Plato's theory of Forms posits that there is a higher, more real realm of ideal and perfect forms that particular objects in the sensible world imperfectly participate in. He uses three analogies - the Sun, the Divided Line, and the Cave - to illustrate this theory. While some problems exist regarding how the realms interact, Plato makes a strong case that mathematics and abstract concepts we grasp through reason suggest there is a deeper reality beyond what our senses show us. Therefore, his theory of a separate, higher order of intelligible forms is quite plausible.

1. Usingthe analogiesof the Sun,The DividedLine andthe Cave,explain Plato’s theory of Forms. How
strong is Plato’s case for thinking that there is a higher order of reality?
Plato’sconsiderations onepistemology(concerningwhat knowledge canhave andhow we can know
it) andmetaphysics (concerningthe natureof reality) resultedin himformulatinghistheoryof Forms-
a dualistictheory whichholdsthatthere is aseparate world toours,whichismore real thanourown,
and is where entitieshe calls Forms exist. This essaywill firstly describe the main features of Forms
and explainPlato’stheory furtherwiththe analogieshe used inthe Republic.Then, Iaimtoshow that
there are many reasons that make Plato’scase of a higherorderof realityvery strongthan there are
problems that weaken it.
Forms can be understood as intelligible, abstract entities in which sensible objects in our world
‘participate’ in. For example, imagine a dog with brown fur. The property of brownness can be
considered independently - as a separate entity from the dog’s fur and of any other brown thing. In
this,all thingsthathave the propertyof beingbrownisdue tothose objects‘participating’inthe Form
of brownness and in doing so sensible objects are ‘copying’ or ‘resembling’ the original Form.
Furthermore, Forms are transcendent, meaning that they are not constrained by time and space,
unlike objectsinthisworld whichnecessarilyexistina certainlocationat a giventime.Asa resultof
Forms not existing in time or space, it follows that Forms are immutable and eternal – they are
unchangingandare withoutbeginningorend. Withthesetypesof propertiesitfollowsthatthe Forms
are absolute and perfect,unlike everyobjectthatexistsin the material world.For instance,a rose is
widelyconsideredtobe a beautiful object.However,there maybe some people whofindthe rose to
be ugly.Inadditionto this, the decay of a rose is inevitable,andwhenthathappensit ceasesto be a
beautiful object and ultimately it will cease to exist altogether (as well as everything else in this
material world).The Formof Beauty however,isunqualifiedlybeautiful - the same goesforall Forms
(in that they are unqualifiedly x).
Thus, Platobelievedthatthere are twodistinctworlds:The sensible worldinwhichwe alllive in,which
contains the particulars that participate in the Forms, and the intelligible world of The Forms.
Moreover,since forPlatothe Formsare more real thanobjectsinthe sensibleworld,he also believed
that the realm of the Forms is a higher order of reality; more real than the sensible world which we
live in.
We are able toknowthese twodifferentordersof realitybyusingdifferentfaculties.Sensible objects
are knownusingour senses andintelligible objectsare known throughreason.Platoholdsthat since
knowledge is ‘what is’ and is infallible, ‘the object of knowledge is something incapable of change’
(Ferrari, 2007 p.258). Therefore, the Forms not onlythe highest realitybut also genuine knowledge,
hence why his thoughts on epistemology and metaphysics are related by the theory of Forms since
‘kind of reality or being of an object has corresponds to the mode of cognition one can have of it’
(Pappas, 2003 p129).
Furthermore, ignorance is what ‘is not’ and ‘opinion’ is a state of cognition which lies between
knowledgeandignorance.Opinion isvariableandissubjecttochange, thusthe objectsof opinion are
items that are also liable to change; hence why particulars that are e.g. beautiful, can also be
consideredtobe ugly,because particularinstancesare ‘not onlyFbutalsonot-F.’(Annas,1981p.218),
whereas the Form is wholly F.
Inorder tofurtherexplain histheoryof the Forms,Platousesthree differentanalogies,the firstbeing
‘The analogy of the Sun’, in which Socrates compares the Sun to the form of the Good - which Plato
holdsishighestobjectof knowledgeandgoodness.The analogydevelopsbyassertingthatwe use our

2. sensory faculties to experience the world. Although most of our senses don’t require anything
additional to be able to use them, e.g. we use our hearing to hear and nothing else is needed. Our
sighthoweverrequireslightforvision,thuslightis necessaryfor our eyesbeingable to see.Though
the sunisnot itself sight,itisthe cause of sightandisseenbythe sightitcauses.’ (508b)Thus,the Sun
isresponsibleforlightandgrowthwhichmakesobjectsvisible andallowstheeye tosee.Analogously,
the Form of the Good is the source of reality and truth which, ‘gives the objects of knowledge [the
Forms] their truth and the knower’s mind the power of knowing…’ (508e) The Good is what allows
reason to have knowledge of the Forms. As a result,it is also the case that the Form of the Good is,
‘the source notonlyof theintelligibilityofthe objectsofknowledge,butalsoof theirbeingandreality;’
(509b)
In supportof this,it can be arguedthat the Form of the Good doesallow ustofullyunderstandother
Forms.For instance,youcouldhave formedadefinitionof justice butuntil youworkoutwhatmakes
justice good, you will not fully understand it. (Ferrari, 2007 p.269)
Secondly Plato describes the analogy of the Divided Line (509d-511e) to further illustrate the two
distinct orders of reality – the visible and the intelligible, as well as to represent the stages of
understanding one must pass to gain true knowledge.
Socrates supposes a line divided into two unequal parts, then divided again by the same ratio. The
first division refers to the objects of knowledge and opinion/ the intelligible world and the sensible
world.Frombottomtotop, the sectionof opinioncontains shadowsandimagesandphysical objects.
In the higher section of knowledge, mathematical objects and Forms are located. For Plato,
mathematics aids the progression of the mind from the sensible realm into the intelligible realm of
the Forms. It does this by not dealing with the Forms directly, ‘but employs sensible images and
representations of them’ (Sayers, 1999 p.124) Plato uses the example of geometry. Mathematicians
have to use imagestorepresentthe geometrical conceptstheyare dealingwith,howeveritisnotthe
image of the e.g. triangle that they are deliberating,it is the actual Form of the triangle which is the
subjectof theirreasoning.The image of the triangle isonlyarepresentationof the intelligibleFormof
the triangle. Therefore mathematics ‘forms a bridge by which the mind can pass from the world of
senses to the intelligible realm of the Forms’ (Sayers, 1999 p.125)
Lastly, in book seven of the Republic (514a) Socrates explains the ‘Cave’ analogy. Plato uses this
analogytodescribe the journey fromignorance toknowledge.He imaginesan‘undergroundchamber
like a cave’, with entrance open to the daylight. Within this chamber there are prisoners who have
beenrestrainedsincechildhood,whosenecksandlegshavebeenchaineddownandfixedsothatthey
cannot move and cannot look in any direction other than the wall straight ahead.
Higherup and behindthe prisoners,there isafire burning, whichpeoplecontrol puppetsandfigures
of all sorts of objects behind,suchas ‘figuresof menandanimals’.This causesshadowstocastonthe
wall in frontof the prisoners.All the prisonersexperience are the shadowsthat are cast on the wall.
Because of their position, they are not able to see the figures being cast behind them. The chained
prisonersinthe cave are describedtobe “likeus”,because theirepistemologicalstate is analogousto
our own. It implies that we all begin in a state of ignorance, as the prisoners assume that what they
are experiencing is reality simply because they have not experienced anything else to show them
otherwise. ‘And so in every way they would believe that the shadows of the objects we mentioned
were the whole truth’ (515c).Inthis,the cave portraysthe sensibleworld–the worldinwhichwe live
in.

3. Platothenpresumesthatif one of the prisonersweretobe releasedfromthe cave,theywould firstly
stand up and turn around to see the fire; which Plato suggests would be painful and the light of the
fire would dazzle him so he would not at first be able to see properly the objects used to cast the
shadows.If he wastoldthat the shadows he usedtosee were ‘emptynonsense’andthe objectshe is
now seeing are more real, the prisoner would struggle to believe it.
He continues thatif the prisonerwere forcedoutof the cave,whichcorrespondsto the realmof the
Forms,itwould againbe a very painful struggle forthisprisoner.Once outof the cave,the prisoneris
blindedbythe lightof the sun,and will againstruggle to see anything.Thoughaftera while,hiseyes
become adaptedto the light.Primarily,the prisonerfindsiteasierto look at shadowsof people and
objects,thenhe canlookatreflectionsinwater,andsoonheisabletolookat ‘the objectsthemselves’
whichrepresentForms.Later, he findsit easiertolook at the moon and stars at nightand ultimately
he isable to look‘directlyatthe sunitself’whichasstatedearlieranalogoustothe Formof the Good.
The prisoner will realise ‘that it is the sun that produces the changing seasons and the years and
controls everything in the visible world, and is in a sense responsible for everything that he and his
fellow-prisoners used to see’ (516b)
Platoendsthe analogybyexplaining thatthe freedprisonerwouldpitythe otherprisonersinthe cave
and wouldwant to returnto the cave to tell themabout reality. Thoughif he wentback to the cave,
hiswouldfinditdifficulttoadjusttothe darknessof the cave,the otherprisonerswouldassumethat
hisventure outside the cave hascausedhisblindness,andthatthe journeytothe outside of the cave
is a journey not worth taking.
Plato’stheory assumes objectivityisrelatedtoreality,inthathe assertsthatthe Formsare more real
than objectsin this worldand thus the realitythatthey existinis a higherrealitythan ours. If this is
so, Plato’s case for believing there is a higher order of reality is plausible; reason being that Plato
effectivelymaintains thatthe objectswe perceiveinthisworldare deceptive anditisnotuncommon
for us to form conflicting observations of the same objects; for example,an action can be perceived
as just to one observer and at the same time alsounjust to another. Thus it can be argued that only
perfect concepts, which are absolutely ‘x’, can avoid these contradictory observations. Also, it is
reasonable toclaimthateverythinginthisphysical world thatexistsis imperfect;soall these objective
conceptsmust existin a separate,higherorderreality. Hence,if itis true that thingswhichare more
objective are more real,since the objectsinthis worldare flawedwe can conclude that theyare less
real. Since the Forms are objective they are entities which are more real, so wherever they existis
more real than our world.
Furthermore, mathematics makes Plato’s case for a higher reality strong. Mathematics is the truest
knowledge we can know, concerning abstract entities which are not known by sensory experience,
only by reason. E.g. we can experience two apples, three apples and so on, but we can never use
sensory experience to encounter numbers themselves. ‘The study of mathematics puts us in touch
withthe intelligibleworld.Ithelpstodetachthe mindfromthe sensesandleadittoabstractthought.
All genuine knowledge of the world has rational character.’ (Sayers, 1999 p.107) In a material world
no suchthingas a perfecttriangle orcircle etc.exists.However,we are stillable toknow theyexistby
reasoning. We can do calculations without having to refer to the material world. In addition to this,
Russell claims that there is nothing about our minds that could make true that two and two is four:
‘All oura priori knowledgeisconcernedwithentitieswhichdonot,properlyspeaking, exist, eitherin
the mental or in the physical world.’ (Russell, 1959 p.50)
Anotherreasonwhyit appearsto be plausible forPlato’scase inthinkingthatthere isa higherorder
of reality is because of our ability to recognise properties of things. In the Phaedo (74b-75b), Plato

4. explains thatwe are able torecognize thingsthat have the propertyof being equalandthingsthatare
unequal; The Form of Equality however can never be unequal. He explains that if we are able to
recognise that certain things are equal or unequal, then we must have some prior understanding of
what the Form of equalityis - thisunderstandingisderivedfromourknowledge of the Forms (when
our souls existed in that realm prior to this life).
However, this dualistic model of reality raises some important problems such as; how does an
immaterial ‘soul’ in another realm unite with a physical body? Secondly, though Plato explains that
we are able to gainknowledge of the Forms, whichis through reasoning,he failsto explainhow the
twoordersof realityactuallyinteractandhow exactly theparticularsinthisworldparticipatewiththe
Formsthemselves.Isitthatanobject participatesinthe wholeForm, orisitthatanobjectparticipates
witha partof it? If the former,there would havetobe adifferentformforeachdifferentthing;which
alsoraisesaquestionof howwideisthe rangeof Formsthatexist.(Annas,1981p.224) Platomentions
conceptssuchas Beauty,Truthand Justice tobe Formsas well asmaths objectsandotherterms, but
isthere a Form fordirt,curly hair,disease ora Germanshepherddogwiththree legsForm? If objects
participate with parts of Forms, Forms become divisible,which as a consequence makes them no
longerabsolute. Although these issuesare difficult,Ibelieve thattheynonethelessdonotundermine
Plato’s case for the existence of a higher order realitybecause even thoughit is difficult to imagine
the scope of the Forms and how they would interact with particulars, it doesn’t follow that they
nevertheless exist.
Though,SayerssuggestthatPlato’stheoryof Formsmaybe interpretedinanalternativeway.We can
accept thatthe Formsare the reality,butinsteadof existinginaseparate world,the sensibleworldis
the wayinwhichthe same realityof theForms‘the sensible realmisthewayinwhich thissamereality
appears to a more superficial view which relies on the senses’ (Sayers,1999 p.112). Thus, instead of
there being two distinct worlds, there is only one world. Similarly, Aristotle believed that Forms are
located in the objects them; that no separate higher order of reality for the Forms exists. However
these types of explanationsfail to account for the fact that material objects change; how the Forms
are supposed to remain immutable if they exist in a world, or in objects that are in a state of flux.
Ultimately, Iagree thatit isinitially oddtoconsiderthatan intelligibleworldsuchasthe realmof the
Forms – which we can only have access to through reason, is more real than our world with objects
that we can experience through our senses.(Sayers, 1999 p109) Nevertheless,I believe that Plato’s
case for a higher order of reality is very strong, as I agree with Sayers in saying that there is a lot of
knowledgethatisnotaccessible byoursenses;He alsousesthe exampleof entities likenumbersand
mathematics to illustrate that there is a deeper fundamental order of things which is not revealed
obviously to the senses but can only be known by thought.
References
Annas, J. (1981) An Introduction to Plato’s ‘Republic’ New York: Oxford University Press.
Ferrari, G.R.F. (ed.) (2007) The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s ‘Republic’. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Pappas, N. (2003) Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Plato and the ‘Republic’. 2nd
Edn. New York:
Routledge.
Plato & Gallop, D. (1975) Phaedo. Oxford: Clarendon Press

5. Plato & Lee, H.D.P. (1974) Plato: Republic. 2nd
Edn. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
Russell, B. (1959) The Problems of Philosophy. 48th
Edn. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sayers, S. (1999) Plato’s ‘Republic’: An Introduction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.