry (Craig, 2014: 308). He argues that the incident
centres, which eventually became Sinn Féin offices, are the direct ancestors of the Armalite
and Ballot box strategy of the 1980’s (Craig, 2014: 308). Not surprisingly, Craig insists that
the later advancement of Sinn Féin was aided by the experience of political organisation
around the incident centres. He suggests the often cited argument applauding Adams,
McGuinness and Morrison in developing a political programme after the Hunger strike is
flawed over simplification, contradicting much of what O’Leary, Frampton, Bew, O’Kane and
Tonge suggest (Craig, 2014: 316). Craig gives an interesting insight into the thought process

20. 16
of Mi6’s Frank Cooper, the NIO and Republicans during this period and how there was
maybe an ulterior motive behind the establishment of ceasefire incident centres.
Firstly, the UDA’s Andy Tyrie was concerned that the ceasefire incident centres would lead to
the emergence of IRA style police forces in Catholic areas and that a secret deal had been
reached between the Provisionals and the British. In a meeting at Laneside (a building used
for discreet talks between a whole range of government officials and paramilitaries), Tyrie
was assured by Frank Cooper of Mi6 that this was not the case and that it was ‘better that they
(the Provisionals) expend their energies in a political way than in terrorism’ (Craig, 2014:
315). Secondly, a few days after the order was given by the British to close the incident
centres, a piece appeared in the Irish Times in which the IRA stated that the ceasefire was part
of Britain’s attempt to politicise the struggle (Irish Times, 1975). Despite this, the statement
also added that the Sinn Féin advice centres would remain open, indicating clearly that there
was not to be a complete rejection of open politics. Craig believes that it was at this point that
Sinn Féin became a public face, one that it had not shown before (Craig, 2014, 316). The NIO
also weighed in on the incident centres by stating that ‘Sinn Fein was clearly politicizing itself
and this was cautiously welcomed’ (Craig, 2014: 316).
Further evidence to this accord is available in the various UK national archive papers and the
private papers of Brendan Duddy (a key intermediary between the British and IRA) that
O’Dochartaigh presents in arguing, firstly, that the War of Attrition was tactic used by the
IRA in order to get the British to the negotiating table and secondly, that the IRA in the
1970’s were prepared to settle for far less than the demands of Irish Republicanism entailed.
O’Dochartaigh uses these source materials to show how some quarters within the British
regime in the 1970s realised a politicised Sinn Féin ‘would be more likely to produce political
stability throughout Ireland as a whole than a continuation of a terrorist movement’
(O’Dochartaigh, 2015: 209). In another UK National Archives piece, O’Dochartaigh shows
how it was in the interest of the British regime ‘to see a strong Provisional Sinn Fein’ even at
the expense of the SDLP ‘so that the extremists are brought into the mainstream of politics
and are forced to act politically and in due course responsibly’ (O’Dochartaigh, 2015: 209).
McIntyre offers an alternative to O’Dochertaigh’s and Craig’s argument stating that up until
the 1990’s, the British were much too absolutist in their strategy of marginalization to realize
the potential of the Provisional movement and how far they were prepared to capitulate on

21. 17
their Republican belief system. He is adamant that the enemy came from within regarding the
capitulation of Republicanism and of the social movement itself. What made the Good Friday
Agreement a runner from the outset in his opinion was the ‘willingness of the Provisionals to
shed the core tenants of their belief system’ (McIntyre, 2008: 19). He provides the example of
how ‘no informer throughout the course of the conflict has been able to deal such a blow to
the capacity of the IRA as its own leadership has’ (McIntyre, 2008: 75). This is certainly
feasible considering ‘Sinn Féin has unsaid everything they said in the 1970’s and 1980’s and
ultimately settled for less than the SDLP got in 1973 which Republicans regarded then as a
sellout’ (McIntyre, 2008: 301).
2.6.1 LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSION
Using the example of the Provisional movement in Northern Ireland the social movement
framework used in this literature review has shown how social movements tend to change,
transform and abandon their values and principles over time. Former allies such as ETA in the
Basque region and the PLO in Palestine have also undergone similar transformations, which
have challenged the central belief system of the movement whilst also failing to achieve their
aims and objectives.
The question of how, and why this occurs is of central importance in asking if the Provisional
movement can be accused of abandoning Republicanism. Before addressing the factors,
which led to the Provisional movement compromising on many of its principles, the
researcher believed that it was necessary to discuss the Provisional movement and the
tradition of Republicanism that it ascribed to. In doing so, the researcher wanted to show how,
in some cases, joining the Provisional movement came down to defending the community
against Loyalist and British oppression rather than the promotion of a socialist Republic. For
Bean and McIntyre, this goes some way in perhaps explaining why the Provisional movement
were so ‘pragmatic’ in their approach to Irish Republicanism.

22. 18
The concept of incorporation provides the researcher with a mechanism to assess the
transformation of the Provisional movement as it looks at actors from within the movement
and actors from without (British state for example) and how their actions have incorporated
the movement into existing political structures without changing the status quo. Examples of
exogenous and endogenous factors are apparent when assessing the Provisionals and are dealt
with accordingly throughout this chapter. Whilst Sinn Féin and their supporters will claim that
they have entered a ‘legitimate political process’ that will eventually lead to a united Ireland,
the Good Friday Agreement and the institutions created in 1998 are actually a handicap to the
creation of a 32 county Republic due to the administration of British rule in Northern Ireland
and their acceptance of the consent principle. The Provisional movement follows a long line
of revolutionary social movements where their struggle has essentially become
institutionalised within the confines of parliamentary buildings by the very state forces they
were rebelling against.

23. 19
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
3.1.1 INTRODUCTION
The research for this dissertation was qualitative in nature using the Frameworks method
along with semi-structured interviews. This approach was chosen because the researcher is
interested in the richness of narrative detail amongst participants. The Frameworks method
can be described as a flexible and systematic approach to analysing data of a qualitative
nature and is particularly suitable for researchers who have had no prior experience in
conducting qualitative research (Gale, Heath, Cameron, Rashid and Redwood, 2013). The
Frameworks Method is most commonly used in thematically analysing semi structured
interviews and seeks to identify similarities and dissimilarities in qualitative data through its
Matrix output. This enables the researcher to systematically reduce the data where they can
then analyse it by ‘case’ (individual interviewee in this case) and by ‘code’ (where the
practice of coding takes place). By following the Frameworks Method’s clear steps, this
researcher was able to produce highly structured outputs of summarised data, which were
essential in tackling the question of whether the Provisional movement can be accused of
abandoning Republicanism.
3.2.1 WHY A QUALITATIVE APPROACH WAS CHOSEN
A qualitative approach is considered more suitable for research interested in individual stories
of respondents particularly when one is dealing with complex material and emotive issues. It
enables researchers to understand, explain, explore, discover and clarify situations, feelings,
perceptions, attitudes, values, beliefs and experiences of groups of people and individuals
(Kumar, 2014: 132). Qualitative research has a long and established tradition in the social and

24. 20
political sciences and is particularly appropriate in this study because of the sensitivity of the
material that is being looked at. The question posed by this dissertation means that it would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible to accurately quantify the ‘abandonment of
Republicanism’. It would also be a disservice to each interviewee who participated not to
record or report their responses word for word on contentious issues surrounding
Republicanism, the IRA, Sinn Féin and the peace process. Taking the research question into
consideration along with the participants involved, the researcher believed that a qualitative
approach was ideal for analysing ‘covert groups such as “terrorists” and their supporters’
(Pierce, 2008: 45). This is particularly the case when one researches what are termed in
research as ‘hard to reach’ or ‘vulnerable’ populations.
3.3.1 SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
Interviews are often presented as the gold standard of qualitative research (Barbour, 2014:
111). Blee and Taylor argue that through semi structured interviewing, ‘researchers can gain
insight into the individual and collective visions, imaginings hopes, expectations, critique of
the present, and projection of the future on which the possibility of collective action rests and
through which social movements form, endure and disband (Blee and Taylor, 2002: 95). The
interview will usually involve in depth probing and questioning that is responsive to
participants and their individual experiences and context (Arthur and Nazroo, 2003: 110). The
ability to ‘probe’ the interviewee is an advantageous aspect to a semi structured interview as it
allows the interviewer to get a more holistic understanding of the participant and the area
being examined that may not be provided in structured interviews. This is precisely why this
method of interviewing was chosen as it enabled the interviewer to ensure certain questions
would be answered while also offering the opportunity to explore other considerations not
necessarily suggested by the literature. The researcher was conscious at all times of not
influencing the interviewees in their answering of questions, what is referred to in the
literature as interview bias.
Despite this, all forms of interviews present the risk of participant bias, inaccuracies because
of poor recall and reflexivity. Due to the research focusing on incidents and events that

25. 21
occurred over 30 years ago in some cases, participants are forgiven if there are slight factual
inaccuracies in the data collected and its up to the researcher to verify thoroughly what is
presented as factual. Regarding participant bias, all participants subscribed to a Republican
tradition but held widely different views on how that tradition should be continued. It is
feasible that some, if not all participants tried to promote their interpretation of Republicanism
upon the researcher when interviewing each participant. With reflexivity, there is a possibility
that participants told the interviewer what he wanted to hear in order to protect themselves,
the researcher, others and the secrecy of the Republican movement.
3.4.1 COHORT
The main study involved conducting 8 interviews in an in-depth, semi structured, 1 to 1
context. The participants for the semi-structured interviews were all men and can be classified
as Irish Republican activists who had been heavily involved with the Republican movement.
At one time, this meant they were either a member of the Provisional IRA, Sinn Féin or in
some cases, both organisations simultaneously. The researcher tried as best he could to
include participants from both sides of the Irish border in order to have an all island
perspective to the Provisional movement’s campaign. All participants had been involved with
the Republican movement during the 1970’s and thereafter. Each participant is widely known
within the Republican community for their actions, whether political or militaristic during The
Troubles and for their stance taken during the Peace Process. The cohort includes individuals
who were Officer Commanders of certain IRA Brigades, Blanket men and Hunger Strikers
and Sinn Féin politicians elected to government and local councils both north and south. With
such high profile involvement within the Provisional movement, the researcher believed that
each participant was invaluable to the research project. Due to the small sample size, the
researcher decided to triangulate each expert interview with secondary literature for a deeper
understanding and sound explanation of the complex phenomena of social movements along
with Republicanism. Despite the fact that 5 out of the 8 interviewees have decided to follow a
different path from the one set out by Sinn Féin and the Good Friday Agreement, each
participant has remained committed to Republicanism and a 32 county Republic through
peaceful means. It is due to this divergence within the sample that the researcher believes his

26. 22
cohort are able to assist in answering the key question of this thesis, whether or not the
Provisional movement can be accused of abandoning Republicanism.
Prior to the commencement of the interviews, the researcher and his supervisor agreed upon
the number of interviews to be conducted. The researcher devised 28 questions and a formal
topic schedule, which he asked each participant. Each participant agreed to the interview
being recorded and signed a consent form stating this. Each of the 8 interviewees were male
participants in order to keep consistency within the data set as adding in female participants
could mean that certain gender issues may arise and would have to be taken into consideration
in terms of the literature review, methodology and analysis. Due to one of the participants
asking could he keep his anonymity, each participant has been given a letter to differentiate
between them (A-H).
3.5.1 DATA SOURCES: GATEKEEPERS AND STAKEHOLDERS
It is notoriously difficult to obtain access to known or self-identifying paramilitaries when
attempting to engage in postgraduate research. The much-referenced Boston tapes study,
threw up many methodological and ethical issues that have impacted on issues of gatekeepers
and stakeholders6
. Gatekeepers are persons or institutions of significant authority within any
given area. Scholarly discussions about the figure of the gatekeeper typically identify them as
individuals or institutions that have the power to either grant or withhold access to a research
population (Crowhurst and Kennedy Macfoy, 2013: 457). Gatekeepers are firm ‘topics’
within social research and not just a resource for assisting researchers with ‘discovering and
authenticating’ during the research process (Seale, 2004: 108). Gatekeepers can, and
6 The Boston Tapes also known as the Belfast project was designed to be an oral history of the
‘Troubles’ conducted in Boston College. Former Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries gave a
series of interviews on their part in the ‘Troubles’. The idea was that each participant would tell
their story, which would not be made public until they died. In 2011, the PSNI became
interested and began a legal bid to gain access to the interviews held by the college. Following a
lengthily court battle, the PSNI received the recordings of 2 former IRA members, Brendan
Hughes and Dolores Price. There is still controversy surrounding why the PSNI got involved.

27. 23
sometimes do, stop research in its tracks (Ahern, 2014). In this case, Sinn Féin is a good
example of a gatekeeper. Stakeholders are people or organisations with a vested interest in the
topic a researcher wishes to pursue. They usually have something to gain or lose as a result of
the outcome of a certain project, programme or process (Hovland, 2005: 8). A pertinent
example here would be ex volunteers of the IRA.
3.6.1 SAMPLING
The researcher used snowball sampling in order to obtain access to gatekeepers and
stakeholders. The primary reason for selecting snowball sampling was due to the lack of
detailed information in relation to the sampling frame consisting of ex IRA volunteers and
individuals who left the Provisional movement along with the sensitivity of the area being
examined. Snowball sampling is a non-probability based sampling technique that can be used
to gain access to hard to reach or hidden populations such as IRA volunteers. Through a local
voluntary health network, the researcher was introduced to a first interviewee. This was a
person of significance within the then organisation and was an OC (Officer Commander) of a
highly regarded Brigade during the Troubles. All subsequent interviews were sourced using
this individual as a starting point for snowball sampling. Any problems or issues in relation to
snowball sampling were mitigated against by asking participants to recommend individuals
with differing view points on the path of the Provisional movement as well as individuals who
had a similar outlook to their own (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003).
As already mentioned, the researcher was able to acquire several high profile individuals
within the then Provisional IRA as well as elected representatives of Sinn Féin. The second
interviewee was an OC of an IRA Company. The third interview was with an ex IRA
volunteer who had been on hunger strike. He also had a heavy involvement with Sinn Féin.
The fourth interviewee was a Hunger Striker and the OC of one of the most successful
Brigades during the Troubles. The fifth interview involved a man who was central to the rise
and politicization of Sinn Féin during the Troubles. The sixth interviewee was much like the
fifth. The seventh and eighth interviewees were both part of a group of Sinn Féin members
who defected from Sinn Féin in the late 1990’s.

28. 24
3.71. DATA COLLECTION
Only the political area of Northern Ireland was considered for data collection. This is because
the study does not claim a comparative dimension with other political social movements
alluded to, rather is examines the area by and in itself.
After contact had been made with a known ‘gatekeeper’, the researcher then used the
snowballing method to extend the sample. Interviews were conducted from the 24th
of August
2015 until the 23rd
of September 2015. The interviews lasted from approximately 55 minutes
until 1 hour and 30 minutes. Each interview took place in a setting that was most convenient
to the interviewees while also factoring in issues such as cost, noise level and safety for the
researcher. Six of the eight interviews were held in interviewee households while one was
held in a Sinn Féin office and the other in public house. Four of the eight interviews took
place in the researchers native county of Louth, with three in Belfast and one in Monaghan.
3.7.2 PILOT STUDY AND RESULTS
Prior to the commencement of the 8 interviews, a pilot study was conducted in order to give
the researcher a detailed experience in directing an interview. The pilot test is supposed to
assist the research in determining if there are any flaws, limitations, or other weaknesses
within the interview design, allowing the researcher to make necessary revisions prior to the
official study (Turner, 2010, 757). It also ensures that the questions ‘are as clear to the
respondents and as they are to the researcher’ (Bryman et al, 2012: 242). The researcher is
aware, however, that findings from pilot studies have limited relevance in the analysis of
actual data. They nonetheless facilitate a period of reflection.
The pilot study was conducted on an ex Sinn Féin member in the researcher’s hometown of
Dundalk. Initially, the pilot participant notified the researcher of the possible problems in
asking participants directly about IRA membership. He made the point that membership of an
illegal organisation is still punishable by imprisonment. The pilot participant suggested that
the researcher rephrased that particular question asking when did they join the Republican
movement. He then explained how some of the questions were too broad which could mean

29. 25
interviewees spend a considerable amount of time answering a small amount of questions.
The researcher rectified all issues mentioned by the pilot participant before the official
interviews took place.
3.8.1 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This area of research is particularly complex as some respondents were involved in a criminal
organisation and/or engaged in criminal and violent acts. This brings with it a number of
ethical issues but these have oversight through the researchers allocated academic supervisor
in UCD. Other issues such as a letter of information, a consent form, a copy of the interview
sheet, guaranteed anonymity and the option of a copy of the finished dissertation were
provided to each participant who took part in the research project. Participants were also
asked if they wanted a copy of the completed interview transcript to remove any information
that they may deem harmful to themselves or others. Before the interviews took place, the
researcher ensured that each participant understood that they were being recorded on audio
file. Each participant agreed to being interviewed and agreed to being recorded with the
intended use of facilitating the researchers project on Irish Republicanism. The audio files of
each interview have been transferred onto a USB flash drive and this flash drive along with
the interview transcripts are stored in a filing cabinet under lock in the researchers home.
Only the researcher has access to the key for the filing cabinet. Participants were also made
aware that they did not have to take part in the interview process if they did not want to, that
they could skip any question they please and that they could terminate the interview at any
time. There were no cases of participants skipping questions or terminating interviews. All of
the above information was provided in a letter of information and a consent form to which all
participants signed in agreement. The researcher also made each participant aware of that he
would provide the names of 3 psychotherapists if necessary due to the potential sensitivity of
some of the questions being asked and the nature of some of the individuals involved.
Consideration also had to be taken for the protection of the interviewer. These procedures
should be taken no matter what kind of cohort is being researched. There was a possibility
that an interviewee may take offence to a question being asked and with the concept of asking
whether the Provisional movement can be accused of abandoning their Republicanism. The
researcher also had to take into account the fact that, in most cases, he was entering the homes

30. 26
of individuals who had been involved in a political/military struggle. A responsible approach
to these issues might include employing measures such as leaving a list of appointments with
a colleague, carrying a mobile phone and utilizing a phone-in system to report back once
fieldwork visits have been completed (Barbour, 2014: 104). The researcher made sure that he
had his phone on person at all times and informed a nominated family member of his
intentions and the estimated time of each interview.

31. 27
CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
4.1.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the empirical findings and analysis of data gained from the interviews of
8 Irish Republican activists who participated politically and/or militarily in the conflict in
more widely known as “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland. The overarching research
questions asks whether the Provisional movement can be accused of abandoning
Republicanism during the struggle of 1969 to 1998? This was operationalized by asking each
interviewee about their involvement within the Republican movement, their opinions on the
direction of the Republican movement and how they understood the movement’s transition
from a community defence organisation initially, to a predominately militaristic war machine
from 1972 until 1986, to a party that in 1998 spoke of peace and equality. By triangulating the
findings from his interviews against the secondary sources used in the literature review, this
researcher hopes to show how social movements change and alter out of recognition over time.
When analysing the interviews at hand, the researcher noticed the emergence of 2 central
metathemes: The Compromise/Abandonment of Republican Values and Principles and The
Provisional Movement and Social Movement Theory. Due to word limitations of the thesis, the
researcher chose not to explore further themes.
4.2.1 THE COMPROMISE/ABANDONMENT OF REPUBLICAN VALUES
The Compromise/Abandonment metatheme became apparent to the researcher when
participants discussed their understanding of certain events and issues that occurred during
“The Troubles”. What this particular theme seeks to address is how movements institutionalise
their tactics and attempt to gain concrete benefits for their supporters through negotiations and
compromises as a direct result of the challenges from the state and its authorities (Tarrow,
1994: 101). After analysing the interviews more carefully, 8 lesser sub themes began to
emerge as shown in the graph below (Figure 1). They were granted their own designation

32. 28
within the graph as the data merited such justification. These sub themes facilitate the
researcher in showcasing certain anomalies within the Provisional movement and how
decisions were made so that it would be able to enter a political process despite the
contradictions in doing so. In essence, it gives an interesting insight into how a social
movement like the Provisional movement goes down the path of change and abandonment.
FIGURE 1: METATHEME 1: COMPROMISE/ABANDONMENT OF REPUBLICAN VALUES.
4.2.1
Compromise/
Abandonment of
Republican Values
4.3.1 Principles or
Tactics?
4.4.1
Abstentionism and
Partitionist
Parliaments
4.5.1 Armed
Struggle
4.9.1 Post 1969
Republicans
4.6.1 Negotiations
and Settlements
4.7.1 Pan
Nationalism
4.8.1 Good Friday
Agreement

33. 29
4.3.1. PRINCIPLES OR TACTICS?
The policy of abstentionism, the rejection of the Dáil and Stormont and the legitimate use of
armed struggle were Irish Republican principles on which the Provisional movement formed
but would later disregard in support of power sharing, decommissioning, prisoner releases and
a reformed police service. When conducting his interviews, the researcher was mindful of
these so called principles as Ó’Brádaigh once claimed that ‘to enter Leinster house would be a
complete betrayal of the all Ireland Republic, a betrayal of all those who gave their lives’.
Other statements by Provisional members insisted that ‘there could be no return to Stormont’
either (Evans and Tonge, 2013: 40). Despite this, all participants were in agreement that ‘you
can’t allow yourself to be hooked on principles that were set at a different time’ as echoed by
Participant F. Participant B insisted that ‘there was enough pragmatism within the movement
not to allow that sort of thing to get in the way of the armed campaign’. This relates directly to
the claim made by Lynn when he states that the Provisionals became ‘less dogmatic, more
pragmatic and more politically aware in much the same way as their predecessors in Fianna
Fáil and Clann na Poblachta had’ (Lynn, 2003: 92). It is for these reasons however, that Bean
argued the Provisionals become much ‘less revolutionary and more than slightly
constitutional’ (Bean, 2007: 182).
4.4.1 ABSTENTIONISM AND PARTITIONIST PARLIAMENTS
Even though all participants insisted that Republicanism cannot be hamstrung by principles
reflecting a different period of Republican struggle, they did recognise the significance of the
abstentionism principle in particular. Bean describes the dropping of abstentionism as a
‘fundamental realignment of Provisionalism’ (Bean, 2007: 72). Previous generations of
Republicans, such as Ó’Brádaigh, had warned that by taking up seats in partitionist
parliaments, the revolutionary aspect of the movement would be compromised, or in Giugni’s
words, incorporated. Participant B informed the researcher that he had written a paper whilst
in prison ‘stating that whether we like it or not, the parliament of the 26 counties is a
parliament supported by the vast majority of people, therefore it has legitimacy’. Bean offers a
similar assessment on the idea of abstentionism citing how the majority of the people in the

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south recognised the legitimacy of the Dáil (Bean, 2007: 182). Despite this, Participant B
stated that ‘if you drop the abstentionist principle in relation to the southern parliament, it was
a dropping of a key tenant, a defining feature of Republicanism and not just Provisional
Republicanism’. It became apparent within the interviews that the Long War was not having
the desired effects that were once envisaged meaning that changes had to be made. Bean also
talks about the failure of a major IRA offensive in the 1980’s and how individuals within the
leadership were not fully committed to the continuation of the military campaign and were
seeking a new type of strategy (Bean, 2007: 184). Della Porta states that this awareness of the
weakness of the armed struggle project leads to a transformation of the meaning of formally
accepted behaviour (Della Porta, 2013, 278). Opinion was split on entering the political arena
but all participants recognised the contradictions of trying to smash the state whilst vying for
votes at the same time. But as Participant D correctly points out, ‘what compromises have you
made to win the support of the rich people in south Dublin or the big farmers in Meath in order
to get support? To get the extra seats, you have to row back’. In becoming a competitive force
both north and south, Sinn Féin had to compromise on much of their socialist and
revolutionary aspects in order to appeal to moderate nationalists in the north and the middle
class in the south. Participant C encapsulates this kind of feeling when he accuses Sinn Féin of
‘abandoning Republicanism as a political philosophy because they have accepted their role not
as a political vanguard trying to improve the lives of our people; I think they have accepted
their role as regional managers in a neoliberal economy where you keep your mouth shut, you
do what you are told and you get your wage’.
4.5.1 ARMED STRUGGLE
The democratic deficit and the ineffectiveness of constitutional politics in Northern Ireland
meant that it was all too easy for disaffected individuals to turn towards the Provisional
movement. Tarrow argues that anti state violence develops within social movements largely
because ‘protestors lacked access to legitimate means of participation and were forced into
clandestinity, where their only means of expression was violent’ (Tarrow, 1994: 95). No
participant argued that the continuation of armed struggle was central to their Republican
identity or any form of Republicanism for that matter, but some did take issue with the process

35. 31
of decommissioning claiming it was ‘an abandonment of the aims of the struggle’ as
Participant G did. Participant G continued to tell the researcher that ‘the issue of surrendering
arms was a major psychological hurdle to get over’ and that ‘even in the defeat of the Irish
civil war, the Republican army refused to surrender their arms and dumped them in case a
future generation needed them’. McIntyre argues that prior to decommissioning, the leadership
had always reassured its grassroots that decommissioning would never happen because it
would mean surrender (McIntyre, 2008: 63). This was also a common theme found throughout
the interview process. Of course, the leadership within Sinn Féin realised that certain
compromises had to be made if they were to be part of what Cronin terms as a legitimate
political process or a settlement and decommissioning was one of them issues. Tarrow
explains how the threat of violence is a major power in social movements ‘but it turns into a
liability when potential allies become frightened, elites regroup in the name of social peace
and the state learns how to respond to it’ (Tarrow, 1994: 95). Once the British got Sinn Féin to
play the Stormont game, incorporating them into the realm of constitutional politics, it was
impossible that the party could serve in government without serious questions being asked
about the status of weapons. Despite this, McIntyre and some interviewees talked of scenarios
where the leadership have often suggested that not all weapons were decommissioned in order
to prevent backlash from grassroots Republicans. This reiterates the point put forward by
Participant G but also showcases the drastic summersaults by the movement where slogans
such as ‘not a bullet not an ounce’ once appeared on walls in Republican areas. Even ten years
after decommissioning, Participant A believes ‘that the IRA never handed over all their
weapons’ arguing that ‘they decommissioned enough to make them believe we
decommissioned’. However, McIntyre disagrees, insisting that the leadership were ‘prepared
to tell anyone who would listen that nothing was decommissioned’ before sarcastically
suggesting that ‘London, Dublin and Washington went along with it to keep the peace process
alive’ (McIntyre, 2008: 69). Many Republicans, including McIntyre have argued strenuously
that decommissioning has criminalised the Republican resistance to British rule in Ireland.
Others, like Participant C question the struggle considering the outcome was ‘what the Brits
put on the table in 1974’.

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4.6.1. NEGOTIATIONS AND SETTLEMENTS
Prior to the early 1990’s, the Provisional were absolutist in their approach to negotiations and
settlements, or so it seemed. The cornerstone of the armed campaign was geared towards a
declaration of intent to withdraw from Ireland by the British. O’Dochartaigh talks about how
the leadership of the Provisional movement understood that violence and the danger of
violence decisively shaped the relationship the British government had with the movement in
complex ways (O’Dochartaigh, 2015: 215). Despite this, both participant B and
O’Dochartaigh argue that there were individuals negotiating during the 1975 cessation who
attached a high priority to achieving a peaceful settlement and were willing to make major
compromises to that end (O’Dochartaigh, 2015: 204). O’Dochartaigh goes further and claims
that the British were aware of this reluctance to continue an armed campaign and withdrew
from negotiations purely because they did not provide a sufficiently serious threat to the
British state. Thus, the Long War became a bargaining strategy in order to get the British to
the negotiating table. It has already been mentioned how the Long War failed but what it did
do was show the British that the IRA could persist at least in some format (O’Dochartaigh,
2015: 205). The movements by the Provisionals to engage in constitutional politics as well as
formulating relations with the SDLP, Fianna Fáil and the US government can also be
interpreted as attempts to alter the movements negotiating balance with the British state with
the ultimate aim of agreeing upon a settlement. A common feature of social movements is to
try and widen their appeal but in doing so, they run the risk of contaminating fundamental
beliefs and principles. Its no surprise that certain hard line elements of Republicanism would
have to be diluted. Constitutional nationalists were no longer ‘cowardly collaborators’ and
they were now defined as potential allies who would help to reinvigorate the Republican
struggle by reaching out to new elements of support. In this way, the Provisionals strategy
became one of managed retreat rather than revolutionary advance (Bean, 2007: 188).

37. 33
4.7.1 PAN NATIONALISM
The weakening position of the Provisional movement combined with a correspondingly
realistic evaluation of the ability and power of other actors such as the British state meant that
the Provisionals no longer considered themselves strong enough to achieve even limited aims
on their own. Participant F reiterated this point, telling the researcher that ‘Sinn Féin will not
achieve a united Ireland on its own. It can’t do it without the Irish Government and it can’t do
it without the SDLP’. Participant B spoke about how the whole concept of Pan Nationalism
‘was to make alliances with the grassroots of the SDLP and Fianna Fáil in order to undermine
their leadership so that we would lead the field and we would be the hegemonic force within
this movement’. However, it became apparent from an early stage that it was going to be a top
down approach, the Dublin government would lead the charge and the Provisionals were very
much the junior partner (Bean, 2007: 191). From this analysis, it’s quite obvious the process of
incorporation was in full effect by the late 1980’s. This new brand of ‘struggle’ waged in the
form of constitutional politics and diplomacy meant that Pan Nationalism could only secure
concessions that fell well short of Republican goals once envisaged by volunteers, party
members and supporters. As Participant B argues, the Provisionals became ‘a junior party in a
popular coalition that couldn’t give a Republican outcome to a Republican problem’. Pan
Nationalism would lay the foundations for future peace initiatives, but it also meant that
Fianna Fáil successfully drew the Provisionals into ‘the orbit of conventional politics’ (Bean,
2007: 191). Participant E was correct in his assessment ‘that you weren’t going to win at the
negotiating table what you hadn’t won on the battlefield’ and argued that ‘politics is an
extension of the struggle’. Although Sinn Féin would go on to dominate the nationalist
community within the north, it would do so only as part of a settlement determined by
Westminster which ultimately fell short of their historic goals. As Participant D argues, their
strategy from the late 1980’s ‘was a case of nationalist reformism and not Republicanism’.

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4.8.1 GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT
The deal between Paisley and the Provisionals was the culmination of a 20 year peace process
whose defining characteristic was the gradual jettisoning of Republican ideology by the IRA
under the hands of Adams and McGuinness (Moloney, 2008: xi). Whilst all participants
agreed that the time for peace was right, 4 believed that the Good Friday Agreement is a
stumbling bloc to Republicanism and the unification of the country. Participants from both
sides of the argument informed the researcher that war weariness, the increasing brutality of
the struggle and the strategic use of Loyalist Death Squads had a profound impact on the
mentality of volunteers/activists, which reinforced the need for a peace settlement and
reinforces Cronin point referring to increased repression as a direct cause in the decline of
terrorist organisations (Cronin, 2006: 17). Della Porta speaks about the importance of
emotional characteristics or ‘burnout’ in explaining how members of clandestine organisations
can abandon the call to arms on the basis of stress, incredible tiredness and the activities being
too intense (Della Porta, 2013: 279). Another aspect that became apparent when listening to
Participants B, C and G in particular was the ability of the leadership to disguise the true
intentions of the Good Friday Agreement by employing ambiguity, deception, dishonesty,
secrecy and outright lying to volunteers, party members and supporters alike. Participant G,
along with others, were ‘led to believe that a peace process would only be acceptable if there
was a British declaration of intent to go’. As McIntyre argues, the Provisionals fought a long
and futile war, which ultimately ended with the same terms offered in 1973 (McIntyre, 2008:
133). The Good Friday Agreement was sold to Republicans as a ‘legitimate political process’
and a transitional document to a united Ireland. But, as Participant G correctly points, ‘the
Good Friday Agreement was a transition from revolution to devolution’. The objective of the
Provisionals was to secure a British declaration of intent to withdraw. In the end, ‘it came
down to a civil rights agenda, an equality based agenda, not a Republican one’ as put by
Participant C. By their involvement in the Good Friday Agreement, Republicans have
legitimised partition, reinforced the strength of the union with Britain and facilitated in the
administration of British rule in the 6 counties. ‘Circumscribed by the consent principle and its
embodiment in the institutional structures of the Belfast Agreement, the very conditions under
which they are in government mean that the Provisionals cannot function as Irish Republicans’
(Bean, 2007: 258).

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4.9.1 POST 1969 REPUBLICAN
Participant E spoke about how some Republicans ‘used to refer to people who joined the IRA
after 1969 as only a “69 Republican”; That you weren’t a theological, ideological Republican
in the bad times when there was no Republicanism’. Of course, Participant E disputed such
claims, but the likes of Robert White, McIntyre and Bean to a lesser extent have argued that
Provisionalism has been a distinct departure from pre 1969 Republicanism, illustrated in the
way that the Provisional leadership were more than prepared to usurp Republican traditions in
the form of abstentionism and the recognition the partition for example. In the researchers
case, 4 of his Participants joined the Provisional movement as a means of defending and
protecting their community rather than general political reasons. Members only acquired the
politics of Republicanism at a later stage as a result of their socialisation into the movement as
well as time spent in jail (Bosi, 2012: 350). Participant B, who branded himself as a ‘post 1969
Provisional Republican’ argued that the ‘Provos were not a response to British state presence
per se, they were a response to how that British presence manifested itself’. There is no doubt
that the August 1969 attacks, the Falls Road curfew, the defence of St Matthews, the defence
of Ardoyne and the policy of internment were instrumental factors in the development of the
Provisional movement and Participant B also points to these issues in arguing his case. The
community defence aspect of the Provisionals resonated more with the catholic/nationalist
community than any Republican sentiment. It is for this reason that McIntyre suggests that the
lack of Republican tradition within the Provisional movement explained why they ditched
Republicanism so easily. This lack of baptism in Republican tradition as McIntyre coins it,
perhaps made it relatively easy for post 1969 Republicans to make such drastic changes that
essentially, compromised the essence of Irish Republicanism. Thus, as Participant B argues,
‘the British did not have to withdraw from Ireland to bring the Provisionals to heal, they
merely had to modify their behaviour which they did with the Good Friday Agreement’.

40. 36
4.10.1 THE PROVISIONAL MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY
From analysing the Provisional movement in the context of social movement theory, the
researcher can confirm that the actions of the Provisionals are not dissimilar to other social
movements and their transformations. Rucht is correct in his assertion that once social
movements become involved in the political process, they tend to lose their character as
challengers to the state apparatus. Sinn Féin politicians are certainly well polished and
regimented but it is for precisely this reason why Participants C and D refer to them as
‘Fianna Fáil Nua’ and ‘Fianna Fáil 2.0’ respectively.
Interestingly, Cronin’s point on repression as an element in the decline of terrorist groups
struck a particular cord with many Participants. Participant C spoke about the use of Loyalist
death squads against the nationalist/catholic/Republican communities and the inability of the
IRA to protect against them as a culminating factor in peace process negotiations. Other
issues, like war weariness as suggested by Della Porta, also had an important role in the need
for some kind of settlement according to all Participants.
Five of the eight participants indirectly recognised Giugni’s take on incorporation and how
internal and external actors and actions had serious consequences relating to the direction of
the movement. Opinion is split on whether Republicans themselves or external forces such as
the British regime, the Irish government and John Hume for example contributed more to the
incorporation of the movement into the political system. The remaining participants echoed
the belief that they entered a legitimate political process that will eventually lead to a united
Ireland, which is not surprising at all. The ‘legitimate political process’ in the name of the
Good Friday Agreement however, tests the concept of Republicanism and delegitimises the
Republican struggle that preceded it. Essentially, it has created a system where the British
monarchy remains along with a distinctive sectarian and nationalist divide. McIntyre insists
that Republicans within the Provisional movement ‘died in opposition to a reformed
Stormont. They died in opposition to acceptance of the Unionist veto dressed up in the
language of the consent principle. They died in opposition to Leinster house and they died in
opposition to a British police force enforcing the law of the British state’. (McIntyre, 2008:
114).

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4.11.1. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The research involved in this dissertation asked whether or not the Provisional movement can
be accused of abandoning Republicanism using a social movement theory framework. The
initial task was to provide the reader with a clear understanding of the social movement theory
framework being used, along with a thorough understanding of Provisional Republicanism on
the island of Ireland before addressing the issue of abandonment. This was then facilitated by
conducting 8 expert interviews of individuals who were involved either militarily, political or
both in the Provisional movement from the 1970’s up until the signing of the Good Friday
Agreement.
Using Giugni’s theory of incorporation, along with Cronin’s idea of a ‘legitimate political
process’ the literature review outlines how a social movement, like the Provisional movement
transitions into a legitimate political process. The literature showcases how social movements
intend on transforming society but, in the majority of cases, and certainly in this case, they
merely end up incorporating themselves into the political system, essentially institutionalising
the movement and failing to achieve its initial objectives. Whilst the movement still holds
aspirations for a 32 county socialist Republic, the literature suggests that this is not feasible
due to the confines of the consent principle along with Sinn Féin now administrating British
rule, thus abandoning their Republicanism.
The findings in this study reiterate what was presented in the literature review, suggesting that
the very concept of a legitimate political process in the form of the Good Friday Agreement is
flawed considering this process has legitimised the partition of Ireland along with enshrining
the Unionist veto into constitutional law. The researcher believes that he has provided a strong
argument as to why the Provisional movement can be accused of abandoning their
Republicanism with the inclusion of 8 expert interviews triangulated against secondary
literature on Republicanism and social movement theory. Using the mechanism of
incorporation, the researcher has shown how endogenous and exogenous forces have directed
the movement into a constitutional path without transforming society as it had initially
intended to do. In doing so, the researcher has shown how the Provisional movement, now
under the guise of Sinn Féin, have been forced to accept their position as regional managers in
a devolved power sharing assembly, overseen by Westminster and the Monarch.

42. 38
5.1.1 LIMITATIONS
On completion of the dissertation, the researcher noticed some limitations that should be
considered for future study in this area. Perhaps a quantitative study would be useful in terms
of triangulating the research approach. At the moment, it is only qualitative and it may be
interesting to deliver surveys at different levels at organisational and post organisational
membership. The method of analysis in the Frameworks method may also be a limiting factor.
There are several other content and thematic analyses that could have been used in the
methodological process. The actual study used in this dissertation relates solely to Northern
Ireland and took place in Northern Ireland using the example of the Provisional movement.
Whilst brief examples of other organisations such as the PLO and ETA were given, perhaps a
more in depth approach and further triangulation with these revolutionary social movements
and others would have been useful in explaining change and abandonment. The study was not
gender proofed either, as all participants were males. It might have been interesting to get a
female perspective on the Republican movement as a whole and on social movement theory.
Tying in with the previous point, the researcher only spoke to individuals from the Republican
tradition, and it may have been useful to have an opinion from the various British institutions
and the Irish government as to how their involvement it negotiations and agreements led to the
demobilisation of Republicanism. In a wider sense, social movement literature tends to look at
how social movements form as opposed to how and why they cease. Whilst there are books
that discuss this phenomenon, they are limited in comparison to social movement formation
making the concepts of abandonment and change difficult constructs to assess.

43. 39
6.1.1 RECOMMENDATIONS
Along with the limitations aforementioned, the researcher also has recommendations for this
particular area of work. Perhaps the area of social movements and the concept of Irish
Republicanism should be given more prominence in third level history and political science
courses. The researcher believes that the findings of this study should be made more widely
available for consultation and rebuttal. Additionally, studies such as this require a great deal of
consideration in terms of ethical frameworks as the material involves persons who, at some
stage in their lives, engaged in criminal behaviours and this may be personally distressing for a
researchers and raise legal issues a postgraduate student may not be equipped to deal with.

44. 40
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