Authors:

Carolina Castilla
(Colgate University)

WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE AND
WHAT’S MINE IS MINE:
Bargaining Power and Incom...
Motivation
Castilla & Walker (2013):
 Ghana
 Private lottery windfalls are allocated towards gifts and loans
 Public lo...
Research Objectives
Bargaining power depends on:
 Share of resources of each spouse
 Anderson and Eswaran, (2009): the i...
Conclusions
Theoretical Findings:
 There exists a threshold level change of bargaining power that
needs to be exceeded to...
Experiments with Spouses







Testing across HH models: Kebede et al. (2011); Munro et
al. (2008); Munro et al. (201...
Experiments with Spouses




Ashraf (2009) the goal is to find whether hiding occurs,
and how communication influences s...
Experiments with Spouses



Mani (2013): differs in timing of information treatment
Income-control treatment:





...
The Model


Contract:
Spouses pool all of their resources and bargain over how to allocate
them between private and publi...
The Model
Proposition:
There exists a strictly positive threshold change in bargaining
power (∆𝜇 ) such that if 𝜕𝜇 < ∆𝜇 th...
Testable Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Hiding is Inefficient.


Hiding will cause underinvestment in household public goods.

...
Experimental Design (Location)
Uttarakhand
Dehradun

Almora
Experimental Design
Sample: 200 established couples, 50% from Dehradun and
50% from Almora.
 Recruitment: Door-to-door
 ...
Experimental Design: Timeline







Randomly assigned to an information treatment
Each spouse randomly assigned to a ...
Experimental Design: Choices



Play modified Ultimatum Game
Split own share of endowments between:










Hou...
Information Treatment

Information Environment

Lottery Prize Eligible
(Player A)
Wife
Husband

Private with option to
Dis...
Experimental Design: Player A
Flip Coin
Heads:
Extra Rs. 75

Private
&/or
Conceal
Split Endow
A+75, B, PG

Tails

Informed...
Experimental Design: Player B
Private &
Conceal:
50% change
Player A has 75

Informed of
Endowment Distribution &
Outcome ...
Bargaining Power Treatment
Table 2: Distribution of Resources
Endowment
(Player B –
Player A) 1/

Distribution of Resource...
Bargaining Power Treatment
Table 2: Distribution of Resources
Endowment
(Player B –
Player A) 1/

Distribution of Resource...
Bargaining Power Treatment
Table 2: Distribution of Resources
Endowment
(Player B –
Player A) 1/

Distribution of Resource...
Bargaining Power Treatment
Table 2: Distribution of Resources
Endowment
(Player B –
Player A) 1/

Distribution of Resource...
Experimental Design: Visual Aid
50

20

10

5

5

50

20

10

5

5

Your Money

Your Spouse

Household
Experimental Design: Visual Aid
50

20
20

5
10

5

10

5

50

Your Money

Your Spouse

Household
Experimental Design: Visual Aid
Empirical Strategy: Baseline
𝑛
𝑔

𝑔

𝑔

𝑔

𝑥 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 = 𝛿1 𝑇ℎ𝑃𝑟 + 𝛿2 𝑇ℎ𝑃𝑟−𝐷 + 𝛿3 𝑇ℎ𝑃𝑟−𝐶 + 𝛽

𝑤 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 + 𝜃

𝑋 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 +

7

𝛼𝑠 +
...
Results: Effect of Asymmetric
Information
Panel (a): Information Treatment Effects
HH Account
Own Account
All
Player A Pla...
Results: Effect of Asymmetric
Information
Panel (a): Information Treatment Effects
HH Account
Own Account
All
Player A Pla...
Baseline Results Description


As bargaining power increases:





Private Information:





Allocation towards HH ...
Empirical Strategy: Two-way Interaction
3
𝑔

𝑥 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 = 𝛽

𝑛
𝑔

𝑤 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 +

𝑗

𝛿𝑗 𝑇ℎ × 𝑤 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 + 𝜃
𝑗 =1







𝑋 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 ...
Results: Two-way Interaction, BP
and Information
Panel (a):Two-way Interaction, (BP) and Information
HH Account
Own Accoun...
Results: Two-way Interaction, BP
and Information
Panel (a):Two-way Interaction, (BP) and Information
HH Account
Own Accoun...
Two-way Interaction Results


As bargaining power increases, allocation towards HH Account:







As bargaining powe...
Results: Two-way Interaction,
Gender and Information
HH Account
All
Player A Player B
Own Share
0.494*** 0.510*** 0.470***...
Results: Two-way Interaction,
Gender and Information
HH Account
All
Player A Player B
Own Share
0.494*** 0.510*** 0.470***...
Results: Three-way Interaction,
BP, Information and Gender
Own Share
Endowment
Private X Own Share
Private-Reveal X
Own Sh...
Three-way Interaction Results




Two-way interactions average out gender differences which
move in opposite directions
...
Results: Three-way Interaction,
BP, Information and Gender
Own Share
Endowment
Private X Own Share
Private-Reveal X
Own Sh...
Three-way Interaction Results


For Females, as BP increases:







Increase in allocation towards Own Account
No di...
Mechanisms (female response)

workMembers of the HH that work for Income
for Income
Husband and Wife
Husband Only
Wife Onl...
Conclusions
Theoretical Findings:
 There exists a threshold level change of bargaining power that
needs to be exceeded to...
THANKS!
QUESTIONS?
Contact: ccastilla@colgate.edu
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What's Yours is Mine and What's Mine is Mine: Bargaining Power and Income Concealing between Spouses in India

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02.16.2014 - Carolina Castilla

  1. 1. Authors: Carolina Castilla (Colgate University) WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE AND WHAT’S MINE IS MINE: Bargaining Power and Income Concealing between Spouses in India
  2. 2. Motivation Castilla & Walker (2013):  Ghana  Private lottery windfalls are allocated towards gifts and loans  Public lottery windfalls are spent on highly visible items (assets, ceremonies and health) – Husbands  Personal care by wives Castilla (2011):  Ghana (same households, but 10 years earlier)  Asymmetric Information over farm income allocated towards gifts by husbands. Theory: incentives to hide in HH with cooperative and noncooperative contracts.
  3. 3. Research Objectives Bargaining power depends on:  Share of resources of each spouse  Anderson and Eswaran, (2009): the influence of additional resources on bargaining power of women is small compared to idiosyncratic or cultural sources of bargaining power.  Cultural norms and socio-economic characteristics. Research Question:  How do different sources of bargaining power affect cooperation and efficiency between spouses under asymmetric information?
  4. 4. Conclusions Theoretical Findings:  There exists a threshold level change of bargaining power that needs to be exceeded to induce revelation Empirical Findings:  Experiments with established couples in Uttarakhand, India  Ultimatum games that varied control over endowments  Information Treatments: Public, Private and Private with option to reveal  When given the chance, 21% of spouses choose to conceal  No differences by gender contributions towards HH account  Men who choose to reveal are more cooperative than women
  5. 5. Experiments with Spouses     Testing across HH models: Kebede et al. (2011); Munro et al. (2008); Munro et al. (2011) Spousal Preferences: Bateman & Munro (2005); Cochard et al. (2009); Dasgupta and Mani, (2013); Carlsson et al. (2012) Dictator games: Iversen et al. (2011) Asymmetric Information: Ashraf (2009); Mani (2013); Hoel (2013)
  6. 6. Experiments with Spouses   Ashraf (2009) the goal is to find whether hiding occurs, and how communication influences spousal behavior. Information Treatments:     Private: obscures choices and allows plausible deniability Public: all choices and outcomes are observed Negotiation: spouses communicate prior to making choices Findings:     Invest in own account if Private (men and women) Commit consumption if Public (men) Save in wife’s account if Negotiation (men) If spouse controls savings, save in own account
  7. 7. Experiments with Spouses   Mani (2013): differs in timing of information treatment Income-control treatment:      Information Treatment: (ex-post)   Two investment options (high and low) Baseline: Fixed shares, no trade-off btw control and payoff High return investment goes towards spouse’s account: private, cash or joint – differences in cost of appropriating Low return: own private account None, Full or partial – only inform outcomes (not choices) and allow to renegotiate Findings: control matters, information and threat of retaliation do not.
  8. 8. The Model  Contract: Spouses pool all of their resources and bargain over how to allocate them between private and public good consumption. Benchmark: When T is revealed:  The household solves: max 𝑄,𝑥 𝑚 ≥0 𝜇 𝑌𝑓 , 𝑌 𝑚 , 𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑧 + 1 − 𝜇 𝑌𝑓 , 𝑌 𝑚 , 𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑧 𝑢 𝑥𝑚 + 𝑣 𝑄 𝑢 𝑌𝑓 + 𝑌 𝑚 + 𝑇 − 𝑥 𝑚 − 𝑝𝑄 + 𝑣 𝑄 Where: 𝜇 𝑌𝑓 , 𝑌 𝑚 , 𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑧 − 𝜇 𝑌𝑓 , 𝑌 𝑚 , 𝑇,z 𝑝, 𝑧 𝑢 𝑥 𝑚 Husband’s bargaining power + 𝑣 𝑄 𝑢 Distribution𝑇factors, for instance𝑄 cultural or legal factors 𝑌𝑓 + 𝑌 𝑚 + − 𝑥 𝑚 − 𝑝𝑄 + 𝑣
  9. 9. The Model Proposition: There exists a strictly positive threshold change in bargaining power (∆𝜇 ) such that if 𝜕𝜇 < ∆𝜇 there are incentives to hide. 𝜕𝑇 Intuition of Proof: Husband hides T iff 𝜕𝑈 𝑚 𝜕𝑇 𝑅 < 𝜕𝑈 𝑚 𝜕𝑇 𝐻 Low Initial Bargaining Power lim ∆𝜇 < 0 No Hiding High Initial Bargaining Power lim ∆𝜇 > 0 Hiding can occur depending on responsiveness of BP 𝜇 →0 𝜇 →1
  10. 10. Testable Hypotheses Hypothesis 1: Hiding is Inefficient.  Hiding will cause underinvestment in household public goods. Hypothesis 2: Income hiding can occur even when revealing the available resources increases bargaining power.  Bargaining power is determined partly by relative amount of resources and partly by other factors.
  11. 11. Experimental Design (Location) Uttarakhand Dehradun Almora
  12. 12. Experimental Design Sample: 200 established couples, 50% from Dehradun and 50% from Almora.  Recruitment: Door-to-door  Mobile Lab: at their homes.  Incentives: LED lamp per spouse, plus opportunity to earn some cash. Protocol:  Enumerator of same gender  Separate rooms  Ultimatum Game: using strategy method  Survey 
  13. 13. Experimental Design: Timeline     Randomly assigned to an information treatment Each spouse randomly assigned to a Role (A or B)  Player A: Informed party  Player B: Informed of outcome Endowments: informed of their own (ω_i ) and their spouse’s (ω_j ) endowment Each spouse was presented with 7 decisions, one-at-atime
  14. 14. Experimental Design: Choices   Play modified Ultimatum Game Split own share of endowments between:        Household Account Own Account Spouse’s Account Player A: played 7- lotteries with 50% chance to win Rs. 75 Player B: no lottery option Payoffs: 1.5 𝜋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝑔 ∗ 2
  15. 15. Information Treatment Information Environment Lottery Prize Eligible (Player A) Wife Husband Private with option to Disclose (POD) T1 T2 Private Information (PI) T3 T4 Complete Information (CI) T5 T6
  16. 16. Experimental Design: Player A Flip Coin Heads: Extra Rs. 75 Private &/or Conceal Split Endow A+75, B, PG Tails Informed of Endowment Distribution Complete &/or Reveal Split Endow+75 A, B, PG Informed of Player B’s Proposed Split Accept or Reject Split Endow A, B, PG
  17. 17. Experimental Design: Player B Private & Conceal: 50% change Player A has 75 Informed of Endowment Distribution & Outcome of Coin Toss Split Endowment A, B, PG Informed of Player A’s Proposed Split Accept Reject Complete & Reveal: Player A has 75 If heads
  18. 18. Bargaining Power Treatment Table 2: Distribution of Resources Endowment (Player B – Player A) 1/ Distribution of Resources 2/ With Lottery Prize, Without Lottery Prize If known or revealed Player B 255 - 45 85 150 - 75 67 195 - 105 65 150 -150 50 120 - 180 40 105 - 195 35 150 - 225 40 1/ Amounts in Indian Rupees. Player A Player B 15 33 35 50 60 65 60 68 50 52 40 32 28 33 Player A 32 50 48 60 68 72 67 Change (%) 17 17 13 10 8 7 7 Household Endowment 300 225 300 300 300 300 375
  19. 19. Bargaining Power Treatment Table 2: Distribution of Resources Endowment (Player B – Player A) 1/ Distribution of Resources 2/ With Lottery Prize, Without Lottery Prize If known or revealed Player B 255 - 45 85 150 - 75 67 195 - 105 65 150 -150 50 120 - 180 40 105 - 195 35 150 - 225 40 1/ Amounts in Indian Rupees. Player A Player B 15 33 35 50 60 65 60 68 50 52 40 32 28 33 Player A 32 50 48 60 68 72 67 Change (%) 17 17 13 10 8 7 7 Household Endowment 300 225 300 300 300 300 375
  20. 20. Bargaining Power Treatment Table 2: Distribution of Resources Endowment (Player B – Player A) 1/ Distribution of Resources 2/ With Lottery Prize, Without Lottery Prize If known or revealed Player B 255 - 45 85 150 - 75 67 195 - 105 65 150 -150 50 120 - 180 40 105 - 195 35 150 - 225 40 1/ Amounts in Indian Rupees. Player A Player B 15 33 35 50 60 65 60 68 50 52 40 32 28 33 Player A 32 50 48 60 68 72 67 Change (%) 17 17 13 10 8 7 7 Household Endowment 300 225 300 300 300 300 375
  21. 21. Bargaining Power Treatment Table 2: Distribution of Resources Endowment (Player B – Player A) 1/ Distribution of Resources 2/ With Lottery Prize, Without Lottery Prize If known or revealed Player B 255 - 45 85 150 - 75 67 195 - 105 65 150 -150 50 120 - 180 40 105 - 195 35 150 - 225 40 1/ Amounts in Indian Rupees. Player A Player B 15 33 35 50 60 65 60 68 50 52 40 32 28 33 Player A 32 50 48 60 68 72 67 Change (%) 17 17 13 10 8 7 7 Household Endowment 300 225 300 300 300 300 375
  22. 22. Experimental Design: Visual Aid 50 20 10 5 5 50 20 10 5 5 Your Money Your Spouse Household
  23. 23. Experimental Design: Visual Aid 50 20 20 5 10 5 10 5 50 Your Money Your Spouse Household
  24. 24. Experimental Design: Visual Aid
  25. 25. Empirical Strategy: Baseline 𝑛 𝑔 𝑔 𝑔 𝑔 𝑥 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 = 𝛿1 𝑇ℎ𝑃𝑟 + 𝛿2 𝑇ℎ𝑃𝑟−𝐷 + 𝛿3 𝑇ℎ𝑃𝑟−𝐶 + 𝛽 𝑤 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 + 𝜃 𝑋 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 + 7 𝛼𝑠 + 𝑠=1      𝜎 𝑟 + 𝜀 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 𝑟=1 Dependent: Amount in HH Account or Own Account Controls 𝑋 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 : Gender, District and Lottery outcome (heads). Own share of endowments 𝑤 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 Round fixed effects. Spouse random effects. Hypothesis 1: 𝛿1𝑔 = 𝛿3𝑔 ≠ 0 𝑔 𝛿2 = 0 No guilty compensation No differences among disclosers and PI
  26. 26. Results: Effect of Asymmetric Information Panel (a): Information Treatment Effects HH Account Own Account All Player A Player B All Player A Player B Own Share 1.464*** 1.575*** 1.362*** 0.764*** 0.953*** 0.646*** Endowment (0.043) (0.061) (0.061) (0.036) (0.048) (0.047) -7.628** -19.73*** 4.592 11.84*** 26.74*** -3.059 Private (3.101) (4.221) (4.202) (3.065) (3.308) (2.687) 2.312 3.639 0.920 -0.142 -0.613 -0.036 Private - Reveal (3.469) (4.746) (4.326) (2.464) (3.512) (2.775) -10.46** -21.46*** 1.278 11.65** 31.88*** -7.040** Private - Conceal (3.642) (5.318) (5.132) (5.214) (5.339) (2.568) N 2799 1399 1400 2799 1399 1400 R-squared 0.4197 0.4449 0.4292 0.3078 0.4979 0.2446 Random Effects. No differences across genders
  27. 27. Results: Effect of Asymmetric Information Panel (a): Information Treatment Effects HH Account Own Account All Player A Player B All Player A Player B Own Share 1.464*** 1.575*** 1.362*** 0.764*** 0.953*** 0.646*** Endowment (0.043) (0.061) (0.061) (0.036) (0.048) (0.047) -7.628** -19.73*** 4.592 11.84*** 26.74*** -3.059 Private (3.101) (4.221) (4.202) (3.065) (3.308) (2.687) 2.312 3.639 0.920 -0.142 -0.613 -0.036 Private - Reveal (3.469) (4.746) (4.326) (2.464) (3.512) (2.775) -10.46** -21.46*** 1.278 11.65** 31.88*** -7.040** Private - Conceal (3.642) (5.318) (5.132) (5.214) (5.339) (2.568) N 2799 1399 1400 2799 1399 1400 R-squared 0.4197 0.4449 0.4292 0.3078 0.4979 0.2446 Random Effects. No differences across genders
  28. 28. Baseline Results Description  As bargaining power increases:    Private Information:    Allocation towards HH account increases Allocation towards Own account increases half as much Decreases allocation towards HH account (Player A = information advantage) Statistically equal for those who choose to conceal By construction allocation towards own account:   Increases for Player A Decreases for Player B – knowing there is asymmetric information increases sharing (other’s account)
  29. 29. Empirical Strategy: Two-way Interaction 3 𝑔 𝑥 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 = 𝛽 𝑛 𝑔 𝑤 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 + 𝑗 𝛿𝑗 𝑇ℎ × 𝑤 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 + 𝜃 𝑗 =1      𝑋 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 + 7 𝛼𝑠 + 𝑠=1 𝜎 𝑟 + 𝜀 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 𝑟=1 Dependent: Amount in HH Account or Own Account Controls 𝑋 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 : Gender, District and Lottery outcome (heads). Own share of endowments 𝑤 𝑠,ℎ,𝑟 Round fixed effects. Spouse fixed effects. Hypothesis 2: 𝑔 𝑔 𝑔 𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 𝛿3 = 0 No differences in effect of BP by Info. Treatment
  30. 30. Results: Two-way Interaction, BP and Information Panel (a):Two-way Interaction, (BP) and Information HH Account Own Account All Player A Player B All Player A Player B Own Share 1.503*** 1.680*** 1.287*** 0.865*** 0.913*** 0.688*** Endowment (0.084) (0.124) (0.106) (0.060) (0.090) (0.061) -0.001 -0.107 0.154 -0.170* -0.000 0.000 Private X Own Share (0.110) (0.157) (0.150) (0.089) (0.123) (0.100) Private-Reveal X -0.035 -0.110 0.075 -0.060 -0.017 -0.064 Own Share (0.112) (0.160) (0.151) (0.087) (0.119) (0.107) Private-Conceal X -0.170** -0.411** 0.007 0.128 0.529*** 0.126 Own Share (0.086) (0.132) (0.110) (0.107) (0.130) (0.097) N 2799 1399 1400 2799 1399 1400 R-squared 0.4199 0.4466 0.4301 0.3086 0.4978 0.2426 Fixed Effects.
  31. 31. Results: Two-way Interaction, BP and Information Panel (a):Two-way Interaction, (BP) and Information HH Account Own Account All Player A Player B All Player A Player B Own Share 1.503*** 1.680*** 1.287*** 0.865*** 0.913*** 0.688*** Endowment (0.084) (0.124) (0.106) (0.060) (0.090) (0.061) -0.001 -0.107 0.154 -0.170* -0.000 0.000 Private X Own Share (0.110) (0.157) (0.150) (0.089) (0.123) (0.100) Private-Reveal X -0.035 -0.110 0.075 -0.060 -0.017 -0.064 Own Share (0.112) (0.160) (0.151) (0.087) (0.119) (0.107) Private-Conceal X -0.170** -0.411** 0.007 0.128 0.529*** 0.126 Own Share (0.086) (0.132) (0.110) (0.107) (0.130) (0.097) N 2799 1399 1400 2799 1399 1400 R-squared 0.4199 0.4466 0.4301 0.3086 0.4978 0.2426 Fixed Effects.
  32. 32. Two-way Interaction Results  As bargaining power increases, allocation towards HH Account:     As bargaining power increases, amount towards Own Account:   Increases if Complete Information No differences b/w Complete Information and Private & Disclose or Private Decrease if Private & Conceal : those least cooperative, become less so as BP increases Increases regardless of information environment Except for:  Those who choose to conceal – increase allocation towards own account significantly more.
  33. 33. Results: Two-way Interaction, Gender and Information HH Account All Player A Player B Own Share 0.494*** 0.510*** 0.470*** Endowment (0.013) (0.018) (0.020) -11.94** -24.63*** 1.494 Private (4.146) (5.551) (5.834) -1.675 0.534 -4.930 Private - Reveal (4.277) (5.842) (5.273) Private -9.839* -18.59** 0.260 Conceal (5.420) (7.669) (7.919) Gender -3.127 -0.969 -4.727 (=1 if Male) (4.379) (5.950) (5.576) 8.530 9.841 6.087 Private X Male (5.938) (8.181) (8.057) Private-Reveal 6.997 5.354 10.68 X Male (6.606) (9.209) (8.171) Private-Conceal 1.869 -3.156 4.691 X Male (7.221) (11.12) (9.806) Random Effects. Own Account All Player A Player B 0.265*** 0.303*** 0.228*** (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) 14.55** 31.30*** 1.419 (4.706) (4.812) (3.872) 4.248 4.745 1.868 (3.629) (4.943) (3.771) 11.42 29.22*** 7.396 (8.059) (7.895) (6.568) 1.225 -1.192 -0.001 (3.250) (4.535) (3.757) -5.479 -9.257 -5.299 (5.979) (6.373) (5.338) -9.240* -11.39* -4.354 (4.824) (6.785) (5.491) 1.807 7.029 -6.126 (10.42) (9.528) (7.962)
  34. 34. Results: Two-way Interaction, Gender and Information HH Account All Player A Player B Own Share 0.494*** 0.510*** 0.470*** Endowment (0.013) (0.018) (0.020) -11.94** -24.63*** 1.494 Private (4.146) (5.551) (5.834) -1.675 0.534 -4.930 Private - Reveal (4.277) (5.842) (5.273) Private -9.839* -18.59** 0.260 Conceal (5.420) (7.669) (7.919) Gender -3.127 -0.969 -4.727 (=1 if Male) (4.379) (5.950) (5.576) 8.530 9.841 6.087 Private X Male (5.938) (8.181) (8.057) Private-Reveal 6.997 5.354 10.68 X Male (6.606) (9.209) (8.171) Private-Conceal 1.869 -3.156 4.691 X Male (7.221) (11.12) (9.806) Random Effects. Own Account All Player A Player B 0.265*** 0.303*** 0.228*** (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) 14.55** 31.30*** 1.419 (4.706) (4.812) (3.872) 4.248 4.745 1.868 (3.629) (4.943) (3.771) 11.42 29.22*** 7.396 (8.059) (7.895) (6.568) 1.225 -1.192 -0.001 (3.250) (4.535) (3.757) -5.479 -9.257 -5.299 (5.979) (6.373) (5.338) -9.240* -11.39* -4.354 (4.824) (6.785) (5.491) 1.807 7.029 -6.126 (10.42) (9.528) (7.962)
  35. 35. Results: Three-way Interaction, BP, Information and Gender Own Share Endowment Private X Own Share Private-Reveal X Own Share Private-Conceal X Own Share Private X Own Share X Male Private-Reveal X Own Share X Male Private-Conceal X Own Share X Male N R-squared Panel (b): Three-way Interaction, BP, Information and Gender HH Account Own Account All Player A Player B All Player A Player B 1.503*** 1.681*** 1.287*** 0.865*** 0.913*** 0.688*** (0.084) (0.124) (0.106) (0.060) (0.090) (0.061) -0.105 -0.260 0.098 -0.115 0.159 0.206 (0.132) (0.185) (0.188) (0.116) (0.153) (0.138) -0.173 -0.308* -0.005 0.123 0.209 -0.118 (0.145) (0.183) (0.219) (0.120) (0.135) (0.171) -0.183 -0.377** -0.033 0.078 0.480** 0.207 (0.130) (0.178) (0.182) (0.164) (0.186) (0.168) 0.208 0.314 0.107 -0.109 -0.330 -0.399 (0.142) (0.187) (0.212) (0.133) (0.163) (0.151) 0.272* 0.401** 0.158 -0.359** -0.460*** 0.093 (0.149) (0.191) (0.223) (0.123) (0.140) (0.182) 0.051 -0.046 0.100 0.077 0.077 -0.156 (0.169) (0.262) (0.225) (0.210) (0.237) (0.194) 2799 1399 1400 2799 1399 1400 0.4218 0.4499 0.4311 0.3121 0.5034 0.2502
  36. 36. Three-way Interaction Results   Two-way interactions average out gender differences which move in opposite directions For Females, as BP increases:     Increase in allocation towards HH Account No differences between Complete and Private Information Decrease in allocation towards HH Account if Private Info with Option relative to Complete Information For Males, as BP increases:   No differences between Complete, Private Information or Private & Conceal Increase in allocation towards HH Account if Private & Reveal – Men are more cooperative
  37. 37. Results: Three-way Interaction, BP, Information and Gender Own Share Endowment Private X Own Share Private-Reveal X Own Share Private-Conceal X Own Share Private X Own Share X Male Private-Reveal X Own Share X Male Private-Conceal X Own Share X Male N R-squared Panel (b): Three-way Interaction, BP, Information and Gender HH Account Own Account All Player A Player B All Player A Player B 1.503*** 1.681*** 1.287*** 0.865*** 0.913*** 0.688*** (0.084) (0.124) (0.106) (0.060) (0.090) (0.061) -0.105 -0.260 0.098 -0.115 0.159 0.206 (0.132) (0.185) (0.188) (0.116) (0.153) (0.138) -0.173 -0.308* -0.005 0.123 0.209 -0.118 (0.145) (0.183) (0.219) (0.120) (0.135) (0.171) -0.183 -0.377** -0.033 0.078 0.480** 0.207 (0.130) (0.178) (0.182) (0.164) (0.186) (0.168) 0.208 0.314 0.107 -0.109 -0.330 -0.399 (0.142) (0.187) (0.212) (0.133) (0.163) (0.151) 0.272* 0.401** 0.158 -0.359** -0.460*** 0.093 (0.149) (0.191) (0.223) (0.123) (0.140) (0.182) 0.051 -0.046 0.100 0.077 0.077 -0.156 (0.169) (0.262) (0.225) (0.210) (0.237) (0.194) 2799 1399 1400 2799 1399 1400 0.4218 0.4499 0.4311 0.3121 0.5034 0.2502
  38. 38. Three-way Interaction Results  For Females, as BP increases:     Increase in allocation towards Own Account No differences between Complete, Private Information or Private & Reveal Increase in allocation towards Own Account if Private & Conceal by 50% more. For Males, as BP increases:   No differences between Complete, Private Information or Private & Conceal Decrease in allocation towards HH Account if Private & Reveal – the increase in HH account comes from reduction on own resources.
  39. 39. Mechanisms (female response) workMembers of the HH that work for Income for Income Husband and Wife Husband Only Wife Only ife Husband and Other than Wife Dehradun 19 53 1 16 Almora 10 72 1 12 respondent decides Proportion of HHs where respondent decides Home Whether to work outside of Home How many children to have s Major Household Purchases es Gifts to respondent's relatives Sell land oney Savings from Household Money Dehradun 17 4 6 16 2 7 Almora 8 1 5 1 0 0
  40. 40. Conclusions Theoretical Findings:  There exists a threshold level change of bargaining power that needs to be exceeded to induce revelation   High Initial BP: threshold strictly positive Low Initial BP: no incentives to conceal money Empirical Findings:  When given the chance, 21% of spouses choose to conceal  No compensation through increased HH Good allocation  No differences by gender on Own and Public Good contributions  Men who choose to reveal are more cooperative than women:  As BP increases, men contribute more towards PG, while women contribute less
  41. 41. THANKS! QUESTIONS? Contact: ccastilla@colgate.edu

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