Legal Memorial Example

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5TH
NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015
MEMORANDUM FOR THE APPELLANTS
5TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION
TARKA SASTRA, 2015
IN THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF GOD’S ISLAND
IN THE MATTER OF
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SLP NO. ___ OF 2015
MRIGA APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF LEOLAND RESPONDENT NO. 1
AND
WRIT JURISDICTION
W.P. (CIVIL) NO. ___ OF 2015
PUBLIC INTEREST BODIES
& RELIGIOUS BODIES PETITIONER
V.
UNION OF GOD’S ISLAND RESPONDENT NO. 2
PETITIONS U/ARTS. 136 & 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GOD’S ISLAND, 1950
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANTS

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5TH
NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOTCOURT COMPETITION, 2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CONTENT P.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS v
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES vii
I. CASE LAW vii
II. LEGISLATIONS viii
III. JOURNALS ix
IV. COMMENTARIES ix
V. LEXICONS ix
VI. WEBSITES x
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2
ISSUES RAISED 3
SUMMARYOF PLEADINGS 4
WRITTEN PLEADINGS 6
I. WHETHER THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE COLONIAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE DARK ISLES AND MRIGA, IN 1898, IS BINDING
UPON THE UNION OF GOD’S ISLAND. 6
[1.1] NON-REPUDIATION OF THE AGREEMENT: AGREEMENT CONTINUES
TO BE IN FORCE 7
[1.2] NO BAR TO INTERFERENCE: ART. 363 IS NOT APPLICABLE 9
II. WHETHER THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION

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OF GOD’S ISLAND, 1950 IS VALID. 10
[2.1] PROCEDURAL CONFORMITY: REQUISITE PROCEDURE HAS NOT BEEN
STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH 11
[2.2] DOCTRINE OF BASIC STRUCTURE: AMENDMENT HAS DESTROYED THE
ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTION 12
III. WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATION OF LEOLAND CONCERNING THE
TAKEOVER AND COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE DEER TEMPLE
ESTABLISHMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 14
[3.1] LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE: STATE LEGISLATURE LACKS COMPETENCE
TO ENACT 14
[3.2] FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: VIOLATION OF PART III 16
IV. WHETHER THE DEER TEMPLE PROPERTY CAN BE USED TO REDRESS
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS CAUSED BY THE LEOLAND LIQUOR CORPORATION. 19
[4.1] ESSENTIALS OF RELIGION: PROHIBITION OF LIQUOR IS AN ESSENTIAL
PART OF THE RELIGION IN QUESTION 19
[4.2] DPSP: IMPORTANCE OF ART. 47 20
V. WHETHER THE OFFICIALS IN THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF LEOLAND
ARE GUILTY OF COMMITTING AN OFFENCE U/§. 295 OF THE GOD’S
ISLAND PENAL CODE, 1860 FOR THE RAZING DOWN OF STRUCTURES
AND THE CONVERSION OF IDOLS. 21
[5.1] ADJOURNMENT OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: §. 343 PERMITS
ADJOURNMENT BY MAGISTRATE 22
[5.2] PROCEDURAL CONFORMITY: REQUISITE PROCEDURE HAS BEEN

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COMPLIED WITH 22
[5.3] ESSENTIALS OF AN OFFENCE: §. 295 PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT 23
PRAYER 26

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATION EXPANSION
§. Section
§§. Sections
¶ Paragraph Number
¶¶ Paragraphs Numbers
& And
AIR All India Reporter
All Allahabad High Court
Anr. Another
AP Andhra Pradesh High Court
Art. Article
Arts. Articles
GPC, 1860 The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860
The Constitution The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950
Cr.P.C., 1973 The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
ed. Edition
e.g. exemplis gratia (Latin)
etc. Etcetera
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
i.e. id est (Latin)
LLC Leoland Liquor Corporation
Ltd. Limited
No. Number
Ors. Others
p. Page Number
Pat Patna High Court

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pp. Page Numbers
r/w. Read With
S/d Signed
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
S. No. Serial Number
U/§. Under Section
U/§§. Under Sections
U/Art. Under Article
U/Arts. Under Articles
v. Versus
Vol. Volume
Vols. Volumes

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
I. CASE LAW
S. NO. CASE TITLE CITATION PP.
1. Aruna Roy v. Union of India AIR 2002 SC 3176 13
2. Bhauram v. Baijnath AIR 1962 SC 1476 8
3.
Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya
Pradesh
AIR 1955 SC 781 17
4. Bhimashya & Ors. v. Smt. Janabi @Janawwa (2006) 13 SCC 627 8
5.
C. Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri
Swaminathaswami
AIR 1996 SC 1697 17
6.
C.F. Dhirubha Dharangdhara Cheimical v. State
of Bombay
AIR 1955 SC 47 18
7. Chinthaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1951 SC 118 17
8. Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. AIR 1959 SC 648 15
9.
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. J.B.
Educational Society
AIR 2005 SC 2014 14
10. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299 13
11. Jhulan Sain v. Emperor AIR 1920 Pat 349 24
12. Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 17
13. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 12
14. Khoday Distilleries Ltd v. State Of Karnataka (1995) 1 SCC 574 20
15.
Laxmi Khandsari & Ors. v. State of Uttar
Pradesh
AIR 1981 SC 873 (¶ 16) 17
16. M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1979 SC 898 16
17.
M.P. Shikshak Congress v. R.P.F.
Commissioner, Jabalpul & Ors.
AIR 1999 SC 443 16
18. Madhu Kishwar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1864 (¶ 12) 13
19. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India AIR 2015 SC 1517 10
20. Mahendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1963 SC 1019 (¶ 14) 12

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21. Minerva Mills Ltd v. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789 12
22. Motilal v. State AIR 1952 All 963 (964) 8
23. N.K. Bajpai v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 2012 SC 1210 18
24. P.N. Kaushal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1978 SC 1457 19
25. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India AIR 1957 SC 628 14
26. Raghunath Rao v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 1267 11
27. Rehman Shagoo v. State of Jammu & Kashmir AIR 1960 SC 1 14
28. S.I. Corporation v. Board of Revenue AIR 1964 SC 207 (215) 8
29. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1918 17
30. Saghtir Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 728 12
31. Saksena, I.N. v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1976 SC 2250 14
32.
Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Anna Satram
Committee & Ors. v. The Commissioner, Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowment & Ors.
AIR 1999 SC 3567 13, 18
33.
Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of
Enforcement
AIR 2005 SC 2622 21
34. State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara (1975) 1 SCC 29 20
35. Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University AIR 1996 SC 1011 13
36. Veernath v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1957 AP 1034 18
II. LEGISLATIONS
S. NO. TITLE OF LEGISLATION PP.
1. The Constitution of India, 1950 Passim
2. The General Clauses Act, 1897 7, 21
3. The Antiquities and Ancient Treasures Act, 1972 15, 16
4. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 21-25
5. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 21-25
6. The Indian Independence Act, 1947 7, 8

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III. JOURNALS
S. NO. TITLE OF JOURNAL PP.
1. All India Reporter (AIR) Passim
2. Supreme Court Cases (SCC) Passim
I. COMMENTARIES
S. NO. AUTHOR TITLE EDITION PP.
1. M.V. Pylee Constitutional Amendments in India 3rd ed. 2010 Passim
2. Arvind P. Datar
Commentary on the Constitution of India,
Vol. II
22nd ed.
reprint 2010
11
3. Durga Das Basu Shorter Constitution of India
13th ed. reprint
2006
14
4. Durga Das Basu Case Book on Indian Constitutional Law 2nd ed. 2007 17
5. Durga Das Basu
Vol. II
8th ed. 2007 Passim
6. Durga Das Basu
Vol. VIII
8th ed. 2011 Passim
7. Durga Das Basu
Vol. X
8th ed. 2012 Passim
8. V.N. Shukla Constitution of India 12th ed. 2013 Passim
9. P.S.A. Pillai Criminal Law 12th ed. 2014 24
10. Hari Singh Gour The Penal Law of India 11th ed.1998 Passim
11. Peter Murphy Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2003 Passim
II. LEXICONS
S. NO. AUTHOR TITLE EDITION PP.
1. Henry Campbell Black Black’s Law Dictionary 4th ed. revised 1968 15
2. P. Ramanatha Aiyar Concise Law Dictionary 3rd ed. reprint 2007 24

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III. WEBSITES
S. NO. WEBSITE LINK PP.
1. www.scconline.in Passim
2. www.manupatra.com Passim
3. www.judis.nic.in Passim
4. www.indiankanoon.org Passim
5. www.legalserviceindia.com Passim
6. www.thelawdictionary.org Passim
7. www.oxforddictionaries.com Passim

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5TH
NATIONAL TARKA SASTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2015
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Appellants herein have approached the Supreme Court of God’s Island through:
1. Appellant: A Special Leave Petition U/Art. 136 of The Constitution of God’s Island,
1950.
2. Petitioner: A Writ Petition U/Art. 32 of The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950.
The petitions have been clubbed together and the Supreme Court has admitted the petitions as
maintainable.
This Memorandum sets forth the facts, laws and the corresponding arguments on which
the claims are based in the instant case. The Appellants affirm that they shall accept any
Judgement of this Hon’ble Court as final and binding upon itself and shall execute it in its
entirety and in good faith.
[Each of the parties to the pending dispute before this Hon’ble Court may be referred to
individually as either ‘Appellant’, ‘Petitioner’, ‘Respondent No. 1’ or ‘Respondent No. 2’ as the
case may be. For the sake of convenience, they may be collectively referred to as ‘the
Appellants’ (representing the Appellant & the Petitioner) or ‘the Respondents’ (representing
Respondent No. 1 & Respondent No. 2)]

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the sake of brevity, the material facts are placed herewith in the chronological order:
1. God’s Island, now an independent and secular country, was conquered by the Dark
Islanders in 1700 A.D. Deer’s Cave, belonging to a religious denominational sect named
Mriga, situated in the State of Leoland, contained a hoard of antique material riches.
Unsuccessful attempts to take over the property by the Colonial Rulers resulted in an
Agreement with Mriga to safeguard Mriga’s rights over the Deer Temple.
2. In 2011, God’s Island faced a huge financial crisis caused by the Leoland Liquor
Corporation. Several people employed in charitable institutions run by the Corporation
lost their livelihood. Subsequently, based on a re-discovery by the National Bureau of
Ancient Antiquities the State Legislature of Leoland enacted a Legislation to enable
complete control and takeover of the Deer Temple establishment.
3. A writ petition filed by Mriga before the High Court of Leoland challenging the
Legislation was dismissed. Simultaneously, the High Court remanded to trial a certain
issue regarding the criminality of actions of the Government Officials. Aggrieved by the
dismissal, Mriga appealed to the Supreme Court of God’s Island.
4. During the time when the judgement was being considered by the Supreme Court, the
Union of God’s Island passed an Amendment to Art. 26 of the Constitution.
Consequently, various other religious denominations and public interest bodies also filed
petitions challenging the Amendment.
5. The petitions were clubbed to be heard together. The matter was posted for final hearing
before a Constitutional Bench on the 20th of September, 2015.

ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE [I]
WHETHER THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
DARK ISLES AND MRIGA, IN 1898, IS BINDING UPON THE UNION OF GOD’S ISLAND.
ISSUE [II]
WHETHER THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GOD’S ISLAND, 1950 IS
VALID.
ISSUE [III]
WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATION OF LEOLAND CONCERNING THE TAKEOVER AND COMPLETE
CONTROL OF THE DEER TEMPLE ESTABLISHMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
ISSUE [IV]
WHETHER THE DEER TEMPLE PROPERTY CAN BE USED TO REDRESS THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
CAUSED BY THE LEOLAND LIQUOR CORPORATION.
ISSUE [V]
WHETHER THE OFFICIALS IN THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF LEOLAND ARE GUILTY OF
COMMITTINGAN OFFENCE U/§. 295 OF THE GOD’S ISLAND PENAL CODE, 1860 FOR THE RAZING
DOWN OF STRUCTURES AND THE CONVERSION OF IDOLS.

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
______________________________________________________________________________
[I] WHETHER THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT OF
THE DARK ISLES AND MRIGA, IN 1898, IS BINDING UPON THE UNION OF GOD’S ISLAND.
______________________________________________________________________________
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Agreement continues in validity after
the commencement of the Constitution by the joint application of §. 7 of the God’s Island
Independence Act, 1947 and Art. 372 of The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950. Furthermore,
the application of Art. 363 is not attracted owing to the nature of the parties to the Agreement.
______________________________________________________________________________
[II] WHETHER THE AMENDMENT TO ARTICLE 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GOD’S ISLAND,
1950 IS VALID.
______________________________________________________________________________
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Amendment to Article 26 of The
Constitution of God’s Island, 1950 is not valid in law. The procedure compliance U/Art. 368 has
not been adhered to and the Amendment has failed the test of Basic Structure which is the
touchstone of validity of a Constitutional Amendment. Furthermore, the retrospective effect of
the Amendment is unclear and ambiguous and thus cannot be applied.
______________________________________________________________________________
[III] WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATION OF LEOLAND CONCERNING THE TAKEOVER AND
COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE DEER TEMPLE ESTABLISHMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
______________________________________________________________________________
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the State Legislation of Leoland

concerning the takeover and complete control of the Deer Temple establishment is
unconstitutional. There is a clear lack in legislative competence to enact the Legislation in the
relevant subject-matter. Furthermore, violation of the Rights guaranteed by Part III and other
provisions of The Constitution points to the unconstitutionality of the Legislation and the
subsequent Constitutional Amendment of Art. 26 cannot validate the Legislation retrospectively.
______________________________________________________________________________
[IV] WHETHER THE DEER TEMPLE PROPERTY CAN BE USED TO REDRESS THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS CAUSED BY THE LEOLAND LIQUOR CORPORATION.
______________________________________________________________________________
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Deer Temple property cannot be used
to cure the financial crisis of the Leoland Liquor Corporation as the prohibition of liquor is an
‘essential’ part of the religion in question and it affects the religious sentiments of both Mriga
and the crores of devotees.
______________________________________________________________________________
[V] WHETHER THE OFFICIALS IN THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF LEOLAND ARE GUILTY OF
COMMITTING AN OFFENCE U/§. 295 OF THE GOD’S ISLAND PENAL CODE, 1860 FOR THE
RAZING DOWN OF STRUCTURES AND THE CONVERSION OF IDOLS.
______________________________________________________________________________
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Officials in the State Government are
guilty of committing an offence U/§. 295 of The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860 for razing down
structures and the conversion of idols belonging to the Appellant. The requisite procedure under
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been complied with and the essential elements of the
offence have been proved with substantial evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

WRITTEN PLEADINGS
______________________________________________________________________________
[I] WHETHER THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT OF
THE DARK ISLES AND MRIGA, IN 1898, IS BINDING UPON THE UNION OF GOD’S ISLAND.
______________________________________________________________________________
It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the Agreement entered into between the
Colonial Government of the Dark Isles (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Colonial Rulers’)1 and
Mriga, the Denominational Sect (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Appellant’)2 on 17.08.18983
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Agreement’) is binding upon the Union of God’s Island
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Respondent No. 2’),4 thereby making the State of Leoland (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Respondent No. 1’)5 also bound by it.
It is pertinent to note that the validity of the Agreement was subsequently recognised by
the King of the Dark Isles in 1901.6 The Agreement thus mandated legal recognition for the
lineal rights, custom and tradition of the Appellant with regard to the management and daily
administration of the temple and its related properties.7 The related properties refer to the assets
found in the Deer’s Cave8 that were under the control of the Appellant prior to the enactment of
the State Legislation of Leoland on the subject of the takeover9 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘State Legislation’).
1 Moot Proposition, p. 2, ¶ 2
2 Memorandum For The Appellants, p. i, Cause Title
4 Memorandum For The Appellants, p. i, Cause Title
5 Memorandum For The Appella.nts, p. i, Cause Title

In the present case it is important to analyse the current status of laws that were brought
about during the pre-Constitutional period, i.e. the period before 1950. The premises for the
continuance in force of the Agreement can be understood by delving into the following aspects:
i. that the Agreement continues to have the force of law owing to non-repudiation by
the appropriate authority; and [1.1]
ii. that the present case does not attract the application of Art. 363 of The Constitution of
God’s Island, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Constitution’10).11 [1.2]
[1.1] NON-REPUDIATION OF THE AGREEMENT: AGREEMENT CONTINUES TO BE IN FORCE
The Appellant most respectfully submits that the Agreement continues in validity till the
present date as it has not been repudiated or revoked by any appropriate authority. Repudiation is
required to make the Agreement cease in its application by virtue of the following:
a. the Agreement continues to be valid under the Proviso to §. 7 of the God’s Island
Independence Act, 1947 enacted by the Colonial Rulers; and12 [1.1.1]
b. the Agreement continues to be valid U/Art. 372(1) of The Constitution.13 [1.1.2]
1.1.1: AGREEMENT IS VALID UNDER THE PROVISO TO §. 7
The Agreement is valid under the Proviso to §. 7. This proviso prescribes that
effect shall continue to be given to the provisions of any such agreement which relates to
customs, etc. until the provisions in question are denounced by the Ruler of the Indian
State or by the Dominion or Province or are superseded by subsequent agreements.
Therefore, in the present instance, an Agreement is one which relates to and has acquired
10 §. 3(15). “Constitution”. The General Clauses Act, 1897
11 Art. 363. “Bar to interference by courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc.” The
Constitution of God’s Island, 1950
12 §. 7. “Consequences of the setting up of the new Dominions”. God’s Island Independence Act, 1947
13 Art. 372. “Continuance in force of existing laws and their adaptation”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950

the status of a ‘custom’. A custom to be valid must be immemorial, reasonable, should
have continued without interruption since its immemorial origin, and must be certain.14
Proving the above ingredients, the Appellant had the possession of the Deer Temple since
550 A.D.15 and as the Colonial Rulers failed to take over the property, it has remained
with the Appellant for time immemorial. Therefore, the Agreement continues to be valid
under the Proviso to §. 7 of the God’s Island Independence Act, 1947 enacted by the
Colonial Rulers.
1.1.2: AGREEMENT CONTINUES TO BE VALID U/ART. 372(1)
It is clear from Art. 395 that the God’s Island Independence Act, 1947 has been
repealed.16 Therefore, it may be argued that the provisions of the said Act cannot be
applied to the present case. However, it is important to note that the Agreement was
entered into prior to the enactment of the God’s Island Independence Act, 1947.17
Furthermore, Art. 372 of The Constitution clearly provides for the provision of §. 7 of the
God’s Island Independence Act, 1947 and saves the Court from any difficulties in
interpretation of the validity of the Agreement.
The object of Art. 372(1) is to sanction the continuance of the existing laws until
they are repealed or amended by a competent authority under the new Constitution.18 As
established in the previous argument, a custom having the force of law is specifically
included in the definition of ‘law’ U/Art. 13.19 The Agreement in the present case falls
under the definition of ‘law’ U/Art. 13(3)(a). Therefore, U/Art. 372(1) the Agreement
14 Bhimashya & Ors. v. Smt. Janabi @Janawwa, (2006) 13 SCC 627
16 Art. 395. “Repeals”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950
18 S.I. Corporation v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1964 SC 207 (215); See also Motilal v. State, AIR 1952 All 963 (964)
19 Bhauram v. Baijnath, AIR 1962 SC 1476

which was in force before the commencement of the Constitution will continue to be in
force as there has been no alteration or repeal or an amendment to the same.
[1.2] NOBAR TO INTERFERENCE: ART. 363 IS NOT APPLICABLE
The Appellant most respectfully submits that Art. 363 of The Constitution cannot be
invoked by the Respondents in the present case as the parties to the Agreement in question are
different from that of those entailed in the Article. The application of the provision requires that
one of the parties to the Agreement must be any ‘Ruler of an Indian State’20 and that the other
party must be the Government of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Governments.
By virtue of Art. 363(2)(b) and Art. 366(22), it is evident that the Appellant cannot fall
under the term “Ruler” as it is a Denominational Sect representative of a particular sect in a
religion. The Denominational Sect has a deep-rooted ancestry that dates far back for more than
14 centuries. However, it has not represented itself or been recognised as a Ruler of any of the
States in God’s Island and therefore does not fall under the categories of ‘Prince’, ‘Chief’ or
other person recognised by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler
of any Indian State and cannot be said to fall within the purview of the term “Ruler”.
In light of the above, it is humbly submitted that in the present case, the Agreement
continues to be in force by virtue of Art. 372(1) of The Constitution and is thus binding upon the
Union of God’s Island. The State of Leoland is bound by obligations that the Union is bound by.
Therefore, the State of Leoland is also bound by the Agreement.
20 Art. 366(22). “Ruler”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950

______________________________________________________________________________
[II] WHETHER THE AMENDMENT TO ART. 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF GOD’S ISLAND, 1950
IS VALID.
______________________________________________________________________________
It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the Amendment to Art. 2621 of The
Constitution is not valid in law. In the present instance, the Constitutional Amendment to Art. 26
is not in conformity with the ideals of the Constitution and the principle of Secularism.22
The power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is derived from Arts. 245,23 24624 &
24825 r/w. item 97 in List I, i.e. the Union List.26 Art. 368 is the principal provision that confers
upon the Parliament the wide power of Amendment.27
To examine the validity of the Amendment, the Court should not concern itself with the
wisdom behind or the propriety of the Constitutional Amendment but rather with the compliance
of the following rules: 28
i. that the procedure prescribed by Art. 368 of The Constitution is strictly complied with;
and [2.1]
ii. that the amendment has not destroyed or damaged the basic structure or the essential
features of The Constitution.29 [2.2]
21 Art. 26. “Freedom to manage religious affairs”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950
22 “SECULAR”, inserted by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. Preamble to The Constitution of God’s
Island, 1950
23 Art. 245. “Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States”. The Constitution of God’s
Island, 1950
24 Art. 246. “Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and the Legislatures of States”. The Constitution of God’s
Island, 1950
25 Art. 248. “Residuary powers of Legislation”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950
26 Schedule VII: List I - Union List, Entry 97. “Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including fees
taken in any court”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950
27 Art. 368. “Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure thereof”. The Constitution of God’s
Island, 1950
28 Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1517

[2.1] PROCEDURAL CONFORMITY: REQUISITE PROCEDURE HAS NOT BEEN STRICTLY
COMPLIED WITH
The Appellant most respectfully submits that the requisite procedure U/Art. 368 has not been
strictly complied with [2.1.1] and that the retrospective application of the Amendment is effected
in an ambiguous manner, thereby making it invalid. [2.1.2]
2.1.1: COMPLIANCE WITH ART. 368
For the purposes of an Amendment U/Art. 368, the provisions of the Constitution fall
under two categories:
(i) Art. 368(2) prescribes that an amendment can be effected by a special majority,
i.e., a majority of the total membership of each House of Parliament as well as by
a majority of not less than 2/3rd of the members of that House present and voting.
(ii) The proviso to Art. 368(2) prescribes a condition for five particular types of
amendment wherein a ratification of not less than one half of the States is
required.
In the present case, the Amendment to Art. 26 falls under the former category and not
the latter in which the ratification is required. However, in the present case the State
Legislatures have ratified the Amendment.30 When The Constitution does not place an
obligation upon the Parliament to obtain ratification from the State Legislatures to amend
The Constitution, such ratification would amount to excessive use of procedure which is
not required U/Art. 368. Therefore, the stipulated procedure for Amendment has not been
complied with.
29 Raghunath Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1267; See also Arvind P. Datar, Commentary on the Constitution
of India, Vol. II (2nd ed. reprint 2010)

2.1.2: PROCEDURE FOR RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION
The retrospective operation of the Amendment is unreasonable, arbitrary and
violative of Arts. 1431 & 2132 of The Constitution. Retrospective effect to a Constitution
Amendment Act, if intended, must be given by using express words in that behalf. The
Court cannot ascribe retroactivity to an amendment of The Constitution by implication.33
In the present case, the retrospective effect of the Amendment has neither been expressly
mentioned in the Preamble nor in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Amendment Act.34 Therefore, this Constitutional Amendment cannot be considered to be
retrospective in operation.
[2.2] DOCTRINE OF BASIC STRUCTURE: AMENDMENT HAS DESTROYED THE ESSENTIAL
FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTION
It is most respectfully submitted that the Doctrine of Basic Structure has been violated in
the present case. The basic features of The Constitution constitute the unalterable part of The
Constitution. The Constitution has conferred a limited power of amendment on the Parliament.
Thus the Parliament cannot, under the exercise of that limited power, enlarge that very power
into an absolute power. Indeed, a limited amending power is one of the basic features of The
Constitution and, therefore, the limitations on that power cannot be destroyed.35
In the present context, the scope of the Doctrine of Basic Structure under Part III36 is to
be examined. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,37 it was held that the Parliament may
31 Art. 14. “Equality before law”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950
32 Art. 21. “Protection of life and personal liberty”. The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950
33 Mahendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 1019 (¶ 14); See also Saghtir Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
AIR 1954 SC 728
34 For e.g., Constitution (70th Amendment) Act, 1992
35 Minerva Mills Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789
36 Part III. Fundamental Rights. The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950
37 AIR 1973 SC 1461 (769)

amend the Fundamental Rights provided the basic foundation and structure of The Constitution
remains the same.
In the present case, the Amendment, ignoring the subsisting traditional and lineal
denominational rights enjoyed by the communities, provides for the acquisition, management,
control, and administration of denominational institutions without the aid and advice of the
denominational group. If any provision of law were to subject such religious property to a
restriction, it must do so by leaving the right of administration to the denomination. But if such
law takes away the right of administration from the hands of the religious denominations
altogether and vests it in any other authority, it would violate Art. 26,38 thereby violating the
Basic Structure of the Constitution. Secularism and freedom of conscience and religion is
considered to be one of the basic features of The Constitution.39 In the present instance, Art. 26
which embodies the principle of Secularism has been arbitrarily and unreasonably violated.
Furthermore, the Right to Life U/Art. 21 in its expanded horizon includes all
interpretations that give meaning to a person's life including the culture, heritage and tradition
with dignity of person and thus is a basic structure of The Constitution.40 Thus the Respondents
have violated the Basic Structure of the Constitution by introducing an Amendment to Art. 26.
In light of the above, it is humbly submitted that in the instant matter, the Amendment
cannot be said to be valid in law as the Respondents have not followed the requisite procedure
and have grossly violated the Basic Structure of the Constitution.
38 Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Anna Satram Committee & Ors. v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endowment & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 3567
39 Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University, AIR 1996 SC 1011; See also, Aruna Roy v. Union of India, AIR 2002 SC
3176; Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299
40 Madhu Kishwar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1864 (¶ 12)

______________________________________________________________________________
[III] WHETHER THE STATE LEGISLATION OF LEOLAND CONCERNING THE TAKEOVER AND
COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE DEER TEMPLE ESTABLISHMENT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
______________________________________________________________________________
It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the State Legislation concerning the
takeover and complete control of the Deer Temple establishment is unconstitutional. It is ultra
vires the power granted by The Constitution.
It is a well-settled rule that Legislation can be declared unconstitutional on two grounds
namely,
i. the lack of legislative competence to enact legislation over the subject-matter; and [3.1]
ii. violation of any Fundamental Rights guaranteed in Part III or any other provision of The
Constitution [3.2].41
[3.1] LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE: STATE LEGISLATURE LACKS COMPETENCE TO ENACT
The Appellant most respectfully submits that a law passed without legislative
competence is a nullity ab initio42 and nothing can be done to cure that law.43 The legislative
powers of the Legislature of the Union and the States are limited by Chapter I, Part XI of The
Constitution.44 Both the Parliament as well as the State Legislatures may enact legislations with
respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III of the Seventh Schedule.45 However, Art.
254,46 which enshrines the Doctrine of Repugnancy,47 states that where both the State
Legislatures and Parliament occupy the same field contemplated by List III then the legislation
41 Saksena,I.N. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 2250
42 R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v.Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628
43 Rehman Shagoo v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 1960 SC 1
44 Durga Das Basu, Shorter Constitution ofIndia, 1164 (13th ed. reprint 2006)
45 Concurrent List, Seventh Schedule, The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950
46 Art. 254. “Inconsistency between laws, made by Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of the State”.The
47 Government of Andhra Pradesh v. J.B. Educational Society, AIR 2005 SC 2014

passed by the Parliament being prior in point of time will prevail over the State Legislation.
Repugnancy in the context of statutes could be defined as an inconsistency or contradiction
between two or more parts of a legal instrument.48
In the present instance, the Central Legislation which has been passed prior to and
clashes with the State Legislation w.r.t. the acquisition and complete control of the Appellant’s
assets is the Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1972’).
Repugnancy between the two legislations may thus be ascertained on the basis of the following
principles:49
a. the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupy the same
field; and [3.1.1]
b. there is direct conflict between the two provisions. [3.1.2]
It is also relevant to note that the requisite procedure has not been complied with [3.1.3].
3.1.1: OCCUPANCY IN THE SAME FIELD
The Preamble and a provision in the Act of 1972, clearly provides for the
acquisition of antiquities and art treasures. Similarly, Acquisition of property is a subject-
matter that falls under Entry 42 of List III. The property of the Appellant qualifies for the
definition of Antiquity under the Act, as an “article, object or thing of historical
interest”.50 Therefore, the State Legislation on the complete takeover and control of the
Deer Temple establishment51 is also a law w.r.t. Entry 42 of List III.
3.1.2: THERE IS DIRECT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO PROVISIONS
48 Henry Campbell Black, Black’sLaw Dictionary,1457 (4th ed. revised 1968)
49 Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1959 SC 648
50 §. 2(1)(a). “Antiquity”.Antiquities and Art Treasures Act, 1972
51 Moot Proposition,p. 3, ¶ 10

The Act of 1972 provides that the Central Government has the authority to
compulsorily acquire antiquities or art treasure.52 Since the temple establishment falls
within the ambit of the Central Legislation, the subsequent State Legislation which
authorises the State Government to acquire the temple establishment is inconsistent and
absolutely irreconcilable to the Central Legislation. Therefore, the Central Legislation
will prevail and the State Legislation is violative of The Constitution.
3.1.3: REQUISITE PROCEDURE HAS NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH
If law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List
is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law
can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President U/Art. 254(2) of The
Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as
the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overrule the provisions of the
Central Act in their applicability to the State only.53 However, since there is absence of
clear consent obtained from the President while passing the State Legislation, the State
Legislation is void in view of the repugnance.
[3.2] FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: VIOLATION OF PART III
The Appellant most respectfully submits that when a statute contravenes a Fundamental
Right, it has to be declared unconstitutional and must cease to stand in the way of those who are
52 §. 19. “Power of Central Government to compulsorily acquire antiquities and art treasures”. Antiquities and Art
Treasures Act, 1972
53 M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 898; See also M.P. Shikshak Congress v. R.P.F.
Commissioner, Jabalpul & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 443

entitled to exercise the rights in question.54 In the present case, these rights would be Arts. 14,
15,55 21 & 26 of The Constitution.
The guarantee of equal protection and the right against discrimination envisaged U/Arts.
14 & 15 respectively, shall be limited only through the imposition of reasonable restrictions.56
By ‘reasonable’, it is meant that the classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational.57
The discrimination which is prohibited is treatment in a manner prejudicial as compared with
another person or class similarly circumstanced by the adoption of a law different from the one
applicable to the other person or class.58 Therefore, the acquisition of property from the
Appellant alone without affecting the rights of any other religious denomination amounts to a
violation U/Arts. 14 & 15 and thereby violates the principle of Secularism, which constitutes the
basic structure of the Constitution.59
Art. 21 which protects life and personal liberty, is a foundation for a society where rule of
law has primacy and not arbitrary or capricious exercise of power.60 Life in its expanded horizon
includes culture, heritage and tradition of a person.61 Therefore, an unlawful intrusion into
activities of the religious denomination and curtailing the liberty to administer their property
would not only amount to the violation of Art. 21 of the Appellant but also would also violate the
rights of crores of devotees who are regular pilgrims of the Deer Temple.62
Art. 26(c) & (d) gives the freedom to religious denominations to own, acquire and
administer property. If any law were to take away the right of administration from the hands of
54 Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 781
55 Art. 15. “Prohibition ofdiscrimination on grounds of religion,race, caste, sex or place of birth”, The
56 Laxmi Khandsari & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873 (¶ 16)
57 Chinthaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118
58 Durga Das Basu, Case Book on Indian Constitutional Law,52 (2nd ed. 2007)
59 S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918
60 Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569
61 C. Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami, AIR 1996 SC 1697

the religious denominations altogether and vests it in any other authority, it would violate Art.
26.63
The Appellant most humbly submits that in spite of there being a general presumption in
favour of the Constitutionality of a Legislation, if there is a prima facie case of a violation being
made out, then the onus shifts to the State to show that the Legislation comes within the
permissible restrictions and that the particular restriction is reasonable.64
3.2.1: SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT VALIDATE THE
STATE LEGISLATION
The Respondents’ argument that the implied language of the Amendment to Art.
26 gives effect to the State Legislation will not hold good as the Supreme Court has
stated that a subsequent amendment of the Constitution cannot confer jurisdiction upon
the Legislature with retrospective effect, so as to validate the law,65 unless the
Amendment is expressly given retrospective effect.66 In the present case, there is absence
of any express provision giving retrospective effect to the Amendment.
In light of the above, it is humbly submitted that the State Legislation is unconstitutional
and ultra vires the Constitution and the enactment of Amendment cannot validate such a
Legislation.
63 Sri Kanyaka Parameswari Anna Satram Committee & Ors. v. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endowment & Ors., AIR 1999 SC 3567
64 N.K. Bajpai v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 2012 SC 1210 (¶ 14)
65 Veernath v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1957 AP 1034
66 C.F.Dhirubha Dharangdhara Chemical v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 47

______________________________________________________________________________
[IV] WHETHER THE DEER TEMPLE PROPERTY CAN BE USED TO REDRESS THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS CAUSED BY THE LEOLAND LIQUOR CORPORATION.
______________________________________________________________________________
It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the Deer Temple property cannot be used
to cure the financial crisis of the Leoland Liquor Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ‘LLC’).
The acquisition of the Deer Temple property to fund the debt of LLC hurts the religious
sentiments of the Appellant [5.1] and violates the Fundamental Rights granted by The
Constitution. [5.2]
[5.1] ESSENTIALS OF RELIGION: PROHIBITION OF LIQUOR IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE
RELIGION IN QUESTION
The Appellant most respectfully submits that the acquisition and conversion of the Deer
Temple property to fund the financial crisis caused by the bureaucratic mismanagement of the
LLC67 by Respondent No. 1 hurts the religious sentiments of not only the denominational sect
but crores of its devotees as well. Similar to the manner in which the Supreme Court pointed out
in P.N. Kaushal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.68 that there is a widespread religious
prohibition towards the consumption of liquor, the Appellant also considers the prohibition of
liquor as an essential part of its religion. For instance, in the abovementioned case even the touch
of a bottle containing alcohol pollutes the Mohammedans and the religion of Hinduism strictly
67 Moot Proposition,p.4, ¶ 13
68 AIR 1978 SC 1457

prohibits the use of alcohol in any form whatsoever. The Respondents must, by furthering the
principle laid down in Art. 47,69 stop aiding and abetting the spread of liquor in the State.
[5.2] DPSP: IMPORTANCE OF ART. 47
Since 550 A.D., the Appellant has been enjoying its right to own, acquire and manage the
property without any disturbance from the Colonial Rulers and the Respondents until the LLC
faced a financial crisis in 2011.70 The LLC experienced social ruin and was marked by serious
opposition from the general public.71 Though the Respondents later nationalised the business, it
continued to experience wide spread bureaucratic mismanagement and official inefficiency that
resulted in a loss which was beyond the fiscal capacity of the Government.72
Bearing in mind the present scenario and the obligation of the State to further the
principles enunciated under Part IV,73 the State is required to bring about the prohibition of
consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs which are injurious to health. The State has the
power U/Art. 47 to completely prohibit the manufacture, sale, possession, distribution and
consumption of liquor as a beverage, both because it is inherently a dangerous article of
consumption and also because of the directive principle contained in Art. 47.74 The
Constitutional Bench of this Hon’ble Court held that in view of the provisions of Art. 47 of the
Constitution, the total prohibition of manufacture or sale of liquor would be reasonable and
permissible and the only exception can be for medicinal preparations.75
69 Art. 47. “Duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health”.
The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950
71 Moot Proposition, p.4, ¶ 12
72 Ibid, ¶ 13
73 Part IV. Directive Principles of State Policy. The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950
74 Khoday Distilleries Ltd v. State Of Karnataka, (1995) 1 SCC 574
75 State of Bombay v. F.N.Balsara, (1975) 1 SCC 29

______________________________________________________________________________
[V] WHETHER THE OFFICIALS IN THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF LEOLAND ARE GUILTY OF
COMMITTING ANY OFFENCE UNDER THE GOD’S ISLAND PENAL CODE, 1860 FOR THE RAZING
DOWN OF STRUCTURES AND THE CONVERSION OF IDOLS.
______________________________________________________________________________
It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble Court that the Officials in the State Government
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Government Officials’) are guilty of committing an offence76 U/§.
295,77 of The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘GPC, 1860’) for the
razing down of structures and the conversion of idols belonging to the Appellant.
In the present case, it is clear that the Government Officials are being implicated as
prosecuting the State Government would effectively mean prosecuting the Government Officials
who are the true perpetrators of the crimes. The Government Officials cannot hide behind the
guise of the body corporate, i.e. the State Government, and can be held liable by application of
the Doctrine of Lifting the Corporate Veil which has been upheld in cases such as Standard
Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement78 owing to the existence of provisions such as
s§. 279 & 1180 of the GPC, 1860.
In the present case, it is relevant to establish the following to determine the criminality of
the actions of the Government Officials in the process of taking over of the assets:
i. that the trial before the Magistrate Court be adjourned until the case before this Hon’ble
Court is decided; [5.1]
76 §. 3(38). “Offence”. The General Clauses Act, 1897
77§. 295. “Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class”. The God’s Island
Penal Code, 1860
78 AIR 2005 SC 2622
79 §. 2. “Punishment of offences committed within India”. The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860
80 §. 11. “Definition of Person”. The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860

ii. that the requisite procedure under The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘Cr.P.C., 1973’) has been complied with; and [5.2]
iii. that the essential elements of the offence have been proved beyond reasonable doubt
[5.3].
[5.1] ADJOURNMENT OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS: §. 343 PERMITS ADJOURNMENT BY
MAGISTRATE
The Appellant most respectfully submits that U/§. 343(2)81 of the Cr.P.C., 1973, when
the Magistrate becomes aware of the pendency of an appeal against the decision arrived at in the
judicial proceeding out of which the present matter has arisen - in the present case the question
of commission of a penal offence has arisen out of the suit filed before the Hon’ble High Court -
the Magistrate may at any stage adjourn the hearing of the case until such appeal is decided. It is
evident that this provision would give this Hon’ble Court the power to decide on the question of
commission of a penal offence irrespective of the undecided nature of the matter in the
Magistrate Court.82
[5.2] PROCEDURAL CONFORMITY: REQUISITE PROCEDURE HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH
The Appellant most respectfully submits that in the present case the requisite procedure
under the Cr.P.C., 1973 [5.2.1] has been complied with. This is relevant as §. 483 of the Cr.P.C.,
1973 mandates the trial of all offences under the GPC, 1860 to be conducted in accordance with
the provisions of the Cr.P.C., 1973.
81 §. 343. “Procedure of Magistrate taking cognizance”. God’s Island Penal Code, 1860
83 §. 4. “Trial of offences underthe Indian Penal Code and other laws”. The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860

5.2.1: THE MAGISTRATE HAS THE POWER TO TAKE COGNISANCE
The offence punishable U/§. 295 is triable by any of the Classes of Magistrate by
virtue of §. 2684 and The First Schedule85 of the Cr.P.C., 1973. Upon remanding to trial,
the Magistrate has taken cognisance of the offence U/§. 190(1)(c)86 of the Cr.P.C., 1973.
This is an instance wherein the Magistrate takes cognisance of the offence upon his own
knowledge that such offence has been committed.87 And therefore in the present instance,
cognizance has been taken as a prima facie case exists based on the belief of the Hon’ble
High Court that a criminal action is involved in the present case. Furthermore, the
Magistrate has the power to order an investigation U/§. 156(3)88 of the Cr.P.C., 1973.
5.2.3: SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS COLLECTED & SUBMITTED
After the High Court remanded to trial the question of whether a penal offence
applies, evidences were collected and submitted before the proceedings of the Magistrate
and relying upon the same, the Magistrate has remarked that there was an active mens rea
in such conversion of idols.89 Therefore, the sufficiency of evidence cannot be questioned
in this Hon’ble Court.
[5.3] ESSENTIALS OF AN OFFENCE: §. 295 PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
The two constituent elements of a crime that can be understood by the maxim actus non
facit reum nisi mens sit rea. To establish a charge U/§. 295, the following elements have to be
proved:
84 §. 26. “Courtsby which offences are triable”.The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860
85 §§. 295. Offences underthe God’s Island Penal Code, Classification Of Offences, The First Schedule, The Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973
86 §. 190. “Cognizance of offences by Magistrate”.The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860
88 §. 156. “Police Officer’s power to investigate cognizable case”.The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860

5.3.1: INTENTION OR KNOWLEDGE PRESENT
In the present instance, the knowledge that razing down certain structures and
converting the ancestral idols of worship would insult the religious feelings of the
Appellant is sine qua non to the commission of the offence U/§. 295.90 It is evident that
the religious sentiments of not only the Appellant, but also the devotees would be deeply
wounded when religious property that has been in possession for more than 1400 years is
destroyed.
5.3.2: DESTRUCTION & DEFILEMENT OF A PLACE OF WORSHIP OR AN OBJECT HELD
SACRED
The words ‘destroy or damage’ would mean physically or materially affecting the
property concerned or a place of worship or veneration.91 It would also mean a thing
destroyed by some external action upon it.92 Applying the said definition to this case, as
the Deer Temple is considered as a revered sacred shrine of God’s Island,93 any damage
to this temple would amount to an offence U/§. 295 of GPC, 1860.
5.3.3: TRESPASS INTO A PLACE OF WORSHIP
‘Trespass’ U/§. 295 implies any violent or injurious act or unjustifiable intrusion
upon a property in possession of another,94 with the intention or knowledge of wounding
feelings or insulting the religion of any person. In the present instance, the Government
Officials have entered the temple premises and damaged the temple wounding the
feelings of the Appellant and the devotees thereby committing an offence under §. 295 of
GPC, 1860.
90 P.S.A.Pillai, Criminal Law, 533 (12th ed. 2014)
91 Ibid, 535
92 P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Concise Law Dictionary (3rd ed. reprint 2007)
94 Jhulan Sain v. Emperor, AIR 1920 Pat 349

5.3.4: ARGUENDO, CHARGE UNDER A MINOR OFFENCE IF INGREDIENTS OF §. 295 NOT
FULFILLED
If the elements of §. 295 are not fulfilled for some reason, the Government
Officials should be charged U/§§. 426 or 447 of the GPC, 1860 as given U/§. 222(1) &
(2) of the Cr.P.C., 1973. The above provisions prescribe that when a person is charged
with an offence consisting of several particulars and a combination of some is proved
which constitutes a minor offence, then he may be convicted of the minor offence. Also,
if a person is charged with an offence and facts are proved which reduce it to a minor
offence, then he may be convicted of the minor offence, although he is not charged with
it.95
In light of the above, it is humbly submitted that in the instant matter, the Government
Officials are guilty of committing an offence U/§. 295 for the razing down of the religious
property belonging to the Appellant and the conversion of idols present in the Deer Temple.
95 §. 222. “When offence proved included in offence charged”.The Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Court to:
REVERSE the order of the High Court of Leoland and HOLD that:
1. The Agreement entered into in 1898 continues to have the force of law and is thus
binding upon the Union of God’s Island;
2. The Amendment to Art. 26 of The Constitution of God’s Island, 1950 is invalid;
3. The State Legislation of Leoland concerning the takeover and complete control of the
Deer Temple establishment is unconstitutional;
4. The prohibition of liquor is an ‘essential part’ of the religion in question and thus the
Deer Temple property cannot be used to redress the financial crisis caused by the Leoland
Liquor Corporation;
5. The Officials in the State Government of Leoland are guilty of committing an offence
U/§. 295 of The God’s Island Penal Code, 1860 for the razing down of structures and the
conversion of idols.
AND/OR pass any other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case and in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.
Place: ________, God’s Island S/d_____________
Date: 9th September, 2015 COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANTS

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