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CERN: Machine Protection Systems

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The Large Hadron Collider at CERN is the world's most largest machine, having stored magnet energy in excess of 5 Giga-Joules, and energy stored in each circulating beam in excess of 360 …

The Large Hadron Collider at CERN is the world's most largest machine, having stored magnet energy in excess of 5 Giga-Joules, and energy stored in each circulating beam in excess of 360 Mega-Joules.

A machine protection system has been implemented to protect LHC against the risks related to stored energies, whilst allowing the machine to operate close to the physical limits.

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  • 1. Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?B. Todd ISSC 2010 August 2010Thanks to : TE/MPE/MI, A. Schauf, ISSC, J. Joyce, L, Fabre, et al. long– 60 minutes – 1v5
  • 2. CERN CERN Founded in 1954 20 Member States Funded by the European Union …most of the EU… 8 Observer States and Organisations 580 Institutes World Wide …Japan, Russia, USA… 2500 Staff 35 Non-Member States 8000 Visiting Scientists …Australia, Canada, New Zealand… Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire European Centre for Nuclear Research Pure Science – Particle Physics 1. Pushing the boundaries of research, physics beyond the standard model. 2. Advancing frontiers of technology. 3. Forming collaborations through science 4. Educating the scientists and engineers of tomorrowbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 3. CERN We use the world’s largest and most complex scientific instruments to study the basic constituents of matter. These instruments are particle accelerators and detectors. Accelerators boost beams of particles to high energies before they are made to collide with each other or with stationary targets. Detectors observe and record the results of these collisions. Our flag-ship project is the Large Hadron Collider…benjamin.todd@cern.ch benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 4
  • 4. CERN CERN Accelerator Complex CERN Lake Geneva Geneva Airport CERN LAB 2 (France) CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 5. CERN CERN Accelerator Complex CERN Lake Geneva Large Hadron Collider (LHC) Geneva Airport CERN LAB 2 (France) Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) Proton Synchrotron 27km long (PS) 150m underground CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 6. CERN CERN Accelerator Complex CERN Lake Geneva Large Hadron Collider (LHC) Geneva Airport CERN LAB 2 (France) Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) Proton Synchrotron (PS) CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 7. CERN Accelerator Complex Lake GenevaLarge Hadron Collider (LHC) Geneva Airport CERN LAB 2 (France) Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) Proton Synchrotron (PS) CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)
  • 8. CERN CERN Accelerator Complex CERN Lake Geneva Large Hadron Collider (LHC) Geneva Airport CERN LAB 2 (France) Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) Proton Synchrotron Injector complex (PS) 1e12 protons per injection CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland) 2808 injections per beam…benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 9. CERN CERN Accelerator Complex Lake Geneva Large Hadron Collider (LHC) Geneva Airport CERN LAB 2 (France) Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) Proton Synchrotron (PS) CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 10. CERN CERN Accelerator Complex CERN Lake Geneva Large Hadron Collider (LHC) Geneva Airport CERN LAB 2 (France) Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) Proton Synchrotron (PS) CERN LAB 1 (Switzerland)benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 11. CERN CERN Accelerator Complex CERN Beam Dumping Systems Large Hadron Collider (LHC) ~ 9 km ~ 5.5 miles Beam-2 Transfer Line (TI8) Super Proton Synchrotron (SPS) Beam-1 Transfer Line (TI2) 100us for one turn,benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection CERN, the LHC and Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 12 of 23
  • 12. CERN CERN Accelerator Complex CERN CMS LHC-b ALICE ATLASbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 13. CERN ATLAS – A Toroidal LHC ApparatuSbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 14
  • 14. CERN ATLAS – A Toroidal LHC ApparatuSbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 15
  • 15. CERNbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 16
  • 16. CERN Why the LHC? material costs of the LHC and experiments ≈$4 billion The Higgs Boson Gravity is such a weak force – can it be explained? Dark Matter / Energy 96% of mass in the universe is unaccounted for Do Weakly Interacting Massive Particles (WIMPs) account for this? Beyond the Standard Model String Theory / Super Symmetry / Super String Theory / A Theory of Everything? We need some clues! collide two beams… high intensity = more ‘events’ LHC Beam Intensity = 3 x 1014 p high energy = more massive particles possible LHC Energy = 7 TeV [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 17
  • 17. CERN Collisions ~109 proton-proton collisions per second Massive amounts of data generated – all must be processed new particles are rare – only a few events per day [3]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 18
  • 18. CERN Technological Challenges …To see the rarest events… LHC needs high luminosity of 1034 [cm-2s-1] Collisions generate 3 x 1014 p per beam particle fluence near machine PetaBytes of datademands radiation-tolerant electronics Per year … to get 7 TeV operation… LHC needs 8.3 Tesla dipole fields with circumference of 27 kms (16.5 miles) World’s largest … to get 8.3 Tesla … machine LHC needs super-conducting magnets <2 K (-271 C) with an operational current of ≈13kA cooled in super fluid helium 1 ppm maintained in a vacuum 10x less pressure than on moon surface Stored energy per beam is 360 MJ Stored energy in the magnet circuits is 9 GJ A magnet will QUENCH two orders of magnitude with milliJoule higher than others deposited energy [11] benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 19
  • 19. CERN Technological Challenges Kinetic Energy of 200m Train at 155 km/h ≈ 360 MJ Stored energy per beam is 360 MJ Stored energy in the magnet circuits is 9 GJ Picture source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Alstom_AGV_Cerhenice_img_0365.jpg [11] Shared as: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.enbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 20
  • 20. CERN Technological Challenges Kinetic Energy of 200m Train at 155 km/h ≈ 360 MJ Stored energy per beam is 360 MJ Stored energy in the magnet circuits is 9 GJ Kinetic Energy of Aircraft Carrier at 50 km/h ≈ 9 GJ Picture source: http://militarytimes.com/blogs/scoopdeck/2010/07/07/the-airstrike-that-never-happened/ [11] Shared as: public domainbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 21
  • 21. CERN Technological Challenges Machine protection – a fundamental requirement to realise LHC I would argue: LHC stored energies are game-changing far above prior machines machine protection mindset had to rapidly evolve to address the new risks keeping pace, but only now are we starting to formalise how we tackle challenges like LHC We’re defining what we’ve done after the fact. Similar in a way: electronic systems in passenger vehicles? LHC’s most comparable predecessor / competitor : The TEVATRON = p+p- accelerator / collider in Fermilab, USA. [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 22
  • 22. CERN Protection Functions Beam Protection: Beam Energy Beam Dump 100x energy of TEVATRON 0.000005% of beam lost into a magnet = quench 0.005% beam lost into magnet = damage Failure in protection – complete loss of LHC is possible Powering Protection: Magnet Energy Emergency Discharge 10-20x energy per magnet of TEVATRON magnet quenched = hours downtime many magnets quenched = days downtime magnet damaged = $1 million, months downtime many magnets damaged = many millions, many months downtime (few spares)benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 23
  • 23. CERN Protection Functions Beam Protection: Beam Energy Beam Dump 100x energy of TEVATRON 0.000005% of beam lost into a magnet = quench 0.005% beam lost into magnet = damage Failure in protection – complete loss of LHC is possible Concrete Beam is ‘painted’ Shielding diameter 35cm 8m long absorber Graphite = 800 Cbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 24
  • 24. CERN Protection Functions Beam Protection: Beam Energy Beam Dump 100x energy of TEVATRON 0.000005% of beam lost into a magnet = quench 0.005% beam lost into magnet = damage Failure in protection – complete loss of LHC is possible unacceptable beam dump danger exists completed DETECT COMMUNICATE SYNCHRONISE ABORT >80 us <150 us <90 us 90 us Plant / Sensor Beam Interlock System Beam Dump To protect against fastest failure modes ≈ 400 µs over 27kmbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 25
  • 25. CERN Protection Functions LHC is (just) the first machine with these energy risks High Energy Physics community is learning to deal with the challenges I think: • System-safety ideas, concepts and approaches should be absorbed by CERN LHC is its own prototype: • systems involved protection are unique • certain technologies used have never been tried on this scale before My mission: • rigorous development of machine protection as if it were a safety system • Could our argument-based approach be accepted by system-safety? I can argue that the MPS is fit for purposebenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 26
  • 26. CERN Protection Functions It took more than ten years to address all of the issues for the LHC… • prior knowledge • assumptions • simulations • failure cases • solutions for every failure case • testing • Implementation • verification And we’re still learning…benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 27
  • 27. CERN LHC Equipment and Control System Vacuum Example: • maintain correct pressure Plant Systems: Fulfill operational requirements Sensors Plant Actuators Vacuum Vacuum Pump Pressure Speed Control [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 28
  • 28. CERN LHC Equipment and Control System Vacuum Example: • maintain correct pressure • bad pressure = close valves Vacuum Vacuum Valve Pressure Actuator Plant Protection: Plant Ensure plant stays within limits Protection Plant Systems: Fulfill operational requirements Sensors Plant Actuators Vacuum Vacuum Pump Pressure Speed Control [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 29
  • 29. CERN LHC Equipment and Control System Vacuum Vacuum Valve Pressure Actuator Plant Systems: Plant Ensure plant stays within limits Protection Fulfill operational requirements Sensors Actuators Plant • Sensors, Actuators and Process may be combined • No rules regarding combination Vacuum Pump • Must meet functional requirement Speed Control [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 30
  • 30. CERN LHC Equipment and Control System Personnel Safety System: Access Beam doors absorbers People in perimeter – stop machine personnel safe • cannot be merged with plants Safety but machine at risk • Must meet legal requirement Plant Protection Sensors Actuators Plant [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 31
  • 31. CERN LHC Equipment and Control System Safety Beam Machine Protection System: Protection Prevent damage to machine Prevent undue stress to components Powering Protection •No rules regarding implementation • Must meet functional requirement Plant Protection Sensors Actuators Plant [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 32
  • 32. CERN LHC Equipment and Control System Safety Beam Machine Protection System: Protection Prevent damage to machine Prevent undue stress to components Powering Protection •No rules regarding implementation • Must meet functional requirement Powering powering protection closely coupled to powering plant Plant Protection Sensors Actuators Plant [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 33
  • 33. CERN LHC Equipment and Control System Personnel Safety System: Sensors Safety Actuators Beam Machine Protection System: Protection danger exists – extract energy danger will exist – extract energy Powering Protection Powering Plant Systems: Plant Protection Sensors Actuators Plant [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 34
  • 34. CERN LHC Equipment and Control System Personnel Safety System: Sensors Safety Actuators Beam Machine Protection System: Protection danger exists – extract energy danger will exist – extract energy Powering Protection Beam protection inputs from • Safety system Powering • Plant systems • Dedicated sensors Plant Systems: Plant Protection Sensors Actuators Plant [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 35
  • 35. CERN The Machine Protection System Today Control System Discharge Circuits Quench Protection System Radio Frequency System Power Converters Power Essential Controllers Interlock Cryogenics Controllers Auxiliary Controllers General Emergency Stop Warm Magnets Uninterruptible Supplies Beam Television Control Room Powering Protection Collimation System Beam Protection Experiments Beam Vacuum System Interlock Beam Interlock System Beam System Dumping Access System Access System System Beam Position Monitor Beam Lifetime Monitor Timing Post Mortem Fast Magnet Current Changes System Beam Loss Monitors (Aperture) I am responsible for BIS and SMP Beam Loss Monitors (Arc) Software Interlock System Design and implementation Injection Systems Safe Machine Parametersbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 36
  • 36. CERN The Machine Protection System Today Control System Discharge Circuits Quench Protection System Radio Frequency System Power Converters Power Essential Controllers Interlock Cryogenics Controllers Auxiliary Controllers General Emergency Stop Warm Magnets Uninterruptible Supplies Beam Television Control Room Collimation System Experiments Beam Vacuum System Interlock Beam Interlock System Beam System Dumping Original Access System Access System System Specification Beam Position Monitor (2000) Beam Lifetime Monitor Timing Post Mortem Fast Magnet Current Changes System Current Specification Beam Loss Monitors (Aperture) Beam Loss Monitors (Arc) Software Interlock System Injection Systems Safe Machine Parametersbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 37
  • 37. CERN The Story So Far 1994 2002 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Install LEP magnets CERN approves September 10th LHC project first circulating beam September 18th first lesson learned An un-considered failure mode of solder connection 2008-9 LHC closed – repair 2012 LHC closed – upgrade Machine Protection demonstrated to be a real riskbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 38. CERN The Story So Far 1994 2002 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Install LEP magnets CERN approves September 10th LHC project first circulating beam September 18th first lesson learned not all circuits had been commissioned to 5 TeV - Final Main Dipole Circuit Commissioning • Electrical Fault at 5.2 TeV in dipole bus bar, between quadrupole and dipole Post-Analysis: R = 220 nΩ, nominal = 0.35nΩ • Electrical Arc developed and punctured helium enclosure Post-Analysis: 400 MJ dissipated in cold-mass and arcing • Helium Release into the insulating vacuum Post-Analysis: Pressure wave caused most damagebenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 39. CERN Magnet Protection Magnet Interconnectbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 40
  • 40. CERN Ideal 13 kA Connection Scheme Superconducting Cable Tin – Silver Foils Cross Section View Longditudinal View – filled with Solder Copper SuperconductingStabiliser Cablebenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 41. CERN Observed Interconnectionsbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 42. CERN Magnet Protectionbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 43
  • 43. CERN Incident location Dipole Bus barbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 44. CERN Pressure wave PT QV QV SV QV SV QV QV Q D D D Q D D D Q D D D Q D D D Q Cold-mass Vacuum vessel 1. Pressure Wave propagates inside insulation Vacuum enclosure Line E Cold support post Warm Jack 2. Rapid Pressure Rise Compensator/Bellows Vacuum barrier Self actuating relief valves could not handle pressure Design: 2Kg He/s Incident: ~20 kg He/s 3. Forces on the vacuum barriers (every second cell) Design: 1.5 bar Incident: ~8 bar • Several Quadrupoles Displaced by ~50 cm • Cryogenic line connections damaged • Vacuum to atmospheric pressurebenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 45. CERN Collateral Damage Quadrupole-dipole interconnection Quadrupole support Main Damage Area: 700m • 39 dipoles and 14 quadrupoles effected • moved to surface: • 37 replaced and 16 repairedbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 46. CERN LHC repair and consolidation 14 quadrupole 39 dipole magnets 204 electrical Over 4km of vacuum magnets replaced replaced interconnections repaired beam tube cleaned New longitudinal restraining Almost 900 new helium 6500 new detectors and 250km cables system for 50 quadrupoles pressure release ports for new Quench Protection System to protect from busbar quenches Future Damage Limitationbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 47. CERN The Story So Far 1994 2002 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Install LEP 3.5 TeV magnets CERN approves September 10th Repair LHC project first circulating beam September 18th first lesson learned November 30th 1.18 TeV November 23rd 450 GeV November 20th second startupbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 48. CERN 1994 2002 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Install LEP 3.5 TeV magnets CERN approves September 10th Repair LHC project first circulating beam September 18th first lesson learned November 30th 1.18 TeV November 23rd 450 GeV November 20th second startupbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 49. CERN The Story So Far 1994 2002 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Install LEP 3.5 TeV 7.0 TeV magnets CERN approves September 10th Repair Upgrade LHC project first circulating beam September 18th first lesson learned November 30th 1.18 TeV November 23rd 450 GeV November 20th second startupbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 50. CERN Dump Statistics January-August 2010 increase of beam energy as machine protection is commissioned ≈770 triggers to date Within this: one mission abort due to Beam Interlock System fail-safe Beam Loss Others Detected 17% 23% Control Room 16% Beam Position Incorrect 12% Software Interlock 8% Beam Dump Self Trigger Powering 14% System Fault 10%benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 51
  • 51. CERN The Future – Linear Accelerators CLIC – Compact LInear Collider ILC – International Linear Collider LHC results = electron / positron collider required for detailed study CERN is designing CLIC machine protection Various Institutes designing ILC machine protection Only one of these likely to be built – depends on what LHC discovers • logical next step for physics • specification to be finished circa 2015 • > $10 Billion machines • 30-50 km long • beam energy densities 1000x higher than previous e-e+ machines • beam energy 10000x above component damage limitbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 52
  • 52. CERN Large Hadron Collider (LHC) Compact Linear Collider (CLIC)benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?
  • 53. CERN The Future – ITER ITER – International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor many synergies with LHC challenges CERN is consulting on the design of the ITER Machine Protection… • first steps of 50-year plan • prove / disprove fusion feasibility for commercialisation • > $10 Billion machine • > 100 GJ of stored magnetic energy • 500MW of fusion for 1000 seconds vs state-of-the-art: 16MW of fusion for 1 second (Joint European Torus) Tritium – Deuterium Fusion Deuterium Tritium Neutron Helium + → + + Energy [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 54
  • 54. CERN The Future – ITER ITER – International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor many synergies with LHC challenges CERN is consulting on the design of the ITER Machine Protection… • first steps of 50-year plan • prove / disprove fusion feasibility for commercialisation • > $10 Billion machine • > 100 GJ of stored magnetic energy • 500MW of fusion for 1000 seconds vs state-of-the-art: 16MW of fusion for 1 second (Joint European Torus) Tritium – Deuterium Fusion Deuterium Tritium Neutron Helium + → + + Energy [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 55
  • 55. CERN The Future – ITER ITER – International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor Safety– prevent Tritium release Protection– protect the reactor Plant– protect the sub-systems Safety Protection Plant Protection Sensors Actuators Plant [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 56
  • 56. CERN The Future – ITER ITER – International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor Safety– prevent Tritium release Protection– protect the reactor Plant– protect the sub-systems Safety Protection Plant Protection Sensors Actuators Plant [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 57
  • 57. CERN The Future – ITER ITER – International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor Safety– prevent Tritium release Protection– protect the reactor Plant– protect the sub-systems Safety Protection Plant Protection Sensors Actuators Plant [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 58
  • 58. CERN The Future – ITER ITER – International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor Safety– prevent Tritium release Protection– protect the reactor Plant– protect the sub-systems Safety Protection Initial study: Machine protection can veto plant protection Plant Protection • Shutdown in sequence Sensors Actuators • Sacrifice one to save another Plant [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 59
  • 59. CERN The Future – ITER ITER – International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor Safety– prevent Tritium release Protection– protect the reactor Plant– protect the sub-systems Safety Protection Initial study: Machine protection can veto plant protection Plant Protection ΔT • Shutdown in sequence Sensors Actuators • Sacrifice one to save another Plant Or delay plant protection? [11]benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 60
  • 60. CERN My Mission LHC is its own prototype, a unique machine, ≈30 years in the making • key protection systems involved are one-of-a-kind • Installations are very large • Shut down a 27km machine in less than 0.5 milliseconds • Electronically harsh machine environment (B, E, radiation fields) • stored energies are far higher than in previous machines • LHC is the first machine with such massive built-in destruction potential • cost of failure is extreme • we have used an argument based approach to address machine protection Future machines will be bigger, more powerful, more challenging • protection already critical factor, even in first design drafts High Energy Physics community is already dealing with the challenges But technology is ahead of safety: this is formalising what we’ve already done. My mission: • rigorous development of machine protection as if it were a safety system. • Keep the deep-thinking approach, incorporate system-safety techniques • certification. Wishful thinking? stake-holders could demand some “compliance” from us to insure their investment.benjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 61
  • 61. CERN “Machine Protection – A Future Safety System?” an open question to your community Thank you for your attentionbenjamin.todd@cern.ch Machine Protection – A Future Safety System? 62