Thesis_MSc

Wageningen University- Department of Social Sciences
MSc. Thesis Rural Development Sociology
The relation between social networks and the
recovery process of households with
differential vulnerability:
A case study on the Peruvian earthquake 2007
July 2009 Kirsten de Vette
MSc. Management of Agro-ecological 841106887010
knowledge and social change (MAK) Supervisors:
Specialization: Dr. ir. G.M Verschoor
Rural Development Sociology Dr. ir. G. van der Haar
RDS-80430

Relation between social
networks and recovery
I
Acknowledgements
Before presenting my master thesis, I would first like to give special thanks to some people that made
the fieldwork and thesis possible.
First of all I would like to start with thanking the employees of the International Technology and
Development Group (ITDG) in Peru, as for without them I would have probably not been able to do
the numerous of interviews with the affected people.
To start with Alcides Vilela, the director of the ITDG office in Chincha, for the enthusiastic response
on my request for assistance in the fieldwork in the area and who openheartedly invited me to come
and created the initial stable connection in the area.
To Juan Bilbao, who made me feel comfortable from the very beginning and advising me about the
do’s and don’ts in the area.
To Jorge Mariscal who opened so many doors by introducing me to the wonderful people in the field.
He was always there when I needed someone to talk to or discuss issues.
To my dear female colleagues Nelida and Helga were so supportive and always took the time to listen
to my stories.
To Jorge Olivera for the many discussions that made me understand the situation of the recovery
faster.
To José, the driver, who was very attentive through coming to fetch me from UPIS-El Carmen many
times.
And of course to the other employees, who all very welcoming, very kind, open minded and
supportive when it came to establishing the data was suitable for the research.
Secondly, I want to express my sincere appreciation to the four households who opened up to me,
trusted me and were so hospitable and inviting. In this research I used pseudonyms in order to protect
the privacy of the households spoken to.
Household Zuniga who integrated me in their life as being a part of their household and by doing this
the most detailed descriptions of their relations with their social networks and the process of recovery
came about.
Household Manisco, who opened their house to me, who were so hospitable and invited me for lunch
several times. They all took the patience to explain to me their process of recovery. The trust and
confidence they had in me was truly appreciated.
Household Luterio seemed at first seemed more distant, but after a while they truly trusted me. I was
also truly touched by the invite to the commemoration.

II
The household Abada, who were able within their busy schedule to plan time for me and who were not
only elaborative about their recovery process, but who explained to me the rules and regulations as
much as they could.
The four households made the experience a wonderful one that will always be remembered.
Thirdly I want to thank both my parents for making it possible for me to study and who always
supported me in my dreams. With special thanks to my mother and sister, who in this process of
writing a thesis who allowed me to feel frustrated, but helped me tone down and get my feet back on
the ground. Especially I want to express my gratitude to the editing that was done by Maaike.
Fourthly, I want to give my special thanks to my boyfriend, Joost, who helped me through the
struggles of the writing process. He took the time to listen, discuss and he assisted me with editing.
Especially his patience with me and love for me is extraordinary.
I want to express my gratitude to all my friends, for the many laughs and wonderful moments, as
without them I would not have been able to finish the thesis.
Maja thank you for going through this process with me. Writing the theses simultaneously made us
share many coffees, library moments and moments of laughter.
To the MAKS-22 group I must say that I feel blessed to have met all of you. The wonderful, but also
challenging moments have taught me a lot over the last two years.
Last, but certainly not least I want to give my sincere thanks to my supervisors Gerard Verschoor and
Gemma van der Haar. Thank you for the support and for triggering me to unfold this process of
writing. I appreciate the many hours that you have spent to provide me with the detailed feedback of
which I learned so much. I truly feel that I have developed my skills and was able to finish the thesis,
because of that.
Kirsten de Vette Rotterdam, July 2009.

III
Table of contents
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ I
Table of contents ..................................................................................................................III
List of figures and pictures ....................................................................................................V
List of acronyms.................................................................................................................. VI
Translations......................................................................................................................... VI
Executive summary ............................................................................................................VII
1. Waves flowing underneath the ground of coastal Peru ....................................................1
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................1
1.2 The earthquake........................................................................................................2
1.3 The research location ..............................................................................................4
1.3.1 The population ................................................................................................4
1.3.2 Livelihood.......................................................................................................5
1.3.3 Broader economic influences...........................................................................6
1.4 Emergency response................................................................................................7
1.4.1 Emergency response........................................................................................7
1.4.2 Initial steps towards recovery focused on the private homes ..........................12
1.5 Problem statement.................................................................................................14
1.6 Thesis outline........................................................................................................15
2. Social networks in disaster recovery .............................................................................17
2.1 Disaster paradigms................................................................................................17
2.2 Previous research on the role of social networks in recovery .................................18
2.3 Towards an actor oriented perspective...................................................................20
2.3.1 Disaster recovery: an actor oriented perspective ............................................20
2.3.2 Social networks in disaster recovery: an actor oriented perspective................21
2.4 Conceptual model .................................................................................................22
2.4.1 The recovery process.....................................................................................22
2.4.2 Social networks in recovery...........................................................................23
2.4.3 Differential vulnerability ...............................................................................24
2.4.4 The complex view on recovery......................................................................24
2.6 Objective and Research questions .........................................................................25
2.7 Methodology.........................................................................................................26
2.7.1 Research strategy...........................................................................................26
2.7.2 Data collection techniques and sources..........................................................27
2.7.3 Data analysis .................................................................................................30
3. Household Zuniga: Building up social networks ...........................................................31
3.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................31
3.2 Large household and few existing networks ..........................................................31
3.3 The earthquake: Loss of house, property and loss of livelihood .............................37
3.4 Weak existing social networks causes household to build new relations ................39
3.5 Vulnerability and building new relations to recover...............................................49
4. Household Manisco: Siblings and new relations............................................................51
4.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................51
4.2 Household and existing relations in and outside of UPIS-El Carmen .....................51
4.3 The earthquake: Scared without a house and the loss of one income......................56
4.4 Support from siblings and new relation .................................................................57
4.5 The mobilization of capable relations through social activity and effort.................66

IV
5. Household Abada: Social networks are willing and able to support...............................68
5.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................68
5.2 Married couple without children............................................................................69
5.3 The earthquake: Limited impact............................................................................73
5.4 The successful mobilization of the social networks................................................74
5.5 Social position and access to capable social relations ............................................81
6. Household Luterio: New relations essential in the recovery...........................................83
6.1 Introduction ..........................................................................................................83
6.2 Household with social networks in El Carmen.......................................................83
6.3 The earthquake: Loss of both job and livelihood ...................................................86
6.4 Few “capable” social relations and mobilizing a new relation................................88
6.5 Social position, mutuality and establishing relations..............................................95
7. Conclusion....................................................................................................................97
References..........................................................................................................................102

V
List of figures and pictures
Figure1: Map of research location……………………………………………………………..4
Figure 2: Genealogy household Zuniga………………………………………………………..35
Figure 3: Genealogy household Manisco……………………………………………………....54
Figure 4: Genealogy household Abada………………………………………………………...71
Figure 5: Genealogy household Luterio………………………………………………………..85
Picture 1: Street in Chincha……………………………………………………………………..2
Picture 2: A destroyed houses in UPIS-El Carmen……………………………………………..3
Picture 3: Ruptured roads on the way to Chincha ……………………………………………...9
Picture 4: The emergency shelter of ITDG…………………………………………………….11
Picture 5: The borrowed property of household Zuniga……………………………………….42
Picture 6: The bathroom of household Zuniga………………………………………………....42
Picture 7: The new property of household Zuniga……………………………………………..48
Picture 8: The day care facility of household Manisco………………………………………...63
Picture 9: The kitchen of household Manisco………………………………………………….64
Picture 10: Lisa and Cidez Abada……………………………………………………………...69
Picture 11: Reconstructed house of household Abada…………………………………………80
Picture 12: The back part of the house of household Luterio………………………………….93
Picture 13: The new furniture of household Luterio…………………………………………...94

VI
List of acronyms
FORSUR
Fondo de Reconstruccion del
Sur
Fund for Reconstruction of the
South
INDECI Instituto Nacional de Defensa
Civil
National Civil Defence
ITDG Solucionas Practicas International Technology
Development Group
CMPAD Comision Multi Sectorial de
Prevencion y Atencion de
Desastres
Multi-Sectoral Disaster
Prevention and Response
Committee
OCHA Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs
PCM Presidencia del Consejo de
Ministros
President’s Council of Ministers
SINADECI Sistema Nacional de Defensa
Civil
National Civil Defence System
UNDAC United Nations Disaster
Assessment and Coordination
UPIS Urbanización Popular Interés
Social
Popular social housing
development area
Translations
Albañil independent constructor
bono por los damnificados government voucher
Camioneta truck
camote sweet potato
chacra agricultural field
certificado de posesión landholding certificate
comerciante vendor
Comunal community centre
compadre the godparent (seen from the parents view)
Lucuma Peruvian fruit
maestros teachers (in this case for reconstruction)
manzana Block
negocio small shop/business
pasar la voz word to mouth (telling someone)
superiór college, studying after highschool
título legal ownership’s title

VII
Executive summary
This research aims to contribute to the debate on the role of social networks in the disaster
recovery by adding knowledge. It describes the recovery process of four households with differential
vulnerability. The case study takes an actor-oriented perspective by viewing the households as actors
having agency that go into a complex process in which they interact, negotiate and struggle with
multiple other actors in order to integrate the knowledge and resources through which disaster
recovery unfolds. The research distinguishes itself not only by looking at the longer-term recovery, but
also by providing a nuanced view of the mobilization of social networks in recovery. This nuanced
description required the research to be of qualitative nature, for which I used informal interviews,
genealogies, life histories, observations and some semi-structured interviews with organizations.
The major findings of the case study indicated that the complex process of recovery is greatly
influenced by the vulnerability of a household, which may be influenced by the employment status,
the size of the household, the social position and the physical structure of the houses they lived in.
This vulnerability affected to what extent a household suffered damage and thus also influenced the
need for mobilizing social relations. Additionally, the position of a household, influenced by
vulnerability, may determine the number of capable relations to turn to.
The first case described here, represented the most vulnerable household. The pre-disaster
vulnerability was identified by an insecure income, high expenses due to the size of the household (9),
the weakness of the structure of their rental house and the fact that they were relatively new in the
settlement. This vulnerability caused them, in face of the earthquake, to loose their house and rights to
property. It also distorted their income generation. Besides this, their migration history and their lack
of social activity had resulted in small and limited existing social networks that they could mobilize.
As for the small networks, they supported during the emergency phase, but the relative vulnerability of
these siblings resulted in immobilization in the recovery. Another relation mobilized resulted in a
refusal of their request for help. Because of this, they had to mobilize dormant relations to get access
to temporary property and become recommended to agroup to apply for a loan. The lack of access to
certain resources, such as water and electricity, made them establish relations with the neighbours,
who based on trust and compassion provided them with the resources. Another relation that turned out
to be significant to their recovery process was their daughter’s connection with employees of the
present NGO, ITDG. These employees felt the obligation and need to provide the household with
furniture and some material to enhance their temporary living situation.
In the pre-disaster situation, the second household had one stable income and another small
wage that covered the expenses of this household (4). The physical structure of the house, especially,
had made them vulnerable to the impact of the earthquake. The loss of the house, belongings and one
of the incomes had created the necessity to mobilize their social networks. Their well maintained
social activities and relatively long presence in the settlement, in comparison to the Zuniga household,

VIII
had created more social relations to turn to. However, most of these relations were also affected by the
earthquake which had affected their ability to be mobilized. It was therefore that four siblings living
outside the earthquake affected area were the most relevant relation to enhance their recovery. As
siblings with the access to financial resources, they probably felt obligated to help them. Due to this
household’s ability to mobilize more social relations, such as neighbours and friends, mutual
cooperation and provision of small favours occurred more easily. Furthermore the household’s ties to
an NGO had provided them with additional opportunities and connections. These were only possible,
because of the skills of the mother of the household and the effort that she had put into assisting the
NGO.
The household (2) with lowest vulnerability of the four had miraculously suffered the least
damage. Their low sized household allowed for a double income and fewer expenses. Furthermore, the
fact that they belonged to a family with a relatively higher standard of living, which was also not
affected by the earthquake, influenced their vulnerability positively. Their social activity and position
within social relations created the ability to mobilize their existing social networks in order to access
expertise, mobilize labour and access financial resources and materials. Through this it was
unnecessary to mobilize or activate new relations to enhance their recovery process.
The fourth household (4) had been vulnerable due to underemployment and this was worsened
when the temporary job was distorted due to the earthquake. It clearly showed their necessity to
mobilize relations with the ability to provide support, but the earthquake affected most of their existing
social networks. Especially relatives were incapable due to vulnerability and therefore not mobilized.
In fact, within their families, this household was thought to be doing the best out of all, causing first-
degree relatives to request them for help. The fact that they had known their neighbours for eight years
had led them to have some sort of mutual cooperation, but these friendships could not lead to
improved access to resources and opportunities, which they needed. With this knowledge the
establishment of a new relation with employees of an NGO could be explained. Build on the
household’s cooking skills and construction skills, this relation based job opportunities.
While it became clear that households differ with regard to the access that they have to
resources, knowledge, expertise and skills, all households mobilized relations. It was clear that only
capable relations were mobilized, which allowed some to mobilize their existing relations while others
had to access dormant or new relations. When a household was considered to be doing relatively well,
the possibility of being mobilized increased. It illustrates the mutuality of social relations. The ability
to mobilize relations was dependent on factors such as migration, job, knowledge, social activity level
and the vulnerability of social networks. The support that could be derived was not only depended on
the capability of the provider, but also on whether it could be build upon the capacities, such as skills,
experience, and resources of the household. To conclude, the knowledge generated provides a better
understanding of the households’ agency which might be relevant to NGOs or other organizations.
Further I recommend that mutuality and the relations with NGOs could be further examined.

1
1. Waves flowing underneath the ground of coastal Peru
1.1 Introduction
“Like there were waves flowing below the ground taking
down the house that took eight years to build.” 1
The earthquake of August 2007 unfolded in a true disaster for many Peruvian households on the
southern coast of Peru. The affected households suffered severe damage to their houses and assets
while some were additionally affected through a disrupted livelihood. In Urbanización Popular
Interés Social (UPIS) El Carmen, the research location, ninety percent of the houses collapsed (ITDG,
2008). Taking into account that the personal experience above forms a typical illustration for a lot of
households in the settlements, it indicates to some extent the difficulty to recover.
Even though reconstruction programs were established by international organizations and the
Peruvian government, households still had a long path to recovery. Upon my arrival, November 2008,
households that had been excluded from reconstruction aid were still residing in emergency tents,
without the prospect of external aid by national/international organizations or the church. Other
households were living in emergency houses waiting for the government reconstruction aid to arrive.
Even the households that had participated in reconstruction programs were still in the middle of the
process of recovery. This illustrates that recovery is a long and complex process in which affected
people can be greatly dependent on their capacities and the support of their social networks.
This research delves into the nature of the recovery process of the households to describe the
complex process in which the affected households interact with their environment and the actors
within their surroundings. Frerks et al. (1999) argue that affected people naturally make use of
familiar practices and social networks. They return to practices that they know and build on their
capacities, while turning to members of their social networks. I therefore argue for the importance of
investigating these social networks that may be mobilized.
It is not expected that being a member of social networks necessarily means that relations are
based on mutual cooperation or support. Neither is support or cooperation measurable in advance. This
research therefore tries to provide a nuanced view on the relation of social networks and the recovery
process of affected households. It acknowledges that different factors of vulnerability may affect this
relation, through its effect on recovery only and the effect it may have on the social networks and or
the ability to mobilize social relations. Through the description of how the social networks are
1
Translated from first informal conversations in UPIS-El Carmen.

2
mobilized and how they influence the recovery process I intend to generate knowledge to contribute to
the debate on the relation between the social networks and the recovery process.
This chapter presents the background of the research topic and describes the earthquake and
its consequences on the research location UPIS-El Carmen. The research location, its population and
its socio-economic situation provides an understanding of the difficulties that are faced by the affected
households. After that, a description of the external response and its effect on the situation follows,
which leads to the problem statement of this research.
1.2 The earthquake
On the 15th
of August 2007 at 18.41pm inhabitants of coastal Peru were taken by surprise by
an earthquake with a magnitude 8 on Richter scale. The earthquake resulted from subduction between
the Nazca and South American continental plate. The seismic shock created by this subduction lasted
for three minutes. The epicentre was 145 kilometres south east of Lima, 45 km north-west of Chincha
Alta and 110km of Ica, the capital of Ica department (NEIC, 2008). Although tsunami warnings were
given to Peru, Chile, Ecuador and Colombia, these were false alarms.
Picture 1: Street in Chincha

3
At least 519 people were killed (all but one in the Ica department), 1500 injured, about 45000
houses collapsed and 35000 houses were damaged (SINADECI, 2009). The earthquake’s reach
extended well beyond the Ica department, but this department suffered the most. The Ica department is
situated on the coast south of Lima and covers about 2132783 square kilometres (Regional
Government Ica, 2009). The department is politically divided into five provinces which are composed
of forty three districts. The province Chincha suffered most destruction in infrastructure and houses.
Chincha is composed of eleven districts each with an own municipality that serves numerous
villages and settlements. The research focused on UPIS-El Carmen which is a settlement of El
Carmen, the centre village of the district El Carmen.
These settlements were established on the basis of the social policy of the government to
create housing area. It was the response to the increasing population in the end of the 20th
century
which had created a shortage in houses. The shortage became such a major issue that government
action was required. The government initiated the establishment of the settlements similar to as they
had done in other areas of the country. UPIS-El Carmen was established in 2000 on what used to be an
agricultural field. This field was divided in manzanas (blocks) which was again divided into fifteen to
twenty properties. The properties were distributed among the people that could prove they were in
need of property and a selection was made based upon their necessity of an own property. All
households in every manzana organized to start the construction of the houses. One constructor
company was responsible for the settlement’s construction and the same materials were used for all
houses. The government’s responsibility was to establish electricity and water connections in the
settlement.
Picture 2: A destroyed houses in UPIS-El Carmen

4
The earthquake resulted in an almost complete destruction of this settlement as ninety percent,
a hundred and eighty out of the two hundred houses, became unsuitable for living through either
severe damage or complete collapse (ITDG, 2008). The settlements construction appeared to have
caused this huge percentage, as the foundation was only fifty centimetres into the ground, while
massive walls of adobe material attracted more seismic shaking than a thinner wall would.
Surprisingly no human lives were lost in this settlement during the earthquake, but people
were forced to live on the streets without communication possibilities and without electricity. Water
was scarce as most taps were covered with debris. The communication lines were repaired in four days
and it took a week for electricity to be reconnected.
1.3 The research location
Figure1: UPIS-El Carmen in the district El Carmen (wikipedia 2009)
1.3.1 The population
UPIS-El Carmen houses a combination of people from different villages in the district El
Carmen as well as migrants from other parts of the country. While the settlement is composed of
mestizos and mixed ethnicities the majority of the population is Afro-Peruvian. The district is truly
known for this Afro-Peruvian culture and its many traditional dances. The African slave trade during
the 16th
century had significantly increased the number of African descendants in the area. This
resulted after Francisco Pizarro and his men had killed a significant number of Inca people during the
conquest in 1533 (Wikipedia, 2009). It resulted in a shortage of labour domestically and in the farming

5
industry, which increased the demand for slavery. The African descendants became the most exploited
and marginalized ethnic group in the country.
Most of the residents in the settlement are Christian, which was brought by the Spanish, but
the African descendants brought in special celebrations, dances and other traditional customs. These
customs and traditions are very distinct from the rest of Peru. This is especially seen with the
worshipping of the virgin El Carmen is a typical tradition that dates back from the colonial times and
is greatly influenced by the African culture. It is taught to all residents when they are very young that
the virgin of El Carmen is holy and it is truly believed that if you worship her good will come to you.
With every celebration, festival or event an image of the virgin is present. Throughout the year,
residents from 3 up to 30 years spent many hours practicing traditional dances to honour the Virgin El
Carmen. At the end of the year on the 27th
of December they perform the dances “negritos and las
pallitas.” It is believed that this will bring the Virgin in the good spirit.
This illustrates the big role that the religion plays in UPIS-El Carmen which was also seen at
the moment of the earthquake. The residents, even though in complete shock of what had happened
came to the parish to see if the Virgin El Carmen image and the church had not been affected. The
church had been partly destroyed, but the virgin was spared.
1.3.2 Livelihood
The livelihood of the population in the area depends on agriculture, fishing and manufacturing
products. Cotton is the traditional product of the area, but extensive competition resulted in low prices
and thus low profit. The middle and large farms, that were able to invest, have changed to non-
traditional products such as grapes, avocados, asparagus, lucuma (typical Peruvian fruit), oranges,
apples and camote (sweet potato). Most of these products are exported which explains the importance
of the processing industry. The fishing industry in the province relies mostly on anchovy, sardine, tuna
and sea bass. Also this industry mainly focuses on export, where canned fish and fish meals for
poultry belong to the main export products of Peru (FAO on Peru, 2009). Roughly sixty percent2
of the
men in UPIS-El Carmen work for the corporation Fruticola, locally known as Fruchincha. It is the
largest factory in the area, that focuses mostly on export of asparagus, avocados, grapes and has a
separate factory based on canned fish. The work is mostly temporary or seasonal, but some work full
time.
The different harvest times and different labour intensity per product determine the demand of
labour in the factory, which causes the demand for employees to fluctuate. Underemployment is a
consequence, which means that the people that work can not work full time. For the people working
on the agricultural field the same situation applies and employees often work on temporary basis.
2
Mentioned by Cidez Abada and the ITDG

6
In the meanwhile the supply of labour exceeds the demand, creating advantages for employers
in the fruit and vegetable industry, whether farm owners or factory directors. The wages of employees
can be kept to a minimum. Even though the legally recognized minimum wage is 500 soles per month,
normal wages on the field and in the factories are 12-20 soles (3-5euro) a day and even by working
fulltime this minimum is not obtained. The external control on the provision of minimum wage seems
to be absent and employees do not tend to complain in fear of their replacement. Another advantage
that employers enjoy is the high criteria they have for jobs. As the work is physically hard, both on the
field and in the factories, the preference of employers goes out to people under 25 years of age.
Furthermore men are preferred over women. This results in an increase of unemployment in the age
groups above 25, especially with regard to women. It can explain why many women in UPIS-El
Carmen work in and around the house and a lot of households have tried to set up a small store. In
UPIS-El Carmen there are about thirty small shops, selling mostly food and drinks, but some have
extended their products to beauty products and or clothes. This business has become very competitive
and most shops earn small profits only. The competitiveness of the shops has also created some
pressure on the owners of these small shops, which was seen by the possibility to buy on credit. As the
possibility to buy on credit is sometimes requested in times of hardship this can create difficulties for
the owner. Denying the credit, however, may mean the loss of customers.
The consequence of all these issues concerning employment and income is that a lot of the
households in UPIS-El Carmen are unable to satisfy their basic needs, which can be defined as poverty
(World Bank, 2009). Whereas specific statistics lack on Chincha, the Ica department has 41,7 % of the
population living with an average income of less than one dollar a day (World Factbook, 2008).
1.3.3 Broader economic influences
This area-specific economic situation is influenced by the history of the nation’s economy.
Namely the Peruvian economy is, in 2009, still recovering from the collapse of the economy in
President Garcia’s previous term. Garcia’s administration implemented the policy of “Economic
Heterodoxy” which meant an expansion of public expenditure and limitation of external debt
payments. This resulted in hyperinflation of 7650 % and therefore reduced the per capita consumption
to levels of before 1960 (Parodi and Trece, 2000). While the nation had not been a wealthy one before,
this situation increased poverty. When Alberto Fujimori was elected in 1990 he ended price controls,
protectionism, restrictions on foreign direct investment and most state ownership of companies. The
foreign investment in the nation caused economic growth and a drop in inflation. But the cold spell of
El Niño weather phenomenon created a stagnation in the economy’s growth from 1998 to 2001, due to
crop failure. The effects remained to be seen during president Toledo’s term (2001-2006). Toledo’s
party implemented a program to attract investment and restart privatization, but the economy did not

7
yet react as Toledo had anticipated. When Garcia took office in 2006 he put in to work an effort to
create macro economic stability by a fiscal program that targets the deficits. The economy started to
grow and reached a growth of 9 % during 2007 (World Factbook, 2009). However, the rising oil and
commodity prices caused an inflation of 5,5 % at the beginning of 2007 (World Factbook, 2008). Also
efforts to boost construction and create jobs, by investing three million dollar in an employment
stimulus package and drawing investors, have not yet had result on the underemployment. The effect
that this macro-economic effort is supposed to have is not achieved in the province of Chincha. While
the inflation is illustrated by the increasing and unstable prices of consumer goods, the wages have not
yet increased. The economic prosperity of the country is not felt by the poor in society since the major
issues of un- and underemployment combined with the minimal wages remain unaltered.
1.4 Emergency response
The previous part has shown the effects of the earthquake and introduced the research location with its
socio-economic circumstances. The remaining of this chapter starts with providing a review the
emergency response and its relation to the way society reacted in the situation of the earthquake. It
provides an overview of the new actors that arrived in the area after the earthquake. This is followed
by discussing the external aid for reconstruction which may have affected the way that people
mobilize their social networks.
1.4.1 Emergency response
In UPIS-El Carmen the above described vulnerability, in the form of underemployment and
the fragile construction of the houses, made the earthquake turn into a disaster where the affected
people were in need of emergency relief. The affected people came together, on the plaza and the
agricultural fields. All traumatized by what had just happened, the people spoke of what happened and
what they had lost. Most tried to find relatives, friends and the people with whom they closely related
and were occupied with seeking ways in which they could provide themselves with food, water and a
shelter. It illustrates clear collaboration within the social networks. In the first few days relatives from
outside the affected area came by to check upon their family members sometimes bringing some basic
necessities in the form of food and clothes. As it took the external aid a week to arrive in UPIS-El
Carmen, these basic necessities provided by relatives were crucial to the survival, making the social
networks in the emergency phase essential.
When the earthquake struck the Peruvian government had a disaster response plan in place,
because the country is prone to different kinds of natural disasters, such as floods, earthquakes and
landslides. This National Civil Defence System (SINADECI) seeks to manage issues related to

8
disasters, but the structure of this system is complex and very hierarchical. It is led by the President’s
Council of Ministers (PCM) under which the Multi-Sectoral Disaster Prevention and Response
Commission (CMPAD) functions. The CMPAD coordinates evaluates, prioritises and supervises
assistance and support (Savage and Harvey, 2007). These tasks are carried out by the National Civil
Defence (INDECI) who creates the rules, policies and strategies. Subsequently the INDECI provides
the immediate assistance by channelling and organising national and international emergency relief
(Savage and Harvey, 2007). This is done through the Civil defence Committee which is supposed to
be established by the mayor of each municipality. The committee should include governors, police,
armed forces, churches, companies and NGOs. The procedure is that the response starts through this
committee. Whenever the disaster exceeds the capacity of the district to handle it, the responsibility is
given to a level higher in hierarchy, which means it goes from district to provincial to regional to
national.
After this earthquake the INDECI started off with the rescue phase after which they led the
emergency relief. The international aid was supposed to go through their system, but inefficiency of
the system led to problems. The responsibility of responding lay at the Civil Defence Committees,
which were assumed to be in place. Many districts, such as the El Carmen district, had not yet
established a Civil Defence Committee. A second issue was that the shortage made it impossible to
create one now. This was mainly because the personnel that worked in the municipality had also been
busy with the damage and losses suffered in their families. The enormous chaos, the shortage in
personnel and the late arrival of aid proves that the emergency clearly exceeded the capacity locally.
The tasks had to be taken over by the Provincial Civil Defence who was in no better position to handle
this kind of disaster (Savage and Harvey, 2007). Via the Regional Civil Defence the responsibility was
shifted to the INDECI itself. This process took time as none of these levels acknowledged their
incapacity to respond and this hierarchical structure further delayed the actual response.
Besides that, President Garcia had instead of building on the existing system, created a parallel
system called Fund for Reconstruction of the South (FORSUR). This was a structure of all regional
and provincial presidents and mayors of the districts. The tasks had remained unclear and through the
duplication of these systems certain tasks were not carried out by anybody, because the responsibility
of tasks was unclear. These two systems created chaos and a lack of coordination which greatly
hindered emergency relief after this earthquake.
The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) came in to improve the
organization together with the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC). The
UNDAC was employed to carry out rapid assessment and support the local officials in the INDECI in
coordinating international relief efforts. Not only did OCHA improve the coordination of multiple
incoming organizations, but especially they tried to coordinate the flows of aid. These international
efforts were mostly concentrated in Pisco, the town that had suffered the most losses of lives. With the

9
OCHA and UNDAC located in Pisco, the response there had been relatively well organized. Also the
accessibility via port and airport in Pisco had enabled the aid to arrive.
The areas beyond, however, were not very well reached as the roads and bridges towards the
areas had been damaged during the earthquake. The response for the province Chincha had thus been
slow. The government sent numerous of teams to repair parts of roads and bridges so as to improve the
accessibility to the areas and allow for response.
Picture 3: Ruptured roads on the way to Chincha five days after the earthquake (source: ITDG 2007)
The first local NGO, International Technology Development Group (ITDG), arrived after five
days in UPIS-El Carmen, but some more distant villages had waited up to thirteen days for the first aid
to arrive. The INDECI had at the same time arrived, providing some tents for people to sleep in on the
plaza of UPIS-El Carmen, while other people had created small tents with blankets and wooden sticks.
In the meanwhile, the local factory Fruchincha, where numerous men work, started emergency relief
by providing El Carmen and UPIS-El Carmen with food aid, during breakfast and lunch. Prepared
food was distributed on the plaza of El Carmen and plaza of UPIS-El Carmen to all families and every
household was able to benefit from the aid that lasted for two and a half months in total.

10
Further aid distribution in El Carmen and its settlement had been chaotic. Individuals, private
companies, and some NGOs simultaneously tried to provide help, but the problem in general was
duplication of efforts as different parties assessed different needs. The lack of cooperation between
them led to uncoordinated action. The local priest mentioned that he had tried to convince the people
to divide themselves into groups in order to easily and equally distribute among groups. The main
square of El Carmen, however, became the drop off point and people were afraid of missing out which
resulted in abolishment of this idea of groups. The emergency relief, simultaneously, became
unequally distributed, with the ones living near the plaza receiving the aid always and often a lot of it
while for the people living further away, less was left. As the settlement of this centre village, UPIS-El
Carmen, was five minutes walking from this drop-off point, the households in the settlement received
less aid.
Another effort that the priest wanted to introduce, to eliminate the unequal distribution, was to
separate tasks between the municipality and the parish. The priest would then take the responsibility
for distributing the incoming food aid, water and medicines, while the municipality would take care of
distributing the clothes and other materials. It appeared that the municipality did not have the capacity
to take on board such a task. The aid brought in by the church arrived in the end of August 2007 and it
was the task of the priest to equally distribute the incoming aid amongst all villages in the El Carmen
district, since it is the only church in the district. This was managed from the parish in El Carmen the
centre of El Carmen district, where all incoming aid was stored and the church started to function as an
external aid distributor. The people of El Carmen became agonized by the fact that they saw numerous
of station wagons and trucks coming with aid while, in their eyes, relatively little aid was distributed
in their village. The faith in the priest dropped among a lot of the people in the centre village and
UPIS-El Carmen, while comparing to most villages in the district they were best supplied with other
external aid. The citizens accused the priest of corruption, because he was supplying the more distant
and less fortunate villages in the district3
. The priest, Lorenzo Bergantin, became very disappointed, as
El Carmen and UPIS-El Carmen were receiving relatively a lot of other external aid. The priest
recalled mentioning to the citizens of El Carmen and UPIS-El Carmen “With your hands full you still
ask for more. But I am trying to distribute aid to all villages, even the ones that need it more than you
do.” In the meanwhile each household in El Carmen and UPIS-El Carmen had received three bags
with basic necessities, each roughly a month apart from one another.
After three weeks the INDECI had created funds to coordinate a clean up of solid waste and
debris in UPIS-El Carmen by the citizens themselves. Through the municipality, the INDECI had
created an incentive of 90 soles (22,5 euro) per week for all residents that helped with the clean up.
This clean up started after the first week of September and lasted until the end of September 2007.
3
Padre Lorenzo

11
Simultaneously some of the citizens of UPIS-El Carmen organized themselves in groups to try and
remove the debris from their properties.
The emergency shelters provided by ITDG could afterwards be built by the affected people
themselves on part of the property or next to the property. Within two months after the earthquake all
residents of the hundred and eighty houses that had been destroyed were supplied with an emergency
shelter. The emergency shelter had been financed via an aid organization in Spain and consisted of
wooden poles with thick cotton fabric wrapped around it, also covering the roof. Sometimes plastic
was used to make the roof waterproof.
Picture 4: The emergency shelter of ITDG
During this emergency relief the government had been accused of corruption. Especially
through the system of the INDECI, aid, such as food clothes blankets and medicine, disappeared. It
was found that people in power positions took aid home, distributed it amongst their family and used it
for other purposes. This was proven due to numerous of confiscations in homes of mayors, INDECI
coordinators and other government officials.
To summarize the many different ways to respond by the actors involved, such as multiple
NGOs, the municipality, the companies and the church, created difficulties in the actual distribution of
aid. Chaotic, uncoordinated action and most of all unequal distribution was the result.

12
1.4.2 Initial steps towards recovery focused on the private homes
The affected households living in the emergency shelters had to initiate the recovery. The
recovery phase is distinguished from the emergency phase in that it is on the longer term, not with
mere survival in mind, but it concerns the reconstruction, repairing and replacing belongings and
rebuilding the livelihood. To initiate reconstruction it was necessary to have título (legal ownership’s
title) of property so as to avoid legal issues. Besides having a place to start reconstruction, an owner’s
approval is a necessity to legally be entitled to the property and the house on it. Not all households
living in UPIS-El Carmen had título when the earthquake struck. Namely, with the establishment of
the settlement in 2000, most households received the certificado de posesión (landholding certificate),
but not everyone applied for título afterwards.
The certificado de posesión includes the map of the area that you possess, the surface, the
division of the property and the identification papers of the people living on the land. The certificado
de posesión is registered in the municipality (in this case in El Carmen). Once the citizens have the
certificado de posesión, they can start the application for título. The start of this process is to register
the property in the Chincha municipality with the certificado de posesión. It is then necessary that the
municipality controls your certificado de posesión and will check whether the applicant actually lives
there with the number of persons he/she applied with. It can take up to several months before the
municipality has checked these criteria. Subsequently the applicant has to return to the municipality in
Chincha where the next requirements are discussed. This means the owner needs to pay taxes
according to praised value of the house and the number of people living there. This, however, should
be paid in El Carmen municipality. Also the duties of living in the municipality are to be paid. When
these payments are fulfilled, the applicant returns to the Chincha municipality and the registration of
ownership is made, but not yet officially valid. This registration is send to the official register in Ica,
the capital of the department. This entire registration process can last up to several years and takes up
working time of the applicant.
Due to the described bureaucracy and costs several households in UPIS-El Carmen did not
apply for título after having received the certificado de posesión. Other households had come to live in
UPIS-El Carmen well after the establishment and had neither certificado de posesión nor título. The
government wanted to help out and provided the households with certificado de posesión, with the
opportunity to receive título for free. It meant that only with the correct and official registration of the
certificado de posesión, this título could be received. This created exclusion of households that moved
to UPIS-El Carmen later than the establishment of the settlement and to households that rented
property.
The following step made by the government was the provision of a bono por los damnificados
(government voucher) that was worth 6000 soles (1500 euro). With this voucher people could buy
material for the reconstruction of their house. The card functioned like a credit card with which the

13
people could obtain 5400 soles (1350 euro) worth of material and they could get 600 soles (150 euro)
in cash from a bank. The criteria for this government voucher were título and proof of living there
during the earthquake. Interestingly enough no such programs existed for the people who did live in
the affected area but did not have the certificado de posesión.
The households who already had título and the ones that had received the free título, were able
to officially apply for the government voucher. The process of application was delayed due to
inefficient work of the INDECI who had made the District Office responsible. This District office was
supposed to control the houses for damage and find proof that the applicant lived there during the
earthquake. Residents in UPIS-El Carmen accused the municipality of corruption as they felt like the
friends and relatives of the employees, of the municipality were given precedence during this control.
It illustrates how connections might increase the ability to advance faster than those without the
connections. However, even if this was the case, there is no implication that this precedence resulted in
earlier receipt of the government voucher. The Civil Defence District Office distributed the first
government vouchers in February 2008, and it was claimed by the municipality that the distribution
went from manzana (block) to the next. This said, in the end of January 2009, eighty percent of the
approved applicants had not yet received the government voucher (ITDG, 2008). The interesting issue
is that while the president mentioned that 180 million soles had been spent on the vouchers, it seemed
as if this money evaporated.
While some were waiting for the government vouchers, ITDG came back in January 2008 and
mentioned that they were trying to receive funds for a reconstruction program in UPIS-El Carmen, but
the official announcement had not yet been made. In February 2008 a ‘Japanese NGO’ announced a
reconstruction program for 100m2 houses. As this NGO was the first to announce a reconstruction
program and the size was appealing, eighty households in UPIS-El Carmen enthusiastically applied.
The only requirements according to this Japanese NGO were a payment of 80 soles (20 euro) and the
ownership papers had to be handed over for copying. This Japanese NGO left with the money and
papers to arrange the start of reconstruction, but did not return.
When the ITDG returned in the March 2008 to officially announce its reconstruction program
for two room houses of 32m2, most households that had applied for the Japanese reconstruction did
not apply for the ITDG reconstruction. During the investigation it was mentioned that 32m2 had been
less appealing compared to the 100m2 offered by the Japanese NGO.
Whereas normally ITDG had to do a survey to select the households, here all households that
applied were selected. The only criterion was the título to avoid legal problems. An NGO can namely
not start reconstruction on property that is owned by someone else. Sixty-four out of the hundred-
eighty households in UPIS-El Carmen had started the ITDG reconstruction already when the other
households discovered that this Japanese NGO had unfolded a major scam. By that time the ITDG had
already redirected its funds to other villages and could not help the households that were deceived by
the Japanese.

14
The ITDG reconstruction started where the ITDG provided material and employees of the
ITDG, maestros (teachers), taught the participants how to reconstruct. The affected households
organized with other beneficiaries, which were often households living in the same manzana, to
reconstruct. It was an obligation to come to the meetings to be included in the decision making and
discuss problems that were faced. Some of the meetings included lectures on disaster preparation and
mitigation.
As the priest had seen the exclusion of many households due to lack of ownership and due to
the scam he provided an offer for reconstruction to those who had been excluded. He was unable to
help the households that rented a house, as the household had to have bought property. The owners of
these houses did not dare to come to ask for the reconstruction aid as it was known to the priest that
these people did not live there during the earthquake. The church offered reconstruction with a version
of adobe material. As this was the material that had collectively failed to resist the earthquake, people
in UPIS-El Carmen did not want this reconstruction aid. The adobe offered by the priest had been
especially created to be more resistant to seismic shocks, but this was not good enough for the people
in UPIS-El Carmen who were too scared. Only three households accepted the church aid according to
the priest. The rest rather lived in an emergency shelter. The priest mentioned this could have been
related to the fact that the faith in the priest had dropped in the village of El Carmen and UPIS-El
Carmen and said: “So I decided to help the people in another area who gratefully wanted the
reconstruction.” The priest had chosen this material especially because a lot more houses could be
build with the funds he had received.
To summarize, the reconstruction efforts of the affected households were severely limited due
to the difficulties of property and ownership. Besides that, while the government voucher had been a
great idea, some households did not receive it and were unable to start reconstruction. Others were
completely excluded from all sorts of reconstruction aid. The households that did participate in the
reconstruction program of ITDG, at least had a part of their house reconstructed, but were still
dependent on themselves and their own capacities to mobilize resources when it came to full
reconstruction of the house. The social networks are thought to possibly influence this by providing
access to resources in terms of finances, knowledge, material and connections.
1.5 Problem statement
To describe the problem statement a small summary of the above is necessary. The households
in UPIS-El Carmen were severely affected by the earthquake, where ninety percent of the houses were
partly or completely destroyed. Some households faced more damage to their belongings than others
and for some the earthquake resulted in a disruption of the livelihood as a whole.

15
The unequal distribution of aid was a great problem during the emergency phase, but with
reconstruction aid some households became completely excluded. This aid depended on the assets,
property and its título that some households did not have. The result was that some households had
lower capacities to respond. Even the households that had received the reconstruction aid still had a
long and complex process towards recovery in which they had to build upon their own capacities and
those of the ones within their social networks. Where previous research has seen the role of social
networks in recovery as positive, a nuanced view of the influence of social networks on longer term
recovery is lacking. The problem is that there seems to lack a detailed and nuanced description about
the role of social networks in the longer term recovery process of households.
Therefore this research tries to distinguish itself from other research by looking at the longer
term. It focuses more on investigating the role of the social networks in the recovery phase. It thus
intends to contribute by filling the gap in knowledge that seems to exist. This is done by providing a
detailed description on how “the survival, protection and relief of affected people rests in the hands of
the affected people” (Hilhorst, 2007:19). It is then interesting to investigate the recovery process of the
affected households, while analyzing the social relations that are mobilized and activated in the after
math of a disaster. In this process it is necessary to account for the differences between households,
with regard to their vulnerability.
1.6 Thesis outline
To start this research and fill the gap of knowledge about the recovery process of affected
households with differential vulnerability and its relation to their social networks the following chapter
will first present the main disaster paradigm through which I perform the investigation, which is
followed by previous research on disaster recovery and the influence of social networks. Subsequently
the perspective used to view the concepts introduced, after which the view taken is described. This
theoretical part leads to the questions that this research wants to address and then discusses the
methodology used to answer these questions. In this part the qualitative nature of the research is
described. The triangulation of data collection techniques and sources are explained as well as the way
of analyzing the data collected to enable drawing conclusions from it.
Chapter three starts with describing the household Zuniga and its recovery process. This
household was the most vulnerable household of the four investigated, who due to migration had
experienced a disruption in most of their social relations. The relatives of the mother’s side were
crucial during the survival, but incapable to provide support during the recovery process, which is why
household Zuniga did not mobilize the relation. The case argues in favour of the importance of social
networks as this household tried to mobilize dormant networks and establish new relations that were
expected to have the ability to support.

16
Chapter four introduces the second household, Manisco, in which the significance of financial
assistance of the siblings came to the surface. These siblings did not live in within the borders of the
affected area and had the capacity to provide support. The support enhanced the recovery by the access
that it gave household Manisco to financial resources to increase their saving. The recovery process of
this household argues also for the significance of creating a new relation, as the established relation
with an NGO resulted in the recovery of the disrupted job through the provision of material and
through the provision of a new job opportunity later on in the process
Chapter five elaborates on the third household, Abada, whose recovery process was
significantly enhanced through the support of the social relations who lived nearby and were not
affected by the earthquake. The willingness to provide support resulted in financial assistance as well
as manual labour or the provision of materials for reconstruction.
Chapter six discusses the fourth case, the Luterio household, which shows that having
relatives in the earthquake affected area lowers the ability and willingness to mobilize them. It does
provide an argument for the mutuality of relations by explaining that the affected household itself was
mobilized via first degree relatives. Furthermore it describes that establishing relations with an NGO
can be essential for the recovery of the household.
The last chapter will bring all the findings together and also focuses on the differential
vulnerability of the households. It tries to link vulnerability to the need to mobilize the social
networks, but also links vulnerability to the ability to mobilize certain relations during the recovery
process. After describing the drawn conclusions, the practical implications and recommendations for
further research are mentioned.

17
2. Social networks in disaster recovery
The previous chapter has introduced the disaster, the external response, the research location
and the problem statement. This chapter explains in detail the theoretical framework chosen. First it
discusses the main paradigms used in disaster research and explores previous research done about
social networks and their mobilization in disaster situations. Then the chapter introduces an approach
that puts the actor central and acknowledges the dynamics of recovery as a process of interaction,
negotiation and social struggle. The assumptions that this approach takes to view the relevant concepts
are explained, which assisted me to form the theoretical framework chosen. It presents the angle with
which this investigation tries to enter the debate on social networks’ mobilization in disaster situations.
Subsequently the research questions are presented that allow me to generate knowledge that
contributes to the theoretical debate. Then I describe the methodology with which I answer these
questions.
2.1 Disaster paradigms
In order to investigate disaster response locally there is a need to discover how this earthquake
turned into a disaster and thus how to view disasters, vulnerability and response. Disaster research
until the eighties tended to equate hazard to disaster. This was followed by the “structural paradigm”
that marked the eighties. The latter presumed that reviewing a society at large could provide an
explanation as to how a hazard turns into a disaster. This paradigm argued that the root causes of
vulnerability, such as poverty and other social issues, created the possibility for a hazard to turn into a
disaster. It assumed that addressing these root causes would lower the disaster risk (Frerks et al.,
1999).
For many years this was the focus of disaster research, until research was done about the
mutuality of human activity and the environment. Evidence was provided that human activity could
create environmental degradation and with this degradation natural hazards started to be on the
increase. It partly stemmed from the complexity theory which according to Waldrop (1992:11) was the
theory that mentioned that “change in systems are complex in the sense that they consist of many
independent agents that interact with each other in many ways.” The mutuality of the environment and
society surfaces and this mutual constitution argues that through the interaction also disaster
vulnerability and response occurs.
Where complexity theory is based on systems thinking, it “denies agency and diversity and
puts unwarranted boundaries around people and phenomena” (Hilhorst, 2004:1). Instead she argued to
use the term social domains where people are interacting, negotiating and struggling within several
‘systems’ simultaneously. Domains are then the locations where the knowledge of multiple actors is

18
integrated, shared and thus the place where the interaction negotiation and social struggles take place.
2.2 Previous research on the role of social networks in recovery
When doing research on the role of the social networks in recovery it is important to review
the already established knowledge with regard to this debate. Overall, previous research assumed that
social networks play a positive role in disaster situations. This assumption is seen in the concepts used
to describe the functioning of social networks, such as social capital and social security.
Social capital views social networks as an asset that increases the ability to access resources,
information and thus functions as a readily available path to walk on in times of crisis. Lin (2002)
described that actors are motivated by the instrumental or expressive needs to engage with other actors
in order to access the actor’s resources for the purpose of gaining better outcomes. Instrumental needs
are considered to be needs that add value, while expressive needs are the need to preserve what is
already there. This assumes that people anticipate and act strategically only driven by these needs.
Putman (1996 in Lin 2002) saw social capital as the social life - networks, norms and trust - that
enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives. These views put social
capital as a social asset, something that someone owns and puts to work for gain. Lin referred to
“social capital as the ways through which actors gain access to powerful positions by using their
connections” (Lin 2002: 29). The latter creating the idea that unequal societal structures influence the
social capital someone has, meaning that the powerful can access more resources embedded in social
relations. Creating quite a more nuanced view Bourdieu (1986: 248) describes “social capital as the
aggregate of the actual/ potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” This idea of
mutuality is how Bourdieu distinguished himself from other writers on social capital, together with the
acknowledgement that the non-powerful can create equal social capital (Schuller et al, 2000).
The second concept that takes the assumption that social networks have a positive role on
disaster recovery is social security. One may describe it as an actor having the options to invest in
relations to enable choices (Von-Benda-Beckman In Nooteboom, 2003). Through these relations
security is established, where the social networks are partly strategically selected and partly shaped
through culture, expectations and pressures (Nooteboom, 2003).
These concepts thus assume that social networks are a positive asset, but their role in disaster
recovery may be greatly influenced by the situation itself. It may also depend on the moment on which
the research focused. When reviewing previous research it was noticed that most research focused on
the emergency phase, or did not distinguish between phases. In Horst (2008), who investigated
families, who received remittances in Somalia, to determine assistance networks, it was unclear as to
what phase of the disaster these families were in. Horst (2008) came to the conclusion that the money

19
received was shared within the community in the refugee camps. This partly represents the idea of
altruistic communities. Savage and Harvey (2007), who investigated the connections within a
community in Pisco directly after the Peruvian earthquake, argued that the communities support the
poorest within them. It illustrated the relevance of community relations, such as neighbours. They
found that if a household receives aid from the family after a disaster they are likely to share it with
their communities and concluded that the poorest indirectly benefited. This was based on the
emergency phase only. Another research that was somewhat unclear on whether the focus was the
emergency phase or the recovery phase, investigated the order of social support in Mexico. Here
Kaniasty and Norris (2000) tried to link the support to the strength of the relation. It was mentioned
that the social support occurs in a crisis situation and they specifically saw that the reliance of disaster
affected people started with family, closest friends, neighbours and then acquaintances and the more
formal relations.
Pelling (2003) argued that periods of emergency are typically marked by high consensus in a
community. This altruistic behaviour is aimed at preventing and reducing the suffering. It was noticed
that this does not necessarily need to occur as individuals in situations of hardship may withdraw from
building up or maintaining widespread social networks and retreat to small tightly knit groups.
When looking at the recovery phase, however, Pelling (2003) mentioned that the altruistic
behaviour in the community drops during the reconstruction activities as the as the goals of individuals
might differ from the goals of the community. Swanson et al. (2009), on the other hand, argued that
the informal social networks increase rates of disaster recovery. However, when reviewing their
interpretation of recovery it emphasized the period of change immediately following a disaster until
one year after a disaster. They do not distinguish between emergency and recovery and they put a time
span on the recovery phase of one year.
The above written previous research illustrates that research has drawn various conclusions,
which might be caused by the different phases in which researcher’s investigate the phenomenon and
the multiple interpretations that the term recovery provokes. Quarantelli (1999) reviewed several
interpretations of recovery in different research to find common ground amongst them. He concluded
that recovery was mostly explained as “the attempt to bring post disaster situations to some level of
acceptability, by actions to routinize everyday activities of those whose routines have been disrupted”
(Quarantelli, 1999:2) “Some level of acceptability” is open to multiple interpretations, as it may be
differently defined and cover a different time span for different actors, such as NGOs, government,
companies or affected people.
In this research the intention is to look on the longer term recovery process instead of the
emergency phase only. The duration of this process is dependent on the households under
investigation and this research does not want to put borders as to where it ends. The diverse
conclusions drawn by research on this phenomena, led me to believe that a nuanced and more detailed
description was necessary. This triggered me in distancing myself from the terms social capital and

20
social security, as the concepts provide, according to me, a too romantic way of viewing social
networks. I argue that being a member of social networks does not necessarily result in support in case
of a disaster and assume that vulnerability may influence someone’s need to mobilize the social
relations, as well as it may affect the ability to mobilize social relations. Additionally it may influence
the actual support, if present, that can be provided.
2.3 Towards an actor oriented perspective
As described before, I want to provide a nuanced view on the relation between the social
networks and recovery process. Instead of viewing social networks as an asset or form of security that
functions in case of emergency, I allow myself to take into account the fact that the social relations do
not necessarily provide support. To be exact, a description of the complexity of social relations is
needed. I believe that the actor oriented perspective assists me with this. Paragraph 2.3 provides an
explanation of the actor oriented perspective with regard to recovery and social networks.
2.3.1 Disaster recovery: an actor oriented perspective
As disaster response and thus disaster recovery of a household unfolds itself within the
complex interaction of multiple actors with different realities, like described by the mutuality
paradigm, a perspective is needed to guide me in investigating these interactions. The basis of the
actor oriented perspective that is to bring to the centre “the integration of the theoretical understanding
with the practical concerns” (Long, 1992:4) that surfaces through interactions. The places where these
interactions take place “the arenas”. The arenas are “the social locations where contests over the
issues, resources, values and representations take place” (Oliver de Sardan In Long 2001:59). Within
and between these arenas different patterns of social organization occur that result from the
interaction, negotiations and social struggles (Long, 2001). The action taken may be influenced by this
social organization as Long (1992) argues that action is never taken by an individual alone, but
reciprocally constituted with the environment. Through focusing on explaining the social organization,
the household’s response might be found.
The social organization in the after-math of a disaster can include actors, such as affected
people, different NGOs, the church, the municipality and government. Disasters are namely a time
where social relations change and new actors appear on location (Hilhorst, 2007). Recovery may then
be seen as multiple processes by which actors and their respective networks engage with and (co)
produce their personal social world (Long, 2001). These networks may range from family, kinship,
“compadrazgo”, to political bureaucratic commercial and recreational connections (Long, 2001).

21
The various actors involved in the interaction, even if different, have agency. Long and Van
der Ploeg (1994) explain this as actors that are knowledgeable and capable within the limits of access
to information, uncertainties and other constraints. Instead of looking at affected people to be victims
waiting for recovery, this creates the opportunity of seeing affected people as people that have the
capacity to enable recovery. The household’s recovery process can then be assumed to come about
through the interaction of various actors in the arena(s), while taking into account struggles,
disagreements and negotiations accompany this interaction process. As Leeuwis et al. (1990)
mentioned, this social process can be influenced by social networks and power relations. This allows
for the differences among households as some households might have a better position to access
resources and/or obtain knowledge or information by mobilizing their existing social relations and
establishing new relations.
This means that the actor oriented perspective would put these relations central, which is often
been the critique on this approach. Namely it is said to ignore the understanding of the broader social
structures and processes in which it is embedded. Having said this, “social action is never made up of
a series of detached individuals” (Long, 2001:4).
2.3.2 Social networks in disaster recovery: an actor oriented perspective
The actor oriented perspective looks at the creation of a social network as a process in which
an understanding is gained of how people create relations and shake off old ones (Long, 2001; 154).
The recovery is thus a social process influenced by social networks, which can include the old and
new relations. Frerks et al. (1999) already mentioned that the social networks are directly related to
how people organize themselves and respond to a disaster.
The recovery is shaped through the integration of knowledge of multiple actors and can be
influenced by social networks. The networks may explain the different access to resources and
information and knowledge that is brought into the “arena”. It is thought that those who are able to
mobilize relations may have more opportunities. This does not mean however that “cooperation and
the provision of opportunities are necessarily the result of relations” (Long, 2001; 154).
The actor oriented perspective does not view social networks as assets that can be used, nor
does it assume that a state of security is reached like the terms social capital and social security imply.
Through avoiding these terms, a more nuanced view on social networks is expected to surface. It then
takes into account that relations might bring certain commitments and obligations which might delay a
household’s recovery. It is also a fact that certain commitments might influence the support that can be
provided by the members of social networks. As Kapferer (in Long 2001: 155) argues, “the bonds of
trust and support do not reside in the realm of abstract moralities or cultural disposition, but rather in
strategic management of ongoing relations, exchange contents and social meanings that are

22
constructed around them.” It explains the complexity of social relations where support can not be
measured or determined, but result from long lasting relations and the specific moment.
Besides the existing relations, it is assumed that when in disaster situations new actors arrive
at the location, new social relations may be formed. These socially distant relations can enable access
to otherwise inaccessible resources and can open up new opportunities (Broissevain 1974, Allen and
Cohen 1969 in Long 2001:151).
2.4 Conceptual model
This part of the chapter presents what assumptions from the actor oriented perspective are
incorporated into this research. It clarifies how I investigated the relation of the social networks and
the recovery process of households with differential vulnerability.
2.4.1 The recovery process
As was illustrated in paragraph 2.2 it would first be useful to explain what is understood under the
concept recovery. The actor oriented perspective, as I understand it, sees recovery as a process in
which various actors, with different realities, interact, negotiate and struggle to respond. To establish a
clear definition of recovery, this investigation followed the locally established definition, thereby
putting the affected households at the centre of the investigation. Recovery is the process towards the
rebuilding of the house, repairing assets and rebuilding the livelihood. Within this process the
interaction among the various actors involved in this recovery thus becomes the focus of investigation.
It is assumed that these actors have agency, and the agency of the affected households is
reflected in their recovery process. It is thus expected that actors will “within their knowledgeability
and capability attempt to solve problems, learn to intervene in the flow of events around them and to a
degree, they might monitor their own actions when observing how others react to their actions”
(Giddens 1984:16). This knowledge and capability is expected to be different among the households
which may also partly explain why they experience disasters differently. Differential vulnerability, on
which I elaborate in 2.4.3, may influence this.
This research looks upon the recovery process as processes of interaction, negotiation and
social struggle of actors with their environment, including differing actors, in order to integrate
knowledge, resources and capacities, to rebuild the livelihood, rebuild their house and replace/repair of
assets. This social process is assumed to be influenced by the social relations, whether these were
already present at the moment that the earthquake struck or newly build relations.

23
2.4.2 Social networks in recovery
As mentioned above the process of interaction, negotiation and social struggles of households
with their environment, including other actors, may shape the response. These actors may
simultaneously be part of the household’s existing social networks, dormant networks or are new
relations mobilized throughout the recovery process. The existing social networks are relations that the
household had at the moment of the earthquake, dormant networks are the relations that were inactive
at the moment of impact and the new social networks are the relations that came about in the after-
math of the disaster. The latter may include new actors that arrive at the location.
It is this research’s intention to look upon the role of the social networks on the recovery
process. The ability to mobilize relations in case of an emergency can be considered a capacity, in the
form that the relation may provide access to knowledge and resources that can off set the vulnerability.
The households are expected to have different abilities to mobilize relations or form new relations.
This can be affected by factors of vulnerability, such as position in the community and personality that
might provide easier access to social relations that may be significant.
The ability to socially organize can be investigated by the patterns of social organizations in
the recovery phase. The support provided can only be analyzed on a situation specific basis. The
support can not be measured or estimated beforehand. The members may thus provide support and
enhance the capacity to respond, but this does not necessarily need to occur.
In fact many different underlying aspects may at that specific moment in time be of influence
on the role that the social relations can play. Examples are the vulnerability of the members of their
networks may determine their ability to provide support or not, but also past experiences and future
expectations may determine whether support is present or not.
There may be other influencing factors, such as unwritten rules, which may be culturally
constructed, that can explain commitments and obligations of being a member of social networks
(Nooteboom, 2003). Either side of the relation may try to mobilize their rights in the relation to get
support, implying the mutuality. This may mean that the affected household can also be mobilized by
others within their social networks. Dependency within families is an example that can influence the
recovery process of both provider and receiver’s side of the relation. This research incorporates
mutuality, but by centralizing the household, it focuses on the direct effect that this has on the
household’s recovery process.
Thus through the recovery process I intend to discover the different patterns of social
organization, whether these are existing-, dormant- or new relations. The analysis tries to provide a
detailed description of why certain relations are relevant and how these relations influence the
recovery process while taking into account differential vulnerability

24
2.4.3 Differential vulnerability
While this is a concept that is already intertwined in the previous two paragraphs it is
important to describe it seperately. Blaikie et al. (2003:21) argue that “a disaster occurs when a
significant number of vulnerable people experienced a hazard and suffered severe damage and/or
disruption of their livelihood system in such a way that recovery was unlikely without external aid.”
Without vulnerability present in the area, the earthquake could not have turned into a disaster, which
shows that the vulnerability of a society and the environment are mutually constituted. The concept
vulnerability links the relationship that people have with their environment to the social forces,
institutions and cultural values that sustain and contests them (Oliver-Smith, 1999).
By focusing on the differential vulnerability one sees how “social inequalities influence the
risk confronted in everyday life and how these affect the capacity to anticipate cope with, resist and
recover from an impact of a hazard” (Oliver Smith, 1999; Wisner et al, 2004:11). It makes the
households interpret and experience a disaster differently and therefore influences the recovery
process employed by the household. The starting position of the recovery can be very different, which
can be influenced by numerous of different factors of vulnerability. Amongst others, these factors can
include the size of household, the employment status, the class, the race, the ethnicity, gender and age.
Vulnerability is closely related with capacities as they influence one another. Where people build upon
their capacities to recover, vulnerability may affect the capacity to recover and capacities may off set a
part of vulnerability.
The root causes vulnerability may lie in the same economic policies, or political rules and
regulations, which need to be recognized. The analysis will look upon the root causes of vulnerability
as obstacles to recovery. While giving attention to the broad economic situation that affects prices and
employment situations and rules and regulations with regard to property, certificado de posesion or
título I do not intend to go into depth on these broader policies or institutions. I describe the initial
position see if one household is more vulnerable than the other, which allows me to find the
differences. Capacities to overcome this vulnerability may also lie in the knowledge or resources and
access to these. Examples being technological knowledge to construct a house, skills, social
organization and expertise. This access to resources and knowledge can be acquired through the social
relations which illustrates the connection between vulnerability, capacities and the social networks.
2.4.4 The complex view on recovery
To clarify the view that is taken when investigating recovery of households, a summary of the
above is necessary. The main disaster paradigm followed is the mutuality paradigm that argues that
disaster response and disaster recovery is a complex process that comes about through the interaction
of many independent agents with multiple realities. The result is that through interaction the

25
knowledge, capacities and resources of many are integrated and from that onwards disaster recovery
unfolds. It should be seen as a process, in which the households rebuild their house, repair their assets
and rebuild a livelihood. It follows that during this process the households will do everything within
their knowledgeability and capability to recover. This means the recognition of agency, which as Long
(2001) pointed out is activated within the interaction.
The social networks of the households are expected to be included in this interaction. This
does not mean that support and cooperation results from the social relations, but social relations may
provide access to knowledge and/or resources, which can influence the recovery. Therefore this
research tries to find the social organization during the recovery process of a household and through
this discovers relations mobilized, whether already existing-, dormant, or new relations. The analysis
then takes into account the factors that may influence the provision of support. It is important to
recognize the differential vulnerability of the household, as broader influences such as size of the
household, employment status and social position may influence the disaster experience. Vulnerability
is also thought to be influenced by social networks and the other way around. Namely, capable social
relations may off set part of the vulnerability by providing support, but the factors of vulnerability can
in turn determine the access that a household has to social relations. The latter factors of vulnerability
may include social position and social attitude.
2.6 Objective and Research questions
To address the problem and hence create a more nuanced view of the relation between social networks
and the recovery process of a household the objective of this research is “improving the body of
knowledge on the role that social networks play in the recovery after an earthquake, by investigating
the relation of social networks and the recovery process of affected households with differential
vulnerability.” On the basis of the knowledge generated it is the intention to get a more nuanced view
on the relation of recovery and social networks to enable recommendations for future research.
The main research question in order to achieve the abovementioned objective is:
How do social networks relate to the recovery process of affected households, with differential
vulnerability?
To describe the recovery process of households it is necessary to determine the damages
suffered by a household in order to understand what they are recovering from. Through discussing this
impact the pre-disaster vulnerability is addressed. This provides an initial idea on how the differential
vulnerability presents itself. However through adding sub-questions about the root causes and the
differential capacity to overcome this vulnerability more knowledge is acquired on the vulnerability
level of a household which in turn can impact their recovery process. As explained in the theoretical
part of this chapter, the recovery process is the process in which households interact with its

26
environment with the intent to rebuild their house, rebuild their livelihood and replace/repair their
assets. This is covered through a sub-question, because this process will be described in the cases.
Finally the influence of the social networks on this process is covered through determining which
relations are relevant during the process of recovery and what kind of support or limitations these
relations bring to the recovery process. All these elements are turned into the following sub-questions.
What was the impact of the earthquake on the household?
How did the household interact with its environment in their recovery process?
Which social networks were relevant in the recovery process?
What kind of support or limitations did these social networks bring?
What were the obstacles to the household in the recovery process?
What capacities did the household have in order to off set the vulnerability?
2.7 Methodology
This part of the chapter explains what research strategy is used to answer the above mentioned
research questions. It discusses why this strategy is chosen, after which it discusses the methods that
were used to perform the investigation. The limitations to these methods and the fieldwork are also
described after which I elaborate about the data analysis.
2.7.1 Research strategy
Exploratory research enables me to describe the social process of recovery and mobilization of the
social networks and describe the actions are taken. This research is of qualitative nature based on
providing more detailed descriptions of the mobilization of social networks and its influence on the
recovery process. Therefore qualitative research is used to find the specifics so as to improve and
expand knowledge on this specific topic (Yin, 1994). The generalization to wider populations is not so
important and by finding the specifics we can sustain unambiguous conclusions and hence favour
internal validity over external validity (Yin, 1994). The use of case studies provides the opportunity to
highlight and analyze the processes by which social actors actually manage their everyday social
worlds and attempt to resolve certain problematic situations (Yin, 1994). This would enable the
creation of knowledge on the social networks in a balanced and nuanced manner. Higher internal
validity is created through the use of triangulation, which is the use multiple methods of data
collection and multiple sources. The triangulation allows for cross-checking of data and thus allows
for more reliable data on the relation between the social networks and the recovery process.

27
It is this research intention to contribute to the debate on social networks and the recovery
process through the description of the case. One may thus refer to the research strategy as a descriptive
case study. The knowledge generated may be used in future research.
2.7.2 Data collection techniques and sources
The access to the possible research area was achieved through the ITDG, an NGO occupied
with reconstruction programs in some villages in the Chincha province. They provided me with
reading material on the first day and by means of conversations they already prepared me with the
relevant information of the villages they worked with. The initial introduction in the field with the
“affected people” was also arranged by the ITDG. The ITDG informed me about the three districts in
which they worked. They recommended one district due to the initial focus on migrants and
remittances. The initial philosophy of the research had been that the remittances would be used to
strengthen the recovery strategies of affected households.
Within the chosen district a selection was to be made out of three villages. I held a small
survey amongst several households in each village and decided to select the village that inhabited most
households with migrants in their family. Not a village, but the settlement, UPIS-El Carmen, was the
selected research location. During the first days of fieldwork, the conversations with the households
led me to believe that remittances were irrelevant in the settlement. This created doubt for the
feasibility of this research and the focus changed from remittances to social networks. The selection of
the households remained suitable, because during the small survey other differences between
households had also caught my attention. These differences guided the final selection of the four
households. It was decided to select two households that had participated in a reconstruction program
of the ITDG. These two had also received government aid in form of the material voucher. The
differences of these two households was in that one had a lot of family outside of the earthquake
affected area and the other household had their family mostly living within the affected area. The third
household had rebuilt their house without an NGO program while having received government aid in
the form of a material voucher and had family living outside and within the earthquake affected area.
The fourth household now lived on borrowed property with no reconstruction possibilities, no
government aid and the family with whom they have contact living mostly outside of the earthquake
affected area. This selection was made to acknowledge the heterogeneity, which is also assumed by
the actor oriented perspective (Long, 2001).
Communication was mostly with these selected affected households themselves, in which the
assumption of the actor-oriented perspective was followed that allows for “an active subject” (Knorr-
Cetina, 1981:4), which means that actors have agency (Long, 2001). Using informal interviews, which

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