The document outlines significant industrial safety incidents, including the Flixborough explosion, Mexico City LPG terminal fire, and Bhopal gas tragedy, highlighting the catastrophic consequences of process safety failures. It also details the components of a Process Safety Management (PSM) program, emphasizing the importance of process safety information, hazard analysis, operating procedures, training, and incident investigation. Effective management of change and employee participation are stressed as critical elements in preventing future incidents.

1. Process Safety Management
29 CFR 1910.119
-A.Sivasakthi

2. FILXBOROUGH, 01.06.1974, UK

4. EXPLOSION AT FLIXBOROUGH U.K.
1. 4.53 P.M. On Saturday 1.6.74 Flixborough Works Of
Nypro. (U.K.) Product-caprolactum
2. 28 Killed, 36 Major Injuries
3. Reactor Section Of The Caprolactum Plant.
4. On 27.3.74 It Was Discovered That Reactor No:5
Was Leaking Cyclohexane.
5. Decision Was Taken To Remove Reactor No:5 And
To Install A Bypass Assembly To Connect Reactor
No:4 And 6 So That Plant Could Continue
Production

5. 6. In Afternoon Of 1.6.74 A Large Quantity Of
Cyclohexane Escaped Due To Rupture Of Bypass Line
7. The Cyclohexane Formed A Vapour Cloud And The
Flammable Mixture Found A Source Of Ignition. At
About 4.53 P.M. There Was A Massive Vapour Cloud
Explosion
8. The Blast And The Fires Destroyed Not Only The
Cyclohexane Plant But Several Other Plants Also.

6. MEXICO CITY, 19.11.1984, MEXICO

7. LPG TERMINAL AT MEXICO-CITY
1. 5.35 A.M. On 19.11.1984. Major Fire And Series Of
Explosions Occurred At The Pemex Lpg Terminal At San
Juan, Mexico City.
2. 500 People Were Killed And The Terminal Was
Destroyed.
3. The Terminal Was Used For The Distribution Of Lpg
Which Came By Pipeline From Three Different
Refineries. The Lpg Storage Capacity Of 16000 M3
Consisted Of Six Spheres And 48 Horizontal Cylinders.

8. 4. Morning Of 18.11.84 The Plant Was Being Filled From A
Refinery 400 Km Away. At 0530 Hrs A Fall In Pressure Was
Registered In The Control Room & Also At A Pipeline Pumping
Station 40 Km Away. A 8” Pipe Connected To Sphere F4 Had
Ruptured.
5. The Release Of Lpg Continued For 5-10 Min.. When The Gas
Cloud Had Grown To Cover A Large Area It Found A Ignition
Source And Ignited. It Was 5.40 A.M The Cloud Caught Fire
Over A Large Area Giving A High Flame & Causing Violent
Ground Shock
6. At 0545 Hrs The First Bleve Occurred. About A Minute Later
Another Explosion Occurred,one Of The Two Most Violent
During The Whole Incident.One Or Two Of The Smaller
Spheres Bleved,giving A Fireball 300m Diameter
7. Then Followed A Series Of Explosions As Vessels Suffered
Bleve. There Were Some 15 Explosions Over A Period Of An
Hour And A Half.

10. FEYZIN, 04.01.1966, FRANCE

11. FEYZIN DISASTER
1. 4th jan. 1966 france refinery
2. 18 killed, 81 injured
3. Operator drawing water from 1200m3 propane
sphere
4. Pool of propane in the bund
5. Sphere engulfed in flames, vessel became
overheated, bleved
6. Three further spheres toppled due to collapse of
support legs

12. PASADENA, 23.10.1989, USA

13. “PHILLIPS” Pasadena Texas USA
1. Polyethylene Plant
2. 23.10.89
3. 23 Deaths,130 Injuries
4. Polymerisation Of Ethylene In Isobutane
5. Particles Of Polyetylene Settled Out And Were
Removed From Settling Legs
6. Release Of Mixture Of
Ethylene,isobutane,hexane,and Hydrogen
7. Vapour Cloud Explosion
8. Loss Us$500 Millions

14. About 550,000 people were exposed to the gas. A government affidavit in 2006
stated the leak caused 558,125 INJURIES including 38,478 TEMPORARY
PARTIAL INJURIES and approximately 3,900 SEVERELY AND PERMANENTLY
DISABLING INJURIES
bhopal gas tragedy

15.  Occurrence: 3rd
December 1984.
 Place of occurrence: Bhopal, Madhya
Pradesh, India.
 Company: Union Carbide Corporation.
 Chemical: Methyl Isocyanate (40 tons)
 People Affected- >500,000
 People Died- ~40,000

16. All safety system fails due to poor maintenance.

17. FIRE & EXPLOSION IN HPCL REFINERY VIZAG
1. 7th Sept.1997
2. Capacity - 6.5 million tons per annum
3. Facility for handling LPG
4. Vapour clould Explosion involving LPG
5. LOSS Rs. 256Cr.
6. Life Loss 58

18. Visakhapatnam Toxic gas leak(LG Polymer)
1. 7th May 2020
2. After nationwide lockdown
3. Styrene monomer(20-22 deg C)
4. Toxic gas release (3 KM)
5. Evacuation more then 10000 people
6. Life Loss 14 and affected 1000 people

21. 1: Process Safety Information (PSI)

22. Section 1: Process Safety Information (PSI) is the technical information
on the process and equipment in the system. This information allows
for accurate Process Hazard Analysis and maintaining information on
the system for operator training and reference.
 Process Chemistry
 Block Flow Diagram
 Piping and Instrument Diagrams
 Maximum Intended Inventory
 Technology of Process Changes
 Materials of Construction
 Electrical Classification
 Pressure Relief System Design
Cont...

23.  Ventilation System Design
 Design Codes and Standards
 Material and Energy Balances
 Safety Systems
 List of Process Equipment
 Compliance
 Site Plan
PSI Cont...

24. 2: Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

25. Section 2: Process Hazard Analysis (PHA):
To identify equipment, operating procedures, and conditions where the
potential exists for employee exposure and environmental hazards
associated with the Process.
Employee exposure hazards would typically involve liquid spills and/or
accidental releases of Process Chemical).
Environmental hazards occur when vapor releases or liquid spills reach
beyond the property line, into the atmosphere, or into the ground

26.  PHA Team
 PHA Method:
What-if
Checklist
What-if/checklist
Hazard and operability study (HAZOP)
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)
Fault tree analysis or Event tree analysis
An appropriate equivalent methodology.

27. 3: Operating Procedures

28. Section 3: Operating Procedures
Written Operating Procedures have been developed for Process
system. The Operating Procedures are available to all employees,
contractor employees, and authorized representatives.
1. Initial start-up.
2. Normal operations.
3. Temporary operations.
4. Emergency operations.
5. Sudden Power failure.
6. Emergency shutdown.
7. Normal shutdown.
8. Startup following a turnaround or
emergency shutdown.

29. 4 - Training

30. Section 4 - Training:
Training is an essential part of the PSM Program. It provides a
means of conveying information and ensuring comprehension
of information.
There are 3 categories of persons who must have training as required by
the OSHA PSM Standard:
1. Operators/Technicians.
2. Other employees.
3. Contractor Employees.
Training method:-
1. Initial training
2. On-the-Job Training
3. Refresher training
4. Training on changes in the process or systems will occur when the
“Management of Change” procedures dictates the need.

31. 5: Contractors

32. Section 5: Contractors
Contractors under the Process Safety Management program are
those who are involved in the installation or maintenance of
equipment and systems at this worksite. All contractors, covered
in this PSM Program will be provided necessary information
concerning the process, equipment and procedures.
 Contractors selection
 Contractors evaluation
 Contractors control/Access
 Training
 Legal compliance

33. 6: PSSR

34. Section 6: PSSR
Pre-Startup Safety Review It is important that a safety review takes place before any
highly hazardous chemical is introduced into a process. PSM, therefore, requires the
employer to perform a pre-startup safety review for new facilities and for modified
facilities when the modification is significant enough to require a change in the
process safety information. Prior to the introduction of a highly hazardous chemical
to a process, the pre-startup safety review must confirm that the following:
Construction and equipment are in accordance with design specifications;
Safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and are
adequate;
A process hazard analysis has been performed for new facilities and
recommendations have been resolved or implemented before startup, and
modified facilities meet the management of change requirements; and
Training of each employee involved in operating a process has been completed.

35. 7: Hot work

36. Section 7: Hot work
Hot work is classified as any welding, brazing, grinding, flame
or spark producing operation. The requirements for hot work
on Process equipment are the same as those for all other hot
work performed at this worksite.
A permit must be issued for hot work operations conducted on or
near a covered process. The permit must document that the fire
prevention and protection requirements in OSHA regulations
(1910.252(a)) have been implemented prior to beginning the hot
work operations; it must indicate the date(s) authorized for hot
work; and identify the object on which hot work is to be
performed. The permit must be kept on file until completion of
the hot work

37. 8: Mechanical Integrity

38. Section 8: Mechanical Integrity
It is important to maintain the mechanical integrity of critical process equipment to ensure it is
designed and installed correctly and operates properly.
PSM mechanical integrity requirements apply to the following equipment:
• Pressure vessels and storage tanks;
• Piping systems (including piping components such as valves);
• Relief and vent systems and devices;
• Emergency shutdown systems;
• Controls (including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks); and
• Pumps. The employer must establish and implement written procedures to maintain the ongoing
integrity of process equipment.
Employees involved in maintaining the ongoing integrity of process equipment must be trained in
an overview of that process and its hazards and trained in the procedures applicable to the
employees’s job tasks.
(Operator Training, Tests and Inspections, Maintenance Procedures, Correction of Deficiencies,
Deficiency Identification, Periodic Monitoring and Logging Maintenance, Tests & Inspections)

39. 9: Incident Investigation

40. Section 9: Incident Investigation
Incident investigation is the process of identifying the underlying or
basic causes of incidents and implementing steps to prevent similar
events from occurring. The intent of an incident investigation is to
learn from past experiences and avoid future events of the same
nature.
Investigation Team
Incident Report
Incident Analysis Committee
Post Incident Actions

41. 10: Emergency Planning & Response

42. Section 10: Emergency Planning & Response
If, despite the best planning, an incident occurs, it is essential that
emergency pre-planning and training make employees aware of,
and able to execute, proper actions. For this reason, an emergency
action plan for the entire plant must be developed and
implemented in accordance with the provisions of other rules.
In addition, the emergency action plan must include procedures for
handling small releases of hazardous chemicals.

43. 11: Management of Change

44. Section 11: Management of Change
This section of PSM program outlines the guidelines to establish and
implement written procedures to manage changes (except for
“replacement in kind”) to process chemicals, technology, equipment and
procedures; and, changes to facilities that affect a covered process.
The Management of Change Program is an aid to ensure:
Proper material and equipment is placed in the system.
Management and Engineering review of proposed changes.
PHA is conducted prior to changes.
PSI is updated.
Operator training is accomplished for the changes.

45. 12: Employee Participation

46. Section 12: Employee Participation
Employers must develop a written plan of action to implement the
employee participation required by PSM. Under PSM, employers must
consult with employees and their representatives on the conduct and
development of process hazard analyses and on the development of the
other elements of process management, and they must provide to
employees and their representatives access to process hazard analyses
and to all other information required to be developed by the standard

47. 13: Compliance Audits

48. Section 13: Compliance Audits
An audit is a technique used to gather sufficient facts and information,
including statistical information, to verify compliance with this policy
and procedure. The audit includes an evaluation of the design and
effectiveness of the process safety management system and a field
inspection of the safety and health conditions and practices to verify
that the employer’s systems are effectively implemented.
(Planning, Staffing, Format, Conducting the audit, Evaluation,
Corrective action)

49. 14.Trade Secrets

50. Employers must make available all information necessary to comply
with PSM to those persons responsible for compiling the process
safety information, those developing the process hazard analysis,
those responsible for developing the operating procedures, and
those performing incident investigations, emergency planning and
response, and compliance audits, without regard to the possible
trade secret status of such information.
Nothing in PSM, however, precludes the employer from requiring
those persons to enter into confidentiality agreements not to
disclose the information.
Section 14: Trade Secrets

51. Thank you…