This document provides a summary of the causes of the current rhino poaching crisis and analyzes the effectiveness of enforcement efforts. It begins with acknowledgments and an abstract. The introduction provides historical context on rhino poaching and the traditional Chinese medicine market. It then examines the high demand from China, Hong Kong, and Vietnam for rhino horn in traditional medicine. Other contributing factors discussed include the political and economic instability in rhino range states due to civil war, corruption, and poverty. The document also analyzes negative attitudes that fuel poaching. It reviews international legislation and enforcement efforts in both consumer and supplier countries. Finally, it considers whether current law enforcement is effective and provides recommendations for the future, including education, conservation,

1. 1
HOW THE RHINOCEROS LOST ITS HORN
An Analysis of the Causes of the Current Rhino
Poaching Crisis and the Effectiveness of Enforcement
Exam Code: Z0922905
Date of Submission: 14/03/2013
Degree: BA Criminology
Word Count: 10,634

2. 2
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank all those who have supported me during the writing of this report.
In particular, I would like to give a special thanks to my Dissertation Supervisor Dr
Sam Hillyard, as without her guidance, this would not have been possible.

3. 3
Abstract
In the last five years, reports have shown that levels of rhino poaching in Africa have
increased to unprecedented levels, not seen since the poaching crisis of the 1980s. It
is suggested that the increasing demand from Southeast Asia for the usage of
rhinoceros horn in Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) is the major cause of this
recent spate in killing; coupled with the failure of African authorities that are often
too corrupt or impoverished to prevent poaching. There have been efforts to stop the
illegal poaching of rhino with many members of the CITES treaty ratifying their own
national legislations, but none of these have successfully deterred the poachers. In
order to combat rhino poaching, the underlying causes need to be addressed. TCM
consumers must be made aware and educated on the effects their consumption is
having on wildlife and governments must do more to deter people from engaging in
this criminal activity, by applying harsher sentences and improving policing via the
use of specialised units. Whilst this is occurring, conservation efforts need to continue
to ensure that rhino numbers do not dramatically decrease as they did before, by
fencing off more areas as reserves and trans-locating specimens to other areas in
order to establish more populations.

4. 4
Contents
Table of figures ...............................................................................................................5
Introduction ....................................................................................................................6
Historical Context of the Traditional Chinese Medicine Consumer Market..........................7
Historical Context of the Poaching of the African Rhinoceros.............................................9
Why are Rhino Poached?...............................................................................................10
High Demand for Traditional Medicine.......................................................................11
China....................................................................................................................12
Hong Kong ...........................................................................................................12
Vietnam................................................................................................................13
Political and Economic Instability of Rhino Range States.............................................15
Civil War..............................................................................................................15
Corruption.............................................................................................................17
Poverty.................................................................................................................19
Negative Attitudes towards Rhino Conservation ..........................................................21
Rhino Horn Consumers..........................................................................................21
Rhino Horn Suppliers ............................................................................................22
What is being done to curb the Illegal Poaching and Trade of Rhino?................................24
International Legislation - CITES...............................................................................24
International Legislation – Case Example of the United Kingdom.................................26
Consumer Enforcement – ASEAN-WEN....................................................................27
Consumer Enforcement – China and Vietnam .............................................................28
Supplier Enforcement – National Agendas ..................................................................29
Rhino Management Group .....................................................................................29
Lusaka Agreement.................................................................................................29
Supplier Enforcement – South Africa..........................................................................30
Are Current Law Enforcement Methods Effective?..........................................................31
What should be done in future to prevent the further increase of the rhino poaching crisis?.38
Education..................................................................................................................38
Conservation .............................................................................................................39
Intelligence ...............................................................................................................42
Appropriate Legislation .............................................................................................44
Conclusion....................................................................................................................45
Bibliography .................................................................................................................47

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Table of figures
Figure 1 - Scatter graphs depicting the numbers of black and white rhino adapted
from: 1895 through 1997 (Emslie and Brooks, 1999); 2007 (Milliken et al., 2009);
2010 (Save the Rhino International, 2013) ................................................................ 33
Figure 2 - A bar chart depicting the number of rhino poached in South Africa 2000-
2012 (adapted from Stop Rhino Poaching, 2012)...................................................... 34

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Introduction
The Rhinoceros has long been a flagship species for CITES, since the early inclusion
of 4 of the 5 subspecies on Appendix I in 1977 banned all international trade in the
animal and its parts (Leader-Williams, 1992). All subspecies have been poached to the
brink of extinction over the last century, 95% of which have been lost in the last 40
years, with 2/3 of the world’s rhinoceros population today residing only in South
Africa (Save the Rhino International, 2013). They are being killed primarily for their
horns, which are in high demand from China and Southeast Asia due to the ever-
growing traditional medicine market that believes rhino horn to be a cure for numerous
ailments, including fevers (Shaw, 2012). This demand has led to an alarming number
of poaching incidents, particularly in the last decade, with numbers still increasing. In
South Africa alone in 2012; 668 rhino were killed for their horns, nearly a 50%
increase on the 448 rhinos killed in 2011 (McGrath, 2013).
If this trend continues, it will mirror the poaching crisis of the 1980s when rhino
populations were decimated and eliminated from most of their range (‘t Sas-Rolfes,
2012). Lessons should have been learnt then as to how to manage and eventually
prevent the onset of poaching, but from the evidence it seems that most nations
involved have been wholly unprepared and could not foresee this event. Law
enforcement will be key to the prevention and policing of poaching, but at the moment
it is in desperate need of improvement due to the lack of protection it offers rhino and
the absence of a strong deterrent. This report will aim to scrutinise the efforts of both
supplier and consumer nations to put a stop to the killing, before suggesting what needs
to be done in future to ensure the poaching stops. Before this however, rhino horn

7. 7
poaching needs to be put into context and the underlying reasons for it need to be
established in order to understand what nations need to do in future.
The next section will describe the brief history of TCM and how it became a global
consumer market under the dictatorship of Chairman Mao, specifically referring to the
“Great Leap Forward”, a Communist regime which encouraged the mass migration of
many Chinese nationals in the 1960s.
Historical Context of the Traditional Chinese Medicine
Consumer Market
Traditional Chinese Medicine has become a global market over the last few decades,
now being practiced by millions of people worldwide. It originated in China millennia
ago, being practiced as early as 200BC (Leader-Williams, 2003). The question that
needs to be posed is: how did this localised tradition become a global phenomenon
that has led to the near-extinction of several wildlife species?
The globalisation of traditional medicine seems to have taken off under the influence
of Chairman Mao. In “The Great Leap Forward” (1958-1963), Mao aimed to transform
China into one of the world’s leading powers by using the labour force to promote
industrialisation and economy (Mainka and Mills, 1995). This led to mass
environmental devastation in China and the decimation of native species, including the
loss of 3000 tigers (Mainka and Mills, 1995). Intended to grow China’s economy, The
“Great Leap Forward” was a disaster in reality and led to millions of deaths because

8. 8
the labour force was diverted to steel production, leading to a famine as the harvest
was left to rot (Peng, 1987). During this period, thousands of Chinese people fled the
Communist regime, taking their opinions on traditional medicine with them as they
spread throughout Asia, even as far as the United States of America. With their
increased affluence, they were able to consume wildlife at an even more alarming rate
(Mainka and Mills, 1995).
After the establishment of the People’s Republic in China in 1949, Mao encouraged
people to have large families in order to increase the labour force in preparation for
the “Great Leap Forward” in 1958. He also promoted the integration of traditional
medicine with its Western counterpart. Due to the increasing population, wildlife
resources were being depleted at an alarming rate, but it was not recognised that this
was an issue until 1985, when there was a national realisation that many wildlife
species were in danger of extinction. It was at this time that farms for breeding
particular species were established for the purpose of killing them for medical
provisions (Mainka and Mills, 1995). By the early 1990s, there were 2200 traditional
medicine factories in China (Mainka and Mills, 1995), which shows just how ingrained
traditional medicine is in Chinese society.
China and other consumer countries would not be able to engage in the traditional
medicine market to the extent that they do if the countries that are home to the species
most commonly used did not provide them with the animal parts demanded. Why is
there a market of supply? The next section will discuss the historical context of
poaching in African nations, with reference to colonial hunting of rhino for food before

9. 9
colonialism paved the way for international trade routes, which led to the growth in
demand from Arab countries and Southeast Asia that has continued unabated since due
to the political instability of many African nations post-independence.
Historical Context of the Poaching of the African
Rhinoceros
The poaching of rhinos is not a recent development. It has occurred over many
centuries as rhino have often been an important part of the diets of native Africans
(Lang, 1924), but it is only recently causing concern that the species will become
extinct if appropriate measures to eliminate poaching are not taken by rhino range
states. In the 19th century, before the onset of the colonial era, rhinos were a common
sight across Africa, with hundreds of thousands of them roaming from Central-West
Africa, down to the southern-most tip (Emslie and Brooks, 1999). Even with the arrival
of British and Dutch settlers later that century, rhinos were only hunted for food, as
the meat was considered a local delicacy. Shortly after however, uses for other parts
of the rhino were developed (ornamental and medicinal) and this is when early
colonists opened trade routes from East Africa, leading to the growth in demand for
rhino horn (‘t Sas-Rolfes, 2012) among the Arab states, where it was known as a status
symbol and used to make dagger handles (Emslie and Brooks, 1999).
As the influence of European settlers grew when the colonisation of Africa occurred
later on in the 19th century, native Africans were banned from killing any animals that
were a threat to their crops, yet White settlers readily hunted native species like the

10. 10
rhino for their own pleasure (Hill, 1995). Despite the relentless hunting of rhino by the
colonists, rhinos still numbered as many as 100,000 in 1960; however poaching
escalated in the 1970s due to an increasing demand from consumers in Asia and the
Middle East as well as political and economic instability in many range states initiated
by independence, which meant poachers could hunt freely without fear of being
caught. These factors alone led to a 96% reduction in the population of black rhinos
by 1992, and the near extinction of the southern white subspecies. The only reason that
the southern white rhino increased from 20 in 1895 to 8440 in 1997 was due to South
Africa’s efforts at protection (Emslie and Brooks, 1999). Rhino numbers have
recovered since poaching levels decimated the population in the 1970s/80s, but over
the last decade, poaching has reached a record high and shows no sign of decreasing.
Why are poaching levels increasing again?
The following section will attempt to answer this question by discussing reasons for
the current trend in rhino poaching, including the high demand for rhino horn as a
component of TCM; political and economic instability of African nations; and the
negative attitudes towards rhino conservation.
Why are Rhino Poached?
There are many current threats to the survival of the rhino. Onthe side of the consumer,
the traditional medicine market is booming; with rhino horn being one of the products
highly desired by the traditional medicine community. On the supplier market, nations
that supply China and Southeast Asia often are politically and economically unstable,
usually due to civil unrest and corrupt governments. Weak currencies also contribute,

11. 11
as this means there is a lack of funding available for conservation efforts and law
enforcement.
Here, TCM demand will be discussed, with reference to China, Hong Kong and
Vietnam; then the political and economic instability of African nations will be
divulged, specifically civil war, corruption and poverty; before ending with the
negative attitudes towards conservation that poachers and consumers hold.
High Demand for Traditional Medicine
Rhino horn is in high demand from Asian countries such as China, as well as countries
with substantial Chinese communities, as it is an important ingredient in TCM due to
the widespread belief that it can cure particular illnesses and diseases, despite a lack
of medical evidence. Over the past few decades, East Asia has experienced mass
economic growth, which has stimulated the poaching of rhino at an alarming rate
because prices of horn have rocketed to $550 for African horn and $9000 for Asian
horn (believed to be of greater benefit) (Martin, 1983: cited in Western, 1989). This
economic boom has meant that the trading of animal products is now a highly lucrative
business with vast volumes of horn entering the black market (199,478kg-229,910kg
from 1970-1987) (Western, 1989). Much of the trade went undetected in the past due
to the inability to record North Korean figures and the failure to recognise the
Taiwanese market until 1988 (Western, 1989); so the extent of the trade could be
greater than originally feared if detection rates are still low.

12. 12
China
China is the world's major manufacturer of TCM products and thus is the major
exporter to other Southeast Asian countries and Chinese nationals overseas. The
Chinese government ratified the CITES Treaty (Convention of International Trade in
Endangered Species, as shown in chapter) in 1981, 6 years after the initial treaty was
enacted. However, due to China’s non-compliance, the average medicine factory still
consumed 650kg of rhino horn per year as late as 1990 (Martin, 1990). It was not until
1993 that the government banned all trade in rhino parts (Crawford, 1994).
Despite the legislation, China are still heavily involved today. The Chinese
government insist that the people driving the rhino horn trade are not Chinese nationals
but the Chinese communities overseas, as they have the economic prosperity to pay
the extortionate prices of rhino horn, which rose by 700% in 2010 (NWCU, 2011). To
dissuade its people from consuming rhino horn, China should take a leaf out of its
sovereignty Hong Kong, which has successfully decreased TCM demand.
Hong Kong
Hong Kong was the largest importer of rhino horn in the 1960s/70s, but its government
was the first Southeast Asian country to take action in an attempt to stall the trade. The
government banned the importation of rhino horn in 1977 (Milner-Gulland, 1993), at
the time that rhinos were first up-listed on the CITES appendices. By 1989, it appeared
to have been effective as the amount of rhino horn smuggled into Hong Kong since
1977 appeared to be negligible when compared to other countries (Martin, 1989).

13. 13
Hong Kong was therefore the only Southeast Asian country to successfully impose
legal sanctions to prevent the consumption and trade of rhino horn (Song and Milliken,
1990). An explanation for Hong Kong’s eagerness to react against the increasing
demand for rhino horn is that it was a British territory until 1997. Margaret Thatcher
(British Prime Minister 1979-1991) ensured the removal of all traditional medicine
products containing rhino horn in an effort to further slow the demand (Martin, 1989),
as the UK were conscious of the damage the trade was doing to the rhino population.
Of course, the detected rhino horn could only be a small fraction of the actual amount
of smuggled horn: considering it is a Special Administrative Region of China, there is
every possibility that Hong Kong acts as a trading hub for imports from Africa and
exports to China. This seems more plausible if the recent seizure of 33 rhino horns is
anything to go by (Hatcher, 2011). More recent research will need to be done to
investigate whether the demand in rhino horn has increased since the UK handed it
back to China, as Hong Kong does not feature heavily in current literature.
Vietnam
It has recently emerged that Vietnam is currently the main rhino horn consumer
market, not China (Ayling, 2012). Since the start of the 21st century, Vietnam has
experienced an annual GDP increase of 7% and is predicted to be one of the fastest
growing economies by 2025 (Milliken and Shaw, 2012), which means that more
consumers can afford the rhino horn price tag of US$75,000/kg. Like the Chinese, the
Vietnamese use horn in TCM, as a supposed cure for numerous ailments, the most
recent being cancer (Ayling, 2012). It is this belief alone that has exacerbated rhino

14. 14
horn consumption this century in Vietnam (Ayling, 2012). As well as the terminally
ill, the younger generations also fuel the consumer market through their demand for
luxury items; using rhino horn habitually as a detoxifier and often giving horns as gifts
to gain influence within social and political circles (Milliken and Shaw, 2012).
Vietnam signed the CITES treaty in 1994 (later than most South-east Asian nations)
as many of their national species were on the brink of extinction (Milliken and Shaw,
2012). However, unlike other TCM consumer countries, rhino horn was not removed
from medical compendia (Ayling, 2012). The government are not willing to claim
responsibility for high consumption, instead stating that Vietnam is only a transit
country for horn going to China because Vietnam’s links with Africa are too weak to
engage in its own trade (Ayling, 2012). With a government known for its corruption,
this is unlikely to be true, especially when there has been an increase in trophy-hunting
permits granted to Vietnamese nationals by South Africa since 2003 (Ayling, 2012).
Vietnam is clearly responsible for the current high levels of rhino horn consumption,
although it is unknown the extent to which other countries are involved, due to the lack
of research literature.
It cannot just be purely down to the consumer markets and their high demand for the
product that caused the poaching crises of the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the new
poaching crisis of the 21st century. The supplier countries are complicit in the illegal
rhino horn trade for various reasons, namely the political and economic instability of
the past and present rhino range states. Their impetus to poach rhino fuels the illegal
trade, so these countries need to be held accountable as well. The next part will

15. 15
investigate the reasons for the supply of rhino horn, discussing the civil wars in Angola
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); corruption in Kenya and Zimbabwe;
and poverty in Tanzania and Zambia.
Political and Economic Instability of Rhino Range States
Colonialism and slavery are part of Africa’s past. However, with independence came
struggles for power, civil war, corruption, and poverty. These issues posed significant
threats to wildlife (including rhino). Many species were killed by militia to trade for
arms and ammunition or by poverty-stricken civilians for food. In addition to this, the
wars acted as incentives for poachers because the gains were high but the fear of
apprehension was minimal. War also led to cuts in conservation budgets, so species
were not adequately protected.
This period of instability of many rhino range states in the late 1960s after their
independence from the colonial powers, coupled with an increase in demand for rhino
horn in Asia at around the same time led to 96% of the rhino population being
slaughtered over a period of just two decades (O’Connor, 2010).
Civil War
Many historic rhino range states have lost all their rhino populations because of
persistent poaching during prolonged wars in the region. Angola, Central African
Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan, rife

16. 16
with civil wars since their independence in the 1960s, are examples of this. (Emslie
and Brooks, 1999).
In the case of Angola, its civil war was one of the longest armed conflicts of the Cold
War, lasting from 1975-2002. The war was fought by the groups MPLA and UNITA,
both vying for control of the country (Brittain, 1998). During this time, its rhino
population was eradicated, with a major decline from 300 in 1980 to 90 in 1984, extinct
altogether by 1995. Rhinos were poached by UNITA soldiers in order to trade the horn
for high calibre weapons from the South African Defence Force, their allies in the war
effort (Emslie and Brooks, 1999). As well as this, the economy was devastated, so
Angolans became dependent on exports (Ross, 2004). Rhinos were probably therefore
also killed to provide Angolans with a form of income.
The Democratic Republic of Congo has had similar issues in its history. Immediately
after its independence, disputes between Prime Minister Lumumba’s party and
CONAKAT party president Tsombe escalated into war (Ndikumana and Emizet,
2003). Its stronghold of 1150 Northern White rhino in 1960 quickly decreased to 200
in 1965 (Hillman-Smith, 1994: cited in Emslie and Brooks, 1999), a 90% decline
(Curry-Lindahl, 1972). The population recovered to 490 by 1976, after a brief period
of stability in the early years of the dictator Mobutu’s reign (Savidge et al, 1976: cited
in Emslie and Brooks, 1999), but in the years following this, the number was again
decimated to just 15 individuals, 50% of which were poached by Garamba National
Park staff (Smith et al, 1995: cited in Emslie and Brooks, 1999). This spate of poaching
corresponded with the withdrawal of the UNDP/FAO project and the appointment of

17. 17
a new park conservator (Emslie and Brooks, 1999), so corruption may have played a
major part here. Another period of stability allowed the numbers of rhino to double by
1995, but this recovery was at risk from the 1997 civil war that resulted in the deposal
of Mobutu. Conservation management was difficult during this period due to the
destruction of supplies and poachers had set up a permanent presence in the National
Park, however fortunately losses of rhino were minimal (Emslie and Brooks, 1999),
with 25 surviving the war. By 2005, the Democratic Republic of Congo had the last 5
wild northern white rhino and it was proposed that they should be trans-located to a
sanctuary in Kenya (IUCN, 2005). Unfortunately this never happened as the rhino
were not found the following year, presumed poached, meaning that this subspecies
was extinct in the wild until the captive population in the Czech Republic were
transported to a Kenyan conservancy (IUCN, 2012).
Corruption
Corrupt governments are rife in African nations, with many countries being lowly
ranked on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency
International, 2012). Most governments consider the environment to be a ‘soft’
political issue so their attentions are often concentrated on other sectors. This is bad
news for rhinos because conservation efforts rely on adequate financial resources if
they are to be successful. Many governments are complicit in the illegal trade of rhino
horn themselves as there is a chance of high gains but low risk of detection (Smith and
Walpole, 2005), so corruption is clearly a major contributor to the loss of rhino with a
stronger correlation to the changing rate of rhino populations than poverty levels and
human population density (Smith et al, 2003).

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Kenya may historically and presently be a major stronghold for the Black rhino, but it
is a country that has been plagued by corrupt governments and agencies such as the
police, who endemically aid criminals by supplying arms or taking bribes to turn a
blind eye (Heald, 2007). Corruption in Kenya was at its peak during the Presidential
reign of Daniel Arap Moi from 1978 until 2002 (Branch and Cheeseman, 2008) and it
was during the early years of his reign that Kenya lost 1000 rhino whilst the
government appropriated almost all of the revenue gained from tourism, which should
have been used for community projects (Thompson and Homewood, 2002). Most of
the poaching was by Somali bandits but the poaching problem had been intensified by
the corrupt government turning a blind eye to the issue (Emslie and Brooks, 1999).
Even now, Kenya is ranked 136/176 on the Corruption Perceptions Index
(Transparency International, 2012), but rhino numbers are increasing every year due
to the efforts of conservationists and the Kenyan Wildlife Service, so Kenya is less of
a poaching concern.
Zimbabwe, like Kenya, has also had a long history of internal corruption; but unlike
Kenya, its rhino population is now diminishing, the only range state to show a decrease
in numbers in the 2010 survey (Emslie, 2012). The Mugabe regime has been riddled
with corruption, making Zimbabwe’s rank in the Corruption Perceptions Index 163rd
out of 176 countries (Transparency International, 2012). High levels of corruption
caused the economy to crash, particularly after the redistribution of land taken from
White farmers caused a mass downturn in agriculture (Zimbabwe’s main industry)
(BBC News, 2002) and led to the 2008 hyperinflation of 11,200,000% (Hanke and

19. 19
Kwok, 2009). This plunged the economy into crisis, which could explain the decrease
in rhino numbers, if Zimbabweans have turned to poaching to alleviate their poverty.
Poverty
Corruption goes hand in hand with poverty, so Africa is stricken, with 46.7% of
Africans living on less than US$1 a day (Lufumpa, 2006). It has been argued that rural
poverty has contributed to the continual poaching of many African mammal species
including the rhino because few African states have the financial resources necessary
to protect wildlife; and even if they did, the governments are unlikely to allocate
greater funds for conservation as other issues take preference (Newmark and Hough,
2000).
Tanzania was once a major stronghold for the black rhino, with 3795 animals in 1980.
The last poaching crisis decimated this population to just 46 by 1997 (Emslie and
Brooks, 1999), although this has now recovered to 113 (WWF, 2012). Poaching
became such an issue that the government took drastic action in 1989, launching a
special anti-poaching operation: Operation Uhai, involving the Tanzanian army, police
and staff from the wildlife authority (Songorwa, 1999). This temporarily stopped the
problem but this method of wildlife protection required the government to allocate
large funds to policing 28% of its total land area, which were not available considering
the fact that Tanzania was (and still is) one of the most poverty-stricken countries in
the world (Songorwa, 1999). This lack of funding has led to the understaffing and
under-equipment of areas subject to protection, allowing poaching to continue
unabated.

20. 20
Rural poverty of the residents of Tanzania has been stated as the primary reason for
poaching, being described as a coping or adaptive livelihood strategy (Johannesen,
2004: cited in Knapp, 2007). Those who engage in poaching are more likely to be
unemployed and hence poorer than non-poachers, so poaching as a way to survive
seems likely (Knapp, 2007).
Zambian rhinos have shared a similar fate to those of Tanzania, although through no
lack of the country’s efforts to conserve the population. In 1972, Zambia committed
itself to conservation by dedicating 9% of its total land area as National Parks, and a
further 22% as game management areas (Leader-Williams and Albon, 1988).
Unfortunately there was a major fall in copper prices around this time, causing a
massive decline in the Zambian economy which had a knock-on effect for park
infrastructure and enforcement efforts. It was no longer viable to spend $200/km² per
year, so this alongside a dramatic increase in rhino horn prices on the world market
resulted in the poaching crisis of the 1980s (Leader-Williams and Albon, 1988), going
from 2750 animals in 1980, to fewer than 106 by 1987 (Emslie and Brooks, 1999).
Zambia turned its attention to conservation again in 2003, when the first black rhino
were reintroduced. This reintroduction continued through to 2010 and there is now a
stable population of 30 individuals (Chomba and Matandiko, 2011), a conservation
success story. This could only occur because the Zambian government were
determined to conserve the species, so the continued success of the rhino conservation
programme will be highly dependent on people holding positive views. The next

21. 21
section will look at the attitudes held by rhino horn consumers and suppliers and how
this negativity contributes to poaching.
Negative Attitudes towards Rhino Conservation
Despite much of the world believing in the work of conservationists, there are many
that do not share the view of those trying to stop illegal killing of rhino, and it is the
negative attitudes (mainly of the consumers and suppliers of rhino horn) towards these
animals that fuel the poaching effort. This segment will describe the reasons for this
negativity, namely their ignorance of the situation and rebellion against the Western
world.
Rhino Horn Consumers
Consumers of rhino horn are against conservation because they are single-handedly
fuelling the demand for horn, provoking the yearly increase in the slaughter of the
world’s rhino. Their belief in it being an efficacious medicine makes them opposed to
Western medicine. The wrongful perception that TCM is more effective with fewer
side effects has damaged the survival of all the rhino species (TRAFFIC, 2007). What
is worse is that they do not seem to understand the impact that their consumption is
having on the species, convinced that their consumption has an inconsequential impact
on rhino numbers (Emslie and Brooks, 1999).
The countries of the Western world that are attempting to control the numbers of rhino
being poached every year are not helping the situation as much as they would like.
Many press reports have incorrectly stated that Southeast Asia uses rhino horn as an

22. 22
aphrodisiac, infuriating the Chinese in particular. The perceived over-involvement of
the Western world has made the Chinese feel that they are being unfairly coerced into
giving up their historical traditions and are offended that Westerners have gone so far
as to encourage the burning of rhino horn stockpiles (Emslie and Brooks, 1999). In
response, the Chinese have stated that it is in fact the Westerners that have encouraged
the formation of the black market, because their banning of the legal trade has forced
traditional medicine users to use products illegally (Emslie and Brooks, 1999).
Furthermore, most of the TCM users are not even aware of legislation regarding the
use of rhino horn (TRAFFIC, 2007), so education and awareness programmes are
necessary if the consumer market is to be subdued.
Reducing demand will not necessarily mean that the rhino will be saved; as stated
earlier there are other reasons why rhino are being poached at an alarming rate. The
supplier market not only poach for trade to Southeast Asian buyers, which is to be
explained next.
Rhino Horn Suppliers
The attitudes of rhino poachers and their motivations for poaching can be traced back
to the colonial era. White colonists moved the indigenous people off their farming
lands and to add further insult, prevented Black farmers from hunting wildlife for
sustenance by making it illegal. The White invaders were the ones who suggested the
beginnings of conservation, further excluding the natives from having any
involvement in the management of wildlife (Hill, 1995). For the Black farmers,
conservation had little meaning except for its association with the White colonists who

23. 23
took their livelihoods from them (IUCN, 1988: cited in Hill, 1995), so their view was
that they would rather be rid of wildlife, than conform to the conservation laws of the
Whites (Hill, 1995).
After independence, poaching increased dramatically, though this was not for animal
parts to trade. 90% of post-independence poaching can be attributed to the native
Africans’ attitude towards white rule, with which preservation of wildlife was
associated (Timberlake, 1985: cited in Hill, 1995). In fact, leadership groups at this
time actively encouraged their people to resist conservation as part of the anti-
colonialism movement in the 1960s (Hill, 1995). It is no coincidence that this was the
time of the start of the first major poaching crisis.
More recently, Africans are not wholly against conservation but are merely reluctant
to participate in conservation themselves unless it is of some socio-economic benefit
to them. Integrated Conservation and Development Projects have been attempted in
many countries to no avail, because of the failure to improve the situation for locals.
Rather than decreasing poaching, it increased because people gradually became
opposed to these ideas (Songorwa, 1999) and did not want to associate themselves
with the false promises of the programmes. Conservation may increase the overall
population over time, but it does nothing to alleviate the crux of the problem. Poachers
have to be deterred from this line of business, and the only way to ensure this occurs
is to devote resources to increased and improved enforcement.

24. 24
The next section will discuss the international and national efforts of countries to curb
poaching levels, with specific reference to CITES; Chinese and Vietnamese
enforcement; the African Rhino Management Group and Lusaka Agreement; and the
regional framework of South Africa (the most successful conservator of rhino).
What is being done to curb the Illegal Poaching and Trade
of Rhino?
International Legislation - CITES
CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora) is an agreement effected in 1975 and signed by 177 member states, as a
method of ensuring the sustainable trade of animals and plants in an attempt to protect
vulnerable species from extinction (CITES, 2013). 5000 species of animal and 29000
species of plant are listed (CITES, 2013) in three appendices determined by the degree
of protection needed, decided upon at the Conference of the Parties, where a 2/3 vote
is required to place a species within Appendix I or II (Favre, 2002).
Appendix I include species threatened with extinction, where trade must only be
permitted in exceptional circumstances. In order to trade any species on this appendix,
2 permits are needed: an import permit (issued only if the specimen is not used for
commercial purposes detrimental to the survival of the species), and an export permit
(issued only if the specimen was legally obtained and an import permit already issued)
(Favre, 2002).

25. 25
Appendix II includes species that will be threatened with extinction if trade is not
controlled in order to maintain their numbers (CITES, 2013). A CITES export permit
is required in order to trade these species, and will only be issued if the example was
legally obtained; the export will not endanger the survival of the species and if the
authorities are satisfied that living examples will be exported carefully (Favre, 2002).
Appendix III contains species that are protected in at least one country, which has
asked other party members for assistance in controlling trade. Permits are only
necessary for export if the exporting state included the species in Appendix III. In all
other cases, only a certificate of origin is required (CITES, 2013).
The CITES treaty is only a frame-worked agreement between nations, so it relies on
individual member parties to prohibit the trading of species on Appendices I and II
through domestic legislation, rather than a single international legislation; assuming
that all enforcement will be carried out on a national level (CITES, 2013).
Clearly, this treaty is slightly aged in its approach to law enforcement as it places too
much trust in the governments of individual nations. In order for the treaty to be
successful in preventing the extinction of endangered species, the governments of the
nations party to the treaty have to construct their own legislation individually and
enforce these laws themselves. If some countries do not comply, there is no set
procedure for ensuring they do in future; however there have been instances where
Party States have enabled trade sanctions against those that do not adhere to the treaty
(Favre, 2002).

26. 26
The Rhino was one of the first species to be listed on CITES Appendix I in 1977,
meaning that all trade in this species was banned (Emslie and Brooks, 1999); however
this had no effect on the levels of poaching, which reached crisis point in the 1980s,
emphasising the problems of the CITES treaty that were identified in the previous
paragraph. The 1994 CITES Resolution Conference attempted to tackle the failure of
reversing the decline in rhino numbers by urging member range states to develop
appropriate rhino recovery plans, which will be looked at in further detail in chapter.
Despite the consumer and supplier states having issues decreasing the poaching and
trade of rhino, other countries have taken measures to ensure that they themselves do
not further fuel the expansion of this illegal trade. Let’s take the UK enforcement
efforts as an example.
International Legislation – Case Example of the United Kingdom
The UK is a party to the CITES treaty and is seen to be taking steps to tackle its own
illegal wildlife trade, which often includes rhino horn. In 2003, WWF and TRAFFIC
UK campaigned to make it an arrestable offence to illegally trade in wildlife, with a
maximum sentence of 5 years imprisonment (WWF, 2013). With specific regard to the
TCM market, it is illegal to sell or buy any product that is made from an endangered
species (Operation Charm, 2013). The rhino horn trade at this time was under control
and low, but 2010 saw a massive surge in this trade in the UK, causing DEFRA to take
action by restricting the re-export of rhino horn (WWF, 2013).

27. 27
In 2006, the UK launched its National Wildlife Crime Unit (NWCU, 2011), a police
unit that gathers intelligence on wildlife crime. In its 2011/12 Strategic Assessment, it
found rhino horn to be the most common ingredient in TCMs found in the UK
(NWCU, 2011). The unit made traditional medicine (particularly rhino horn) one of
its 2011-2013 priorities as data suggested an increased demand possibly due to the
influx of Chinese immigrants particularly in London (over 60% of TCMs containing
rhino horn are found here), where 1.77% of the population are Chinese (Rogers, 2011).
From 2010, no rhino horn is eligible to leave the country unless it meets strict criteria
(NWCU, 2011).
If countries like the UK that are not directly involved with the poaching and trade of
rhino are actively trying to restrict the trade from their end, then surely those directly
involved should provide their own effective legislation and enforcement? The next
sections will discuss the question posed.
Consumer Enforcement – ASEAN-WEN
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Wildlife Enforcement Network was
established in 2005 and is currently the world’s largest wildlife law enforcement
network that involves police, customs and environmental agencies of the 10 ASEAN
countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam). Linked with INTERPOL and CITES amongst
others, the 2005-2010 ARREST programme was initiated with the primary goal of
fighting wildlife trafficking in Asia, by reducing consumer demand, strengthening law
enforcement, and strengthening regional cooperation (ASEAN-WEN, 2013).

28. 28
Consumer Enforcement – China and Vietnam
China was one of the last Asian consumer states to legislate against the trade in
endangered species; banning the import, export, transport, sale and purchase of rhino
horn in 1993. They only signed because they were under extreme amounts of pressure
from CITES and the UN (Cheung, 1995). Furthermore, medicine manufacturers were
urged to stop using rhino horn and required to register and seal all stocks (Loh and
Loh, 1994: cited in Cheung, 1995). China attempted to deter people from participating
in illegal trading by imposing harsher penalties like confiscation of property and long
prison sentences (Low, 1991: cited in Cheung, 1995). Despite these attempts to prove
its committal to preventing trade of endangered species, as of yet, China has not
invested resources or manpower needed to effectively implement these policies.
As mentioned in chapter, Vietnam is fast becoming one of the strongest economies in
the world and a major importer of rhino horn (usually from South African hunting
trophies). It actively regulates the wildlife trade and depending on the severity of
violations, issues hefty fines or prison sentences. A member of CITES since 1994, its
main Decree on Management of Export, Import and Re-export of Endangered Species
2006 corresponds with CITES regulations where permits are needed (Milliken and
Shaw, 2012). Penalties vary according to the seriousness of the violation, the
maximum for less serious offences being a fine of VND500 million (approximately
US$29,000) and severe encroachments carrying a prison sentence of up to 7 years
(Milliken and Shaw, 2012).

29. 29
Supplier Enforcement – National Agendas
Rhino Management Group
Four rhino range countries (South Africa, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe),
conservators of 81% of Africa’s entire black rhino population, formed this group in
1989 to implement their individual conservation plans. The group acts as a support for
the members by sharing conservation strategies with each other, as an aid to each
other’s individual plans. This has included workshops directing countries on how to
monitor their rhino, construct bomas (enclosures), and ensure the security of their
population. The group consists of representatives from all relevant wildlife authorities
in each country, as well as private owners of rhino (Emslie and Brooks, 1999), who
work together to compile annual status reports aimed at evaluating the progress of the
conservation plan (Adcock, 1998: cited in Emslie and Brooks). At one of its early
meetings, this group was noted as a successful model that should be followed by
individual range states in the future (Brooks, 1989: cited in Emslie and Brooks, 1999).
Lusaka Agreement
In 1994, as part of a UN Environment Programme, six countries (Kenya, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) signed the Lusaka Agreement on
Cooperative Enforcement Operations directed at Illegal Trade in Flora and Fauna; with
Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho and Liberia subsequently
signing (Lusaka Agreement Task Force, 2013). This agreement was made with the aim
of reducing and eventually eliminating the illegal trade in wildlife, establishing a

30. 30
permanent task force in order to accomplish this (Emslie and Brooks, 1999). A task
force of nominated members from each signatory was set up in 1999, with the ability
to collect information and investigate cross-border wildlife crime, participating in
undercover operations if necessary (Lusaka Agreement Task Force, 2013).
Supplier Enforcement – South Africa
South Africa has been hardest hit by the current poaching crisis as it is Africa’s largest
stronghold for both species of rhino. It is predicted that 2 rhino are killed every day
here, most of them being poached in Kruger National Park. Every year, the numbers
of poached rhino have increased an unprecedented amount, with nearly a 50% increase
in losses from 2011-2012 (McGrath, 2013), from 448 in 2011 to 668 in 2012. As of
the time of writing, a rhino is killed every 11 hours, higher than the 2012 average (ITV
News, 2013). If poaching continues at this rate, rhino will likely be extinct in 15 years.
What is even more concerning is the development of poaching from a few guns to
professionals darting animals from helicopters. Corrupt game industry officials are
actively involved in the killing, with four rangers being arrested in Kruger National
Park in 2012 (BBC News, 2012). With the threat of extinction hanging in the air, what
are South Africa doing to stop the poachers?
In 2010, the year that it became clear that Africa was on the brink of another rhino
poaching crisis, a National Wildlife Crime Reaction Unit was launched to enhance
data collection; exchange of information; and collaboration between law enforcement
officials (Milliken and Shaw, 2012). Rhino crime was made a priority, with specialist

31. 31
rhino crime prosecutors appointed to compile legal strategies that include other crimes
relating to poaching, such as fraud and corruption. Private security and anti-poaching
units have also multiplied in the last year or so to provide back-up to National Park
rangers in the fight against the increasingly organised and efficient poaching gangs
(Milliken and Shaw, 2012).
Punishments for those convicted of crimes against rhino have also been increased in
recent years. South Africa’s Asset Forfeiture Unit are able to seize assets from those
charged with serious rhino offences and bail is now rarely allowed. Custodial
sentences now carry a 10 year maximum penalty for the act of killing a rhino and 5-
12 years imprisonments for couriers attempting to transport rhino horn out of South
Africa, along with an additional charge of fraud (Milliken and Shaw, 2012). It is all
well and good that there are international and regional frameworks in place to enforce
the laws surrounding the illegality of poaching and trading in rhino horn, but one key
question needs to be asked. Are current law enforcement strategies effective? The
evidence of an all-time high poaching rate seems to suggest otherwise, but is it as clear-
cut as that? The next section will argue the case for and against the effectiveness of
wildlife law enforcement.
Are Current Law Enforcement Methods Effective?
As previously stated, poaching has been increasingly rife since 2009, with a 3000%
increase since 2008 (WWF, 2013) and not showing any signs of slowing. All species
of rhino (except the Southern White), are listed on the IUCN Red List as Critically

32. 32
Endangered, with the reported extinction of the western black rhino in 2011 (IUCN,
2012).
Since the last poaching crisis, rhino numbers had increased steadily. For example, the
white population doubled in just a decade to 14550 animals in 2005, with the black
rhino also increasing from 2410 to 3725 in the same period (Milledge, 2008). The
future of the rhino looked promising until a major increase in poaching levels,
beginning in 2008 threatened the security of this ancient mammal once more.
Fortunately, even with the onset of the latest poaching crisis in 2008, both of the
African species have continued to increase in numbers (Milliken et al, 2009), with the
white rhino amounting to 20165 animals and the black rhino, 4880 specimens (Save
The Rhino International, 2013) as of the last survey taken in 2010 (see Figure 1). All
range states except Zimbabwe reported a net increase of rhino since the previous
survey in 2007 (Save the Rhino International, 2013), so clearly something is working.

33. 33
Figure 1 - Scatter graphs depicting the numbers of black and white rhino adapted
from: 1895 through 1997 (Emslie and Brooks, 1999); 2007 (Milliken et al., 2009);
2010 (Save the Rhino International, 2013)
It could also be argued that the tightened security e.g. the use of 24hr armed guards in
the case of the last few northern white rhino in a Kenyan conservancy (Calkin, 2012)
and increased punishments for those convicted are actually working as deterrents. As
well as yearly increases in the total number of rhino, the arrest rates in South Africa in
2012 were nearly twice those of 2010 and 2011, including numerous arrests of
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
log(numberofrhinos)
Year
White Rhino Population Numbers
1
10
100
1000
10000
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
log(numberofrhinos)
Year
Black Rhino Population Numbers

34. 34
Vietnamese and other Asian nationals believed to be operating as international
exporters (Milliken and Shaw, 2012). If convicted and given a sentence proportionate
to the crime, this could set a precedent for others considering entering the trafficking
network.
However, there are two sides to the argument as to whether policing of this heinous
crime is effective. On the other side of the coin, law enforcement agencies have not
done enough to ensure the elimination of this international trafficking ring. The
poaching gangs in South Africa and Kenya involved in the illegal trade are
increasingly organised and operate more efficiently (Milledge, 2008), which could
account for the annual increase in poached rhino despite the increased enforcement
efforts of the countries most affected (see Figure 2).
Figure 2 - A bar chart depicting the number of rhino poached in South Africa 2000-
2012 (adapted from Stop Rhino Poaching, 2012)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Year
Number of Rhinos Poached in South Africa 2000-2012
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

35. 35
With poaching on the increase, this means that the total amount of rhino horn entering
the black market has increased too (Milledge, 2008), from 664 horns (2000-2005) to
1521 horns (2006-2009) (Milliken et al., 2009). If enforcement has been effective, one
would expect rhino horn recovery rates to have increased. Unfortunately this has not
been the case, with rhino horn recovery rates dropping instead from 68% in 2001
(Milliken et al, 2009) to 7% in 2012 (Milliken and Shaw, 2012), thereby suggesting
the ineffectiveness of enforcement methods.
The first issue with enforcement is it is not as effective as it could be and should be,
due to a substantial lack in funding. With corrupt governments and absolute poverty
commonplace in African rhino range states, government resources are directed
towards other more pressing country issues. Protecting rhino in the wild is estimated
to cost $1000/km² per year (Dublin and Wilson, 1998), so saving the rhino is an
expensive business. Governments are not willing to give such large sums of money for
this cause, particularly with all the other more pressing issues that exist such as high
child mortality rates, famines and droughts.
Secondly, arrest rates may be increasing, but this does not necessarily translate into
convictions with appropriate punishments. Since 2006, only 10 prosecutions for rhino
crimes have resulted in lengthy prison sentences of 10 years for poaching and 2 years
for the illegal possession of horn; although the total conviction rate in South Africa is
relatively high if compared to Zimbabwe, where only 18/123 cases resulted in arrest,
6 of which led to a conviction (Milliken et al, 2009). Furthermore, most arrests and

36. 36
convictions are of poachers, who are at the bottom of the wildlife trafficking chain.
85% of those arrested in South Africa from 2010-2012 were poachers, with
approximately 5% being the exporters (DEA data, 2012: cited in Milliken and Shaw,
2012). The people guiding this trade are eluding the authorities to a great extent and
unless the middle men are caught and made examples of, this network cannot be
broken and will continue to gain in strength.
Enforcement agencies can also attribute their failure to curtail this issue to corruption
in their own ranks. Concerns have been raised that staff involved in the protection of
rhino are in fact connected to rhino crime, by transferring their insider knowledge to
poaching gangs for monetary gain or actively participating in smuggling themselves
e.g. the Chinese People’s Liberation Army branch responsible for controlling
smuggling across the Chinese borders (Crawford, 1994). It is obvious that this is
occurring as some of the rhino that have been killed had their horns sawn rather than
hacked, and the cause of death was a single kill shot from above, that only a skilled
professional with a helicopter could achieve (Milliken and Shaw, 2012). An example
of insider corruption are the high profile cases of a corrupt senior conservation official,
Walter Nkuna (Reserve Manager for Atherstone Nature Reserve in Limpopo), who
committed suicide after his involvement in the death of five rhino (Gill, 2012: cited in
Milliken and Shaw, 2012) and the Groenewald Gang, which sparked a public outcry
in South Africa.
Arrested and charged in 2010, the gang led by David Groenewald (a former police
officer himself), along with his wife, a professional hunter and three wildlife

37. 37
veterinarians; slaughtered all the rhino they had bought at auction, selling the horns
and burying the bodies. Their motive for this act was quite simply: profit. It would
have been less profitable to pay for the animals’ upkeep and trophy hunting permits if
they had gone down the legal route, so they decided to illegally poach their animals
and sell their horns on the black market (Ghosh, 2010).
If those that are supposed to be helping conserve this species are involved in their
slaughter, what can be done and who can be trusted to conserve the African rhino? Of
course, these corrupt game industry professionals are only a minority, but it makes it
harder for law enforcement agencies to impose policies when there is mistrust between
the ranks. Nothing appears to be solving the current crisis, the evidence suggests rather
than being solved, it is in fact being exacerbated; resulting in an ever-increasing loss
of rhino and black market horn. Something needs to change and now. We need to pose
the question: what should be done in future to prevent this crisis from continuing to
soar?
The next section will provide some answers to this question by discussing the need to
educate the people resident in rhino range states in order to get them involved in rhino
conservation; conservation efforts such as fenced reserves, dehorning of at risk
populations and possible translocation of animals to safer locations where new viable
breeding populations can be established; greater intelligence methods utilised by
enforcement agencies to contend with the organisation and resources of today’s
poachers, such as specialised units and the use of DNA horn fingerprinting; and finally
the appropriate legislation to encourage deterrence of those who may want to get

38. 38
involved in this market, for example: harsher penalties and better enforcement of the
CITES treaty.
What should be done in future to prevent the further
increase of the rhino poaching crisis?
Education
Education and training of the public about the problems facing wildlife species is
needed in order to intensify anti-poaching measures (Mainka and Mills, 1995) but
conservation efforts that target community involvement have often failed in the past
because the local people felt that it was forced upon them, causing an antagonistic
attitude towards protecting wildlife. This did not mean however that they possessed a
wholly negative attitude towards the protection of animals (Happold, 1995), they just
needed to be convinced that conservation would also benefit their lives in some way.
In order to convince people that this is the case and reduce any resentment they have
towards the rhino and its conservation, they need to be able to understand the benefits
that wildlife brings (Happold, 1995). Once this is achieved, community-based wildlife
management programs can be established (Emslie and Brooks, 1999) involving the
entire community in rhino conservation and this will hopefully ease pressures on the
overworked game rangers and law enforcement officials.
One particular harrowing example of a rhino killing was used as part of a campaign to
make the public aware of the situation: the story of Geza. Geza was a young male
rhino, whose life was cut off in his prime by a cruel act of mercilessness. When found

39. 39
by park rangers, his horn had been hacked off his face, yet even crueller was that he
was still alive and suffering immensely. It was agreed that there was no hope in saving
Geza so it would be best to euthanize, but before carrying out the lethal injection,
camera crews were brought in so that the world could get a visual insight into the
reality of poaching (Fowlds, 2012). It was hoped that this would awaken those who
fuel the poaching of rhino and prevent them from continuing to do so, but as of yet,
Geza is not and will not be the only example of rhino killed in this way.
Despite failures of many other programmes in the past, there have been some notable
successes. In the Ngorongoro and Masai Mara areas of Tanzania and Kenya
respectively, WWF have established community game wardens and it has been noted
that rhino numbers have increased in areas shared by both human and animal; although
only correlational, success has been linked to the degree of the community’s
involvement in conservation efforts (Emslie and Brooks, 1999).
Conservation
Conservation has always been a big part of ensuring the survival of the world’s most
endangered species. The rhinoceros has always been a key conservation species ever
since 1895, when only 20 white rhino remained in the whole of Africa (Emslie and
Brooks, 1999). The white rhino may have made a spectacular comeback thanks to the
tireless efforts of conservationists but in recent years the black rhino has started to
share the same fate. There may be a significant population of black rhino left in the
wild now but this may not continue to be the case, particularly if the demand from the

40. 40
East continues to rise. A variety of conservation methods need to be deployed if the
extinction of this creature is to be prevented.
With Africa being a wildlife enthusiast’s haven and hence relying on tourism to bolster
its economy, wildlife needs to be protected. Wildlife reserves and National Parks have
been set up but these will not stop the poachers from acting. Kruger National Park in
South Africa is the current epicentre for poaching, with most of South Africa’s rhino
losses being from this area.
It should be suggested that erected boundary fences be patrolled 24/7 to stop rhino
roaming out of protected areas as well as act as an early warning sign to rangers of
possible intruders if holes are cut into the fencing (Emslie and Brooks, 1999). Such
reserves have been set up in Kenya and they appear to be working, as rhino populations
show an annual increase of 5% (Brett, 1990); however there are issues with fencing
off reserves. Rhino are migratory animals that cover large ranges so fencing disturbs
this natural order, preventing surplus animals from dispersing over a wider area and
therefore increasing the density of the population. With more births than deaths
occurring because of added protection, the population will continue to increase until
the reserve is overpopulated (Emslie and Brooks, 1999). As a result, it should be noted
that fencing cannot be the only solution as human intervention will be necessary to
ensure the removal of surplus animals to other reserves (Emslie and Brooks, 1999).
A less subtle method of preventing rhino from being poached is dehorning, which has
been done in the past in Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. This would involve

41. 41
frequently sawing off the horns of every rhino so that there would be nothing for
poachers to poach. It is a slightly controversial method of conservation however
because of possible detrimental effects to the rhino, particularly evident in calf
mortality rates, which are higher in calves of dehorned rhino (probably due to the
inability of its mother to fight off predators) (Lindeque and Erb, 1995).
Dehorning would perhaps be most useful in areas with too few members of staff and
too high a poaching threat for them to deal with. The dehorning process would only be
an expensive short term measure because rhino horn grows 5cm a year (Pienaar et al,
1991: in Emslie and Brooks, 1999), so this method would have to be used regularly in
order to continually deter poachers.
Although it has proven successful in Namibia and Swaziland (no rhino lost to poaching
in the latter area since 1992) (Emslie and Brooks, 1999), Zimbabwe has had mixed
results. It made dehorning a national conservation policy in 1992 (Milliken, Nowell
and Thomsen, 1993), but the rhino that had been dehorned were reported to all have
been poached by 1993 (Milner-Gulland et al, 1994), and Zimbabwean populations are
still continuing to decrease.
Another potentially risky and expensive method of ensuring the survival of Africa’s
rhino is translocation. This method was first attempted in the 1960s by Dr Ian Player
and his team, when rhino were drugged and transported in crates on trucks to other
game reserves in order to begin new viable breeding populations (Player, 1967).

42. 42
The most recent attempt was coordinated last year by rangers in Hluhluwe-iMfolozi
Park in South Africa, as part of the WWF South Africa Black Rhino Range Expansion
Project (BRREP). Rhinos that had been specifically chosen for the translocation were
anaesthetised and suspended from a helicopter, then transported to a secret location
elsewhere in Africa to create new breeding populations (Natural World, 2013).
As with all other methods, it has its disadvantages. Aside from its cost, it is a time-
consuming process because large groups of rhino are initially needed and these all
have to be moved. Moving the rhino is a dangerous process as Player found in his
translocations and even after translocation, the rhino can find it hard to adjust to their
unfamiliar surroundings, with the incidence of death among them from their capture
to 3 months after their release, 5.9%. (Brett, 1998). Despite the risks, translocated
animals can be more successful than the natural populations. If protected sufficiently,
the annual population growth can be as high as 10% (Emslie et al, 2009), clearly
evident in the remarkable recovery of the white rhino population from 20 individuals
to over 17000 today.
Intelligence
As previously mentioned, there has been progress in law enforcement since the last
poaching crisis, but it is not being as successful as it would have been hoped. Greater
intelligence networks are necessary in order to prevent and apprehend the increasingly
organised poachers (Jachmann, 1998: in Emslie and Brooks, 1999). Covert procedures
such as undercover operations have already proven their effectiveness, with South
Africa’s high arrest rates partly attributable to undercover investigations (Emslie and

43. 43
Brooks, 1999). South Africa has been at the forefront of African nations’ attempts to
improve law enforcement methods. In 2008, the National Biodiversity Investigators
Forum was formed as part of the NEMA Biodiversity Act Regulations, to investigate
poaching crimes (Milledge, 2008) and improve cooperation between wildlife
personnel and organised crime units (Milliken et al, 2009).
As well as heightened intelligence, adequate resources need to be deployed in all rhino
ranges. The optimum ranger:area ratio is 1:30km² and if located in the larger reserves,
they should be aided by specialist anti-poaching units. In order to be effective in their
employment, rangers need to be specially trained on the use of firearms and also
receive a decent wage because they risk their lives on a daily basis, sometimes even
being killed in the line of duty. If they are not motivated enough to undertake such
dangerous work, many will refuse to work or may even join the side of the poachers
(Emslie and Brooks, 1999).
With the increasing use of forensic science in human criminal investigations, it could
be argued that this could also be used in wildlife crimes. Technology has progressed
so much since the last crisis that scientists have discovered the ability of rhino horn to
absorb chemical isotopes and elements (Lee-Thorp et al, 1992: in Emslie and Brooks,
1999), meaning that the area where the horn was originally taken from can be traced.
This knowledge could be used to discover more about particular trade routes and
identify poaching hotspots, as proven in its trace of one of the largest seizures of
elephant ivory (Alacs et al, 2010).

44. 44
Appropriate Legislation
Deterrence of poachers will be key in preventing the poaching crisis, as if people were
not willing to kill the rhino, it would not occur. The problem is, in order to deter people
from committing a crime, sentences have to reflect the seriousness of the crime. In
many countries, the punishment for poaching a rhino is usually only a monetary fine.
This in itself is a major issue as the fines are given in local currencies that devalue
against the harder currencies used to purchase horn off the poachers. They would have
made huge amounts of money selling horn to countries with harder currencies so a fine
is not sufficient to deter them.
Rather than fines, custodial sentences should be the most common form of punishment
for poaching crimes in order to have at least a chance of a deterrent effect. The wider
use of expert witnesses in court cases would help achieve this goal because they will
be able to convince the court that rhino poaching is a serious crime and the sentences
of those convicted would be sufficiently severe. Expert witnesses have already proved
their utility in the cases they have been involved in, with South Africa and Namibia
increasing their maximum sentences for this crime to 10 and 20 years respectively
(Emslie and Brooks, 1999).
At the moment, the only attempt at a worldwide legislation to combat this international
issue is the CITES treaty, and as previously mentioned, this alone cannot halt the
poaching onslaught. Alongside CITES, domestic legislation of each member is
necessary due to the absence of enforcement within the treaty (Cheung, 1995);

45. 45
consumer countries need to provide more funds and personnel to counter trafficking
as the rhino range states are too poor to be solely responsible for the task, whereas the
range states need to cooperate with each other on the movement of horn across borders.
As an added incentive to cooperate with CITES, there should be appropriate sanctions
in place to use against those nations that continue to violate the treaty (McFadden,
1987).
Conclusion
The African rhinoceros has been increasingly poached for its horn in the last five years
due to South-east Asian demand for its use in TCM and the inability of Africa to deal
with the crisis, due to the political and economic instability that has plagued the
continent since its independence. In Asia, Vietnam has been earmarked recently as
today’s major TCM consumer, due to the unproven rumours that have circulated
nationwide claiming that rhino horn can cure cancer.
White rhino numbers have consistently increased since 1895 because poaching
mortalities have never outweighed births, but if the demand from Vietnam continues
to increase at the rate it has done and the rate of poaching mirrors this, white rhino
numbers may start to drop. Black rhino have maintained a stable population since the
last crisis in the 1980s, but the population is significantly smaller than the white
subspecies (see Figure 1).
South Africa has been the main target for poachers in the current poaching crisis
because it is the stronghold for 90% of Africa’s wild rhinos. When it was clear that

46. 46
rhino poaching was increasing to unprecedented levels, South Africa stepped up its
efforts to ensure the continued survival of its rhinos by employing a variety of methods
that included the establishment of a specialised National Wildlife Crime Unit, the
introduction of harsher penalties to legislation, and the translocation of rhinos to other
areas. With rhinos being introduced to other African countries that previously lost their
original populations to poaching, these areas need to already have the adequate
provisions in place to ensure that the new rhino do not share the same fate. Resources
must be directed towards the erection of boundary fencing and employment of game
rangers to patrol these fences 24/7 if rhino numbers are not to be affected negatively
by the increase in poaching.
Corruption also needs to be addressed in Africa. As previously mentioned in chapter,
there are an increasing number of cases where those in the game industry are
personally involved in rhino poaching. To prevent private game owners from poaching
their own rhinos, there needs to be an application system where extensive background
checks are made into those who apply to own private land for the purpose of keeping
game. This would hopefully prevent corrupt individuals from having access to animals
for the purpose of poaching them, and make it harder for other poachers to find a rhino
source to work with.
Consumer countries need to play a role in enforcement too. Major consumers should
follow the example of the UK, where rhino horn has become a top CITES priority
recently, by forcing domestic legislations that target traffickers in an attempt to stop
trade. However, prevention is better than cure, so it should also be suggested that the

47. 47
demand for rhino horn in TCM be reduced by endorsing culturally sensitive awareness
campaigns that educate consumers on the effects of their consumption and promote
substitutes such as water buffalo horn (Song and Milliken, 1990).
If nations can be persuaded to ensure that enough resources are allocated correctly to
ensure the efficiency of an intelligence network among law enforcement officials and
to implement advertising campaigns that promote awareness of the plight of the rhino
and educate those involved as to why they need to be protected, then there may just be
a chance that the poaching of rhino can once again be quashed.
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