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Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
The role of insurance companies
in a risky economy
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle
Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
EEA-ESEM Lisbon 2017
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Motivation
Example: a simple economy composed of 7 ∗ 109
people, each one
exposed to an endowment risk distribution with 11 possible states
(endowment from 0 to 10 units).
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Motivation
Example: a simple economy composed of 7 ∗ 109
people, each one
exposed to an endowment risk distribution with 11 possible states
(endowment from 0 to 10 units).
Arrow and Debreu tell us that Pareto optimality is reached with
117∗109
security markets.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Motivation
Example: a simple economy composed of 7 ∗ 109
people, each one
exposed to an endowment risk distribution with 11 possible states
(endowment from 0 to 10 units).
Arrow and Debreu tell us that Pareto optimality is reached with
117∗109
security markets.
The main issues are that:
it requires to have a tremendous number of security markets.
it requires to make public the individual state of each person in the
economy.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Motivation
Example: a simple economy composed of 7 ∗ 109
people, each one
exposed to an endowment risk distribution with 11 possible states
(endowment from 0 to 10 units).
Arrow and Debreu tell us that Pareto optimality is reached with
117∗109
security markets.
The main issues are that:
it requires to have a tremendous number of security markets.
it requires to make public the individual state of each person in the
economy.
What role is played by insurance companies?
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Contribution
I show that Pareto optimality is reached with only 10 ∗ 7 ∗ 109
+ 1 of
these security markets if people have also access to standard
insurance contracts supplied by stock insurance companies.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Contribution
I show that Pareto optimality is reached with only 10 ∗ 7 ∗ 109
+ 1 of
these security markets if people have also access to standard
insurance contracts supplied by stock insurance companies.
The presence of insurance companies allow:
to reduce the required number of security markets by many orders of
magnitude.
to lower tremendously the required public information.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Contribution
I show that Pareto optimality is reached with only 10 ∗ 7 ∗ 109
+ 1 of
these security markets if people have also access to standard
insurance contracts supplied by stock insurance companies.
The presence of insurance companies allow:
to reduce the required number of security markets by many orders of
magnitude.
to lower tremendously the required public information.
I show this result in a static exchange economy with:
multiple commodities,
heterogeneous agents in terms of preferences and risk distributions,
no restriction on risk dependence.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Literature review
Kihlstrom and Pauly (1971), Ellickson and Penalva-Zuasti (1997):
one commodity, heterogeneous agents, no restriction on risk
dependence.
they do not explain who supplies insurance contracts.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Literature review
Kihlstrom and Pauly (1971), Ellickson and Penalva-Zuasti (1997):
one commodity, heterogeneous agents, no restriction on risk
dependence.
they do not explain who supplies insurance contracts.
Malinvaud (1973), Cass, Chichilnisky and Wu (1996)
one commodity, homogeneous agents, i.i.d. risks.
mutual insurance companies.
Penalva-Zuasti (2001, 2008)
one commodity, heterogeneous agents, i.i.d. risks.
stock insurance companies.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Contents
The model
Risky economy.
Spot and security markets.
Insurance companies.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Contents
The model
Risky economy.
Spot and security markets.
Insurance companies.
The equilibrium:
Equilibrium.
Pareto optimality.
Role of insurance companies.
Insurance premiums.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Risky economy
Exchange economy with C commodities and N risk-averse
heterogeneous agents:
VNM utility for agent i: vi (.) : RC
+ → R
Endowment vector for agent i: ei(si ) = ei − li(si ), si = 1, .., Si
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Risky economy
Exchange economy with C commodities and N risk-averse
heterogeneous agents:
VNM utility for agent i: vi (.) : RC
+ → R
Endowment vector for agent i: ei(si ) = ei − li(si ), si = 1, .., Si
Definition of an Arrow-Debreu state
An ”Arrow-Debreu” state is a full specification of the individual
endowments obtained by all the agents in the economy.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Risky economy
Exchange economy with C commodities and N risk-averse
heterogeneous agents:
VNM utility for agent i: vi (.) : RC
+ → R
Endowment vector for agent i: ei(si ) = ei − li(si ), si = 1, .., Si
Definition of an Arrow-Debreu state
An ”Arrow-Debreu” state is a full specification of the individual
endowments obtained by all the agents in the economy.
Definition of an Fundamental state
A ”fundamental” state is a full specification of the aggregate
endowments in the economy.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Risky economy
Arrow-Debreu states denoted: z = 1, .., Z, with probability π(z).
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Risky economy
Arrow-Debreu states denoted: z = 1, .., Z, with probability π(z).
Fundamental states: t(.) : [1, Z] → [1, T]
Individual states: si (.) : [1, Z] → [1, Si ]
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Risky economy
Arrow-Debreu states denoted: z = 1, .., Z, with probability π(z).
Fundamental states: t(.) : [1, Z] → [1, T]
Individual states: si (.) : [1, Z] → [1, Si ]
With Ft the set of Arrow-Debreu states in the Fundamental state t:
∀z ∈ Ft, i ei(si (z)) = EEE(t(z))
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Risky economy
Arrow-Debreu states denoted: z = 1, .., Z, with probability π(z).
Fundamental states: t(.) : [1, Z] → [1, T]
Individual states: si (.) : [1, Z] → [1, Si ]
With Ft the set of Arrow-Debreu states in the Fundamental state t:
∀z ∈ Ft, i ei(si (z)) = EEE(t(z))
Consumption plan of agent i in Arrow-Debreu state z denoted:
xi(z).
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Spot and security markets
C spot markets:
after the state of nature has been revealed.
price vector: p(z).
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Spot and security markets
C spot markets:
after the state of nature has been revealed.
price vector: p(z).
T security markets:
security market t enables to get one ex-post money unit if t occurs,
in exchange for z∈Ft
π(z) ex-ante money unit.
quantity of securities purchased/sold by agent i denoted
ai = (ai (1), .., ai (T))
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Insurance companies
M insurance companies in competition supply insurance contracts
and are owned through stock markets.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Insurance companies
M insurance companies in competition supply insurance contracts
and are owned through stock markets.
An insurance contract for agent i consists in:
an indemnity in state z:
τi (p(z), si (z)) = p(z)li(si (z));
in exchange for a premium in any state z:
αi =
z
π(z )p(z )li(si (z )).
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Insurance companies
M insurance companies in competition supply insurance contracts
and are owned through stock markets.
An insurance contract for agent i consists in:
an indemnity in state z:
τi (p(z), si (z)) = p(z)li(si (z));
in exchange for a premium in any state z:
αi =
z
π(z )p(z )li(si (z )).
Quantity of insurance purchased by agent i: ni .
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Insurance companies
M insurance companies in competition supply insurance contracts
and are owned through stock markets.
An insurance contract for agent i consists in:
an indemnity in state z:
τi (p(z), si (z)) = p(z)li(si (z));
in exchange for a premium in any state z:
αi =
z
π(z )p(z )li(si (z )).
Quantity of insurance purchased by agent i: ni .
Profit of insurer k:
rk (z) =
j∈Nk
(αj − τj (p(z), sj (z)))nj
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Insurance companies
M insurance companies in competition supply insurance contracts
and are owned through stock markets.
An insurance contract for agent i consists in:
an indemnity in state z:
τi (p(z), si (z)) = p(z)li(si (z));
in exchange for a premium in any state z:
αi =
z
π(z )p(z )li(si (z )).
Quantity of insurance purchased by agent i: ni .
Profit of insurer k:
rk (z) =
j∈Nk
(αj − τj (p(z), sj (z)))nj
Share of insurer k purchased by agent i: mki .
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Equilibrium
Agent maximization problem:
max
xi,ni ,mki ,ai
z
π(z)vi (xi(z))
s.t. p(z)xi(z) = p(z)ei(si (z)) + τi (p(z), si (z))ni
+
k
rk (z)mki + ai (t(z)), ∀ z
αi ni +
z
π(z)ai (t(z)) = 0
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Equilibrium
Agent maximization problem:
max
xi,ni ,mki ,ai
z
π(z)vi (xi(z))
s.t. p(z)xi(z) = p(z)ei(si (z)) + τi (p(z), si (z))ni
+
k
rk (z)mki + ai (t(z)), ∀ z
αi ni +
z
π(z)ai (t(z)) = 0
Market clearing conditions (spot, security, stock):
i
xi(z) = EEE(t(z)), ∀ z ∈ Z
i
ai (t) = 0, ∀ t ∈ T
i
mki = 1, ∀ k ∈ M
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Pareto optimality
Result
In the decentralized economy with C spot markets, T security markets
and insurance companies in competition, the equilibrium exists and the
allocation is Pareto optimal.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Role of insurance companies
With insurance companies, it is sufficient to have T security
markets:
much lower quantity of security markets.
need to make public only the aggregate endowment.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Role of insurance companies
With insurance companies, it is sufficient to have T security
markets:
much lower quantity of security markets.
need to make public only the aggregate endowment.
One way to reach her consumption plan for each agent i is:
elimination of individual endowment risk with insurance contract:
ni = 1.
elimination of price risk exposure and participation to aggregate risk
through security and insurance stock markets:
ai (t(z)) = p(z)(xi(z) − ei) + αi − 1
N k rk (z) and mki = 1
N
.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Insurance premiums
Insurance companies are constrained to sell fair contracts to catch
policyholders on one side and shareholders on the other side.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Insurance premiums
Insurance companies are constrained to sell fair contracts to catch
policyholders on one side and shareholders on the other side.
Insurance premium:
αi =
z
π(z )p(z )li(si (z )) = (1 + βi )p
z
π(z )li(si (z )),
in which:
p =
z
π(z )p(z )
βi =
1
p z π(z )li(si (z ))
z
π(z )(p(z ) − p)li(si (z )).
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Insurance premiums
Insurance companies are constrained to sell fair contracts to catch
policyholders on one side and shareholders on the other side.
Insurance premium:
αi =
z
π(z )p(z )li(si (z )) = (1 + βi )p
z
π(z )li(si (z )),
in which:
p =
z
π(z )p(z )
βi =
1
p z π(z )li(si (z ))
z
π(z )(p(z ) − p)li(si (z )).
For an insurer, the higher the correlation between insured individual
risks and the aggregate risk, the higher the expected profit.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion
Conclusion
An exchange economy with multiple commodities, heterogeneous
agents and no restriction on risk dependence.
Only one security market per fundamental state is sufficient if there
are also stock insurance companies supplying standard insurance
contracts.
Insurance and security markets respectively allow to deal with
endowment risks and price risk.
Insurance premium has an aggregate risk loading factor which is
specific to each agent.
Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique
The role of insurance companies in a risky economy

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Prez eea arnaud

  • 1. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion The role of insurance companies in a risky economy Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique EEA-ESEM Lisbon 2017 Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 2. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Motivation Example: a simple economy composed of 7 ∗ 109 people, each one exposed to an endowment risk distribution with 11 possible states (endowment from 0 to 10 units). Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 3. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Motivation Example: a simple economy composed of 7 ∗ 109 people, each one exposed to an endowment risk distribution with 11 possible states (endowment from 0 to 10 units). Arrow and Debreu tell us that Pareto optimality is reached with 117∗109 security markets. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 4. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Motivation Example: a simple economy composed of 7 ∗ 109 people, each one exposed to an endowment risk distribution with 11 possible states (endowment from 0 to 10 units). Arrow and Debreu tell us that Pareto optimality is reached with 117∗109 security markets. The main issues are that: it requires to have a tremendous number of security markets. it requires to make public the individual state of each person in the economy. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 5. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Motivation Example: a simple economy composed of 7 ∗ 109 people, each one exposed to an endowment risk distribution with 11 possible states (endowment from 0 to 10 units). Arrow and Debreu tell us that Pareto optimality is reached with 117∗109 security markets. The main issues are that: it requires to have a tremendous number of security markets. it requires to make public the individual state of each person in the economy. What role is played by insurance companies? Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 6. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Contribution I show that Pareto optimality is reached with only 10 ∗ 7 ∗ 109 + 1 of these security markets if people have also access to standard insurance contracts supplied by stock insurance companies. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 7. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Contribution I show that Pareto optimality is reached with only 10 ∗ 7 ∗ 109 + 1 of these security markets if people have also access to standard insurance contracts supplied by stock insurance companies. The presence of insurance companies allow: to reduce the required number of security markets by many orders of magnitude. to lower tremendously the required public information. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 8. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Contribution I show that Pareto optimality is reached with only 10 ∗ 7 ∗ 109 + 1 of these security markets if people have also access to standard insurance contracts supplied by stock insurance companies. The presence of insurance companies allow: to reduce the required number of security markets by many orders of magnitude. to lower tremendously the required public information. I show this result in a static exchange economy with: multiple commodities, heterogeneous agents in terms of preferences and risk distributions, no restriction on risk dependence. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 9. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Literature review Kihlstrom and Pauly (1971), Ellickson and Penalva-Zuasti (1997): one commodity, heterogeneous agents, no restriction on risk dependence. they do not explain who supplies insurance contracts. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 10. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Literature review Kihlstrom and Pauly (1971), Ellickson and Penalva-Zuasti (1997): one commodity, heterogeneous agents, no restriction on risk dependence. they do not explain who supplies insurance contracts. Malinvaud (1973), Cass, Chichilnisky and Wu (1996) one commodity, homogeneous agents, i.i.d. risks. mutual insurance companies. Penalva-Zuasti (2001, 2008) one commodity, heterogeneous agents, i.i.d. risks. stock insurance companies. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 11. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Contents The model Risky economy. Spot and security markets. Insurance companies. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 12. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Contents The model Risky economy. Spot and security markets. Insurance companies. The equilibrium: Equilibrium. Pareto optimality. Role of insurance companies. Insurance premiums. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 13. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Risky economy Exchange economy with C commodities and N risk-averse heterogeneous agents: VNM utility for agent i: vi (.) : RC + → R Endowment vector for agent i: ei(si ) = ei − li(si ), si = 1, .., Si Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 14. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Risky economy Exchange economy with C commodities and N risk-averse heterogeneous agents: VNM utility for agent i: vi (.) : RC + → R Endowment vector for agent i: ei(si ) = ei − li(si ), si = 1, .., Si Definition of an Arrow-Debreu state An ”Arrow-Debreu” state is a full specification of the individual endowments obtained by all the agents in the economy. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 15. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Risky economy Exchange economy with C commodities and N risk-averse heterogeneous agents: VNM utility for agent i: vi (.) : RC + → R Endowment vector for agent i: ei(si ) = ei − li(si ), si = 1, .., Si Definition of an Arrow-Debreu state An ”Arrow-Debreu” state is a full specification of the individual endowments obtained by all the agents in the economy. Definition of an Fundamental state A ”fundamental” state is a full specification of the aggregate endowments in the economy. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 16. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Risky economy Arrow-Debreu states denoted: z = 1, .., Z, with probability π(z). Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 17. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Risky economy Arrow-Debreu states denoted: z = 1, .., Z, with probability π(z). Fundamental states: t(.) : [1, Z] → [1, T] Individual states: si (.) : [1, Z] → [1, Si ] Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 18. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Risky economy Arrow-Debreu states denoted: z = 1, .., Z, with probability π(z). Fundamental states: t(.) : [1, Z] → [1, T] Individual states: si (.) : [1, Z] → [1, Si ] With Ft the set of Arrow-Debreu states in the Fundamental state t: ∀z ∈ Ft, i ei(si (z)) = EEE(t(z)) Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 19. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Risky economy Arrow-Debreu states denoted: z = 1, .., Z, with probability π(z). Fundamental states: t(.) : [1, Z] → [1, T] Individual states: si (.) : [1, Z] → [1, Si ] With Ft the set of Arrow-Debreu states in the Fundamental state t: ∀z ∈ Ft, i ei(si (z)) = EEE(t(z)) Consumption plan of agent i in Arrow-Debreu state z denoted: xi(z). Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 20. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Spot and security markets C spot markets: after the state of nature has been revealed. price vector: p(z). Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 21. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Spot and security markets C spot markets: after the state of nature has been revealed. price vector: p(z). T security markets: security market t enables to get one ex-post money unit if t occurs, in exchange for z∈Ft π(z) ex-ante money unit. quantity of securities purchased/sold by agent i denoted ai = (ai (1), .., ai (T)) Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 22. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Insurance companies M insurance companies in competition supply insurance contracts and are owned through stock markets. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 23. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Insurance companies M insurance companies in competition supply insurance contracts and are owned through stock markets. An insurance contract for agent i consists in: an indemnity in state z: τi (p(z), si (z)) = p(z)li(si (z)); in exchange for a premium in any state z: αi = z π(z )p(z )li(si (z )). Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 24. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Insurance companies M insurance companies in competition supply insurance contracts and are owned through stock markets. An insurance contract for agent i consists in: an indemnity in state z: τi (p(z), si (z)) = p(z)li(si (z)); in exchange for a premium in any state z: αi = z π(z )p(z )li(si (z )). Quantity of insurance purchased by agent i: ni . Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 25. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Insurance companies M insurance companies in competition supply insurance contracts and are owned through stock markets. An insurance contract for agent i consists in: an indemnity in state z: τi (p(z), si (z)) = p(z)li(si (z)); in exchange for a premium in any state z: αi = z π(z )p(z )li(si (z )). Quantity of insurance purchased by agent i: ni . Profit of insurer k: rk (z) = j∈Nk (αj − τj (p(z), sj (z)))nj Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 26. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Insurance companies M insurance companies in competition supply insurance contracts and are owned through stock markets. An insurance contract for agent i consists in: an indemnity in state z: τi (p(z), si (z)) = p(z)li(si (z)); in exchange for a premium in any state z: αi = z π(z )p(z )li(si (z )). Quantity of insurance purchased by agent i: ni . Profit of insurer k: rk (z) = j∈Nk (αj − τj (p(z), sj (z)))nj Share of insurer k purchased by agent i: mki . Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 27. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Equilibrium Agent maximization problem: max xi,ni ,mki ,ai z π(z)vi (xi(z)) s.t. p(z)xi(z) = p(z)ei(si (z)) + τi (p(z), si (z))ni + k rk (z)mki + ai (t(z)), ∀ z αi ni + z π(z)ai (t(z)) = 0 Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 28. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Equilibrium Agent maximization problem: max xi,ni ,mki ,ai z π(z)vi (xi(z)) s.t. p(z)xi(z) = p(z)ei(si (z)) + τi (p(z), si (z))ni + k rk (z)mki + ai (t(z)), ∀ z αi ni + z π(z)ai (t(z)) = 0 Market clearing conditions (spot, security, stock): i xi(z) = EEE(t(z)), ∀ z ∈ Z i ai (t) = 0, ∀ t ∈ T i mki = 1, ∀ k ∈ M Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 29. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Pareto optimality Result In the decentralized economy with C spot markets, T security markets and insurance companies in competition, the equilibrium exists and the allocation is Pareto optimal. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 30. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Role of insurance companies With insurance companies, it is sufficient to have T security markets: much lower quantity of security markets. need to make public only the aggregate endowment. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 31. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Role of insurance companies With insurance companies, it is sufficient to have T security markets: much lower quantity of security markets. need to make public only the aggregate endowment. One way to reach her consumption plan for each agent i is: elimination of individual endowment risk with insurance contract: ni = 1. elimination of price risk exposure and participation to aggregate risk through security and insurance stock markets: ai (t(z)) = p(z)(xi(z) − ei) + αi − 1 N k rk (z) and mki = 1 N . Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 32. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Insurance premiums Insurance companies are constrained to sell fair contracts to catch policyholders on one side and shareholders on the other side. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 33. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Insurance premiums Insurance companies are constrained to sell fair contracts to catch policyholders on one side and shareholders on the other side. Insurance premium: αi = z π(z )p(z )li(si (z )) = (1 + βi )p z π(z )li(si (z )), in which: p = z π(z )p(z ) βi = 1 p z π(z )li(si (z )) z π(z )(p(z ) − p)li(si (z )). Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 34. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Insurance premiums Insurance companies are constrained to sell fair contracts to catch policyholders on one side and shareholders on the other side. Insurance premium: αi = z π(z )p(z )li(si (z )) = (1 + βi )p z π(z )li(si (z )), in which: p = z π(z )p(z ) βi = 1 p z π(z )li(si (z )) z π(z )(p(z ) − p)li(si (z )). For an insurer, the higher the correlation between insured individual risks and the aggregate risk, the higher the expected profit. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy
  • 35. Introduction The model The equilibrium Conclusion Conclusion An exchange economy with multiple commodities, heterogeneous agents and no restriction on risk dependence. Only one security market per fundamental state is sufficient if there are also stock insurance companies supplying standard insurance contracts. Insurance and security markets respectively allow to deal with endowment risks and price risk. Insurance premium has an aggregate risk loading factor which is specific to each agent. Arnaud Gousseba¨ıle Actinfo Chair, Institut Louis Bachelier, CREST-Polytechnique The role of insurance companies in a risky economy