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302 unit2 guilds_killer_app

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This presentation covers a portion of the Unit 2 content from TECH 3020: Societies & Technological Change, at Bowling Green State University

This presentation covers a portion of the Unit 2 content from TECH 3020: Societies & Technological Change, at Bowling Green State University

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  • Find example of first point… Why would guilds be concerned about maintaining the status quo? What are some modern-day examples?
  • “ An association of people in the same trade, formed to protect interests and standards” (Dictionary.com) Positives and negatives: Create, develop, and protect standards Gatekeepers, protecting status quo Unions? Prof associations? Why would guilds be concerned about maintaining the status quo? What are some modern-day examples?
  • Pros / Cons Are certain guilds still discouraging technological innovation? Examples? Modern-Day Guilds Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) Motion Picture Assoc. of America (MPAA) SIIA: The Software & Information Industry Association is the principal trade association for the software and digital content industry. SIIA provides global services in government relations, business development, corporate education and intellectual property protection to the leading companies that are setting the pace for the digital age. PRINCIPAL MISSION: P romote the Industry: SIIA promotes the common interests of the software and digital content industry as a whole, as well as its component parts. Protect the Industry: SIIA protects the intellectual property of member companies, and advocates a legal and regulatory environment that benefits the entire industry. Inform the Industry: SIIA informs the industry and the broader public by serving as a resource on trends, technologies, policies and related issues that affect member firms and demonstrate the contribution of the industry to the broader economy.
  • "There's a period of instability with the introduction of any new technology, (when) no one really knows how the market is going to go and no one knows if the market will be restructured," Prof. Patricia Zimmermann, discussing the impact of new media technologies. Her comment was made in the early 1980s, in reference to the VCR. Valenti’s views were different: “The VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the Boston Strangler [a serial killer of the time] is to the woman alone,"
  • “ we cannot stand by while piracy takes a devastating toll on artists, musicians, songwriters, retailers and everyone in the music industry."
  • For first point: bowling alleys and automated pin set-up (use Dad’s first job as an example); huge task retrofitting all lanes with these devices back then. For last point, think about U-Scan lines at grocery stores: less cashiers, but more technicians, sales reps, trainers, etc.
  • Shawn Fanning: 1999: Napster P2P software developed by 19 year old Shawn Fanning and Sean Parker; uses Motion Picture Experts Group, audio Layer 3 (MP3) as standard file format; Napster gains popularity rapidly among college students. 1999: Leaves Northeastern U after freshman year to work on Napster full-time. 2000: Millions of subscribers / users, numerous lawsuits from RIAA, Metallica, and others
  • Shawn Fanning: 1999: Napster P2P software developed by 19 year old Shawn Fanning and Sean Parker; uses Motion Picture Experts Group, audio Layer 3 (MP3) as standard file format; Napster gains popularity rapidly among college students. 1999: Leaves Northeastern U after freshman year to work on Napster full-time. 2000: Millions of subscribers / users, numerous lawsuits from RIAA, Metallica, and others
  • Napster: destroyer of the status quo for the recording industry. Napster constitutes Volti’s notion of the “great breakthrough” (from Unit 1) by being revolutionary, causing disruptive effects and altering existing social arrangements (driving to a record store and buying a CD) worldwide. In a very real sense, Napster and the P2P clients that followed represented a “Killer App”
  • Oddly enough, Napster is not Napster. It went belly-up in 2000 after being quite literally sued out of existence by the RIAA. In 2002, Roxio (maker of EasyCD Creator, Toast Titanium, and DirectCD) bought logo, trademark, and all remaining corporate branding of Napster at s liquidation sale. That same year, Roxio also bought the ill-conceived digital download service, PressPlay. From there, Roxio re-launched the Napster service a year later using the well-known Napster brand name and the technological infrastructure of PressPlay (but with improved usability and pricing). In late 2003, Roxio sold all non-Napster assets, including the Roxio name itself, and is now just Napster
  • http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1550308820080915
  • Perceived reason = piracy Legitimate concern Potential reason = lack of control Threat to established business models Threat to industry jobs Threat to stability of industry P2P likely a “Killer App”
  • Napster: destroyer of the status quo for the recording industry. Napster constitutes Volti’s notion of the “great breakthrough” (from Unit 1) by being revolutionary, causing disruptive effects and altering existing social arrangements (driving to a record store and buying a CD) worldwide. Killer App “ New good or service that establishes an entirely new category and subsequently dominates and transforms existing industries, and redefines marketplaces.” -- Unleashing the Killer App In a very real sense, Napster and the P2P clients that followed represented a “Killer App” Killer App, cont. “ Killer apps wind-up displacing unrelated older offerings, destroying and recreating industries far from their immediate use, and throwing into disarray the complex relationships between business partners, competitors, customers, and regulators.” -- Unleashing the Killer App
  • Model T Compass cotton gin Welsh longbow Steam engine
  • Model T Compass cotton gin Welsh longbow Steam engine
  • Model T Compass cotton gin Welsh longbow Steam engine
  • Model T Compass cotton gin Welsh longbow Steam engine
  • Broadband Internet Wireless email Desktop publishing File-sharing software CD RW drive Streaming video
  • From The Year the Music Dies , by Charles C. Mann: “ Milestone issues” from WIRED on the state of the music industry: Rip.Mix.Burn. The Fall of the Music Industry, 2002 & The Rebirth of Music, 2006. http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.09/ “ Record labels are under attack from all sides - file sharers and performers, even equipment manufacturers and good old-fashioned customers - and it's killing them. A moment of silence, please.” The Year The Music Dies By Charles C. Mann Not long before his sudden death from a heart attack, I saw Timothy White at a party in Boston, standing by the bar in his usual bow tie and white bucks. When he waved me over, I was delighted: Timothy was not only the editor of Billboard but a respected music critic and biographer. Even the executives he often took to task conceded, with a wince, that he understood the secretive, confusing business better than almost anyone. "How much you want to bet that the entire music industry collapses?" he asked me. "And I mean soon - like five, ten years. Kaboom!" Truth is, it may happen even sooner. This year could determine whether the music business as we know it survives. In the first six months of 2002, CD sales fell 11 percent - on top of a 3 percent decline the year before. Sales of blank CDs jumped 40 percent last year, while the users of Kazaa, the biggest online file-trading service, tripled in number. Meanwhile, the labels' new legitimate online music services attracted fewer paying customers than the McDonald's in Times Square. As recently as 10 years ago, the media conglomerates that own record labels regarded them as cash cows - smaller than Hollywood but more reliably profitable. Now all five major labels are either losing money or barely in the black, and the industry's decline is turning into a plunge. In the next year, whether together or separately, the labels will have to set about totally reinventing the way they do business, a horribly difficult task for any institution. To leap the hurdles posed by digital technology, the industry must find a way to make money selling downloaded music on a per-track basis, allow in-store CD burning, slash recording costs with cheap software and hardware, and change artists' contracts to reflect the new economic reality. Doing any one of these will be next to impossible. Doing all of them would be one of the more amazing turnarounds in business history. The record labels blame piracy for their woes. And they're right - in part. Before writing this paragraph, I logged on to Kazaa. At 10 on a Monday morning, hardly peak time, 3.1 million people were on the network - more simultaneous users than Napster ever had in its heyday. At least a hundred copies of every song on the Billboard Hot 100 were available for download. So were 13 out of 15 tracks on Mariah Carey's new CD, which wouldn't hit stores for another three weeks. And that's not even counting the discs sold on every street corner from the Bronx to Beijing. The industry rightly believes that if it can make file-swapping more difficult, and legitimate online services easier and less expensive, it can turn the kids on Kazaa into paying customers. Pursuing this two-pronged approach, the companies are spending millions on their own Internet services (pressplay from Universal and Sony; MusicNet from BMG, EMI, and Warner), on lawyers to chase away pirates and peer-to-peer networks, and on anti-piracy ads featuring the likes of Britney Spears. But this won't be enough. To survive, the industry will need the active assistance of friends it doesn't have. The labels may be able to kill Kazaa, but they won't be able to stop even more decentralized networks like Gnutella without help from Internet service providers, cable operators, and telephone companies. All their efforts to get DVD-like protection for CDs ultimately depend on the goodwill of hardware manufacturers and Capitol Hill. The online subscription services will flounder without cooperation from performers, songwriters, and record stores. And the ability of Britney to change the hearts and minds of music fans depends on public sympathy. That sympathy is in short supply. Rightly or wrongly, record companies are detested by politicians (for corrupting youth), by webcasters (for demanding royalties), and by their customers (for inflating prices). Musicians and songwriters are famous for loathing the labels, and many have resisted licensing their songs to MusicNet and pressplay. (Both are under investigation for possible antitrust violations.) Radio and MTV aren't in the industry's corner; the labels, through "independent promotion" programs, effectively have to pay them to broadcast music. And the electronics industry's attitude toward the labels is summed up by an Apple slogan: Rip. Mix. Burn. Which, a music executive once told me, translates into "Fuck you, record labels." Even the music trade's corporate masters are torn. Until the 1980s, most labels were controlled by eccentric, sometimes thuggish entrepreneurs who had their whole lives bound up with selling albums. In the past two decades, every big label has been swept up into one of five major groups: Universal, Warner, Sony, BMG, and EMI, which together control about 75 percent of global recorded-music sales. Despite their dominance, though, the majors are merely duchies in large media empires with other, often conflicting, priorities. Last year, the Big Five together sold about $20 billion worth of music. Meanwhile, Sony alone saw about $42 billion in electronics and computer sales. If Sony wants to sell MP3-capable cell phones - a big thing in Japan and potentially worldwide - how much attention will it pay to Sony Music's protests? Similarly, AOL Time Warner is desperately trying to resuscitate AOL by selling high-speed Internet access. Yet one of the main uses for high-speed connections is downloading free music - something that Warner Music sees as a deadly threat. Bertelsmann, the German media titan that owns BMG Music, cared so little about its music division that the company invested millions of dollars in Napster, accepting along the way the outraged resignation of its two main music executives. Worse, at a time when bold thinking is required, the industry, once the province of entrepreneurial risk-takers, is increasingly managed by bean counters focused on short-term survival. Too often, the response to problems is throwing lawyers and money at them, then ducking responsibility. Why, when most industries are using technology to slash costs, is Michael Jackson running up $30 million in studio bills? Or, rather, why is Sony Music letting him? Career protection. By using the hottest producers and recording studios, executives can deflect failure ("We got the Neptunes, what else could we have done?") and allay their fears artists will blame them for a flop ("That track would've got some air, but the Suits wouldn't shell out $50,000 to clear the Zeppelin sample"). Because the costs are billed against the musicians, there's little incentive to save money. For years, the safest path to success in the music business has been to hunt the teen market. But by ignoring career artists at the expense of the latest trends, the labels have lost touch with wide swaths of society. Ultimately, Timothy suggested to me that night, the industry as we know it could vanish not so much because of technology but because few people over the age of 30 would care if it did. "I can't believe that the business I've spent my life with could be about to disappear," he said. "And I also can't believe it's happening so fast." If the industry collapsed, as he predicted, would artists and listeners be better or worse off? After a brutally difficult transition musicians and fans might on the whole benefit. The star-making machinery may crumble, but people will still pay for music, whether it's live, licensed, or digitally delivered (at a competitive price). Look at the bluegrass and gospel circuits, which provide long careers and middle-class lives to some of America's greatest performers. Look at the techno bands that are winning an audience by selling their music to advertisers. And look at artists like Phish, Prince, and Wonderlick, who are trying to use the Internet to deal directly with their fans and bypass the middleman. To be sure, today's middleman does a lot of good, too. Fans taught by two generations of rock and roll to loathe the Suits don't appreciate the enormous contributions of producers and A&R executives (think Ahmet Ertegun or Russell Simmons). And the labels perform the invaluable function of backing young performers financially as they begin their careers. But in a post-label world, musicians might find other ways to get this help, from the American Idol model (building recognition as part of a corporate campaign) to the Broadway show model (getting ad hoc groups of small investors to provide funds). Eliminating the big-label overheads could cut the cost of making music, too, enlarging the pool of contenders and democratizing the process. All of these models would produce fewer global superstars and more locally successful musicians. We might not see another Michael Jackson circa 1982, but we also wouldn't see another Michael Jackson circa 2002. Not a bad tradeoff. When I made these suggestions to Timothy, a habitual skeptic about the music industry, he wasn't convinced: He didn't think that the people he talked to every day were up for a revolution. It could happen, I argued. He clapped me on the shoulder agreeably. "In any case," he said, "we're about to find out."

Transcript

  • 1.
    • Volti, Unit 2 information, chapters 9-11
    • Work in Nonindustrial Societies
    • Technology and Jobs
    • Technological Change and Life on the Job
  • 2.
    • Work in Nonindustrial Societies
    • “ Technological innovations were discouraged, for the prime concern of the guild was the maintenance of the existing way of life” (142)
    • “… technology thus stands indicted as the destroyer of long-established ways of working” (165)
  • 3.
    • Guilds
  • 4.  
  • 5.
    • MPAA
    • Jack Valenti, recently retired President
    • Represents:
      • Disney
      • Sony Pictures, MGM
      • Paramount, Fox
      • Warner Bros.
      • Universal Studios
    © 2003, Associated Press
  • 6.  
  • 7.  
  • 8.
    • Technology and Jobs
    • “ The development of technology over time has not always resulted in diminished workloads; in fact the opposite has sometimes been the case” (153)
    • “ Technological change does eliminate specific jobs, but it does not eliminate work itself” (182)
  • 9.  
  • 10.  
  • 11.  
  • 12. © 2002, Napster
  • 13. 1999 - 2000 2001 2003 2002 2004 $$$ X $$$
  • 14.  
  • 15.
    • Why do RIAA & MPAA care?
  • 16.  
  • 17.  
  • 18.
      • P2P = “Killer App”
  • 19. © 2000, Harvard Business School Press
  • 20.
    • Past Examples
  • 21.
    • Past Examples
    Oct 18, 2010
  • 22.
    • Past Examples
    Oct 18, 2010
  • 23.
    • Past Examples
    Oct 18, 2010 © 1989, MGM
  • 24.  
  • 25.
    • More Examples: Xbox
  • 26.
    • More Examples: Xbox
    © Microsoft, 2002 © Bungie Studios, 2004
  • 27.
    • More Examples: Sirius Satellite Radio
    © Sirius, 2005
  • 28.
    • More Examples: Sirius Satellite Radio
    © Sirius, 2005 © Howardstern.com, 2004
  • 29.
    • P2P / Killer App
  • 30.