cyber security

2. Cyber Security and the Smart Grid
George W. Arnold, Eng.Sc.D.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
U.S. Department of Commerce
george.arnold@nist.gov
2Addressing security challenges on a global scaleGeneva, 6-7 December 2010

3. The Electric Grid
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One of the largest, most complex infrastructures ever built
“The supreme engineering achievement of the 20th
century”
- National Academy of Engineering

4. Electric Grid in the U.S.
• 3,200 electric utility
companies
• 17,000 power plants
• 800 gigawatt peak
demand
• 266,000 km of high-
voltage lines
• 10 million km of
distribution lines
• 140 million meters
• $1 trillion in assets
• $350 billion annual
revenues
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5. The Electric Grid Today
Markets and Operations
Generation
Transmission Distribution Customer Use
One-way flow of electricity
•Centralized, bulk generation, mainly coal and natural gas
•Responsible for 40% of human-caused CO2 production
•Controllable generation and predictable loads
•Limited automation and situational awareness
•Lots of customized proprietary systems
•Lack of customer-side data to manage and reduce energy use

6. Smart Grid Goals
• Enable customers to
reduce energy use
• Increase use of
renewable sources
• Improve reliability and
security
• Facilitate
infrastructure for
electric vehicles
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7. What Will the Smart Grid Look Like?
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High use of variable renewables
Distributed generation and
microgrids
Ubiquitous networked
sensors
Smart meters and
real time usage
data
Dynamic pricing
Energy management systems
Smart
appliances
Distributed
storage
Bidirectional
metering
Electric
vehicles

8. Smart Grid: The “Energy Internet”
Graphics courtesy of EPRI
2-way flow of electricity and information
Standards Provide a Critical Foundation

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Current Grid Environment
• Legacy SCADA systems
• Limited cyber security controls currently in
place
– Specified for specific domains – bulk power
distribution, metering
• Vulnerabilities might allow an attacker to
– Penetrate a network,
– Gain access to control software, or
– Alter load conditions to destabilize the grid in
unpredictable ways
• Even unintentional errors could result in
destabilization of the grid

10. 10
Threats to the Grid
• Deliberate attacks
– Disgruntled employees
– Industrial espionage
– Unfriendly states
– Organized crime
• Inadvertent threats
– Equipment failures
– User/Administrator errors
• Natural phenomena
– Weather – hurricanes, earthquakes
– Solar activity

11. 11
New Risks
• Greater complexity increases exposure to
potential attackers and unintentional errors
• Linked networks introduce common
vulnerabilities
• “Denial of Service” – type attacks
• Increased number of entry points and paths
• Compromise of data confidentiality or
customer privacy

12. Ensuring Security and Privacy
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13. 1313
Smart Grid – an Opportunity
• Modernization provides an opportunity to
improve security of the Grid
• Integration of new IT and networking
technologies
– Brings new risks as well as an array of security
standards, processes, and tools
• Architecture is key
– Security must be designed in – it cannot be added
on later

14. 14
Cyber Security Working Group
• Building cyber security in from the start
has been a paramount concern
• Permanent Working Group
– Over 460 public and private sector
participants
• August 2010 NIST publishes:
Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber
Security
– Reflects Comments on Sept 2009 and
Feb 2010 Draft Smart Grid Cyber
Security Strategy and Requirements
• Guideline includes:
– Risk assessment guidance for
implementers
– Recommended security requirements
– Privacy recommendations

15. 15
Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security
• NIST Interagency Report 7628 - August 2010
– Development of the document lead by NIST
– Represents significant coordination among
• Federal agencies
• Private sector
• Regulators
• Academics
– Document includes material that will be used in selecting
and modifying security requirements
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16. 16
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NISTIR 7628 – What it IS and IS NOT
What it IS
• A tool for organizations that are researching, designing, developing, and
implementing Smart Grid technologies
• May be used as a guideline to evaluate the overall cyber risks to a Smart
Grid system during the design phase and during system implementation
and maintenance
• Guidance for organizations
– Each organization must develop its own cyber security strategy (including a
risk assessment methodology) for the Smart Grid.
What it IS NOT
• It does not prescribe particular solutions
• It is not mandatory

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NISTIR 7628 Content
The NISTIR includes the following
• Executive Summary
• Chapter 1 - Overall cyber security strategy for the
Smart Grid
• Chapter 2 – High level and logical security
architecture
• Chapter 3 – High level security requirements
• Chapter 4 – Cryptography and key management
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18. 18
NISTIR 7628 Content (Continued)
• Chapter 5 - Privacy and the Smart Grid
• Chapter 6 Bottom-up security analysis of the Smart Grid
• Chapter 7 – R&D themes for cyber security in the Smart
Grid
• Chapter 8 – Overview of the standards review
• Chapter 9 – Key power system use cases for security
requirements
• Appendices A - J
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19. Further Information
• Web portal: http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid
• Contact:
– George Arnold, National Coordinator
– Email: george.arnold@nist.gov
– Telephone: +1.301.975.2232
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