combatreform.org/STRATEGICMANEUVER

1. Addressing The Army’s
Deployability Challenge
• Strategic
• Operational
• Tactical
Conus Operational
Staging Area
Area

2. Summary
• Current and future crises will require long range rapid
deployment of US forces from CONUS.
• Deployment time likely to be critical.
• US lacks adequate deployment assets for achieving
response time objectives for current forces.
• Army’s “transformation” a positive but inadequate step.
• Forced entry and early entry forces especially need help.
• More deployment friendly combat and CSS vehicles can
make a dramatic difference.
• Need to consider making part of the “transformation force”
able to meet response time objectives.
• NDI vehicles exist that can provide a significant reduction
in deployment time.

3. Deployment Is Accomplished in
Several Ways
• Forward Deployed Troops and Equipment
• “Temporarily” Deployed Troops and Equipment
• Pre-positioned Equipment and Supplies
• Troops and Equipment Afloat
• Conus Based Forces - Operational
• Conus Based Forces - Deployable
• By ship - necessary for and significant deployment
• By helicopter - necessary for tactical maneuver
• All need efficient utilization of deployment assets

4. Limitations That Currently Impair
The Conduct Of Strategic
Deployment Operations
• Transportation assets available
• Speed, range, and payload of transportation platforms
• Physical characteristics of military equipment to be transported
on military, CRAF, and VISA transportation platforms
• Political will to make require changes
• Fiscal constraints
• Resistance to change
• Security “firewalls” between classified and unclassified portions
of the same information system (e.g. GTN)
• Time-distance factors from origin to destination
• Infrastructure in the JOA
* Strategic Deployment, 10 May 2000, Joint Forces Command J-9, Concept Division J-92

5. Consider The Deployment Assets
Available/Used
Conus Strategic Operational Tactical
Rail Ships Rail Convoy
* *
Trucks Trucks Helicopters
Air
Convoy Transport Convoy •CH47
*
•C5 Air •UH60 A/L
•C17 Transport
•CRAF •C130
• The quality, capability, and characteristics of these assets change
very slowly.
* Rapid deployment assets

6. Need To Make Efficient Use of
Available Transport
• The commercial sector does - so should the military
– On land
– On ships
} footprint critical
– On aircraft - dimension and weight critical
• Only take what is needed/when needed and minimize need
• Consider transport characteristics to design efficient cargo
- especially for air transport
– Transport characteristics hard to change
– Expensive to buy and operate more transport assets
– “More” may not be compatible with available infrastructure
• Much of the design of Army equipment did not emphasize
deployability (especially rapid deployability)

7. The Army Has A Major Rapid
Deployment Challenge
• The goal has been set - “96 hours”, etc . . .
• An interim force has been designed and acquisition underway
(IBCT)
• An objective force is being designed (BCT/FCS)
• Both require acquisition of significant new (expensive)
deployment assets
• Heavy competition for available airlift
• None of the combat vehicles can be delivered to forward
landing strips by C130
• None of the combat vehicles can be tactically deployed by
existing US helicopters
• Aviation/Air Defense/Other requires additional lift
• Forced Entry/Early Entry forces not helped

8. A Different Approach To The Vehicle
Requirement For A Portion Of
The “Transition Force” Can Make A Dramatic
Improvement In Deployability
• Strategic
• Operational
• Tactical

9. Improvements Are Substantial
• Greatly reduced sortie requirements
• Deployable on commercial air freighters (to staging areas)
• Reduced acquisition and O & S costs
• Reduced fuel consumption
• Rapid tactical deployability by helicopter
• Better mobility/agility - especially cross-country
• Complies with NDI objective (early availability)
• Uses currently planned
organization/staffing/comms/sensors/weapons
• Complimentary to current plan
• Provides significant benefits for forced and early entry
forces

10. The New Approach Uses A Non-
Traditional Vehicle Design
• Uses variants of two versions of a proven NDI light
weight, self stackable, space frame, four wheel drive,
military vehicle for all combat and CSS roles
• Environmental and ballistic protection provided by field
installable kits as required by the military situation
Current Proposed
•309 IAV Variants •547 Flyer 21 Variants
•114 MTVs •441 Flyer 31 Variants
•55 HEMMTs
•441 HMMWVs
some others

11. The Lightweight Tailored Dimensions and
Stacking of the Flyer Vehicles for Transport
Provides Different Sortie Options
C17 Sorties 747-400 Sorties C130 Sorties
70 800
250 69 712
60 700
212
200 50 600
50
500
150 40 403
34 400
99 30 310
100 300
75 20 221
50 200
50 0
10 100
0 0 0
Current Flyers Partially Stacked Current Flyers Partially Stacked Current Flyer Partially Stacked
Stacked Flyers Stacked Flyers Stacked Flyers
Flyers Flyers Flyers
Strategic Deployment Operational Deployment

12. The Lightweight and Dimensional Tailoring
Of The Vehicle Provides Significant
Tactical Deployability Under All Environmental
Conditions
• All proposed vehicles deployable by both UH60s and
CH47s, often with useful tactical loads at “high-hot”
conditions
• Little capability for deploying current vehicles by either
UH60s or CH47s

13. Other Benefits From Light Weight
and Stacking
• Stacking for rail or truck transport typically cuts transport
requirements by two
• Stacking for ship transport doubles the use of deck and
below deck space
• Stacking and loading into ISO containers for further
stacking allows even more efficient use of ship deck space
• Potential for stacked vehicles to be air dropped

14. The Flyer Family of Vehicles (Flyer 21
and Flyer 31) Result From A Non-
Traditional Approach To The Design Of
Military Vehicles
• Utilized off-road racing technology and experience while
meeting typical military requirements and emphasizing
deployability
– Light weight, rugged, high cross-country performance
– High payload, reliability, durability, flexibility, transport compatibility
• Flyer 1 in military service in Singapore; Flyer 21 (narrow) in
Marine/SOCOM evaluation; Flyer 31 Proof-of-Design
version (R25) in military use in Israel
• Vehicle demonstrated and formally tested in a number of
countries
• Extensive ILS documentation available

15. Conclusions
• Improving deployability is a high priority objective that
can be met
• Achieving improved deployability will require more
deployment assets and improving the deployment
efficiency of what is taken
• Acquiring more assets mainly requires money
• Improving efficiency of deployment mainly requires
changing the way things are done
• Both need to be done at the same time
• Without doing both the Army’s deployment objectives will
not be met

16. Helicopter Transport Varies Greatly With
Temperature and Altitude
External 30 mile radius
UH60A* Max Sea Level, 60°F 2000', 70° F 4000', 95° F
7843 lbs 7302 lbs 4700 lbs
LAV (38k) 0 0 0
HEMMT (40k) 0 0 0
LMTV (20k) 0 0 0
FMTV (23k) 0 0 0
HMMWV (7k) 1 + 800 lbs 1 + 300 lbs 0
Flyer 21 (3.4k) 2 + 1000 lbs or 1 + 4800 lbs 2 + 500 lbs or 1 + 4300 lbs 1 + 1300 lbs
Flyer 31 (4.5k) 1 + 3500 lbs 1 + 2800 lbs 1 + 200 lbs
Avenger (10.3k) 0 0 0
LOSAT (10.3k) 0 0 0
UH60L* Max Sea Level, 60°F 2000', 70° F 4000', 95° F
9000 lbs 9000 lbs 6630 lbs
LAV (38k) 0 0 0
HEMMT (40k) 0 0 0
LMTV (20k) 0 0 0
FMTV (23k) 0 0 0
HMMWV (7k) 1 + 2000 lbs 1 + 2000 lbs 0
Flyer 21 (3.4k) 2 + 2200 lbs or 1 + 5400 lbs 2 + 2200 lbs or 1 + 5400 lbs 1 + 2200 lbs
Flyer 31 (4.5k) 2 + 0 or 1 + 4500 lbs 2 + 0 or 1+ 4500 lbs 1 + 2000 lbs
Avenger (10.3k) 0 0 0
LOSAT (10.3k) 0 0 0
*Assumes no aux fuel provisions installed