The document discusses key considerations for developing countries regarding spectrum auctions. It notes that while auctions can efficiently allocate spectrum, developing countries must carefully consider how auction rules and pricing can impact investment, competition, and consumer prices. The document outlines factors such as balancing incentives for investment with public interests, setting an appropriate reserve price to avoid unsold spectrum or dampened investment, and ensuring competition through caps or trader rules.
SmartestEnergy: Introduction to the Electricity MarketFrancesca Schoultz
At the Scottish Renewables, Continued Professional Development Event on 6th July 2016, Iain Robertson, Generation Sales Manager presented an Introduction to the Electricity Market which covered: What is a PPA, How is power traded and the role of ELEXON.
SmartestEnergy: Introduction to the Electricity MarketFrancesca Schoultz
At the Scottish Renewables, Continued Professional Development Event on 6th July 2016, Iain Robertson, Generation Sales Manager presented an Introduction to the Electricity Market which covered: What is a PPA, How is power traded and the role of ELEXON.
Philip bates - Analysys Mason - spectrum policy forum 29 march 2018techUK
Overview of Analysys Mason 2012 study on the value of spectrum to the UK economy
Presentation to UK Spectrum Policy Forum - Cluster 3: Economic and Social Value of Spectrum
29 March 2018
Philip Bates
More information on the UK Spectrum Policy Forum can be found here: https://www.techuk.org/about/uk-spectrum-policy-forum
Tony lavender - Plum Consulting - incorporating social value into spectrum al...techUK
Incorporating Social Value into Spectrum Allocation Decisions
Presentation to UK Spectrum Policy Forum - Cluster 3: Economic and Social Value of Spectrum
29 March 2018
Tony Lavender
More information on the UK Spectrum Policy Forum can be found here: https://www.techuk.org/about/uk-spectrum-policy-forum
Garret Farrelly, head of the Energy and Infrastructure Group, wrote an article on the I-SEM Capacity Remuneration Mechanism for the Energy Ireland Yearbook 2016.
This article first appeared in the Energy Ireland Yearbook 2016.
Electricity Markets Regulation - Lesson 8 - PricingLeonardo ENERGY
Once the revenue requirements are established they should be converted into tariff systems. This session explains the major economic principles of electricity pricing and the general pricing models using average and marginal costs. Moreover the session explores the major pricing models for the electricity activities including: generation, transmission, distribution and retail activities.
* Pricing principles : economic efficiency - cost recovery
* General pricing models : average cost pricing - marginal cost pricing
* Cost allocation issue
* Pricing for different activities in the electricity industry : generation pricing - transmission pricing - distribution pricing - retail supply pricing
Electricity Markets Regulation - Lesson 2 - Market DesignLeonardo ENERGY
This section explains the main properties of different types of electricity markets exhibiting different level of competition and different forms of organisation.
• General market models : vertically integrated companies / single buyer / wholesale competition / retail competition
• Power pools : Price based / Cost based
• Markets with bilateral trade
• Balancing markets
• Power exchanges
UK Spectrum Policy Forum – Greg Bensberg, Digital 3&4 - Public and Social val...techUK
UK Spectrum Policy Forum
Cluster 3 Meeting – 17 September 2014
Greg Bensberg, General Manager, Digital 3&4
Public and Social value of DTT & PMSE services
More information at: http://www.techuk.org/about/uk-spectrum-policy-forum
All rights reserved
Electricity Markets Regulation - Lesson 1 - Regulation General PrinciplesLeonardo ENERGY
This session explains the main tasks of regulation and addresses three main questions: what is regulated, where is it regulated, and how is it regulated.
In addition, we explain how the communication between regulators and regulated companies is organised, and how the regulatory performance is measured.
• General tasks of regulators: Price, Quality, Market functioning
• Areas of regulation
• Scope of regulation
• Methods of regulation
• Institutional questions
• Consultation and communication
• Regulatory performance : External performance, Internal Performance
This session explains the nature of economic regulation. It discusses the central question why some parts of the electricity value chain remain regulated and are not subject to competition.
Furthermore, four main issues regarding an adequate regulatory regime are addressed:
· Areas: Where should be regulated?
· Scope: What should be regulated?
· Type: How should be regulated?
· Institutions: Who should regulate?
Special emphasis is put on the types of regulation respectively the different forms of price control and their effects (advantages / disadvantages) – including incentive regulation. A short overview on the current legislation and application of price control in the EU completes the session.
The impact of fixed mobile costs on competition policyroberto ercole
This paper looks at the impact of mobile fixed costs spectrum policy designed to increase competition, and promote coverage. Because of the high fixed costs in mobile there is a tension between increasing the number of operators using spectrum caps or reserving licenses in an auction vs productive efficiency.
This is examined for Saudi Arabia.
The paper was published by www.gtprn.org in November 2020.
Smart Regulation and Competition Policy in Electric and Telecommunications Ma...Mercatus Center
Jerry Ellig participates in a panel discussion before Texas policy makers in Austin, Texas at the Texas Public Policy Foundation's Policy Orientation on the future of the Texas Public Utility Commission and competition policy in electric and telecommunications markets.
Philip bates - Analysys Mason - spectrum policy forum 29 march 2018techUK
Overview of Analysys Mason 2012 study on the value of spectrum to the UK economy
Presentation to UK Spectrum Policy Forum - Cluster 3: Economic and Social Value of Spectrum
29 March 2018
Philip Bates
More information on the UK Spectrum Policy Forum can be found here: https://www.techuk.org/about/uk-spectrum-policy-forum
Tony lavender - Plum Consulting - incorporating social value into spectrum al...techUK
Incorporating Social Value into Spectrum Allocation Decisions
Presentation to UK Spectrum Policy Forum - Cluster 3: Economic and Social Value of Spectrum
29 March 2018
Tony Lavender
More information on the UK Spectrum Policy Forum can be found here: https://www.techuk.org/about/uk-spectrum-policy-forum
Garret Farrelly, head of the Energy and Infrastructure Group, wrote an article on the I-SEM Capacity Remuneration Mechanism for the Energy Ireland Yearbook 2016.
This article first appeared in the Energy Ireland Yearbook 2016.
Electricity Markets Regulation - Lesson 8 - PricingLeonardo ENERGY
Once the revenue requirements are established they should be converted into tariff systems. This session explains the major economic principles of electricity pricing and the general pricing models using average and marginal costs. Moreover the session explores the major pricing models for the electricity activities including: generation, transmission, distribution and retail activities.
* Pricing principles : economic efficiency - cost recovery
* General pricing models : average cost pricing - marginal cost pricing
* Cost allocation issue
* Pricing for different activities in the electricity industry : generation pricing - transmission pricing - distribution pricing - retail supply pricing
Electricity Markets Regulation - Lesson 2 - Market DesignLeonardo ENERGY
This section explains the main properties of different types of electricity markets exhibiting different level of competition and different forms of organisation.
• General market models : vertically integrated companies / single buyer / wholesale competition / retail competition
• Power pools : Price based / Cost based
• Markets with bilateral trade
• Balancing markets
• Power exchanges
UK Spectrum Policy Forum – Greg Bensberg, Digital 3&4 - Public and Social val...techUK
UK Spectrum Policy Forum
Cluster 3 Meeting – 17 September 2014
Greg Bensberg, General Manager, Digital 3&4
Public and Social value of DTT & PMSE services
More information at: http://www.techuk.org/about/uk-spectrum-policy-forum
All rights reserved
Electricity Markets Regulation - Lesson 1 - Regulation General PrinciplesLeonardo ENERGY
This session explains the main tasks of regulation and addresses three main questions: what is regulated, where is it regulated, and how is it regulated.
In addition, we explain how the communication between regulators and regulated companies is organised, and how the regulatory performance is measured.
• General tasks of regulators: Price, Quality, Market functioning
• Areas of regulation
• Scope of regulation
• Methods of regulation
• Institutional questions
• Consultation and communication
• Regulatory performance : External performance, Internal Performance
This session explains the nature of economic regulation. It discusses the central question why some parts of the electricity value chain remain regulated and are not subject to competition.
Furthermore, four main issues regarding an adequate regulatory regime are addressed:
· Areas: Where should be regulated?
· Scope: What should be regulated?
· Type: How should be regulated?
· Institutions: Who should regulate?
Special emphasis is put on the types of regulation respectively the different forms of price control and their effects (advantages / disadvantages) – including incentive regulation. A short overview on the current legislation and application of price control in the EU completes the session.
The impact of fixed mobile costs on competition policyroberto ercole
This paper looks at the impact of mobile fixed costs spectrum policy designed to increase competition, and promote coverage. Because of the high fixed costs in mobile there is a tension between increasing the number of operators using spectrum caps or reserving licenses in an auction vs productive efficiency.
This is examined for Saudi Arabia.
The paper was published by www.gtprn.org in November 2020.
Smart Regulation and Competition Policy in Electric and Telecommunications Ma...Mercatus Center
Jerry Ellig participates in a panel discussion before Texas policy makers in Austin, Texas at the Texas Public Policy Foundation's Policy Orientation on the future of the Texas Public Utility Commission and competition policy in electric and telecommunications markets.
Spectrum liberalisation and technology neutral licencesroberto ercole
how spectrum liberalisation needs flexible technology neutral licensing to work effectively, but the tension this has with the benefits of harmonisation and harmful interference control. The paper looks at the example of Europe and how this principle used WAPECS to do this.
On June 7, 2018, Members of Parliament Oleksandr Dombrovsky and Lev Pidlysetskii submitted a draft law "On Amendments to the Laws of Ukraine on Ensuring Competitive Conditions for the Production of Electricity from Alternative Energy Sources" (No. 8449).
During the next two weeks seven more alternative bills of authorship of various parliamentary groups were introduced to parliament, some of the parliamentarians signed up to more than one text. 5 draft laws unite deputies from different political factions, and 3 others - with sole authorship. The authors of 7 of the 8 bills propose the introduction of state support for RES on the basis of auctions.
The details for a new state support scheme were discussed in August-September 2018 within several working groups, with active involvement of DiXi Group analysts. After the discussion process stalled, several industry associations signed a joint memorandum on 30th of October on key positions they support to be stipulated in the new Law.
The DiXi Group experts analyzed all draft laws and changes proposed by the parliamentarians. The analytical report describes the positive aspects of the bills, identifies the potential risks and contains suggestions on how to reduce them.
The publication is issued within the framework of the Think Tank Development Initiative for Ukraine, implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation in partnership with the Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE) with the fnancial support of the Embassy of Sweden to Ukraine.
Innovation and spectrum regulation and property rights : IEEE DySpan paper 2005roberto ercole
A paper from 2005.
This paper looks at the regulatory changes that are required to allow technologies such as quick and easy access to radio spectrum. Without such changes it will not be possible for DySPAN technologies to make the inroads into the market, that are required to ensure spectrum is used with the optimum economic efficiency. This access to market requires greater use of a technology neutral spectrum property right.
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1542663?denied=
Abhaya Sumanasena - Real Wireless - Spectrum Options techUK
Presentations from the SPF Cluster 2 & 3: Release Mechanisms & Flexible Spectrum Access workshop on 21 May 2018
More information about the UK Spectrum Policy Forum is available here.
http://www.techuk.org/about/uk-spectrum-policy-forum
Licensed shared access: A report for the UK Spectrum Policy ForumtechUK
techUK, on behalf of the UK Spectrum Policy Forum (SPF), commissioned this study on spectrum sharing and Licensed Shared Access (LSA) to make proposals for the most acceptable specification for LSA for the UK.
The main focus of this course is on the introduction, characterisation and analysis of renewable energy support schemes and instruments.
A variety of promotion strategies for renewable energy sources in the electricity sector (RES-E) have been implemented in EU Member States. The main ones are price-based feed-in tariffs or premiums and quantity-based quota systems using tradable green certificates. Much work has been devoted to the motivation for and evaluation of these instruments, mostly in the form of country/local case studies, model simulations, or econometric modeling. The main drivers behind these policies are addressing the externalities of the environmentally harmful emissions of electricity generation and stimulating technological innovation. The most frequently used evaluation criteria of policies are their effectiveness and economic efficiency.
Andrew Barendse of Telkom SA discusses the need and actuality of broadband deployment and regulatory approaches in Africa with particular reference to South Africa
Mahmoud Zaghalil, Director of Regulatory Affairs at Zain in Jordan discusses how governments and policymakers should promote and incentivize broadband development and rollout
Similar to Spectrum allocation: auctions for developing countries (20)
2. Summary
Spectrum is a scarce resource that is critical for the development of a nation
Arguably, the most efficient allocation is through spectrum auctions
However, for a developing country that is considering spectrum auction, it needs to
consult widely on the following:
Incentives that can encourage investment need to be balanced with public policy
objectives
Administrative allocation vs market-based allocation
Effects of high spectrum price on investment and consumer prices
Measures to ensure competition
3. Spectrum regulation
In allocating scarce spectrum, the regulator has to balance between many different
objectives and many stakeholders
Transparency is paramount: every action must be transparent
Non-discrimination must be seen to be upheld
Consultation with stakeholders is critical on:
The spectrum roadmap
The method and rules to allocate spectrum (i.e. beauty contest, auctions)
The spectrum licence details
This is essential to ensure certainty in the industry and would encourage
investment and ultimately benefit end-users
Source: wik-Consult (2005), Study for the Federal Network Agency: Towards more flexible spectrum regulation, pp.6,7
4. Balancing between objectives
Market-based incentives
Granting operators technology
neutral licences
For example: allowing 4G networks to
be deployed on 900MHz or 1800MHz
spectrum (originally for 2G spectrum)
Sufficiently long licences
This will ensure allow operators to be
able use the spectrum and have
certainty in recouping investment
Hence, this leads to continual
investment and upgrading of
networks and allow end users to
enjoy the benefits
Public interests
Public interest requirements to be met
For example: spectrum set aside for
emergency services, military and other
uses for public interests
For example: rural coverage may be
important for regulators but there is less
commercial incentive for operators
Interference to be minimized
For example: use of frequencies for
different services may lead to
interference
Hence, the freedom of use of spectrum
by different operators needs to be
balanced with public interests
Source: wik-Consult (2005), Study for the Federal Network Agency: Towards more flexible spectrum regulation, pp.6,7,14
5. Spectrum allocation mechanisms
Administrative allocation Market-based allocation
The price is set by the market - involves
spectrum auctions and spectrum
trading (in secondary market)
More efficient allocation of spectrum as
it is allocated to the operator that most
highly values it
Theoretically this means that the
operator that won at an optimal market
price will not immediately sell it off and
obtain windfall gain
Potentially free from political
interference
However, the regulator can influence
the prices through setting the reserve
prices (for example)
The regulator set the price based on
recovery of cost for spectrum
management
For example: costs to issue spectrum
licences, maintain databases, conduct
spectrum monitoring, international
coordination and enforcement
Administrative incentive pricing can
also be used
This reflects the opportunity cost of
spectrum while also incorporates
incentives and is used in the UK.
Developing countries start with this
method and later move to market-
based approach
Source: ITU(2017), Guidelines for the review of spectrum pricing methodologies and the preparation of spectrum fee
schedules, pp.3,4,13
6. Spectrum pricing principles (based on ITU
recommendation)
All users should pay spectrum charge which is:
Calculated fairly and without discrimination
Be proportionate to the amount of bandwidth used
Reflect value to society (i.e. frequencies used for public services may be subject to lower
charges)
Spectrum users should be consulted on adjustments in charge
The pricing structure:
Should be clear, transparent and comprehensive
Should reflect scarcity of spectrum and level of demand
The cost of spectrum regulation should not be born by the state
The spectrum charge should be used to recover costs of spectrum regulation and not to
maximize government revenue
The spectrum charges should be specified in law
Source: wik-Consult (2005), Study for the Federal Network Agency: Towards more flexible spectrum regulation, pp.36-37
7. Spectrum price components
These components should be considered in an aggregate manner:
Upfront reserve price – Some countries such as Sweden and Germany set modest but
non-trivial to deter frivolous bids; others such as France set reserve price closer to
perceived value of spectrum
Competitive premium – This is determined by the market, often used in combination with
upfront reserve price
Annual fees – These cover the administrative cost of managing spectrum
Upfront reserve
price
Competitive
premium
(in auction, if any)
Annual fees
Source: GSMA (2017), Effective Spectrum Pricing: Supporting better quality and more affordable
mobile services, p.2
Source: GSMA (2017), Effective Spectrum Pricing: Supporting better quality and more affordable mobile services, p.2, 3
8. Effects of high spectrum price
Dampens investment incentives
Too high spectrum reserve prices can
result in spectrum being unsold
(depriving consumers of benefits)
For example: France’s 3G auction in
2000 where there was difficulty to
allocate the 3rd and 4th licences
Reduces return of investment to
operators resulting in overall
reduction in investment
GSMA’s study found a correlation
between lower spectrum costs and
higher wireless scores (i.e. in terms of
coverage, number of subscribers and
average speed) (p.29)
Spectrum cost is an important factor
in differentiating network investment
of different countries
Increases consumer prices
Too high spectrum reserve price
favours the incumbent to the
detriment of new entrants or smaller
competitors
For example: Smaller Mexican
operators bought lesser spectrum (or
did not participate) in Mexico’s 2016
AWS auction
High spectrum prices combined with
lack of competition could result in
higher prices paid by consumers
GSMA’s study found a correlation
between lower spectrum costs and
lower consumer prices for data
services (p.31)
Higher spectrum costs directly affect
competition between operators
Source: GSMA (2017), Effective Spectrum Pricing: Supporting better quality and more affordable mobile services,
pp.13,14,29,31,40,42,45
9. Ensuring competition in market
Preventing a monopoly of spectrum
being held by a single operator (i.e.
the incumbent)
Spectrum hoarding that prevents
others from using it
Impose spectrum caps or create
certain licences with a fixed minimum
amount of spectrum;
Rules on spectrum trading
The regulator can withdraw spectrum
usage rights
Source: wik-Consult (2005), Study for the Federal Network Agency: Towards more flexible spectrum regulation, pp.32-36
10. Concluding remarks
Spectrum allocation and in particular, spectrum auctions are complex in nature
This is because the regulator has to balance between many different opposing
objectives
Learning from other countries’ success stories is a starting point:
The criticality of ensuring a transparent and non-discriminatory process
The importance of spectrum price (spectrum reserve price and annual fees) on
investment and consumer prices
The safeguarding of competition in the market
Balancing with other public interests
11. Bibliography
GSMA (2017), Effective Spectrum Pricing: Supporting better quality and more
affordable mobile services
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (2016), Guidelines for the review of
spectrum pricing methodologies and the preparation of spectrum fee schedules
wik-Consult (2005), Study for the Federal Network Agency: Towards more flexible
spectrum regulation