India China 1962 War

1. 18/06/2020 Dhola Post - Wikipedia
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Dhola post
border post
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Coordinates: 27°49′05″N 91°40′25″E
Country India
Province Arunachal Pradesh
District Tawang
The McMahon Line in the Tawang sector
Dhola Post
Dhola Post was a border post set up by the Indian Army in
June 1962, in the Namka Chu river valley, in a border area
of Tawang that was disputed by China and India (and is still
disputed).[1][2] On 20 September, the post was attacked by
Chinese forces from the Thagla Ridge to the north, and
sporadic fighting continued till 20 October when an all-out
attack was launched by China leading to the Sino-Indian
War. Facing an overwhelming force, the Indian Army
evacuated the Dhola Post as well as the entire area of
Tawang, retreating to Sela and Bomdila.[3]
Location and background
Establishment
Skirmishes
Notes
References
Bibliography
The map attached to the 1914 Simla Convention,
displaying the border between Tibet and the Assam
Himalayan region (called the McMahon Line),
showed a straight line border running east–west in
the vicinity of the Nyamjang Chu river, cutting across
a ridge called Tsangdhar. Immediately to the north of
Tsangdhar ridge is a higher Thagla Ridge (or Tang
La Ridge or Che Dong in Chinese nomenclature). The
Namka Chu river, 16 miles (26 km) long,[4] flows in
the valley between the two ridges, west to east, joining
Nyamjang Chu at the bottom.
At the foot of the Thagla Ridge in the Nyamjang Chu valley, about 2.5 km north from the mouth of
Namkha Chu, is a grazing ground called Khinzemane.[5] At the northeastern tip of the ridge is
located the Tibetan village of Le (also spelt Lei or Lai). The villagers of Le as well as those of the
village Lumpo to the south are said to have traditionally used the Khinzemane grazing ground. The
Indian government claimed that the grazing ground belonged to Lumpo and the villagers of Le had to
pay rent to Lumpo for its use.[a]
The Indians held that the boundary was supposed to follow the Himalayan watershed, which was
clearly on the Thagla Ridge. They believed that the 1914 map incorrectly depicted the border due to
inadequate exploration at that time and that the correct border was on the Thagla Ridge.[2] In 1959,
Dhola post
Coordinates: 27°49′05″N 91°40′25″E
Contents
Location and background

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[Full screen]
Dhola Post and environs[c]
India had placed a post at Khinzemane at the foot of the Thagla Ridge. The Chinese forces attacked it
and forced it to retreat.[7] After some exchanges in the diplomatic channels,[b] India reinstated the
post. During the officials' level border negotiations between the India and China in 1960, the issue
was thoroughly discussed, even though it did not result in any agreement.[11] China continued to
maintain that Khinzemane was Chinese territory.
In late 1961, India settled on what came to be
called a 'forward policy' to circumvent the
Chinese expansion into the disputed areas,
asking its Army to "go as far as practicable ...
and be in effective occupation of the whole
frontier".[12] In the northeast frontier, Assam
Rifles was tasked with setting up posts all
along the McMahon Line.[13] The Dhola Post
came into being as part of this effort.[7]
The Dhola Post was located on the northern
slopes of the Tsangdhar ridge, close to the
Namkha Chu valley, at about 300 metres
above the level of the river. The Indian official
history of the war states that the post was able
to dominate the Namkha Chu valley, but it was
itself dominated by the Thagla Ridge to the
north.[14] The terrain was extremely difficult:
thickly wooded mountain slopes led to the area via walking tracks in narrow gorges. The closest
inhabitable place was the village of Lumpo at a distance of 24 kilometres (15 mi).[14] The posts had to
be supplied by air and the nearest air drop location was on top of the Tsangdhar ridge.[14]
A walking track was established along the mountain slope facing the Namjyang Chu valley, leading
from Lupo to a depression called Hatung La. At an intermediate location called Zirkhim (or Serkhim)
a helipad was constructed.[14] Lumpo and Zimithang also had helipads, the latter able to take MI-4
Russian helicopters.[15]
The army officer who commanded the Assam Rifles platoon, Captain Mahabir Prasad, questioned the
siting of the post immediately after returning to base. He informed the Divisional Headquarters that,
according to the local Intelligence Bureau sources, the Chinese knew about the Dhola Post and
regarded the location as Chinese territory. They would be ready to occupy it as soon as they received
orders.[7] The Divisional Commander, Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, queried the higher officers whether
the territory was properly Indian, but did not receive a response. His superior, Lt. Gen. Umrao Singh
commanding the XXXIII Corps, expressed his own doubts about the legality of the territory, who was
also greeted with no response.[16] Eventually the matter was referred to Sarvepalli Gopal heading the
Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, who answered in the affirmative, citing the
Officials' Report.[11] But even before the information trickled down to the commanders, the matters
came to a head.[17]
On September 8, 1962, a Chinese unit launched a surprise attack on an Indian posts at Dhola on the
Thagla Ridge, which is deep in Chinese territory by even India's own claim.[18][19]
Establishment
Skirmishes

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a. Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China, 26 September 1959:[6] "
[Villages] within Chinese territory’s [on] the other side of the Thangla ridge have been allowed to
utilise these grazing pastures and for this privilege the Tibetan village of Le is paying rent in kind
to the Indian village of Lumpo. In any case it is not uncommon for border villages on one side to
use by mutual agreement pastures lying on the other side of the international boundary and the
exercise of this privilege cannot be regarded as evidence in support of a territorial claim."
b. Examples:
Government of India: 11 August 1959:[8] "On 7th August armed Chinese patrol strength
approximately 200 committed violation of our border at Khinzemane longitude 91.46'E,
latitude 27.46’N [spheircal coordinates]. When encountered by our own patrol who requested
the Chinese Patrol to withdraw to their territory, our patrol was pushed back to the bridge at
Drokung Samba longitude 91.47'E, latitude 27.46'N. These places are admittedly within Indian
territory and we have been in continuous possession of it. Traditionally as well as according to
Treaty Map the boundary runs along Thagla Ridge north of Mankha Chuthangmu valley and
this position has been accepted in the past."
Government of China: 1 September 1949:[9] "But starting from August 9, Indian armed
personnel again unlawfully intruded many times into Shatze and Khinzemane, both within
Chinese territory... These Indian armed personnel however did not heed the solemn warnings
of the Chinese frontier guards; they not only failed to withdraw from Chinese territory promptly,
but even camped there and deployed forces to control the surrounding important positions to
prevent the Chinese frontier guards from entering, in an attempt to seize by force the above-
said Chinese territory."
Government of India, 10 September 1959:[10] "The circumstances in which the McMahon Line
was fixed as the boundary are given in detail in para 4 of the Prime Minister's letter of the
22nd March 1959 to Premier Chou En-lai. This line is by and large in accordance with the
geographical features in that area and also with long-established usage. The McMahon Line
however departs from well-recognised geographical features at a few places. For example,...
In regard to the specific dispute raised by the Chinese Government about Khinzemane, the
Government of India would like to point out that the boundary line in the particular area follows
the crest of the highest mountain range. Khinzemane is south of this range and is obviously
part of Indian territory.... However the Government of India are prepared to discuss with the
Chinese Government the exact alignment of the so-called McMahon Line at Khinzemane, the
Longju area and the Tamaden area."
c. The border between Bhutan and India is an agreed border. That between India and Tibet appears
to be the prevailing border. These borders follow the ridge lines, quite unlike the 1914 map,
except for the segment that runs along the Namkha Chu river.
1. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), pp. 108–110.
2. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), pp. 293–294.
3. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), pp. 296–305.
4. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 139.
5. Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992), p. 105.
6. India, Ministry of External Affairs (1959b), p. 15.
7. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 110.
8. India, Ministry of External Affairs (1959a).
9. India, Ministry of External Affairs 1959b, p. 5.
10. India, Ministry of External Affairs 1959b, pp. 14–15.
Notes
References

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Hoffmann, Steven A. (1990), India and the China Crisis (https://books.google.com/books?id=BpS
RwC5_EPUC), University of California Press, ISBN 978-0-520-06537-6
Raghavan, Srinath (2010), War and Peace in Modern India (https://books.google.com/books?id=
EbtBJb1bsHUC), Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-1-137-00737-7
Sinha, P.B.; Athale, A.A.; Prasad, S. N. (1992), History of the Conflict with China, 1962 (http://ww
w.php.isn.ethz.ch/lory1.ethz.ch/collections/coll_india/documents/WarWithChina_1962_000.pdf)
(PDF), History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India
Primary sources
India. Ministry of External Affairs (1959), Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and
Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China: 1954-1959 (http://www.claude
arpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/WhitePaper1NEW.pdf) (PDF), Ministry of External Affairs
India. Ministry of External Affairs (1959), Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and
Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China: September - November 1959,
White Paper No. II (http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/WhitePaper2NEW.pdf)
(PDF), Ministry of External Affairs
India. Ministry of External Affairs (1960), Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and
Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China: November 1959 - March
1960, White Paper No. III (http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/WhitePaper3N
EW.pdf) (PDF), Ministry of External Affairs
India. Ministry of External Affairs (1960), Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and
Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China: April - November 1960, White
Paper No. IV (http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/WhitePaper4NEW.pdf)
(PDF), Ministry of External Affairs
India. Ministry of External Affairs (1961), Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and
Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China: November 1960 - November
1961, White Paper No. V (http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/WhitePaper5NE
W.pdf) (PDF), Ministry of External Affairs
India. Ministry of External Affairs (1962), Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and
Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China: November 1961 - June 1962,
White Paper No. VI (http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/WhitePaper6NEW.pd
f) (PDF), Ministry of External Affairs
11. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 111: "[Indian] Army Headquarters had been sent
the minutes of the officials' talks of 1960, as well as the final Officials' Report, in which this issue
had been addressed. During the officials' talks the Chinese had also been told of the Indian view
on correcting a map-drawn line; that is, the need to correlate it with the actual features on the
ground. If a feature such as Thagla Ridge had not been explored when the map was issued, and
if the map-drawn boundary was supposed to be set by the watershed ridge, then the line lay on
the watershed ridge despite the error on the map."
12. Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (2010), pp. 275–276.
13. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 108.
14. Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992), p. 106.
15. Sinha, Athale & Prasad (1992), p. 107.
16. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), pp. 110-111.
17. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis (1990), p. 111.
18. Maxwell, Neville, India's China War (https://web.archive.org/web/20060215153336/http://www.cen
turychina.com/plaboard/uploads/1962war.htm), New York, Pantheon, 1970.
19. Calvin, James, THE CHINA - INDIA BORDER WAR (1962) (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
library/report/1984/CJB.htm), Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1984.
Bibliography

5. 18/06/2020 Dhola Post - Wikipedia
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India. Ministry of External Affairs (1962), Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and
Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China: July 1962 - October 1962,
White Paper No. VII (http://www.claudearpi.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/WhitePaper7NEW.pd
f) (PDF), Ministry of External Affairs
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