ISIS's Growing Influence in Pakistan

New York University
School of Professional Studies
Center for Global Affairs
ISIS – Pseudo-State or Caliphate? The Spread of the Islamic State with Support
from Radical Madrassas in the Post-9/11 Islamic World: An Intelligence Perspective
on the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF SCIENCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS
Concentration: Transnational Security
Thesis Advisor: Mary Beth Altier
Submitted by:
Ali R. Malik
Date:
August 2015
Location:
New York University
(New York, NY)

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment for the requirements of a Master’s
Degree in Global Affairs from the Center for Global Affairs at the School of Professional
Studies at New York University. It contains work done from May 2015 to August 2015.
My advisor on the project has been Mary Beth Altier, Clinical Professor of Global
Affairs at NYU and an expert on political violence, ethic conflict and international
security among other specialties within the political and international relations field.
The research here within is an original, unpublished, independent & intellectual
product by the author, Ali R. Malik; there are however, ideas and contexts based on the
research of others, and I have done my best to provide references to these sources.

INTRODUCTION
America's 9/11 has given way to Pakistan's 24/7/365. The battlefield has been
displaced and in Pakistan, it is much more bloody. While there is no doubt that the reign
of radical and terrorist groups have taken a toll on the region, it seems as if the worst is
yet to come. Today, we are witnessing one of the most feared and dangerous radical
Islamist groups – ISIS, continually defying odds and operating at unprecedented levels.
ISIS is regarded as problematic due to its overarching agenda – to create one, united state
and re-establish the historical, united Caliphate of the Islamic world.1
Unlike most other
groups with similar ambitions, ISIS demands territory to create a standing military
presence. One analyst appropriately wrote: “ISIS is a more conventional fighting force,
rolling in with tanks and capturing whole cities with brutal force rather than staging
spectacular, carefully planned, one-off bomb attacks”.2
Due to these distinct militant
characteristics, quite a few political experts are hesitant in labeling them as a “terrorist
organization”. One such expert emphasized the differences between conventional terror
groups, such as al-Qaeda, and ISIS as follows:
Al-Qaeda conceived of itself as the vanguard of a global insurgency mobilizing
Muslim communities against secular rule. ISIS, in contrast, seeks to control
territory and create a “pure” Sunni Islamist state governed by a brutal
interpretation of sharia; to immediately obliterate the political borders of the
Middle East that were created by Western powers in the twentieth century; and to
position itself as the sole political, religious, and military authority over all
Muslims worldwide.3

1
Berger & Morgan. “The ISIS Twitter Census.” The Brookings Project On U.S. Relations With The Islamic
World, 2015.
2
McClam, Erin. ''More Extreme Than al-Qaeda? How ISIS Compares To Other Terror Groups.” NBC
News, 2014.
3
Cronin, Audrey. “ISIS is not a Terrorist Group.” Foreign Affairs, 2015.

This objective of hiving off and controlling territory has led ISIS to establish itself
as the sole military, religious, and political authority in significant regions of several
countries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Data from leading media
outlets suggest that control of territory in those regions range between 10% and 50%.
According to the Guardian, as of May 2015, ISIS has control of more than 50% of the
landmass in Syria, with complete control over Syrian territories such as Dier Ezzor,
Tishreen Oil Field, Palmyra, ar-Raqqah, Homs, Hama, and Idlib.4
In Iraq, ISIS controls
close to 40% of the country’s landmass, completely presiding over the cities of al-Walid,
Rutba, al-Qalm, Tal Afar, Hit, Ramadi, Fallujah, Sharqt, Mosul Dam, Qaraqoush,
Kuwayr, Hawlja, Qara Tappa, Tikrit, and Baiji. In Northern Africa, specifically in Libya,
the group controls a significant portion of landmass in the regions of Sirte and Tripoli,5
and while they don’t command any territory in Egypt, militants sympathetic to the group
have sponsored several attacks against Egyptian soldiers in Cairo and the Sinai
provinces.6
Much the same in Algeria and Tunisia, while ISIS does not control significant
territory, both countries have been the subject of attacks and are part of a growing
number of territories used as recruitment and training grounds for ISIS militants.7
Over in
Southwest Asia, specifically in Afghanistan, while ISIS has limited influence and control,
recent reports indicate that the group’s objective is to wrest as much territory as it can
from the Taliban.8
In fact, Reuters affirms that civilians in the Afghan provinces of

4
Shaheen, Kareem. "ISIS Controls 50% of Syria After Siezing Historic City of Palmyra." The Guardian,
2015.
5
Akbar, Jay. "The Terrifying Rise of ISIS." Daily Mail, 2015.
6
Ibid
7
Ibid
8
Thomson Reuters. "ISIS-Loyal Group Takes Territoryy from Taliban in Afghanistan." CBC News, 2015.

Zabul, Helmand, and Farah have already witnessed an increased presence of heavily
armed ISIS soldiers.
Figure 1 – List of territories that ISIS currently controls. The figure outlines the extent of the group’s terror
tentacles. As the figure suggests - ISIS pursues its militancy agenda around 10 states that cut across the
Middle East and North Africa.9
Although several issues arise from the data on ISIS’s territorial control and
influence, there are two fundamental sticking points: The first relates to the fact that
ISIS’s sphere of influence cuts across 10-12 countries in the Middle East, North Africa
and Asia, all of which neighbor each other (Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Iran, Iraq, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, Lebanon and Afghanistan). As the map suggests, the
direction of the group’s influence emanates from ar-Raqqah in Syria as well as Fallujah
and Mosul in Iraq, where they utilize these bases as avenues for exerting control over
their growing empire. In fact, it also suggests that ISIS relies heavily on border regions to
coordinate its control over other territories in the Middle East and Africa. Additionally,

9
Akbar, Jay. "The Terrifying Rise of ISIS." Daily Mail, 2015.

the map indicates that ISIS has established a third stronghold in the Libyan province of
Sirte. While it does not provide any indication on the role that Sirte plays, based on its
centralized location, weak governance structure, accessibility from sea and a presence of
vast oil reserves, there is a strong probability that ISIS relies on Sirte as an effective
location to control and coordinate operations in the countries of Tunisia, Algeria, Libya,
and Egypt.
The second point relates to the absence of Pakistan. Although several smaller
militant groups in Pakistan have publicly expressed their allegiance to ISIS, the map does
not list it as one of the countries with territory under the influence of any group even
closely affiliated with ISIS. Additionally, it does not list Pakistan as one of the countries
with an ISIS presence. While the current situation is consistent with this assessment,
Pakistan’s continued absence would suggest a failure by analysts to understand several
on-going factors making the country a prime potential ISIS hotbed. Factors such as
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, history of radicalization, link with terror groups, radical
madrassas, and a history of corruption in the security forces are components that have
already been exploited by militants in the past, and will continue to be ripe elements for
ISIS to capitalize on in the future. The idea of ISIS creating another stronghold like Sirte
in the city of Khuzdar (Balochistan), Landi Kotal (FATA) or Bannu (Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa) is seriously alarming since it is not entirely improbable.
Indeed, the country’s recent history suggests its vulnerability. Prior to the Arab
Spring and ISIS’s emergence, Pakistan continually dealt with a high incidence of
terrorism and violent extremism.10
Year after year, international media outlets carried out

10
CBS News. "Pakistan Suicide Attack Follows al-Qaeda Arrest." CBS News, 2011.

reports of theses attacks,11
suggesting that Pakistan’s military and intelligence services
were complicit in the Taliban’s control over provinces that run along the country’s border
with Afghanistan (including North and South Waziristan, Kurram, Lakki, Marwat,
Bannu, Orazkai, Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Dir, Malakand, Shangai, Buner, Swat,
Kohistan, and Chitral – Figure 2).
Figure 2 – Extent of the Taliban’s Control of Territories in Pakistan.12
In fact, while the U.S. military carried out drone strikes against Taliban and al-
Qaeda training camps in these provinces, the U.S. government argued that these raids
were necessary because Pakistan lacked the ability to do so on their own. Members of the

11
Ibid

12
Freedman, Ilana. "Flashpoint: Pakistan." Gerard Group International, 2009.

U.S. Congress were even more skeptical about Pakistan’s ability to drive out these groups
from its border, with many blatantly declaring that the Pakistani government actively
supports these groups. Congressional representatives eventually relied on news of the
capture and assassination of Osama Bin Laden (near a Pakistani military compound in
Abbottabad), as evidence of Pakistan’s involvement in facilitating the development of
terror groups and violent extremism in their own country as well as neighboring
Afghanistan. Viewing Pakistan from the prism of this history, we can argue that such
suitable conditions are propitious for an ISIS invasion or expansion.
At this time though, a detailed analysis of recent media reports of ISIS’s implicit
goals suggests that the decision to currently leave Pakistan out of the list of countries
under ISIS influence is politically correct and appropriate. Most of these reports suggest
that there is a fear among international intelligence communities that the terror group has
already began to spread its tentacles to Pakistan, yet critics state that there is no credible
evidence to back that claim. The focus has still not entirely shifted from countries in
which ISIS does have a strong presence, such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria.
However, local Pakistani TIME reporter Omar Waraich’s analysis of the extent of
ISIS presence in Pakistan presents clear evidence on the status of the terror group in
Pakistan. In his analysis, Waraich contends that while the existence of entrenched terror
groups might undermine ISIS’s ability to spread its influence across rural provinces
within Pakistan and border regions near Afghanistan and Iran (this actually being the
main contributing factor to their subdued presence at the moment), it cannot be expected
to last.13
The nature and authority of al-Qaeda and the Taliban does not imply that ISIS is
reluctant in expanding its sphere of influence into Pakistan. Instead, Waraich asserts that

13
Waraich, Omar. "ISIS Faces Crowded Landscape of Terror in Pakistan." Time, 2015.

while many atrocities, such as beheadings, rapes and suicide bombings (trademark
actions of ISIS militants), were introduced to the country by Pakistani branches of the
Taliban and al-Qaeda,14
ISIS has already initiated sponsorship of these actions. They will
no doubt let these groups preserve operations at a local level while they seek to spread
their global influence. Taking advantage of this systemic perplexity will allow their
transition to be substantially easier. It would also serve as an attractive option for both
parties, further spawning a favorable environment for ISIS, while distinctly making their
presence felt in the country.15
As recent as November 2014, ISIS has collaborated with Pakistani terror groups
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jundallah to orchestrate attacks and ferry weapons along the
Iranian border.16
Also in 2014, several Taliban splinter groups released a video in which
they proclaimed their allegiance to ISIS.17
More recently, various Pakistani and
international media organizations produced reports documenting ISIS graffiti in Lahore,
the second largest city in the country.18
The spiraling growth of ISIS activities in Pakistan
finally led NATO to call a press conference in May 2015, to inform governments and
corresponding military and intelligence communities that an ISIS influence was indeed
present in the country. In this meeting, NATO officials declared that ISIS was using
Pakistan as a ground for recruiting soldiers and suicide bombers, however,
acknowledging at the same time, that ISIS’s association in the country was not strong
enough to permit the terror group to develop an operational base.19
As part of the

14
Ibid
15
Ibid
16
Ibid
17
Ibid
18
Ibid
19
Pakistan Today. "NATO Says ISIS in Pakistan." Pakistan Today, 2015.

argument to highlight their findings, NATO relied on statements by John Cantlie, a
British war photojournalist who has been an ISIS hostage since November 2012. In his
account, Cantlie provided details on how ISIS has plans to acquire nuclear weapons by
“relying on their Pakistani brothers.” 20
His statement highlights how ISIS leadership
believes acquisition of these nuclear weapons would be their greatest military conquest. It
would allow them to create the perfect storm, by launching, or threaten to launch, an
attack against the United States and their allies.21
On May 30, 2015, India’s Defense Minister, Manohar Parrikar, followed NATO’s
lead and announced his own fear about ISIS’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon from
Pakistan. Parrikar argued that ISIS has access to billions of dollars in assets and, as such,
the world should not rule out the possibility that corrupt Pakistani officials might sell the
country’s nuclear weapons design, or nuclear weapons outright, to ISIS.22
The defense
minister specifically highlighted this “call to brothers” mantra as evidence that the terror
group was already in contact with certain top-level officials. Furthermore, in June 2015,
Ashraf Afzal (a former Royal Air Force (RAF) officer and counterterrorism expert)
declared in an interview that Pakistan would be ISIS’s most likely source of a nuclear
weapon. Ashraf’s argument was again derived from recent data in Pakistan, where they
have witnessed an immense surge in popularity and support for ISIS, specifically in
Balochistan, an arid and mountainous region in Pakistan where the Pak Fauj (Pakistan
Army) regularly conducts nuclear tests.23

20
Ibid
21
Ibid
22
Sehmer, Alexander. "ISIS Could Obtain Nuclear Weapons from Pakistan." The Independent, 2015.
23
Batchelor, Tom. "Rising ISIS Support in Pakistan's Nuclear Testing Region Sparks Fears of 'Dirty'
Bomb." The Daily Express, 2015.

While the arguments of NATO, Parrikar, Ashraf, and other military, government
and intelligence experts underscore the presence of ISIS militants and recruitment efforts
in Pakistan, they do not provide concrete proof that ISIS’s presence is as strong as that in
other countries across the MENA. Their argument merely highlights concerns about the
possibility that ISIS may achieve its aim of spreading into Pakistan and their doubts about
Pakistan’s ability to repel an ISIS invasion (militarily or influentially). However, none of
this discounts the fact that ISIS has expressed its intention for Pakistan. Indeed, John
Cantlie’s statement provides clear proof that ISIS is actively courting within the country,
therefore, these intentions and surrounding controversies highlight the need for a study on
this potential crisis.
OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS
The following research is dedicated to exploring how ISIS will seemingly seek to
expand their radical ideology within regions of largely Muslim populations. Due to
limitations of time and space, the scope of this thesis is quite specific; it focuses on one
radical Islamic group – ISIS – and its possible influence in one nation – Pakistan – with
the potential use of one major recruitment vehicle – madrassas – to accomplish its
ultimate goal of establishing one, united Islamic State and Caliphate. The purpose of this
thesis is to analyze the likelihood that ISIS could pull off such a significant feat. At the
same time, I will seek to establish a purely kinetic as well as adjoining ideological
solution whereby the Pakistani’s themselves can undercut ISIS’s deviant ideology. It
should be understood that this analysis is necessary because of concerns shared by India,
NATO, the U.S. and many others – the alarming possibility of ISIS acquiring nuclear

weapons from Pakistan. At the end, I hope to use the outcomes of this analysis to provide
intelligence recommendations that could aid Pakistan, the United States and the
international intelligence community in halting further and future ISIS expansion plans.
To achieve this, I will analyze:
Ø Motivations behind an ISIS supported move into to Pakistan;
Ø Factors that would cause existing radical groups in Pakistan to align themselves
with ISIS (by changing ideologies and tactics) and the likelihood ISIS will allow
them some degree of autonomy;
Ø Role of radical madrasas in entrenching extremism historically in Pakistan and
how they might contribute to ISIS’s expansion plans;
Ø What can be expected if ISIS successfully completes their objective (for ISIS and
for the rest of the world); and finally
Ø Countermeasures that can be taken by the Pakistani Intelligence Services (PIC) -
Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI), Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Federal
Investigation Agency (FIA) with assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA - U.S. intelligence) in order to prevent an ISIS threat from materializing.
APPROACH
To adequately answer my research question, it is essential to justify my approach.
First, leading international relations and security scholars have already proposed
numerous theories to account for Islamic radicalization and violent extremism, and it is
important to establish a portion of this thesis to review some of them. I will mostly focus
on theories that explain radicalization, since they will expound on issues related to the

role that madrassas have played in the extremist behavior of Pakistani Muslims in the
past. These theories will also be instrumental in demonstrating my reasoning when
explaining the role that madrassas may play in encouraging ISIS’s expansion into
Pakistan.
Also, as noted in the introduction, ISIS has cleverly used John Cantlie to send
overtures to militant groups and corrupt officials in Pakistan. While there are no clear
indications on whether the organization will be successful in its efforts to spread its
Caliphate into Pakistan, these theories will be useful in highlighting how these
institutions might enhance the attractiveness of ISIS’s message, paving the way for entry
of their acceptance. In addition, my analysis will also examine theories on violent
extremism by placing particular emphasis on beliefs about the spread of ISIS and
concepts on the nature of strategic advantages ISIS might gain by expanding into
Pakistan.
Theories on Radicalization and Violent Extremism as Applied to ISIS
The 9/11 attacks and subsequent targeting of Western countries, including the
2005 London and 2004 Madrid bombings contributed to an increase in scholars’ focus on
the factors that cause radicalization. Many theories seek to explain that radicalization
process however I will focus on four: the social construction of the individual narrative,
social identity theory, social movement theory and the conversion theory.
The theory on the Social Construction of the Individual Narrative is one concept
that international affairs scholars have proposed to explain the radicalization of Muslims
in different parts of the world. This theory states that radicalization occurs within a social

context that consists largely of a network of overlapping relationships,24
by arguing that
the individual and collective narratives that people communicate within are instrumental
in influencing a Muslim’s beliefs, young and old alike.
Cristina Archetti, one of the leading advocates of this theory, contends that the
individual narrative consists of the person’s personal views about the world and their
perspective on the role that they will play in this life.25
She argues that while individual
narrative highlights the individualized nature of a person, the network of relationships
that a person decides to pursue at any given time will influence their outlook on life.26
Advancements in social networking have paved the way for the development of
communication technologies that extend this network of interpersonal relationships far
beyond the traditional concept of face-to-face communication.27
The extension has been
so great that these technologies have led to the development of indirect interpersonal
relationships between people living in totally different corners of the world. Archetti
finishes by stressing that this possibility of creating indirect relationships is a central
factor that has attracted people to social networking sites, and why Islamic militants and
even madrassas have used this method to recruit.28
Thus, the possibility that one will meet with an influential religious figure and
establish a strong indirect relationship has become the main source of attraction behind
the decision for potential recruits to engage social networking sites in this manner. That
possibility has also played into the hands of ISIS, as the terror group is now heavily

24
Archetti, Cristina. "Terrorism, Communication and New Media: Explaining Radicalization in the Digital
Age." Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 1, 2015.
25
Ibid
26
Ibid

27
Ibid
28
Ibid

relying on sites like Twitter, Google+, Facebook and YouTube to recruit new members
and spread its radicalized ideology to new states and territories. Archetti explains ISIS’s
ability to use this tool lies in the seemingly “arm’s length” interaction between members
and their admirers, which creates some sort of a ‘fantasy community’ in the mind of these
individuals.29
This development of perception in regards to politics of identification
creates a space for followers of ISIS to be influenced and manipulated.30
Additionally,
this suggests that the central premise of the theory on the social construction of the
individual narrative is that social media plays two important roles in issues related to
radicalization – First, it assists in creating the types of relationship networks that
influence people’s worldview. Second, these networks foster the type of direct
interpersonal relationships that make it easy for ISIS to expand its personnel growth and
spread its radical tentacles.
The Social Identity Theory (SIT) is another approach that scholars have put forth
to explain radicalization. The idea relies on studies of the dynamics of intergroup
interactions and intragroup interactions to explain the lure for some Muslims into radical
Islam and violent extremism. The SIT posits that human beings decide to belong to
different groups because of their desire to develop their self-esteem or self-worth,31
and
that the higher the status of the group in the eyes of the society, the greater the feeling of
dignity that resonates among its members.32
Irrespective of the main factors that have
contributed to the group’s popularity, SIT states that the level of self-worth will be
similar regardless of the positive or negative impact on society. Advocates of the theory

29
Ibid
30
Ibid

31
Upal, Afzal. "Alternative Narratives for Preventing Radicalization of Muslim Youth." Journal for
Deradicalization 15, no. 2, 2015: 138-163.
32
Ibid

argue that this desire not only leads members to compare the popularity of their group
against others, but it also leads them to deploy social identity management strategies
targeted at enhancing or maintaining their group’s popularity.33
Thus, the theory uses three terms to explain these movements that terror groups
deploy to strengthen their popularity – social action, social creativity and social mobility.
Social action implies the social identity management strategies that individuals of a given
organization deploy whenever they are competing for resources that would enhance the
status of their group (mostly for the detriment of other groups). Social creativity denotes
the extent to which members of a given group are altering or redefining the elements that
constitute a comparative situation. Finally, social mobility signifies the strategies that
group members deploy whenever they want to dissociate themselves from a given
group.34
Proponents of SIT believe that social action is the main element of intergroup
interactions that lead to radicalization and violent extremism,35
since it calls upon
members to deliberately orchestrate terrorist attacks if they accept that such actions will
automatically increase their popularity at the expense of other groups.
Organizations such as ISIS have decided to release professionally produced
videos and high quality images of beheadings and other offensive acts because of the
desire to enhance their popularity in the eyes of the part of society they want to attract (in
the terrorism literature, this is referred to as “outbidding”36
). The massive online and
traditional media traffic generated from this content gives their members a feeling of
superiority compared to those of the Taliban, al-Qaeda and Hezbollah. In fact, the

33
Ibid

34
Ibid
35
Ibid

36
Kydd and Walter. "The Strategies of Terrorism." International Security 31, no. 1, 2015.

increase in ISIS’s popularity has directly coincided with the decline in the popularity of
those groups, in some cases so dramatically, that branches previously affiliated with them
have now decided to shift their allegiance to ISIS.
Social creativity is also an aspect of in-group dynamics that aid members of a
given organization to increase its popularity. The most popular social creativity strategy
is redefinition and reinterpretation of the characteristics that make a group powerful or
popular. This reinterpretation and redefinition of dimensions play an important role in the
enhancement of a group’s status within society and international security experts have
used this argument in their analysis to show how ISIS has been able to use social
creativity to increase their chances of popularity. By recognizing that groups like
Hezbollah or al-Qaeda have greater history and achievements in violent extremism; ISIS
has instead developed new definitions of characteristics that will enhance their status by
advertising their superiority in weapons, financial assets and most importantly, a greater
sphere of influence.
Furthermore, ISIS has made clear in its propaganda that it could easily sustain
wars with Iraqi, Syrian, Turkish and coalition troops and that they have the capacity to
spread their terror across the globe and orchestrate more lone wolf attacks than groups
like al-Qaeda and the Taliban have ever been able to. This redefinition has allowed ISIS
to diminish the importance of some of those very values and achievements that other
terrorist groups have considered essential to their popularity and has allowed them to
develop and enhance their popularity based on this new criterion. Overall, these tactics
are employed to make it difficult for those groups to counter ISIS’s surge if they decide
to enter a space, such as Pakistan. This reasoning under the SIT will be integral to the

argument I will construct on the potential rise in popularity of ISIS within Pakistan, as
well as their presumed reliance on radical madrassas to gain a foothold in the country.
In regards to the growth of ISIS’s popularity in Pakistan, it is highly likely that
they will compare themselves with the Taliban, al-Qaeda and supporting factions. This
comparative analysis will allow ISIS to assess how these established groups were able to
regularly gather their support and it will also highlight the types of narratives, values, and
achievements that they have put in place in order to underscore the concept of success.
This comparative analysis will be effective in allowing ISIS to determine the types of
social identity management strategies needed in order to undo what those groups have
done so they may instead gain dominance within Pakistan. As such, the two types of
social identity management strategies likely to be used by ISIS in their plans to expand
influence and secure backing in Pakistan are social creativity and social action.
Arguments on these two concepts fit directly in line with the role that madrassas could
play. Social action will also influence my reasoning in issues related to the relationship
between ISIS and groups within Pakistan. As things currently stand, there are four groups
in this category – factions of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, radical madrassas and the
Pakistani government.
Taliban and al-Qaeda sympathizers have long taken over radical madrassas and
use them as a ground for recruiting people from the local population and as a base for
spreading their respective ideologies. They have weakened the government’s influence in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) by
orchestrating attacks against military institutions, schools and police outposts. However,
when the 2014 Tehrik-i-Taliban sponsored massacre on the Army Public School in

Peshawar took place, there was a line that was crossed. This attack lead to a swift
reaction from the Pakistan Armed Forces as well as overwhelming public support to
dedicate enough resources to terminate terrorist operations within the country. Still, ISIS
understands that its relationship with all four of these organizations will influence its
ability to conduct a successful expansion operation into Pakistan. ISIS will not be able to
operate in Pakistan as they do in Iraq, and they understand that. They cannot continue
atrocities like beheadings and rape if they want to effectively be given the space to
operate. Instead, they will either have to negotiate and make arrangements with
entrenched organizations to provide provisional backing or provide local government
officials with protection from harm as well as financial assets. If they can somehow
manage to accomplish both, that will be a devastating combination. Regardless, as part of
their social action policy, they will orchestrate proper protocols to positively develop
their influence on the local population.
Another concept is the Social Movement Theory (SMT), which has been
composed to put forth an explanation as to why radicalized Muslims’ resort to violent
extremism. Scholars of the theory use the term ‘social movement’ as the basis of their
argument on the radicalization process, as well as the motives behind violent extremism.
Randy Borum, professor and coordinator of strategy and intelligence studies at the
University of South Florida, defines social movement as the set of beliefs and opinions
within a given population that lead them to exhibit preference for components of
society’s reward distribution and social structure.37
The theory emerged in the 1940’s,
where it was used to account for the Western thought that radical Islamic movements

37
Borum, Randy. "Radicalization Into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories."
Journal of Strategic Security, 2011: 17.

materialized and acted with chaotic and irrational behavior.38
At the time, it was found
that strained environmental situations led Muslims with similar beliefs to unite and fight
against those whom they perceived as the main cause of their deteriorating social
circumstance,39
therefore compelling them to engage in conduct they deemed rational,
eventually succumbing to the lure of radical movements that helped support them.
Present-day advocates of the SMT however, have expanded it further by arguing
that strategic and rational processes set-in immediately after the formation of these
radical movements. The argument is that while chaotic behaviors were the main factors
that paved way for their formation, these factors are not instrumental to the group’s
continued existence and growth – rather their survival hinged on rational and strategic
moves.40
Therefore, these groups have developed systems aiding in attracting and
recruiting new members, retaining original members and removing those whose actions
contradict their objectives. The strategic nature of this structure has led scholars to
pinpoint four tasks these groups adopt after their formation: removal of participation
barriers, arousal of participants’ motives, formation of recruitment networks and
establishment of the group’s resource mobilization potential.
This recent reassessment of the theory has also led to its expansion in other areas,
precisely in providing vivid explanations on the types of actions these radical movements
engage in, in order to guarantee their survival. From the outset, they realize this is
contingent upon their effectiveness in identifying opportunities for expansion and the

38
Ibid
39
Ibid

40
Ibid

efficiency with which they take advantage of those opportunities.41
Specifically, this
means that groups such as ISIS will always be on the lookout for vulnerabilities in
society.42
Their goal is to constantly search for new sources of grievances, with the
implication that what led to their initial formation will not be the primary factor in their
advancement. Therefore, by highlighting social issues, such as the denial of human rights
and change through violence, they should guarantee their survival.43
However, ISIS’ success in effectively exploiting fault lines in society is heavily
contingent upon their competence and they have been using two methods very efficiently
to enhance activities essential to their survival: first, their use of prospecting agents with
the capacity to extract information about potential targets (to include information on
supporting and opposing religious and political views, socioeconomic status and
willingness to cooperate on missions); second, the use of talented recruiting agents to
locate and provide information to potential recruits on the benefits of joining ISIS (most
effectively done on social media).
Further analysis of the creation and continuation of ISIS suggests that they have
so far followed the path outlined in the SMT theory. When the United States decided to
invade Iraq in 2003, we created a void leading to untold economic, social and political
hardships among the country’s citizens, which has been haunting us ever since. This
situation has stimulated behavior that militants considered rational because of the
conditions they were left in. This eventually led to the formation of the original Islamic
State in Iraq. The movement continued to grow substantially larger under the partisan

41
Wiktorowicz, Quintan. Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. New York: Springer,
2004: 118.
42
Ibid
43
Ibid

government of Nouri al-Maliki, who ordered the alienation and ethnic cleaning of at least
half the Sunni population in Baghdad, and countless others across the country.
Immediately after, the eventual leader of ISIS, Baghdadi, and his advisors developed
effective and efficient processes for their survival by underscoring two productive
methods: Ensuring new sources of grievances in the region (such as al-Maliki’s actions,
the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, American soldiers’ burning the Qur’an and
increased concerns of coalition troops becoming an occupying force), and taking
advantage of new opportunities for expansion. When the Arab Spring began and spread
across the MENA in 2009, Baghdadi studied the vulnerabilities that arose and exploited
them. He moved his headquarters to Syria to develop closer synergy with the
discontented Muslims in the region, at the same time rebranding the group as ISIS.
Baghdadi also immediately changed his objectives and declared that he wanted to form a
unified Islamic State that would spread throughout the MENA and Muslim nations across
the world.
To further exploit these rational and strategic efforts, the group is now trying to
understand the benefits of expanding into Pakistan. They likely would rely on the same
strategy, by studying vulnerabilities in Pakistan that have created social discontent –
incidences of corruption, the poverty rate and a history of violent extremism and
terrorism. They are likely to rely on corruption to gauge possible access to nuclear
weapons and/or designs and also support from the clerics of radical madrassas in the
border regions. Groups such as the Taliban and al-Qaeda have previously taken
advantage of this to establish their networks, however, their influence is waning and their
failures have many public figures (such as popular politician Imran Khan, who was

thought to have previously supported the Taliban) and citizens across Pakistan actively
opposing them.44
Without a doubt, ISIS has seen and would like to capitalize on this
present circumstance. Due to their vast financial resources, they have the power to
administer and create pacts with government officials as well as pledge much needed aid
to improve the quality of life for populations in rural Pakistan. Thus, SMT and its
argument about the emergence and survival of movements can be applied to provide
clues into the issue and the threat of a possible ISIS-backed expansion plan into Pakistan
through the madrassa system.
The final theory – the Conversion Theory, has also been effective in the analysis
of radicalization and violent extremism. However, unlike SMT, this approach focuses on
the individual rather than the movement. Proponents of the theory argue that the
individualized processes of transformational ideologies and beliefs (commonly known as
conversion) are responsible for the radicalization of both Muslims and non-Muslims.45
The concept relies heavily on principles and theories of religious sociology and
psychology to substantiate contentions on the correlation between the radicalization of
Muslims and violent extremism.46
In line with the quest to highlight the role of individual
aspects in influencing a person’s appeal to violent extremism, scholars have developed a
model of seven stages outlining this transition:47

44
Walsh, Declan. "Taliban Besiege Pakistan School, Leaving 145 Dead." The New York Times. 2014.
45
Borum, Randy. "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories."
Journal of Strategic Security, 2011: 23.
46
Ibid
47
Ibid

1. Context: First stage in the process – focuses on the gamut of environmental factors
(cultural, social, political, and historical factors) present in the conversion process that
might either impede or accelerate its development.
2. Crisis: Second stage – outlines the personal or social issues that might drive the
individual to a state of personal turmoil.
3. Quest: Third stage – entails the presence of lingering desires that drive the individual
to look for solutions that might end the personal turmoil.
4. Encounter: Fourth stage – entails a personal encounter between the individual
seeking answers and the spiritual solution.
5. Interaction: Fifth stage – involves instances in which an individual seeking answers
engages in an exchange with the spiritual source. This may involve questions about
predicaments and the role that religion can play in resolving it.
6. Commitment: Sixth stage – primarily encompasses two important elements:
a. The individual’s commitment to engage in a decision or several
decisions that highlight his faithfulness to the religion.
b. Public statement or a promised membership bond that underscores the
individual’s willingness to adhere to the rules of the movement.
7. Consequences: Seventh and final stage – consists of consequences that underline the
individual’s determination to adhere to the rules of the religion, to include decisions,
commitments and actions (i.e. transporting bombs, orchestrating a suicide attack or
engaging in beheadings).48

48
Ibid

Each stage highlights how the individual plays a central role in the radicalization
process. The theory differs markedly from my other reviewed theories because it
completely discounts the role of recruitment. By presuming that personal turmoil forces
an individual to seek out membership in a terror group, the conversion theory states that
the group merely plays the role of ‘facilitator’ in the radicalization process. The faith-
based ideology is just providing shelter and the transformation comes full circle when the
individual not only professes their willingness to respect that ideology, but by engaging
in actions designed by that group to terrorize the population.
Theoretical Framework
A review of these theories on radicalization and violent extremism shows that
each has its merits, however, the theory that will be used as the framework for my study
is the social movement theory (SMT). It provides key arguments and important areas of
concern in examining the possibility of ISIS employing radical madrassas to assist in
expanding their Caliphate into Pakistan. SMT is also instrumental in pinpointing the type
of countermeasures that the Pakistani Intelligence Services (PIC – containing the Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Federal Investigation Agency
(FIA)) along with potential support from the CIA and the U.S. military, can deploy in
order to prevent this imminent threat.
Likewise, it will be germane to explore terrorist groups already operating in
Pakistan in order to understand whether or not ISIS could fit into the broader picture and
political landscape. To successfully gain a foothold in Pakistan, ISIS would need to either
assimilate into the ideologies of already-established radical Islamic groups (such Tehrik-i

Taliban Pakistan (TTP or Pakistani Taliban)), convince them to submit to ISIS’s unique
goals and aspiration or completely dismiss them. Thus, my research will assess if any of
these possibilities are practical, given what is known.
Furthermore, we have to evaluate the most realistic realm of entry for ISIS into
Pakistan. Brute force seems unlikely as it could take years for ISIS to plan and stage an
offensive anywhere in Pakistan (as they have in Kobani, Sirte and towns across Syria and
Iraq). This plan could quite possibly result in utter failure as the Pakistani’s have a
legitimate military force. Another option is to send in operatives to persuade local attacks
and bribe politicians, however with the increase in public pressure to combat terrorism, it
would be difficult for them to achieve any type of substantial success. Their goal should
be to figure out how unite people instead of causing increased division. With that in
mind, it is likely that ISIS would have to utilize a recruitment tool to gain the trust and
support of prominent government and religious leaders, as well as the local population.
Therefore, madrassas will be carefully examined since they would likely be the most
effective tool used in accomplishing this task. However, to gain the use of this system to
spread its agenda, ISIS would require the support of some, or all, of their main clerics and
financial supporters, especially within the discontented regions in the FATA, KPK and
Balochistan. In that regard, the effectiveness of madrassas for spreading the message of
other terrorist groups must be studied as well to determine if they are adequate and
appropriate to spread this new type of radical ideology.
Third, studying social media discussion and platforms will provide significant
insight; first and foremost, it will shed enormous light on the deliberation of ISIS
command, their operatives and affiliates. It will also allow us to understand whether or

not organizations, such as al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, anti-Indian groups (Lashkar-e-
Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad) and sectarian groups (the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and the
Shi’a Tehrik-e-Jafria) as well as other radical and quasi-moderate Islamic groups, would
be willing to support ISIS and its initiatives to move into Pakistan. Social media will also
provide critical insight into the consideration and views of local Pakistanis, and their
likelihood of accepting an ISIS dominated ideology and methodology. This element of
focus should be considered decisive since support for ISIS within the general population
will decidedly place a greater burden on the operations of the Pakistani government to
thwart their growth. I will also explore if it is, indeed, ideal for ISIS to spread its
influence and doctrine into Pakistan for various strategic and tactical reasons. There is
already ample evidence to assume that Pakistan is the Islamic State’s next target. To best
assess whether or not ISIS will, or already has, chosen Pakistan as its next place of
interest, it is necessary to probe possible motivations, such as Pakistan’s right to
sovereignty, which would be difficult to exploit through airstrikes by other nations.
The subsequent objective of this thesis will be to explore intelligence strategies
that the PIC should take to prevent ISIS from gaining control of Pakistan, and how
Pakistani leadership can encourage its citizens to take preventative measures to mitigate
this threat. History provides valuable lessons for the future. While taking individual
political, cultural, religious, and ethnic conditions into consideration is essential, past
lessons can and should be applied, appropriately, to present-day situations. Also,
examining the current demographics of the Pakistani people in impoverished areas, to
include their education level, ideologies and worldview, socio-economic status, access to
technology, and current preoccupations, are vital for devising a plan of resistance.

Finally, I will determine if the Pakistani people and leaders will be willing and able to
resist ISIS if proper precautionary methods are put into place.
METHODOLOGY
Qualitative and quantitative research methodologies will be used to obtain the
information pertinent to answer my research question. Social media, primarily Twitter,
will be utilized to establish recruitment techniques and strategies that might be used by
ISIS supporters to spread their ideology into Pakistan. Additionally, these sources will be
beneficial in determining what, if anything, radical groups already established in Pakistan
are saying about ISIS. This analysis of social media will also be extended to Pakistani
intelligence and government accounts, providing both a unique capability to hear the
voices of both the powerful and the people. Furthermore, to assess the motivations that
other extremists groups might have to support ISIS, I will probe primary source
statements, websites, online recruitment policies, and reports as outlined by experts to
include the CIA, FBI, and other international security agencies. One of the most
important facets of this research however will be the analysis of the use of madrassas for
recruitment and employment for individuals going through the system and the
surrounding communities in the past. The information gathered and presented will be in
terms of history and funding as well as the promotion of radical agendas. Sources for this
inquiry will include expert testimony, madrassa websites and other primary sources such
as documents and statements written by prominent madrassa instructors. On a final note,
after careful consideration, it was determined that peer-reviewed journal articles, while
useful for historical information and socio-political analysis, would only account for a

small percentage of the total research, due to their delay in publication. The purported
phenomenon of an ISIS expansion in Pakistan would not be current enough to adequately
assess the present-day situation.
ANALYSIS
The overall objective of this thesis is twofold. I will analyze ISIS’s potential use,
and consequent impact, of radical madrassas, and develop a range of strategies, first and
foremost for the Pakistani Intelligence Services, in order to suppress the collapse of this
system. As described, the use of the SMT model will assist in analyzing the factors that
could generate a shift in allegiance of local leaders and influential clerics of madrassas
towards ISIS. Aspects of the SIT model will complement that by supporting an analysis
of strategies that ISIS will use to enhance their attractiveness to the system. Specifically,
in the following analysis section, I will prominently feature the argument on how ISIS
will project their strength and status through nefarious acts and social media campaigns
against competing groups, all of which will be done to overwhelm any entity that might
undermine its ability to expand into Pakistan.
People of Pakistan – Awaiting ISIS?
Situational Constraints in Pakistan
In relation to the SMT framework, ISIS has been targeting several regions in
Pakistan where situational environmental constraints have forced the population to
engage in behavior we classify as chaotic and seemingly irrational. These people are
reeling from the adverse effects of corruption, unemployment, political marginalization,

low literacy level and continued victimization by the Pakistani military. They have
justified their behavior due to this treatment and this has manifested into riots against the
military, boycott of government programs and enhanced sympathy for terror groups,
radical madrassas and violent extremism. In the past, al-Qaeda and the Taliban have
attempted to galvanize the local population, however their activities have done nothing to
address those situational environmental constraints, consequently, this has led to
prolonged and increased turmoil and upheaval.
Table 1: Route of ISIS Expansion into Pakistan

Situational Environmental
Constraints
Chaotic and Seemingly
Irrational Behavior
ISIS acts rationally and strategically by
expanding into Pakistan, exploiting the
chaos and addressing the environmental
constraints by establishing a Caliphate.
Aligning
w/ Radical
Madrassas
Supporting
Violent
Extremism
Rioting
Against
Government

The Role of Madrassas in Pakistan
Effectiveness in Endorsements of Past Radical Movements
For ISIS to gain entry into Pakistan and establish an operational base, there must
be situational environmental constraints that give way, and gaining control of radical
madrassas may be that deciding force. While there isn’t a precise total on the number of
madrassas in Pakistan, available statistical estimates suggests that it ranges between
20,00049
(Pakistan’s Interior Ministry report) to 29,00050
(2014 Al Jazeera report). In
terms of enrollment figures, the report from the Interior Ministry indicates that certified
madrassas have registered more than 3 million students.51
These figures fluctuate and
vary over time and suggest that there is no agreement on the actual number, however
there is little disagreement when it comes to data on the link between radical madrassas
and the history of radicalism and violent extremism in the country. Studies on these
madrassas suggest that they have been an important avenue for entry of terror groups in
the past and will likely be the vehicle that will continue to augment these movements in
the future. For a fraction of the Muslim population that finds ISIS as an attractive choice
or alternative option to their current situation, the already immense popularity of
madrassas, as a cheap, viable and accessible educational institution, goes hand in hand.
This popularity, particularly among rural communities in the provinces that run along
Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, actually offers the clearest illustration, as well as
most likely scenario, of a possible route that ISIS will use to enter into the country.

49
Ibid
50
Chishti, Ali. "The First Rule of a Jihadi School is that there is no Jihadi School." The Friday Times,
2011.
51
Ibid

As far as radicalism, the report from Pakistan’s Interior Ministry suggests that
about 11,000 madrassas are susceptible due to their ongoing link with the Deobandi
revivalism movement.52
As such, since post-9/11 oversights were put into place,
Pakistan’s security forces and its madrassa educational seminary boards have been
advised to properly deal in disbanding them, albeit with much caution.53
Although this
report does not lists factors leading to the Pakistani’s conclusion that Deobandi madrassas
are extremist, an analysis of their ideology and their links with radicalism present clear
reasons as to why they take this position. The ideology of the Deobandi sect is one that is
consistent with the concepts of radical Islamism, violent extremism and terrorism.
Advocates of the sect claim the reasoning for high levels of indecency and decline of
faith in Islamic society is the decision to mimic the Western culture. Therefore, they
believe there is no choice but to return to a stricter form of Islam.54
Their belief is that
only through such a return will Muslims begin to witness improvement in the levels of
morality and social development in their communities.55
Local historians affirm that the sect emerged in 1867 in Deoband, India (in the
Uttar Pradesh district, 100 miles northeast of New Delhi) when several prominent
Muslim scholars used Deobandi counsels as the primary producers of the Ulama, or legal
Islamic scholarship. Since their emergence, Deobandi madrassas had flourished to
become an important facet of madrassas in the South Asian region. However, when the
Indian government designated their teachings illegal, they were forced to practice
surreptitiously. It wasn’t until President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s rise to power in 1977

52
Ibid
53
Ibid
54
Moj, Muhammad. “The Deobandi Madrassa Movement: Countercultural Trends and Tendencies.” 2014.
55
Ibid

that Pakistan recognized these madrassas as an important component of their religious
educational system.56
Today, many radical madrassas in Pakistan fall under the Deobandi
creed and assert and perform the strictest form of their sect in Islam.57
Analysis has
always confirmed that they not only teach their students the importance of loyalty
towards their religion, but educate them about the importance of waging (violent) jihad to
safeguard the rights of Muslims in every country as well.58
In fact, for a long time,
studies have shown that these madrassas provide the ideological basis for the Taliban’s
extreme brand of Islam. Thus, this obligation has been the driving force in the
orchestration of terror attacks that the Taliban and al-Qaeda have used in Pakistan,
Afghanistan and other parts of the globe. Indeed, past research has shown that Pakistani
Deobandi madrassas are responsible for the development of the spiraling rate of violent
extremism witnessed in the entire region between 2003 and 2015. Deobandi madrassas
have taught a large percentage of former Afghan refugees who have gone on to become
influential leaders and founders of different sects of the Taliban.59
These statistics suggest
that they are not only responsible for the development of terrorism within Pakistan, but
they are also responsible for the spread of radical Islam and violent extremism for
individuals that have come from foreign countries.
Now, information on Deobandi madrassas demonstrates that they have been keen
in influencing the policies their former students have implemented when taking action,
such as when the Taliban took over total control as the “government” of Afghanistan.
Specifically, these madrassas began to impose a brand of Islam that enforced stricter

56
Johnson and Mason. "Understanding the Tablian and Insurgency in Afghanistan." Orbis, 2007.

57
Ibid
58
Ibid
59
Takeyh, Ray, and Nikolas Gvosdev. “The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Radical
Political Islam.” 2013.

restrictions on women and the performance of the Islamic faith by carrying out attacks
against Muslims who deviated from the path of Islam in accordance with the teachings of
the Prophet Muhammad (Pbuh).60
In conjunction, the Taliban also implemented and
established an anti-Shi’a policy. With a fundamental understanding that Shi’as are not
true followers, they sought to eliminate this threat facing actual Muslims, in accordance
with Deobandi adherents.61
This has led to attacks against members of the Hazara
community, with subsequent attacks resulting in the death of over 10,000 ethnic
Hazaras.62
This eventually become an important aspect of the terror that students inflicted
in order to make their presence felt across countries around the world – students from
Pakistani madrassas have been responsible for some of the most gruesome terror attacks
the world has witnessed in the last 15 years. The 9/11 attacks provide a vivid illustration
of the extent of this idea in “protecting Islam”. Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind
the attack, was a student of Mullah Omar, a leading scholar of the Deobandi school of
thought in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Bin Laden and the others involved in the planning
and execution of the attacks believed that it was consistent with their duty. As such, the
terrorists that carried out the 7/7 attacks in London had visited a radical madrassa in
Pakistan several months prior.63
Overall, consensus on studies conducted on the
correlation between Pakistan’s radical madrassas and the country’s history of terrorism
demonstrate that this link is exceptionally strong.
As of 2014, recent evidence on the current leadership of active Deobandi
madrassas suggests that members of the Taliban’s senior command still hold leadership

60
Johnson and Mason. "Understanding the Tablian and Insurgency in Afghanistan." Orbis, 2007.
61
Ibid
62
Ibid
63
Ali, Saleem. “Pakistan's Madrassas: The Need for Internal Reform and the Role of International
Assistance.” Policy Briefing, Doha: Brookings, 2008.

positions. For instance, Jalaluddin Haqqani, a former tribal affairs minister in the Taliban
government, is the patron of several madrassas in the Pakistani province of Waziristan.64
His status gives credence to the argument that these institutions have, and will remain as
incubators of radical Islam within Pakistan. It also gives credence to the view that ISIS
might use these radical madrassas as the primary vehicle for expanding their caliphate
into Pakistan.
Launching Pad for ISIS
The analysis in the previous section suggests that radical madrassas have, and will
continue to be responsible for the spread of terror originating from Pakistan to other parts
of the world. This link will be the focal point for my assumption that they will most likely
be the vehicle to aid in ISIS’s expansion of its Caliphate into Pakistan.
First off, we have to recognize whether there is a comparable root fundamental
understanding of teachings between the system that is already set in place and what ISIS
professes. As I noted, a sketch analysis of the ideology instructed at Deobandi madrassas,
and that of ISIS, immediately exhibit similarities. Most of their ideologies complement
that of the everyday Muslim – encouraging followers to emulate the life of the Prophet
Muhammad (Pbuh) and to commit loyalty and sacrifice to one God. However, the
differences are apparent in terms of how strictly these measures are enforced. ISIS
extremists have taken it a step further by calling on members to oppose all types of class
division and reject monarchies and republican governments. Additionally, and where the
danger comes into play, is the imposition on the obligation for its members to protect the

64
Hodes, Cyrus, and Sedra, Mark. “The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan.” 2015.

Muslim Ummah (nation) across the world by creating havoc wherever and whenever
necessary.
More specifically, ISIS follows the Salafiyya Jihadiyya (Jihadi Salafism) school
of thought, which is an even more radicalized form of the chief ideology used by the
Taliban and al-Qaeda.65
This ideology mandates all Muslims to implement an even purer
and stricter version of Islam in all aspects of their lives by eliminating other religions and
cultures from their lands through a violent jihad.66
This is, in fact, one of the main
differences in thought, however not in action, between ISIS and the Deobandi. Whereas
the Deobandi sect authorizes Muslims to use this jihad to protect the religion, Salafiyya
Jihadiyya commands Muslims to use jihad as a tool for purifying their land. In other
words, with this firm belief, ISIS upholds its members to assume that the presence of
non-Muslims, including Shi’as, in Muslim land, as a threat to Islam. In a supposed
Caliphate, their land would ideally be uninhabited by such individuals. However, we are
not speaking of a tremendous difference; plenty of negotiations and arrangements can be
had in which their similarities do provide ISIS with the related fundamental
understanding to design a legitimate pursuit of avenue into Pakistan.
ISIS’s only impediment and uncertainty will likely be the presence of already
entrenched terror groups in Pakistan. The stance these groups and their factions take will
be significant in either developing or reducing the speed with which ISIS would expand
its Caliphate into the country. By maintaining prominent leaders as clerics of many
operating radical madrassas, their presence at the helm will allow them to decide whether
or not its in their interest to peddle the version of Salafiyya Jihadiyya that is endorsed by

65
Crethiplethi. "ISIS’s Ideology and Vision, and Their Implementation." Crethiplethi, Winter 2014.
66
Ibid

ISIS commanders. However, a recent problem that has arisen in this situation is the fact
that these groups are beginning to battle against an even more aggressive Pakistani
military and a population, many of whom are starting to get extremely weary of their
existence.67
Peddling this ideology will almost certainly lead to diminished support since
even supporters of the Deobandi ideology will not understand the decision to embrace
changes in these dire times. Still, Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders do have an ideological
outlook that is similar to ISIS and that may be enough for them to compromise on how
radical operations will continue in Pakistan. Since ISIS has garnered more popularity and
has developed a widely recognizable brand that is constantly gaining momentum, I can
potentially see a situation in which they decide to unite for a greater cause.
Nevertheless, there is the challenge for ISIS to develop additional methods, by
using their strengths and potential, to expand into Pakistan. In this regard, the SIT
provides some clues into the types of strategies that they will use. As discussed, the
theory uses the strategy of social creativity and collective action to undercut a dominant
group. ISIS has not begun a full-on campaign yet but their strategy, through tweets and
word of mouth, have begun to create the impression that al-Qaeda is not as successful as
they claim. They have also began to alienate groups in order to stage attacks against al-
Qaeda sympathizers. For them to truly succeed in their attempt to enter into the Pakistani
environment, they will have to ramp up these offensives.

67
Schneiderman, R.M. "Is Pakistan Really Cracking Down on Terrorism?" Newsweek.

Technological Prowess
Overview of ISIS Social Media Use
Reports indicate that as of January 2015, ISIS supporters had a minimum of
46,000 active Twitter accounts.68
Of course, these numbers are extremely hard to
estimate and could be off by as much as 10,000 or more.69
There is no accurate means of
authenticating these accounts as estimates are always highly debated and controversial. A
significant sample, consisting of 20,000 supposedly confirmed ISIS
participants/supporters were carefully studied and used to extract this population data.
Most of the users resided within Iraq or Syria, with a minority residing throughout the
other nations in the Middle East, North Africa, Indonesia, Europe, and the United States.
Outside of ISIS controlled states, Saudi Arabians accounted for the most Twitter
supporters of ISIS.70
Interestingly, research has shown that about twenty percent of all
ISIS accounts are in English, five percent are in French, while the rest are in Arabic.71
This seemingly suggests the obvious – Islamic State’s main recruiting targets are Arabic
speakers, given their overarching agenda.
A study conducted by expert researchers and intelligence analysts Berger and
Morgan has highlighted the effectiveness of Twitter as a campaign tool for ISIS. They
designed and implemented collection and analysis techniques using proprietary code,
supplemented by a limited number of third-party tools. Their report uncovered the
following information:

68
Berger, J.M. "Making Sense of ISIS’s Use of Twitter." Newsweek, 2015.
69
Ibid.
70
Berger and Morgan, 'The ISIS Twitter Census', The Brookings Project On U.S. Relations With The
Islamic World, 2015.
71
Ibid.

Ø ISIS readily uses Twitter and other social media sites (such as Facebook and
YouTube) to send out its propaganda, spread its message, and recruit new
followers;
Ø ISIS has used social media to control its public image, particularly by airing its
public beheadings; this has greatly influenced how the world, in general, has
viewed this group;
Ø There is still a great deal of debate over the exact number of social media users
who support ISIS, where they are located, and who they represent; exact numbers
are hard to estimate and are highly contested;
Ø ISIS has sent out thousands of tweets with embedded location metadata;
Ø Twitter accounts that specifically supported ISIS and its agenda had, on average,
1,000 or more followers, which is considerably higher than the average Twitter
account; and
Ø It is estimated that most of ISIS’s social media presence is the result of a
relatively small group of intense users numbering between 500 and 2,000. 72
Twitter has taken proactive measures to ban possible ISIS linked accounts and,
since October 2014, literally thousands have been suspended either temporarily or
permanently. CIA analysts have indicated that this suspension has greatly restricted the
group’s ability to spread its message and propaganda to larger, global audiences.73
More
importantly, Berger and Morgan’s report concluded with general recommendations in
regards to how Twitter could best curb potential ISIS and other terrorist groups’ access to

72
Berger, J.M. "Making Sense of ISIS’s Use of Twitter." Newsweek, 2015.
73
Berger and Morgan, 'Defining and Describing the Population of ISIS Supporters on Twitter', The
Brookings Institution, 2015.

the public. They indicated that the suspension of accounts do have a profound effect and
work to limit (to various degrees) the scope and reach of ISIS activities, however, these
suspensions “do not, at the current level of implementation, completely eliminate those
activities, and cannot be expected to do so”.74
Additionally, critics argue that these
suspensions are ineffective since ISIS propaganda is still readily available on Twitter via
other supplementary accounts, and supporters are resourceful enough to find alternate
means of spreading their message.75
On the other hand, the report did indicate that social media companies and major
governments could work together to “devise appropriate responses to extremism on
social media”.76
The researchers added “although discussions of this issue often frame
government intervention as an infringement on free speech, in reality, social media
companies currently regulate speech on their platforms without oversight or disclosures
of how suspensions are applied”.77
Furthermore, it was noted that approaches to the
problem of fundamental extremists are most successful when they are “mainstreamed
into wider dialogues among the wide range of community, private, and public
stakeholders”.78
Studies have shown that there are some efforts that are effective at
curbing ISIS’s online presence. Government agencies have engaged in counterterrorism
attacks against ISIS and infiltrated many of their Twitter accounts. They have also
encouraged people to use their own hashtags, such as #ISISMediaBlackout, to post
positive and uplifting messages instead of horrendous ones that spread ISIS’s agenda.79

74
Ibid.
75
Siegel, Jacob, 'ISIS Is Using Social Media to Reach YOU, Its New Audience', The Daily Beast, 2014.
76
Berger & Morgan, 'The ISIS Twitter Census’, 2015.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.
79
Siegel, Jacob 'ISIS Is Using Social Media to Reach YOU, Its New Audience', The Daily Beast, 2014.

Pakistan up Next – No Network Unturned
There is already significant reason to believe that ISIS has its hopes set on
infiltrating Pakistan and taking advantage of its sovereignty and nuclear capabilities.
Social media has been instrumental in tracking its agenda and movements and making it
public. On July 16, 2015, one Twitter source read as follows: “Daesh pamphlets surface
in Bajaur Agency http://tribune.com.pk/story/922069/islamic-state-pamphlets-surface-in-
bajaur-agency/ … Someone pls inform @ChaudhryNisar #ISIS #Pakistan”.80
The news
source listed verifies that ISIS has, indeed, dropped pamphlets into areas of the FATA in
Pakistan,81
and that while it has been only been disseminated there, the use of Twitter is
allowing news of this to be spread nationally. This suggests that ISIS propaganda has
already entered the country, and while it may bring fear to many, it will be a welcome
sign for those who are seeking to enlist. Several sources have reported that the problem is
under control, and does not warrant serious concern, however, this is not convincing. It is
almost impossible to tell whether or not this is an isolated event or part of a more
structured and well-planned psychological operation aimed at gaining uneducated
recruits.82
Another tweet read as follows: “#IndianNSA managed to establish rapport
between #TTP and #ISIS so that the two can jointly carryout terror attacks against
https://twitter.com/hashtag/Pakistan?src=hash#Pakistan”.83
This is probably
sensational; however, reports have indicated that ISIS sometimes tries to represent
themselves has having more allies than they really do in order to solicit fear and gain

80
Twitter.com, “#IndianNSA - Twitter Search', 2015.
81
Firdous, I, “Islamic State Pamphlets Surface in Bajaur Agency.” The Express Tribune, 2015.
82
Ibid
83
Twitter.com, “#ISIS Pakistan - Twitter Search', 2015.

more support. It is justifiable for ISIS to suggest that they are receving backing and
support from India. This works to their favor in two specific ways: First, it suggests that
India is gearing up to invade Pakistan. Tensions between these two nations are already
high and further controversy could prove extremely problematic. Second, this type of
psychological warfare heightens the preoccupations of militant groups, such as al-Qaeda.
As a result, if al-Qaeda and its affiliates believe that their cooperation will keep ISIS from
associating with the Indians, they might be more willing to concede, compromising their
their own agenda along the way.84
Now in the past three months there has been an increase of dialogue on Twitter
between ISIS supporters in which they’ve shed light on their plans for aggressions into
Pakistan. I examined these tweets to understand exactly what methods they’re developing
and whether this included maneuvering their way into the madrassa system. Searching for
hashtag mentions, including: #ISISPakistan, #ISILPakistan, #IslamicStatePak and
#ISPakistan brought up plenty of primary source statements in which ISIS supporters
have suggested and identified Pakistan as an important avenue for growth. Not only that,
but they are actually deep in the process of developing an effective narrative directed
towards madrassa clerics meant to project their strength over and above those terror
organizations currently operating in the country.
The assortment of tweets suggests ISIS recognizes that the existence of competing
groups will be inevitably problematic and its members are using various strategies to
discredit them in order to project ISIS as the most powerful terror group in the world. In
one tweet published in January 2015, an ISIS member with the Twitter handle
@Black_Flags retweeted a message from @Abutalut5, expressing ISIS’s superiority by

84
Siegel, Jacob, “ISIS Is Using Social Media to Reach YOU, Its New Audience.” The Daily Beast, 2014.

declaring that the new Taliban regime is a fraud. To support this claim, he uploaded an
image of a news story in which a Taliban member contends that the new Taliban leader,
known as Mullah Mansoor, pleaded with people attending a funeral to pledge their
allegiance to him, however many, if not all, declined.85
The story, and subsequent tweet,
was meant to project the Taliban as an organization whose support in Pakistan is waning
rapidly. In the tribal areas of Pakistan, where one might assume Internet capabilities are
lacking, these stories are distributed in such a way that it has more appeal and effect on
the masses rather than it does on prominent figures, which is exactly what ISIS wants.
Thus, they are perpetuating this worldview aimed at manipulating the minds of the locals,
who assume that they are not being properly informed of their status. Also, by suggesting
that people are reluctant to proclaim their allegiance to Mullah Mansoor, they’ve spread
the message across the FATA and KPK that surrounding communities in Pakistan are
beginning to lose faith in Taliban leadership. Furthermore, in the message accompanying
the picture, @Black_Flags confirms that the Taliban’s deceit has been the main factor in
this newfound resistance and that it was time to review their relationship with the
organization. Most importantly however, the statements suggest that ISIS is not seeking
to use its Salafiyya Jihadiyya philosophy to infiltrate the mindset of radical madrassas
directly; rather they are using the strategy of discrediting the leadership of the Taliban by
claiming that their fraud is inconsistent with the Deobandi ideologies that they allege to
uphold. It is clear that this initial surge is not meant to spawn partnerships; instead the
belief is that by orchestrating this smear campaign, they are seeking to undermine the
Taliban’s influence and than use their weight to effectively fill that gap.

85
Ibid

Regardless of stories being circulated on social media, the Taliban still maintain a
strong presence in rural communities around the FATA and KPK, and it seems as if it is
the duty of ISIS activists to loosen their grip. In the caption accompanying another tweet,
user @Black_Flags claims that the Taliban is starting to appear nervous because of this
noticeable shift in momentum and are resorting to tactics, without shame, that are
actually fooling their Muslim brothers.86
The wording in @Black_Flags’ tweet suggests
that ISIS is aiming to use collective action as a strategy for diminishing the influence of
the Taliban in Pakistan and in the meantime, improving their chances of integrating with
radical madrassas in the region. Particularly, since it seems they are keen on competing
with the Taliban for resources (land, money, influence, etc.), they are categorically
discrediting the organization within the communities they inhabit to gain a supply of
essential human resource and the rewards that come with that.
Figure 3 – Twitter User @Black_Flags Tweet Discrediting the Taliban in 2014.87

86
Ibid
87
Twitter.com – “@Black_Flags. RT @Dua for ISIS." Twitter, 2014.

It’s obvious these tweets are intended to portray the Taliban as a fraudulent group
that misrepresents facts in order to undermine its popularity, therefore discrediting the
organization. This will likely make it easier for ISIS to negotiate with clerics of radical
madrassas to shift their allegiance. Furthermore, from my research of numerous other
Twitter and social media posts, I’ve noticed that ISIS has been pursuing this option of
loosening the Taliban’s grip because they actually seek to differentiate themselves from
being associated in the same sense. I am not sure as of now why they are choosing to go
down this route instead of trying to organize an understanding and/or integrate, however
it is a logical assumption that – ISIS has known from the beginning that its ideology was
similar to that of these entrenched groups; therefore it would take more than just their
popularity and influence to allow for clerics and locals to recognize and accept their
movement. If ISIS’s intention is to not play second fiddle to the Taliban and al-Qaeda
(meaning they desire total hegemony in the region), then that means internally they have
already tactfully decided to activate this social media blitz from the very beginning. Such
actions are consistent with the views of proponents of the social identity theory, who
argue that groups rely on these methods to enhance their status.88
Further evidence of ISIS using collective action as a strategy was witnessed in
May 2015, when Taliban leadership sent out information to discredit the tweet regarding
mourners failing to pledge allegiance to Mullah Mansoor. Again, user @Black_Flags
retweeted evidence that exposed data to show that the Taliban fabricated the video they
produced (Figure 4).89
This was quite savvy on their part as they were able to prove that
the video of the crowd was not actually of those in Quetta, Balochistan, instead it was an

88
Upal, Afzal. “Alternative Narratives for Preventing Radicalization of Muslim Youth.” 2014.
89
Ibid

old video of supporters from Jalalabad, Afghanistan (at a Taliban funeral that took place
in early 2014).90
The message that @Black_Flags accompanied with the deceptive video
states that “Mullah Mansoor and his group do not feel shame in peddling lies”, with
hashtags #Afghanistan, #Pakistan, #India, #Taliban, and #Indonesia.91
Figure 4 – Twitter User @Black_Flags Tweet Discrediting the Taliban in 2015.92
The decision to include these hashtags is important because Twitter users
conducting a simple search using those terms will automatically find the tweet,
significantly increasing its view content, especially by radical Muslims in those specific
regions. The goal to increase the number of viewers, who eventually join the
conversation and turn into participants, will dramatically increase the chances of ISIS

90
Ibid
91
Ibid

92
Twitter.com – “@Black_Flags. RT @Dua for ISIS." Twitter, 2015.

accomplishing their likely goal of appealing to the masses. However, it is interesting to
note that while the Taliban does have influence in a few of those mentioned countries,
ISIS has not quite broken into any one of them yet. In this sense, it’s apparent that ISIS
would deem it important to accumulate Twitter support, whereby users like
@Black_Flags, can use the collective action strategy to reduce the leverage of the current
command and turn people against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Even with a more aggressive
Pak Fauj (Pakistan Army) looming, they can systematically accomplish this task in order
to achieve command over influence, and potentially madrassas, in Pakistan.
Current Response to ISIS in Pakistan
If ISIS enters the Pakistani realm by infiltrating the madrassa system, this will
undoubtedly raise questions as to how will existing radical groups respond. Currently,
they call the provinces that run along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan home, points of
entry that ISIS will most likely target. Thus, they will have to strategically decide
whether or not to align themselves with ISIS and embrace their concomitant ideology.
Obviously, the stipulation would be for ISIS to allow them to continue to operate at their
present level. However, they would fully understand that by being granted this autonomy,
ISIS is also achieving their goal by advancing their expansion efforts, something that
should work out favorably for both sides in the time being.
According to the reasoning in the SIT, there can be a strong case made for the
view that these radical groups will ultimately switch their allegiance to an ISIS-based
ideology completely. The understanding of the theory – that people will shift loyalty to a
dominant group because of greater perception, means that by successfully navigating and

influencing religious clerics and powerful politicians in the community, ISIS will see
substantial growth just based off the reputation they’ve created. This is a risk neither the
Taliban nor al-Qaeda can take. However, it should be noted that the concept for ISIS to
allow these groups autonomy from a strategic standpoint arises from the belief among
ISIS leaders that successful infiltration into the madrassa system will not automatically
guarantee successful entry into Pakistan. It is evident that implementing the Salafiyya
Jihadiyya ideology, which would introduce a relentless massacre of Shi’a and Christian
communities in rural Pakistan, will surely lead to a rapid and robust response from the
Pakistani military most likely backed by an international coalition.
Pakistani and U.S. Intelligence Strategies
In my assessment there are four strategies, from an intelligence perspective, the
Pakistani Intelligence Services (PIC), with assistance from the CIA and other
international intelligence agencies, should launch to prevent ISIS from readily infiltrating
their ideology and supporters into the country. It is important to note that while some of
these strategies are fairly new, implementation in Pakistan should be done with updated
designs by thoroughly factoring in the principles and ideals of the environment. The
mistake of trying to enforce the same principle in different settings cannot be made time
and time again. These strategies include: strengthening current capacities to infiltrate and
track social media platforms, employing greater efforts towards disrupting ISIS
financiers, increasing the investments in the implementation of social media intelligence
(SOCMINT) and a continued deployment of effective countermeasures to offset ISIS’s
social media propaganda.

Infiltration of Social Media Platforms
Developing greater comprehensive and persistent infiltration methods into social
media platforms exploited by ISIS members and supporters will certainly play an
instrumental role in undermining the capacity of their agents to recruit and expand their
ideology. The current strategies being used have been consistently deployed by all U.S.
security and intelligence services and have successfully prevented attempts aimed at
carrying out terrorist attacks on American soil and around the world. Under current
guidelines, agents and analysts from the FBI and CIA have accessed and executed these
programs in three ways: First, by creating bogus social media identities and using them as
platforms to engage with individuals who wish to join ISIS or are otherwise willing to
orchestrate a lone wolf attack within the United States.93
For many years, this has
specifically been the number one employed tactic used as an investigative tool within
both U.S. domestic and international intelligence agencies.94
Secondly, by deploying the
“catfish” recruitment method, whereby intelligence agents meticulously develop fake
online personas and use them to lure ISIS sympathizers into interpersonal and romantic
relationships – designed to coax the target until they eventually reveal their intentions.
Lastly, by setting up the controversial false-flag method, again involving an agent to
create a fake account and use that as an avenue for attracting (which in some cases, can
be seen as coercion) individuals willing to join ISIS or orchestrating a lone wolf attack.
All of these strategies have been quite effective in allowing U.S. intelligence agencies to
track ISIS activities and arrest individuals who are catalysts of the group.

93
Windrem, Robert and Brunker, Mike. "No Laughing Matter: FBI Trolls Social Media." NBC News, 2014.
94
Ibid

“Catfishing” has notably enabled domestic intelligence agents to successfully
apprehend individuals who were intent on formulating their radicalization into a greater
cause. In 2013, the FBI used the strategy to lure Abdul Basit Javed Sheikh into a
romantic relationship with one of its agents.95
During the course of the relationship, Basit
eventually succumbed to amenity and informed the agent about his desire to join Jabhat
al-Nusra. His reasoning was that he “did not want to be the brother who sat back and
watched as his other brothers fought and died for their freedom” in Syria.96
He provided
details of his plans to travel to through Turkey on his way to Syria and the FBI ultimately
arrested him at Raleigh-Durham Airport in North Carolina.
The arrest of Nicholas Teausant in 2015 further demonstrated the effectiveness of
the “catfish” strategy. Within the previous year, Teausant had began posting several
pictures on an ISIS-run Instagram account known as Lone Mujahid Pocket Book. In one
picture, Teausant is seen standing on an American flag and in the accompanying caption,
stated that he truly hates America even though he served in the U.S. military for two
years.97
He additionally declared his eagerness to join “Allah’s (SWT) armed forces”, but
did not know how to start.98
Seemingly an easy target, an FBI agent contacted Teausant,
gained his trust, and provided him with details on how he could fulfill his desires.
However, this turned out to be much greater operation than initially expected. During the
conversation, Teausant informed the agent that he’s met with other Muslim brothers and
they’ve collectively brainstormed the most effective ways of attacking the Los Angeles
subway system. The FBI eventually arrested him as he was attempting to travel to Turkey

95
Ibid
96
Ibid

97
Ibid
98
Ibid

and between 2013 and 2014, used the information they gathered to arrest fifteen
individuals who were connected to Teausant or his associates.99
The FBI’s success in
luring these individuals has made it difficult for ISIS to recruit in the U.S. While this
technique perhaps increases the risk of lone wolf attacks, it does prevent individuals from
coordinating with others to carry out attacks on a much larger scale.
Furthermore, just like ISIS recruiters, the FBI regularly combs the Internet in
search of people reaching out for opportunities to enlist and/or seek guidance. However,
potential recruits are now becoming increasingly aware of these intelligence tactics and
the high number of arrests have led to more cautious behavior. This has unquestionably
diminished the ability of ISIS recruiting agents to establish any direct communication as
stories and ploys of FBI deceit are publically reported. Thus, it has created a sense of
distrust, as recruits are now more skeptical to reach out or accept invitations from ISIS
social media accounts. Accordingly, this strategy has been effective in undermining
ISIS’s capability to spread its propaganda online, specifically in the United States.
However, we cannot maintain status quo, as ISIS recruiters will eventually discover
innovative methods to mobilize this community in a safer online environment. Moving
forward, the success of the catfish method has to be renovated and refined, especially by
the PIC, as opportunities for radicalized parties to organize are greater in Pakistan than in
the U.S. Nevertheless, it has provided one of the clearest illustrations on the effectiveness
of the infiltration strategy and being able to apprehend these individuals before they
encounter ISIS recruiters, and actually become a legitimate threat, is imperative.

99
Brunker, Mike. "Jihadis and Wannabes: Americans and U.S. Residents Who Allegedly Sought to Join the
Islamist Cause in Iraq and Syria." Public Tableau, 2014.

ISIS's Growing Influence in Pakistan

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