1. Michael Montanye
Presidential Term Limits: A Comparative Analysis of Brazil and Nicaragua
In the United States we take presidential term limits for granted. Even before the two-
term presidential limit was codified by the Twenty-second Amendment to the United States
Constitution, only Franklin Delano Roosevelt had broken the precedent set by George
Washington of only serving two terms as President of the United States. Since the ratification of
the Twenty-second Amendment, no serious challenges have been made to the presidential term
limits in the United States. In Latin America, on the other hand, similar term limits have been
challenged and overturned in several incidences.
Term limits, and the efforts to repeal term limits, have largely impacted the presidential
electoral processes in many Latin American countries. One of the major reasons for the term
limits is to guard against dictatorial leadership, which has been problematic in Latin America.
The repeal of term limits has some scholars and supporters of democracy worried about the
potential backslide of countries that had been moving in a democratic direction. The two
specific countries that I will be comparing, and which have taken different routes regarding term
limits, are Nicaragua and Brazil. The alternate approaches that Nicaragua and Brazil take
towards term limits paint different pictures for the future of democracy in each country.
Since I will be commenting on the impacts of term limits on the democracies of these
countries, it is important to understand what democracy is. Guillermo O’Donnell discusses what
is necessary for a country to be considered democratic in his speech, “The Perpetual Crises of
Democracy.” O’Donnell states that the two things are absolutely necessary, “The first is
elections that are reasonably fair, so that the opposition has a reasonable chance of winning…
Second, a democratic regime includes a set of rights, or political freedoms” (O’Donnell 2007,
7). He goes on to explain that, in addition to having fair elections, the result of the elections

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must be accepted by the parties involved. He also states that the political freedoms need to
upheld before, during, and after the elections are held (O’Donnell 2007, 7).
Using these two requirements, he explains that there are different levels of democracies.
He states, “The countries that have moved toward greater electoral fairness have democratic
regimes of better quality than other countries that have not made such a shift” (O’Donnell 2007,
8). He goes on to say that countries with rights that “are more broadly and effectively…
enacted… have achieved a higher-quality kind of democracy” (O’Donnell 2007, 8). This
distinction that not all democracies are created equal is important when trying to understand the
effects of term limits on the democracies of Nicaragua and Brazil. This is especially the case,
given that lower level democracies “face the threat of slow or even sudden death” (O’Donnell
2007, 8).
O’Donnell’s requirements for democracy, while a good measuring stick, are not all-
inclusive. Another condition scholars look for in a democracy, which goes along with fair
elections, is alternation in power. To emphasize the importance of alternation in power,
renowned political scientist Samuel P. Huntington proposed a two-turnover test to consolidated
democracy. The test required two alternations in power, not only on an individual level but also
on a party level, for a democracy to be considered consolidated (Huntington 1991, 266-267). A
consolidated democracy is one that has a level of stability and is not in danger of returning to an
authoritarian regime (Huntington 1991, 210). While passing the two-turnover test does not
automatically make the government a consolidated democracy, the inclusion of alternation in
power in Huntington’s work demonstrates its importance in evaluating democracies.
Krister Lundell studies alternation in power and its close relationship to accountability in
democracies. She postulates that, “One of the most important principles in a democracy is that

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those in power are accountable to the people” (Lundell 2011, 145) and “Alternation in power
is… regarded as a key to executive accountability” (Lundell 2011, 147). The theory then is that
democracies with alternations in power move closer, using O’Donnell’s spectrum as a guide, to
higher-level democracies.
According to the 1988 constitution, Brazilian presidents were not allowed to run for
immediate reelection. In 1997 however, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, then President of Brazil,
spearheaded the movement to get an amendment passed that would repeal the part of the
constitution that barred him from running again in the next election. He was successful and
Brazil now currently employs a presidential term limit of two consecutive four-year terms (Blake
2008, 165-166). Since the amendment passed, both Cardoso and his successor, Luiz Ignácio
“Lula” da Silva, have used it to win reelection bids. What is interesting about the term limits in
Brazil, is that they only prevent against a president running for more than two consecutive terms.
As Jeb Blount explains in a Reuter’s article, on May 31, 2012, about Lula’s possible 2014
presidential campaign, “After sitting out at least one term, a former two-term president can run
for and become president again.” It is entirely plausible that Lula may seek reelection
considering he hand-picked his predecessor, Dilma Rousseff, and propelled her from relative
obscurity into the presidency (de Souza 2011). She also kept on many of Lula’s cabinet
members, eleven in total, which could be a sign that she could be “an interim president” for Lula
(de Souza 2011, 87). Amaury de Souza worries that this would be a dangerous situation for
Brazilian democracy. However, just the fact that Lula respected the constitutional term limits
enough to step down is a positive sign.
In Nicaragua, on the other hand, a different alternative is being pursued. Current
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega’s first term started in 1985, and the original Nicaraguan

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Constitution of 1987, made no mention of term limits. However, Ortega lost power in 1990 and
his opposition amended the Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua in 1995 to ban consecutive
terms and add a cap of two presidential terms (Title VIII, Chapter III, Art. 147). Ortega came
back into power in 2007 and during his term tried to get Nicaragua’s National Assembly to get
rid of the two-term limit and the ban on consecutive terms, but failed. However, due to a
controversial Supreme Court decision Ortega was allowed to run again in the 2011 election,
which he won (Castro 2013). Now in his third term, and second consecutive, Ortega’s party has
once again set the presidential term limits in their sights. A plan to remove the term limits,
which also contains an additional 41 changes, made it out of committee and is scheduled for a
full Assembly vote by December 15 (Castro 2013). The plan is expected to pass as Castro of
Reuters reports, “The Sardinistas [Ortega’s party] hold 63 of the 92 seats in Nicaragua’s National
Assembly, giving the party the two-thirds majority needed to change the constitution” (2013).
The move is meant to add a certain amount of legitimacy to Ortega’s current term, as well as
pave the way for his indefinite reelection.
In Brazil and Nicaragua, as in most of Latin America, the idea of presidential term limits
is a highly relevant topic that sees new developments frequently. Term limits, and what they
represent, are often seen as criteria for a country to move towards higher-level “consolidated”
democracies (Huntington 1991). It is important to note that term limits are not the stand-alone
criterion, and are simply one of many factors that affect the strength and quality of democracy in
a country. Latin America is an interesting place to study term limits, because there are many
different types of term limits implemented, and leaders trying to circumvent them in various
ways. In regards to the different types of term limits, one can get an idea of the variety by
looking at just three countries: Mexico, Brazil, and Nicaragua. Mexico has a strict one-term

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limit, Brazil has a two-term limit that requires the president to take one term off before running
again, and Nicaragua seems poised to be getting rid of term limits altogether.
While it may seem like Mexico’s term limit rule is the best for democracy, based solely
on the individual alternation in power discussed earlier, there are other factors to consider. For
example, Huntington stresses alternation in power, not only at the individual level but also at the
party level. Mexico has seen a distinct lack in party alternation, for the most part, as the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) “ruled in authoritarian fashion for seven decades” leading
up to 2000 (Flores-Macías 2012, 128). The term limits in this instance failed to make Mexico
democratic because, although they held elections, there was not a reasonable chance for the
opposition to win for the majority of the 71-year reign. Each new election was dominated by
whichever candidate the previous president had given the dedazo, the pointing of the finger, and
therefore the term limits could not fully democratize the system (Blake 2008, 325).
Unlike Mexico, both Brazil and Nicaragua allow presidents to serve more than one term.
Brazil and Nicaragua have other similarities on the issue of term limits as well, although if the
Nicaraguan Constitution is amended those will no longer exist. The most obvious similarity is
that they both have term limits. While this may seem like a pointless similarity to draw, it has
significance. It demonstrates that both Brazil and Nicaragua, like much of Latin America, were
wary of the possibility of long-term authoritarian leaders when the term limits were introduced.
Both countries have also recently made changes to allow for a candidate to seek reelection in a
consecutive term, something that had previously been barred. This follows what Colburn and
Trejos call, “an alarming trend in Latin America toward dismantling democracy by legal
subterfuge under the cover of populist or even socialist rhetoric” (2010, 11).

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The leaders of Brazil and Nicaragua have similarities as well. In this case I am referring
to Brazil’s ex-president Lula, and Nicaragua’s current president Ortega. They are both
considered to be charismatic and strong leaders, often compared to Hugo Chavez of Venezuela.
In addition, both Lula and Ortega were their parties’ leading candidates for several unsuccessful
elections before becoming president. Once they won, they became widely popular during what
was constitutionally deemed their last term. How they each handled the constitutional term
limits, however, was very different.
While there are similarities between Brazil and Nicaragua regarding term limits, the
differences are more interesting. In Brazil, a president can run for office again, even after
serving two consecutive terms, as long as he/she waits a term before doing so. This means that
there must be an alternation of power, whether on the individual or party level. When confronted
with this situation during his second consecutive term, Lula respected the constitutional term
limits and hand picked a candidate to run for office.
Nicaragua, on the other hand, limits a president to two terms in total and, prior to Ortega;
those terms could not be consecutive. This, in theory, would have prevented Ortega from
running for reelection in two ways: first, that he had already served his two terms, and second,
that he could not run for a consecutive term. However, Ortega got a favorable Supreme Court
decision that allowed him to run again, and now it seems imminent that a change to the
Constitution will allow him to continue running indefinitely.
How Lula and Ortega reacted to the presidential term limits gives an idea of where each
country is heading in terms of democracy. Using fair elections and alternation in power as
benchmarks for democracy, Brazil’s reaction to term limits seems to bode better for democracy
than Nicaragua’s reaction. The term limits in Brazil require an alternation in power, at least at

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the individual level. According to Gideon Maltz, individual alternation is important for several
reasons. The first is that incumbents have an advantage that, if they serve long enough, can
negate any chance of opposition winning an election (Maltz 2007, 131). This is what many
proponents of democracy worry may happen with President Ortega in Nicaragua if the term
limits are rescinded (Colburn and Trejos 2010).
The second reason individual alternation is important is that, “a long tenure leads to a
dangerous accumulation of power in the president’s hands, and also a greater arrogance and
tendency to abuse it” (Maltz 2007, 131). Alternation in individuals prevents against the long
tenures and, hopefully, the accumulation of power as well. Maltz also explains that presidential
term limits also promote alternation in power of political parties, not just individual alternation.
The reason for this is that, “Incumbent candidates tend to command greater popular support than
do their successors” (Maltz 2007, 131). This could be seen in the 2010 Brazilian election where
Lula had 80 percent popularity but his successor, Rousseff, only won 56 percent of the vote (De
Souza 2011).
Maltz also explained that, “when an incumbent steps down the regime becomes more apt
to fracture” (2007, 133). Both of these factors make it easier for the opposition party to come
into power. The evidence for this is extremely compelling. It shows that, “the opposition’s
chance of victory soared from 7 percent to 48 percent when it faced a successor rather than an
incumbent” (Maltz 2007, 134). This shows that, although term limits do not automatically lead
to a win for the opposition, they at least give the challenger a chance (Maltz 2007, 134). This
evidence for term limits, and the adherence to the term limits in Brazil, paints a hopeful picture
for democracy in Brazil.

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The future of democracy in Nicaragua, on the other hand, seems much more bleak in
light of this evidence. Ortega has already gone against the constitutional term limits, using a
Supreme Court decision to get around them. Now, his party looks as if it will be able to amend
the Constitution in order to allow him to run indefinitely. This will allow him to gain the
advantages of incumbency, making it harder for the opposition to replace him in the future. The
plan to get rid of term limits is rumored to include a total of 42 changes (Castro 2013). These
changes, if they include other electoral processes, could further protect Ortega against the
opposition. If they include changes to the power structure, it could consolidate more power into
Ortega’s hands as Maltz suggests usually happens with long-term presidents (2007, 131). Both
of those scenarios do not bode well for the future of democracy in Nicaragua.
The recent developments on presidential term limits have given political scientists much
to discuss in regards to the development, or regression in some cases, of democracy in Latin
America. While there are plenty of countries to choose from when studying term limits, I chose
Brazil and Nicaragua because of the similarities in their constitutional limits, as well as the
recent efforts in Nicaragua to get rid of term limits. My analysis of each country’s path for
democracy stressed the importance of elections where the opposition has a chance to win, and
alternation in power in assessing the quality of democracy in a country. I also drew from the
theory that term limits help to decrease incumbency advantage that, in turn, decrease the chance
of alternation in power. Brazil’s respect for the term limits therefore makes the future of
democracy in Brazil appear more hopeful, while Nicaragua’s plan to get rid of term limits casts a
shadow on the future of democracy there.

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References
Blake, Charles H. 2008. Politics in Latin America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Blount, Jeb. 2012. “Brazil’s ex-president Lula says he may run again.” Reuters, May 31.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/01/us-brazil-lula-future-
idUSBRE85005820120601
Castro, Ivan. 2013. “Nicaraguan committee passes change to remove presidential limits.”
Reuters, November 28. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/29/us-nicaragua-reform-
idUSBRE9AS02G20131129
Colburn, Forrest D., and Trejos, Alberto. (2010). “Democracy Undermined: Constitutional
Subterfuge in Latin America.” Dissent 57(3): 11-15. Doi: 10.1353/dss.0.0152
Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua. Title VIII, Chapter III, Art. 147.
De Souza, Amaury. 2011. “The Politics of Personality in Brazil.” Journal of Democracy 22(2):
75-88. doi: 10.1353/jod.2011.0024
Flores-Macías, Gustavo. 2013. “Mexico’s 2012 Elections: The Return of the PRI.” Journal of
Democracy 24(1): 128-141. doi: 10.1353/jod.2013.0006
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press. http://books.google.com/books?id=
IMjyTFG04JYC&pg=PR4&dq=samuel+huntington+third+wave&hl=en&sa=X&ei=y-
6gUrS5GoaKrgG374CQBw&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=samuel%20huntingt
on%20third%20wave&f=false
Lundell, Krister. 2011. “Accountability and Patterns of Alternation in Pluralitarian, Majoritarian
and Consensus Democracies.” Government and Opposition 46(2): 145–167. doi:
10.1111/j.1477-7053.2010.01334.x

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Maltz, Gideon. 2007. “The Case for Presidential Term Limits.” Journal of Democracy 18(1):
128-142. doi: 10.1353/jod.2007.0010
O’Donnell, Guillermo A. 2007. “The Perpetual Crises of Democracy.” Journal of Democracy
18(1): 5-11. doi: 10.1353/jod.2007.0012