The document discusses how the Syrian crisis and international responses are negatively impacting Lebanon and potentially pushing it into a "fragility trap". It argues that while Lebanon was not previously a fragile state, it now faces significant stresses due to hosting over 1.3 million Syrian refugees, including economic burdens, security issues, and social/political tensions. International aid has largely circumvented the Lebanese government, exacerbating these challenges. The document proposes a more pragmatic approach, including classifying refugees and encouraging some to return based on need or origin, and providing long-term support to both refugees and the Lebanese state to enhance security, government capacity, and economic opportunities. It raises concerns about potentially undermining another state's stability and sovereignty

1. Neighboring Insurgency:
How are the Syrian Crisis and International
Responses Driving Lebanon to Fragility Trap?
Leila Nicolas, PhD
leila@leilanicolas.com
www.leilanicolasr.com
www.leilanicolas.com

2. In this paper, I assume that the effects
of the spillover of the Syrian crisis and
the international responses are
deeply and negatively affecting the
Lebanese State's existence, leading
Lebanon to "fragility trap".

3. Is Lebanon a fragile State?

5. Is Lebanon a fragile State?
Actually, Lebanon is a middle income country,
which was not really a ‘fragile state’ before
Syrian crisis ,but had "Situations of fragility“.

6. The Syrian War ( March 2011- …)

7. Lebanon: Open border policy

8. Syrian Spillover Consequences
• Violent conflicts, terrorism and organized
crime increased in Lebanon:
• Sunni Radicals called for supporters to back
Syrian opposition thus sending arms and
fighters from Lebanon to Syria , while
Hizbullah (Shia) intervened in Syria to back
Asaad regime, this escalated more sectarian
tensions in Lebanon.

9. Stability and Security effects
A- Fighting in Tripoli between the Alawites who
support Syrian regime and Sunnis supporting
Syrian opposition.
B- Several terrorist attacks and suicide bombers
blew in Tripoli, Beirut and Bekaa.
• Jihadist groups frequently claim responsibility for those.
C- crimes increased dramatically.
D- Weapons are being smuggled in both
directions between Lebanon and Syria.

10. Demographic stress
• UNHCR have registered around 1.1 million
Syrian refugees.
• Lebanese officials: more than 1.3 million
Syrian refugees have entered Lebanon by
May-2014 (37% of Lebanon’s pre-crisis
population)
• 500,000 Palestinian refugees
• 50,000 Iraqi refugees

12. Economic and Social Stress
• 5.7 billion $
• lost economic activity till Summer 2013
• 170,000
• Lebanese expected to fall into poverty by 2014, in
addition to the current 1 million poor
• 10%
• increase in unemployment rate in Lebanon
• 340,000 Lebanese
• expected to join the ranks of unemployment
• $348-$434 million
needed by Lebanon's public education system to
accommodate all the additional Syrian students

13. Economic and social Stress
• 1.1 billion $
• The grow of total budgetary spending by the Government
alone
• 2.6 billion $
• The deficit of public finances has widen
• 1.5 billion $
• Is the estimated to cut in revenue collection
• 589 million $
• the fiscal cost on infrastructure
• 1.1 billion $
• required for stabilization of infrastructure
• including 258 million$ for current spending

14. Political and Institutional Effects
A – Tensions among Lebanese
B- Increasing tensions between refugees and
host communities
Example: Ersal province, has 40,000 Lebanese
inhabitants, hosts 120, 000 Syrian refugees.
C- Crises of state legitimacy and authority
• Postponing parliamentary elections from May 2012 to Nov.
2014.
• Presidential void started at 25th of May 2014.

16. WHY?

17. Work, Settle freely, International Aid

18. Donors' Policies
• Western donors countries as well as Gulf
states have been reluctant to disburse
substantial funds to the Lebanese
government.
• As a result, the international aid was managed
around the Lebanese government in direct
cooperation with non-state actors on the
ground or the refugees themselves… leading
to increased burdens on Lebanese institutions.

19. WHY?
• More than 40% of the 1.1 million registered
refugees (UNHCR) came from non- conflict
areas in Syria.

20. Direct cash programs
• In Lebanon, Cash delivered via ATM card has
become the preferred modality used by
international donors for:
• food, non-food needs, winter assistance etc..
• the experience in Lebanon prove that "giving
cash directly had some benefits, however it
affected negatively the host communities
and put pressure on Lebanon.

21. Disadvantages of Direct Cash
• Discriminated between refugees …Caused tensions
among them , and the hosting communities.
• Caused 100% raise to the prices of food and supplies
A small refugee family gets an average cash of 280 $ per
month, while the average wage in Syria for a non- skilled
person is about 68 $ and a “university graduate”
employee wage is 115$ (2013- 2014)
 officials say: 20% percentage of registered refugees, pass
the Lebanese- Syrian border at the end of each month to
collect their vouchers or Cash money…..then go back to
Syria.

22. Solutions

23. Suggested Solutions
First- Keep the current policies and let the
Lebanese State collapse.
Second- Pragmatic Approach:
Doing things differently; e.g. doing things
outside traditional expertise in dealing
with refugees’ crisis.

24. Pragmatic Approach
• Step ONE- Classify Refugees:
Category 1- who are really in need for humanitarian assistance,
those should be on the top of assistance priority.
Category 2- who came from prior conflict- now safe areas; but
may have no homes or places to live. This category should be
encouraged to return, on condition that aid and assistance be
delivered by UN in Syria.
Category 3- Economic refugees should be encouraged to return to
their homelands, the aid assistance in Lebanon should be
stopped.
Category 4 –Syrian workers previously working in Lebanon, and
registered as refugees to benefit from aid. Those should never
benefit from any aid program, as they are exploiting the funds.

25. Pragmatic Approach-2
Step TWO- Help the Lebanese government to
develop a new strategies to preserve both the
Lebanese state and Syrian refugees.
Step Three- Long term projects
targeting three dimensions:
• A. Enhancing the security of both refugees and
Lebanese citizens; providing humanitarian relief based
on humanitarian needs only.
• B. Contributing to a legitimate government with
sufficient capacity;
• C. Creating a peace dividend.

26. Syrian refugees voting in Lebanon

28. Future- oriented dilemma
 It has been accepted that:
• When governments are unwilling or unable to
protect their citizens, the international
community then steps to take this responsibility.
 But, what if practicing this international
responsibility becomes a cause to depriving
another state's citizens from their rights?
 what if taking this responsibility is leading
another state to the edge of civil war, or to
collapse?.