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IPv4 Hijacking: 
Our Experience 
Mirjam Kühne, Ivo Dijkhuis 
TF-CSIRT 43 | Rome - Italy | 18 September 2014
Overview 
• Introduction to the RIPE NCC 
• Our definition of hijacking 
• Common approaches we observe 
• Investigations and interventions 
• Common difficulties and typical responses 
• What you can do 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
2
Introduction to the RIPE NCC 
• Not-for-profit, independent membership association 
• Neutral and impartial 
• Established in Amsterdam in 1992 
• Provides open community platform 
• Over 10,000 members in 76 countries 
• Bottom-up industry self regulation 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
3
RIPE NCC Activities 
• Distribute IP addresses and AS numbers 
• Support policy development in the RIPE NCC 
service region (Europe, Middle East, parts of central 
Asia) 
• Maintain RIPE registry (RIPE whois Database) 
• Resource certification (RPKI) 
• Training Courses 
• Tools and measurements 
- RIPE Atlas, RIPEstat 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
4
Our Definition of Hijacking 
! 
“Taking control of issued Internet number 
resources under false pretences” 
! 
• IPv4 addresses get re-registered to hijackers or 
another (innocent) organisation 
• IPv4 addresses have economic value due to IPv4 
scarcity 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
5
Background Information 
• 12 September 2012: the RIPE NCC starts allocating 
from the last /8 
• The RIPE NCC sees an increase in hijackings of 
apparently unused and/or abandoned addresses 
• Hijacks found so far 
• 227 cases investigated, 19 hijacks found, 6 ongoing 
• Often cases get resolved before they turn into hijack 
• Most hijacking cases involve organisations we don’t 
have a business relationship with (PI, legacy) 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
6
When Do We Investigate? 
• A resource holder sends us a complaint or abuse 
report 
• An experienced staff member notices something 
out of the ordinary 
• Follow-up from existing investigations: one case 
often leads to another 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
7
Common Approaches Hijackers Use 
• Research company histories and provide paper 
trails to demonstrate changes in business structure 
• Conduct BGP test announcements to check if 
addresses are unused 
• Re-register expired domain names to make email 
change requests look legitimate 
• Copy websites, with identical pages hosted on 
(almost) identical domain names 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
8
Common Approaches Hijackers Use 
• Forged documentation 
• Faked IDs 
• Faked company registration papers 
• Forged signatures of real people on contracts 
• Forged stamps and signatures of notaries and resource 
holders 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
9
How Do We Investigate? 
• We check changes in company structure 
• Public records 
• National chamber of commerce registries 
• We contact former and current resource holders 
(where possible) 
• Contact notaries found on documentation 
• Phone calls, emails and faxes 
• Using other contact information beyond what was 
provided 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
10
What Do We Do? 
• Allowing time to support claim to the address space 
• Reverting all changes immediately 
• Resources are de-registered if no legitimate holder 
found 
• Where member involvement in the hijacking case can 
be proven 
• Closure of member account and de-registration of 
IP resources 
• Reporting to authorities where appropriate 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
11
Common Difficulties 
• The resource holder expects immediate action while 
we need to investigate carefully 
• It can be difficult to find and contact the resource 
holder in question 
• No effective penalty and lots to gain for the hijacker: 
• They can open a new RIPE NCC member account 
• No high costs involved 
• No blacklists, no fine 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
12
What You Can Do 
• Protect your resources against hijacking by making 
sure your RIPE Database objects and contact 
information are up to date 
• If acquiring resources, ensure you are in contact 
with the legitimate holder or representative 
• If you need help, or think your resources may have 
been hijacked, contact: reg-review@ripe.net 
! 
! 
https://www.ripe.net/lir-services/resource-management/address-hijacking-in-the-ripe-ncc-service-region 
! 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
13
Questions? Section Title 
Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 
14

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IPv4 Hijacking: Our Experience

  • 1. IPv4 Hijacking: Our Experience Mirjam Kühne, Ivo Dijkhuis TF-CSIRT 43 | Rome - Italy | 18 September 2014
  • 2. Overview • Introduction to the RIPE NCC • Our definition of hijacking • Common approaches we observe • Investigations and interventions • Common difficulties and typical responses • What you can do Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 2
  • 3. Introduction to the RIPE NCC • Not-for-profit, independent membership association • Neutral and impartial • Established in Amsterdam in 1992 • Provides open community platform • Over 10,000 members in 76 countries • Bottom-up industry self regulation Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 3
  • 4. RIPE NCC Activities • Distribute IP addresses and AS numbers • Support policy development in the RIPE NCC service region (Europe, Middle East, parts of central Asia) • Maintain RIPE registry (RIPE whois Database) • Resource certification (RPKI) • Training Courses • Tools and measurements - RIPE Atlas, RIPEstat Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 4
  • 5. Our Definition of Hijacking ! “Taking control of issued Internet number resources under false pretences” ! • IPv4 addresses get re-registered to hijackers or another (innocent) organisation • IPv4 addresses have economic value due to IPv4 scarcity Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 5
  • 6. Background Information • 12 September 2012: the RIPE NCC starts allocating from the last /8 • The RIPE NCC sees an increase in hijackings of apparently unused and/or abandoned addresses • Hijacks found so far • 227 cases investigated, 19 hijacks found, 6 ongoing • Often cases get resolved before they turn into hijack • Most hijacking cases involve organisations we don’t have a business relationship with (PI, legacy) Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 6
  • 7. When Do We Investigate? • A resource holder sends us a complaint or abuse report • An experienced staff member notices something out of the ordinary • Follow-up from existing investigations: one case often leads to another Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 7
  • 8. Common Approaches Hijackers Use • Research company histories and provide paper trails to demonstrate changes in business structure • Conduct BGP test announcements to check if addresses are unused • Re-register expired domain names to make email change requests look legitimate • Copy websites, with identical pages hosted on (almost) identical domain names Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 8
  • 9. Common Approaches Hijackers Use • Forged documentation • Faked IDs • Faked company registration papers • Forged signatures of real people on contracts • Forged stamps and signatures of notaries and resource holders Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 9
  • 10. How Do We Investigate? • We check changes in company structure • Public records • National chamber of commerce registries • We contact former and current resource holders (where possible) • Contact notaries found on documentation • Phone calls, emails and faxes • Using other contact information beyond what was provided Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 10
  • 11. What Do We Do? • Allowing time to support claim to the address space • Reverting all changes immediately • Resources are de-registered if no legitimate holder found • Where member involvement in the hijacking case can be proven • Closure of member account and de-registration of IP resources • Reporting to authorities where appropriate Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 11
  • 12. Common Difficulties • The resource holder expects immediate action while we need to investigate carefully • It can be difficult to find and contact the resource holder in question • No effective penalty and lots to gain for the hijacker: • They can open a new RIPE NCC member account • No high costs involved • No blacklists, no fine Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 12
  • 13. What You Can Do • Protect your resources against hijacking by making sure your RIPE Database objects and contact information are up to date • If acquiring resources, ensure you are in contact with the legitimate holder or representative • If you need help, or think your resources may have been hijacked, contact: reg-review@ripe.net ! ! https://www.ripe.net/lir-services/resource-management/address-hijacking-in-the-ripe-ncc-service-region ! Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 13
  • 14. Questions? Section Title Kühne & Dijkhuis - TF-CSIRT 43 - 18/9/2014 14