JACK O. VANCEThe Anatomy ofa Corporate Strategyp- MO.docx

JACK O. VANCE
The Anatomy of
a Corporate Strategy
p- MORE AND MORE companies are coming to real-
ize the significance of a suitable corporate strategy
to the continued prosperity of their enterprises. The
best approaches to the development of a corporate
strategy, however, are not clear. In this article I
want to say a few words about the meaning of strat-
egy, to illustrate two current major forces that un-
derscore the necessity for skillfully developed com-
pany strategies, and then to examine three key fac-
tors of great importance in developing an aggres-
sive corporate strategy.
The Nature of Corporate Strategy.—Corporate
sti-ategy fundamentally is the deployment of re-
sources to achieve an objective. It refers to an im-
portant action which can be taken with respect to
any aspect of a business. Corporate strategy can be
formulated formally in a systematic long-range
planning program or intuitively in the brain of a top
manager of a business. Regardless of where and
how a strategy is developed, it—and the process that
created it—is vital to a business organization be-
F A L L / 1970 / V O L . X I I I / N O . 1
cause it determines tlie major dii-ections a company
takes and the momentum with which it moves.

As Seymour Tilles notes, ". . . while the notion of
a strategy is extremely easy to grasp, working out
an agreed-upon statement for a given company can
be a fundamental contribution to the organization's
future success."^ In addition, in today's intensely dy-
namic environment, the internal and extemal forces
on profitability accentuate the advantages of strate-
gic planning. Therefore, developing and sustaining
an ongoing corporate strategy is vital to the long-
term viability of the organization.
Ceorge Steiner believes that "Developing a strat-
egy is usually a very diflBcult and fateful task. It
usually means questioning old methods, exploring
unfamiliar environmental waters, facing up to an
objective evaluation of strengths and weaknesses,
forcing important changes on people in the firm and
organizational arrangements, and taking high risks
with the firm's capital. This has to be done in a
world of rapid change, and it has to be done contin-
uously."^
Textbooks suggest that, ideally, every corporate
body have a strategy that meets three criteria.
• It recognizes and understands how the forces of
the past have affected the organization.
• It is responsive to the current forces of change.
• It is capahle of implementing programs hased on
the first two considerations.

By constructively integrating the knowledge gained
from past experiences, the organization should be
able to determine and formulate a program that
projects into the future to embrace products, mar-
kets, earnings, debt position, ownership, and rates
of growth. Also, a corporate strategy must be dy-
namic enough to burst through the limiting bounda-
ries imposed by tunnel vision, yet flexible enough to
withstand or thwart a possible distraction or con-
flict: strikes, accidents, price wars, competitive in-
roads, and invasion by raiders.
Robert R. Blake and his associates believe that
dynamic corporate strategy "relies on the premise
that future possibilities can be defined and made
exphcit according to optimal definitions, and by logi-
cal analysis of and derivation from the past. It does
not reject the past as a basis for thinking about the
future, but then, neither does it rely on it entirely.
Dynamic planning designs an optimal model, then
builds into it specific corporate objectives. This ena-
bles the organization to see and examine alternative
sets of possibilities which can be used to evaluate its
present operations, and to introduce needed
changes."^
This would appear to be a fairly simple prescrip-
tion for corporate health. However, experience has
shown that this kind of strategic planning only oc-
curs by a vigorous and organized eflFort, inspired by
an innovative board of directors. According to
Blake, such planning requires more intellectual
competence and skill because it challenges the orga-
nization to be more creative, innovative, and re-
sourceful while becoming more committed to the
chosen strategy.

In the following discussion, let us consider two
among a number of current forces having sufficient
impact on a company to emphasize the need for
skillful strategic analysis: technological obsoles-
cence and conglomeration. These are then related
to a three-step program for evolving a corporate
sti'ategy and developing a management team to im-
plement it.
Accelerating Technological Obsolescence.—The
accelerated technological obsolescence of entire
fields of well-established products and services is
proceeding daily, and undoubtedly is having its im-
pact on the corporate director s own business. John
Kenneth Galbraith underscored this point when he
wrote: "The imperativeness of technology and orga-
nization . . . are what determine the shape of eco-
nomic society."'
Indeed, consider the effect of microelectionics on
communication products, containerization on trans-
portation systems, and computerized services on
office equipment design. Unfortunately, there seems
to be a myopic law of nature that impedes organiza-
tions from challenging the status quo or from capi-
talizing on technological change. The electric razor
was not developed by the safety razor companies;
certainly it wasn't a silk stocking company that de-
veloped nylon nor was it a typewriter company that
introduced the electric typewriter; and the airplane
was not designed by automobile companies.
Theodore Levitt writes: "If a company's ovn re-
search does not make [a product] obsolete, another's
will. Unless an industry is especially lucky . . . it can

easily go down in a sea of red figiu-es—just as the
railroads have, as the buggy whip manufacturers
have, as the corner chains have, as most of the big
movie companies have, and indeed, as many other
industries have. The best way for a firm to be lucky
is to make its own luck. That requires knowing
what makes a business successful."^
Competing With Conglomerates.—Before deter-
mining a corporate strategy, the thoughtful director
must also consider the ever-increasing horizontal
and vertical acquisition routes of merger-minded
conglomerates. One needs only to look at the oil
companies that have recently acquired coal deposits
or low-cost crude streams and moved into petro-
chemicals. Retail chains that market insurance and
financial services holding companies are currently
moving to combine insurance, mutual funds, and
banking within the framework of a department
store of finance. Outboard motor companies are al-
ready selling boats, and medical supply houses are
managing hospitals' central supply functions on an
annual contract basis. As these organizations build
unique competitive strengths, they threaten the sur-
vival of single-line marketers or unintegrated raw
materials-dependent companies.
6 California Management Review
"Fifteen years ago," said Dictaphone then-Presi-
dent Lloyd M. Powell, "we had one competitor; 12
years ago there were four; now there are at least
SO."*̂ When Mr. Powell made that statement. Dicta-
phone was solely manufacturing and selling dictat-

ing machines and other sound recording and repro-
ducing equipment and accessories. Thus, it was a
one-product company competing against some gi-
ants in the industry. By June 1969 Dictaphone was
literally a new company, involved in manufacturing,
selling, and leasing a variety of business machines,
providing office supplies and services, and market-
ing office furniture. In short, it diversified to become
a mini-conglomerate.
As this illustration suggests, competing with the
conglomerates challenges every resource of an orga-
nization. However, by developing an aggressive
corporate strategy a smaller company will be better
able to withstand the rigors of such demanding
competition.
Developing an Aggressive Corporate
Strategy
Preventive measures can help a company avoid
being swallowed by conglomerate competition or
overtaken by technological obsolescence. But the
board of directors and chief executive officer, who
have questioned their corporate strategy, need to be
aware of three key factors of prime significance in
developing an aggressive corporate strategy. They
are :
• Position in the profit cycle of its industry
• Plans for developing an ambitious, progressive
management team
• Effectiveness in supplying social needs
The Company's Position in Its Industry's Profit Cy-

cle.—A concern for the inherent profit structure of
the business is the point at which any strategic anal-
ysis begins. Thus, looking at the company from the
perspective of its industry profit cycle in terms of its
competitiveness on the money market is the factor
to consider. How can this competitiveness be mea-
sured? A company should seek to achieve a return
on investment that is at least equal to those con-
cerns that have recently sold common stock at a
price in the upper quartile of the price earnings ra-
tios (12 to 18). What this rather elaborate calcula-
tion proves is that currently, the after-taxes profits
of the organization should be close to 15 percent of
its net worth if long-term debt is in the range of 25
to 35 percent of the net worth. A lower debt would
mathematically justify a lower profit percentage as
a percent of net worth.
If the profit rate passes this first hurdle, there is
some assurance it will be able to perpetuate the
company in its quest for capital. Too many indus-
tries slide past this first strategic danger signal in a
wave of high cash fiow from depreciation of deple-
tion accounting. Lulled by an abundance of cash,
the railroads sought capital by issuing 50-year
bonds to finance 20-year locomotives; oil companies
found easy financing on their reserves. These and
other industries never subjected themselves to the
artificial test of the sale of common stock at a com-
petitive money market rate. Today, the fundamen-
tal economics of many of these basic industries
demonstrate the increasing ratio of capital per ex-
panding unit of revenue, coupled with a decreasing
profit margin on these sales. Now these industries
are in the 5 to 11 percent return on net worth range.

Their correspondingly low price earnings ratios in-
vite economy-seeking mergers or corporate raiders.
This is typical of a business in the decline of its in-
dustry's life profit cycle.
Tliere would seem to be three alternatives avail-
able to a company with this problem. All, in effect,
call for eventual diversification into fields of activity
characterized by higher profit margins. Such diver-
sification would be accomplished through merger,
acquisition, or the internal development of research
and development resources.
TJie horizontal merger as a technique for building
a base for subsequent steps is a first strategic con-
sideration. A regional oil company that merges to
become national, builds cash resources, and
achieves cost reductions would be an example of
the horizontal merger technique.
Another example of the horizontal merger process
is National Can Company of Chicago. In the mid-
1950s, management realized that there was no place
in the U.S. economy for a small can maker. Al-
though National Can was the third largest manufac-
turer of metal containers, it had less than 4 percent
of the market; its six plants could supply only pack-
Jack O. Vance is a Director in McKinsey and
Company, Inc., management consultants with
offices in the United States and overseas. He has
been with the company for nineteen years.
FALL / 1970 / VOL. XIII / NO. 1

ers who were located in the plant areas, thus mak-
ing it, in eflFect, a regional company. In addition,
forces in the industry were such that a small can
company was faced with demanding seasonal sales
problems. Therefore, President Robert S. Solinsky
and his management team embarked on an ambi-
tious, aggressive expansion program and acquired
can companies in different areas. Profitability de-
clined, but sales volume rose from $41 million in
1954 to $147 milhon in 1964.̂ Obviously these ac-
quisitions have not solved the basic profit-cycle di-
lemma, but they have built financial strength for fu-
ture moves. And it is important to manufacturing
that through increased size alone these companies
have become more elusive for the conglomerate
that might have been eyeing their reserves and cash
flow.
Acquisition as a technique for buying time in
moving toward diversification is a second typical
strategic consideration, as this example illusti-ates:
"Late in 1965 Leonard F. McCollum, chairman of
Houston's Continental Oil Company, made a deal
with Chairman Ceorge Love of Consolidation Coal
Company to buy Consol. The purchase made the
United States' ninth largest oil company the biggest
coal company as well. But size and power were not
the main rationale of the deal. For McCollum was
thinking in energy terms, as opposed to petroleum
terms. With this broader, more visionary sense of
mission, he saw the advantages of vastly expanding
Continental's energy base."*
However, problems of a low stock earnings multi-

ple that force the use of convertible preferred can
be encountered when a company uses acquisition to
buy time in moving toward diversification. The size
of the acquisition necessary to counterbalance the
company's low performance can create the need for
large amounts of such preferred stock. These con-
vertible issues all have an eventual day of reckoning
when conversion may produce dilution. There is, of
course, already pressure to show earnings on the ba-
sis of total conversion.
The possible financial difficulty of following this
second alternative has led many companies in tradi-
tional low profit-cycle industries to relinquish the
idea of becoming corporate parents. Rather, they
have sought instant diversification through a so-
called reverse merger or sell out.
Deployment of resources for research and devel-
opment aimed at diversification is yet a third con-
sideration. Ceneral Electric is a case in point. Dur-
ing the past few years a surge of activity has
plunged various U.S. companies into the costly at-
omic power industry in search of the breeder reac-
tor, which creates more fuel than it bums. The
breeders promise to deliver vast quantities of en-
ergy at such low cost that they will have a cascad-
ing effect on all industry, on man's efforts to gather
food and build shelter, and on the fabric of society
itself. To this purpose, Ceneral Electric has already
invested more than $200 million in researching and
developing the light-water reactor in which the
coolant itself is turned into steam. If the Ceneral
Electric project is eventually supported by the
Atomic Energy Commission (of the six competitors
in this field the AEC will support only three), the CE

diversification may pay exciting dividends. It has
been predicted that by 2001 nuclear power stations
should be generating half of the electric energy in
the United States, and the total market for nuclear
reactors alone should run around $4 billion annu-
ally. When atomic power becomes a reality, it will
probably open an exciting industry for those who
have pioneered it.®
Deployment of resources aimed at diversification
is probably only feasible as a primary solution
where the company's problem is still relatively mild.
Du Pont illustrated this point.
"For years Du Pont has been a financial paragon.
Spending lavishly on research, it developed patent-
protected 'proprietary' products that enabled it for
a long time to earn, after taxes, an average of no
less than 10 percent on its gross operating invest-
ment, or the undepreciated cost of plant and equip-
ment plus current assets—all without incurring long-
term debt in the United States. But . . . this return
on investment has fallen and is now little better
than that of more pedestrian chemical companies."^"
Therefore, even more than usual, Du Pont is now
staking its future on research aimed at new product
development and diversification to provide the
foundations for tomorrow's corporate growth.
The application of technology is usually affected
in connection witli the previously discussed acquisi-
tion process. Often the transfer of technology and
research efforts produce the synergy that builds an
outstandingly cohesive corporate strategy.

8 California Management Remew
Developing an Ambitious, Aggressive Management
Team.—"In 1959, during one of the frequent reorga-
nizations at Chrysler Corp., aimed at halting the
company's slide, a management consultant con-
cluded: 'The only thing wrong with Chrysler is peo-
ple. The corporation needs some good top execu-
tives.' "̂ ^ And Ralph J. Cordiner, former president of
Ceneral Electric Company, declared, "Not custom-
ers, not products, not money but managers may be
the limit on Ceneral Electric's growth."^"
Is it any wonder, therefore, that the third element
in the successful company strategy is a plan for de-
veloping a superior management team that has the
vision and courage constantly to question, refine,
and realign the direction of the company? Such a
group is not produced by skillful recruiting, fol-
lowed by the traditional employee relations pro-
gram. Building a management team is a skill beyond
any usually displayed by a typical corporate person-
nel department. It begins by infusing into the mem-
bers of the team the belief that they can achieve
their own goals best by directing their energies to-
ward the success of the organization; it continues
by compensating them, if possible, for the travel
and family tensions inherent in widespread dynamic
operations. Thus, to develop an exceptional man-
agement team, a corporation combines the entrepre-
neurial satisfactions of wealth with the psychologi-
cal consideration of individual needs. However,
such a program will not evolve by chance; it must
be carefully nurtured. Such a program will be con-

stantly modified and adapted by tlie expanding
scope of the executive structure, yet will adhere to
the following principles:
1 / Executives should not be allowed to devote their
careers to specialization.
2 / Executives should be provided incentives for cur-
rent gain plus estate building.
3 / Executives should be challenged to live under and
perpetuate high standards of performance.
4 / Executives should be committed to organizational
approach for continuous change.
Let us examine how to build this type of team in
your organization.
Prohibiting Career Specialization.—The objective
of a nonspeciahzed orientation is a top management
team in which no member is wedded to any one
particular corporate activity, such as finance, mar-
keting, research and development, or production.
Each man should be capable of contributing signifi-
cantly to all facets of corporate work. However, de-
fining what is meant by an expansive, multidisci-
plined approach is still not achieving it.
One method for achieving such an approach is to
rotate selected management responsibilities at least
every three years. Thus, executives will be forced to
come to grips with new concepts. They will develop
an understanding not only of the separate disci-
plines within the organization, but of the various

business areas in which the corporation is involved.
At Ceneral Electric, for example, familiarity with
perhaps some 60-odd industries might be essential.
At another large enterprise, the management
group's expertise might span a range of industries
including aerospace, automobiles, agriculture, and
textile machinery. Tlie aim is to stimulate creativity
in the job rather than solidify routine.
Providing Strong Incentives.—An accepted meth-
od for motivating high-caliber management is to
provide strong incentives. The opportunity to
achieve personal wealth and owTiership in the com-
pany can be created through stock options and spe-
cial tax shelters for estate building. If the executives
possess the basic learning capacity and creativity,
this opportunity can be expected to bear the fruit of
high productivity while developing and expanding
executive potential.
Setting High Performance Standards.—Executive
motivation may be responsive to both the incentive
of wealth and the acceptance of an "up or out" pol-
icy for the good of the enterprise. Following this
policy for all positions above a given level will as-
sure that stagnant people with stagnant ideas are
short lived. Talent, not seniority, then becomes the
only acceptable criterion for advancement.
Organizing for Continuous Change.—The organi-
zational approach that complements the continu-
ously changing business environment can be de-
fined as a series of profit centers spawning addi-
tional profit centers. At the top is the small, aggres-
sive, uncompromising corporate holding staff. This
structLu-e emphasizes profit responsibility as far

down in the organization as possible by sectioning
off independent profit centers and assigning respon-
sibility for these segments.
FALL / 1970 / VOL. XIII / NO. 1
Effectiveness in Supplying Social Needs.—The
second key to designing a corporate strategy moves
outside the financial field. Because of the various
forces operating in the environment, it is essential to
adopt a long-term social role as part of the corpo-
rate strategy. Therefore, in addition to considering
technological obsolescence, the viable coi'porate
strategy must also be guided by the changing needs
of people because it is a force that promises to be
the key to commercialization of the future. The fol-
lowing examples illustrate this.
Recently, Boise Cascade created a department of ur-
ban renewal. This is an outgrowth of President Robert
V. Hansberger's membership on the President's Com-
mittee on Urban Housing and the company's agreement
to serve as a prime consulting contractor for redevelop-
ment of sixty blocks of downtown Boise. The new de-
velopment will explore the ways to offer development,
management, planning, and consulting aid to cities in-
volved in renewal.̂ ^
Irvine, California, is a small town in Orange County
rushing headlong to become a big city. It was deliber-
ately planned to be a city, and this is what sets it apart
from other totally planned new towns that have been
built from scratch in recent years. Irvine's quality has
all along been the main concern of the man who drew

up the master plan in 1961, Los Angeles architect-plan-
ner, William L. Pereira. He believes that cities should
be man's greatest work of art and ideal places for enjoy-
ing life. First as planner and more recently as consul-
tant with some say as to how the city will evolve, Per-
eira has attempted to imbue Irvine with a unique char-
acter. Prominent in his plans are the elements that give
Southern California its vitality: preoccupation with re-
search and higher education, avidity for culture, and a
love of outdoor living. Pereira's distinctive contribution
was to provide Irvine at birth with a brain and a soul in
the form of a new university. Convinced that a great
university is an essential resource in a modern city, and
vice versa, he served two clients by marrying their inter-
ests. He recommended Irvine to the University of Cali-
fornia regents, who were seeking a campus site. And he
helped persuade the corporation developing the Irvine
Ranch to donate the land, one of the requirements of
the university. His master plan calls for the campus to
grow by extending spokes so that the city and university
will remain in intimate contact. One of Pereira's precau-
tions is to choose clients who intend to retain ownership
of their land and manage its development. Whenever
possible, he also likes to stay on as consultant after the
planning stage, do enough architecture to set a stan-
dard, and review the proposals of other architects. He has
such an arrangement at Irvine with both the university
and the landowners. He explains: "When we do this we
are like a corporation lav^^er who helps to put together
a new company, then carries through as counsel."^*
In 1968, Neiman-Marcus President Stanley Marcus
announced that henceforth civil rights will be as impor-
tant a factor as price, quality, or delivery time in what
his six Texas department stores will buy. Specifically,
Neiman-Marcus intends to deal as much as possible

with firms who hire and train more people from minori-
ties. "We would rather do business with a company
which is actually and sincerely pursuing a policy of
equal opportunity than to continue to do business with
one which is not," he said. "The Federal Coverrunent
requires that every one of its suppliers of goods and ser-
vices certifies that it is an equal opportunity employer.
We believe a private company should do no
Thus, in the future, anticipating the changing
needs of people will be of paramount importance to
business.
Anticipating Changing Needs.—Responding
effectively and profitably requires the ability both
to identify future social needs and to position the
company to reap the benefits. Social needs express
themselves through various manifestations—in-
creasing age span and leisure time, air and water
pollution problems, the socialization of medical
care, urban crises.
We cannot accurately foresee how these and
other social trends would affect different corpora-
tions. However, an understanding of how the com-
pany's five-year strategy relates to social trends is
unquestionably a factor in designing any well con-
ceptualized long-range plans. Developing and using
such foresight in planning and in present operations
is the impetus behind efforts that many companies
are making, as suggested in the following examples:
• Transportation concerns, squeezed by the impact
of truck, air, and water transport, prohibited from ac-
quiring any one of these competing modes, and locked
into an established rate structure, are turning to total

systems and logistics support concepts as solutions to
the challenges of the next few decades.
• Developing nations represent potential opportuni-
ties for manufacturers of standard products. In coun-
tries where legal barriers against them are not raised,
companies can take the initiative to develop control
over an entire process by integrating backwards and
forwards, thereby consolidating their position. Licensed
monopoly is an established business method in these in-
stances.
• Providing special services for the increasing older
generation has captured the attention of progressive or-
ganizations. One social implication of the extended life
span offered by medical advances will be the growing
demand for residential environments having leisure ac-
tivities and convalescent care.
• A three-cornered approach to new developments
in medicine, computer technology, and medical instru-
mentation design anticipates providing large-scale med-
ical diagnostic services via production line diagnostic
computer centers.
Today, companies concerned with their strategies
are grappling with the problems and the potentials
of these kinds of anticipated changes. But when we
project further into the future, toward the promise
and potential that will exist in 1985, 2000, and 2025,
are we aware of the possible commercial implica-
tions of what we see? How can these examples help

to delineate the strategic opportunities in the far fu-
ture?
The following listing shows only a few of the
changes that might be expected during our life-
times. An astute businessman might be able to dis-
cern how they relate to his business scene.
Technological and Social Changes
1970—1975 Electronically implanted organs
Personality and IQ drugs
Sea water desalination
1976-1999 Ocean farming
Economical regional weather control
Genetic control of hereditary defects
Manufacturing of synthetic protein
Year 2000 plus Biochemical stimulation of growth of
new human organs or limbs
Direct interaction between the human
brain and a computer
Education by direct recording of infor-
mation on the brain
Year 2025 plus Chemical control of aging (50 years
plus)
Specially bred animals for low-grade
labor
Communication with extraterrestrial
beings

Control of gravity
While these possibilities are seemingly in the
Jules Verne category, they reflect the breadth of
thinking that the strategic plan of the corporation
should represent. A plan for tomorrow that is rooted
too deeply in the products and social conditions of
today will not be viable in the context of the expo-
nential change pattern imposed by our technologi-
cal capabilities. For example, when Du Pont started
the work on polymer chemistry out of which nylon
eventually evolved, the company did not realize
that man-made fibers would be the end product. Du
Pont acted on the assumption that any gain in man's
ability to manipulate the structure of large, organic
molecules—a scientific skill at that time in its in-
fancy—would lead to commercially important results
of some kind. It was only after six or seven years of
research that man-made fibers first appeared as a
possible major result area. Therefore, as Peter F.
Drucker says, "if the business entrepreneur suc-
ceeds, it is not by chance; it is because the small
idea his business grew from not only met the needs
of the future, but shaped the future as
We have described an approach to preparing a
strategy for a diversified, financial performance-ori-
ented, aggressive organization employing outstand-
ing executive rewards. But what if your corporate
strategy is not interested in running on such a fast
track? Is there a niche for the more average corpo-
rate citizen in this scheme?
Of course there is. We have, though, one caveat.

If your stock is publicly traded, the market will
eventually make its own assessment of your growth
potential. If the figure is too low, your shareholders
may be invited to shift their financial interests to a
company with a more rewarding growth thrust.
Thus, once size has brought public financing, we
feel that no corporation can ignore the money mar-
ket test of the evident vitality of their strategy.
Defining the degree of emphasis on growth re-
quires serious consideration by the board of direc-
tors. Today the boards of most major companies
have opted for the strongest growth plan they can
generate, rather than a limited rate of growth cou-
pled with apprehensive looks over the corporate
shoulder. This drive for performance results is, in
fact, one of the most vital by-products of our com-
petitively oriented free enterprise system.
REFERENCES
1. Seymour Tilles, "How to Evaluate Corporate
Strategy," Harvard Business Review (July-August
1963), 112.
2. George A. Steiner, Top Management Planning
(New York: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 238-239.
3. Robert R. Blake, Warren E. Avis, Jane S. Mouton,
Corporate Darwinism (Texas: Gulf, 1966), p. 69.
4. John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State
(Boston: Hough ton Mifflin, 1967), p. 7.
5. Theodore Levitt, "Marketing Myopia," Harvard
Business Review (July-August 1960), 50.

F A L L / 1970 / V O L . X I I I / N O . 1 11
6. Forbes (May 15, 1965), p. 47.
7. David W. Ewing, The Practice of Planning (New
York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 39.
8. Ibid.,-p. 43.
9. Forbes (February 1, 1969), 30; Fortune (March
1967), 117-123ff.
10. Fortune (November 1967), 139.
11. Business Week (October 6, 1962), 45.
12. Edward C. Bursk and Dan H. Fenn, Jr., Plan-
ning the Future Strategy of Your Business (New York:
McGraw-HiU, 1956), p. 46.
13. BuMnessWeek (February 24, 1968), 152.
14. Think (January-February 1968), 4-7.
15. Time (January 19, 1968), 83.
16. Peter F. Drucker, "The Big Power of Little
Ideas," Harvard Business Review (May-June 1964), 6.
Those readers who found the above article of interest will
undoubtedly be interested in the fol-
lowing articles which appeared in earlier issues of the Review:
"A View of Coporate Planning," by Melville C. Branch, Vol.
VII, No. 2, p. 89.
"Do We Need a New Corporate Response to a Changing Social
Environment? Pts. I and II," by

S. Prakash Sethi and Dow Votaw, Vol. XII, No. 1, p. 3 and p.
17.
"How to Assure Poor Long-Range Planning for Your Company,"
by George A. Steiner, Vol. VII,
No. 4, p. 93.
"Organizational Revitalization," by Warren G. Bennis, Vol. IX,
No. 1, p. 51.
"Study of a Business Decision," by John E. Fleming, Vol. IX,
No. 2, p. 5 1 .
"The Decision-Making Grid: A Model of Decision-Making
Styles," by Jay Hall, Vincent O'Leary,
and Martha Williams, Vol. VII, No. 2, p. 43.
"The Ethical Dimension in American Management," by Glenn
Gilman, Vol. VII, No. 1, p. 45.
To order, use form inside back cover.

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