1. Planning to Fight 1
Planning to Fight: The Second Battle of Zhawar
CPT Philip Bucci
MSCoE

2. Planning to Fight 2
LTG Nabi Azimi showed very little understanding of the mission command
principles throughout this battle by lacking understanding of the enemy, direction to his
men, leadership in the field, and assessment of the reality on the ground. His faults as
a commander would lead to significant losses to his men, mission failure, and the loss
of his command. Using the 3M, (men, mission, and me), method of analysis I will show
that LTG Azimi’s mission would fail from the start.
In February 1986, Secretary Gorbachev announced that Soviet Forces would
conduct a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan. This would be precipitated by
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan taking the leading in combat operations against the
Mujahideen. With this in mind, the Soviets pushed the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan Command to relieve the siege of Khost by again attacking the Mujahideen
strong point at Zhawar.
The Soviet approved plan called for 54 under-strength Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan maneuver battalions and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan artillery and
aviation assets. While the ground commander MG Mohammad Asef Delavar, Deputy
Minister of Defense LTG Nabi Azimi was the overall commander of the Afghan Forces.
Advising this mission on behalf of the Soviets was Deputy to the Senior Military Adviser
for Combat, General-Major V. G. Trofimenko.
Azimi and Trofimenko produced a collaborative plan for the offensive. The Plan
had two separate elements constituted of an eastern combat group and a western
combat group. The 38th Commando Brigade was selected to make a an air assault
onto the Key Terrain of Dawri Gar. Dawri Gar was a mountain which rose 3,600 meters

3. Planning to Fight 3
above sea level and towered over Zhawar giving a a dominate location to whoever held
it.
The commando group had little experience in air assault missions, and the first
lift was scheduled to go in before sunrise on the 28 February. The operation began with
government forces, covered by Soviet aviation, moving out of their attack positions into
the combat zone. When the Afghan units in the Matwarkh region, they ceased further
movement for about a month awaiting further orders.
Around midnight on 2 April, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan began
artillery and aviation attacks into the target area. This was followed by the initial
Commando group’s insertion. The commandos landed without opposition but in
Pakistan, not onto the mountain top. This led to the ground assault meeting heavy
resistance from Mujahideen defending Dawri Gar Mountain. As a result the ground
advance was fixed in place. Generals Azimi made the decision based on the missed
drop of the initial commando assault to launch the rest of the brigade onto the open
areas around Zhawar itself rather than the open landing zone on top of the Dawri Gar
Mountain.
A Mujahideen commander saw the second wave of Commando transport
helicopters flying into the battle area and contacted the commanders at Zhawar to warn
them. The Mujahideen expected that the landings would be at Lezhi or Darakai. Radio
reports of further aircraft flying to the battle area continued to come in, allowing the
Mujahideen to arrange themselves for both anti air combat and into positions to repel
forces out of the landing zones around the Zhawar area.

4. Planning to Fight 4
The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan forces and their Soviet advisors chose
to follow the standard pattern for an attack and began to pound the area with air strikes
followed quickly by air assault landings and artillery fire in an attempt to link up the air
assault forces with the slower moving, but more powerful ground advance. Knowing this
the Mujahideen commanders had warning, reaction time, and solid information as to
where the attack would be headed. Helicopters began to land the rest of the Commando
Brigade on seven landing zones around Zhawar. Mujahideen gunners began to destroy
as many helicopters as possible while they were still on the landing zones. Mujahideen
air defense proved to be ineffective against the follow on air strikes made by the soviet
fighters and bombers.
Noting the ineffectual results of the anti-air fire and that the high ground was
unoccupied the Mujahideen took the initiative and began to attack the landing zones.
The four landing zones were rapidly overran and the Mujahideen captured many of the
commandos. Mujahideen called for reinforcements to take the commandos off the
battle field and hold them in Pakistan. By the end the Mujahideen had captured 530
commandos.
Soviet aircraft with smart munitions made strikes on the caves. They hit the first
western cave and killed 18 Mujahideen outright. The second western cave and
collapsing the opening trapping some 150 Mujahideen inside. This second cave was the
radio transmission bunker for the Mujahideen in the area. This strike trapped the
Mujahideen commander, Jalaluddin Haqani. The Soviet followed the precision strike
with dummy ordnance. They blasted away the rubble blocking the cave entrances,
freeing the trapped Mujahideen inside.

5. Planning to Fight 5
As the battle for the remaining landing zones continued one group of
commandos reached the high ground and held out for three days before being overrun.
One of the lead Commando Officers managed to exifiltrate and lead 24 of the
commandos to the safety. The exfiltration took eight days.
As the Corps first echelon tried to link up with the air assault-force they
consumed their entire supply of ammunition were forced to pull back to their their
release points after 3 days. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan had maintained
the garrison at Lezhi since the first battle of Zhawar and continued to fight for the
possession of the Manay Kandow Pass for some ten days following the failed air
landings.
General Varrenikov contacted the Soviet Minister of Defense criticizing the
leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan Forces on the ground. He argued
that weather, the length of campaign, and the lack of actionable intelligence were to
blame for the overall failure. He outlined his plans to reinforce with three Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan regiments, a Democratic Republic of Afghanistan spetsnaz
battalion and six Soviet battalions. He replaced General Azimi as operations
commander and requested time to resupply. General Sokolov, the Minister of Defense,
gave Varrenikov twelve days to resume of the operation. LTG Azimi flew to Kabul on
where he issued orders to arrest the helicopter regiment commander, who was hiding,
attempting to blame him for the miss landing of the initial commando elements.
In the end the Soviet forces took over the operation and were eventually
successful in taking the high ground and relieving the siege of Khost. It would prove to
be a pyrrhic victory for the communists, as soon after they pulled off the mountain, the

6. Planning to Fight 6
Mujahideen forces returned and refortified the position. It would not fall until the
American invasion almost 15 years later.
The 3Ms tie into LTG Azimi’s failures in mission command in that lacking
understanding of the enemy, direction to his men, leadership in the field, and
assessment of the reality on the ground. LTG Azimi failed his men by not providing
proper direction for their fight they were about to enter and by not providing proper
leadership in the field. His commando elements had little experience with air assault
missions, and his enemy knew his order of battle so well that they could anticipate it.
By not ensuring that his men had the proper direction, and support throughout the battle
his men were forced to fight an enemy in a defensive position that was hardened and
ready. Admittedly LTG Azimi was merely following his training by using the soviet
method, in the end he set his soldiers up for failure because his enemy knew how he
would fight.
LTG Azimi failed his mission for two reasons, fist and most obviously, he failed to
take to the objective. His more significant reason for failure was his inability to asses
the reality of the battlefield as presented to him. Once he learned that the initial assault
elements had miss the landing zones, he should tasked on the remaining elements with
that operation. Instead he continued fighting the plan, rather than planning to fight.
This led his men into landing zones with no overwatch and eventually to their deaths.
Finally he failed himself by not better recognizing the strength and abilities of his
own force and that arrayed against him. While LTG Azimi had the upper hand in
numbers, technology and fire power, his enemies had the high ground, early warning,

7. Planning to Fight 7
rapid access to reinforcements and the desire to fight. The first battle of Zhawar ended
with the Mujahideen still in possession of the high ground and significant loss of men to
the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan military. If LTG Azimi had kept this in mind he
would have known that Zhawar was not only important but strategic to the Mujahideen
forces.
This battle has significance today in that we can see the folly of assuming that
just because we may have more firepower, men, or technology, the ability to detect
patterns and predictable behaviors are key. The Mujahideen knew that communists
were coming simply because the order of battle never changed. In Afghanistan today
the insurgent forces know response times for quick reaction forces, helicopter routes,
rules of engagement and many other predictable habitual techniques and procedures
that we have. This gives them an advantage in that we cannot get ahead of their
decision processes since they know our next three moves better than we do. Also by
having the leaders that make decisions on actual battle maneuvers never set foot on the
field leads to a false sense of knowledge. LTG Azimi was not in a forward position, but
he directed events as if he could see the actual battle area. Decision makers are wary
about pushing decisions down to their subordinates, it lowers their worth to the overall
fight in their mind. Had LTG Azimi sought more “on the ground” knowledge he might
have adjusted his battle plan accordingly. The US military almost had a similar outcome
in Operation Anaconda in 2002. Leaders in the rear made the decision to continue
fighting the plan despite the reality on the ground. In the end, men on the ground were
able to shape the outcome by cutting out the leadership in the rear and acting on real
time information on the ground.

8. Planning to Fight 8
In conclusion, LTG Azimi failed to practice good mission command because he
lacked understanding of the enemy, direction to his men, leadership in the field, and
assessment of the reality on the ground. This lead to the failure of his command in this
battle, and the loss of an entire Commando Brigade, numerous portions of other
elements, huge amounts of materiel, and nearly the campaign. Had he better
understood the mission command principles he might have won the battle in the first try,
or at minimum, been able to salvage more men and materials for the second attack.
LTG Azimi is a fine example of what fighting the plan can lead to rather than planning to
fight.

9. Planning to Fight 9
Bibliography
Grau, L. W. (1996). The Bear Went Over the Mountain. Leavenworth: National Defense
University Press.
Grau, L. W. (2001). The Campaign For The Caves: The Battles For Zhawar
in the Soviet-Afghan War. Retrieved August 22, 2012, from Globalsecurity.org:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/010900-zhawar.htm
Grau, L. W. (1995). The Other Side of the Mountain. Leavenworth: National Defense
University Press.
Grau, L. W. (2004). The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains.
Retrieved August 22, 2012, from Leavenworth.army.mil:
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/miredinmount.htm