The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that construction companies do not owe a duty of care to workers at a construction site who suffered purely economic losses, such as lost wages, due to an accident caused by the companies' alleged negligence. The Court examined four public policy factors and found that all four factors favored not recognizing a duty in this situation. Specifically, the Court found that the normal expectations of participants, the policy of encouraging industry participation while ensuring safety, avoiding increased litigation, and decisions from other jurisdictions all indicated a duty should not be owed for purely economic harm resulting from negligence.

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Case Alert: No Duty Owed for Purely Economic Harm
On November 19, 2015, the Supreme Court of Connecticut issued a decision in the cases captioned
Lawrence v. O & G Industries, Inc. and Beamer v. O & G Industries, Inc. concerning the duty of care
owed by the defendants, several construction companies, whose alleged negligence caused an
explosion at a power plant, to the plaintiffs, who were employees that sustained only economic losses
as a result of the explosion. In affirming the trial court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion to
strike, the Supreme Court held that the defendants did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs who
were employed at construction site but suffered only economic loss.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The plaintiffs in these two civil actions were gainfully employed in various trades at a power
plant construction site in Middletown, Connecticut known as the Kleen Energy Project (the
“Project”). Each defendant was a contractor or subcontractor actively involved in the construction
and start-up of the power plant. On February 7, 2010, a gas explosion occurred. The plaintiffs
then brought these actions against the defendants, alleging, inter alia, that their negligence
caused the explosion, which resulted in the termination of the plaintiffs’ gainful employment at
the power plant site and economic losses in the form of past and future lost wages.
The defendants moved to strike the economic loss counts of the operative complaints. The trial
court (Bright, J.) granted the defendants’ motions to strike, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to
sufficiently allege that the defendants owed them a duty of care necessary to sustain their
negligence claims. The trial court determined whether recovery should be permitted as a matter
of public policy under the four factor test articulated in Jarmie v. Troncale, 306 Conn. 578, 603
(2012), which is discussed below.
Relying on both Connecticut Supreme and Superior Court decisions, the trial court concluded
that “[f]or more than 150 years the law in Connecticut, and elsewhere, has limited tort liability to
cases involving physical harm to person or property. Departing from this requirement would
undermine reasonable expectations built on this long held understanding of the law, and would
create an endless ripple of liabilities arising from the defendants’ conduct. Public policy is not
served by so expanding the defendants’ liability to purely economic claims such as those asserted
by the plaintiff[s].” Subsequently, the trial court (Sheridan, J.) granted the plaintiffs’ motions for

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judgment in accordance with Judge Bright’s memoranda of decision granting the defendants’
motions to strike. This consolidated appeal followed.
ISSUE:
Whether construction companies owe a duty of care to workers employed on a job site who suffer
purely economic harm, namely lost wages, as a result of an accident caused by the construction
companies’ alleged negligence when such negligence results in a shutdown of the Project.
HOLDING & REASONING:
The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the defendants did not owe a duty of care to the
plaintiffs for their purely economic losses. The Court found that all four public policy factors
relating to whether the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiffs, as discussed below, favored the
defendants:
(1) The normal expectations of the participants in the activity under review:
The Court found Connecticut’s existing body of common law instructive, including three
particular cases. First, it looked to the seminal Connecticut case in the area of pure economic
loss, Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New Haven Railroad Co., 25 Conn. 265, 277-78 (1856),
which held that a life insurance company could not recover life insurance benefits that it had
paid by bringing a direct action against a railroad company whose negligence had caused the
death of its insured. The court in that case found that, in the absence of privity of contract
between the plaintiff and the defendants or of any direct obligation of the latter to the former,
the loss to the plaintiffs was a remote and indirect consequence of the misconduct of the
defendants and was not actionable.
Next, the Court discussed RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381 (1994), which
concluded that a general contractor did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, a construction
company, for economic loss in the form of increased workers’ compensation premiums and
lost dividends arising out of the contractor’s negligence. In that case, the Court noted that
nexus between the negligent act and the economic loss was too tenuous to impose liability for
such collateral consequences.
Finally, the Court found instructive the Superior Court decision in DeVillegas v. Quality
Roofing, Inc., 1993 WL 515671, No. CV92 0294190S (Nov. 30, 1993)(Freedman, J.). In that
case, a corrections officer sought to recover lost overtime pay and other purely economic
damages incurred when a roofing contractor’s negligence caused a fire that damaged the
facilities where he worked. The trial court stuck the officer’s claims, citing numerous
decisions of other jurisdictions as well as Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. New Haven
Railroad Co., for the proposition that the “long established common law rule in [Connecticut]
is that in the absence of privity of contract between the plaintiff and [the] defendant, or of an

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injury to the plaintiff’s person or property, a plaintiff may not recover in negligence for a
purely economic loss.”
The Court also found instructive Connecticut’s statutory law, noting that unemployment
insurance benefits pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-222 et seq. exists for persons such as the
plaintiffs, who become unemployed through no fault of their own. The ready availability of
these benefits to mitigate the harm caused by unemployment resulting from events such as
the power plant explosion significantly informs the ordinary expectations of the parties,
particularly given the at-will nature of employment in Connecticut.
Accordingly, and based on both Connecticut’s common law and statutory law, the reasonable
expectations of the participants here favored the defendants in the first factor considered by
the Court.
(2) The public policy of encouraging participation in the activity, while weighing the safety of the
participants and (3) the avoidance of increased litigation (the Court considered these two factors
together):
The Court found that expanding the defendants’ liability to include the purely economic
damages suffered by other workers on site appears likely to greatly increase the pool of
potential claimants, but at the same time there would be no corresponding increase in safety.
It noted that companies like the defendants are already subject to extensive state and federal
regulation, and already may be held civilly liable to a wide variety of parties who may suffer
personal injury or property damage as a result of their negligence in the industrial or
construction context. Thus, the Court determined that the probability of an increase in
litigation by recognizing a duty on large construction sites like the power plant here—
especially to affected workers whose relationship with the tortfeasors may be quite
attenuated—would not be offset by an increase in safety. The Court was also concerned with
the difficulties in proof that would vary by individual employees’ employment circumstances,
exposing potential defendants to an endless number of claims and economic burdens on
industry. Thus, the Court found in favor of the defendants on the second and third factors.
(4) The decisions of other jurisdictions:
The Court was also persuaded by other federal and state court decisions that similarly
rejected nearly all claims like those brought by the plaintiffs in the present case, seeking
wages lost as a result of a third party’s negligence in the absence of privity of contract,
personal injury, or property damage. The basis of these cases are predicated on the notion
that a defendant should be shielded from unlimited liability for all of the economic
consequences of a negligent act, particularly in a commercial or professional setting, and
thus to keep the risk of liability reasonably calculable. As such, the Court found that the
fourth factor, namely, the decisions reached by other jurisdictions, also favored the
defendants.

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A copy of the decision can be found here. If you have questions or would like to discuss this
decision, please contact Attorneys Anthony Natale (anatale@natalelawfirm.com) or Angela Vickery
(avickery@natalelawfirm.com).
Case Alert: Connecticut Recognizes
Loss of Parental Consortium
On September 28, 2015, the Supreme Court of Connecticut issued a decision in the case captioned
Campos v. Coleman, 319 Conn. 36 (2015), which overrules the holding in Mendillo v. Board of
Education, 246 Conn. 456 (1998). The Mendillo decision declined to recognize a derivative cause of
action for loss of parental consortium by a minor child. Following Campos, however, Connecticut
courts now recognize that a minor child can bring a loss of parental consortium claim, subject to
certain limitations discussed below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
The decedent was struck by a motor vehicle while riding his bicycle and died three days later
from his injuries. Thereafter, his wife and three children filed an eight count complaint alleging,
inter alia, that (1) Coleman, the operator of the vehicle, negligently caused the decedent's death,
thereby entitling the decedent's estate to damages under the wrongful death statute, (2) LQ
Management, the owner of the vehicle, was also liable for Coleman's negligence, (3) the
decedent's wife was entitled to damages for loss of spousal consortium, and (4) the three children
of the decedent were entitled to damages for loss of parental consortium. Defendants moved to
strike, among other things, the claims for loss of parental consortium, and the trial court granted
their motion as to the loss of parental consortium claims. Thereafter, a jury returned a verdict
for the decedent's estate on the wrongful death claim and for the wife's loss of spousal
consortium claim. The decedent's three children then filed an appeal, contending that the
Mendillo decision should be overruled and the court should allow them to pursue their claims
for loss of parental consortium.
ISSUE:
Whether the decision in Mendillo, which declines to recognize a derivative cause of action for
loss of parental consortium by a minor child, should be overruled.

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HOLDING:
The decision in Mendillo is overruled, and Connecticut courts will now recognize a cause of
action by a minor child for loss of parental consortium resulting from an injury to a parent,
subject to certain limitations. Those limitations are as follows: (1) loss of parental consortium
claims must be joined with the parent's negligence claim whenever possible, and the jury must
be instructed that only the child raising the claim can recover the pecuniary value of the parent's
services; (2) a claim for loss of parental consortium is barred when the action brought by the
injured parent has been terminated by settlement or by an adverse judgment on the merits; and
(3) a loss of parental consortium claim may be raised only by a person who was a minor on the
date that the parent was injured, and damages may be awarded only for the period between the
date of the parent's injury and the date that the child reaches the age of majority.
In addition, liability is limited to damages arising from injury to the parent during the parent's
life, thereby precluding damages arising from the parent's death. A fact finder necessarily must
consider whether the parent's injuries were insignificant or serious, and whether they were
temporary or permanent. These factors are to be considered on a case-by-case basis in
determining the amount of damages.
Finally, it should be noted that the court did not decide the issue of whether a stepchild who has
not been legally adopted by the injured stepparent may bring a loss of parental consortium
claim.
APPLICABILITY TO PENDING CASES:
The Campos v. Coleman holding is applicable to pending and future cases. A claim for loss of
parental consortium is barred only when the action brought by the injured parent has been
terminated by settlement or by an adverse judgment on the merits, or if the statute of limitations
has run prior to the issuance of this decision.
* * * * * *
A copy of the decision can be found here. If you have questions or would like to discuss this
decision, please contact Attorneys Anthony Natale (anatale@natalelawfirm.com) or Angela Vickery
(avickery@natalelawfirm.com).