Bosnia Final

Justice and Reconciliationin Bosnia-Herzegovina:
Analysis of PastEfforts to Restore Peace andHope for the Future
Alicia Tutini
PHIL 470: Independent Study
13 May 2015

Introduction
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina ravaged the country and the people
within, rendering the nation ethnically divided and reluctant to reconcile. Nearly
two decades after the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia-
Herzegovina struggles to establish itself as a country recovered from war, still
battling extreme ethnic politics and polarization in all areas of society. This paper
strives to illustrate a fraction of the complex picture of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s
journey towards justice and reconciliation. The time frame covered in this paper
spans from the early 1990’s to 2014, with a concentration on events in the wake
of international intervention, particularly the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA).
First, historical context will be provided, briefly describing the 1992-1995 war
and what spurred the eventual intervention from international actors. Second, an
analysis of the Dayton Peace Agreement will be presented. Following the details
of the DPA, the focus of the paper will shift to efforts towards justice in the
country, specifically the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). After examining the strengths and shortcomings of the ICTY,
an explanation of societal problems, particularly within the Bosnian government,
will provide context for further measures of justice and reconciliation. Finally,
this paper presents an argument for a truth commission as a possible method of
achieving an impartial assessment of the past to progress Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s long journey towards reconciliation and forgiveness.

Historical Context
EthnicTensions Lead to War
The ethnic groups within the region share a deep and entangled history,
reaching back many centuries. Ample literature dissecting the region’s complex
history provides credible reports on the subject matter, and this paper will not
attempt to repeat their analysis.1 The events and tensions presented in this paper
will pertain only to the most recent war, specifically events that spurred
international intervention through the Dayton Peace Agreement and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. However, it is worth
noting that the war from 1992-1995 is not an isolated event within the region;
periods of conflict have erupted many times as tensions between the ethnic groups
boil over.2 It has been argued that these violent outbreaks are unavoidable in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. By peering into the periodic conflicts, analysts contend that
Bosnia-Herzegovina endures only because its peoples have never truly been free
to choose their own destiny.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina is a relatively new state, emerging from the breakup
of Yugoslavia in the beginning of the 1990’s. Within only a couple decades, the
country has undergone drastic changes, politically and socially. Prior to the
breakup, Bosnia-Herzegovina constituted one of the six Republics of the Socialist
Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, functioning as a communist socialist
1
Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, (London: Picador,
2005).
2
Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict
and International Intervention (New York:M.E. Sharpe,Inc., 1999), pp. 16-61
3
and International Intervention (New York:M.E. Sharpe,Inc., 1999), pp. 20

dictatorship under Josip Tito. The Communist Party propagated the slogan
“Brotherhood & Unity” amongst the republics, a sentiment especially strong
within Bosnia-Herzegovina: a poll conducted before the 1990 elections showed
that 74% of the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina favored the banning of
nationalist parties.4 The signs of economic and social deterioration of Yugoslavia
seeped into political rhetoric, fuelling ethno-nationalism and resulting in the
dissolution of the federation. This presented several questions to be addressed,
namely the issue of rights – should they be vested in individuals or collective
groups? – and determining who would have control over the state and the rights
within – who has the right to claim titular status?5 Finally, there is the issue of
whether a separate state of Bosnia-Herzegovina should exist at all. In the wake of
Yugoslavian disintegration, generally, within Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosniaks and
Croatians favored secession, while the Serb population wished to remain
connected to its “parent state,” Serbia.6 The struggle for identity and power fuels
the animosity of the ethnic groups. “The essence of ethnic conflict is the struggle
between mobilized identity groups for greater power – whether it be for equality
within an existing state, or the establishment of a fully independent national
state.”7
4
Timo Kivimaki, Marina Kramer,and Paul Pasch,“The Dynamics of Conflict in the
Multi-ethnic State of Bosnia and Herzegovina” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2012),pp. 16
5
and International Intervention (New York:M.E. Sharpe,Inc., 1999) pp. 5
6
7
and International Intervention (New York:M.E. Sharpe,Inc., 1999) pp. 4

Ethnicity in the 1992-1995 Conflict
The conflict was characterized by extreme nationalism and brutal
violence. Powerful political figures encouraged and invigorated the ethnic
divisions, namely Republic of Serbia President, Slobodan Milosevic, and
Republic of Croatia President, Franjo Tudman. Both leaders utilized nationalism
rhetoric to embolden their respective groups to support partition of the region
along ethnic lines. During the conflict, all groups committed war crimes, but
Bosniaks suffered the majority of casualties, which “further strengthened the
Bosniak sense of ownership of the unity of the country, as partition is now
associated with the atrocity of violent ethnic cleansing.”8
Events Leading to Dayton
Initially, the international community brushed off the conflict as a civil
war where all parties were considered warring factions, equally responsible for
the war. U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, aptly specified the stance of the
international community when he said, “We don’t have a dog in this fight.”9 With
arguments from scholars and historians claiming that ancient hatreds caused the
war, and consequently that outside efforts would prove entirely futile, the
international community refused to intervene. Opinions changed after a series of
events which diplomat, Richard Holbrooke, deemed “the brutal stupidity of the
Bosnian Serbs.”10 The United Nations dispatched troops – UN Protective Force –
to the area to act as impartial peacekeepers. To deflect a military response from
8
9
As quoted in “Back to Bosnia: Charlemagne” in The Economist,2005.
10
Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York:Random House, 1998), 23.

the international community, in May 1995, Bosnian Serbs took hostage several
hundred of the peacekeepers as collateral, conveying the impotence of the
international community. Additionally, the July 1995, massacre of 8,000 Muslim
men and boys within Srebrenica, indicated that the Bosnian Serbs were the
primary aggressors of war crimes. The massacre was extensively broadcasted,
horrifying the world. These events illustrated to the international community,
particularly the United States, the pressing need for a peace agreement.11
Dayton PeaceAgreement
Analysis of Dayton Peace Agreement
The ultimate agreement negotiating persistent peace for the region
emerged from Dayton, Ohio, in December 1995. The negotiations at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base ended the nearly four-year war that ravaged Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The main participants from the region were President of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic, President of Croatia Franjo Tudman,
and President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic, accompanied by his
Foreign Minister. The importance of the peace agreement cannot be understated –
beginning with the fact that all parties signed the document, an arrangement that
not a single one of them liked.12,13 Previous years of negotiations had gained no
traction, as cease-fires were ignored and violence continued. Thus the cessation of
11
Adriana Camisar, Boris Diechtiareff, Bartol Letica, and Christine Switzer, “An
Analysis of the Dayton Negotiations and Peace Accords” (The Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, 2005), pp. 5-6
12
13
and Diplomacy, 2005), pp. 11

ethnic cleansing is a notable success of the peace agreement, as a fundamental
purpose of the agreement, as stated by President Clinton, was “to give all the
people of Bosnia a much greater stake in peace than war, so that peace takes on a
life and a logic of its own.”14 The signatures were attained largely due to pressure
from the international community, and particularly the United States, who utilized
Richard Holbrooke as negotiator to press the parties to sign. This negotiation
process marked the first time the United States took charge, utilizing intense
diplomacy and the threat of force to enact “a new era in Balkan Diplomacy.”15 As
detailed in “An Analysis of the Dayton Negotiations and Peace Accords,”
Holbrooke faced an immense challenge in heading negotiations: he was tasked
with ending the war, safely withdrawing the UN peacekeepers, and finding an
acceptable division of territory that would not lead to partition or further conflict.
Moreover, psychological barriers further complicated negotiations as parties
displayed extremely low levels of trust for each other. Finally, the road to peace
was obstructed by an obvious stalemate, as all parties felt they were unfairly
targeted to accept unwanted compromise.16,17 The pressure to end violence
resulted in a complicated system, saturated with concessions that purportedly
symbolize compromise amongst the three ethnic parties, but in reality were hardly
14
William J. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Implementation of the Peace Agreement
in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 27 November 1995. In Public Papers of the Presidents, William
Jefferson Clinton,vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996).
15
and Diplomacy, 2005), pp. 6
16
17

accepted willingly.18,19 The seemingly obscure location was selected purposefully;
mediators wanted to remove the parties from their comfort zone, as previous
attempts to establish permanent peace were disastrous. In addition to the primary
aim of ending the war, the Dayton Peace Agreement provided guidelines for the
reconstruction of a war-torn society. Scholarly proponents of the agreement argue
that it dictated positive standards for a society looking to rebuild through
“peaceful conflict resolution, protection of human rights and minority rights,
equality, political representation, good governance and the rule of law.”20
Academic and diplomatic criticisms of the Dayton Peace Agreement
vastly outnumber its praises.21,22 Fundamentally, those who condemn the
agreement believe that rather than solving Bosnia’s problems, it sustained them
by cementing the ethnic divides in a constitution.23 The DPA split the nation into
two entities, and the population dynamics of the two entities reflects ethnicity, as
visualized by Graph A.
18
19
20
Hasan Korkut and Muhidin Mulalic, “Implications of Dayton Peace Agreement on
Current Political Issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina” SDU Faculty of Arts and Sciences
Journal of Social Sciences,(2014), pp. 110
21
Kori Schake, “The Dayton Peace Accords:Success or Failure?” Studies in
Contemporary History and Security Policy,Vol. 3 (1999), pp. 288-293
22
Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western,“The Death of Dayton: How to Stop Bosnia
from Falling Apart” Council on Foreign Affairs (September/October 2009).
23
Contemporary History and Security Policy,Vol. 3 (1999), pp. 288

Recalling that the Bosniak attitude generally embraced a unified nation, as
partition became associated with ethnic cleansing, it can be deduced that dividing
the country along the newly forced ethnic lines gave Bosniaks the impression that
the Bosnian Serbs were being rewarded for their perpetration of ethnic
cleansing.24 This is perhaps the sharpest criticism of the DPA, as analysts argue
that it actually compensated those who committed ethnic cleansing, legitimizing
the results of the practice by enforcing borders that echo its effects.25,26,27
Critiques of the Dayton Accords frequently express a tone of frustration,
as it is strongly possible that codifying the three ethnic groups “may have been
24
Journal of Social Sciences,(2014), pp. 112.
25
Journal of Social Sciences,(2014), pp. 112-113.
26
Contemporary History and Security Policy,Vol. 3 (1999), pp. 288-289.
27
Gerald Toal, “’Without Brussels there can be no Bosnia-Herzegovina?’ Managing
BIH’s Geopolitical Challenges” in “The Tenth Anniversary of the Dayton Accords and
Afterwards:Reflections on Post-Conflict State- and Nation-Building” ed. Nida Gelazis.
(The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005), pp. 33.

necessary to gain agreement.”28,29 Given the express purpose of ending violence,
the agreement was effective: the brutal ethnic cleansing that occurred during the
conflict ceased. But the pressure to end the bloodshed did not address the
underlying problems that caused the war, namely the conflicting goals of the
ethnic groups. The history of Bosnia-Herzegovina is saturated with territorial
disputes; the conflict after the collapse of Yugoslavia is another instance of
disagreements over how the region should be divvied up.30 Constitutionalizing the
three ethnic groups added electoral competition to the animosity, making the
agreement
tailor-make for those who wish to stoke ethnic antagonisms for political
gain. These ethnic chauvinists…preach to their respective constituencies
and pledge to ‘protect’ their groups. This, in turn, weakens moderates who
advocate greater national unity and civic, rather than ethnic, identities.31
The DPA sustained ethnic identification, codifying and thus perpetuating the
problems that spurred war in the first place. The persistent and reinforced ethnic
identity split all levels of society, allowing divisive politics to reign in place of
national unity. But even this claim conveys a deeper problem: is the idea of
national unity an idealistic projection of a cohesive and successful society? The
region has an extensive history of animosity, and the most recent war antagonized
this into full-fledged hatred and complete distrust. Dividing the country along
28
29
“The Tenth Anniversary of the Dayton Accords and Afterwards:Reflections on Post-
Conflict State- and Nation-Building” ed. Nida Gelazis. (The Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, 2005).
30
31
from Falling Apart” Council on Foreign Affairs (September/October 2009).

ethnic lines, while maintaining the notion of a unified state, conveys the hope that
the country would reconcile its differences, but still recognizing that such a goal
could not be attained.
ResultantState
The state created by the Dayton Peace Agreement is massively
complicated,32 though its complexity is arguably merely a byproduct of its
comprehensive approach to securing a solution. The government can be illustrated
in layers, five in total. The state of Bosnia-Herzegovina is comprised of two
entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (mostly Bosniaks and Croats),
and Republika Srpska (mostly Serbs). Each entity composes roughly half of the
state’s territory, and each is considered autonomous, able to carry on parallel
relationships with other nations. As each entity is essentially self-governing, both
have promulgated their own constitutions, which enforce different administrative
and political systems.33 To clarify, here is a sketch of the entity structures: within
the Federation, the entity is apportioned into 10 cantons and 74 municipalities.
The cantons are granted their own substantial amount of autonomy, and are
allowed to adopt laws so long as they do not contradict laws at the entity level.
The legislature within the Federation includes a House of People and a House of
Representatives, as well as an executive branch with a President, vice-president,
and necessary ministries. Within Republika Srpska, there are 63 municipalities,
with no intermediary between the entity and municipalities. The legislature within
32
The Dayton Peace Accords,U.S. Department of State,Washington, D.C. 1996.
33
Thierry Domin, “Political System of Bosnia and Herzegovina” SFOR Informer (2001).

Republika Srpska has only a National Assembly, as well as an executive branch
with President, vice-president, and necessary ministries.34
Shared institutions in the executive branch are the tri-partite Presidency
and Council of Ministers, within the parliamentary legislative branch are the
House of Representatives (42 members directly elected from the entity), and the
House of Peoples (15 members selected by the Parliamentary Assemblies) within
the respective entities. State-level power was purposefully limited, in charge of
military, diplomatic, and foreign affairs, as well as the budget of state-level
institutions.35 At the top of the governmental pyramid is the Office of the High
Representative, a structure created by the DPA. The primary and strongest
purpose of the High Representative is to ensure civilian peace implementation,
and can do so by removing government officials who obstruct reform. The High
Representative has made many efforts to dismiss obstructionist politicians, but its
influence has diminished as the office has become characterized as undemocratic,
skirting around the process of allowing the public to select who remains in
office.36
The state created by the Dayton Peace Agreement was well intended, but
shortsighted. The thorny government and distrustful constituencies sustained
conveys that,
after all, the Dayton agreement did not create a workable state, but instead
ended the war by creating a system of lots of checks and little balance, in
34
35
36
Roland Kostic, “Ambivalent Peace:ExternalPeacebuilding Threatened Identity and
Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Department of Peace and Conflict Research:
Uppsala University, issue 78, 2007), pp. 192.

which anyone can black any proposal, thereby creating an institutional
structure that could accomplish nothing.37
Ending the ruthless violence was the primary purpose of the agreement, and
formatting a complicated state may have been a consequence of this goal. But, as
the country continues to wallow in ethnic animosity and struggles to overcome its
differences, the notion that peace is more than the absence of war appears quite
apt.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
The ICTY was created in 1993 by the U.N. Security Council as a response
to the atrocities perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia. The incremental process to
establish the ad hoc tribunal commenced in the wake of widespread media
coverage of the atrocities perpetrated in the area, and the repeated failures to
ascertain a peace agreement.38 The Security Council passed a number of
resolutions, both affirming its abhorrence of the atrocities and to institute a
“competent, independent, and impartial” court to address serious violations of
international law. For the sake of brevity, only two of the many resolutions will be
addressed here. The Security Council passed Resolution 808 early in 1993, stating
its determination to end the crime of ethnic cleansing and other violations of
international humanitarian law.39 To address the violations, the Security Council
decided that an international tribunal should be established for the prosecution of
37
Robert Hayden in “The Tenth Anniversary of the Dayton Accords and Afterwards:
Reflections on Post-Conflict State- and Nation-Building” ed. Nida Gelazis. (The
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005), pp. 16
38
Virginia Morris and Michael Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to The International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis (NewYork:
Transnational Publishers, 1995), pp. 17-35
39
U.N Security Council Resolution 808 (February 1993).

individuals responsible for serious violations of international law committed in
former Yugoslavia since 1991 – later known as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The resolution requested that the Security-
General submit a report detailing the specifics of the tribunal, including its legal
foundation. This report was unanimously adopted, without revision, in Resolution
827. The resolution determined that the atrocities continuing in the former
Yugoslavia, particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina, constituted a threat to international
peace and security, and that an international tribunal that prosecuted the
responsible individuals would address the violations of law.40 Under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is authorized to maintain international
peace and security, allowing the body to “determine the existence of any threat to
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”41 The tribunal’s legal basis
stemmed from international conventions, customary law, and laws of war – in
particular the Nuremberg Charter, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the
Genocide Conventions.42 Drawing from the Nuremberg Charter, the Security
Council confirmed jurisdiction with respect to war crimes, including murder and
ill-treatment of civilian population, plundering public or private property, and
devastation not justified by military necessity.43 From the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the Security Council affirmed jurisdiction with respect to grave
40
U.N. Security Council Resolution 827 (May 1993).
41
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (October 1945).
42
Transnational Publishers, 1995), pp. 61-88
43
Transnational Publishers, 1995), pp. 374

breaches of the convention, including torture or inhumane treatment, unlawful
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian, and taking civilians
as hostages.44 From the Genocide Convention, the Security Council asserted
jurisdiction with respect to genocidal acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group as such, namely: killing members of the group,
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group.45
With the signatures of Security Council members, the first truly international war
crimes court became a reality.
Achievements of the ICTY
The tribunal was formed for the purpose of establishing individual
criminal responsibility, contributing to the ongoing international efforts to end
leadership impunity in the wake of war. Like any judicial process, the purpose is
to establish criminal responsibility according to the fixed definitions of crimes
and rules of procedure. Permissible information must pertain strictly to
identifying the defendant as responsible for criminal actions, where responsibility
is defined, broadly speaking, as either direct commission of a crime or as a
responsibility that ensues on the basis of a person’s failure to prevent or
punish crimes by others which he or she knew or should have known
about.46
44
Transnational Publishers, 1995), pp. 371.
45
Transnational Publishers, 1995), pp. 377.
46
Jelena Pejic, “The Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission: A Shaky Start”
FordhamInternational Law Journal,vol. 25 issue 1 (2001), pp. 3.

The purpose of the international tribunal focused on holding leaders accountable,
affirming the notion that impunity is not an option, regardless of authority. As
noted by the ICTY, indictments were issued for heads of state, prime ministers,
army chiefs-of-staff, and government ministers, conveying to other possible
offenders that positions of leadership are not immune to criminal accountability.
Holding authority figures responsible for the criminal behavior in an international
court has a ripple effect, as it brings justice to the victims of atrocities, portraying
to the community that the violence was brutally criminal and not to be tolerated.
The process of convicting defendants requires irrefutable evidence, including the
testimonies of victims – hundreds of stories retracing horrific experiences of
torture, sexual assault, forced displacement, and witnessing murder. “People of all
walks of life – farmers, doctors, housewives, local politicians, mechanics,
students, school children, and many others” recounted their traumatic experience
within the impartial environment.47 Confirming beyond a reasonable doubt the
crucial facts directly related to crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia
provides both the local region and the international community with a reputable,
albeit inconclusive, truth. “The Tribunal’s judgments have contributed to creating
a historical record, combatting denial and preventing attempts at revisionism and
providing the basis for future transitional justice initiatives in the region.”48
The initial establishment of the tribunal, as expressed by the Security
Council, contributed to the credibility of international bodies to enforce peace by
making
47
United Nations, “Tribunal’s Achievements” http://www.icty.org/sid/324
48

it possible to bring to justice the persons responsible for “ethnic
cleansing” and other violations of international humanitarian law and
would thereby contribute to the restoration and maintenance of
international peace and security. The effective prosecution of such persons
by a neutral international body would deter further atrocities and break the
cycle of violence and retribution by providing a credible threat of
punishment.49
Additionally, the effective implementation of the ICTY allowed for systematic
development of international humanitarian law. The first truly international war
crimes tribunal, and the first tribunal established under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter, the ICTY greatly contributed to the evolution of international justice. As
detailed by the Tribunal, notable developments include
Identifying a general prohibition of torture in international law which
cannot be derogated from by a treaty, internal law or otherwise;
Specifying crucial elements of the crime of genocide, in particular the
definition of the target of this crime; Significant advances in international
humanitarian law pertaining to the legal treatment and punishment of
sexual violence in wartime; Determining that enslavement and persecution
constitute crimes against humanity; Applying and strengthening the
doctrine of command responsibility, removing uncertainty about the level
of knowledge to be expected from a superior whose subordinates were
about to commit crimes or actually committed them; Contributing to
procedural law in areas of protective measures for witnesses.50
Since the formation of the ICTY, a number of other ad hoc courts have been
successfully created, proving that “efficient and transparent international justice is
viable.”51 And finally, the ICTY encouraged judiciaries within the former
Yugoslavia to reform and to take ownership of prosecuting those responsible. The
Tribunal initiated a so-called Rules of the Road system, through which the ICTY
Prosecution reviewed over 900 investigations files from prosecutions offices in
49
Transnational Publishers, 1995), pp. 44
50
51

Bosnia-Herzegovina to verify their soundness, thereby preventing the likelihood
of arbitrary arrests.52
Weaknesses of the ICTY
While the ICTY has been praised as an advancement of international law,
its internal influences on Bosnian society are not so profound. Turning back to the
early stages of the Tribunal, it began staggeringly slow, as the lack of co-
operation from the states of the former Yugoslavia, particularly in providing
evidence and delivering those indicted, persisted.53 A fascinating tension emerges
through criticisms of the Tribunal, as they directly reflect and refute the
achievements claimed by the ICTY. Generally, the ICTY is not popular, is
regarded as anti-Serb by the Bosnian Serb population, while criticized as not
prosecuting enough Serbs by the Bosniak population.54 The perceptions of the
ICTY mean that public acceptance of the ‘truth’ established by the tribunal is
rather dubious. Additionally, judicial bodies have many guidelines and
limitations, which allows for a tribunal to maintain a sharp focus, but also
restrains the tribunal to prosecuting only those with substantial evidence
supporting their involvement.55 And, as the purpose of the Tribunal is to establish
individual criminal accountability and convict those responsible, providing a
voice to the victims of crimes is secondary. The victims are welcome to state their
testimony, but it is less to offer them an opportunity for sharing their personal
52
53
Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes
Tribunals (NewJersey:Princeton University Press,2000), pp 255-260
54
FordhamInternational Law Journal,vol. 25 issue 1 (2001), pp. 3-4.
55
FordhamInternational Law Journal,vol. 25 issue 1 (2001), pp. 3-4.

experience and feelings towards it, and more to determine if that experience
substantiates criminal responsibility. The positive impression purportedly
provided by the Tribunal to victims from the conflict is difficult to digest, as the
ICTY prosecutes only a minimal number of war criminals, leaving tens of
thousands of victims not addressed by the court. Furthermore,
the prolonged implementation date and lack of progress may have
provided a false sense of hope resulting in frustration or anger for the
victims and their families. It may be more damaging to know there is a
court that has the potential to hold perpetrators responsible for the crimes,
but is unable to do so. 56
This experience of false hope has been documented with victims of rape and
sexual assault.57 Moreover, Determining the political and moral responsibility of
societal power structures that enabled or allowed the commission of crimes is
outside the scope of a tribunal, as is providing detailed recommendations that aim
to prevent such crimes from being repeated.58
Failure to Reconcile
Denying Responsibility
Among the greatest impediments to reconciliation in Bosnia is a continued
denial of suffering, from downplaying the damage to communties to outright
rejections of the atrocities. Milorad Dodik, the President of Republika Srpska, told
a pre-election rally held in Srebrenica in 2010 that,
56
Corene Rathgeber,“Truth and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina” M.A. thesis,
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2000), pp. 22
57
Corene Rathgeber,“Truth and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina” M.A. thesis,
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2000), pp. 23-24
58
FordhamInternational Law Journal,vol. 25 issue 1 (2001), pp. 3

[u]nborn Serb children cannot be held responsible for something that
happened 15 years ago. They cannot and they will not be. And genocide
that not take place here. We will not accept claims that what happened
here was genocide, because it was not.59
Understanding his comment within context, utilizing the denial of genocide, an
act that the ICTY explicitly determined to have occurred, as a political tool to
garner support during a campaign, serves as an ominous testimony to the state of
ethnic reconciliation. Legislative efforts to criminalize genocide denial have been
squandered; opponents, primarily members of the Serb political party, dispute the
necessity of such a law. The president of the political party argued that such a law
“would cause disagreement and even animosity.”60
Lack of Political Will
There is an obvious need for reconciliation, but the demand lacks; an
absence of political will obscures the possibility of an enduring peace amongst the
constituent groups in Bosnia. This is perhaps the most prevalent form of a failure
to reconcile, as the groups refuse to take ownership of their differences or move
beyond divisive rhetoric, and the government continues to enjoy the political
benefits of a deeply divided constituency.
The Dayton accords have failed in the essential task of creating a political
community that takes responsibility for resolving its problems, which is
perhaps the most damning evidence that a peace, with a life and a logic of
its own, has not been creating in Bosnia-Herzegovina.61
59
Dzenana Halimovic, “Genocide Denial Concern in Bosnia” Institute forWar & Peace
Reporting (2010).
60
Dzenana Halimovic, “Genocide Denial Concern in Bosnia” Institute forWar & Peace
Reporting (2010).
61

Sharp criticisms of the absence of political will is a common thread amongst
authors analyzing the Bosnian conflict and subsequent efforts at justice and
reconciliation.62,63 The nonexistence desire to resolve the ethnic divisions
manifested harshly into actual efforts to impede reconciliation – poignantly
exemplified by enforcing “administrative, legal, even physical obstacles” to
refugees/displaced persons returning to their homes.64 The DPA did include
explicit provisions on the return of refugees to their pre-war address:
All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their
homes of origin…The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an
important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.65
However, implementation of returning refugees to their homes is noticeably
lacking, and even obstructed, as areas seek to remain homogeneous.
Frustration is expressed towards the consistent interferences of international
actors, arguing that a relationship of reliance has formed, and the Bosnian people
are not convinced to take responsibility for their problems.
There continues to be an expectation by Bosnians that the international
community will resolve their problems, and therefore they themselves do
not have to participate…Unless solutions grow indigenously out of the
political culture of Bosnia, they are unlikely to be respected by the
population once the international community leaves.66
62
63
from Falling Apart” Council on Foreign Affairs, September/October 2009.
64
65
The Dayton Peace Accords, U.S. Department of State,Washington, D.C. 1996.
66

The absence of political will to reconcile is an unpromising sign for reform within
Bosnia-Herzegovina, a problem compounded by the active denial of events that
occurred during the conflict.
Corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia and Herzegovina is undergoing three great transformations,
moving from wartime to stable peacetime, shifting from a centrally controlled
economy to a free market economy, and changing from a socialist style
government to a democracy.67 These societal swings each lend themselves to
corruption; the combination of these forces compounds its likelihood, a situation
exemplified by Bosnia and Herzegovina. The post-war context remains
characterized, as noted by a 2009 Transparency International report, by the
“politicization of the public sector, complicated power structures and fragmented
administration…converging to create a fertile ground for corruption.”68 That same
year, Bosnia-Herzegovina scored 3.0 on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly
clean) in a Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, and has only
marginally improved to a 3.9 score in 2014.69 Corruption is rampant in Bosnian
society, affecting all levels of society. This paper will address two forms: political
corruption, and judicial corruption.
67
Nedim Kahvedzic & Samir Losic, “Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Causes,
Consequences and Cures” (M.A. thesis, University of Linkoping, 2010) pp. 30
68
Marie Chene, “Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina”
Transparency International (2009).
69
Francesco Bosso,“Bosnia and Herzegovina: Overview of Political Corruption”

Bureaucratic/Political Corruption
The complicated and fragmented government structures and systems, and
the competing ethnic groups heavily enable political corruption. The public sector
is considerably bloated, consistently accounting for over half of the country’s
GDP since the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.70 In the wake of
the conflict, appointments to newly formed administrative institutions were made
according to political allegiances. “Almost every public office…is allotted
according to an ethnic quota, a spoils system that has led to extensive patronage
networks, corruption and inefficiencies.”71 Wages within government are
astronomically high, with members of Parliament (legislature) earning about 10
times more than the average civilian.72 The numerous levels and layers of
government facilitates confusion over competencies, with overlapping legislation
and government structures that “lacks transparency, undermines citizen
accountability, and provides many opportunities for abuse of office and diversion
of public funds.” The public perception of the government is rather dismal,
finding the structures polarized and egocentric: a 2013 Transparency International
Global Corruption Barometer reported that “more than two-thirds of respondents
said that the government is run entirely or to a large extent by a few big entities
acting in their own self-interest.”73
70
from Falling Apart” Council on Foreign Affairs (2009).
71
from Falling Apart” Council on Foreign Affairs (2009).
72
Ana Baric, “Bosnia Boils Over: An Upheaval Two Decades in the Making” Organized
Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (February 2014).
73

Political parties also suffer from high amounts of corruption, and thus low
levels of public trust. Findings from the 2013 TI Global Corruption Barometer
report that respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina “identify politicians as the most
corrupt institutional actors, with a staggering 77 per cent of those interviewed
feeling that politicians are corrupt or very corrupt.”74 As the public sector remains
ethnically divisive, and is among the highest paying employment opportunities,
the individuals attracted to the positions tend to be easily corruptible, and
opportunities for exploitation are frequent. Political party financing and
expenditures remain opaque, and the political elite “entertains close ties with both
criminal and informal economic networks.”75 Furthermore, electoral campaigning
is fraught with divisive rhetoric, and the 2010 elections were characterized as “the
hardest, the harshest, and the most inappropriate to the individual politicians and
political parties…with a range of negative attitudes promoted in the media that are
not part of democratic process.”76 In 2002, the Office of the High Representative
imposed the Law on Conflict of Interest in the Institutions of Government, which
established strict measures to prohibit elected officials, executive office holders
and advisors from carrying out any official action that “would directly affect
private enterprises in which they, or their close relatives, had a financial
74
75
76
Hauke Kramm, “Bosnia’s Failure in Creating a Truth Commission – How Institutions
and Functions Encourage Post Conflict Countries to Create a Truth Commission”
(Universiteit Twente,2012), pp. 21

interest.”77 The punishment for violations of the law would result in fines and
ineligibility to run for elected office for a four-year period. This legislation was
widely unpopular among ruling politicians who, in a rare display of cross-ethnic
parliamentary consensus, amended the legislation to remove the ineligibility
clause, redefine close relative to only include members of the same household,
and actually increase the monetary limit on contracts for personal services of
public officials.78
Though the Office of the High Representative later amended this
egregious agreement,79 the behavior of government officials displays a poor effort
concerning political reconciliation, undermining crucial aspects towards of a
functioning post-conflict society.
Judiciary in Bosnia-Herzegovina
The judiciary within Bosnia-Herzegovina is another example of the
complex system of governmental institutions implemented by the Dayton Peace
Agreement. At the state level, there are two courts: the Constitutional Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina has jurisdiction over matters of the state, including
terrorism, war crimes, human trafficking, and organized and economic crimes.
The court has a criminal department, an administrative department, and an
appellate department. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has
77
United Nations, “Law on Conflict of Interest in the Institutions of Government” Article
7-9 of UN Convention against Corruption (August 2012).
78
79 United Nations, “Law on Conflict of Interest in the Institutions of Government”
Article 7-9 of UN Convention against Corruption (August 2012).

jurisdiction over constitutional matters, and is tasked with the protection of human
rights and fundamental rights of Bosnian citizens. Within the entity Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are four courts: The Constitutional Court of Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Supreme Court of Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cantonal Courts, and Municipality Courts. Within the entity
Republika Srpska, there are four courts: The Constitutional Court of Republika
Srpska, the Supreme Court of Republika Srpska, District Courts, and Basic
courts.80,
Judicial Corruption
The judiciary, along with political parties, is perceived to be the most
corrupt institutions and actors within the country, with 65 per cent of households
considering the judiciary to be ‘corrupt’ or ‘extremely corrupt’ in 2013.81 The
sluggish effort or failure to prosecute politically connected individuals or major
criminals conveys to the general public that the judiciary is both ineffective and
untrustworthy. Studies convey that the judiciary struggles to maintain independent
and impartial when confronted of political influence, with a
legacy of control by political parties, ethnic bias, weak professional
standards, and corruption. Respect for basic political, civil, and human
rights tends to be selective and independent judges have reportedly faced
various forms of threats and intimidation.82
Nationalist political parties heavily influence the judiciary, with strong pressure
from the both the executive branch and from local political figures. “Court files
80
Mirela Rozajac-Zulcic, “A Guide to Legal Research in Bosnia and Herzegovina”
Globalex (2014).
81
82

containing letters from politicians about specific cases,” with judges reacting
accordingly thus rendering the judiciary itself highly politicized.83 During 1998-
2000, the Judicial System Assessment Program found that “the judges were not
independent, did not consider themselves independent and were not treated as
independent by other institutions.”84 Judges responded to powerful influences by
adjourning cases, or stalling the case by calling for more witnesses and
unnecessary expert testimonials.85 As the judiciary is largely an entity
responsibility, progress towards equality before law within Bosnia-Herzegovina is
slow-moving. The lower-level judicial bodies particularly display of weak
professional standards, though the lack of impartiality seeps into all levels of the
judiciary.86 The effect of inconsistent rulings, non-transparent legal processes, and
politicized prosecutions have far-reaching effects in Bosnian society, as citizens
and businesses believe the judiciary and the rule of law enforced to be highly
subjective.87
Judicial Reform
Effort towards reforming the judiciary has seen moderate progress in
attempts to create a more accountability, efficient, and impartial judicial system.
Improvements have been made to increase the sheer number of individuals within
83
Nedim Kahvedzic & Samir Losic, “Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Causes,
Consequences and Cures” (M.A. thesis, University of Linkoping, 2010) pp. 31
84
United Nations “Judicial System Assesssment Program” UN Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 2009-2013.
85
United Nations “Judicial System Assesssment Program” UN Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 2009-2013.
86
Francine Friedman, Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Polity on the Brink, pp. 64-65.
87
The Human Rights Center and the International Human Rights Law Clinic, “Justice,
Accountability and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and
Prosecutions” Berkeley Journal of International Law,vol. 18, issue 1, (2000), pp. 3

the judiciary, as the country’s courts were experiencing a severe overload of cases
in the wake of the conflict. According to a 2014 EU “Bosnia and Herzegovina
Progress Report,” each court has enacted a backlog reduction program, and courts
saw a 9% increase in productive from 2012 to 2013.88 Addressing the lack of
professionalism, training is provided by entity Judicial and Prosecutorial Centres,
and all candidates entering the judicial field must pass a newly structured system
of written examinations and interviews, which is “expected to increase the
objectivity and transparency of recruitment, based on merit and qualifications.”89
Politicization of rulings remains a looming problem, however, as political
influences continue to interfere with legal processes, particularly in cases of
corruption and prosecuting war crimes.90
Strengthening the rule of law is a necessary step for an impartial society,
as distrust in its applicability and enforcement convey to the general public and to
businesses that the rulings are easily manipulated. Furthermore, failing to
prosecute war crimes cases that are within the country’s jurisdiction conveys an
unwillingness to punish those responsible for committing crimes during the
conflict, thus illustrating to the public that the rule of law is not neutral, which
could have a detrimental effect on how the public perceives the rulings made at
the ICTY.91
88
European Commission, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report”, (October 2014),
pp. 13
89
European Commission, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Progress Report” (October 2014),
pp. 13
90
pp. 12-13
91
pp. 12-13

Education and Reform Efforts
The structure of the education system within Bosnia was determined in the
Dayton Peace Agreement – in the haste to end the brutal violence, insuring a
stable future through objective and consistent education dropped down the
priority list. Well-intended, but shortsighted, the provisions outlined in the peace
agreement disseminated power to the three constituent groups, including
education. The result is divided institutions: three separate schooling systems
composed of three different curricula.92 Within Republika Srpska, education
remains centralized at the entity level; however, within the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, authority over education was doled out to local cantonal
governments, resulting in over 50 schools drawn along ethnic lines. Curricula
were to be designed for the ethnicity of the canton’s territory, but for more
heterogeneous areas, the approach became more complicated. The disunion of
curricula has resulted most poignantly in the phenomenon of “two schools under
one roof” in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, wherein Bosniak and Croat
school authorities have segregated the students and classrooms according to their
ethnic identity.93 Fragmentation of the region that solidified – rather than rectified
– the political and social cleavages provided an educational framework that
encouraged three different curricula, enforcing “separation of ethnicity, culture,
history, instead of aiming to a common identification as Bosnians and
92
Zlatko Custovic, “Segregation, Education and Nationalism: Two Schools Under One
Roof System in Bosnia and Herzegovina” Politheor (October 2014).
93

Herzegovinians.”94 The initial purpose of the separation was to temporarily
encourage refugees and displaced persons to return to their previous addresses
without fear of traumatic encounters.95 However, the gentle reserve to protect the
vulnerable has devolved into political rhetoric, transforming into a tenant of
identification. Valery Perry’s “Reading, Writing and Reconciliation: Education
Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina” details a particular school that was “divided
into Bosnian Croat and Bosniak sections, separating students by floor, with piles
of chairs and desks serving as barriers in the corridors and separate entrances for
each group.” Today, most of Bosnia’s 2,200 public primary and secondary
schools utilize mono-ethnic curriculums: Serb-dominated schools use textbooks
produced in Serbia, Croat-dominated schools use textbooks from Croatia, and
Bosniak-dominated schools use textbooks developed in Bosnia. In response to
the approach to education, a high school teacher within Bosnia-Herzegovina told
journalists that the system of alienation has produced “a generation of young,
intolerant, ethnically isolated and ethnically overfed pupils who are being used as
weapons of nationalist politicians.”96 A formidably true statement, the tensions
between students have erupted into violence. Students recall games and rallies
where the flag of Croatia was raised, and in response students waved the flag of
the United Islamic Community (representing 1,7000 mosques in Bosnia).
Students called each other Ustase, Croatian Fascist, or Balija, a derogatory
term for a Turkish descendant of the Ottoman Empire. They gestured with
94
95
96
Aida Cerkez-Robinson, “Bosnia’s Schools a Study in Intolerance” Associated Press,
2009.

Sieg Heil salutes and an open hand representing five centuries of Ottoman
domination. Fights ensued.97
A considerable factor in continued segregation is a fear of erasure –
families fear that teaching their child in an environment that does not align
completely with their ethnic identification will allow for their culture and history
to be removed from the curriculum, therefore delegitimizing the ethnic group.
Reinforcing this notion is the presence of three separate recognized languages,
which “can easily be exploited by those who want to keep the current, very
segregated educational system by simply stressing the importance for children of
different ethnicities to be taught in ‘their language.” The actual lingual differences
are minimal, but the officially recognized status of the languages provides an
additional symbolic sentiment. As Zlatko Custovic notes in his analysis on
education and nationalism in Bosnia, the languages serve the purpose of
symbolically retaining autonomy through upholding cultural values, political
goals – the existence of three languages belonging to the three groups allows for
individuals to assert loyalty.
Integrating the ethnic groups has proven to be a massive obstacle within
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The “two schools under one roof” program was originally
implemented to protect returning refugees, as well as to assuage the sharp contrast
in historical perspectives. However, overcoming the discrepancies is a rocky
process: academically, textbook reviewers struggle to agree on crucial aspects of
the region’s history. Politically, the Croatian Democratic Union minister in the
Central Bosnia Canton was removed in 2005 for failing to implement laws for
97
Susan E. Reed,“Bosnia’s Segregated Schools” Boston Globe, May 2014

integration. His replacement has opted to continue the obstruction, and she
responded to questions about ‘two schools under one roof’ by stating that the
project “will not be suspended because you can’t mix apples and pears. Apples
with apples and pears with pears.”
Attempts to reform the curricula have been made by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Mission to Bosnia and
Herzegovina (OSCE). Both conclude that education modification is crucial for
successful recovery and actively pursue routes to apply tolerance to teaching. The
progress is slow, but present. Efforts to unite the three different curricula in a
common framework by UNESCO ultimately failed, though “many of its
principles were addressed during subsequent curriculum revision processes.”98
OSCE succeeded by addressing textbook content and teaching methodology,
developing “Guidelines for Textbook Writing and Evaluation of History
Textbooks for Primary and Secondary Schools in BiH.”99 This series of
recommendations, which strives to implement impartiality, was adopted by both
entities and addresses both teachers and textbook authors. As youth are
susceptible to only “learning what their parents tell them,” these guidelines enable
an attempt at objectivity in Bosnian education.100 The recommendations for
history textbooks include the following provisions:
98
“Drafting a Common Curriculum: Framework, Bosnia and Herzegovina.” UNESCO.
2010.
99
“Curricular Reform.” Organization for the Security and Co-operation in Europe:
Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
100
Quote from Denis Džidić at BIRN. Mr. Divjak, from Education Builds Bosnia and
Herzegovina, also noted that “parents influence their children in a very bad way.”

2.1 When writing textbooks, the authors should decrease the quantity of
information relating to political history, in order to enable the provision of
more information which students would also receive through other aspects
of history, such as cultural, social, economic, and the history of everyday
life.
2.2 Textbooks should be scientifically based and objective and aimed at
building mutual understanding, reconciliation and peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina
2.3 When writing textbooks, authors should apply the principle of multi-
perspectivity, in order to enable the pupils to learn tolerance. The principle
of multi-perspectivity should be present in all aspects of the textbooks: in
the texts, illustrations, and sources…
2.7 Sensitive issues/controversial themes should be stated in the textbooks,
in order to be opened up for discussion…101
Detailing these provisions sets parameters for the structure of education in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, though they provide ambiguous or arguably contradictory
limitations, by stating that textbooks should both discuss sensitive/controversial
issues but also decrease the quantity of information relating to political history.
These parameters are largely symbolic, as the recent conflict is still avoided in the
current curriculum.102 Other international efforts to integrate communities are
partially successful, in that there are US-sponsored programs (e.g., Tolerance
Through English) offering Bosniak and Croatian students a joint English class and
summer camp.103 The introduction of a third language could facilitate a more
comfortable environment to discuss touchy issues, as well as provide a broader
global perspective.104
101
“Guidelines for Writing and Evaluation of History Textbooks for Primary and
Secondary Schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” April 2005. The Commission for the
Development of Guidelines for Conceptualizing New History Textbooks in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
102
Susan E. Reed,“Bosnia’s Segregated Schools” Boston Globe, May 2014
103
International “Teaching Tolerance Through English” Summer Academy. Embassy of
the United States (2014).
104

While strenuous efforts have been exerted, traction is moderate. There
exists no foundation for common truth, as students study only their respective
language, history, and geography. Details of the most recent war are
conspicuously omitted from textbooks, as
teaching controversial issues from the recent past involves strong
emotions and invokes painful and traumatic memories; many often feel
that their sufferings are not sufficiently emphasized in the condensed
accounts necessary for a textbook.105
Thorough education reform is essential for the harmonization of upcoming
generations, teaching tolerance to the children of war victims, and forgiveness to
children who were war victims. Thawing the frozen conflict is a responsibility
that will inevitably be passed on to the children of the war; objectively educating
youth is indispensable for peace.
Truth and Reconciliation
The Need for Truth
Having peered into the depths of Bosnian society, it is clear that a
common truth is needed. The country was divided along ethnic lines, solidifying
the tension between groups. Now, the upcoming generations are in the process of
learning three different histories, the political groups continue to minimize or
deny the suffering caused during the war, and the government is ripe with
corruption. Political will to reform, to reconcile, to forgive – is absent.
Establishing a common, shared truth is essential for the country to overcome its
traumatic past and reconcile with the differences among perceptions and
experiences. It has been stated by a Bosnian leader that, “if we keep going along
105
A quote from Snjezana Koren in Susan E. Reed, “Bosnia’s Segregated Schools”
Boston Globe, May 2014

this path, fifty years from now our grandchildren will fight over which one is
correct.” To address this complex problem, this paper contends that a prospective
truth commission constitutes the most comprehensive solution for cohesion.
Prospect of Truth Commission
It is generally agreed there is a need for further reconciliation in the
region, though efforts to achieve this either stumble along or collapse completely.
Proponents of a truth commission for reconciliation contend that the unstable
peace established by the Dayton Peace Agreement and subsequent tribunal will
not provide the country with the “big picture,” and thus “it is essential the people
of Bosnia are exposed to the ‘different truths,’ and to the ‘real truths’ in order to
create a ‘common truth.’”106 These truths primarily involve perceptions of
victimhood, as all sides of the conflict experienced ethnic cleansing.107 Goran
Basic’s explains in “Stories After the Bosnian War: Competition for Victimhood”
that victimhood has transformed into a desirable status. As the conflict was
characterized by brutal violence among all parties, and the people within Bosnia
underwent a traumatic and divisive conflict that affected all factions within the
country, there is no clear of well-defined “perpetrator” of the atrocities. The
conflict was experienced in a myriad of ways that was much dependent upon the
location of the individual at the time of the conflict.108 Additionally, as the
106
Corene Rathgeber,“Truth and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina” M.A.
thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2000), pp. 27.
107
Goran Basic, “Stories After the Bosnian War: Competition for Victimhood”
Proceedingsof the 1st
Annual International Conference on Forensic Sciences and
Criminalistics Research (Global Science and Technology Forum, 2013).
108
Criminalistics Research (Global Science and Technology Forum, 2013), pp. 75.

conflict advanced, some people fled or were displaced, and others opted to stay.
This is resulted in feelings of contempt among groups, as those who selected to
stay feel that their victimhood is more deserved. On a broader scale, feelings of
jealousy towards the success of certain areas has reinforced notions that particular
groups were unfairly treated in the post-war rebuilding efforts.109
The conflict stems from deeply rooted ethnic tensions, and the Dayton
accords decentralized the Bosnian government in almost all major institutions and
functions, delineating power to the three major ethnic groups. This has allowed
for the three groups to take ownership of three separate histories, each compelled
by a deep connection to their ethnicity and a desire to have their experience with
abuse recognized and recorded. Creating a truth commission, supporters argue,
should be seen as a necessary and “assertive step toward reconciling such
different conceptions of truth and history” that would allow Bosnians “to find
common ground and ease tensions between the three groups.”110
As Priscilla Hayner noted in her comprehensive book on truth
commissions, Unspeakable Truths, the bodies typically share four characteristics:
(1) truth commissions focus on the past; (2) they investigate a
pattern of abuses over a period of time, rather than a specific event; (3) a
truth commission is a temporary body, typically in operation for six
months to two years, and completing its work with the submission of a
report; and (4) these commissions are officially sanctioned, authorized, or
empowered by the state.111
109
Criminalistics Research (Global Science and Technology Forum, 2013), pp. 76.
110
Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New
York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 112.
111

Within these characteristics, countries may sharpen the focus of a commission.
For Bosnia and Herzegovina, the emphasis would concentrate on the victims,
providing them with a respectful and safe environment that can respond to their
needs. “As Bosnians are searching for a forum to tell their story, this is what is
important to them, there is healing when a victim can tell their story.”112 The false
hope addressed earlier conveys the absence of victim satisfaction in the criminal
prosecutions – a truth commission can provide a platform for all victims, not only
the ones tethered to the most serious violators of international law. As a truth
commission would allow all individuals to become involved in and contribute to
the process, it could “contribute to conflict resolution and societal healing at the
community level.” 113 Additionally, the commission could establish a common
truth, determining the institutional and systematic perpetration of atrocities from
all facets within the state, providing a credible report of the broad political forces
that plunged the country into war. Furthermore, the truth commission could
potentially restore trust in the government, particularly political parties and the
judiciary, as it investigates their involvement and influence in the conflict.114
Finally, a truth commission would arguably be held in higher regard among
Bosnian people than the ICTY, as it would be a local body with accessible
proceedings and tangible results.115
112
113
114
115
thesis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2000), pp. 26-31.

Possibility of Truth Commission
The prospect of a truth commission is currently unlikely, as efforts to
establish an official inquiry into the truth have faltered and failed. While many
groups and representatives have voiced support for a truth commission, traction is
mediocre at best. Attempts to establish a truth commission in the former
Yugoslavia have failed, arguably for the exact reasons that have undermined
success in other areas of Bosnian reconciliation: a fundamental disagreement over
goals coupled with a lack of political will to reach consensus or compromise, a
feeling of underrepresentation, and a sense that particular groups are blamed
disproportionately. The most strenuous effort to enact a truth commission was
organized by the U.S. Institute of Peace in 2002, which succeeded in securing a
presidential decree for a truth commission within Serbia and Montenegro, with a
mandate to “research the social, inter-communal and political conflicts in the
period from 1980 to 2000, [and] documents its work.”116 The commission was,
however, disbanded, due ultimately to a lack of support, as the commission “was
not perceived as an impartial body within the country and even less across the
region.”117
Obstacles to implementing a truth commission fundamentally stem from
the same obstructions to reform: a lack of political will to move beyond divisive
rhetoric and find common understanding. In Hauke Kramm’s “Bosnia’s Failure in
Creating a Truth Commission – How Institutions and Functions Encourage Post-
Conflict Countries to Create a Truth Commission,” it is detailed that post-conflict,
116
“Truth Commission: Serbia and Montenegro” United States Institute of Peace,2003.
117
“Truth Commission: Serbia and Montenegro” United States Institute of Peace,2003.

a structure of government power-sharing is a strong determining factor of
successful implementation of a truth commission.118 However, power is a
desirable commodity within Bosnia, and willingness to cooperate across ethnic
lines is a rare occurrence. Yet, the future is promising, and the possibility of
cross-ethnic efforts remains: Kramm’s analysis notes that societies facing a future
of co-existence together are more willing to implement a truth commission to
create a stable and understanding coexistence.119 Nearly two decades since the
enactment of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the population could conceivably
reconcile with a traumatic and entangled history, conveying that, for Bosnia-
Herzegovina, perhaps it is the simple passage of time that will soften the hard
experiences of the past.120
ReconciliationforBosnia-Herzegovina
Ascertaining reconciliation amongst the peoples of Bosnia has proven to be a
tumultuous process. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina ravaged the country and the
people within, rendering the nation ethnically divided and reluctant to reconcile.
Nearly two decades after the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement,
Bosnia-Herzegovina struggles to establish itself as a country recovered from war,
still battling extreme ethnic politics and polarization in all areas of society. The
118
(Universiteit Twente,2012), pp. 20.
119
(Universiteit Twente,2012), pp. 22
120

need for reform is obvious; however, the lack of political will compounds the
existing divides between the Bosnian peoples, with examples of failures to
implement amendments to the government, or reorganize the education system
convey how challenging this process to establishing an equal and accepting
society. There remains a drastic need for societal and communal reconciliation,
and an understanding of others’ experiences during the conflict. Without a
common truth shared amongst the people, it seems unlikely that the conflict’s
resulting animosity will calm for understanding and forgiveness to emerge.
A positive perspective on reconciliation in Bosnia can be extracted from
recent activities within the population, showing that process has not grinded to a
complete halt, and the Bosnian community appears willing to place pressure on its
politicians, exemplified by the 2014 protests that spread across the country.121 The
demonstrations displayed a justified public anger, albeit through violence in
certain instances, over continued politicization within the government and the
economy. The outrage of the public shows that while political will is absent at a
government level, it is certainly present at the civilian level. Non-governmental
organizations, scholars, victim’s associations, and civilians have gathered many
times over the last decade in attempts to gather momentum for a truth
commission.122 But, without government support and cooperation, a “bad
commission could be worse than not having one at all.”123 There remains
significant work to be completed in the strides towards reconciliation and
121
Tim Judah, “Bosnian Protests:A Balkan Spring?” BBC News,February 2014.
122
Alan L. Heil Jr., “A Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Bosnia and
Herzegovina?” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,June 2000, pp. 86
123
Herzegovina?” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs,June 2000, pp. 86

understanding within Bosnia-Herzegovina, most poignantly the need to inspire
political will, encouraging political cross-ethnic collaboration and ensuring that
impartiality is enforced within society. Truly, during a Security Council meeting
this May, it was stated that, “a great deal can be achieved in 2015 if there is
renewed commitment within the country and among its political leaders to pull
together and work together, to work as one.”124
124
“Bosnia and Herzegovina Must Take ‘Fresh Chance’ It has been Given, Security
Council Told” UN News Centre, May 2015.

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