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1. HISTORICAL BACKROUND
2. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT
3. INCOMPATIBILITIES
4. ACTIONS
5. SOLUTION
 Ethnic war means that, an ethnic conflict is an armed conflict between ethnic groups.
It contrasts with civil war on one and regular warfare on the other, where two or more
sovereign states are in conflict as like as in Yugoslavia had that situation.
 Yugoslavia which is also known as Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia civil war
occurred as a result of a series of political uprisings and conflicts in the first half of
1990’s. This modern Yugoslavia existed from 1945 until the early 1990’s. It was a
combination of differing regional cultures that had developed for centuries.
 Prior to the 20th century, the region found itself in between two great empires, the Ottoman Empire and the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. For several hundred years the boundary between these two shifted back and forth
numerous times, putting the smaller regions under control of one ruler or another- and there were also periods of
relative independence for several of the republics.
 But after the First World War (1914-1918), both of these empires collapsed and many new nations were formed
out of the pieces.
 On December 1,1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes announced its existence, bringing together
several of these regions under one monarchy.
 Governance was not easy for the new kingdom, as there were differences in how the state
should be set up and administered.
 The Serbs saw their republic, Serbia, as the center of the new nation, and wanted a government
that was unified around them and controlled from their capital city of Belgrade.
 Many Croats, Slovenes, and Muslims of Bosnia preferred a looser federal government that,
while supporting the unity of the nation, gave a great deal of freedom to the individual
republics within it.
 Many things worked against the new nation. The Great War had been disastrous for people and
property, and much was in ruins.
 Economic depression set in across Europe making progress even more difficult.
 Rival political factions often resorted to violence.
 The struggle between the Serbs (fighting for unity) and the Croats (fighting for more individual
autonomy) became particularly fierce, and radical elements of both sides used intimidation and
assassination.
 King Alexander tried to exert more control and bring stability to his nation, and in 1928 it was
renamed ‘Yugoslavia’,the country of the Southern Slavs- to try to foster a better sense of cultural
unity.
 He was assassinated in 1934, and the violence and instability grew worse.
 He was able to suppress religious and cultural rivalries among the Roman Catholics, Serbian
Orthodox and Muslims during his lifetime.
 World War II broke out in 1939, and chaos soon engulfed Yugoslavia. The nation found itself
pressured from the outside by more powerful nations like Germany and Italy and by regional
neighbors like Bulgaria and Romania, and soon it was torn apart from within by civil war
between several different factions.
 The civil war in Yugoslavia was a very complex conflict. Some fought against the Germans
who occupied the country, others allied with them; some fought to bring back the new king
who had fled, others fought to set up a new government; village turned on village and neighbor
attacked neighbor.
 Eventually the Partisans, a resistance group led by a man named Josip Broz, who called
himself Tito, prevailed by helping to defeat the Germans and by establishing dominance over
the many other groups fighting for control of Yugoslavia.
 Tito established a communist government modeled on the Soviet Union. This new Yugoslavia
was a federation of six republics;
Serbia
Croatia
Slovenia
Montenegro
Macedonia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Kosovo and Vojvodina (two autonomous regions,both located within Serbia)
 Even though the United States was wary of Soviet influence in the new communist countries of
Eastern Europe, Tito’s communist Yugoslavia received recognition and support.
 In 1948, Yugoslavia made a surprising break away from the USSR, declaring that it would
develop its own form of communism different from that of the Soviets and its other Eastern
European neighbors.
 Through the 1950’s and 1960’s Yugoslavia seemed to have found a way to be independent
from foreign influence, politically unified internally, and along a path towards economic
growth and prosperity.
 But all was not as it seemed on the surface. Tito and the Communist Party were keeping the
country together through strict political control over the republics, repression of reform-minded
opposition and intimidation by secret police.
 Economic problems were continually mismanaged.
 During to 1980s, forming of the Federation Republic began to behave almost independently of
the centers of economic and political spheres with authorized the Constitution of 1974.
 Communist rule restored stability and good relations with the west ensured a steady stream of
loans.
 Later, however, national and ethnic tensions increased due to unequal development and a
growing burden of debt. When Tito died in 1980 many expected the federation to break up but
Yugoslavia was to survive for another ten years. After Tito's death, ethnic nationalism began to
rise again in Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo between ethnic Albanians and Serbs.This,
coupled with economic problems in Yugoslavia.
WAR between the years of 1990-2001 & INDEPENDENCE
Yugoslavia
Ethnic nationalities of the Yugoslavia
The causes of conflicts in these countries
 Multinational Construction;
Yugoslavia incorporated many ethnic groups. There was a good system to keep so many ethnic groups together.
In Yugoslavia, the federal government’s peoples who enjoyed from cultural rights and also minorities were equally
benefit from these rights such as Albanian people.
Some Politian became head of state after the death of Yugoslavia, and this multinational structure become tainted
because of their failed policies.
Community of Balkans and especially the former Yugoslavia who has different ethnic combinations and has opposite
and rival sects and religions so, this situation has led to development and formation of nationalism Serbs and
Montenegrins who are Orthodox, they have different religious and culture from Croats and Slovenes
Greek Orthodox fight on the side of the Serbs during the Bosnian War shows deep divisions between Orthodox unity,
Catholics and Muslims
Wars are not the religious wars in Yugoslavia territory however; the parties have used religious factors to fight against
none of them.
Religious differences are made a material of domestic politics as a part of the culture and nationality.
Serbian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox peoples sympathized toward Serb and Montenegrins because of religious
reasons on the other hand; Catholic and Protestant churches and communities sympathized toward Croats and
Slovenes as well.
Religion factor is only complementary and a secondary as part of the ethnic and cultural identity in this war.
 Religious and Cultural Reasons
There was a huge difference in terms of standard of living between federal states in Yugoslavia
Slovenia and Croatia have the highest living standards then others states.
The southern states of Yugoslavia believe that there is a way out of the economic crisis. This differences among the states,
gave rise to debate as exploiter – exploited.
Relatively rich states claimed that carry the burden of the poorer states. But, the poor states suggested that were exploited
by the rich states as well.
Yugoslavia traditionally unbalanced regional distribution of income than other socialist countries. And then when they
passed to market economy, it has aggravated this situation.
After that, in 1970s, world economic crisis has completely weakened the power of the federal governments. The results of
this case, was evident the deepening of inequity in regional distribution of income.
In1976, National income per capita in the richest part of Slovenia was close to 7 times of National income per capita in the
poorest part of Kosovo
 Economic Reasons
The cause of the ethnic conflict in the Balkans is based on religious reasons. However, it is very difficult to make this
distinction.
Ethnic identity and religious factors are intertwined in Yugoslavia.
Under the federation of peoples have entered into new searches after the weakening of authority, thus, strengthened
the tendency to revolt against inequality and feelings of nationalism came to the forefront again.
Economic and ethnic problems started to emerge after the death of Tito in the Yugoslavia.
In 1981, the uprising of the Albanian communities in Kosovo was the forerunner of future events. Nationalist
movement began to take shape in Serbian in the mid-1980s.
In 1989, the economic and political crisis has caused the deterioration of relations between the republics and in the
same year in the eastern bloc reform movements also reflected in Yugoslavia and in 1990, they passed a multi-party
system
 Nationalism
In the elections of 1990, the Communists came to government in Serbia and Montenegro but nationalist
parties came to management in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia.
Serbs, Croats and Bosnians formed a coalition of nationalist parties in Bosnia- Herzegovina.
After strengthening the supra- nationalism, supra-identity called “Yugoslav identity” was removed and
then people were forced to return to their sub-identities.
This situation has caused the people in his own division
 Nationalism
 In briefly, nationalism started to use as political power in Yugoslavia. For example, Slobodan Milosevic
became head of state after the death of Yugoslav President Tito and he is not nationalist but, he played the
nationalist trump in Serbia
 And then these nationalist policies created a tremendous impression in Slovenia and Croatia.
 After that, nationalist rivalry began between the federal states.
 Milosevic has used feelings of Serbs which is about the injustice of the Serbs and also it’s about genocide
of Serbs in Kosovo.
 As a result, while the leaders using these policies; they caused the breakdown of Yugoslavia
 In this case, problems are called ethnic problems but, as we see, there is a power or economic resources
of war under the ethnic mask.
 Ethnic differences play a central role because; political leaders use it as a tool to mobilize the masses.
 In this period, all the ethnic elements in the country began to explore new possibilities,
often contradictory. After the revolutions of 1989 swept Eastern Europe, a sense of
new possibility entered Yugoslav political life. All elements felt confident that they
could throw off unwanted features of Communism, but the definition of what was to be
lost varied from place to place.
 In January 1990 the League of Communists (the Yugoslav Communist Party) split
along ethnic lines, and ceased to be a unifying national force. In that same month,
violent riots in Kosovo reached new levels, with several dozen people killed. The JNA
(the Yugoslav National Army, in which the officer corps was heavily Serbian)
intervened to restore order. Because this episode led to fears that the JNA would
become a tool of Serbian interests, the effect was to move the other nationalities
farther toward secession.
 In the spring of 1990, Slovenes and Croats took concrete steps toward setting up new
forms of political power. In April, there were free elections in the two northern
provinces. In Slovenia, a Center-Right coalition won and began work on a new
constitution that claimed the right to secede from the federal state. In Croatia, Franjo
Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Union, a conservative nationalist party, took the
largest share of seats in the April election. In Serbia, on the other hand, the results of
a June 1990 referendum favored keeping a single-party state and curbing ethnic
autonomy in Kosovo and Vojvodina, the very policies that were fueling Slovene and
Croat efforts to distance themselves from Serbia. In the first period, the ability of the
nationalities to pursue their own goals in the aftermath of the 1989 revolution led to a
growing distance between the factions.
 In this period the contradictions between competing goals moved the situation from
tension to violence. In August 1990, minority Serbs in the Serb-majority Krajina district
of Croatia began to agitate for autonomy. They argued that if Croatia could leave
Yugoslavia, they in turn could leave Croatia. To prevent Croatian interference in a
planned referendum, local Serb militias made up of trained army reservists set up
roadblocks to isolate the Krajina region. In Serbia, Milosevic announced that if
Yugoslavia broke apart, there would have to be border changes that would unite all
ethnic Serbs in a single political entity. Serbia also cracked down on Albanian
agitation.
• Such steps alarmed Slovenes and Croats, and propelled them toward independence.
The two republics organized local militia and armed their police, despite warnings
from the JNA and anxiety among Croatia's Serbs, who recalled the use of local police
by the Ustashe to round up Serbs in 1941. In March 1991, Serbs in Croatia
proclaimed an autonomous Krajina, which was recognized by Milosevic. In clashes
over control of local police stations, the first people were killed in that area. In the
second period, the incompatibility between Serb and
• Slovene-Croatian wishes became clear, and led to violence outside of Kosovo for the
first time.
 This was the period when true open warfare began, as the Serbs resisted the Slovene
and Croatian independence movements. In May 1991, a Croatian was due to become
the new Yugoslav president under the scheme of rotation, but Serbia refused to
accept the change. This action set aside the last chance for a solution through
constitutional means. In June, both Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their
independence. Debates over the "legality" of such moves played out against a
background in which all sides chose to ignore inconvenient parts of the old
constitution.
 To frustrate Slovene independence, the JNA seized the customs posts on the borders
of Slovenia. After fighting between Slovene militia and the JNA, there was a
stalemate. JNA units were blockaded in their barracks, too powerful for the Slovene
forces to attack, but without access to the gasoline they needed to move. Perhaps
because there were so few Serbs in Slovenia, Serbia conducted a policy toward that
state that was very different from the policy adopted toward Croatia. Under a
negotiated settlement, the JNA units withdrew and allowed the Slovenes to secede.
 In Croatia the war escalated instead. Fighting began with guerilla warfare in Krajina
between the new Croatian armed forces, local Serb militia, and elements of the JNA
stationed there. In August 1991, Serbian regular army units began campaigns to
control two strategic areas: Vukovar and Dubrovnik. At Vukovar in Eastern Slavonia,
artillery fire drove Croatians out of the city, which was of strategic importance as a
gateway leading from Serbia to areas of Serbian population in the western parts of
Bosnia and in Krajina, and as a region that was a source of oil. Two recurring patterns
in Serbian strategy can be seen here for the first time: the use of terror to drive away
local populations ("ethnic cleansing"), and a Serbian reliance on heavy weapons to
attack urban areas, because of a shortage of infantry. The second Serbian offensive
took place on the Dalmatian coast, where Serb forces failed to take the coastal city of
Dubrovnik from Croatia. Dubrovnik is important as a major source of tourist revenue,
and is also the place where roads from the interior reach the Adriatic Sea.
 During this same period, member states of the European Economic Community (led
by Germany) recognized Slovene and Croat independence. The world international
community became involved for the first time as well, with UN authorization for 14,000
peacekeepers and an economic embargo against the rump of Yugoslavia: Serbia and
Montenegro. By the end of the third period, most of the principal organized forces in
the civil war were present, including the UN, the Croats and the Serbs, while the
Muslim government of Bosnia was about to make its appearance.
 In this period the arena of open war shifted from Croatia to Bosnia, where the province
split along ethnic lines. In early March 1992, a majority of Bosnians voted for
independence in a plebiscite, but the voters split along ethnic lines with many Serbs
opposing such a step. Immediately after the voting, Serbian local militia set up
roadblocks that isolated Bosnia's major cities from surrounding, Serbian-dominated
rural areas. Many Serbs left cities like Sarajevo, and a separate Bosnian Serb
parliament was set up.
 In April 1992, Bosnian Serb forces began a methodical effort to seize control of as
much territory as possible, especially in the eastern part of Bosnia (which is adjacent
to Serbia), as a step toward a possible union with Serbia. Backed by JNA units, self-
proclaimed "Chetnik" gangs that included criminal elements used terror tactics to drive
Muslim villagers out of their villages. Many of those Muslims arrived as refugees in
larger cities like Zepa, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Sarajevo. Serb units seized roads and
began a siege of Sarajevo, shelling the city and using snipers to kill civilians
 This was the period in which "ethnic cleansing" became general, including the
extensive use of rape and the creation of concentration camps to hold Muslim men,
where many were murdered. While incidents of terror by all ethnicities have been
reported in Bosnia, by all reliable accounts Serbs were the chief offenders. The
persistence of these reports led to escalating commitment by the UN, culminating in
pledges to use force and the enlistment of NATO forces as an instrument.
 Meanwhile, Serbian goals became clear on the ground. By the end of the summer of
1992, two-thirds of Bosnia was in Serb hands: the eastern zone near Serbia proper, a
thin corridor running east-to-west toward Croatia, and land on both sides of the
Bosnian-Croatian border around the Krajina region of Croatia. At this time, Croatian
forces also attacked and seized Muslim districts in Bosnia, leaving very little territory
except some larger cities in the hands of the Bosnian Muslim government.
 During this year, all sides in Bosnia pursued a dual strategy, balancing fighting
with negotiations on the world stage to seek maximum advantage. Peace talks began
in Geneva, Switzerland, based on the Anglo-American Vance-Owen plan to partition
Bosnia, separate the ethnic factions, and so end the fighting. Because it pragmatically
accepted the results of Serbian aggression, the Vance-Owen plan was widely
criticized and was unacceptable to the Bosnian Muslim government. After assuming
office in January 1993, new U.S. President Bill Clinton distanced his administration
from the plan.
 By this time, the Serbs (who made up less than 40 percent of the population)
controlled some 70 percent of the land area of Bosnia. With some difficulty, Karadzic
was able to persuade the Bosnian Serb Parliament to accept several partition plans
that gave Serbs between 50 and 52 percent of the country. Pressure from rump
Yugoslavia played a role: Milosevic wanted to end the crisis, to end sanctions and
curb an annual inflation rate which soon reached 2 million percent.
 The Bosnian Muslim government, on the other hand, resisted a settlement while it
pursued international favor in the media, with some success, as Western reporters
uniformly condemned Serbian excesses. The Bosnians also gained increased UN aid.
The UN agreed to send provide food to refugees in six cities and designated them as
"safe" zones not to be attacked by Serbs. Those cities were Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac,
Zepa, Srebrenica and Gorazde. The Bosnian Muslims lobbied against an arms
embargo imposed on all sides that prevented them from buying heavy weapons that
could offset Serb access to JNA arsenals, although some weapons were smuggled
into the country. This fifth period of stalemate was the calm before the storm: the next
two periods were unexpectedly volatile, given the apparent lack of progress at this
time.
 Beginning early in 1994, the stalemate began to destabilize.In March 1994, the Croatian
and Muslim Bosnian governments agreed on guidelines for a federated Bosnia. This freed
both groups to face the Serbs: the Muslims in Bosnia, the Croatians in Bosnia and in
Krajina, which remained in revolt against the Zagreb government. Later in the year, allied
Muslim and Croat forces began small but significant joint operations against Bosnian Serb
areas.
 In February 1994, one of the most prominent attacks on civilians during the war enraged
Western observers, when an explosion killed 68 people in Sarajevo's Markale market
place. Early reports blamed a Serbian mortar attack, and the US, the European Union and
NATO demanded that the Serbs remove artillery from around Sarajevo or face retaliatory
air strikes. Serbian and Russian observers, however, described the explosion as a
Bosnian provocation. Official UN investigators were unable to prove either allegation. The
Serbs largely complied with Western demands around Sarajevo, but shelling of other "safe
areas" continued and was not punished. At the same time, the episode illustrated the
extent to which the Bosnian Serbs had lost the contest for world opinion.
 France and the US quarreled: the US wanted to put more pressure on the Serbs, but
France was unwilling to place at risk its peacekeepers who were on the ground.
Civilian representatives of the UN vetoed some air attacks ordered by their own
commanders. When some air strikes did take place in May 1994, the Serbs
responded by taking UN peacekeepers hostage. In the fact of such threats, the UN
then caved in completely. Generally, this sixth period discredited the UN, and the
result was new initiatives both by the Serbs and by their enemies in Croatia and at
NATO. Out of public view, both sides prepared to take much more active measures.
 The summer of 1995 saw the climax of the civil war in Bosnia, as both sides explored
their options now that the UN had lost any authority to control events. In July 1995,
Serbian forces defied the UN and suddenly overran two of the "safe areas" in eastern
Bosnia: Srebrenica and Zepa. Some of the worst "ethnic cleansing" of the war took
place at this time: up to 8,000 Muslims were massacred under the direct supervision
of Mladic, the Bosnian Serb commanding general.
 It is likely that the ineffective record of UN and Western action during 1994 led the
Bosnian Serbs to expect no Western response, but instead the opposite happened.
Karadzic and Mladic were indicted as war criminals by a UN tribunal and Britain,
France and the US began plans for a military reaction to future attacks on "safe
areas." Peacekeepers in exposed areas were withdrawn, additional forces arrived,
and the UN's civilian representatives lost the right to veto the use of force.
 It also appears that the Western states gave Croatia the green light to take back
control of Krajina. When Serb forces from Bosnia and Krajina attacked the Bihac
"safe area" in extreme western Bosnia, they were counterattacked in a joint
offensive by Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces and those of the Croatian
government. Within a few days, the Serbs lost all of Krajina and much of western
Bosnia: 130,000 Serb refugees were driven off of lands upon which their families
had lived for hundreds of years. When angry Serbs shelled Sarajevo again, killing
37 people in one incident, NATO reacted with an unprecedented wave of air
strikes against the Bosnian Serb infrastructure. The Muslims and Croats appear to
have stopped their advance only because the West told them to do so: by then,
the Croat-Muslim federation was in control of just over half of Bosnia. When
Milosevic failed to intervene on their behalf, the Bosnian Serbs found themselves
alone and vulnerable.
 For the first time, all sides now simultaneously believed that no
further advantage lay in store for them through more fighting, and
for that reason all sides were willing to negotiate. After a hiatus of
18 months, peace talks resumed and led to a treaty signed in
November 1995, which was to be enforced by 60,000 NATO
troops. If this does mark the end of the war, it will have ended with
some 250,000 people killed out of a prewar Bosnia population of
4.4 million, over half of whom have become refugees.
 While relationships between the various ethnicities in Bosnia
remain troubled, the period of open warfare, atrocities against
civilians and deep international crisis has ended.

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YUGOSLAVIA_CIVIL_WEDWQSDASDASAzxCZXR (1).pptx

  • 1.
  • 2. 1. HISTORICAL BACKROUND 2. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT 3. INCOMPATIBILITIES 4. ACTIONS 5. SOLUTION
  • 3.  Ethnic war means that, an ethnic conflict is an armed conflict between ethnic groups. It contrasts with civil war on one and regular warfare on the other, where two or more sovereign states are in conflict as like as in Yugoslavia had that situation.  Yugoslavia which is also known as Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia civil war occurred as a result of a series of political uprisings and conflicts in the first half of 1990’s. This modern Yugoslavia existed from 1945 until the early 1990’s. It was a combination of differing regional cultures that had developed for centuries.
  • 4.  Prior to the 20th century, the region found itself in between two great empires, the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. For several hundred years the boundary between these two shifted back and forth numerous times, putting the smaller regions under control of one ruler or another- and there were also periods of relative independence for several of the republics.  But after the First World War (1914-1918), both of these empires collapsed and many new nations were formed out of the pieces.  On December 1,1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes announced its existence, bringing together several of these regions under one monarchy.
  • 5.  Governance was not easy for the new kingdom, as there were differences in how the state should be set up and administered.  The Serbs saw their republic, Serbia, as the center of the new nation, and wanted a government that was unified around them and controlled from their capital city of Belgrade.  Many Croats, Slovenes, and Muslims of Bosnia preferred a looser federal government that, while supporting the unity of the nation, gave a great deal of freedom to the individual republics within it.
  • 6.  Many things worked against the new nation. The Great War had been disastrous for people and property, and much was in ruins.  Economic depression set in across Europe making progress even more difficult.  Rival political factions often resorted to violence.  The struggle between the Serbs (fighting for unity) and the Croats (fighting for more individual autonomy) became particularly fierce, and radical elements of both sides used intimidation and assassination.  King Alexander tried to exert more control and bring stability to his nation, and in 1928 it was renamed ‘Yugoslavia’,the country of the Southern Slavs- to try to foster a better sense of cultural unity.  He was assassinated in 1934, and the violence and instability grew worse.  He was able to suppress religious and cultural rivalries among the Roman Catholics, Serbian Orthodox and Muslims during his lifetime.
  • 7.  World War II broke out in 1939, and chaos soon engulfed Yugoslavia. The nation found itself pressured from the outside by more powerful nations like Germany and Italy and by regional neighbors like Bulgaria and Romania, and soon it was torn apart from within by civil war between several different factions.  The civil war in Yugoslavia was a very complex conflict. Some fought against the Germans who occupied the country, others allied with them; some fought to bring back the new king who had fled, others fought to set up a new government; village turned on village and neighbor attacked neighbor.  Eventually the Partisans, a resistance group led by a man named Josip Broz, who called himself Tito, prevailed by helping to defeat the Germans and by establishing dominance over the many other groups fighting for control of Yugoslavia.
  • 8.  Tito established a communist government modeled on the Soviet Union. This new Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics; Serbia Croatia Slovenia Montenegro Macedonia Bosnia-Herzegovina Kosovo and Vojvodina (two autonomous regions,both located within Serbia)
  • 9.  Even though the United States was wary of Soviet influence in the new communist countries of Eastern Europe, Tito’s communist Yugoslavia received recognition and support.  In 1948, Yugoslavia made a surprising break away from the USSR, declaring that it would develop its own form of communism different from that of the Soviets and its other Eastern European neighbors.  Through the 1950’s and 1960’s Yugoslavia seemed to have found a way to be independent from foreign influence, politically unified internally, and along a path towards economic growth and prosperity.
  • 10.  But all was not as it seemed on the surface. Tito and the Communist Party were keeping the country together through strict political control over the republics, repression of reform-minded opposition and intimidation by secret police.  Economic problems were continually mismanaged.  During to 1980s, forming of the Federation Republic began to behave almost independently of the centers of economic and political spheres with authorized the Constitution of 1974.
  • 11.  Communist rule restored stability and good relations with the west ensured a steady stream of loans.  Later, however, national and ethnic tensions increased due to unequal development and a growing burden of debt. When Tito died in 1980 many expected the federation to break up but Yugoslavia was to survive for another ten years. After Tito's death, ethnic nationalism began to rise again in Yugoslavia, especially in Kosovo between ethnic Albanians and Serbs.This, coupled with economic problems in Yugoslavia. WAR between the years of 1990-2001 & INDEPENDENCE
  • 13. The causes of conflicts in these countries  Multinational Construction; Yugoslavia incorporated many ethnic groups. There was a good system to keep so many ethnic groups together. In Yugoslavia, the federal government’s peoples who enjoyed from cultural rights and also minorities were equally benefit from these rights such as Albanian people. Some Politian became head of state after the death of Yugoslavia, and this multinational structure become tainted because of their failed policies. Community of Balkans and especially the former Yugoslavia who has different ethnic combinations and has opposite and rival sects and religions so, this situation has led to development and formation of nationalism Serbs and Montenegrins who are Orthodox, they have different religious and culture from Croats and Slovenes Greek Orthodox fight on the side of the Serbs during the Bosnian War shows deep divisions between Orthodox unity, Catholics and Muslims
  • 14. Wars are not the religious wars in Yugoslavia territory however; the parties have used religious factors to fight against none of them. Religious differences are made a material of domestic politics as a part of the culture and nationality. Serbian Orthodox Church and the Orthodox peoples sympathized toward Serb and Montenegrins because of religious reasons on the other hand; Catholic and Protestant churches and communities sympathized toward Croats and Slovenes as well. Religion factor is only complementary and a secondary as part of the ethnic and cultural identity in this war.  Religious and Cultural Reasons
  • 15. There was a huge difference in terms of standard of living between federal states in Yugoslavia Slovenia and Croatia have the highest living standards then others states. The southern states of Yugoslavia believe that there is a way out of the economic crisis. This differences among the states, gave rise to debate as exploiter – exploited. Relatively rich states claimed that carry the burden of the poorer states. But, the poor states suggested that were exploited by the rich states as well. Yugoslavia traditionally unbalanced regional distribution of income than other socialist countries. And then when they passed to market economy, it has aggravated this situation. After that, in 1970s, world economic crisis has completely weakened the power of the federal governments. The results of this case, was evident the deepening of inequity in regional distribution of income. In1976, National income per capita in the richest part of Slovenia was close to 7 times of National income per capita in the poorest part of Kosovo  Economic Reasons
  • 16. The cause of the ethnic conflict in the Balkans is based on religious reasons. However, it is very difficult to make this distinction. Ethnic identity and religious factors are intertwined in Yugoslavia. Under the federation of peoples have entered into new searches after the weakening of authority, thus, strengthened the tendency to revolt against inequality and feelings of nationalism came to the forefront again. Economic and ethnic problems started to emerge after the death of Tito in the Yugoslavia. In 1981, the uprising of the Albanian communities in Kosovo was the forerunner of future events. Nationalist movement began to take shape in Serbian in the mid-1980s. In 1989, the economic and political crisis has caused the deterioration of relations between the republics and in the same year in the eastern bloc reform movements also reflected in Yugoslavia and in 1990, they passed a multi-party system  Nationalism
  • 17. In the elections of 1990, the Communists came to government in Serbia and Montenegro but nationalist parties came to management in Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia. Serbs, Croats and Bosnians formed a coalition of nationalist parties in Bosnia- Herzegovina. After strengthening the supra- nationalism, supra-identity called “Yugoslav identity” was removed and then people were forced to return to their sub-identities. This situation has caused the people in his own division  Nationalism
  • 18.  In briefly, nationalism started to use as political power in Yugoslavia. For example, Slobodan Milosevic became head of state after the death of Yugoslav President Tito and he is not nationalist but, he played the nationalist trump in Serbia  And then these nationalist policies created a tremendous impression in Slovenia and Croatia.  After that, nationalist rivalry began between the federal states.  Milosevic has used feelings of Serbs which is about the injustice of the Serbs and also it’s about genocide of Serbs in Kosovo.  As a result, while the leaders using these policies; they caused the breakdown of Yugoslavia  In this case, problems are called ethnic problems but, as we see, there is a power or economic resources of war under the ethnic mask.  Ethnic differences play a central role because; political leaders use it as a tool to mobilize the masses.
  • 19.
  • 20.  In this period, all the ethnic elements in the country began to explore new possibilities, often contradictory. After the revolutions of 1989 swept Eastern Europe, a sense of new possibility entered Yugoslav political life. All elements felt confident that they could throw off unwanted features of Communism, but the definition of what was to be lost varied from place to place.
  • 21.  In January 1990 the League of Communists (the Yugoslav Communist Party) split along ethnic lines, and ceased to be a unifying national force. In that same month, violent riots in Kosovo reached new levels, with several dozen people killed. The JNA (the Yugoslav National Army, in which the officer corps was heavily Serbian) intervened to restore order. Because this episode led to fears that the JNA would become a tool of Serbian interests, the effect was to move the other nationalities farther toward secession.
  • 22.  In the spring of 1990, Slovenes and Croats took concrete steps toward setting up new forms of political power. In April, there were free elections in the two northern provinces. In Slovenia, a Center-Right coalition won and began work on a new constitution that claimed the right to secede from the federal state. In Croatia, Franjo Tudjman's Croatian Democratic Union, a conservative nationalist party, took the largest share of seats in the April election. In Serbia, on the other hand, the results of a June 1990 referendum favored keeping a single-party state and curbing ethnic autonomy in Kosovo and Vojvodina, the very policies that were fueling Slovene and Croat efforts to distance themselves from Serbia. In the first period, the ability of the nationalities to pursue their own goals in the aftermath of the 1989 revolution led to a growing distance between the factions.
  • 23.  In this period the contradictions between competing goals moved the situation from tension to violence. In August 1990, minority Serbs in the Serb-majority Krajina district of Croatia began to agitate for autonomy. They argued that if Croatia could leave Yugoslavia, they in turn could leave Croatia. To prevent Croatian interference in a planned referendum, local Serb militias made up of trained army reservists set up roadblocks to isolate the Krajina region. In Serbia, Milosevic announced that if Yugoslavia broke apart, there would have to be border changes that would unite all ethnic Serbs in a single political entity. Serbia also cracked down on Albanian agitation.
  • 24. • Such steps alarmed Slovenes and Croats, and propelled them toward independence. The two republics organized local militia and armed their police, despite warnings from the JNA and anxiety among Croatia's Serbs, who recalled the use of local police by the Ustashe to round up Serbs in 1941. In March 1991, Serbs in Croatia proclaimed an autonomous Krajina, which was recognized by Milosevic. In clashes over control of local police stations, the first people were killed in that area. In the second period, the incompatibility between Serb and • Slovene-Croatian wishes became clear, and led to violence outside of Kosovo for the first time.
  • 25.  This was the period when true open warfare began, as the Serbs resisted the Slovene and Croatian independence movements. In May 1991, a Croatian was due to become the new Yugoslav president under the scheme of rotation, but Serbia refused to accept the change. This action set aside the last chance for a solution through constitutional means. In June, both Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence. Debates over the "legality" of such moves played out against a background in which all sides chose to ignore inconvenient parts of the old constitution.
  • 26.  To frustrate Slovene independence, the JNA seized the customs posts on the borders of Slovenia. After fighting between Slovene militia and the JNA, there was a stalemate. JNA units were blockaded in their barracks, too powerful for the Slovene forces to attack, but without access to the gasoline they needed to move. Perhaps because there were so few Serbs in Slovenia, Serbia conducted a policy toward that state that was very different from the policy adopted toward Croatia. Under a negotiated settlement, the JNA units withdrew and allowed the Slovenes to secede.
  • 27.  In Croatia the war escalated instead. Fighting began with guerilla warfare in Krajina between the new Croatian armed forces, local Serb militia, and elements of the JNA stationed there. In August 1991, Serbian regular army units began campaigns to control two strategic areas: Vukovar and Dubrovnik. At Vukovar in Eastern Slavonia, artillery fire drove Croatians out of the city, which was of strategic importance as a gateway leading from Serbia to areas of Serbian population in the western parts of Bosnia and in Krajina, and as a region that was a source of oil. Two recurring patterns in Serbian strategy can be seen here for the first time: the use of terror to drive away local populations ("ethnic cleansing"), and a Serbian reliance on heavy weapons to attack urban areas, because of a shortage of infantry. The second Serbian offensive took place on the Dalmatian coast, where Serb forces failed to take the coastal city of Dubrovnik from Croatia. Dubrovnik is important as a major source of tourist revenue, and is also the place where roads from the interior reach the Adriatic Sea.
  • 28.  During this same period, member states of the European Economic Community (led by Germany) recognized Slovene and Croat independence. The world international community became involved for the first time as well, with UN authorization for 14,000 peacekeepers and an economic embargo against the rump of Yugoslavia: Serbia and Montenegro. By the end of the third period, most of the principal organized forces in the civil war were present, including the UN, the Croats and the Serbs, while the Muslim government of Bosnia was about to make its appearance.
  • 29.  In this period the arena of open war shifted from Croatia to Bosnia, where the province split along ethnic lines. In early March 1992, a majority of Bosnians voted for independence in a plebiscite, but the voters split along ethnic lines with many Serbs opposing such a step. Immediately after the voting, Serbian local militia set up roadblocks that isolated Bosnia's major cities from surrounding, Serbian-dominated rural areas. Many Serbs left cities like Sarajevo, and a separate Bosnian Serb parliament was set up.
  • 30.  In April 1992, Bosnian Serb forces began a methodical effort to seize control of as much territory as possible, especially in the eastern part of Bosnia (which is adjacent to Serbia), as a step toward a possible union with Serbia. Backed by JNA units, self- proclaimed "Chetnik" gangs that included criminal elements used terror tactics to drive Muslim villagers out of their villages. Many of those Muslims arrived as refugees in larger cities like Zepa, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Sarajevo. Serb units seized roads and began a siege of Sarajevo, shelling the city and using snipers to kill civilians
  • 31.  This was the period in which "ethnic cleansing" became general, including the extensive use of rape and the creation of concentration camps to hold Muslim men, where many were murdered. While incidents of terror by all ethnicities have been reported in Bosnia, by all reliable accounts Serbs were the chief offenders. The persistence of these reports led to escalating commitment by the UN, culminating in pledges to use force and the enlistment of NATO forces as an instrument.  Meanwhile, Serbian goals became clear on the ground. By the end of the summer of 1992, two-thirds of Bosnia was in Serb hands: the eastern zone near Serbia proper, a thin corridor running east-to-west toward Croatia, and land on both sides of the Bosnian-Croatian border around the Krajina region of Croatia. At this time, Croatian forces also attacked and seized Muslim districts in Bosnia, leaving very little territory except some larger cities in the hands of the Bosnian Muslim government.
  • 32.  During this year, all sides in Bosnia pursued a dual strategy, balancing fighting with negotiations on the world stage to seek maximum advantage. Peace talks began in Geneva, Switzerland, based on the Anglo-American Vance-Owen plan to partition Bosnia, separate the ethnic factions, and so end the fighting. Because it pragmatically accepted the results of Serbian aggression, the Vance-Owen plan was widely criticized and was unacceptable to the Bosnian Muslim government. After assuming office in January 1993, new U.S. President Bill Clinton distanced his administration from the plan.  By this time, the Serbs (who made up less than 40 percent of the population) controlled some 70 percent of the land area of Bosnia. With some difficulty, Karadzic was able to persuade the Bosnian Serb Parliament to accept several partition plans that gave Serbs between 50 and 52 percent of the country. Pressure from rump Yugoslavia played a role: Milosevic wanted to end the crisis, to end sanctions and curb an annual inflation rate which soon reached 2 million percent.
  • 33.  The Bosnian Muslim government, on the other hand, resisted a settlement while it pursued international favor in the media, with some success, as Western reporters uniformly condemned Serbian excesses. The Bosnians also gained increased UN aid. The UN agreed to send provide food to refugees in six cities and designated them as "safe" zones not to be attacked by Serbs. Those cities were Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Zepa, Srebrenica and Gorazde. The Bosnian Muslims lobbied against an arms embargo imposed on all sides that prevented them from buying heavy weapons that could offset Serb access to JNA arsenals, although some weapons were smuggled into the country. This fifth period of stalemate was the calm before the storm: the next two periods were unexpectedly volatile, given the apparent lack of progress at this time.
  • 34.  Beginning early in 1994, the stalemate began to destabilize.In March 1994, the Croatian and Muslim Bosnian governments agreed on guidelines for a federated Bosnia. This freed both groups to face the Serbs: the Muslims in Bosnia, the Croatians in Bosnia and in Krajina, which remained in revolt against the Zagreb government. Later in the year, allied Muslim and Croat forces began small but significant joint operations against Bosnian Serb areas.  In February 1994, one of the most prominent attacks on civilians during the war enraged Western observers, when an explosion killed 68 people in Sarajevo's Markale market place. Early reports blamed a Serbian mortar attack, and the US, the European Union and NATO demanded that the Serbs remove artillery from around Sarajevo or face retaliatory air strikes. Serbian and Russian observers, however, described the explosion as a Bosnian provocation. Official UN investigators were unable to prove either allegation. The Serbs largely complied with Western demands around Sarajevo, but shelling of other "safe areas" continued and was not punished. At the same time, the episode illustrated the extent to which the Bosnian Serbs had lost the contest for world opinion.
  • 35.  France and the US quarreled: the US wanted to put more pressure on the Serbs, but France was unwilling to place at risk its peacekeepers who were on the ground. Civilian representatives of the UN vetoed some air attacks ordered by their own commanders. When some air strikes did take place in May 1994, the Serbs responded by taking UN peacekeepers hostage. In the fact of such threats, the UN then caved in completely. Generally, this sixth period discredited the UN, and the result was new initiatives both by the Serbs and by their enemies in Croatia and at NATO. Out of public view, both sides prepared to take much more active measures.
  • 36.  The summer of 1995 saw the climax of the civil war in Bosnia, as both sides explored their options now that the UN had lost any authority to control events. In July 1995, Serbian forces defied the UN and suddenly overran two of the "safe areas" in eastern Bosnia: Srebrenica and Zepa. Some of the worst "ethnic cleansing" of the war took place at this time: up to 8,000 Muslims were massacred under the direct supervision of Mladic, the Bosnian Serb commanding general.  It is likely that the ineffective record of UN and Western action during 1994 led the Bosnian Serbs to expect no Western response, but instead the opposite happened. Karadzic and Mladic were indicted as war criminals by a UN tribunal and Britain, France and the US began plans for a military reaction to future attacks on "safe areas." Peacekeepers in exposed areas were withdrawn, additional forces arrived, and the UN's civilian representatives lost the right to veto the use of force.
  • 37.  It also appears that the Western states gave Croatia the green light to take back control of Krajina. When Serb forces from Bosnia and Krajina attacked the Bihac "safe area" in extreme western Bosnia, they were counterattacked in a joint offensive by Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces and those of the Croatian government. Within a few days, the Serbs lost all of Krajina and much of western Bosnia: 130,000 Serb refugees were driven off of lands upon which their families had lived for hundreds of years. When angry Serbs shelled Sarajevo again, killing 37 people in one incident, NATO reacted with an unprecedented wave of air strikes against the Bosnian Serb infrastructure. The Muslims and Croats appear to have stopped their advance only because the West told them to do so: by then, the Croat-Muslim federation was in control of just over half of Bosnia. When Milosevic failed to intervene on their behalf, the Bosnian Serbs found themselves alone and vulnerable.
  • 38.  For the first time, all sides now simultaneously believed that no further advantage lay in store for them through more fighting, and for that reason all sides were willing to negotiate. After a hiatus of 18 months, peace talks resumed and led to a treaty signed in November 1995, which was to be enforced by 60,000 NATO troops. If this does mark the end of the war, it will have ended with some 250,000 people killed out of a prewar Bosnia population of 4.4 million, over half of whom have become refugees.  While relationships between the various ethnicities in Bosnia remain troubled, the period of open warfare, atrocities against civilians and deep international crisis has ended.