The document discusses telework as a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), emphasizing that while employers are not obligated to offer telework programs, they must allow employees with disabilities equal opportunities if such programs exist. It highlights that reasonable accommodations may require modifying telework eligibility for disabled employees but notes that not all jobs can be performed effectively at home, especially those necessitating in-person interaction and supervision. The document cites case law indicating that requests for work-from-home accommodations are often viewed as extraordinary and granted only in exceptional circumstances.

1. [ii] Work at Home
For individuals who have great trouble traveling, arranging for alternative worksites, such as at a
person’s home, may be a reasonable accommodation. Because computer equipment and telecopiers can
transmit information over telephone lines, establishing an alternative worksite may prove quite feasible
for some types of jobs, especially jobs that do not require frequent personal contact among employees.29
EEOC’s Position on Telework
Although many employers have established telework or telecommuting programs for their
employees, the EEOC has advised that the ADA does not require employers to offer such programs.29.1
Nevertheless, if an employer does offer a telework program for its employees, an employer must allow
employees with disabilities an “equal opportunity” to participate in the program.29.2
In addition, as a
reasonable accommodation, the EEOC has opined that the ADA may require an employer to waive
certain eligibility requirements or otherwise modify its telework program for an employee with a
disability who needs to work at home.
#Comment Begins
EXAMPLE
ABC Company has an established telework program. In order to be eligible, an employee must
have worked for ABC at least one year. Jane Jones is a new employee. She has a mobility disability that
makes it difficult for her to perform her job five days a week at ABC’s offices. Jane could perform her job
at home and but for the one year eligibility rule, would be able to participate in ABC’s telework program.
As a reasonable accommodation, ABC may need to waive its one-year rule for Jane.29.3
#Comment Ends
Even if an employer does not have an established telework or telecommuting program, the ADA’s
reasonable accommodation requirement may obligate an employer to allow an employee to work at home,
even if the employer does not allow other employees to telework or telecommute. The EEOC has taken
the position in its Enforcement Guidance on reasonable accommodation that “an employer must modify
29
Id. at 126.
See also Langon v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (reasonable
accommodation may involve allowing computer programmer with MS to work at home).
But see Heaser v. Toro Company, 247 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming lower court’s grant of summary judgment
that allowing former marketing services coordinator with multiple chemical sensitivities and allergies to work at
home was not feasible where computer software necessary for former employee’s position could not have been used
through remote access to employer’s computer systems and former employee failed to dispute that due to her
medical condition, she could not work with carbonless paper, printed literature, and copiers that were central to her
job).
29.1
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Work at Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation (2003),
Question 1, available at http://eeoc.gov/facts/telework.html.
29.2
Id.
29.3
This example is taken from EEOC, Work at Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation.

2. its policy concerning where work is performed if such a change is needed as a reasonable
accommodation.”30
Thus, an employer may be required to allow an individual with a disability to work at
home, but “only if this accommodation would be effective and would not cause an undue hardship.”31
The EEOC’s Guidance acknowledges, however, that the essential functions of some jobs cannot be
performed at home. Critical to the analysis is consideration of “the employer’s ability to adequately
supervise the employee and the employee’s need to work with certain equipment that cannot be replicated
at home.”32
#Comment Begins
PRACTICE POINTER
The EEOC has advised that “critical considerations” in determining whether or not it would be a
reasonable accommodation to allow a disabled employee to work at home include the following:
• whether there is a need for face-to-face interaction and coordination of work with other employees;
• whether in-person interaction with outside colleagues, clients or customers is necessary; and
• whether the position in question requires the employee to have limited access to documents or other
information located only in the workplace.32.1
#Comment Ends#Comment Begins
EXAMPLE
Jane Jones, who has a mobility impairment, is an employee of ABC Company. Because of her
impairment, Jane requests that she be able to work at home two days a week. Jane’s job involves some
contact and coordination with other employees of ABC Company. Given the nature of her job, however,
contact and coordination with other employees could be achieved effectively by telephone and e-mail. In
this situation, ABC would violate the ADA if it denied Jane’s request to work at home solely because her
job involves some contact with other employees.32.2
#Comment Ends
Case Law Addressing Telework
Although the EEOC supports working at home as a reasonable accommodation, present case law
supports the view that working at home is an extraordinary accommodation and is warranted only in
30
EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation, Question 33, infra Appendix S.
31
EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation, infra Appendix S.
32
Id.
32.1
See EEOC, Work at Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation, Question 4.
32.2
See EEOC, Work at Home/Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation, Question 4.

3. exceptional cases. Because most jobs involve team work under supervision, which cannot be performed at
home without a reduction in the quality of the employee’s job performance, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration found that an employer would not be
required to accommodate an individual with a disability by allowing unsupervised work at home. The
court acknowledged that advances in communications technology may change the need for interaction
among employees and personal supervision, but at the present time, most jobs cannot be accomplished by
an employee working at home alone.33
Accordingly, present case law supports the view that working at home is an extraordinary
accommodation and is warranted only in exceptional cases.33.1
That working at home normally is not
33
Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995) (“reasonable accommodation almost
never requires an employer to allow a disabled employee to work at home”); Tyndall v. National Education Centers,
31 F.3d 209, 213–14 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that allowing plaintiff to work at home was not a reasonable
accommodation); Law v. United States Postal Service, 852 F.2d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (decided under
Rehabilitation Act); Gits v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20871, 12 AD Cases
(BNA) 645 (D. Minn. June 15, 2001) (employee’s request to work at home was unreasonable because he was a team
leader and such a position involves team work under supervision); Davis v. Lockheed Martin Operations, 84 F.
Supp. 2d 707 (D. Md. 2000) (“the ADA does not require an employer to allow an employee to telecommute when
no comparable employee does so, and when the essential functions of that employee’s position require her presence
in the office. Employers do not risk liability for discrimination when they decline to take ‘cutting edge approaches to
workplace innovations.’ ”); Wojciechowski v. Emergency Technical Services, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3740 (N.D.
Ill. 1997) (“generally, an employer is not required to offer a work at home accommodation.”); Whillock v. Delta Air
Lines, 926 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ga. 1995), aff’d, 86 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 1996) (“the ADA does not require that
defendant abandon the essential function of attendance at the job to accommodate plaintiff. If the only
accommodation, which would allow plaintiff to perform the essential functions of her job is allowing her to work at
home, plaintiff is not an ‘otherwise qualified individual with a disability’ under the terms of the ADA.”).
See also Larranaga v. Department of Commerce, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15519 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d sub nom.
Larranaga v. Department of Commerce, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15519 (allowing an employee to work offsite or
freelance at home as an accommodation was not required due to the importance of face-to-face interaction between
employee and co-workers).
Cf. Davis v. Guardian Life Insurance, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 719 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2000) (question of fact for jury
as to whether plaintiff’s presence at office twice a week was essential to fulfilling her job requirements; although
“attendance is normally an essential element of any job … every day attendance may not always be an essential
element of a job.”).
But see Waggoner v. Olin Corporation, 169 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[i]n some jobs—though almost certainly not
in production jobs … working at home for a time might be an option. However, in evaluating any requests of
accommodation, the issue will be whether the hardship imposed on the employer by it is ‘undue.’ ”).
33.1
See Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 867 (6th Cir. 1997) (disabled sales representative’s request for an at-
home accommodation was unreasonable under the ADA because the employee “failed to present any facts
indicating that his was one of those exceptional cases where he could have ‘performed at home without a substantial
reduction in [the] quality of [his] performance.’ ”) (quoting Vande Zande v. Wisconsin of Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d
538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995); Nanette v. Snow, 343 F. Supp. 2d 465, 474 (D. Md. 2004) (where essential functions of
job of program analyst required office meetings and personal interaction with customers, work from home was not a
required reasonable accommodation) (decided under 1973 Rehabilitation Act); Lalla v. Consolidated Edison
Company of New York, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5312, 12 AD Cases (BNA) 892 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2001) (disabled
former employee failed to prove that working on computer database from home would be a reasonable
accommodation where employer denied that it had any work-at-home program and plaintiff could not identify any
other employee permitted to work from home); Parker v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 141, 150
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Parker has offered no support for the proposition that a reasonable accommodation includes

4. feasible, was emphasized by the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Heaser v. Toro Company, where an
employee suffering from various health problems, including severe allergies, fibromyalgia, and multiple
chemical sensitivities sought to work at home as a reasonable accommodation.33.2
The employee
contended that allowing her to work from home would be a reasonable accommodation because she could
log onto the employer’s computer system from her home and perform her tasks as a marketing services
coordinator. She contended that she could complete the majority of her work duties by computer or by
phone. Notwithstanding the employee’s contentions, the Eighth Circuit held that in this instance, the
ADA did not require work at home as a reasonable accommodation because doing so would have
obligated the employer to change its overall manner of conducting business to accommodate the
employee.
Similarly, in Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
it would not be a reasonable accommodation to allow an employee suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder to work at home because physical attendance in the work place constituted an essential function
of the employee’s job as a service coordinator.33.3
In so holding, the Tenth Circuit noted that the service
coordinator position was a low level hourly position that was administrative in nature and required both
supervision and teamwork. Although the plaintiff contended that she could perform her job functions at
home using a computer, telephone and fax machine, the court found that the employer had established
that it could not adequately supervise the plaintiff if she were at home. As explained by the court of
appeals, “although [the employer] could tell [if the plaintiff] was logged onto her computer, [the
employee’s] supervisors would not be able to ascertain what she was doing while logged into the
computer. [The plaintiff] could, for example, engage in any number of non-work related activities while
logged into her computer without [the employer’s] knowledge … . At a time when employers are
justifiably concerned with productivity at the workplace, we are in no position to second guess [the
employer’s] desire to directly supervise its lower level employees.”33.4
The Tenth Circuit also found that
the employer had presented “significant evidence demonstrating team work as an essential function of the
service coordinator position because the coordinators typically assist in covering for one another in a job
even [the plaintiff] described as ‘very hectic’ ”33.5
The court rejected the plaintiff’s suggestion that other
service coordinators could “pick up the slack” while she worked from home as being “simply irrelevant in
determining whether teamwork is an essential function of the job.”33.6
In other decisions, the courts also have concluded that a request to work at home is unreasonable
working from one’s home. Indeed, a number of courts that considered the issue have reached the contrary
conclusion.”); Keck v. New York State Office of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 10 F. Supp. 2d 194, 201
(N.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding that being able to work from home would not be a reasonable accommodation for
employee with chemical sensitivities because of the difficulty of supervising an employee who works from home);
Misek-Falkoff v. IBM Corp., 854 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 60 F.3d 811 (2d Cir. 1995).
33.2
247 F.3d 826, 828–30 (8th Cir. 2001).
33.3
Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2004).
33.4
Id. at 1121.
33.5
Id.
33.6
Id.
According to the court, an accommodation that “would require other employees to work harder is unreasonable.” Id.
at n.3, citing Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995). See also Basith v. Cook County, 241
F.3d 919, 929 (7th Cir. 2001) (“it is possible that any function whether or not essential, could be assigned to
additional employees. The mere fact that others could do [plaintiff’s] work does not show that the work is non-
essential.”). See also supra Section 4.02[2] for a discussion of regular, predicable attendance at work as being an
essential job function.

5. because it would require the employer to eliminate an essential function of the job. In Kvorjak v. Maine, a
disabled employee who worked as a claims adjuster requested the accommodation of working at home on
a full-time, permanent basis.33.7
The First Circuit, deferring to the employer’s evidence that training and
team work were essential functions of the claims adjuster position, held that the employer was not
obligated to provide the accommodation because the employee could not perform the essential functions
of the position from home.33.8
Similarly, in Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., the Fifth Circuit had held
that a disabled loan analyst’s request for a “flex-time accommodation,” which ostensibly would have
allowed the employee to work from home, was unreasonable because his presence in the office was an
essential function of the loan analyst position.33.9
In EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., a divided Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reaffirmed
the rule that “regularly attending work on site is essential to most jobs, especially the interactive ones,”
and accordingly, an employer usually will not be legally required to allow a disabled employee to work
from home.1
<footnote 33.9.1> The appeals court upheld the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to Ford in a case brought by the EEOC on behalf of a former Ford employee, who worked as a resale steel
buyer and who claimed that the company had violated the ADA by denying her request to telecommute as
a reasonable accommodation for her disability. Writing for the eight judge court majority, Circuit Judge
David W. McKeague said that the circuit court was not “writ[ing] on a clean slate,” and that “[m]uch ink
has been spilled establishing a general rule that, with few exceptions ‘an employee who does not come to
work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise.’”2
<footnote 33.9.2> As the court
explained, there is a “good reason” for this general rule: “‘most jobs require the kind of teamwork,
personal interaction, and supervision that simply cannot be had in a home office situation.’”3
<footnote
33.9.3> Accordingly, as the en banc majority held: “Regular, in-person attendance is an essential function
– and a prerequisite to essential functions – of most jobs, especially the interactive ones.”4
<footnote
33.7
Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 2001).
33.8
Id. at 57–58.
33.9
Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 726–27 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
1
EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 761 (6th
Cir. 2015).
2
782 F.3d at 761, quoting EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., 253 F.3d 943, 948 (7th
Cir. 2001) (en banc). The general
rule that regular predictable onsite attendance is an essential requirement for most jobs was confirmed by what
Circuit Judge McKeague characterized as the “sometimes-forgotten guide” of “common sense.” According to the
court, “[n]on-lawyers would readily understand that regular onsite attendance is required for interactive jobs.” Id. at
762.
3
782 F.3d 761, quoting Raulen v. United States Tobacco Mfg. L.P., 319 F.3d 891, 896 (7th
Cir. 2003). This general
rule, according to Circuit Judge McKeague, “aligns with the text of the ADA,” which recognizes the employer’s
“judgment” and “written [job] description” in determining what types of functions are deemed essential. 782 F.3d at
761-62, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The court also found that the EEOC’s regulatory definition of what constitutes
essential job functions includes factors that “point toward finding regular and predictable on-site attendance
essential.” Id. at 762. Factors such as the amount of time performing a job function or the consequences of failing to
perform the function, in the court’s view, all counsel in favor of regular and predictable on-site attendance being an
essential function. As Circuit Judge McKeague explained, “[m]ost of one’s work time is spent at work, and many
interactive functions simply cannot be performed offsite.” Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, the court found that
the consequences of failing to show up for work “can be severe.” Id.
4
Id. at 762-63. In dissent, Circuit Judge Karen Nelson Moore, writing for herself and four other circuit court
judges, contended there was sufficient evidence to rebut Ford’s contention that the employee’s resale steel buyer job
required a great deal of face-to-face teamwork because the evidence showed that even when the employee was in the
office, she performed 95 per cent of her job duties using the phone or through email. Id. at 772. Moreover,

6. 33.9.4>
Some courts, however, have taken the position that the jury should determine whether work at
home is a reasonable accommodation in specific situations. In one case holding that a triable issue existed
as to the reasonableness of working at home as an ADA accommodation, Humphrey v. Memorial Hosps.
Association, the Ninth Circuit emphasized there was evidence in the record that the essential functions of
the employment position could be performed at home.33.10
The case was brought by a disabled medical
transcriptionist who sought to perform her job duties with an at-home work accommodation. In allowing
the case to proceed to trial, the court of appeals explained that “[w]orking at home is a reasonable
accommodation when the essential functions of the position can be performed at home and a work-at-
home arrangement would not cause undue hardship for the employer.”33.11
In assessing the evidence on
summary judgment, the circuit court found that “physical attendance at [the employer’s] offices [was] not
an essential job duty” because, according to the court, “the record [made] it clear that [the employer]
permitt[ed] some of its medical transcriptionists to work at home.”33.12
In Woodruff v. Peters, the District of Columbia Circuit also ruled that a triable issue of fact existed
as to whether or not an employee who had undergone back surgery and a long recuperation period could
perform the essential functions of his job with a flexible schedule including work at home.33.13
In so
ruling, the court noted that the agency’s telecommuting handbook had anticipated that employees may
telecommute as frequently as five days a week, that the federal agency previously had allowed the
employee to telecommute two days a week and have a flexible work schedule, and, finally, that the
employee’s description of the team he led indicated that it was mostly “self directed,” which, the court
noted, suggested that the employee did not have to be physically present in the office.”33.14
Given these
facts, the circuit court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the federal
agency because there remained “a genuine issue of material fact” as to whether the accommodations
sought by the employee were reasonable and did not constitute an undue hardship to the federal
agency.33.15
according to Judge Moore, at the present time, “fast and effective electronic communication” means that “it should
no longer be assumed that teamwork must be done in person.” Id. at 776. By denying a trial on the issue, Judge
Moore cautioned that the majority’s opinion “sets a problematic precedent for other failure to accommodate cases.”
Id.
33.10
Humphrey v. Memorial Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1011 (2002).
33.11
239 F.3d at 1136.
33.12
Id. at 1137.
33.13
482 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
33.14
Id. at 528.
33.15
Id.