A Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decision against the oil and gas industry in a case that sought to bar the state Dept. of Environmental Protection from considering nebulous impacts on the public and natural resources when considering whether or not to grant a drilling permit.
PA Commonwealth Court Decision to Allow More Leasing/Drilling of State LandsMarcellus Drilling News
In a crushing blow to the litigious anti-drilling group Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation (PEDF), the PA Commonwealth Court ruled yesterday against the PEDF's lawsuit that attempts o stop all drilling and leasing of state-owned lands for oil and gas drilling. The court said a) such drilling is just fine and b) the decision of whether or not to allow drilling on state-owned lands (and which parcels) rests with the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources.
U.S. District Court Decision Against Chesapeake & Inflection on Force Majeure...Marcellus Drilling News
The decision handed down by U.S. District Court Judge David Hurd that found Chesapeake Energy and Inflection Energy could not extend land leases beyond the original term because of the drilling moratorium in New York State. Chespeake & Inflection claimed the moratorium prevented them from drilling, but the judge ruled they could have still drilled conventional, vertical wells.
The decision by U.S. District Judge John Copenhaver Jr. that a zoning ordinance passed by three liberal Democrat commissioners in Fayette County, WV that blocks oil & gas wastewater injection wells in the county is illegal and unenforceable.
PIOGA Letter to PA Joint House Senate Committee Warning Against Publication o...Marcellus Drilling News
A letter from the Pennsylvania Independent Oil and Gas Association (PIOGA) to the PA Joint House Senate Committee on Documents asking them to NOT publish the Dept. of Environmental Protection's (DEP) final Chapter 78a Marcellus Drilling regulations citing the PA Supreme Court's recent ruling on Act 13 as the basis.
The official motion filed with the New York State Court of Appeals, NY's highest court, to hear the case of Norse Energy v Town of Dryden over the town's vote to ban all fracking and drilling throughout the township.
Bp settlement order_and_reasons_for_final_approval_of_bp_settlement Michael J. Evans
This order grants final approval of the Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement between BP and private plaintiffs resulting from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The settlement resolves economic loss and property damage claims for individuals and businesses in Gulf states and coastal areas through court-supervised programs that have already paid out over $405 million. The order describes the settlement categories, geographic scope, exclusions, lack of caps except for Seafood Compensation, and transparency of the claims framework. A fairness hearing was held on November 8, 2012 to consider final approval and objections.
This document is EPA's motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by three states seeking to compel EPA to add carbon dioxide to the list of criteria air pollutants under the Clean Air Act. EPA argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the decision to add pollutants to the list involves complex technical, legal and policy determinations that are within EPA's discretion, not a non-discretionary duty that can be compelled by the court. EPA also notes it has determined through recent actions that the Clean Air Act does not authorize regulating carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.
2009 BIOL503 Class 8 Intellectual Property IV Supporting Doc: City of Hope v....Karol Pessin
This document summarizes a Supreme Court of California case between City of Hope National Medical Center and Genentech, Inc. regarding royalties from a 1976 research collaboration agreement. The jury found Genentech breached its fiduciary duty and contract, awarding $300 million in compensatory damages and $200 million in punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirms the compensatory damages but sets aside punitive damages, finding no fiduciary relationship existed. While the contract terms were ambiguous, extrinsic evidence showed the parties did not intend City of Hope's royalty rights to apply to products not using DNA synthesized by City of Hope or to settlement proceeds not involving patent infringement.
PA Commonwealth Court Decision to Allow More Leasing/Drilling of State LandsMarcellus Drilling News
In a crushing blow to the litigious anti-drilling group Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation (PEDF), the PA Commonwealth Court ruled yesterday against the PEDF's lawsuit that attempts o stop all drilling and leasing of state-owned lands for oil and gas drilling. The court said a) such drilling is just fine and b) the decision of whether or not to allow drilling on state-owned lands (and which parcels) rests with the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources.
U.S. District Court Decision Against Chesapeake & Inflection on Force Majeure...Marcellus Drilling News
The decision handed down by U.S. District Court Judge David Hurd that found Chesapeake Energy and Inflection Energy could not extend land leases beyond the original term because of the drilling moratorium in New York State. Chespeake & Inflection claimed the moratorium prevented them from drilling, but the judge ruled they could have still drilled conventional, vertical wells.
The decision by U.S. District Judge John Copenhaver Jr. that a zoning ordinance passed by three liberal Democrat commissioners in Fayette County, WV that blocks oil & gas wastewater injection wells in the county is illegal and unenforceable.
PIOGA Letter to PA Joint House Senate Committee Warning Against Publication o...Marcellus Drilling News
A letter from the Pennsylvania Independent Oil and Gas Association (PIOGA) to the PA Joint House Senate Committee on Documents asking them to NOT publish the Dept. of Environmental Protection's (DEP) final Chapter 78a Marcellus Drilling regulations citing the PA Supreme Court's recent ruling on Act 13 as the basis.
The official motion filed with the New York State Court of Appeals, NY's highest court, to hear the case of Norse Energy v Town of Dryden over the town's vote to ban all fracking and drilling throughout the township.
Bp settlement order_and_reasons_for_final_approval_of_bp_settlement Michael J. Evans
This order grants final approval of the Economic and Property Damages Settlement Agreement between BP and private plaintiffs resulting from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The settlement resolves economic loss and property damage claims for individuals and businesses in Gulf states and coastal areas through court-supervised programs that have already paid out over $405 million. The order describes the settlement categories, geographic scope, exclusions, lack of caps except for Seafood Compensation, and transparency of the claims framework. A fairness hearing was held on November 8, 2012 to consider final approval and objections.
This document is EPA's motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by three states seeking to compel EPA to add carbon dioxide to the list of criteria air pollutants under the Clean Air Act. EPA argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the decision to add pollutants to the list involves complex technical, legal and policy determinations that are within EPA's discretion, not a non-discretionary duty that can be compelled by the court. EPA also notes it has determined through recent actions that the Clean Air Act does not authorize regulating carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.
2009 BIOL503 Class 8 Intellectual Property IV Supporting Doc: City of Hope v....Karol Pessin
This document summarizes a Supreme Court of California case between City of Hope National Medical Center and Genentech, Inc. regarding royalties from a 1976 research collaboration agreement. The jury found Genentech breached its fiduciary duty and contract, awarding $300 million in compensatory damages and $200 million in punitive damages. The Supreme Court affirms the compensatory damages but sets aside punitive damages, finding no fiduciary relationship existed. While the contract terms were ambiguous, extrinsic evidence showed the parties did not intend City of Hope's royalty rights to apply to products not using DNA synthesized by City of Hope or to settlement proceeds not involving patent infringement.
A case heard by the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Ohio in which a landowner claimed that the relatively little drilling done on a small portion of their land should allow them to reclaim title to the mineral rights and release the unused portions of the land to another driller. The court disagreed, ruling the language in the lease does not allow it.
JLCNY Lawsuit Complaint Against NY State for Illegal "Takings" in Ongoing Fra...Marcellus Drilling News
The lawsuit paperwork that will soon be filed by the Joint Landowners Coalition of New York against New York State, Gov. Andrew Cuomo, DEC Commissioner Joe Martens and State Health Commissioner Nirav Shah for illegal "takings"--that is, landowners are being intentionally denied their private property rights under the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by not being able to allow drilling for natural gas on their private property. If landowners move forward and the state continues to deny them their rights, the outcome may very well bankrupt the state in settlement payments. Cuomo has made an utter mess of this whole issue with his ongoing inability to make a decision on fracking. Very un-leader like, wouldn't you say?
This summary order vacates the sentences of defendants Mariluz Zavala and Jose Ibanez and remands their case for de novo sentencing. The district court erred in applying simultaneous role-in-offense sentencing enhancements under different subsections of the guidelines for the same offense. It also failed to undertake a sufficient factual analysis to support a finding that the criminal activity was "otherwise extensive" to justify an enhancement. Additionally, the district court made errors in its grouping analysis of the counts. The case is remanded for the district court to remedy these errors by reassessing which enhancements apply and correctly grouping the counts.
Delaware Riverkeeper v Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental Protection - Leidy...Marcellus Drilling News
This document summarizes a court case involving petitions challenging permits issued by New Jersey and Pennsylvania environmental agencies for a pipeline expansion project. The court consolidated two petitions - one challenging NJ permits and one challenging a PA permit. The court determined it had jurisdiction to review the permits and that the state environmental agencies did not act arbitrarily in issuing the permits, so it denied the petitions. The project is now mostly completed in New Jersey.
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion For Partial Summary JudgmentHonolulu Civil Beat
The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment in a case regarding four revocable permits issued by the Board of Land and Natural Resources for water development on public lands. The court found that allowing the permits to be continuously renewed on a holdover basis for 13 years was not a "temporary" use as envisioned by state law and constituted an "action" that required an environmental assessment under state law. As a result, the court invalidated the four revocable permits.
WV Supreme Court Decision Disallowing Surface Rights Owners to Appeal Drillin...Marcellus Drilling News
The decision issued Nov 21, 2012 by the West Virginia Supreme Court in case #11-1157 - James Martin, et al. v. Matthew L. Hamblet. The ruling says that surface rights landowners may not appeal permit decisions by the state Dept. of Environmental Protection on the location of drilling pads by mineral rights owners and their representatives (drilling companies). Surface rights owners would like a say in where drilling will happen on their property--and just compensation for the land taken.
The document contains questions and multiple choice answers regarding USPTO rules and procedures for reissue patents, as outlined in the MPEP. It addresses topics like what can be corrected with a Certificate of Correction, what constitutes impermissible recapture in a reissue application, and the requirements for filing reissue applications to broaden claims within two years of the original patent grant.
OH 7th District Court of Appeals Decision in Hupp v. Beck Energy CorpMarcellus Drilling News
The Seventh District Court of Appeals in Ohio overturned a lower court ruling and ruled in favor of Beck Energy Corp and XTO Energy, a major victory for the drillers and major defeat for the landowners in Monroe and Belmont counties who say their land never got drilled and they wanted to re-sign with another company.
Dept. of Energy Response Denying Sierra Club's Request for Rehearing of Domin...Marcellus Drilling News
The Dept. of Energy responded to the nutty Sierra Club's request to re-hear a decision made by the department to grant the Dominion Cove Point (Maryland) LNG export facility the right to export LNG to non-Free Trade Agreement countries--specifically India and Japan. The Sierra Club request was a feeble attempt to throw whatever they can against the wall and see if some of it will stick. The strategy (once again) failed.
This document summarizes a court memorandum regarding a motion for reconsideration in a case between Frederick Fink and Sylvia LaSelva. The court had previously ruled that Fink's claim against LaSelva for money received as trustee of a trust was barred by res judicata based on prior bankruptcy settlements. However, the bankruptcy court later found that the prior settlements did not resolve issues regarding the validity of an assignment of trust interests or LaSelva's entitlement to dividends received as trustee. Based on the bankruptcy court's comments, the court here allows reconsideration of its previous ruling, finding the bankruptcy court was in a better position to understand the scope of the prior litigation.
This document is a court opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit regarding a dispute over the expansion of the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport. The Federal Aviation Administration approved Broward County's plan to extend a runway and close another, over objections that an alternative plan would be preferable environmentally. The opinion finds that the FAA approval is a final order, the petitioners have standing, and that the FAA did not act arbitrarily or in violation of relevant statutes in approving the county's plan rather than the alternative.
The document summarizes the statutes of limitation for various commercial claims under Kansas law, including:
- The statute of limitations is 3 years for account stated and antitrust claims, 5 years for express contracts, 3 years for oral contracts, 4 years for UCC breach of contract claims, and 2 years for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and fraud claims.
- The limitations period begins at the time of the breach for most contract and commercial claims, and when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable for tort claims like conversion and fraud. Discovery rules and tolling may also apply to determine accrual date in some cases.
This case involves a lawsuit brought by three states against the EPA seeking an order to add carbon dioxide to the list of air pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act. The EPA argues the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. The EPA memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss argues that 1) the decision to add pollutants involves complex technical and policy determinations left to the EPA's discretion, 2) the EPA has not made a formal judgment to add CO2 as required by the Clean Air Act, and 3) the EPA has concluded it does not have authority under the Act to regulate CO2 and other greenhouse gases to address climate change. Therefore, the plaintiffs have not shown the EPA violated a non-
This document summarizes a Tax Court case regarding Walter and Carol Selph's challenge to tax liabilities and penalties for tax years 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Tax Court found that the Selphs were entitled to challenge their underlying tax liabilities for those years. Additionally, the court found that the Selphs were liable for failure-to-pay penalties for 1999 but not 2000 and 2001 due to Mrs. Selph's health issues those years which constituted reasonable cause for failure to timely file.
The tax court case involved whether commissions Howard Slater received for transferring his annuity accounts qualified for nonqualified deferred compensation treatment under section 409A. The court found that the commissions did not meet the requirements of section 409A as they were not conditioned on future services and the plans did not meet the election requirements. Therefore, the commissions were required to be included in the Slaters' gross income for the 2005 tax year.
This appeal involves post-judgment orders from a legal malpractice case brought by Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co., Malibu Broadbeach L.P., and Pacific Coast Management against Knapp, Petersen & Clarke and several individuals. The trial court granted Sulphur and Malibu's motion for attorney's fees and costs, denied the defendants' motion for fees and motion to tax costs, finding Sulphur and Malibu were the prevailing parties. The defendants appeal, arguing: 1) the trial court failed to properly determine the prevailing party under Civil Code §1717 before considering C.C.P. §998; 2) even if it had, it abused its discretion in finding Sulphur and
Three lawsuits and notices of intent to sue were filed against EPA regarding greenhouse gas emissions. The International Center for Technology Assessment petitioned EPA in 1999 to regulate vehicle GHG emissions but EPA did not respond. This prompted a lawsuit in 2002 alleging unreasonable delay. Additionally, Sierra Club and others sued EPA in 2002 for failing to review and update emissions standards for power plants as required every eight years. Finally, three Northeast states sent EPA a notice of intent to sue for failing to designate carbon dioxide as a criteria pollutant and set air quality standards, as they argue is required by the Clean Air Act.
The Justice Centre - Legal challenge. File No. CI 20-01-29284Guy Boulianne
This document is an amended notice of application filed with the Queen's Bench of Manitoba. It was filed by several churches and individuals seeking relief from public health orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The applicants are seeking declarations that certain provisions of Manitoba's Public Health Act and the public health orders issued under that Act are unconstitutional and violate their Charter rights. Specifically, the applicants argue that the public health orders infringe their rights to freedom of religion, expression, assembly and liberty. They are asking the court to declare the relevant provisions of the Public Health Act and the public health orders invalid.
This document is a memorandum from the United States Tax Court regarding a tax case between Joyce A. Perkins and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Tax Court found that Perkins was liable for a $6,582 income tax deficiency for 2003 but not liable for an accuracy-related penalty. The issues before the court were: 1) whether $26,400 paid to Perkins by her ex-husband in 2003 was alimony income under section 71 of the tax code, and 2) whether Perkins was liable for an accuracy penalty. The court analyzed Tennessee law on alimony and concluded the payments were alimony in futuro, making them taxable income to Perkins. However, the court found Perkins was not liable
PA Commonwealth Court Decision Overturning Zoning Part of Act 13 Marcellus Dr...Marcellus Drilling News
The decision issued by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, the appeals court (second level) in PA. The decision overturns a portion of the Act 13 Marcellus Shale drilling law passed by the PA legislature in early 2012. The zoning portion of the law would have overruled any local zoning of oil and gas drilling with state guidelines. Seven towns and a few others sued to have the zoning provision nullified. The case will likely go to the PA Supreme Court in 2012.
Oneok v. Learjet- SCOTUS Decision 04-21-15Ryan Billings
This document is a Supreme Court syllabus for the case ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. It provides a summary of the key details of the case in 3 paragraphs:
1) Respondents, a group of manufacturers, hospitals, and other institutions that buy natural gas directly from interstate pipelines, sued petitioners claiming the pipelines had engaged in behavior that violated state antitrust laws by reporting false information to natural gas indices.
2) The district court granted summary judgment for the pipelines, finding the claims were preempted by the Natural Gas Act. The appeals court reversed, finding the claims aimed at obtaining damages for excessive retail prices, not wholesale prices regulated by the act.
3
A case heard by the Fifth District Court of Appeals in Ohio in which a landowner claimed that the relatively little drilling done on a small portion of their land should allow them to reclaim title to the mineral rights and release the unused portions of the land to another driller. The court disagreed, ruling the language in the lease does not allow it.
JLCNY Lawsuit Complaint Against NY State for Illegal "Takings" in Ongoing Fra...Marcellus Drilling News
The lawsuit paperwork that will soon be filed by the Joint Landowners Coalition of New York against New York State, Gov. Andrew Cuomo, DEC Commissioner Joe Martens and State Health Commissioner Nirav Shah for illegal "takings"--that is, landowners are being intentionally denied their private property rights under the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by not being able to allow drilling for natural gas on their private property. If landowners move forward and the state continues to deny them their rights, the outcome may very well bankrupt the state in settlement payments. Cuomo has made an utter mess of this whole issue with his ongoing inability to make a decision on fracking. Very un-leader like, wouldn't you say?
This summary order vacates the sentences of defendants Mariluz Zavala and Jose Ibanez and remands their case for de novo sentencing. The district court erred in applying simultaneous role-in-offense sentencing enhancements under different subsections of the guidelines for the same offense. It also failed to undertake a sufficient factual analysis to support a finding that the criminal activity was "otherwise extensive" to justify an enhancement. Additionally, the district court made errors in its grouping analysis of the counts. The case is remanded for the district court to remedy these errors by reassessing which enhancements apply and correctly grouping the counts.
Delaware Riverkeeper v Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental Protection - Leidy...Marcellus Drilling News
This document summarizes a court case involving petitions challenging permits issued by New Jersey and Pennsylvania environmental agencies for a pipeline expansion project. The court consolidated two petitions - one challenging NJ permits and one challenging a PA permit. The court determined it had jurisdiction to review the permits and that the state environmental agencies did not act arbitrarily in issuing the permits, so it denied the petitions. The project is now mostly completed in New Jersey.
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion For Partial Summary JudgmentHonolulu Civil Beat
The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment in a case regarding four revocable permits issued by the Board of Land and Natural Resources for water development on public lands. The court found that allowing the permits to be continuously renewed on a holdover basis for 13 years was not a "temporary" use as envisioned by state law and constituted an "action" that required an environmental assessment under state law. As a result, the court invalidated the four revocable permits.
WV Supreme Court Decision Disallowing Surface Rights Owners to Appeal Drillin...Marcellus Drilling News
The decision issued Nov 21, 2012 by the West Virginia Supreme Court in case #11-1157 - James Martin, et al. v. Matthew L. Hamblet. The ruling says that surface rights landowners may not appeal permit decisions by the state Dept. of Environmental Protection on the location of drilling pads by mineral rights owners and their representatives (drilling companies). Surface rights owners would like a say in where drilling will happen on their property--and just compensation for the land taken.
The document contains questions and multiple choice answers regarding USPTO rules and procedures for reissue patents, as outlined in the MPEP. It addresses topics like what can be corrected with a Certificate of Correction, what constitutes impermissible recapture in a reissue application, and the requirements for filing reissue applications to broaden claims within two years of the original patent grant.
OH 7th District Court of Appeals Decision in Hupp v. Beck Energy CorpMarcellus Drilling News
The Seventh District Court of Appeals in Ohio overturned a lower court ruling and ruled in favor of Beck Energy Corp and XTO Energy, a major victory for the drillers and major defeat for the landowners in Monroe and Belmont counties who say their land never got drilled and they wanted to re-sign with another company.
Dept. of Energy Response Denying Sierra Club's Request for Rehearing of Domin...Marcellus Drilling News
The Dept. of Energy responded to the nutty Sierra Club's request to re-hear a decision made by the department to grant the Dominion Cove Point (Maryland) LNG export facility the right to export LNG to non-Free Trade Agreement countries--specifically India and Japan. The Sierra Club request was a feeble attempt to throw whatever they can against the wall and see if some of it will stick. The strategy (once again) failed.
This document summarizes a court memorandum regarding a motion for reconsideration in a case between Frederick Fink and Sylvia LaSelva. The court had previously ruled that Fink's claim against LaSelva for money received as trustee of a trust was barred by res judicata based on prior bankruptcy settlements. However, the bankruptcy court later found that the prior settlements did not resolve issues regarding the validity of an assignment of trust interests or LaSelva's entitlement to dividends received as trustee. Based on the bankruptcy court's comments, the court here allows reconsideration of its previous ruling, finding the bankruptcy court was in a better position to understand the scope of the prior litigation.
This document is a court opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit regarding a dispute over the expansion of the Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport. The Federal Aviation Administration approved Broward County's plan to extend a runway and close another, over objections that an alternative plan would be preferable environmentally. The opinion finds that the FAA approval is a final order, the petitioners have standing, and that the FAA did not act arbitrarily or in violation of relevant statutes in approving the county's plan rather than the alternative.
The document summarizes the statutes of limitation for various commercial claims under Kansas law, including:
- The statute of limitations is 3 years for account stated and antitrust claims, 5 years for express contracts, 3 years for oral contracts, 4 years for UCC breach of contract claims, and 2 years for breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and fraud claims.
- The limitations period begins at the time of the breach for most contract and commercial claims, and when the injury becomes reasonably ascertainable for tort claims like conversion and fraud. Discovery rules and tolling may also apply to determine accrual date in some cases.
This case involves a lawsuit brought by three states against the EPA seeking an order to add carbon dioxide to the list of air pollutants regulated under the Clean Air Act. The EPA argues the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. The EPA memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss argues that 1) the decision to add pollutants involves complex technical and policy determinations left to the EPA's discretion, 2) the EPA has not made a formal judgment to add CO2 as required by the Clean Air Act, and 3) the EPA has concluded it does not have authority under the Act to regulate CO2 and other greenhouse gases to address climate change. Therefore, the plaintiffs have not shown the EPA violated a non-
This document summarizes a Tax Court case regarding Walter and Carol Selph's challenge to tax liabilities and penalties for tax years 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Tax Court found that the Selphs were entitled to challenge their underlying tax liabilities for those years. Additionally, the court found that the Selphs were liable for failure-to-pay penalties for 1999 but not 2000 and 2001 due to Mrs. Selph's health issues those years which constituted reasonable cause for failure to timely file.
The tax court case involved whether commissions Howard Slater received for transferring his annuity accounts qualified for nonqualified deferred compensation treatment under section 409A. The court found that the commissions did not meet the requirements of section 409A as they were not conditioned on future services and the plans did not meet the election requirements. Therefore, the commissions were required to be included in the Slaters' gross income for the 2005 tax year.
This appeal involves post-judgment orders from a legal malpractice case brought by Sulphur Mountain Land and Livestock Co., Malibu Broadbeach L.P., and Pacific Coast Management against Knapp, Petersen & Clarke and several individuals. The trial court granted Sulphur and Malibu's motion for attorney's fees and costs, denied the defendants' motion for fees and motion to tax costs, finding Sulphur and Malibu were the prevailing parties. The defendants appeal, arguing: 1) the trial court failed to properly determine the prevailing party under Civil Code §1717 before considering C.C.P. §998; 2) even if it had, it abused its discretion in finding Sulphur and
Three lawsuits and notices of intent to sue were filed against EPA regarding greenhouse gas emissions. The International Center for Technology Assessment petitioned EPA in 1999 to regulate vehicle GHG emissions but EPA did not respond. This prompted a lawsuit in 2002 alleging unreasonable delay. Additionally, Sierra Club and others sued EPA in 2002 for failing to review and update emissions standards for power plants as required every eight years. Finally, three Northeast states sent EPA a notice of intent to sue for failing to designate carbon dioxide as a criteria pollutant and set air quality standards, as they argue is required by the Clean Air Act.
The Justice Centre - Legal challenge. File No. CI 20-01-29284Guy Boulianne
This document is an amended notice of application filed with the Queen's Bench of Manitoba. It was filed by several churches and individuals seeking relief from public health orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The applicants are seeking declarations that certain provisions of Manitoba's Public Health Act and the public health orders issued under that Act are unconstitutional and violate their Charter rights. Specifically, the applicants argue that the public health orders infringe their rights to freedom of religion, expression, assembly and liberty. They are asking the court to declare the relevant provisions of the Public Health Act and the public health orders invalid.
This document is a memorandum from the United States Tax Court regarding a tax case between Joyce A. Perkins and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Tax Court found that Perkins was liable for a $6,582 income tax deficiency for 2003 but not liable for an accuracy-related penalty. The issues before the court were: 1) whether $26,400 paid to Perkins by her ex-husband in 2003 was alimony income under section 71 of the tax code, and 2) whether Perkins was liable for an accuracy penalty. The court analyzed Tennessee law on alimony and concluded the payments were alimony in futuro, making them taxable income to Perkins. However, the court found Perkins was not liable
PA Commonwealth Court Decision Overturning Zoning Part of Act 13 Marcellus Dr...Marcellus Drilling News
The decision issued by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, the appeals court (second level) in PA. The decision overturns a portion of the Act 13 Marcellus Shale drilling law passed by the PA legislature in early 2012. The zoning portion of the law would have overruled any local zoning of oil and gas drilling with state guidelines. Seven towns and a few others sued to have the zoning provision nullified. The case will likely go to the PA Supreme Court in 2012.
Oneok v. Learjet- SCOTUS Decision 04-21-15Ryan Billings
This document is a Supreme Court syllabus for the case ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. It provides a summary of the key details of the case in 3 paragraphs:
1) Respondents, a group of manufacturers, hospitals, and other institutions that buy natural gas directly from interstate pipelines, sued petitioners claiming the pipelines had engaged in behavior that violated state antitrust laws by reporting false information to natural gas indices.
2) The district court granted summary judgment for the pipelines, finding the claims were preempted by the Natural Gas Act. The appeals court reversed, finding the claims aimed at obtaining damages for excessive retail prices, not wholesale prices regulated by the act.
3
This summarizes a document reviewing environmental law cases from 2009-2010. It discusses three cases:
1) Fresh Meadow Food Serv., LLC v. RB 175Corp. upheld a RICO claim against a defendant who concealed underground storage tanks and contaminated soil when selling a property.
2) Wickens v. Shell Oil Co. addressed recoverable attorney fees under Indiana's Underground Storage Tank Act.
3) Evansville Greenway & Remediation Trust v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co. concerned the common interest privilege and apportionment of liability under CERCLA. The court applied the privilege to communications between parties working to remediate contaminated sites. It also found CERCLA
The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected arguments from critics of the AWA Goodhue wind project Monday morning to affirm a fall 2011 Minnesota Public Utilities Commission decision to issue a site permit for the wind power development.
FERC Order Denying Rehearing Requested by NY AG Schneiderman re Constitution ...Marcellus Drilling News
New York Attorney General Eric Scheiderman requested the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission rehear and investigate the matter of tree clearing in NY along the proposed path of the Constitution Pipeline (still not built). Schneiderman alleged the Constitution should have prevented landowners from clearing trees on their own property ahead of the pipeline's approval by Lord Cuomo. FERC told Schneiderman to get lost--no rehearing of the matter.
I Headnotes and indexes are copyrighted and may not be duplica.docxeugeniadean34240
I Headnotes and indexes are copyrighted and may not be duplicated by photocopying, printing.
I or other means without the express permission of the publishers. 1 -800-351-0917
43 Fla. L. Weekly S512 SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
Committee later submitted a revised proposal in response to comments. While we
generally approve the Committee's revisions, the revised proposal would have allowed
twenty days[ ratherthan ten, to serve a reply brief. In order to maintain consistency with
otherprovisions in rule 9.146(g)(3)(B), we haverevised the Committee's proposal such
that parties are allowed twenty days to respond after the last initial brief, and ten days
to respond after the last answer brief.
3Wehave revised the Committee's proposal to refer specifically to requirements for
electronic service in Rule ofJudicial Administration 2.516(b).
"See CoastalDev. ofN. Fla.,Inc. v. City ofJacksonville Beach, 788 So. 2d 204,205
footnotes.
(a) Florida Supreme Court.
(111887-present: Fenelonv. State. 594 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1992).
{211846-1886: Livingston v. L 'Engle, 22 Fla. 427 (1886).
J ±' C-fl&LL/fl 1
n.3(Fla.20CII); Fla. Power &Light Co. v.CityofDania,76l So.2d 1089,1094 (Fla.
2000) ("No statewide criterion exists at this time."); see also Broward Cty. v. G.B. V.
Intern., Ltd.
Anstead,J.)
, 787 So. 2d 838, 849-53 (Fla. 2001) (Pariente, J., dissenting, joined by
(LEWIS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.) I dissent
because there is no need to amend the rule with regard to joinder on
appeal. This amendment is likely to generate more confusion than
clarity. I concur with the remainder ofthe amendments.
! * * *
I ■
! ..■■■■
Rules of Appellate Procedure—Amendment—Uniform Citation
System
IN RE: AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
9.800. Supreme Court of Florida. Case No. SC17-999. October 25,2018. Original
Proceeding—Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Counsel: Courtney Rebecca
Brewer, Ch lir, Appellate CourtRules Committee, Tallahassee, Kristin A. Norse, Past
Chair, App sllate Court Rules Committee, Tampa; and Joshua E. Doyle, Executive
Director, and Heather Savage Telfer, Staff Liaison, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee, for
Petitioner.
(PER CUjRIAM.) This matter is before the Court for consideration of
proposed, amendments to Florida Rule ofAppellate Procedure 9.800
(Uniforn
Fla. Cons t.
TheFlorida Bar's Appellate CourtRules Committee (Committee)
proposes
uniform
proposal
Citation System). We havejurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a),
amendments to rule 9.800 to substantially update the
citation formats provided in that rule. The Committee's
to amend the rule was first presented to the Court in the
Commirt 5e' s regular-cycle report ofproposed rule amendments in In
re Amendments to the Florida Rules ofAppellate Procedure—2017
Regular-Cycle Report, No. SC17-152 (Fla. report filed Jan. 31,
2017).' The Court, on its own motion, entered an order directing that
the proposed amendments to rule 9.800 be .
Three New England states - Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Maine - announced they will sue the Environmental Protection Agency over its determination that it lacks legal authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles under the Clean Air Act. The states argue that EPA does have authority to regulate these emissions. They will challenge EPA's decision in federal court, claiming it contradicts earlier EPA statements and testimony acknowledging that greenhouse gas emissions endanger public health. Environmental groups had previously requested that EPA regulate vehicle CO2 emissions, but EPA denied that request in August, asserting that Congress did not give it authority to do so.
A petition filed by the litigious Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation preemptively asking PA Commonwealth Court to prevent Gov. Tom Corbett from issuing an executive order that would allow a little more drilling under (not on) some PA state land. The order by Corbett maintains a moratorium on new drilling that involves surface disturbance and requires any new drilling to be done from adjacent private property. The plan would raise an additional $75 million for PA's budget.
Decision by U.S. District Judge David N. Hurd on Force Majeure Case in New Yo...Marcellus Drilling News
A decision issued by Judge David Hurd in a case of landowners from Broome and Tioga Counties in New York State against Chesapeake Energy and Statoilhydro. Chesapeake is attempting to extend leases on property for gas drilling claiming that the moratorium in New York has stopped them from drilling. Landowners claim the leases were signed long before horizontal hydraulic fracturing of shale was done and that Chesapeake could have drilled, conventionally, any time they chose to.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on Oct 9, 2015 issued a stay on the odious and overreaching Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)/Army Corps of Engineers' (ECA) so-called update that redefines Waters of the United States (WOTUS) to include just about everything, including mud puddles. Some 13 states sued to stop the new rule. This action keeps the rule from being adopted in any of the 50 states until a lawsuit, brought by the 13 states, has a chance of playing out in court.
The document discusses three key points:
1) Recent court decisions have affirmed the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and the Obama administration plans to enact new regulations through the EPA.
2) The EPA has proposed new regulations for stormwater runoff and effluent from construction sites to reduce pollution.
3) The Supreme Court recently decided three important environmental cases, holding that naval training exercises outweigh protecting marine mammals, that the EPA can consider costs in regulating cooling water intake structures, and will determine if CERCLA liability is joint and several.
Friends of the Willamette has filed a lawsuit against WhyChang? alleging violations of its NPDES permit and various environmental laws. The memo analyzes WC's NPDES permit status, the scope of permit protections, and potential enforcement consequences. It finds that WC's permit remains valid, but some discharges may fall outside protections. Significant civil penalties are possible for violations, though some defenses like lack of notice may apply.
FERC Response to NY AG Schneiderman's Petition to Revoke Constitution Pipelin...Marcellus Drilling News
Response from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman's petition that FERC investigate and remove its approval of the Constitution Pipeline based on false allegations that the project prematurely cut down trees and engaged in construction activities for the pipeline.
Erin Deady
This session will continue the discussion of the Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact in SE Florida. Understanding and preparing for climate change on a local level is among the most significant and timely sustainability issues facing Florida and its vulnerability to those impacts. The issues cross the social, built, and natural environments and the jurisdictional lines of local government. The session will further explore national and state policy and funding issues, as well as legal and organizational aspects of addressing climate change impacts.
FERC Order Denying Stay of Kinder Morgan's Broad Run Expansion ProjectMarcellus Drilling News
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission denied a request to stay the authorization of Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company's Broad Run Expansion Project. The Commission found that the intervenors requesting the stay did not demonstrate they would suffer irreparable harm if the project proceeded. Specifically, the Commission determined that the environmental impacts to forest and a nearby animal rehabilitation center would be insignificant. Additionally, conditioning authorization on future permits did not improperly encroach on state authority. Therefore, justice did not require granting a stay.
1. The document is a letter from the EPA General Counsel responding to questions from the Chairman of a House subcommittee regarding the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act.
2. The EPA argues that while the Clean Air Act does not expressly mention regulating greenhouse gases, the Act gives the EPA broad authority to regulate air pollutants if they are reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. The absence of explicit statutory authority does not preclude EPA action.
3. The EPA also asserts that provisions mentioning carbon dioxide and global warming do not restrict the EPA's regulatory authority provided by other parts of the Clean Air Act. The EPA believes it has authority to regulate greenhouse gases under
This document is an appellant's opening brief for a case in the California Court of Appeal regarding a trust. Robert Quick (the appellant) alleges that Andrea Pearson (the respondent), as trustee, breached the trust by concealing its existence from him and failing to provide him distributions as a beneficiary. The brief argues that Quick sufficiently alleged facts to state a cause of action and overcome defenses of statute of limitations and laches. It maintains the trial court erred in sustaining Pearson's demurrer without leave to amend.
The final disposition of the Act 13 law that was challenged by seven selfish PA towns, an anti-drilling doctor and a wacko environmental group. The PA Supreme Court couldn't be bothered deciding these points and sent it back to a lower court for a final decision. The Commonwealth Court found that the Public Utility Commission could not evaluate a town's zoning ordinances to be sure they don't violate state standards. It also found the language in Act 13 limiting a doctor from making public the specific formulas used by drillers in their fracking fluids. There were a few other notable decisions as well.
This document summarizes a workers' compensation case involving letters sent by the applicant's attorney to three Agreed Medical Evaluators without the defendants' approval. The defendants filed a petition for removal, arguing the letters contained impermissible "information." The WCJ initially found the letters were only "communications," but then recommended removal was appropriate. The Appeals Board granted removal to determine whether the letters contained "information" requiring the defendants' approval under Labor Code section 4062.3. The Board noted removal is an extraordinary remedy, but was warranted here due to the potential for substantial prejudice and irreparable harm if biased medical evaluator reports resulted.
The document is a letter from the Attorney General of Massachusetts appealing the withholding of documents in response to a Freedom of Information Act request regarding communications about the U.S. Climate Action Report 2002. The letter argues that the Council on Environmental Quality failed to adequately justify withholding documents and violated FOIA. It provides examples where CEQ inadvertently disclosed information it had tried to redact, demonstrating the information was not properly exempt. The letter requests CEQ provide a detailed Vaughn index to justify any withheld information.
The document summarizes five key facts about the recovery of US shale oil production:
1) Rig counts have increased by 90% since bottoming out in May 2016 and are up 30% year-over-year, signaling increased drilling and production capacity.
2) While decline rates remain steep, production profiles have increased substantially due to technological advances, meaning aggregate supply will be stronger.
3) Preliminary data shows that net new shale supply turned positive in December 2016 for the first time since March 2015, recovering just 7 months after rig counts increased.
4) Increased drilling activity is supported by a large stock of drilled but uncompleted wells, demonstrating the recovery and expansion of the shale sector.
5)
Quarterly legislative action update: Marcellus and Utica shale region (4Q16)Marcellus Drilling News
A quarterly update from the legal beagles at global law firm Norton Rose Fulbright. A quarterly legislative action update for the second quarter of 2016 looking at previously laws acted upon, and new laws introduced, affecting the oil and gas industry in Pennsylvania, Ohio and West Virginia.
An update from Spectra Energy on their proposed $3 billion project to connect four existing pipeline systems to flow more Marcellus/Utica gas to New England. In short, Spectra has put the project on pause until mid-2017 while it attempts to get new customers signed.
A letter from Rover Pipeline to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission requesting the agency issue the final certificate that will allow Rover to begin tree-clearing and construction of the 511-mile pipeline through Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio and Michigan. If the certificate is delayed beyond the end of 2016, it will delay the project an extra year due to tree-clearing restrictions (to accommodate federally-protected bats).
DOE Order Granting Elba Island LNG Right to Export to Non-FTA CountriesMarcellus Drilling News
An order issued by the U.S. Dept. of Energy that allows the Elba Island LNG export facility to export LNG to countries with no free trade agreement with the U.S. Countries like Japan and India have no FTA with our country (i.e. friendly countries)--so this is good news indeed. Although the facility would have operated by sending LNG to FTA countries, this order opens the market much wider.
A study released in December 2016 by the London School of Economics, titled "On the Comparative Advantage of U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Shale Gas Revolution." While America has enough shale gas to export plenty of it, exporting it is not as economic as exporting oil due to the elaborate processes to liquefy and regassify natural gas--therefore a lot of the gas stays right here at home, making the U.S. one of (if not the) cheapest places on the planet to establish manufacturing plants, especially for manufacturers that use natural gas and NGLs (natural gas liquids). Therefore, manufacturing, especially in the petrochemical sector, is ramping back up in the U.S. For every two jobs created by fracking, another one job is created in the manufacturing sector.
Letter From 24 States Asking Trump & Congress to Withdraw the Unlawful Clean ...Marcellus Drilling News
A letter from the attorneys general from 24 of the states opposed to the Obama Clean Power Plan to President-Elect Trump, RINO Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnel and RINO House Speaker Paul Ryan. The letter asks Trump to dump the CPP on Day One when he takes office, and asks Congress to adopt legislation to prevent the EPA from such an egregious overreach ever again.
Report: New U.S. Power Costs: by County, with Environmental ExternalitiesMarcellus Drilling News
Natural gas and wind are the lowest-cost technology options for new electricity generation across much of the U.S. when cost, public health impacts and environmental effects are considered. So says this new research paper released by The University of Texas at Austin. Researchers assessed multiple generation technologies including coal, natural gas, solar, wind and nuclear. Their findings are depicted in a series of maps illustrating the cost of each generation technology on a county-by-county basis throughout the U.S.
Annual report issued by the U.S. Energy Information Administration showing oil and natural gas proved reserves, in this case for 2015. These reports are issued almost a year after the period for which they report. This report shows proved reserves for natural gas dropped by 64.5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), or 16.6%. U.S. crude oil and lease condensate proved reserves also decreased--from 39.9 billion barrels to 35.2 billion barrels (down 11.8%) in 2015. Proved reserves are calculated on a number of factors, including price.
The document is a report from the U.S. Energy Information Administration analyzing oil and gas production from seven regions in the U.S. It includes charts and tables showing historical and projected production levels of oil and gas from each region from 2008 to 2017, as well as metrics like the average production per rig. The regions - Bakken, Eagle Ford, Haynesville, Marcellus, Niobrara, Permian, and Utica - accounted for 92% of domestic oil production growth and all domestic natural gas production growth from 2011-2014.
Velocys is the manufacturer of gas-to-liquids (GTL) plants that convert natural gas (a hyrdocarbon) into other hydrocarbons, like diesel fuel, gasoline, and even waxes. This PowerPoint presentation lays out the Velocys plan to get the company growing. GTL plants have not (so far) taken off in the U.S. Velocys hopes to change that. They specialize in small GTL plants.
PA DEP Revised Permit for Natural Gas Compression Stations, Processing Plants...Marcellus Drilling News
In January 2016, Gov. Wolf announced the DEP would revise its current general permit (GP-5) to update the permitting requirements for sources at natural gas compression, processing, and transmission facilities. This is the revised GP-5.
PA DEP Permit for Unconventional NatGas Well Site Operations and Remote Piggi...Marcellus Drilling News
In January 2016, PA Gov. Wolf announced the Dept. of Environmental Protection would develop a general permit for sources at new or modified unconventional well sites and remote pigging stations (GP-5A). This is the proposed permit.
Onerous new regulations for the Pennsylvania Marcellus Shale industry proposed by the state Dept. of Environmental Protection. The new regs will, according to the DEP, help PA reduce so-called fugitive methane emissions and some types of air pollution (VOCs). This is liberal Gov. Tom Wolf's way of addressing mythical man-made global warming.
The monthly Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO) from the U.S. Energy Information Administration for December 2016. This issue makes a couple of key points re natural gas: (1) EIA predicts that natural gas production in the U.S. for 2016 will see a healthy decline over 2015 levels--1.3 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) less in 2016. That's the first annual production decline since 2005! (2) The EIA predicts the average price for natural gas at the benchmark Henry Hub will climb from $2.49/Mcf (thousand cubic feet) in 2016 to a whopping $3.27/Mcf in 2017. Why the jump? Growing domestic natural gas consumption, along with higher pipeline exports to Mexico and liquefied natural gas exports.
This document provides an overview of the natural gas market in the Northeast United States, including New England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. It details statistics on gas customers, consumption, infrastructure like pipelines and storage, and production. A key point is that the development of the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania has significantly increased domestic gas production in the region and reduced its reliance on other supply basins and imports.
The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission responded to each point raised in a draft copy of the PA Auditor General's audit of how Act 13 impact fee money, raised from Marcellus Shale drillers, gets spent by local municipalities. The PUC says it's not their job to monitor how the money gets spent, only in how much is raised and distributed.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Act 13/Impact Fees Audit by PA Auditor...Marcellus Drilling News
A biased look at how 60% of impact fees raised from PA's shale drilling are spent, by the anti-drilling PA Auditor General. He chose to ignore an audit of 40% of the impact fees, which go to Harrisburg and disappear into the black hole of Harrisburg spending. The Auditor General claims, without basis in fact, that up to 24% of the funds are spent on items not allowed under the Act 13 law.
The final report from the Pennsylvania Dept. of Environmental Protection that finds, after several years of testing, no elevated levels of radiation from acid mine drainage coming from the Clyde Mine, flowing into Ten Mile Creek. Radical anti-drillers tried to smear the Marcellus industry with false claims of illegal wastewater dumping into the mine, with further claims of elevated radiation levels in the creek. After years of testing, the DEP found those allegations to be false.
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in Harper v Muskingum Watershed Conse...Marcellus Drilling News
Anti-drilling landowners (backed by Food & Water Watch) claimed the Muskingum Watershed Conservancy District had violated the deed to the land it owns by leasing that land for Utica Shale drilling. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the case. The anti-drillers lost.
Recent years have seen a disturbing rise in violence, discrimination, and intolerance against Christian communities in various Islamic countries. This multifaceted challenge, deeply rooted in historical, social, and political animosities, demands urgent attention. Despite the escalating persecution, substantial support from the Western world remains lacking.
लालू यादव की जीवनी LALU PRASAD YADAV BIOGRAPHYVoterMood
Discover the life and times of Lalu Prasad Yadav with a comprehensive biography in Hindi. Learn about his early days, rise in politics, controversies, and contribution.
Christian persecution in Islamic countries has intensified, with alarming incidents of violence, discrimination, and intolerance. This article highlights recent attacks in Nigeria, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq, exposing the multifaceted challenges faced by Christian communities. Despite the severity of these atrocities, the Western world's response remains muted due to political, economic, and social considerations. The urgent need for international intervention is underscored, emphasizing that without substantial support, the future of Christianity in these regions is at grave risk.
https://ecspe.org/the-rise-of-christian-persecution-in-islamic-countries/
projet de traité négocié à Istanbul (anglais).pdfEdouardHusson
Ceci est le projet de traité qui avait été négocié entre Russes et Ukrainiens à Istanbul en mars 2022, avant que les Etats-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne ne détournent Kiev de signer.
#WenguiGuo#WashingtonFarm Guo Wengui Wolf son ambition exposed to open a far...rittaajmal71
Since fleeing to the United States in 2014, Guo Wengui has founded a number of projects in the United States, such as GTV Media Group, GTV private equity, farm loan project, G Club Operations Co., LTD., and Himalaya Exchange.
विवादास्पद फिल्म के ट्रेलर से गाली-गलौज वाले दृश्य हटा दिए गए हैं, और जुर्माना लगाया गया है। सुप्रीम कोर्ट और बॉम्बे हाई कोर्ट दोनों ने फिल्म की रिलीज पर रोक लगा दी है और उसे निलंबित कर दिया है। पहले यह फिल्म 7 जून और फिर 14 जून को रिलीज होने वाली थी, लेकिन अब यह 21 जून को रिलीज हो रही है।
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13062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
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18062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
CLICK:- https://firstindia.co.in/
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Yichen Wei and Adam Drennan share the architecture and technical requirements behind "user watch status" for a major global media streaming service, what that meant for their database, the pros and cons of the many options they considered for replacing DynamoDB, why they ultimately chose ScyllaDB, and their lessons learned so far.
16062024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
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1. IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania Independent Oil & :
Gas Association, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 321 M.D. 2015
: Argued: June 8, 2016
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Department of Environmental :
Protection, :
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: September 1, 2016
Petitioner Pennsylvania Independent Oil & Gas Association (PIOGA)
initiated this action for declaratory relief in our original jurisdiction against
Respondent Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP), asking this Court to declare that DEP may not apply and enforce
Section 3215(c) of the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act, also known as Act 13,1
58 Pa. C.S. § 3215(c), as part of its well permit application process. PIOGA
contends that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court enjoined application and
1
Act 13 of 2012 is codified at 58 Pa. C.S. §§ 2301–3504.
2. 2
enforcement of Section 3215(c) of Act 13 in Robinson Township v.
Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013) (Robinson Twp. I).2
PIOGA has moved
for judgment on the pleadings, and DEP has filed a cross-application for summary
relief, seeking dismissal of PIOGA’s petition for review.3
The dispute before the
Court is a legal one. For the reasons set forth below, we deny PIOGA’s motion
and grant DEP’s cross-application.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Act 13 and Robinson Twp. I
In February 2012, Governor Tom Corbett signed Act 13 into law.
Act 13 repealed the Oil and Gas Act of 1984.4
In place thereof, Act 13 amended
2
By Opinion and Order dated December 29, 2015, this Court overruled DEP’s
preliminary objections and directed DEP to file an answer to PIOGA’s petition for review.
Pennsylvania Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Cmwlth., Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. (Pa. Cmwlth.,
No. 321 M.D. 2015, filed December 29, 2015) (en banc) (PIOGA I). DEP filed its answer to the
petition for review on January 28, 2016.
3
Both an application for summary relief under Rule 1532 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Appellate Procedure and a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 1034 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure seek similar relief. Pa. R.A.P. 1532 note. Summary
relief is proper where the moving party establishes the case is clear and free from doubt, there are
no genuine issues of material fact to be tried, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Detar v. Beard, 898 A.2d 26, 31 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). When ruling on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings in our original jurisdiction, we must view all of the opposing party’s
allegations as true, and only those facts that the opposing party has specifically admitted may be
considered against the opposing party. Tulio v. Beard, 858 A.2d 156, 158 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
We may only consider the pleadings themselves and any documents properly attached thereto.
Id. A party’s motion for judgment on the pleadings will only be granted when there is no issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Montgomery
Cnty. v. Dep’t of Corr., 879 A.2d 843, 846 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr.
of Pa. State Univ. v. Cmwlth., 788 A.2d 1071, 1075 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (en banc), aff’d in part,
remanded in part, 821 A.2d 1205 (Pa. 2003).
4
Act of December 19, 1984, P.L. 1140, as amended, 58 P.S. §§ 601.101-.605,
repealed by the Act of February 14, 2002, P.L. 87.
3. 3
Title 58 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes by re-codifying portions of the
repealed Oil and Gas Act of 1984 and adding new provisions organized into three
new parts and six new chapters relating to oil and gas development in the
Commonwealth. Chapter 32 of Act 13 addresses well permitting and establishes
statewide limitations on oil and gas development. As described by our
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “Act 13 comprise[d] sweeping legislation affecting
Pennsylvania’s environment and, in particular, the exploitation and recovery of
natural gas in a geological formation known as the Marcellus Shale.” Robinson
Twp. I, 83 A.3d at 913.
In Robinson Twp. I, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on appeal from
a decision by this Court, considered, inter alia, legal challenges to Chapter 32 of
Act 13. A plurality concluded that Sections 3215(b)(4), 3215(d), 3303, and 3304
of Act 13 violated Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, known as
the Environmental Rights Amendment.5
Id. at 985 (plurality).6
Justice Baer,
writing separately, concurred with the plurality’s conclusion that these sections
were unconstitutional, but on substantive due process grounds. Id. at 1008-09
(Baer, J., concurring). He also concurred in the plurality’s mandate, yielding a
5
The Environmental Rights Amendment provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the
people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Pa. Const. art. I, § 27.
6
Then-Chief Justice Castille penned the lead opinion, in which Justices Todd and
McCaffrey joined.
4. 4
majority directive, that “application and enforcement of Sections 3215(b)(4),
3215(d), 3303, and 3304 [of Act 13] is hereby enjoined.” Id. at 1000 (plurality),
1009 (Baer, J., concurring).
Section 3215(b) of Act 13 imposed restrictions on the location of oil
and gas wells. Section 3215(b)(1) through (3) provided for well site and related
disturbed area setbacks from certain perennial streams,7
springs, other bodies of
water, and wetlands. Section 3215(b)(4) provided that DEP must waive the
setbacks under certain conditions:
The department shall waive the distance
restrictions upon submission of a plan identifying
additional measures, facilities or practices to be
employed during well site construction, drilling and
operations necessary to protect the waters of this
Commonwealth. The waiver, if granted, shall include
additional terms and conditions required by the
department necessary to protect the waters of this
Commonwealth. Notwithstanding section 3211(e), if a
waiver request has been submitted, the department may
extend its permit review period for up to 15 days upon
notification to the applicant of the reasons for the
extension.
58 Pa. C.S. § 3215(b)(4). As noted above, a majority of Supreme Court justices
held that this provision, authorizing a waiver of setbacks, was unconstitutional and
enjoined its application and enforcement.
7
Section 3215(b) of Act 13 refers to “solid blue lined stream . . . as identified on the most
current 7 ½ minute topographic quadrangle map of the United States Geological Survey.” The
United States Geological Survey uses a solid blue line on its maps to denote a perennial stream,
http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/TopographicMapSymbols/topomapsymbols.pdf (last visited
June 22, 2016). See Pa. R.E. 201 (relating to judicial notice).
5. 5
In Part V of Robinson Twp. I, a majority of the Supreme Court8
addressed the severability of other provisions in Section 3215, in light of their
conclusion that Section 3215(b)(4) was unconstitutional. Among the provisions
that the Supreme Court addressed was Section 3215(c), the provision at issue in
this matter. Section 3215(c) provides:
On making a determination on a well permit, the
department shall consider the impact of the proposed
well on public resources, including, but not limited to:
(1) Publicly owned parks, forests, game lands
and wildlife areas.
(2) National or State scenic rivers.
(3) National natural landmarks.
(4) Habitats of rare and endangered flora and
fauna and other critical communities.
(5) Historical and archaeological sites listed on
the Federal or State list of historic places.
(6) Sources used for public drinking supplies in
accordance with subsection (b).
58 Pa. C.S. § 3215(c). The majority also considered the severability of
Section 3215(e), which provides:
The Environmental Quality Board [“EQB”] shall
develop by regulation criteria:
(1) For the department to utilize for
conditioning a well permit based on its impact to
the public resources identified under subsection (c)
and for ensuring optimal development of oil and
gas resources and respecting property rights of oil
and gas owners.
8
Justice Baer joined Part V of the lead opinion. Robinson Twp. I, 83 A.3d at 1000 (Baer,
J., concurring).
6. 6
(2) For appeal to the Environmental Hearing
Board of a permit containing conditions imposed by
the department. The regulations shall also provide
that the department has the burden of proving that the
conditions were necessary to protect against a
probable harmful impact of the public resources.
58 Pa. C.S. § 3215(e) (emphasis added).
On severability, the Supreme Court first rejected the request of the
challengers to declare the entirety of Act 13 unconstitutional in light of the
Supreme Court’s decision that certain “core” parts of Act 13 were unconstitutional.
Robinson Twp. I, 83 A.3d at 998-99. The Supreme Court, however, recognized
that “there are obvious consequences of certain of our holdings.” Id. at 999
(emphasis added). In so doing, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the parties
did not offer much guidance with respect to a section-by-section severability
analysis. Nonetheless, it proceeded to consider the question “in part, to the extent
that its application is obvious and necessary to provide direction to the parties
going forward.” Id. (emphasis added).
With respect to the setbacks in Section 3215(b)(1) through (3) of
Act 13 for well locations, the Supreme Court opined that the waiver provision in
subsection (b)(4), which the majority held unconstitutional, was “a key part of the
Section 3215(b) scheme.” Id. Concluding that the General Assembly did not
intend that the setback provisions apply in the absence of the waiver provision, the
Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of Section 3215(b) were not
severable—i.e., were “incomplete and incapable of execution in accordance with
the legislative intent.” Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court enjoined application
and enforcement of Section 3215(b) in its entirety. The Supreme Court’s mandate
in this regard provides: “The remaining parts of Section 3215(b) are not severable
7. 7
from Section 3215(b)(4) and, as a result, the application or enforcement of Section
3215(b) is enjoined in its entirety.” Id. at 1000.
With respect to Sections 3215(c) and (e), the Supreme Court
concluded, without any additional supporting analysis: “Moreover, insofar as
Section 3215(c) and (e) are part of the Section 3215(b) decisional process, these
provisions as well are incomplete and incapable of execution in accordance with
legislative intent. Application of Section 3215(c) and (e) is, therefore, also
enjoined.” Id. at 999 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court’s mandate in this
regard provides: “Moreover, Sections 3215(c) and (e) . . . are not severable to the
extent that these provisions implement or enforce those Sections of Act 13 which
we have found invalid and, in this respect, their application or enforcement is also
enjoined.” Id. at 1000 (emphasis added).
B. Well Permitting Post-Robinson Twp. I
PIOGA initiated this action because, after Robinson Twp. I, DEP, as
part of the well permit application process, continues to seek information from
applicants relating to the impact that a proposed well site will have on the public
natural resources identified in Section 3215(c) of Act 13. DEP confirms this
practice in its Answer to PIOGA’s petition for review:
DEP requires well permit applicants to complete the form
entitled “Coordination of a Well Location with Public
Resources” (DEP Form No. 5500—PM—OG0076)
(“Public Resources Form”) and to comply with DEP’s
Policy for Pennsylvania Natural Diversity Inventory
(“PNDI”) Coordination During Permit Review and
Evaluation (DEP Document No. 021-0200-001) (“PNDI
Policy”). By way of further answer, DEP requires well
permit applicants to identify the impacts to threatened
and endangered species and species of special concern,
and to coordinate with applicable jurisdiction agencies if
8. 8
these species may be present at or near the proposed well
site consistent with the PNDI Policy.
(DEP Answer ¶ 23.) Through the Public Resources Form, DEP asks, inter alia,
that the well permit applicant identify public resources in the vicinity of the
proposed well site, coordinate with responsible agencies, and describe measures
that the applicant will take to protect those public resources. Through the PNDI
Policy, DEP seeks, inter alia, to identify and mitigate any impact a proposed well
site may have on certain threatened, endangered, or special concern species (both
flora and fauna).9
DEP contends that notwithstanding Robinson Twp. I, Section 3215(c)
of Act 13 provides DEP with the authority to require applicants to complete the
Public Resources Form and to comply with the PNDI Policy and to consider this
information in evaluating the impact a proposed well will have on public natural
resources. (DEP Answer ¶¶ 23, 24.)
II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, PIOGA’s principal
argument is that DEP currently applies Section 3215(c) of Act 13 by requiring well
permit applicants to complete the Public Resources Form and comply with the
PNDI Policy. PIOGA contends that by doing so, DEP is violating the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s mandate in Robinson Twp. I. Alternatively,
PIOGA claims, in response to DEP’s answer to the amended petition for review,
that no other law authorizes DEP to require well permit applicants to complete the
Public Resources Form and comply with the PNDI Policy. Finally, PIOGA
9
Both the Public Resources Form and the PNDI Policy are appended to PIOGA’s
petition for review.
9. 9
contends that even if DEP has the authority to require compliance in this regard in
the name of protecting the Commonwealth’s public resources, there are no
standards governing DEP’s exercise of that authority, raising constitutional
concerns.
In its cross-application for summary relief, DEP’s principal argument
is that notwithstanding Robinson Twp. I, DEP retains authority under
Section 3215(c) of Act 13 to protect public resources from the potential impact of
oil and gas wells. Alternatively, should this Court conclude that Robinson Twp. I
enjoined for all purposes application and enforcement of Section 3215(c) of
Act 13, DEP contends that its authority to protect public resources reverts to
relevant provisions in the repealed Oil and Gas Act of 1984.
Based on these contentions, we will first address the parties’ dispute
over how to interpret the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s mandate in Robinson
Twp. I with respect to Section 3215(c) of Act 13. Our resolution of that question
will determine whether we must and, if so, how we will address the parties’ other
issues.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Supreme Court’s Mandate
Before considering the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s mandate with
respect to Section 3215(c) of Act 13, some background on the substance of that
provision provides useful context for the discussion.
Despite the sweeping effect of Act 13, Pennsylvania has long
regulated on a statewide basis the location of oil and gas wells as part of the well
permitting process. Section 3215 of Act 13 essentially replaced Section 205 of the
Oil and Gas Act of 1984, 58 P.S. § 601.205 (repealed 2012). See generally
10. 10
Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of Borough of Oakmont, 964 A.2d
855 (Pa. 2009) (discussing overlap between Oil and Gas Act of 1984 and local
zoning ordinance regulation of well site location). Like Section 3215, Section 205
of the Oil and Gas Act of 1984 provided specific restrictions on the location of oil
and gas wells designed to protect existing water wells, buildings, streams, and
other bodies of water. Moreover, like Section 3215, Section 205 of the Oil and
Gas Act of 1984 provided for variances and waivers of these restrictions but,
unlike Section 3215, only at the discretion of DEP—a difference affected by the
General Assembly’s use of the mandatory word “shall” in Section 3215 of Act 13
instead of the permissive “may” in Section 205 of the Oil and Gas Act of 1984.
Compare 58 P.S. § 601.205(a), (b) (repealed 2012), with 58 Pa. C.S. § 3215(a), (b).
Most relevant to the primary issue before the Court is Section 205(c)
of the Oil and Gas Act of 1984, the precursor to Section 3215(c) of Act 13.
Consider this side-by-side comparison:
Section 205(c) of the Oil and
Gas Act of 1984
Section 3215(c) of Act 13
The department shall, on
making a determination on a well
permit, consider the impact of the
proposed well on public
resources to include, but not be
limited to, the following:
(1) Publicly owned parks,
forests, game lands and wildlife
areas.
(2) National or State
scenic rivers.
(3) National natural
landmarks.
(4) Habitats of rare and
On making a determination
on a well permit, the department
shall consider the impact of the
proposed well on public
resources, including, but not
limited to:
(1) Publicly owned parks,
forests, game lands and wildlife
areas.
(2) National or State
scenic rivers.
(3) National natural
landmarks.
(4) Habitats of rare and
11. 11
endangered flora and fauna and
other critical communities.
(5) Historical and
archaeological sites listed on the
Federal or State list of historic
places.
endangered flora and fauna and
other critical communities.
(5) Historical and
archaeological sites listed on the
Federal or State list of historic
places.
(6) Sources used for
public drinking supplies in
accordance with subsection (b).
In large measure, when the General Assembly passed Act 13, it re-enacted
Section 205(c) of the Oil and Gas Act of 1984. The only material change was the
addition of a sixth class of enumerated “public resources,” that being “[s]ources
used for public drinking supplies in accordance with subsection (b)”—a
cross-reference to the Section 3215(b) setback and waiver provisions relating to
perennial streams, springs, other bodies of water, and wetlands. With respect to
Section 3215(e) of Act 13, which, inter alia, directs the EQB to develop regulatory
criteria “[f]or the department to utilize for conditioning a well permit based on its
impact to the public resources identified under [Section 3215(c) of Act 13],” there
appears to be no equivalent in the repealed Oil and Gas Act of 1984.
PIOGA contends that the Supreme Court in Robinson Twp. I enjoined
application and enforcement of Section 3215(c) in every instance. It relies
primarily on language found in Part V of the Supreme Court’s opinion, addressing
severability. There, as noted above, a majority of the Justices of the Supreme
Court found a relation between Section 3215(c) and (e) and Section 3215(b), the
latter of which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional. PIOGA directs this
Court to express language within that portion of the opinion, where the Supreme
Court enjoins Section 3215(c) and (e) without qualification: “Application of
Section 3215(c) and (e) is, therefore, also enjoined.” Robinson Twp. I, 83 A.3d at
12. 12
999 (emphasis added). (PIOGA Br. in Support of Motion for Judgment on
Pleadings at 17.)
DEP, by contrast, contends that the Supreme Court’s decision with
respect to application and enforceability of Sections 3215(c) and (e) of Act 13 was
qualified, or limited, as reflected in the body of the opinion where the Supreme
Court expressly provided that the provisions should be enjoined only “insofar as
Section 3215(c) and (e) are part of the Section 3215(b) decisional process,” which
is a reference to the setback from water sources provisions and waiver process.
Robinson Twp. I, 83 A.3d at 999. DEP contends that whatever link the Supreme
Court drew between Section 3215(c) and Section 3215(b), it only enjoined
application and enforcement of Section 3215(c) and (e) to the extent of that link.
DEP, therefore, as it did under the Oil and Gas Act of 1984, may continue to
evaluate proposed well sites for their impact on public natural resources, just not
with respect to the “Section 3215(b) decisional process.” Robinson Twp. I,
83 A.3d at 999. (DEP Br. in Support of Cross-Application for Summary Relief
at 13-17.)
Pennsylvania generally follows the rule of stare decisis, under which
“a conclusion reached in one matter should be applied to future substantially
similar matters.” Ario v. Reliance Ins. Co., 980 A.2d 588, 597 (Pa. 2009)
(emphasis added). Much of the parties’ respective arguments invites the Court to
parse the words used by the Supreme Court in Part V of its opinion in Robinson
Twp. I. For purposes of enforcing the Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson
Twp. I, however, the conclusion is paramount. As explained by retired Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, former law professor, and
World War II veteran the late Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert:
13. 13
Stare decisis, the decision of the court, forms the
precedent; it is the court’s judgment that controls. We
may say that a precedent is a legal precept that attaches a
definite detailed consequence to a definite detailed set of
facts. Thus, a decision or judgment without an
accompanying ratio decidendi may nevertheless serve as
precedent. It follows that, although the rationes
decidendi are extremely important in determining how
courts arrive at their decisions, they should not be
confused with actual precedents, qua precedents. We
follow the doctrine of stare decisis, not stare rationes
decidendi.
Because courts tend to overwrite opinions, it may
be often said that a court’s “discussion outran the
decision.”
Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process: Readings, Materials and Cases 818
(West Publ’g Co. 1984) (1976) (footnotes omitted).
The Supreme Court’s conclusion in Robinson Twp. I—i.e., that of the
majority of the Justices—is set forth in Part VI of the opinion, titled “Conclusion
and Mandate.” Pertinently, it provides:
D. The remaining parts of Section 3215(b) are
not severable from Section 3215(b)(4) and, as a result,
the application or enforcement of Section 3215(b) is
enjoined in its entirety. Moreover, Sections 3215(c) and
(e), and 3305 through 3309 are not severable to the extent
that these provisions implement or enforce those Sections
of Act 13 which we have found invalid and, in this
respect, their application or enforcement is also enjoined.
Robinson Twp. I, 83 A.3d at 1000 (emphasis added).10
To resolve the principal
issue in dispute between DEP and PIOGA, we must interpret the above mandate.
10
As PIOGA points out at page 18 of its Brief in Support of its Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, in PIOGA I, addressing DEP’s challenge to PIOGA’s standing, this Court
observed that the Supreme Court in Robinson Twp. I “already found [Section 3215(c) of Act 13]
to be unconstitutional.” PIOGA I, slip op. at 14. This was not an accurate characterization of the
(Footnote continued on next page…)
14. 14
Simply stated, PIOGA contends that the mandate enjoins application and
enforcement of Section 3215(c) of Act 13 in its entirety. DEP, by contrast,
contends that the mandate enjoins application and enforcement of Section 3215(c)
only with respect to its application to Section 3215(b) of Act 13, which the
Supreme Court enjoined in its entirety.
There is no guiding precedent that governs our resolution of this
question, other than this Court’s related duties to follow the mandates of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and to effectuate its decisional law. See Walnut St.
Assocs., Inc. v. Brokerage Concepts, Inc., 20 A.3d 468, 480 (Pa. 2011).11
In
(continued…)
Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson Twp. I. As noted above, and as is clear from the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s mandate in Robinson Twp. I, the only provisions of Act 13 that
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional were Sections 3215(b)(4), 3215(d), 3303, and 3304.
Robinson Twp. I, 83 A.3d at 1000. The Supreme Court did not address, let alone rule upon, the
constitutionality of the remaining portions of Section 3215(b), Sections 3215(c) and (e),
and 3305 through 3309. Instead, it held that these provisions are unenforceable (either in whole
or in part) because they are not severable from the unconstitutional provisions. Id.
11
We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s contention that in addressing the issues
before us in this matter, the Court is “reopen[ing] the litigation [in Robinson Twp. I] or
render[ing] judgment on an issue the Supreme Court has already decided” in Robinson Twp. I.
See Pennsylvania Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., ___ A.3d ___ (Pa. Cmwlth.,
No. 321 M.D. 2015, filed September 1, 2016) (Covey, J., dissenting), slip op. at 7. Rather, this
Court is tasked in this matter with doing what courts are routinely asked to do—i.e., interpret
precedent. As for the Supreme Court’s denial of DEP’s Application for Reargument in Robinson
Twp. I, we do not presume, as the dissent does, to know the reason(s) the Supreme Court denied
DEP’s application. The order denying the application provides no explicit insight into the
mindset of the justices. The dissent apparently believes that in denying reargument, the Supreme
Court affirmatively rejected the argument that DEP advances in this matter. It is, however,
equally plausible that the Supreme Court simply did not believe that DEP’s concerns, expressed
in its application, over how the Supreme Court’s mandate with respect to Sections 3215(c) and
(e) of Act 13 might later be interpreted (i.e., PIOGA’s interpretation in this matter) warranted
(Footnote continued on next page…)
15. 15
meeting these duties, we are guided predominantly by the words that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court chose to use in its mandate giving effect to its
severability analysis in Part V of its decision in Robinson Twp. I. As noted above,
the Supreme Court held that Section 3215(b)(4) of Act 13, relating to waiver of
water source setbacks, was unconstitutional. Concluding that the remaining
portions of Section 3215(b), which established those setbacks, were “not
severable” from the waiver provision, the Supreme Court’s mandate enjoined
application and enforcement of Section 3215(b) “in its entirety.”
The Supreme Court’s mandate with respect to Section 3215(c)
and (e) of Act 13 is less definitive. With respect to its conclusion on severability,
the Supreme Court held that Section 3215(c) and (e) are not severable “to the
extent” that they implement or enforce Section 3215(b) of Act 13. With respect to
enjoining their application and enforcement, the Supreme Court only did so “in this
respect.” To do as PIOGA asks and interpret the Supreme Court’s mandate with
respect to Section 3215(c) and (e) as unqualified, like the Supreme Court’s
mandate with respect to Section 3215(b), would require this Court to ignore key
differences in the words that the Supreme Court chose with respect to these
provisions. Just as we are obligated to give meaning to every word in a statute, if
possible, so too should we endeavor to give meaning to every word chosen by the
Supreme Court when enforcing its mandates. See Commonwealth v. Lobiondo,
462 A.2d 662, 664 (Pa. 1983).
(continued…)
reconsideration or reargument under the standards set forth in Rule 2543 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Appellate Procedure (relating to considerations governing allowance of reargument).
16. 16
We construe the language in the Supreme Court’s mandate as
providing a narrower injunction with respect to the application and enforcement of
Section 3215(c) and (e) of Act 13 than with respect to Section 3215(b) of Act 13.
Given the definitiveness of the Supreme Court’s mandate with respect to
Section 3215(b), we are compelled to construe the added phrases “to the extent”
and “in this respect” with respect to the Section 3215(c) and (e) mandate as words
of limitation, leaving Section 3215(c) and (e) viable with respect to matters
unrelated to Section 3215(b) of Act 13. As noted above, Section 3215(c), like its
precursor, Section 205(c) of the Oil and Gas Act of 1984, provides DEP with the
authority to consider the impact a well location may have on public resources, such
as publicly-owned parks, forests, and game lands; scenic rivers; and historical and
archeological sites within the Commonwealth. The only provision of
Section 3215(c) linking that subsection to Section 3215(b) is paragraph (6), which
provides for DEP to consider the impact of the proposed well on “[s]ources used
for public drinking supplies in accordance with [Section 3215(b)].” (Emphasis
added.) This provision relates to but one of the classes of enumerated public
resources that the General Assembly sought to protect in Section 3215(c). The five
(5) others bear no relation to the water source setback and waiver provisions of
Section 3215(b). Accordingly, they are unaffected by the Supreme Court’s
mandate in Robinson Twp. I. Consistently, it follows that Section 3215(e), which
provides the EQB with the duty to develop regulatory criteria, is enjoined only to
the extent that the regulatory criteria would bear on the water source setback and
waiver provisions of Section 3215(b).
For the above reasons, we reject PIOGA’s request for a declaratory
judgment that DEP lacks the authority to apply and enforce in any and all respects
17. 17
Section 3215(c) of Act 13 and to consider the impact that a proposed well site will
have on public natural resources. To the contrary, DEP’s authority under
Section 3215(c) to consider the impact that a proposed well will have on public
resources, those listed and unlisted, is extant, limited only by the portion of the
Supreme Court’s mandate in Robinson Twp. I that enjoins its application and
enforcement with respect to the water source setback and waiver provisions set
forth in Section 3215(b).12
In practice, this means that when DEP considers the
impact of a proposed well on a source or sources used for public drinking supplies,
it is not constrained to do so “in accordance with” enjoined Section 3215(b).13
B. Regulatory Standard
PIOGA expresses concern that if the Court were to conclude, as we
have, that DEP retains some authority under Section 3215(c) to consider and, by
conditions, mitigate the impact a proposed well site may have on public resources,
there are no standards governing DEP’s exercise of that authority, raising
constitutional concerns. We disagree. In Act 13, the General Assembly
unambiguously expressed its intent that the EQB promulgate regulatory criteria
that DEP must use “for conditioning a well permit based on its impact to the public
resources identified under [Section 3215(c)] and for ensuring optimal development
of oil and gas resources and respecting property rights of oil and gas owners.”
12
In light of our disposition of this issue, we need not consider DEP’s alternative
contentions relating to authority under other laws, including the repealed Oil and Gas Act of
1984.
13
But see Section 3218 of Act 13, 58 Pa. C.S. § 3218 (relating to protection of water
supplies).
18. 18
Section 3215(e) of Act 13.14
This specific power and duty to promulgate
regulations with respect to public resource considerations for well permits is in
addition to the power vested in the EQB to promulgate regulations with respect to
implementation of Act 13 in general, see 58 Pa. C.S. § 3274, and, as noted above,
had no equivalent in the Oil and Gas Act of 1984.15
Any concerns over how DEP exercises its authority under
Section 3215(c) of Act 13 with respect to well permit applications, including, but
not limited to, whether DEP follows the regulatory criteria established by the EQB,
are better left to the administrative agency process, followed by review in our
14
When interpreting a statute, this Court is guided by the Statutory Construction Act of
1972, 1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501–1991, which provides that “[t]he object of all interpretation and
construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.”
1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). “The clearest indication of legislative intent is generally the plain language
of a statute.” Walker v. Eleby, 842 A.2d 389, 400 (Pa. 2004). “When the words of a statute are
clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(b). Only “[w]hen the words of the statute are not explicit”
may this Court resort to statutory construction. 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c). “A statute is ambiguous or
unclear if its language is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations.” Bethenergy Mines,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 676 A.2d 711, 715 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 685 A.2d 547
(Pa. 1996). Moreover, “[e]very statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its
provisions.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a). It is presumed “[t]hat the General Assembly intends the entire
statute to be effective and certain.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(2). Thus, no provision of a statute shall be
“reduced to mere surplusage.” Walker, 842 A.2d at 400. Finally, it is presumed “[t]hat the
General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or
unreasonable.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1922(1).
15
In Pennsylvania, environmental regulation and enforcement is split between three
bodies—(1) DEP, which implements and enforces the laws; (2) the EQB, which serves as the
administrative rulemaking body; and (3) the Environmental Hearing Board, which serves as the
adjudicator in disputed matters. See Tire Jockey Serv., Inc. v. Cmwlth., Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
915 A.2d 1165, 1185 (Pa. 2007).
19. 19
appellate jurisdiction. See Canonsburg Gen. Hosp. v. Dep’t of Health, 422 A.2d
141 (Pa. 1980).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, PIOGA’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings is denied, and DEP’s cross-application for summary relief is granted.
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
20. IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania Independent Oil & :
Gas Association, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 321 M.D. 2015
:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Department of Environmental :
Protection, :
Respondent :
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 1st day of September, 2016, the motion for judgment
on the pleadings of Petitioner Pennsylvania Independent Oil & Gas Association
(PIOGA) is DENIED, and the cross-application for summary relief of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)
is GRANTED. Judgment is ENTERED in favor of DEP and against PIOGA.
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
21. IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania Independent Oil & :
Gas Association, :
Petitioner :
: No. 321 M.D. 2015
v. :
: Argued: June 8, 2016
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Department of Environmental :
Protection, :
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
CONCURRING OPINION BY
JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: September 1, 2016
I concur in the Majority’s thoughtful analysis, however, I write
separately to expound upon the Majority’s discussion of the Department of
Environmental Protection’s (DEP) mandate under section 3215(c) of the
Pennsylvania Oil & Gas Act, also known as Act 13, 58 Pa.C.S. §3215(c), to
consider the impact of the proposed well on public resources, including public
drinking supplies. It is necessary to make this clarification as the parties continue
in this process.
22. PAM - 2
As recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Act must
comply with the Pennsylvania Constitution, specifically, Article I, section 27,
known as the Environmental Rights Amendment, which provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and
esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s
public natural resources are the common property of all
the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee
of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve
and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
Pa. Const. art. I, §27 (emphasis added).
Significantly, in making a determination as to the impact of a
proposed well upon public resources, DEP is instructed that it “shall” consider the
enumerated list of public resources. 58 Pa.C.S. §3215(c). However, while section
3215(c) of Act 13 requires DEP to consider the enumerated public resources, the
list is by no means exclusive or exhaustive. Clearly, DEP’s mandate is to consider
the impact of the proposed well on public resources, which includes, but is not
limited to, the six enumerated resources.
In full, section 3215 (c) provides:
On making a determination on a well permit, the
department shall consider the impact of the proposed
well on public resources, including, but not limited to:
(1) Publicly owned parks, forests, game lands and
wildlife areas.
(2) National or State scenic rivers.
(3) National natural landmarks.
(4) Habitats of rare and endangered flora and fauna
and other critical communities.
(5) Historical and archaeological sites listed on the
Federal or State list of historic places.
23. PAM - 3
(6)Sources used for public drinking supplies in
accordance with subsection (b).
58 Pa.C.S. §3215(c) (emphasis added).
The Majority correctly interprets the Supreme Court’s holding in
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013) (Robinson Twp. I),
that section 3215(c) is enjoined to the extent that it implements or enforces section
3215(b) of Act 13. However, although paragraph 6 of section 3215(c) is enjoined
to the extent it applies to the setback and distance restrictions of 3215(b), I believe
it is clear DEP is not precluded from, and is in fact mandated to consider, a
proposed well’s impact on public resources, which would include sources for
public drinking supplies.
In other words, DEP must consider the impact of a proposed well
upon public drinking supplies because it is a public resource under the ambit of the
prefatory language in section 3215(c). The mandate upon DEP to consider the
impact of proposed wells upon public drinking supplies as a public resource is, I
believe, integral to the purpose of the Act. Any other interpretation would
undermine DEP’s duty to consider the impact of a proposed well on public
resources and, as trustee, to conserve and maintain public resources for the benefit
of all citizens of the Commonwealth.
With respect to how DEP exercises its authority under section 3215(c)
with respect to well permit applications (including, but not limited to, whether
DEP follows the regulatory criteria established by the EQB), I agree with the
Majority that it is better left to the administrative agency process, followed by
review in our appellate jurisdiction. (Slip op. at 18.)
________________________________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
24. IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania Independent Oil & :
Gas Association, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Department of Environmental :
Protection, : No. 321 M.D. 2015
Respondent : Argued: June 8, 2016
BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge
HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
DISSENTING OPINION
BY JUDGE COVEY FILED: September 1, 2016
I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s ruling that, by using the
phrases “insofar as,” “to the extent that” and “in this respect” in its conclusion in
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013) (Robinson Twp. I),
our Supreme Court held that if there are circumstances in which subsections (c) and
(e) of Section 3215 of the Oil and Gas Act (Act 13), 58 Pa.C.S. § 3215(c), (e), are
applicable independently of the Section 3215(b) well permit decisional process, they
are not enjoined.
The Majority states: “Much of the parties’ respective arguments invites
the Court to parse the words used by the Supreme Court in Part V [Severability]
of its opinion in Robinson Twp. I. For purposes of enforcing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Robinson Twp. I, however, [Part VI] the conclusion is paramount.”
25. AEC - 2 -
Majority Op. at 12. (emphasis added). I disagree. To rely on specific words in the
Supreme Court’s conclusion misrepresents the Court’s ruling, especially in light of
the fact that the Supreme Court included a specific discussion on Section 3215’s
severability. Parsing certain words, as the Majority has done to support its decision,
becomes unnecessary when the statute, and the Supreme Court’s rationale and ruling
are read in context.
Section 3215 of Act 13 provides in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.--Wells may not be drilled within 200
feet, or, in the case of an unconventional gas well, 500 feet,
measured horizontally from the vertical well bore to a
building or water well, existing when the copy of the plat is
mailed as required by [S]ection 3211(b) [of Act 13]
(relating to well permits) without written consent of the
owner of the building or water well. Unconventional gas
wells may not be drilled within 1,000 feet measured
horizontally from the vertical well bore to any existing
water well, surface water intake, reservoir or other water
supply extraction point used by a water purveyor without
the written consent of the water purveyor. If consent is not
obtained and the distance restriction would deprive the
owner of the oil and gas rights of the right to produce or
share in the oil or gas underlying the surface tract, the well
operator shall be granted a variance from the distance
restriction upon submission of a plan identifying the
additional measures, facilities or practices as prescribed by
the [D]epartment [of Environmental Protection (DEP)] to
be employed during well site construction, drilling and
operations. The variance shall include additional terms and
conditions required by [DEP] to ensure safety and
protection of affected persons and property, including
insurance, bonding, indemnification and technical
requirements. Notwithstanding [S]ection 3211(e) [of Act
13], if a variance request has been submitted, [DEP] may
extend its permit review period for up to 15 days upon
notification to the applicant of the reasons for the extension.
26. AEC - 3 -
(b) Limitation.—
(1) No well site may be prepared or well drilled
within 100 feet or, in the case of an unconventional
well, 300 feet from the vertical well bore or 100 feet
from the edge of the well site, whichever is greater,
measured horizontally from any solid blue lined
stream, spring or body of water as identified on the
most current 7½ minute topographic quadrangle map
of the United States Geological Survey.
(2) The edge of the disturbed area associated with
any unconventional well site must maintain a 100-
foot setback from the edge of any solid blue lined
stream, spring or body of water as identified on the
most current 7½ minute topographic quadrangle map
of the United States Geological Survey.
(3) No unconventional well may be drilled within
300 feet of any wetlands greater than one acre in size,
and the edge of the disturbed area of any well site
must maintain a 100-foot setback from the boundary
of the wetlands.
(4) [DEP] shall waive the distance restrictions
upon submission of a plan identifying additional
measures, facilities or practices to be employed
during well site construction, drilling and
operations necessary to protect the waters of this
Commonwealth. The waiver, if granted, shall
include additional terms and conditions required
by [DEP] necessary to protect the waters of this
Commonwealth. Notwithstanding [S]ection
3211(e) [of Act 13], if a waiver request has been
submitted, [DEP] may extend its permit review
period for up to 15 days upon notification to the
applicant of the reasons for the extension.
(c) Impact.--On making a determination on a well
permit, [DEP] shall consider the impact of the proposed
well on public resources, including, but not limited to:
27. AEC - 4 -
(1) Publicly owned parks, forests, game lands and
wildlife areas.
(2) National or State scenic rivers.
(3) National natural landmarks.
(4) Habitats of rare and endangered flora and
fauna and other critical communities.
(5) Historical and archaeological sites listed on the
Federal or State list of historic places.
(6) Sources used for public drinking supplies in
accordance with subsection (b).
(d) Consideration of municipality and storage operator
comments.--[DEP] may consider the comments submitted
under [S]ection 3212.1 (relating to comments by
municipalities and storage operators) in making a
determination on a well permit. Notwithstanding any other
law, no municipality or storage operator shall have a right
of appeal or other form of review from [DEP’s] decision.
(d.1) Additional protective measures.--[DEP] may
establish additional protective measures for storage of
hazardous chemicals and materials intended to be used or
that have been used on an unconventional well drilling site
within 750 feet of a solid blue lined stream, spring or body
of water identified on the most current 7½ minute
topographic quadrangle map of the United States
Geological Survey.
(e) Regulation criteria.--The Environmental Quality
Board shall develop by regulation criteria:
(1) For [DEP] to utilize for conditioning a well
permit based on its impact to the public resources
identified under subsection (c) and for ensuring
optimal development of oil and gas resources and
respecting property rights of oil and gas owners.
(2) For appeal to the Environmental Hearing
Board of a permit containing conditions imposed
by [DEP]. The regulations shall also provide that
28. AEC - 5 -
[DEP] has the burden of proving that the
conditions were necessary to protect against a
probable harmful impact of the public resources.
(f) Floodplains.—
. . . .
(g) Applicability.—
(1) This section shall not apply to a well proposed to
be drilled on an existing well site for which at least
one well permit has been issued prior to the effective
date of this section.
(2) Nothing in this section shall alter or abridge the
terms of any contract, mortgage or other agreement
entered into prior to the effective date of this section.
58 Pa.C.S. § 3215 (text emphasis added).
In Robinson Twp. I, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared Section
3215(b)(4) of Act 13 unconstitutional. In determining whether any other subsections
of Section 3215 were inseparably connected to Section 3215(b)(4) such that it could
not be presumed the General Assembly intended to enact the remaining subsections
without the constitutionally-infirm provision, our Supreme Court expressly
expounded:
Setting aside the question of global severability—i.e.,
whether the specific provisions held to be unconstitutional
require that the entire Act be enjoined—there are obvious
consequences of certain of our holdings. Thus, we have
already recognized that Section 3215(b)(4) which addresses
waivers of the general rule requiring setbacks for the
protection of certain waters of the Commonwealth, is a key
part of the Section 3215(b) scheme. It would appear that
the General Assembly did not intend for the setback
provision to operate without allowing industry operators to
secure waivers from the setbacks. Absent the enjoined
Section 3215(b)(4), the remaining parts of Section
3215(b)—which the citizens do not challenge on
29. AEC - 6 -
appeal—are incomplete and incapable of execution in
accordance with the legislative intent. Having held that
Section 3215(b)(4) is unconstitutional, we conclude that
the remaining parts of Section 3215(b) are not severable.
Accordingly, application of Section 3215(b) is enjoined.
Moreover, insofar as Section 3215(c) and (e) are part of
the Section 3215(b) decisional process, these provisions
as well are incomplete and incapable of execution in
accordance with legislative intent. Application of
Section 3215(c) and (e) is, therefore, also enjoined.
Robinson Twp. I, 83 A.3d at 999 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court used the
identical reasoning for enjoining Section 3215(b) in its entirety, as it did to enjoin
Sections 3215(c) and (e).
In addition, Section 3215(c)(6) expressly references Section 3215(b).
The Supreme Court expressly enjoined Section 3215(b) in its entirety because it
found “the remaining parts of Section (b) . . . are incomplete and incapable of
execution in accordance with legislative intent.” Robinson Twp. I, 83 A.3d at 999.
A statutory provision that specifically cites a statutory section that has been declared
void, makes the dependent provision void. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1925. If the Supreme
Court had intended for only Section 3215(c)(6) to be enjoined, then it would have so
ruled. Rather, it held that “[a]pplication of Section 3215(c) and (e) is, therefore,
also enjoined.” Robinson Twp. I, 83 A.3d at 999 (emphasis added).
Similarly, Section 3215(e)(1) explicitly cites to Section 3215(c). The
Supreme Court in enjoining the “[a]pplication of Section 3215(c) and (e)”
determined, on the same basis that it enjoined Section 3215(b), that they are
“incomplete and incapable of execution in accordance with legislative intent . . . [.]”
Robinson Twp. I, 83 A.3d at 999.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Supreme Court expressly and
unequivocally ruled that because Sections 3215(c) and (e) could not be severed from
Section 3215(b), their application was enjoined. This conclusion is further supported
30. AEC - 7 -
by Justice Baer’s statement in his Concurring Opinion, wherein he opined: “Given
that I would strike Section 3215(b)(4) and (d), I further agree with the lead opinion
that the entirety of subsection (b), as well as subsections (c) and (e) would be
‘incapable of execution’ and must be enjoined.” Id. at 1009.
This Court is prohibited from revisiting the Supreme Court’s holding in
Robinson Twp. I.
[W]e, as an intermediate appellate court are bound by
the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and are
powerless to rule that decisions of that Court are wrongly
decided and should be overturned. See, e.g., Nunez v.
Redevelopment Auth[.] of the City of Phila[.], . . . 609 A.2d
207, 209 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1992) (‘as an intermediate
appellate court, we are bound by the opinions of the
Supreme Court.’).
Griffen v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., 757 A.2d 448, 451 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (emphasis
added).
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson Twp. I, DEP filed an
Application for Reargument (Application) with the Supreme Court. Therein, DEP
asserted that “the [Supreme] Court’s holding that [Sections] 3215(c) and (e) are
not severable from [S]ection 3215(b) misapprehends Section 3215 and bears further
review on remand.”1
DEP Robinson Twp. I App. for Reargument at 9 (emphasis
added). DEP, herein, is doing nothing more than asking this Court to revisit the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Robinson Twp. I. Unlike the Majority, I would not reopen
the litigation or render judgment on an issue the Supreme Court has already decided.
1
The Supreme Court denied DEP’s Application for Reargument on February 21, 2014. See
Supreme Court Docket No. 63 MAP 2012. Contrary to the Majority’s statement, the Dissent makes
no presumption regarding the basis as to why the Supreme Court denied the Application. Rather,
reference to the Application is for the sole purpose of revealing DEP’s acknowledgement in its
Application that the Supreme Court held that Sections 3215(c) and (e) were not severable from
Section 3215(b). “It is well settled that this Court may take judicial notice of pleadings and
judgments in other proceedings where appropriate.” Lycoming Cnty. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd.,
943 A.2d 333, 335 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
31. AEC - 8 -
Based on the foregoing, I would hold that the Supreme Court’s decision
does not require the “pars[ing] [of] words” to ascertain its holding. Majority Op. at
12. Nor do I believe that the Supreme Court ever intended the parties or this Court to
rely upon the Statutory Construction Act of 19722
to interpret its decision. Rather,
the Supreme Court unequivocally stated, without qualification, that “[a]pplication of
Section 3215(c) and (e) is, therefore, also enjoined.” Robinson Twp. I, 83 A.3d at
999 (emphasis added). To hold otherwise gives no effect to this clear language or
Justice Baer’s express language: “I further agree with the lead opinion that the
entirety of subsection (b), as well as subsections (c) and (e) would be ‘incapable of
execution’ and must be enjoined.” Id. at 1009 (emphasis added).
___________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
Judge Cohn Jubelirer joins in this dissenting opinion.
2
1 Pa. C.S. §§ 1501–1991.