This document summarizes a court case involving an appeal of a speeding conviction where the appellant's speed was measured using a laser device. The court allowed the appeal, finding that the evidence presented by the officer who operated the laser device was insufficient. Specifically, there was not enough evidence that the officer received proper training on the laser, that he tested the device before and after using it as required, or that the laser provided an accurate measurement of the appellant's speed. The court concluded there was reasonable doubt regarding the laser's reliability and the officer's competence, and set aside the conviction.
PERATURAN-PERATURAN ANGKATAN TENTERA (BIDANGKUASA TERUS) 1976FAROUQ
1. The document outlines regulations regarding summary jurisdiction in the Malaysian Armed Forces.
2. It defines key terms and establishes that a commanding officer has the power to investigate and deal summarily with charges against those under their command. This power can be delegated to subordinate commanders.
3. The regulations specify which punishments subordinate commanders are authorized to award depending on their rank and the rank of the accused person. Minor punishments are outlined in an attached schedule.
KAEDAH-KAEDAH ANGKATAN TENTERA (LEMBAGA SIASATAN) 1976FAROUQ
The document outlines rules for Armed Forces boards of inquiry and courts-martial in Malaysia. It details procedures for investigations, trials, evidence collection and witness testimony. Some key points include:
- Boards of inquiry can be convened to investigate servicemember absences or deficiencies in arms/equipment. Courts-martial can try offenses under the Armed Forces Act.
- Rules govern search warrants, interrogation of suspects, and the roles of prosecutors, defending officers and interpreters at trials.
- Courts-martial must consider challenges to their jurisdiction and objections to charges. Accused servicemembers can plead guilty, not guilty, or object to joint charges/trials.
- If found guilty, courts consider
KAEDAH-KAEDAH ANGKATAN TENTERA (PENJARAAN DAN TAHANAN) 1976FAROUQ
This document outlines rules for the Armed Forces of Malaysia regarding imprisonment and detention. It covers several topics:
1) It establishes control and inspection of detention centers, including appointing inspectors to oversee detention centers and report to the Minister.
2) It specifies where persons may serve sentences of imprisonment or detention, including service establishments (detention centers and unit detention rooms) and civil prisons. It also classifies service establishments.
3) It provides guidelines for officers serving sentences and where servicemen sentenced in or outside of Malaysia will serve their sentences.
The rules aim to standardize treatment and procedures for members of the Armed Forces serving sentences.
This document provides an overview of the Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Act of 2005 in India. Some key points:
- It establishes a Controlling Authority to regulate private security agencies and grant licenses. Licenses are required for any agency providing private security services.
- Certain criteria must be met to be eligible for a license, such as no criminal convictions. Licenses can be cancelled for violations of the act or conditions.
- Agencies must ensure guards and supervisors receive proper training. Guards must be citizens of India between 18-65 years old and pass background checks.
- The act outlines requirements around commencement of operations, employment of supervisors, display of licenses, and other regulatory
KAEDAH-KAEDAH ANGKATAN TENTERA (MAHKAMAH TENTERA) 1976FAROUQ
This document contains the Armed Forces (Court-Martial) Rules of Procedure 1976 which outline the procedures for courts-martial in the Malaysian Armed Forces. Some key points:
- It establishes the procedures for courts-martial, including convening courts, charges, investigations of offences, trials, findings, sentencing and appeals.
- Courts-martial have jurisdiction to try any Armed Forces personnel for offences under the Armed Forces Act and to determine appropriate punishments.
- Trials are generally open to the public, but the president can order proceedings to be in camera for reasons such as national security or public morals.
- It outlines the roles and responsibilities of those involved in courts-
This case involves R. v. Farkas, where Ferenc Farkas was charged with disobeying a no left turn sign under the Highway Traffic Act. At trial, the officer testified that he witnessed Mr. Farkas make a left turn where signs indicated no left turns were allowed. However, Mr. Farkas testified that on the day in question, the sign was completely covered in snow and not visible. The judge accepted Mr. Farkas' evidence and found that because the sign was obstructed and not clear, the offence was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The charge against Mr. Farkas was therefore dismissed.
City Water v. Wellness Beauty Spa (appeal proper & single judge)Matthew Riddell
The appellant, City Water International Inc., appeals a small claims court decision dismissing its claim against the respondent, Wellness Beauty Spa, for breach of contract and unpaid fees relating to the rental of a water filtration system. The trial judge found that the respondent's principal did not understand the 5-year rental term, that the system had deficiencies especially with hot water, and that the appellant improperly withdrew a full annual payment at once. However, the Divisional Court found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by not adequately explaining why she preferred the respondent's evidence over the appellant's or addressing evidence contradicting her conclusions. The appeal was allowed, the trial decision was set aside, and judgment was entered for the appellant in
City Water International Inc. v. Wellness Beauty Spa (panel & leave)Matthew Riddell
City Water International Inc. appealed a Small Claims Court decision and sought leave to have its officer and director, Matthew Riddell, represent the corporation in the appeal even though he is not a lawyer. The Divisional Court granted the request based on additional context not previously provided, including that Mr. Riddell holds a full-time position with City Water and prepared all appeal materials for a claim under $2,000.
PERATURAN-PERATURAN ANGKATAN TENTERA (BIDANGKUASA TERUS) 1976FAROUQ
1. The document outlines regulations regarding summary jurisdiction in the Malaysian Armed Forces.
2. It defines key terms and establishes that a commanding officer has the power to investigate and deal summarily with charges against those under their command. This power can be delegated to subordinate commanders.
3. The regulations specify which punishments subordinate commanders are authorized to award depending on their rank and the rank of the accused person. Minor punishments are outlined in an attached schedule.
KAEDAH-KAEDAH ANGKATAN TENTERA (LEMBAGA SIASATAN) 1976FAROUQ
The document outlines rules for Armed Forces boards of inquiry and courts-martial in Malaysia. It details procedures for investigations, trials, evidence collection and witness testimony. Some key points include:
- Boards of inquiry can be convened to investigate servicemember absences or deficiencies in arms/equipment. Courts-martial can try offenses under the Armed Forces Act.
- Rules govern search warrants, interrogation of suspects, and the roles of prosecutors, defending officers and interpreters at trials.
- Courts-martial must consider challenges to their jurisdiction and objections to charges. Accused servicemembers can plead guilty, not guilty, or object to joint charges/trials.
- If found guilty, courts consider
KAEDAH-KAEDAH ANGKATAN TENTERA (PENJARAAN DAN TAHANAN) 1976FAROUQ
This document outlines rules for the Armed Forces of Malaysia regarding imprisonment and detention. It covers several topics:
1) It establishes control and inspection of detention centers, including appointing inspectors to oversee detention centers and report to the Minister.
2) It specifies where persons may serve sentences of imprisonment or detention, including service establishments (detention centers and unit detention rooms) and civil prisons. It also classifies service establishments.
3) It provides guidelines for officers serving sentences and where servicemen sentenced in or outside of Malaysia will serve their sentences.
The rules aim to standardize treatment and procedures for members of the Armed Forces serving sentences.
This document provides an overview of the Private Security Agencies (Regulation) Act of 2005 in India. Some key points:
- It establishes a Controlling Authority to regulate private security agencies and grant licenses. Licenses are required for any agency providing private security services.
- Certain criteria must be met to be eligible for a license, such as no criminal convictions. Licenses can be cancelled for violations of the act or conditions.
- Agencies must ensure guards and supervisors receive proper training. Guards must be citizens of India between 18-65 years old and pass background checks.
- The act outlines requirements around commencement of operations, employment of supervisors, display of licenses, and other regulatory
KAEDAH-KAEDAH ANGKATAN TENTERA (MAHKAMAH TENTERA) 1976FAROUQ
This document contains the Armed Forces (Court-Martial) Rules of Procedure 1976 which outline the procedures for courts-martial in the Malaysian Armed Forces. Some key points:
- It establishes the procedures for courts-martial, including convening courts, charges, investigations of offences, trials, findings, sentencing and appeals.
- Courts-martial have jurisdiction to try any Armed Forces personnel for offences under the Armed Forces Act and to determine appropriate punishments.
- Trials are generally open to the public, but the president can order proceedings to be in camera for reasons such as national security or public morals.
- It outlines the roles and responsibilities of those involved in courts-
This case involves R. v. Farkas, where Ferenc Farkas was charged with disobeying a no left turn sign under the Highway Traffic Act. At trial, the officer testified that he witnessed Mr. Farkas make a left turn where signs indicated no left turns were allowed. However, Mr. Farkas testified that on the day in question, the sign was completely covered in snow and not visible. The judge accepted Mr. Farkas' evidence and found that because the sign was obstructed and not clear, the offence was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The charge against Mr. Farkas was therefore dismissed.
City Water v. Wellness Beauty Spa (appeal proper & single judge)Matthew Riddell
The appellant, City Water International Inc., appeals a small claims court decision dismissing its claim against the respondent, Wellness Beauty Spa, for breach of contract and unpaid fees relating to the rental of a water filtration system. The trial judge found that the respondent's principal did not understand the 5-year rental term, that the system had deficiencies especially with hot water, and that the appellant improperly withdrew a full annual payment at once. However, the Divisional Court found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by not adequately explaining why she preferred the respondent's evidence over the appellant's or addressing evidence contradicting her conclusions. The appeal was allowed, the trial decision was set aside, and judgment was entered for the appellant in
City Water International Inc. v. Wellness Beauty Spa (panel & leave)Matthew Riddell
City Water International Inc. appealed a Small Claims Court decision and sought leave to have its officer and director, Matthew Riddell, represent the corporation in the appeal even though he is not a lawyer. The Divisional Court granted the request based on additional context not previously provided, including that Mr. Riddell holds a full-time position with City Water and prepared all appeal materials for a claim under $2,000.
The plaintiff's insurer was awarded $10,000 in damages in a subrogated claim for a motor vehicle accident. The defendant had stopped at a stop sign but proceeded when it was unsafe to do so, striking the plaintiff's vehicle. The court found the defendant solely responsible for the accident as the plaintiff had the right of way. Despite difficult weather conditions, the defendant had a duty to wait until it was safe before crossing the intersection. The court therefore awarded the agreed $10,000 damages amount plus interest to the plaintiff's insurer.
This case involves a small claims action brought by Beatrice Williams (Plaintiff) against her landlord Yvonne Bartley (Defendant) for damages from an alleged theft of her property during her arrest and incarceration. The Plaintiff alleges the Defendant provided false information to police leading to her wrongful arrest, charge, and conviction, from which she was later pardoned. However, the court found the Plaintiff's testimony to be vague and unsupported by documentation or additional witnesses. The Defendant testified she was unable to access the Plaintiff's locked room and called police to remove the Plaintiff's belongings. The court preferred the Defendant's testimony and dismissed the Plaintiff's claim for failing to meet the burden of proof.
This document summarizes a court case, R. v. Dodman, where the defendant Jason Dodman was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood. During a roadside stop, the officer detected signs of impairment but administered an approved screening device test within 15 minutes, without ensuring no recent alcohol consumption. While other signs suggested impairment, the court found the breath test results inadmissible due to the Charter violation, and dismissed the over 80 charge. Admitting the evidence would compromise fairness and the reputation of justice.
The defendant was found by police officers slumped over the steering wheel of his vehicle in the middle of an intersection with the engine running. When the officer opened the driver's door to turn off the ignition, the defendant was startled and his foot hit the gas. The officers smelled alcohol on his breath but the court found the evidence equally supported that the defendant had fallen asleep at the wheel and was not fully awake after being startled. Taking all evidence into account, the court found the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was impaired and found him not guilty.
This document summarizes a court case between Her Majesty the Queen and Anthony Azeez regarding charges under Section 253 of the Criminal Code of Canada for driving over the legal limit of alcohol. The judge found that while there was sufficient evidence that the breath tests occurred within two hours of driving, there was no evidence provided that Anthony Azeez was read the breath sample demand after the officer formed the opinion that he was over the legal limit. As a result, the presumption allowing the breath test certificate to be admitted as evidence did not apply, and without this presumption, there was insufficient evidence to find that Azeez was over the legal limit when driving. Therefore, the judge dismissed the charge.
Jordan Beaudrie was charged with racing under the Highway Traffic Act. At trial, the police officer identified Beaudrie in the courtroom as the individual he observed racing, but did not identify him by name in his notes at the roadside stop. The court found that without a proper identification at the time of the incident, the prosecutor did not prove the case against Beaudrie beyond a reasonable doubt. The charge against Beaudrie was dismissed.
This document summarizes a court case, R. v. McCoy, where the appellant Blake McCoy appealed his conviction of failing to stop at a red light. The judge found that there was insufficient evidence that the traffic lights at the intersection were functioning properly on the day in question. Specifically, the officer who charged McCoy did not provide reliable evidence of checking the lights' functioning and made assumptions without direct observation of the light McCoy faced. As a result, the judge determined the justice of the peace erred in taking judicial notice of the lights' functioning and quashed the conviction, entering an acquittal.
This case involves R. v. Fuller, where Jermaine Fuller was charged with failing to wear a complete seat belt assembly under section 106(1) of the Highway Traffic Act. A police officer testified that he observed Fuller without his shoulder strap fastened when stopped at an intersection late at night. However, Fuller and his girlfriend testified that he was wearing his seat belt and only removed it after being pulled over to retrieve documents from the glove compartment. While the judge preferred the officer's evidence, considering the dark and tinted conditions, consistent defense testimony, and reasonable doubt standard, the charge was dismissed due to reasonable doubt about whether the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
This case involves two defendants, Nikiforos and Vlachos, who were charged with failing to wear a seatbelt as passengers in a taxi cab. An officer observed the taxi cab and heard a passenger yelling profanities. The officer followed the cab and observed both passengers reaching for seatbelt straps and pulling them across their hips. However, the court found reasonable doubt due to factors such as it being 3:28 am, limiting the officer's visibility, and inconsistencies in the officer's testimony regarding traffic. As a result, the court dismissed the charges against both defendants.
This document summarizes a court case, R. v. Prescott, where the defendant Ian Prescott was charged with following too closely under section 158(1) of the Highway Traffic Act after he rear-ended another vehicle at a red light. The presiding judge found Prescott guilty. On appeal, the appellate judge determined that (1) there was no evidence presented of the distance between the vehicles, and (2) the lead vehicle that was hit was stopped, not moving. As such, the elements required to prove the offense of following too closely were not met. The appellate judge concluded that Prescott had been charged with the wrong offense and should have been charged with careless driving instead, and acquitted Prescott
This document summarizes a court case, R. v. Mascoe, where the defendant Lascelles Mascoe appealed the 45 day prison sentence imposed by the justice of the peace for driving while under suspension. The judge on appeal found issues with the justice of the peace's reasoning for rejecting the joint submission of a $3,000 fine and failing to explain why the submission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The judge also noted there was only one prior conviction, not three as stated. While a custodial sentence was within range, 45 days was found to be excessive. The prison time was set aside and replaced with a $1,500 fine, with Mascoe having already served 7 days.
The accused, Charles Lupo, appealed his conviction for driving with a suspended license. The trial judge made errors in his assessment of the accused's credibility and in admitting prejudicial evidence. While the trial judge could have rejected the accused's defense, the errors require a new trial. The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.
This case involves R. v. Smagin, where Eugene Smagin was charged with careless driving. The defense counsel requested disclosure on multiple occasions dating back to December 16th, but did not receive any documents from the prosecution until March 15th, just two weeks before the scheduled trial date. The judge criticized the untimely manner in which disclosure was provided by the investigating officer. As a result, the judge dismissed the careless driving charge, finding that the late disclosure did not provide adequate time for the defense to prepare for trial.
R. v. Seles was a case where Rebecca Seles was charged with careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act after her vehicle left the roadway, went through the gravel shoulder, and ended up in a ditch. However, the prosecution did not provide enough evidence about how and why the vehicle ended up in the ditch to prove the charge of careless driving beyond a reasonable doubt. The officer who laid the charge did not provide testimony about any conversation with Seles about what happened. As such, the judge granted the motion of non-suit and dismissed the charge of careless driving against Seles.
The appellant was convicted of careless driving for running a red light. He appealed, arguing the justice failed to properly consider his evidence that he stopped at the light and only proceeded when it was safe. The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered. The justice did not apply the test from R. v. D.W., which requires the justice to consider whether the accused's evidence raises a reasonable doubt, even if not believed. While disbelief of the appellant could be inferred, the justice failed to consider the third part of the D.W. test regarding reasonable doubt.
This document summarizes a court case, R. v. Slawter, in which the appellant Jerry Slawter appealed his careless driving conviction. The presiding judge allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction. While the appellant drove aggressively by moving between lanes, the judge determined the lane change that led to the charge could have been due to momentary inattention while driving a large truck in rainy conditions with difficult to see lane markings. As such, the judge found the appellant's actions did not amount to careless driving and that due diligence had been established.
This document summarizes a court case involving an appeal of a careless driving conviction. Terry Woldenga was convicted of careless driving after his vehicle rear-ended another vehicle that had stopped abruptly. On appeal, the judge analyzed the evidence presented at the original trial and relevant case law on the elements of careless driving. The judge found that the lower court justice of the peace misinterpreted precedent as saying mere inadvertent negligence was sufficient for a careless driving conviction, when the precedent actually said the opposite.
This case involves R. v. Schlesinger, where the defendant David Schlesinger was charged with speeding at 129 km/h in an 80 km/h zone based on a police officer's laser speed reading. The officer could not provide consistent testimony about testing the laser device before use. The court found that (1) the laser must be tested before and after to prove accuracy, (2) the officer's statement of usual practice was not sufficient proof that testing occurred, and (3) the defendant's admission of "probably" speeding at 100-110 km/h was too vague to convict without proof of the laser's accuracy. As a result, the court acquitted the defendant due to reasonable doubt about
Officer Deyo testified that he tested the laser speed gun according to the manufacturer's specifications and found it to be working properly. However, when questioned, Officer Deyo was vague about the number and type of tests performed and the service history of the unit. The judge ruled that Officer Deyo's testimony regarding the testing procedures was manifestly unreliable, as he could not state the required number of tests or their names and procedures. Therefore, the prosecution failed to prove a prima facie case and the charge against Bruno Cuccarolo of speeding was dismissed.
This document summarizes a court case, R. v. Mateus, where the defendant Marco Mateus was charged with speeding. The officer testified that he tested the speed monitoring equipment and found it to be in proper working order. However, the court found that unless tests of such equipment are consistent with and compliant with the manufacturer's procedures, the test results are flawed and unreliable. As there were inconsistencies in how the officer tested the equipment compared to the manufacturer's procedures, the court could not find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court dismissed the speeding charge against the defendant.
The plaintiff's insurer was awarded $10,000 in damages in a subrogated claim for a motor vehicle accident. The defendant had stopped at a stop sign but proceeded when it was unsafe to do so, striking the plaintiff's vehicle. The court found the defendant solely responsible for the accident as the plaintiff had the right of way. Despite difficult weather conditions, the defendant had a duty to wait until it was safe before crossing the intersection. The court therefore awarded the agreed $10,000 damages amount plus interest to the plaintiff's insurer.
This case involves a small claims action brought by Beatrice Williams (Plaintiff) against her landlord Yvonne Bartley (Defendant) for damages from an alleged theft of her property during her arrest and incarceration. The Plaintiff alleges the Defendant provided false information to police leading to her wrongful arrest, charge, and conviction, from which she was later pardoned. However, the court found the Plaintiff's testimony to be vague and unsupported by documentation or additional witnesses. The Defendant testified she was unable to access the Plaintiff's locked room and called police to remove the Plaintiff's belongings. The court preferred the Defendant's testimony and dismissed the Plaintiff's claim for failing to meet the burden of proof.
This document summarizes a court case, R. v. Dodman, where the defendant Jason Dodman was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood. During a roadside stop, the officer detected signs of impairment but administered an approved screening device test within 15 minutes, without ensuring no recent alcohol consumption. While other signs suggested impairment, the court found the breath test results inadmissible due to the Charter violation, and dismissed the over 80 charge. Admitting the evidence would compromise fairness and the reputation of justice.
The defendant was found by police officers slumped over the steering wheel of his vehicle in the middle of an intersection with the engine running. When the officer opened the driver's door to turn off the ignition, the defendant was startled and his foot hit the gas. The officers smelled alcohol on his breath but the court found the evidence equally supported that the defendant had fallen asleep at the wheel and was not fully awake after being startled. Taking all evidence into account, the court found the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was impaired and found him not guilty.
This document summarizes a court case between Her Majesty the Queen and Anthony Azeez regarding charges under Section 253 of the Criminal Code of Canada for driving over the legal limit of alcohol. The judge found that while there was sufficient evidence that the breath tests occurred within two hours of driving, there was no evidence provided that Anthony Azeez was read the breath sample demand after the officer formed the opinion that he was over the legal limit. As a result, the presumption allowing the breath test certificate to be admitted as evidence did not apply, and without this presumption, there was insufficient evidence to find that Azeez was over the legal limit when driving. Therefore, the judge dismissed the charge.
Jordan Beaudrie was charged with racing under the Highway Traffic Act. At trial, the police officer identified Beaudrie in the courtroom as the individual he observed racing, but did not identify him by name in his notes at the roadside stop. The court found that without a proper identification at the time of the incident, the prosecutor did not prove the case against Beaudrie beyond a reasonable doubt. The charge against Beaudrie was dismissed.
This document summarizes a court case, R. v. McCoy, where the appellant Blake McCoy appealed his conviction of failing to stop at a red light. The judge found that there was insufficient evidence that the traffic lights at the intersection were functioning properly on the day in question. Specifically, the officer who charged McCoy did not provide reliable evidence of checking the lights' functioning and made assumptions without direct observation of the light McCoy faced. As a result, the judge determined the justice of the peace erred in taking judicial notice of the lights' functioning and quashed the conviction, entering an acquittal.
This case involves R. v. Fuller, where Jermaine Fuller was charged with failing to wear a complete seat belt assembly under section 106(1) of the Highway Traffic Act. A police officer testified that he observed Fuller without his shoulder strap fastened when stopped at an intersection late at night. However, Fuller and his girlfriend testified that he was wearing his seat belt and only removed it after being pulled over to retrieve documents from the glove compartment. While the judge preferred the officer's evidence, considering the dark and tinted conditions, consistent defense testimony, and reasonable doubt standard, the charge was dismissed due to reasonable doubt about whether the offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
This case involves two defendants, Nikiforos and Vlachos, who were charged with failing to wear a seatbelt as passengers in a taxi cab. An officer observed the taxi cab and heard a passenger yelling profanities. The officer followed the cab and observed both passengers reaching for seatbelt straps and pulling them across their hips. However, the court found reasonable doubt due to factors such as it being 3:28 am, limiting the officer's visibility, and inconsistencies in the officer's testimony regarding traffic. As a result, the court dismissed the charges against both defendants.
This document summarizes a court case, R. v. Prescott, where the defendant Ian Prescott was charged with following too closely under section 158(1) of the Highway Traffic Act after he rear-ended another vehicle at a red light. The presiding judge found Prescott guilty. On appeal, the appellate judge determined that (1) there was no evidence presented of the distance between the vehicles, and (2) the lead vehicle that was hit was stopped, not moving. As such, the elements required to prove the offense of following too closely were not met. The appellate judge concluded that Prescott had been charged with the wrong offense and should have been charged with careless driving instead, and acquitted Prescott
This document summarizes a court case, R. v. Mascoe, where the defendant Lascelles Mascoe appealed the 45 day prison sentence imposed by the justice of the peace for driving while under suspension. The judge on appeal found issues with the justice of the peace's reasoning for rejecting the joint submission of a $3,000 fine and failing to explain why the submission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The judge also noted there was only one prior conviction, not three as stated. While a custodial sentence was within range, 45 days was found to be excessive. The prison time was set aside and replaced with a $1,500 fine, with Mascoe having already served 7 days.
The accused, Charles Lupo, appealed his conviction for driving with a suspended license. The trial judge made errors in his assessment of the accused's credibility and in admitting prejudicial evidence. While the trial judge could have rejected the accused's defense, the errors require a new trial. The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.
This case involves R. v. Smagin, where Eugene Smagin was charged with careless driving. The defense counsel requested disclosure on multiple occasions dating back to December 16th, but did not receive any documents from the prosecution until March 15th, just two weeks before the scheduled trial date. The judge criticized the untimely manner in which disclosure was provided by the investigating officer. As a result, the judge dismissed the careless driving charge, finding that the late disclosure did not provide adequate time for the defense to prepare for trial.
R. v. Seles was a case where Rebecca Seles was charged with careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act after her vehicle left the roadway, went through the gravel shoulder, and ended up in a ditch. However, the prosecution did not provide enough evidence about how and why the vehicle ended up in the ditch to prove the charge of careless driving beyond a reasonable doubt. The officer who laid the charge did not provide testimony about any conversation with Seles about what happened. As such, the judge granted the motion of non-suit and dismissed the charge of careless driving against Seles.
The appellant was convicted of careless driving for running a red light. He appealed, arguing the justice failed to properly consider his evidence that he stopped at the light and only proceeded when it was safe. The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered. The justice did not apply the test from R. v. D.W., which requires the justice to consider whether the accused's evidence raises a reasonable doubt, even if not believed. While disbelief of the appellant could be inferred, the justice failed to consider the third part of the D.W. test regarding reasonable doubt.
This document summarizes a court case, R. v. Slawter, in which the appellant Jerry Slawter appealed his careless driving conviction. The presiding judge allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction. While the appellant drove aggressively by moving between lanes, the judge determined the lane change that led to the charge could have been due to momentary inattention while driving a large truck in rainy conditions with difficult to see lane markings. As such, the judge found the appellant's actions did not amount to careless driving and that due diligence had been established.
This document summarizes a court case involving an appeal of a careless driving conviction. Terry Woldenga was convicted of careless driving after his vehicle rear-ended another vehicle that had stopped abruptly. On appeal, the judge analyzed the evidence presented at the original trial and relevant case law on the elements of careless driving. The judge found that the lower court justice of the peace misinterpreted precedent as saying mere inadvertent negligence was sufficient for a careless driving conviction, when the precedent actually said the opposite.
This case involves R. v. Schlesinger, where the defendant David Schlesinger was charged with speeding at 129 km/h in an 80 km/h zone based on a police officer's laser speed reading. The officer could not provide consistent testimony about testing the laser device before use. The court found that (1) the laser must be tested before and after to prove accuracy, (2) the officer's statement of usual practice was not sufficient proof that testing occurred, and (3) the defendant's admission of "probably" speeding at 100-110 km/h was too vague to convict without proof of the laser's accuracy. As a result, the court acquitted the defendant due to reasonable doubt about
Officer Deyo testified that he tested the laser speed gun according to the manufacturer's specifications and found it to be working properly. However, when questioned, Officer Deyo was vague about the number and type of tests performed and the service history of the unit. The judge ruled that Officer Deyo's testimony regarding the testing procedures was manifestly unreliable, as he could not state the required number of tests or their names and procedures. Therefore, the prosecution failed to prove a prima facie case and the charge against Bruno Cuccarolo of speeding was dismissed.
This document summarizes a court case, R. v. Mateus, where the defendant Marco Mateus was charged with speeding. The officer testified that he tested the speed monitoring equipment and found it to be in proper working order. However, the court found that unless tests of such equipment are consistent with and compliant with the manufacturer's procedures, the test results are flawed and unreliable. As there were inconsistencies in how the officer tested the equipment compared to the manufacturer's procedures, the court could not find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court dismissed the speeding charge against the defendant.
1. Case Name:
R. v. Martin
IN THE MATTER OF an appeal under section 135 of the
Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. P.33, as
amended
Between
Her Majesty the Queen, Respondent, and
Craig Martin, Appellant
[2008] O.J. No. 1803
2008 ONCJ 217
78 W.C.B. (2d) 350
Tannery Info No. 9990085321148-90
Ontario Court of Justice
P.J. Wright J.
May 1, 2008.
(34 paras.)
Transportation law -- Motor vehicles -- Offences -- Speeding -- Appeal of a conviction for speeding
contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act allowed -- The appellant was recorded driving
over the posted limit by an officer using a laser device -- There was not sufficient evidence before
the court that the officer had ever received training in the use of the device, that he tested the laser
before and after its use, or to support the conclusion that the device was accurate or reliable.
Appeal of a conviction for speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act. The
appellant was recorded driving over the posted limit by an officer using a laser device. The
appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding the evidence related to the police officer's
knowledge of the laser device and the reliability of the laser device sufficient.
HELD: Appeal allowed. The evidence of the officer should have raised a reasonable doubt in the
Page 1
2. mind of the trial judge. There was not sufficient evidence before the court that the officer had ever
received training in the use of the device, that he tested the laser before and after its use, or to
support the conclusion that the device was accurate or reliable.
Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:
Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8, s. 128
Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, C. P. 33, s. 135, s. 136(1), s. 136(2), s. 136(3)
Appeal From:
On appeal from the conviction by Justice of the Peace, His Worship J. Oates on April 17, 2007.
Counsel:
Ms. Lorinda Angus: for the Crown.
Mr. Matthew Riddell: for the accused.
1 P.J. WRIGHT J.:-- The Appellant Craig Martin appeals from his conviction on a charge of
speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H. 8.
2 The Appellant's speed was measured by a "laser" device.
3 This appeal raised the following issues:
1. Was the evidence presented by the Crown sufficient to support conclusions
that the officer was trained and competent in the use of the "laser".
2. Was the evidence presented by the Crown as to the accuracy and reliability
of "laser's" measurements of the Appellant's speed adequate.
4 The Appellant submitted that the Justice of the Peace erred in concluding the evidence was
sufficient. The Respondent submitted that the Justice the Peace concluded that the evidence was
sufficient and adequate.
5 Both parties relied on detailed Facta, transcripts of the trial proceedings for the Justice of the
Peace, substantial books of authority and oral arguments.
6 Following argument, consideration of materials filed and the law, I concluded that the appeal
must succeed, set aside the conviction and enter an acquittal with written reasons to follow.
Page 2
3. 7 There are those reasons.
Facts
8 The state of the record is not in dispute. There was one witness called by the Crown, O.P.P.
Officer Dan Zarrello, who identified the Appellant's vehicle as speeding, stopped the vehicle and
issued a speeding ticket to the Appellant.
9 Officer Zarrello was operating a "laser" which he described as an "instrument used to measure
speed of moving motor vehicles" on Highway #400 in the City of Vaughan in York Region. He said
he had "taken courses" with respect to the "laser" and as a result was a qualified operator of the
instrument. On June 4, 2006, he tested the device, once at 8:45 p.m.. He said that test was based on
the guidelines provided by the manufacturer of the "laser".
10 On June 4, 2006 at 9:55 p.m. Officer Zarrello observed the Appellant's vehicle northbound on
Highway #400. He took a reading with the laser which recorded the appellant's speed at 131
kilometres per hours in a posted 100 kilometres per hour zone. A few moments later Officer
Zarrello took a second reading with the "laser" which recorded the appellant's speed at 134
kilometres per hour in the same posted 100 kilometres per hour zone. Officer Zarrello stopped the
appellant and issued a ticket to him for speeding 115 kilometres per hour in a posted 100 kilometres
per hour zone.
11 The Appellant called no evidence at his trial.
Reasons for Judgment Before the Justice of the Peace
12 The reasons for conviction by the Justice of the Peace were brief:
"In this case we have the evidence of the officer who indicated he was operating
this laser device on the 400. He indicated he observed the defendant's vehicle in
lane one and he received, appeared to be speeding, which he is required to do,
forms an opinion. He used the laser device and aimed it at the vehicle and
received a reading of 131. Again he received a second reading of 134 when the
vehicle was 288 metres away from his location. He eventually stopped the
defendant and charged the defendant with 15 over rather than 34. I am satisfied
in this case the accused is guilty. There will be conviction."
Analysis
13 The Appellant's position on appeal was that the evidence before the Justice of the Peace was
not sufficient to support the conclusion that Officer Zarrello was competent in the use of the "laser"
device or that he used it properly. As well the Appellant's position was the evidence was not
sufficient to support the conclusion that the "laser" device was in proper working order, that it had
Page 3
4. been properly tested, both before and after its use in accordance with the manufacturer's
specifications and that the "laser" measurements of the Appellant's speed were inaccurate and
unreliable as a result.
14 The Appellant did not argue that the "laser" device - properly operated - was not a reliable
device for use in speed detection of vehicles.
15 The Respondent seeks to uphold the conviction on the basis that there was prima facia
evidence at trial that Officer Zarrello was a qualified "laser" device operator, that the "laser" device
was operated correctly and that the speed of the Appellant's vehicle as determined by the "laser"
device was accurate and reliable.
What was Officer Zarrello's training and experience in the operation of a "Laser" Device?
16 The court received little information from Officer Zarrello regarding his experience and
operation of the "laser" device apart from the assertion that "at the time" he was "operating a laser
which is an instrument used to measure the speed of moving motor vehicles" (Transcript February
17, 2007, page 3 lines 31 and 32).
17 Officer Zarrello provided no evidence as to the description of the type of "laser" he claimed to
have used, for example, the name of the manufacturer of the "laser" device, the model or serial
number of the laser device. Neither were his notes nor was his recollection of any assistance to
Officer Zarrello in this regard.
18 While Officer Zarrello testified that he had "taken courses" with respect to "the laser" and was
"a qualified operator", that testimony must be assessed in the context of his later evidence given at
trial on February 13, 2007 in which he spoke about being trained by a fellow officer:
"Q. And you indicated earlier that you were trained on this laser unit.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. When were you trained?
A. I would have to say late 90's ... and then I was re-qualified again, I think it was
last ...
Q. So you can't give me a date or a month then - a year or a month?
A. No. but it was - we do it every two years. I don't remember that last time I did it"
Q. So you don't remember when you were originally trained or when you were - had
the refresher course, you can't give me a date or a month?
A. No.
Page 4
5. (Transcript of evidence February 13, 2007, page 10 lines 12-19)
19 No evidence was adduced that Officer Zarrello had ever received any training in the use of the
"laser" device from, by or on behalf of the manufacturer of the very device he was using.
20 By any objective assessment of the totality of Officer Zarrello's evidence it could not be said
that Officer Zarrello was trained or experienced in the operation of the "laser" device.
Was the laser device tested by Officer Zarrello before and after its use as required by the
manufacturer?
21 Officer Zarrello testified that he "tested" the "laser" device at 8:45 p.m. on June 4, 2006, more
than a hour before securing the readings on the "laser" device of the appellant's speed at 9:55 p.m.
Officer Zarrello had no memory of when or whether he tested the "laser" device after the offence.
His notes provided no assistance.
"Q. What time did you test the laser device after the alleged offence?
A. Sorry, I don't have it marked down in my book what time."
(Transcript February 13, 2007, page 24 lines 20-23)
22 Did Officer Zarrello use the manufacturer's manual as a guide when conducting the test on the
laser device?
"Q. So did you use the manual when testing this device?
A. If I have to, yes.
Q. In this particular occasion did you use the manual to test the device?
A. I did not mark it down if I used it or not.
Q. So you said you had an independent recollection. Do you recall using the manual
when testing the device?
A. No I don't recall using it."
(Transcript February 13, 2007, page 16, lines 15-23)
What was the evidentiary basis for Officer Zarrello to assert that he used the "laser" device
properly?
23 Apart from stating that the device was set up correctly, Officer Zarrello provided no specific
evidence to support that statement. He could not recall the manufacturer's specification in the
Page 5
6. manual, he agreed that he did not use the manufacturer's manual and only vaguely spoke of some
elements of the testing he performed. In short, Officer Zarrello's evidence was more in the nature of
his opinion, rather than any instructions that he followed from training or from a manual. It can be
concluded that in the absence of full compliance with the testing and operation process of the
"laser" device being complied with, the readings obtained by Officer Zarrello of the speed of the
Appellant's vehicle are highly suspect.
"There would be no reason for the device manufacturer to set out the
specifications and directions if it mattered not whether they were complied with".
(R. v. Niewiadomski [2004] O.J. No. 478 Schall J. para. 29.)
24 The evidence of Officer Zarrello in totality should have raised a reasonable doubt in the mind
of the learned Justice of the Peace. Officer Zarrello's lack of demonstrable training or qualifications,
his faulty memory, his lack of notes or record keeping, his failure to refer to and use the
manufacturer's manual, which he evidently had in the very box which contained the "laser" device
that he used, his inability to recall the testing procedure, if any, that he performed on the "laser"
device and his bald unsupported "opinion" that he simply would not have used the "laser" device if
it were not working cause the court to conclude that it would be dangerous to rely upon the
evidence of Officer Zarrello or to give his evidence any weight in these proceedings.
Evidentiary Requirements - Application of R. v. Vancrey
25 In R. v. Vancrey [2000] O.J. No. 3033 the Ontario Court of Appeal did an excellent and
instructive overview of the evidentiary requirements to be met where speed is determined by the use
of a "laser" device.
26 First the court considered the facts in these terms:
"... there was led at trial prima facie evidence of the accuracy and liability of the
particular laser unit, consisting of the performance of the manufacturer's test for
good working order before and after the use of the device, together with the
earlier verification of the accuracy of the laser unit from entering the velocity of
moving vehicles on a highway, when compared with an accurate radar unit by a
qualified laser radar operator."
(R. v. Vancrey, supra para. 21)
27 Secondly the court expressed the ratio of it's decision as follows:
"The court received evidence that the officer who operated the laser device was
Page 6
7. trained and experienced and that he tested the device both before and after its use
in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions to ensure it was operating
properly upon the date in question. The court also received evidence of the
accuracy of the device for measuring the speed of vehicles on a highway by
comparing its readings to those of an accurate radar unit. The radar test provides
independent guarantee of the accuracy of the particular laser unit to measure the
speed of a moving vehicle".
(R. v. Vancrey, supra para. 22)
28 In the case at bar there was little or no evidence called by the Crown to allow a trier of fact to
support the conclusion that Officer Zarrello was trained and experienced in the use of the laser, that
he tested the laser before and after its use, or to support the conclusion that the laser was operating
correctly and that measurements of the appellant's speed by the laser device was accurate or
reliable.
29 Indeed, the facts in the case at bar confound the ability of the trier of fact to draw any
conclusion other than that the evidence leaves the court in a state of confusion and with a reasonable
doubt on these critical issues.
30 During the trial the learned Justice of the Peace correctly set out the test in an exchange with
counsel as follows:
"There's case law that indicates that the officer doesn't have to know the technical
- the technical workings of a device other than how to use it and - and that it's
working properly at the time when he was using it and is able to give evidence in
court that in fact he - it was working properly. That's as far as it goes. As far as
any of the technical part of it, that is - there's case law that says that's not
necessary, it's just that the court has to be satisfied that he is qualified and that he
did use it, and he tested it, and it was working properly in his opinion. That's as
far as it goes."
(Transcript February 13, 2007, page 14 lines 8-19)
31 However after carefully reviewing the trial testimony, I do not find that the evidence meets the
tests required.
Conduct of Appeal s. 136 Provincial Offences Act R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 33 as amended
32 The appeal process for a part I offence is governed by section 135 of the Provincial Offences
Act. The conduct of the appeal, however is governed by section 136 of the Provincial Offences Act.
Page 7
8. The language which defines the conduct of the appeal speaks in terms of a broad based review with
generous allowances to all parties to ensure that the issues are fully and effectively defined and
fairly and completely considered.
33 Pursuant to section 136, the appeal court is to provide the parties with an opportunity to be
heard so as to determine the issues before it: when the circumstances warrant the court may make
such inquiries as are required (section 136.(1)). An appeal under section 136 is to be conducted by
way of a review, that is, a reconsideration of a trial proceedings: subsection section 136(2). This
provision reflects the informal nature of appeals in respect of Part I and II proceedings. In
determining a review, it is open to the court to hear or rehear the recorded evidence at trial as well
as require a transcript of the evidence or production of any exhibit (clause 136(3)(a)); receive the
evidence of any witness whether or not he or she testified at trial (clause 136(3)(b)); require the
presiding justice at trial to furnish a written report (clause 136(3)(d); or receive and act upon any
agreed statements of facts or admissions (clause 136(3)(d)).
Ruling
34 On a careful review of the entire evidence tendered during the trial proceedings, law and
submissions of counsel in accordance with section 136 of the Provincial Offences Act I conclude as
follows:
1. The conviction is set aside;
2. Assessing the evidence on the record at trial at its highest and in a manner most
favourable to the prosecution, it is clear that there exists no reasonable prospect
for conviction on a retrial.
3. Having set aside the conviction, I find the Appellant not guilty and I dismiss the
charge of speeding against him.
cp/e/qlttm/qlprp/qlesm/qlaxw/qlrxg/qlaxw
Page 8