The document summarizes a report on the administrative structure of Georgia's court system. It finds the current model lacks efficiency due to lack of accountability and communication between court classes. It recommends a shared administrative services model where court classes retain independent staff while administrative services are provided centrally. However, feedback from court councils opposes changes, with Superior Court judges wanting to maintain influence over the system due to their statutory authority. More communication may improve efficiency without structural changes given opposition to overhauling the system.

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MEMORANDUM
To: Terry Chastain, General Counsel to Georgia Speaker of the House
From: Laura Beth Jackson, Legal Extern
Date: 2015 Legislative Session
Re: Administrative Office of the Courts Special Report
Administrative Office of the Courts and Court Councils
I. AOC and Court Councils
The Georgia Supreme Court established the Judicial Council to serve as the governing
body of the Georgia State Court System. The Judicial Council makes policy and its members
represent all lower classes of court.
The AOC’s general purpose is to staff the Judicial Council. The AOC’s original duties
include but are not limited to: consulting with judges and other employees of the Court;
examining business methods and fiscal information and compiling data; and submitting
recommendations for the improvement of the judicial system. O.C.G.A. § 15-5-24. It also makes
policy for the court system, identifies overlapping interests in the system, coordinates
communication and provides IT services. Due to the hierarchy of the system, the AOC’s abilities
to perform its duties are tied to the Judicial Council, and the AOC is only able to offer or
recommend services to lower judicial councils.
II. Scope of Audit
The Audit reviewed the current court system staffing model. There are six court councils:
one for each class of court including the Superior Courts and below. The Council of Superior
Court Judges (CSCJ) employs the second largest independent staff and receives no services from
AOC. [A. 32]. The Council of Juvenile Court Judges (CJCJ) employs the largest independent
staff and only receives accounts payable services from AOC. [A. 32]. The Councils of State

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Court Judges and Magistrate Court Judges both employ a staff of one individual, and both
receive accounts payable and IT services from AOC. Neither the Council of Probate Court
Judges nor the Council of Municipal Court Judges have independent staff members. Both receive
accounts payable, IT, legal question, budget support, planning and ad hoc policy services, all
from AOC. [A. 32].
III.Findings [A. 17]
The most significant problem with the current model is the lack of efficiency. The factors
that contribute to this problem are (1) lack of accountability and (2) lack of communication.
Lack of Accountability
The Judicial Council does not hold classes of court accountable for performance. [A. 36].
Very few judges track performance, which includes numbers of cases pending at a given time,
ages of current cases, etc. The National Center for State Courts, a non-profit advising entity,
provides a program called CourTools that is not utilized in Georgia. [A. 38]. Judges from all
classes of courts suggest they are skeptical of using a “one-size-fits-all” system to measure
performance, given the differences in jurisdictional characteristics. Concerning case management
and e-filing duties, only five percent of courts use the free, statewide case management system.
Most prefer to enter into contracts with private vendors, resulting in a non-uniform, confusing
system.
Lack of Communication
Because of the differences in jurisdictional characteristics as well as the differences in the
needs and priorities of classes of courts, there is not much communication concerning shared
duties. The Audit discovered overlapping authority on several matters, duplicative work among
classes, and a general lack of concern by one court class of the interests of another court class.

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This lack of concern and communication results in distrust among the entities. Two examples are
(1) a concern over Magistrate Courts representation on the Judicial Council and (2) Superior
Courts interests being ignored by AOC staff. Misbehavior resulting from this distrust causes a
lack of respect among the classes of court. For example, one current Judicial Council member
questioned whether locally funded courts were even entitled to input on state matter or have
councils supported by state funds. [A. 10]
IV.Recommendations
The Audit found a need for a systemic approach to Court administration. It determined
the three most important factors to consider in a staffing model were (1) efficiency, (2)
accountability to judges, and (3) a system perspective. The National Center for State Courts
recommends a governance structure that: consists of a single, unambiguous governing authority
(not common for divided court classes) or multiple governing authorities with clearly delineated
responsibilities; must allow for meaningful input from all court levels and system stakeholders;
and requires governing bodies, staffs, and judges with a shared commitment to system mission,
which includes a common organizational vision, mutual respect, and open communication. Out
of the three potential models offered by the Audit, only the Shared Administrative Services
model would work in considering the needs of all of the court classes. [A. 17]. This model would
continue to allow court classes with independent staff to retain their staff, while sharing purely
administrative services provided by AOC. This ensures that individual court classes’ interests are
considered, while efficiently providing administrative services from one body.

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V. Feedback from Court Councils
Council of Superior Court Judges
CSCJ is opposed to a centralized model. They are happy with current model because they
have the most influence on the Judicial Council. For example: Budgets within Judicial Council’s
appropriation include state, magistrate, probate, and municipal, and are voted on by full
membership. Superior and Juvenile Court councils do not have to present their budget because
they have their own appropriation. They claim that county-paid judges do not need more
influence on the Council, and question whether county-paid judges are even entitled to
representation at the state level. Their response to the staffing model recommendations is
negative: they want an independent staff like those of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court. They also think that transferring duties to AOC staff, which are not under supervision of a
judge, would result in even lower accountability. CSCJ is unhappy that there was an audit, at all:
“The unfortunate result of this audit is ultimately to create the dynamic it claims to wish to
thwart.” [A. 23].
Council of Juvenile Court Judges
CJCJ does not support any change in the system.
Council of Magistrate Court Judges
CMCJ was not happy with comment about locally funded courts. “Locally funded courts
are the busiest courts in Georgia… and have the largest impact on citizens’ lives.” [A. 12]. This
indicates a distrust or lack of respect specifically between CMCJ and the CSCJ. In response to
the staffing model options, CMCJ also answered in the negative. They do not support giving the
AOC more authority, and claim that the proposed “cost savings” would actually be cost shifting
to AOC. CMCJ wants to keep its Executive Director and manage its own staff.

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Council of Municipal Court Judges
“Our Council and its judges determine our initiatives and will continue to do so under
any administrative model.” [A. 21]
Council of Probate Court Judges
“Does not support an effort to incorporate trial court councils as committees of the
Judicial Council.” [A. 12]. The response to the staffing models was not negative or positive.
CPCJ wants its own executive director and staff member.
Council of State Court Judges
They are happy with the current governance structure. They also “need” their Executive Director
and claim that giving AOC more responsibility would not result in cost savings.
Council of Superior Court Clerks
“If you want a unified court technology system, you need to make the superior court clerk
the clerk of all classes of court.” [A.13]. Judges have previously opposed legislation that would
achieve this.
VI.Conclusion
“Superior courts have jurisdiction ‘to exercise a general supervision over all inferior
tribunals.’” O.C.G.A. 15-6-8(4). This indicates that Superior Court judges have statutory
authority to assert more influence over the Judicial Council than other court classes. If an
overhaul of the system were to happen, resulting in AOC having more authority, there may have
to be legislation passed first. As it stands, the CSCJ has the most influence, and that hierarchy is
protected by law. More communication may improve the current system without having to make
structural changes.