Brady C. Blackner worked for nearly two years as one of 20+ site workers for Scott MacDonald at the Utah Test and Training Range on the JLENS program. Brady stood out for his ability to handle pressure, manage time, learn and train, organize and plan, communicate, and work as a team member and leader. Brady took on increasing responsibilities, eventually becoming the team lead directing a crew of five or more. Notably, Brady helped develop ground-based aerostat de-icing equipment that proved highly effective and reduced costs. In summary, Brady is a very dependable and dedicated worker capable of leading a team within his skill set.
Running head DEEPWATER HORIZON INCIDENT CASE ANALYSIS .docxtodd271
Running head: DEEPWATER HORIZON INCIDENT CASE ANALYSIS 1
DEEPWATER HORIZON INCIDENT CASE ANALYSIS 5
Deepwater Horizon Incident Case Analysis
Name
Institution
Date
Deepwater Horizon Incident Case Analysis
Key Issues Identified in the Case
Despite BP best efforts to maintain security at the rig, repairs at the Deepwater Horizon rig were intentionally delayed. The company failed to comply with best practices relating to the safety of rigs, which significantly increased the risk of the rig malfunctioning, which could result in a major security incident. Key parts of the rig were for example never taken to dry land for checks and repairs, despite the fact that a number of employees working on the rig pointed out this fact to management (Ingersoll, Locke, & Reavis, 2010). Instead, the company selected to rely on workarounds for needed repairs, which could not be a long term solution that could guarantee safety. In addition to the hardware problems that were being experienced by the rig, employees at the rig also reported a number of software problems to management that were not addressed. BP as the managing organization for the risk selected to withhold repairs for the rig, which significantly increased the risk of key sections of the rig failing and resulting in a major safety incident.
BP also adopted an overly aggressive operations strategy that selected to ignore a number of operating risks at the rig that could adversely affect operations. Operations at the Macondo Well were considered to be highly risky due to the elevated levels of gas at the well that posed major challenges to drilling. Despite the fact that BP was aware of this, they still selected to proceed with drilling, choosing instead to use modern technology as a way of minimizing the possibility of a security incident (Ingersoll, Locke, & Reavis, 2010). Risk management was therefore not a key concern for the company, despite the key safety risks that were facing the company and its operations. The company also ignored key risks in the design of the well, for example, the process of cementing the well that was supposed to take hours was completed in only 30 minutes, and safety checks that were supposed to confirm the integrity of key structures were intentionally ignored, despite being recommended by employees. In addition, the company did not have an effective disaster management plan, as shown by the ineffective response by the company to the incident.
The management of operations at the rig was also not efficiently conducted, which in a major way contributed to the disaster. Despite BP’s ownership and managing interests in the project, key decisions about the different aspects of the project were supposed to be made by the eleven different organizations involved in the project. Unfortunately, there were no clear consultation processes as relates to decision making on k.
Running head DEEPWATER HORIZON INCIDENT CASE ANALYSIS .docxtodd271
Running head: DEEPWATER HORIZON INCIDENT CASE ANALYSIS 1
DEEPWATER HORIZON INCIDENT CASE ANALYSIS 5
Deepwater Horizon Incident Case Analysis
Name
Institution
Date
Deepwater Horizon Incident Case Analysis
Key Issues Identified in the Case
Despite BP best efforts to maintain security at the rig, repairs at the Deepwater Horizon rig were intentionally delayed. The company failed to comply with best practices relating to the safety of rigs, which significantly increased the risk of the rig malfunctioning, which could result in a major security incident. Key parts of the rig were for example never taken to dry land for checks and repairs, despite the fact that a number of employees working on the rig pointed out this fact to management (Ingersoll, Locke, & Reavis, 2010). Instead, the company selected to rely on workarounds for needed repairs, which could not be a long term solution that could guarantee safety. In addition to the hardware problems that were being experienced by the rig, employees at the rig also reported a number of software problems to management that were not addressed. BP as the managing organization for the risk selected to withhold repairs for the rig, which significantly increased the risk of key sections of the rig failing and resulting in a major safety incident.
BP also adopted an overly aggressive operations strategy that selected to ignore a number of operating risks at the rig that could adversely affect operations. Operations at the Macondo Well were considered to be highly risky due to the elevated levels of gas at the well that posed major challenges to drilling. Despite the fact that BP was aware of this, they still selected to proceed with drilling, choosing instead to use modern technology as a way of minimizing the possibility of a security incident (Ingersoll, Locke, & Reavis, 2010). Risk management was therefore not a key concern for the company, despite the key safety risks that were facing the company and its operations. The company also ignored key risks in the design of the well, for example, the process of cementing the well that was supposed to take hours was completed in only 30 minutes, and safety checks that were supposed to confirm the integrity of key structures were intentionally ignored, despite being recommended by employees. In addition, the company did not have an effective disaster management plan, as shown by the ineffective response by the company to the incident.
The management of operations at the rig was also not efficiently conducted, which in a major way contributed to the disaster. Despite BP’s ownership and managing interests in the project, key decisions about the different aspects of the project were supposed to be made by the eleven different organizations involved in the project. Unfortunately, there were no clear consultation processes as relates to decision making on k.
1. Recommendation Letter for Brady C. Blackner
To whom it may concern,
I had the opportunity to work with Brady for nearly two years on the JLENS program at the Utah
Test and Training Range (UTTR) when I was the Site Manager. Brady, who was one of 20+ site
workers that reported to me, stood out among his peers because of his ability to handle
pressure, manage time, learn and train, organize and plan, communicate and work as a team
member and team leader.
Brady had a range of responsibilities for the aerostat operational and maintenance activity
which included launch, recovery, de-icing and preventive maintenance. He also provided
support for the Power Control and Distribution System (PCDS) and other site PMCS activities.
His major role was working with the aerostat to support both planned and unplanned events.
During this time he took on increasing levels of responsibility eventually becoming the team
lead which consisted of directing a crew size of five or more field service reps. This role
required working closely with both the Raytheon crew and the TCOM Flight Director and crew.
One notable achievement that is worth pointing out because it had very positive results for the
JLENS program was his part in the development of a ground based aerostat de-icing equipment.
This equipment was used extensively during snow and ice conditions. It provided a safe and
innovative solution for de-icing of the aerostat while reducing cost and usage of propylene
glycol. This proved to be highly effective in preventing the aerostat from hitting the ground
causing insurmountable damage and operational downtime.
In summary, Brady is a very dependable and dedicated worker. He is very capable of leading a
team within his skill set. I would be pleased to work with Brady again in the future.
Scott MacDonald
scott_f_macdonald@raytheon.com
RaytheonIDS
Sr. Principal SystemsEngineer