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Standardizing and 
Strengthening Security 
Dima Kumets 
dima@opendns.com 
Sr. Product Manager 
opendns.com/msp 
1 CONFIDENTIAL
2 CONFIDENTIAL 
GLOBAL 
SECURITY 
NETWORK 
208.67.220.220 208.67.222.222 
2% OF INTERNET WORLD-WIDE 
23 DATA CENTER LOCATIONS 
60B+ QUERIES PER DAY 
2,000+ ITSP PARTNERS 
ASIA-PACIFIC 
EUROPE, 
MIDDLE 
EAST & AFRICA 
AMERICA 
S
Umbrella for MSPs: 
Cloud-delivered security 
service for MSPs 
3 CONFIDENTIAL
DECREASED 
COSTS 
50-80% 
reduction in 
malware 
cleanup time 
4 CONFIDENTIAL 
INCREASED 
REVENUE 
Granular Web 
Filter and 
cloud service 
compliance 
IMPROVED 
RETENTION 
Improved 
customer 
uptime and 
value reports 
Security ROI
The Evolving 
Threatscape 
5 CONFIDENTIAL
6 CONFIDENTIAL 
Changes in Technology 
SaaS 
Subscribe to applications 
instead of buying and deploying 
IaaS 
Rent servers and storage 
instead of building 
CaaS 
CyberCrime made easier 
with SaaS and IaaS models
7 CONFIDENTIAL 
OLD NEW 
Hacker Organization 
 Centralized 
 Build from scratch 
 Own servers 
 Expensive 
 Large targets 
Crime Ecosystem 
 Distributed 
 Buy or hosted 
 Specialize in areas 
 Cheap 
 Smaller targets 
Evolution of CyberCrime
8 CONFIDENTIAL 
Cybercrime Job Postings 
Cybercrime Payment Systems 
Cybercrime Marketplaces
SMB in the Crosshairs 
Decreased Cost Makes SMBs Ideal Targets 
9 CONFIDENTIAL 
36% 
TARGETED 
41% 
ATTACKS AGAINST 
SMBS 
18% 
2011 2012 2013 
PROPORTION OF 
BREACHES BY ORG 
SIZE 
15 
x 
1x 
ORGS 
WITH 11- 
100 
EMPLOYE 
ES 
ORGS WITH 
<11 or >100 
EMPLOYEE 
S
How SMBs Are Being 
Targeted: Infection 
Vectors 
10 CONFIDENTIAL
Emails Are Targeting SMBs 
11 CONFIDENTIAL 
GOAL 
Trick SMB into 
opening link or 
attachment
Exploits Kit/Drive By Download Explosion 
12 CONFIDENTIAL 
GOAL 
Breach 
browser to 
push and 
executable
Exploit Kits Are Getting Better 
13 CONFIDENTIAL
Exploits Kit/Drive By Download Explosion 
Explosion in Kits Available 
14 CONFIDENTIAL
Malvertising on the Rise 
How do they work? Attn: NYTimes.com 
1. Set up a website with 
exploit kit 
2. Run an ad on Yahoo, 
AOL or other ad 
network, with legitimate 
company creative 
3. Ad server redirects 
users to exploit kit site 
4. User gets infected 
15 CONFIDENTIAL 
readers: Do not click pop-up 
box warning about a 
virus -- it’s an unauthorized 
ad we are working to 
eliminate. 
The New York Times 
Top websites deliver 
CryptoWall 
ransomware via 
malvertising… 
Adam Greenberg 
SC Times
Malvertising Targeting SMBs 
16 CONFIDENTIAL
Intermediate step: 
Dropper Malware 
17 CONFIDENTIAL
Increasingly Common Step: Dropper 
Increasingly Common Option for Ransomware 
1 
Bad actor gets a 
piece of malware 
on computer 
18 CONFIDENTIAL 
2 
Malware sits 
quietly and just 
phones home; 
not the 
flashy/noisy 
malware 
3 
Bad actor sells or 
rents ability to 
infect computer 
 Malware phones 
home 
 Installs main 
payload: 
Ransomware, 
Keylogger, Spambot 
Malware that 
installs other 
malware 
4 
GOAL 
If contract 
ends or more 
capacity, 
install more 
malware
ANTIVIRUS 
19 CONFIDENTIAL
Source: krebsonsecurity.com 
20 CONFIDENTIAL
Malware payload 
21 CONFIDENTIAL
Keyloggers and 
Spyware 
22 CONFIDENTIAL
23 CONFIDENTIAL
24 CONFIDENTIAL
SMB Bank Account Breaches 
25 CONFIDENTIAL 
Crystal Lake Elementary School District 47 
Amount Stolen: $350,000.00 
Media: McHenry County Blog 
DKG Enterprises 
Amount Stolen: $100,000.00 
Media: Krebs On Security 
Downeast Energy & Building Supply 
Amount Stolen: $150,000.00 
Media: Bank Info Security 
Little & King LLC 
Amount Stolen: $164,000.00 
Media: Krebs On Security 
Battle Ground Cinema 
Amount Stolen: $81,000.00 
Media: Krebs On Security 
Delray Beach Public Library 
Amount Stolen: $160,000.00 
Media: Krebs On Security 
Brookeland Fresh Water Supply District 
Amount Stolen: $35,000.00 
Media: Krebs On Security 
Spring Hill Independent School District 
Amount Stolen: $30,687.00 
Media: News-Journal
26 CONFIDENTIAL
Ransomware 
27 CONFIDENTIAL
Ransomware 
Evolution 
 Fake Anti-Virus 
28 CONFIDENTIAL
“FBI” Ransomware 
Evolution 
 Fake Anti-Virus 
 FBI Ransomware 
– Lock up screen+browser 
– Find pornography in history 
– If none found, pop-up porn 
– Ask for Ransom 
29 CONFIDENTIAL 
GOAL 
Scare user into 
paying ransom
30 CONFIDENTIAL
31 CONFIDENTIAL 
Your webcam 
Image here
32 CONFIDENTIAL
33 CONFIDENTIAL
34 CONFIDENTIAL
Malware Payload: Ransomware 
35 CONFIDENTIAL 
GOAL 
Ransom 
encrypted data 
Evolution 
 Fake Anti-Virus 
 FBI Ransomware 
 Cryptovirus 
– CryptoLocker 
– PrisonLocker 
– HowDecrypt 
– CryptorBit 
– CryptoDefense 
– CryptoWall
CryptoVirus workflow 
Inbound and outbound communication 
1 
Infect machine 
with early stage 
• Email 
• Exploit kit 
• Malvertising 
• Dropper 
36 CONFIDENTIAL 
2 
Phone home to 
Command and 
Control server to 
get encryption 
key 
3 
Encrypt local and 
network share data 
• May take hours to 
days to fully 
encrypt 
• Makes finding a 
clean restore 
difficult 
Ransom user for 
encrypted data 
4 
GOAL 
Ransom user 
• Establish 
deadline and 
threaten 
permanent data 
loss
Signature-based 
security evasion 
37 CONFIDENTIAL
Getting Around Signatures: Crypters 
38 CONFIDENTIAL
Getting Around Signatures: Crypters 
39 CONFIDENTIAL
Getting Around Signatures 
40 CONFIDENTIAL
Test Against Signature Based Tools 
 Ensures a bad actor 
will be successful 
 Allows the bad actor 
to create their own 
CyberCrime sales 
forecasts 
41 CONFIDENTIAL
Getting Around Signatures: Crypters 
42 CONFIDENTIAL
“Signature-based tools (antivirus, 
firewalls, and intrusion 
prevention) are only effective 
against 30–50% of current 
security threats.” 
43 CONFIDENTIAL 
IDC 
November 2011
Strengthening 
security beyond 
signatures 
44 CONFIDENTIAL
Security is About Layers 
45 CONFIDENTIAL
Security Layers and Risk Management 
46 CONFIDENTIAL 
On-network Off-network/Roaming 
EMAIL SECURITY 
ENDPOINT AV 
FIREWALL 
OPENDNS - NETWORK LAYER 
SIGNATURELESS SECURITY SERVICE
47 CONFIDENTIAL 
PREDICTIVE 
INTELLIGENCE 
60B+Daily 
Requests 
Block 
Threats 
Contain 
Infections 
Automation
PREVENT Malware 
 Focus on full infection process 
‒ Not just an executable or signature 
 Block sites with exploit kits at the network layer 
‒ Whether it’s a whole site or an embedded ad 
 Prevent connections to malvertising links 
‒ The connection after the ad is what matters 
 Protect users from phishing 
‒ To prevent breaches 
 Block malicious links in emails and apps 
‒ Because the browser is not the only path of infection 
48 CONFIDENTIAL
CONTAIN: The New Prevention 
Prevent “Phoning home” 
 Block “droppers” from getting malware 
‒ Whether it’s ransomware, keyloggers, spam senders or DDoS bots 
 Stop spyware/keyloggers from uploading data 
 Prevent ransomware from getting key 
 ALERT WITH TICKET IN ConnectWise 
‒ Deep API level integration 
‒ Infection is contained before user notices 
‒ 10 minute clean-up vs 10 hour 
49 CONFIDENTIAL
Standardizing 
Security 
50 CONFIDENTIAL
“80% of attacks leverage 
known vulnerabilities and 
configuration management 
setting weakness” 
51 CONFIDENTIAL 
John Streufert 
Deputy CIO, US State Department
Standardizing Security 
Challenges for MSPs 
52 CONFIDENTIAL 
Anti-virus UTMs + Firewalls 
 System performance 
 Consistency in 
updates and scans 
 Platform support 
 Application issues 
 Multiple Vendors 
 Sizing-based 
 Network topologies 
 Network 
Performance
UTM and Firewall Performance 
Admins are disabling features for Performance 
Has your organization turned off 
certain firewall functions because they 
were impacting network performance? 
53 CONFIDENTIAL 
Has your organization declined to 
enable certain firewall functions to 
avoid impacting network performance? 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
No Don't know Yes 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
No Don't know Yes 
10% 
58% 32% 
11% 
50% 39%
We Deliver Worldwide Coverage in Minutes 
55 CONFIDENTIAL 
208.67.222.222
Protect all Devices Connecting 
to Customer Networks 
56 CONFIDENTIAL 
Lightweight Agent with 
Automation Policy to Deploy 
Deploy in Minutes 
CLIENT-A 
155.21.1.1/28 
CLIENT-B 
214.41.3.1/32 
CLIENT-C 
23.4.2.4/32 
208.67.222.222
Multi-tenant 
Multiple customer organizations under MSP 
57 CONFIDENTIAL
New Feature: Centralized Management 
58 CONFIDENTIAL
New Feature: Centralized Management 
 Types 
– Block page customization 
– Security settings 
– Content filtering 
 Truly linked to customer orgs 
– No config files to manage 
– Instant changes 
 Multiple settings 
– Apply to all or Apply to some 
– Vertical specific 
– Service Level Specific 
59 CONFIDENTIAL
Centralized Management: Single Pane View 
Quickly view and modify settings 
60 CONFIDENTIAL
ROI in action 
Mirus IT saves $100k per year with OpenDNS 
61 CONFIDENTIAL
Cloud Service 
Visibility and Shadow 
IT 
62 CONFIDENTIAL
Problems with Shadow IT 
CUSTOMER 
Business Risk 
 Data leakage 
 Compliance 
 Inefficient processes 
 Security issues 
 Hidden costs 
63 CONFIDENTIAL 
MSP 
Service issues 
 “Surprise” tickets 
 Network issues 
 Cloud isn’t backed up 
 Time wasted 
 Missed Revenue
Cloud Services Visibility 
64 CONFIDENTIAL
Cloud Services Visibility 
65 CONFIDENTIAL
Signatures and humans 
can’t stay ahead of 
ADVANCED ATTACKS 
Firewalls, UTMs and 
VPNs can’t secure 
ERODING PERIMETERS 
Employees are 
deploying Cloud 
SSeHrvAicDeOsW w iIthT 
66 CONFIDENTIAL
67 CONFIDENTIAL 
Easy to Do Business 
Monthly Billing Volume Pricing 
Multi-tenant 
Dashboard 
Manage Seats 
On-demand 
BUSINESS 
PRACTICES ALIGNED 
WITH MONTHLY 
RECURRING 
REVENUE MODELS
68 CONFIDENTIAL 
Dima Kumets 
dima@opendns.com 
Booth 214

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Standardizing and Strengthening Security to Lower Costs

  • 1. Standardizing and Strengthening Security Dima Kumets dima@opendns.com Sr. Product Manager opendns.com/msp 1 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 2. 2 CONFIDENTIAL GLOBAL SECURITY NETWORK 208.67.220.220 208.67.222.222 2% OF INTERNET WORLD-WIDE 23 DATA CENTER LOCATIONS 60B+ QUERIES PER DAY 2,000+ ITSP PARTNERS ASIA-PACIFIC EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA AMERICA S
  • 3. Umbrella for MSPs: Cloud-delivered security service for MSPs 3 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 4. DECREASED COSTS 50-80% reduction in malware cleanup time 4 CONFIDENTIAL INCREASED REVENUE Granular Web Filter and cloud service compliance IMPROVED RETENTION Improved customer uptime and value reports Security ROI
  • 5. The Evolving Threatscape 5 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 6. 6 CONFIDENTIAL Changes in Technology SaaS Subscribe to applications instead of buying and deploying IaaS Rent servers and storage instead of building CaaS CyberCrime made easier with SaaS and IaaS models
  • 7. 7 CONFIDENTIAL OLD NEW Hacker Organization  Centralized  Build from scratch  Own servers  Expensive  Large targets Crime Ecosystem  Distributed  Buy or hosted  Specialize in areas  Cheap  Smaller targets Evolution of CyberCrime
  • 8. 8 CONFIDENTIAL Cybercrime Job Postings Cybercrime Payment Systems Cybercrime Marketplaces
  • 9. SMB in the Crosshairs Decreased Cost Makes SMBs Ideal Targets 9 CONFIDENTIAL 36% TARGETED 41% ATTACKS AGAINST SMBS 18% 2011 2012 2013 PROPORTION OF BREACHES BY ORG SIZE 15 x 1x ORGS WITH 11- 100 EMPLOYE ES ORGS WITH <11 or >100 EMPLOYEE S
  • 10. How SMBs Are Being Targeted: Infection Vectors 10 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 11. Emails Are Targeting SMBs 11 CONFIDENTIAL GOAL Trick SMB into opening link or attachment
  • 12. Exploits Kit/Drive By Download Explosion 12 CONFIDENTIAL GOAL Breach browser to push and executable
  • 13. Exploit Kits Are Getting Better 13 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 14. Exploits Kit/Drive By Download Explosion Explosion in Kits Available 14 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 15. Malvertising on the Rise How do they work? Attn: NYTimes.com 1. Set up a website with exploit kit 2. Run an ad on Yahoo, AOL or other ad network, with legitimate company creative 3. Ad server redirects users to exploit kit site 4. User gets infected 15 CONFIDENTIAL readers: Do not click pop-up box warning about a virus -- it’s an unauthorized ad we are working to eliminate. The New York Times Top websites deliver CryptoWall ransomware via malvertising… Adam Greenberg SC Times
  • 16. Malvertising Targeting SMBs 16 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 17. Intermediate step: Dropper Malware 17 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 18. Increasingly Common Step: Dropper Increasingly Common Option for Ransomware 1 Bad actor gets a piece of malware on computer 18 CONFIDENTIAL 2 Malware sits quietly and just phones home; not the flashy/noisy malware 3 Bad actor sells or rents ability to infect computer  Malware phones home  Installs main payload: Ransomware, Keylogger, Spambot Malware that installs other malware 4 GOAL If contract ends or more capacity, install more malware
  • 21. Malware payload 21 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 22. Keyloggers and Spyware 22 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 25. SMB Bank Account Breaches 25 CONFIDENTIAL Crystal Lake Elementary School District 47 Amount Stolen: $350,000.00 Media: McHenry County Blog DKG Enterprises Amount Stolen: $100,000.00 Media: Krebs On Security Downeast Energy & Building Supply Amount Stolen: $150,000.00 Media: Bank Info Security Little & King LLC Amount Stolen: $164,000.00 Media: Krebs On Security Battle Ground Cinema Amount Stolen: $81,000.00 Media: Krebs On Security Delray Beach Public Library Amount Stolen: $160,000.00 Media: Krebs On Security Brookeland Fresh Water Supply District Amount Stolen: $35,000.00 Media: Krebs On Security Spring Hill Independent School District Amount Stolen: $30,687.00 Media: News-Journal
  • 28. Ransomware Evolution  Fake Anti-Virus 28 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 29. “FBI” Ransomware Evolution  Fake Anti-Virus  FBI Ransomware – Lock up screen+browser – Find pornography in history – If none found, pop-up porn – Ask for Ransom 29 CONFIDENTIAL GOAL Scare user into paying ransom
  • 31. 31 CONFIDENTIAL Your webcam Image here
  • 35. Malware Payload: Ransomware 35 CONFIDENTIAL GOAL Ransom encrypted data Evolution  Fake Anti-Virus  FBI Ransomware  Cryptovirus – CryptoLocker – PrisonLocker – HowDecrypt – CryptorBit – CryptoDefense – CryptoWall
  • 36. CryptoVirus workflow Inbound and outbound communication 1 Infect machine with early stage • Email • Exploit kit • Malvertising • Dropper 36 CONFIDENTIAL 2 Phone home to Command and Control server to get encryption key 3 Encrypt local and network share data • May take hours to days to fully encrypt • Makes finding a clean restore difficult Ransom user for encrypted data 4 GOAL Ransom user • Establish deadline and threaten permanent data loss
  • 38. Getting Around Signatures: Crypters 38 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 39. Getting Around Signatures: Crypters 39 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 40. Getting Around Signatures 40 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 41. Test Against Signature Based Tools  Ensures a bad actor will be successful  Allows the bad actor to create their own CyberCrime sales forecasts 41 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 42. Getting Around Signatures: Crypters 42 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 43. “Signature-based tools (antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion prevention) are only effective against 30–50% of current security threats.” 43 CONFIDENTIAL IDC November 2011
  • 44. Strengthening security beyond signatures 44 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 45. Security is About Layers 45 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 46. Security Layers and Risk Management 46 CONFIDENTIAL On-network Off-network/Roaming EMAIL SECURITY ENDPOINT AV FIREWALL OPENDNS - NETWORK LAYER SIGNATURELESS SECURITY SERVICE
  • 47. 47 CONFIDENTIAL PREDICTIVE INTELLIGENCE 60B+Daily Requests Block Threats Contain Infections Automation
  • 48. PREVENT Malware  Focus on full infection process ‒ Not just an executable or signature  Block sites with exploit kits at the network layer ‒ Whether it’s a whole site or an embedded ad  Prevent connections to malvertising links ‒ The connection after the ad is what matters  Protect users from phishing ‒ To prevent breaches  Block malicious links in emails and apps ‒ Because the browser is not the only path of infection 48 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 49. CONTAIN: The New Prevention Prevent “Phoning home”  Block “droppers” from getting malware ‒ Whether it’s ransomware, keyloggers, spam senders or DDoS bots  Stop spyware/keyloggers from uploading data  Prevent ransomware from getting key  ALERT WITH TICKET IN ConnectWise ‒ Deep API level integration ‒ Infection is contained before user notices ‒ 10 minute clean-up vs 10 hour 49 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 51. “80% of attacks leverage known vulnerabilities and configuration management setting weakness” 51 CONFIDENTIAL John Streufert Deputy CIO, US State Department
  • 52. Standardizing Security Challenges for MSPs 52 CONFIDENTIAL Anti-virus UTMs + Firewalls  System performance  Consistency in updates and scans  Platform support  Application issues  Multiple Vendors  Sizing-based  Network topologies  Network Performance
  • 53. UTM and Firewall Performance Admins are disabling features for Performance Has your organization turned off certain firewall functions because they were impacting network performance? 53 CONFIDENTIAL Has your organization declined to enable certain firewall functions to avoid impacting network performance? 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% No Don't know Yes 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% No Don't know Yes 10% 58% 32% 11% 50% 39%
  • 54. We Deliver Worldwide Coverage in Minutes 55 CONFIDENTIAL 208.67.222.222
  • 55. Protect all Devices Connecting to Customer Networks 56 CONFIDENTIAL Lightweight Agent with Automation Policy to Deploy Deploy in Minutes CLIENT-A 155.21.1.1/28 CLIENT-B 214.41.3.1/32 CLIENT-C 23.4.2.4/32 208.67.222.222
  • 56. Multi-tenant Multiple customer organizations under MSP 57 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 57. New Feature: Centralized Management 58 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 58. New Feature: Centralized Management  Types – Block page customization – Security settings – Content filtering  Truly linked to customer orgs – No config files to manage – Instant changes  Multiple settings – Apply to all or Apply to some – Vertical specific – Service Level Specific 59 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 59. Centralized Management: Single Pane View Quickly view and modify settings 60 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 60. ROI in action Mirus IT saves $100k per year with OpenDNS 61 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 61. Cloud Service Visibility and Shadow IT 62 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 62. Problems with Shadow IT CUSTOMER Business Risk  Data leakage  Compliance  Inefficient processes  Security issues  Hidden costs 63 CONFIDENTIAL MSP Service issues  “Surprise” tickets  Network issues  Cloud isn’t backed up  Time wasted  Missed Revenue
  • 63. Cloud Services Visibility 64 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 64. Cloud Services Visibility 65 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 65. Signatures and humans can’t stay ahead of ADVANCED ATTACKS Firewalls, UTMs and VPNs can’t secure ERODING PERIMETERS Employees are deploying Cloud SSeHrvAicDeOsW w iIthT 66 CONFIDENTIAL
  • 66. 67 CONFIDENTIAL Easy to Do Business Monthly Billing Volume Pricing Multi-tenant Dashboard Manage Seats On-demand BUSINESS PRACTICES ALIGNED WITH MONTHLY RECURRING REVENUE MODELS
  • 67. 68 CONFIDENTIAL Dima Kumets dima@opendns.com Booth 214