MJ652 CORPORATE CRIME CAPSTONE PROJECT

Steve M. Windham1
Ashworth College
MJ652, Corporate Crime
February 03, 2008
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Topic:
Corruption in Law Enforcement.
Thesis:
When those whose job it is to enforce the laws are found breaking the very laws they
enforce changes must be made; changes including ethics training, computerized statistical
observation to flag aberrant behavior, officer fiduciary accountability and departmental
accountability via independent review boards in order to restore the public confidence in our law
enforcement agencies.

Section 1
Introduction.
An overview of the industry selected and the prevalence of the crime you chose to research
within the industry and society (10 points).
Law enforcement agencies are an element of all civilized societies. Law enforcement is
charged with enforcing laws and guarding prisoners. Almost without exception, law
enforcement agents and agencies are employed by the government.
However, there are some exceptions, such as private security guards. While technically
not law enforcement, private security guards provide security and protection for individuals and
companies while often coordinating with law enforcement agencies. In the United States,
security guards are regulated and licensed by the government.
Another exception is that there has been a growing movement to privatize many prisons.
There are many reasons for the privatization of prisons, but the bottom line is that private prisons
are still contracted by and accountable to the government.
There are two primary branches of law enforcement. These branches are: police and
corrections. Finally, there is also the military which can be used when martial law is invoked. It
should be noted that the military also has an internal police force which is called the Military
Police, and military police officers are often referred to as MPs.
A police officer is an agent employed by an agency that this is empowered to enforce the
laws of the land. Their duty is to “effect public and social order through legitimate use of force”
(Wikipedia, 2007, www.wikipedia.org). There are numerous types of police agencies and their
number and type can vary by geographic locale. Some police agencies, such as the Office of the
Sheriff/Coroner, are law enforcement positions that are politically elected. Other types of police
include: highway patrol, park ranger, constable, marshal, military police (MP), state police,
troopers, rangers, and mounted police.
A corrections officer is also known as a prison officer, detention officer, prison guard or
prison warden. The corrections officer has the responsibility of the supervision, safety and
security of prisoners in a detention facility (Wikipedia, 2007, www.wikipedia.org). A detention
facility can be a jail, prison, brig or other holding facility.
Collectively, police officers and corrections officers are referred to as either peace
officers or law enforcement officers. There is usually some degree of cross-over in job duties
between police officers and corrections officers. As an example of a police officer’s duties
crossing over would be that the police officers arrest offenders and must detain them as prisoners
until they are transferred to a holding facility or a detention facility. While corrections officers,
among other things, are responsible for ensuring that prisoners do not violate additional laws
while they are detained.

Law enforcement is a highly criminogenic profession. There are several reasons for this,
and both branches (police and corrections) are subject to temptations that can lead to unethical
and illegal behavior.
There are many different reasons behind the corruption of law enforcement officers. The
very fact that law enforcement officers deal with criminals on a daily basis offers a myriad of
temptations. To further compound the problem, officers are often unsupervised (Rosoff, Pontell
& Tillman, 2002, p. 366). The structural opportunity of police work not only creates the
opportunity for corruption, but often makes it difficult to uncover. Crimes by law enforcement
are rarely reported by other law enforcement officers; most officers would rather to invoke a
code of silence. This code of silence is often referred to the “Blue Wall of Silence.” Those
officers who do not invoke this code of silence are often ridiculed for the remainder of their
professional career (Rosoff, Pontell & Tillman, 2002, p. 366-367).
Taking a bribe or a payoff, beating someone, or stealing suddenly becomes more
appealing when one realizes that, as a law enforcement officer, there is little to no chance of
being caught. This is not to say that all law enforcement officers succumb to corruption.
However, the mechanisms are in place for the law enforcement profession to be considered
highly criminogenic. World-wide, law enforcement agencies face the dilemma of how to combat
officer corruption and abuse.

Section 2
Literature Review.
Organize the works in a logical manner and summarize their content. All literary works
(25 articles) should be discussed and cited. (75 points).
Academic (15 Articles)
1) “Corruption.”
INTERPOL Expert Group on Corruption (IGEC).
Retrieved on September 02, 2007 from the World Wide Web at:
http://www.INTERPOL.int/Public/Corruption/IGEC/Default.asp and
INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organization. It was founded in 1923
and currently has 186 member countries. The function of INTERPOL is to facilitate cross-border
police co-operation, as well as to support and assist all organizations, authorities and
services whose mission is to prevent or combat international criminal activity. INTERPOL aims
to facilitate international police co-operation even where diplomatic relations do not exist
between particular countries. The constitution of INTERPOL, in accordance with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, prohibits any intervention or activities of a political, military,
religious or racial character (INTERPOL, 2007, http://www.interpol.int).
INTERPOL defines corruption as “any course of action or failure to act by individuals or
organizations, public or private, in violation of law or trust for profit or gain” (INTERPOL,
2007, http://www.interrpol.int). The INTERPOL Expert Group on Corruption (IGEC) has taken
a firm stance against corruption. The INTERPOL website notes that the IGEC has produced the
following devices to combat corruption:
• A “Declaration of Intent” for law enforcement that encompasses a “Code of Ethics”
and a “Code of Conduct,” which was subsequently adopted by the INTERPOL
General Assembly (INTERPOL, 2007, http://www.interpol.int);
• A draft set of “Global Standards to Combat Corruption in Police Forces/Services,”
which provides law enforcement with a framework to improve their resistance to
corruption. These standards are two-fold in their intent in that they ensure: 1) That
police forces in INTERPOL member countries exhibit high standards of honesty,
integrity and ethical behavior in the performance of their police functions, and 2) To
promote and strengthen the development of INTERPOL member countries of
measures needed to prevent, detect, punish, and eradicate corruption in police forces
within its national boundaries and to bring to justice police officers and other
employees of the police forces who are corrupt (IINTERPOL, 2007,
http://www.interpol.int); and
• A collation of a “Library of Best Practice,” which is designed to aid investigators in
corruption cases. This library covers anti-corruption strategies and structures and their
potential weaknesses, operatives and techniques in undercover investigations, witness

protection, corruption legislation, prevention, training and education (INTERPOL,
2007, http://www.interpol.int).
2) “Codes.”
INTERPOL Expert Group on Corruption (IEGC).
http://www.INTERPOL.int/Public/Public/Corruption/IGEC/Codes/Default.asp.
INTERPOL has a code of conduct for law enforcement officers. Key principles are that the
primary duties of law enforcement officers are the protection of life and property, the
preservation of public peace, and the prevention and detection of criminal offenses. Fulfill these
duties they are granted extraordinary powers. Because of this, citizens have the right to expect
the highest standards of conduct from them. Officers should have the discretion whether or not
to exercise these powers and should not be restricted from this discretion. However, the
parameters of conduct within which that discretion should be exercised must be defined. This
applies to all law enforcement officers, regardless of rank, while either on-duty or off-duty.
These standards should be applied in a reasonable and objective manner (INTERPOL, 2005,
http://www.interpol.int).
The following are principles of the code of conduct for law enforcement officers (note: these
are abridged, touching on the primary points of each topic):
1) Honesty and integrity. Officers should be open and truthful in their dealings, discharging
their duties with integrity (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int);
2) Fairness and tolerance. Officers have a responsibility to act with fairness and impartiality
in their dealing with both citizens and colleagues. They should treat everyone with
courtesy and respect and avoid favoritism of any individual or group, and all forms of
victimization or discrimination (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int);
3) Use of force and abuse of authority. Officers must never knowingly use more force than
is reasonable, nor should they abuse their authority INTERPOL, 2005,
http://www.interpol.int);
4) Performance of duties. Officers should be conscientious and diligent in the performance
of their duties. They should sustain and improve their professional knowledge and
competence (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int);
5) Lawful orders. Officers must obey all lawful orders and abide by the regulations of their
organization. Officers should support their colleagues in the execution of their lawful
duties, opposing any improper behavior and reporting it where appropriate (INTERPOL,
2005, http://www.interpol.int);
6) Confidentiality. Information which comes into the possession of a law enforcement
agency should be treated as confidential. This information should not be used for

personal benefit, nor should it be divulged to other parties except in the proper course of
law enforcement duty (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int);
7) Impairment. Officers must not be impaired due to drug or alcohol use while on duty
(INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int);
8) Appearance. Unless on duties which dictate otherwise, officers should always be smart,
clean and tidy while on duty in uniform or plain clothes (INTERPOL, 2005,
9) General conduct. Whether on-duty or off-duty, officers should not behave in ways that
are likely to bring discredit upon their organization or the profession. This applies to
former law enforcement officers as well (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int); and
10) Co-operation and partnership. Law enforcement officers should co-operate and assist
others lawfully mandated to prevent and detect crime within the same jurisdiction
(INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int).
The “Code of Ethics for Law Enforcement Officers” as mandated by INTERPOL:
“I hold my law enforcement powers on behalf of the people. Through my professional and
personal example, I shall demonstrate that I respect them and I shall strive to realize their
high expectations of me. I am sworn to protect them and I shall enforce their laws in good
faith, fairly, with courage and integrity, to the best of my ability. In so doing, I shall build
their trust and confidence in the law. I shall never betray them by willfully abusing my
powers, authority or knowledge. To these ends, I serve the people.” (INTERPOL, 2005,
3) “Global standards to combat corruption in police forces/services.”
INTERPOL
Retrieved from the World Wide Web on September 02, 2007 at:
http://www.interpol.int/Public/Corruption/Standard/Default.asp.
This paper is divided into five articles, as follows: 1) Objectives, 2) Definitions, 3)
Principles, 4) Measures and 5) Review. The purpose of this paper is to define corruption,
develop objectives, principles and measures to combat corruption and to provide for an ongoing
review process.
The objectives are to ensure that police forces have high standards of honesty, integrity and
ethical behavior in connection with the performance of their police functions. Further objectives
are to promote and strengthen the development of measures needed to prevent, detect, punish and
eradicate corruption in the police forces and to bring to justice police officers and other
employees of police forces who are corrupt (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int).

INTERPOL defines corruption as the following (note: these are abridged, touching on the
primary points of each topic):
a) Solicitation or acceptance, either directly or indirectly, by a police officer or other
employee of a police force for any money, article of value, gift, favor, promise, reward or
advantage. This is in return for any act or omission already done or omitted or to be done
or omitted in the future in or in connection with the performance of any function of or
connected with policing (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int);
b) Offering or granting, whether directly or indirectly, to a police officer or other employee
of a police force of any money, article of value, gift, favor, promise, reward or advantage.
This is in return for any act or omission already done or omitted or to be done or omitted
in the future in or in connection with the performance of any function of or connected
with policing (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int);
c) Any act or omission in the discharge of duties by a police officer or other employee of a
police force which may improperly expose any person to a charge or conviction for a
criminal offence or may improperly assist in a person not being charged with or being
acquitted of a criminal offence (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int);
d) The unauthorized dissemination of confidential or restricted police information whether
for reward or otherwise (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int);
e) Any act or omission in the discharge of duties by a police officer or other member of a
police force for the purpose of obtaining any money, article of value, gift, favor, promise,
reward or advantage (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int);
f) Any act or omission which constitutes corruption under the law of the Member State
(INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int); and
g) Participation in any manner to do or omit to do any act referred to in the preceding
provisions of this Article (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int).
There are three Principles that INTERPOL embraces. They are listed as follows:
a) To make corruption within police forces/services a high-risk crime (INTERPOL, 2005,
b) To promote and maintain a high standard of honesty, integrity and ethical behavior within
the police forces/services of each Member (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int);
and
c) To foster the recruitment and training as police officers of persons of high levels of
integrity, honesty, ethical standards and expertise (INTERPOL, 2005,

Article 4 of INTERPOL’s “Global standards to combat corruption in police forces/services”
lists twenty-six separate “Measures” that each Member of the Organization is to commit to.
These measures are all in place to deter corruption and include mechanisms for training,
implementation, analysis, and review. Article 5 calls for continued review and reporting to the
General Assembly (INTERPOL, 2005, http://www.interpol.int).
4) “Blinded by the Lights and Seduced by the Sirens’ Song.”
Ruiz, Jim and Bono, Christine.
Criminal Justice Ethics. New York: Winter 2004, Vol. 23, Iss. 1; pg. 65.
In accepting gratuities, police officers need to understand that they may become dependent
on this cumulative financial factor and that it could lead to unethical exchange relationships.
One example noted was that a worker at a restaurant or store could mislabel a product and charge
far less for it than the listed price. While this may seem trivial, it is actually a case of theft. In
comparing gratuities to drugs and alcohol, the authors note that not everyone who uses these
becomes addictive, nor do they become abusive. However, some police officers who accept
gratuities do become corrupted and move on to a greater level of corruption. When corruption
does occur, it is often enabled by making excuses, rationalizing or denying the existence of a
problem (Ruiz & Bono, 2004, p. 65).
5) “Ethical Climate Theory, Whistle-blowing, and the Code of Silence in Police Agencies in the
State of Georgia.”
Rothwell, Gary R. & Bladwin, J. Norman.
Journal of Business Ethics. (2007).
Authors Rothwell and Baldwin conducted a random survey of 300 Georgia, POST certified
police officers. (Under Georgia State law, no person has the power of arrest without being POST
certified). The survey measured the willingness of police officers in the State of Georgia to blow
the whistle, as well as the frequency of blowing the whistle. The survey consisted of thirty-six
questions that were rated from 1 to 5, with one being completely false and 5 being completely
true (Rothwell & Bladwin, 2007, pp. 347-353). The data was arranged into tables for analysis
and comparison.
Surprisingly, the data revealed that police are generally more inclined to blow the whistle
that are civilian employees. Put another way, police officers in the State of Georgia are less
likely to maintain a code of silence than are civilian employees (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007, pp.
341). Furthermore, this study revealed that supervisory status is the most consistent predictor of
whistle-blowing intentions and behavior in Georgia (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007, p. 353)
Rothwell and Baldwin credit training and education for reasons why police officers in the State
of Georgia are more like to blow the whistle. They note that highly trained and educated people
are less expendable, more capable of finding other employment and have an enhanced capacity
to recognize various forms of wrongdoing (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007, pp. 355-356).

6) “Race and Perceptions of Police Misconduct.”
Weitzer, Ronald & Tuch, Steven A.
Social Problems. Aug. 2004. Vol. 51, Iss. 3; pg. 305.
The focus of this article is the perceptions of police misconduct in the United States and the
factors that influence these perceptions. The research for this paper was done by utilizing data
from a large, nationally representative survey of whites, black and Hispanics. The research
focused on four types of police misconduct: 1) verbal abuse, 2) excessive force, 3) unwarranted
stops and 4) corruption. While various factors, including personal and vicarious experiences,
exposure to media coverage of police behavior and neighborhood conditions contributes to
attitudes towards the police, race remains one of the strongest predictors (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004,
ProQuest—no page numbers).
The “Group-Position” thesis states that blacks and whites perceive police and the criminal
justice system in starkly different terms. Blacks are much more likely than whites to express
dissatisfaction with the police. They tend to view the police as a “visible sign of majority
domination.” To date, extensive research has not been conducted on the Hispanic position;
Hispanics are generally lumped with blacks and labeled “minorities,” and are generally viewed
as having similar views as blacks. Whites, on the other hand, are generally favorable towards the
police and tend to favor aggressive law enforcement. Whites are also often skeptical of
criticisms of the police (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004, ProQuest—no page numbers).
The research findings are quite interesting. Blacks are the most likely group to accuse the
police of misconduct; while whites are the least likely group, and Hispanics fall somewhere in
between. Nearly half of the blacks surveyed believe that police often engage in excessive force
and corruption in their city. Blacks and Hispanics are also more likely than whites to take the
extreme view that police misconducts occurs “very often.” While most whites take the “rotten
apple” theory (that there are a few rotten apples causing problems), most blacks and Hispanics
take the “rotten barrel” theory (that the entire police force is rotten). When reporting personal
and vicarious experiences, both blacks and Hispanics are more likely to report repeated abuse,
furthering the disparity not only in occurrences of abuse, but frequency as well (Weitzer & Tuch,
2004, ProQuest—no page numbers).
7) “Senior Police Managers’ Views on Integrity Testing, and Drug and Alcohol Testing.”
Prenzler, Tim.
Policing. Bradford: 2006. Vol. 29, Iss. 3; pg. 394.
This article is based on a questionnaire-based survey that was sent to 114 senior police
managers, most of whom were located in Australia. Responses from this survey revealed that
these police managers supported targeted testing for serious cases of suspected corruption.
While views on less serious cases varied widely, there was strong support for drug and alcohol
testing. This survey indicates a strong belief in testing systems to reveal misconduct and allow
action to be taken that will maximize the integrity of the police organization (Prenzler, 2006,
ProQuest—no page numbers).

Police corruption is a worldwide problem. There is an aggressive search for effective
measures to simultaneously detect existing corruption and to prevent future corruption. It needs
to be considered that integrity testing raises privacy, deception, entrapment and provocation
issues. It is a delicate balancing act to discover existing misconduct without testing
“corruptibility” and interfering with the legal rights of those being investigated.
Australian, English, Canadian and New Zealand courts have rejected the substantive common
law defense of entrapment in drug cases, noting that “an offender does not escape liability
merely because he was induced to commit the offence by another, whether the other be a friend,
a business associate member or a member of a police force.” (Prenzer, 2006, ProQuest—no page
numbers).
8) “Shocking the Conscience: Beyond the Routine Illegality of Police Searches.”
Fagan, Jeffrey
Criminology & Public Policy; Jul 2004; 3, 3; Criminal Justice Periodicals.
There is startling evidence, based on direct observation, that nearly one in three police
searches in an average American city violated the Fourth Amendment standards of search and
seizure; these stops fall outside the Constitutional boundaries of “reasonable suspicion.”
Furthermore, these may not just be Constitutional violations, but they may be criminal acts
(Fagan, 2004, pp. 309-310).
Interestingly, these violations rarely come to the attention of the courts. In one study, 70 of
the 86 searches did not result in arrest, citation or charges. When the searches were deemed
unconstitutional, 31 out of 34 were unknown to the courts. Even when these searches are
disclosed to the courts they are easily concealed. Officers would often resort to the tactic of
“testilying” by giving false testimony (Fagan, 2004, p. 310).
9) “The Measurement of Police Integrity.”
Klockars, Carl B., Ivkovich, Sanja Kutnjak, Harver, William E. and Haberfeld, Maria R.
National Institute of Justice Research in Brief. U.S. Department of Justice. May 2000.
Researchers asked police officers in 30 different police agencies across the United States for
their opinions regarding hypothetical cases of misconduct. They were presented with 11
hypothetical cases, covering a broad range of corruption. The survey measured how officers felt
about corruption, how likely they were to report it and how likely they were to support
punishment. The ability to measure integrity in this manner makes it especially important for
police administrators in influencing and cultivating environments of integrity. The target
audience for this report is: criminal justice researchers and policymakers, legislators, police
administrators, police officers and educators (Klockars et al., 2000, pp. 1-2).
There were six key findings from this research:
1. Of the 11 hypothetical cases, officers considered some types of misconduct to be
significantly less serious than others;

2. The more serious the behavior, the more inclined they were to report a colleague
and the more severe they felt the discipline should be;
3. The continuity among various officers regarding various offenses was very
consistent;
4. The majority of officers indicated that they would not report an officer who
committed a less serious misconduct;
5. The majority of officers indicated that they would report more serious
misconduct, including: stealing, accepting bribes and kickbacks and excessive
force; and
6. There were substantial differences in the environment of integrity between the 30
agencies sampled.
10) “Addressing Police Misconduct.”
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Rights Division. Coordination and Review Section. October 30, 2000.
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/Publs/polmis.htm.
This article covers how the United States Department of Justice addresses police
misconduct. Federal laws are in place to address police misconduct that includes both criminal
and civil statutes. These laws apply to the actions of State, county, and local officers, including
those who work in prisons and jails. There are also several laws that apply to Federal law
enforcement officers. These laws protect all persons in the United States, both citizens and non-citizens
(US Department of Justice, 2000, p. 1).
Criminal and civil cases are usually handled separately, even when they concern the same
incident. In a criminal case, the US Department of Justice brings the case against the accused
officer; whereas in a civil case, the US Department of Justice brings the case against a
governmental authority or law enforcement agency. Criminal cases require proof “beyond a
reasonable doubt;” whereas in civil cases proof is only needed to satisfy a “preponderance of
evidence.” The aim of a criminal case is to punish the offender; while the aim of a civil case is
to correct the policies and practices that foster misconduct and in some cases to provide
individual relief to the victim(s) (US Department of Justice, 2000, p. 1).
18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 makes it a crime for persons acting under color of law “willfully to
deprive or conspire to deprive another person of any right protected by the Constitution or law of
the United States.” (US Department of Justice, 2000, p. 2). There are various remedies under
these laws, including fines and/or imprisonment. There is no private right of action under these
laws—you cannot file a lawsuit on your own (US Department of Justice, 2000, p. 2).
42 U.S.C. § 14141 is known as the “Police Misconduct Provision.” This law makes it
unlawful for State or local law enforcement officers to engage in a “pattern or practice of
conduct that deprives persons of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States.” (US Department of Justice, 2000, p. 2). While the US Department of Justice does not
investigate isolated incidents, they do investigate unlawful policies and “patterns of practice.”

These can include, but are not limited to: excessive force, discriminatory harassment, false
arrest, coercive sexual conduct, and unlawful stops, searches and arrests. The US Justice
Department does not have to show that discrimination has occurred in order to prove a pattern or
practice of misconduct. The remedy under this law is for injunctive relief. This law does not
provide for individual monetary relief, nor is there is right of action under this law (US
Department of Justice, 2000, p. 2).
42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c) are known as the “OJP Statute.” In
conjunction with the Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 these legal mechanisms prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex and religion by law enforcement
agencies that receive financial assistance from the US Department of Justice. Prohibited acts, as
either individual instances or as patterns include: treating a person differently because of their
race, color, national origin, sex or religion, harassment, use of racial slurs, unjustified arrests,
discriminatory traffic stops, coercive sexual conduct, retaliation for filing a complaint with the
US Department of Justice, use of excessive force, or refusal by the agency to respond to
complaints alleging discriminatory treatment by its officers (US Department of Justice, 2000, pp.
2-3). Remedies under this law include changes in policies and procedures with the offending
agency and individual remedial relief with the victim(s). Furthermore, a private right of action is
allowed in Federal Court only after first exhausting administrative remedies (US Department of
Justice, 2000, p. 3).
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities on the basis of the
disability (See 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. and 29 U.S.C. § 794). These laws protect all people
with disabilities in the United States. These laws prohibit discriminatory treatment, including
misconduct. Remedies under law include individual relief as well as changes in the policies and
procedures of the law enforcement agency. Furthermore the victim has a private right to action
(US Department of Justice, 2000, pp. 3-4).
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO)
investigate complaints against law enforcement agencies (including Federal agencies).
Complaints may be filed at:
Criminal Enforcement:
Criminal Section – PHB
Civil Rights Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20530
Civil Enforcement:
Coordination and Review Section – NWB

The Coordination and Review Section can be reached via telephone (voice and TDD) at:
(888) 848-5306.
Disability Enforcement:
Disability Rights Section – NYA
The Disability Rights Section can be reached via telephone (voice and TDD) at:
(800) 514-0301 (voice) and (800) 514-0383 (TDD).
(US Department of Justice, 2000, pp. 4-5).
11) “Early Warning Systems: Responding to the Problem Police Officer.”
National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice
This study was conducted by Samuel Walker, Ph.D., Professor, University of Nebraska at
Omaha; Geoffrey P. Alpert, Ph.D., Washington State University; and Dennis J. Kenney,
Ph.D., Rutgers University. Support for the study was provided by NIJ grant number
98-CX-0002 through a transfer of funds from the Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services.
Generally speaking, ten percent of the police officers in any given police department are
responsible for 90 percent of the problems. Many of these problems involve citizen complaints.
Many police agencies are now adopting “early warning systems” to help identify officers who
might become problematic or abusive. While the data is still somewhat inconclusive due to a
variety of factors, early warning systems do seem to dramatically reduce citizen complaints
(Walker et al., 2001, p. 1).
Early warning systems have three components. These are: 1) Selecting officers for the
program. Performance indicators that generally help identify problematic police officers include:
citizen complaints, firearm-discharge and use-of-force reports, civil litigation, resisting-arrest
incidents, high-speed pursuits and vehicular damage; 2) Intervening with the officer. The
primary goal of early warning systems is to change the behavior of those officers who have been
identified as having problematic performance records. An integral part of the early warning
system is training, with the aim of improving officer performance; and 3) Monitoring the
officer’s subsequent performance. Different departments have different systems in place for
monitoring an officer’s subsequent performance. Some departments are informal; whereas
others have adopted formal monitoring programs (Walker et al., 2001, p. 2).
The study in this article included three police departments: Miami-Dade, New Orleans and
Minneapolis. The data should be viewed with caution as there are a number of variables that
could contribute to a distortion. These include other programs for increased accountability,
changes and variances in data reporting, the lack of a counter-program that reports the positive
police officer performance as well as other environmental variables. Within one year of

implementing an early warning system, New Orleans had a drop in citizen complaints of 62
percent, while Minneapolis citizen complaints dropped 67 percent. In the Miami-Dade Police
Department, only four percent of those flagged by the early warning system had zero use-of-force
reports prior to intervention. This number increased to 50 percent following intervention
(Walker et al., 2001, pp. 2-6)
There has been some concern about early warning systems being used by plaintiffs against
the police departments. However, the opposite is most likely to be the case in that the early
warning systems provide a shield of due diligence in identifying aberrant officers and correcting
their behavior. The three police departments in the report all reported significant reductions in
civilian complaints and use-of-force incidents. It must be noted that the early warning systems
were part of expanded efforts to raise accountability. The early warning systems are most likely
reinforced by other policies and procedures that enforce discipline and accountability (Walker et
al., 2001, p 7).
12) “Community Policing vs. Policing the Community”
John M. Crew
California Association of Human Relations Organizations. February / March 1999.
There exist four barriers that prevent community policing as a law enforcement crime
fighting strategy (Crew, 2007, http://www.charo.org/html/olicingthecomm.html). To better
understand the dynamics it can be helpful to view the interaction between police and
communities as a relationship. Relationships are built upon trust, openness, accountability and
equity (Crew, 2007, http://www.charo.org/html/olicingthecomm.html). Yet some, if not all, of
these elements are missing when communities and police trying to work together.
The first barrier is that “There remains a significant mistrust of law enforcement in many
communities—particularly in communities of color disproportionately affected by police
misconduct (Crew, 2007, http://www.charo.org/html/olicingthecomm.html).” Trying to establish
a relationship between two groups that lack trust is an arduous task at best. There are many
historical and contemporary reasons why certain communities mistrust the police. Until these
issues are confronted and the issue of mistrust is addressed these community policing
partnerships will remain elusive (Crew, 2007, http://www.charo.org/html/olicingthecomm.html).
The second barrier is that “Police institutions remain, in many respects, closed and secretive
institutions, overly protective of their image and reluctant to share negative information with
‘outsiders’ (Crew, 2007, http://www.charo.org/html/olicingthecomm.html).” Since many
agencies are not fully committed to rooting out the “code of silence,” and many police agencies
react to controversies with defensiveness and secrecy, the public will react to efforts of
community policing with skepticism and cynicism. The “code of silence,” also known as the
“blue wall of silence” sends the message that protecting fellow officers from punishment for
malfeasances and crimes they have committed is more important than their obligation to the
public (Crew, 2007, http://www.charo.org/html/olicingthecomm.html).

The third barrier is that ‘There remains significant police resistance to the establishment of
independent, civilian review mechanisms designed to provide direct accountability to the public
(Crew, 2007, http://www.charo.org/html/olicingthecomm.html).” While fourteen civilian
review mechanisms already exist in California and 75% of the 50 largest cities in the United
States have some form of civilian oversight in place, the police are recalcitrant towards any
civilian oversight (Crew, 2007, http://www.charo.org/html/olicingthecomm.html). The attitude
is that if something occurs that they should be trusted to complete their own investigation
without civilian oversight. To appease the community, police will often allow civilian oversight
committees to review their findings, but not actually make determinations. In effect, the
community does not have a direct review of police conduct, they merely have a review of police
review of police conduct (Crew, 2007, http://www.charo.org/html/olicingthecomm.html). This
situation further weakens the partnership between the community and the police.
The fourth barrier is that “True power-sharing is a foreign concept to many police
commanders and represents a threat to various institutional prerogatives currently protected from
outside influences (Crew, 2007, http://www.charo.org/html/olicingthecomm.html).” John M.
Crew points out that “A true community policing partnership would involve full exploration of
all possible options with the community and joint decision-making about priorities, deployment
and tactics (Crew, 2007, http://www.charo.org/html/olicingthecomm.html).” Another common
problem is that police will only submit limited options to a community. The community often
endorses these options, not aware that other options were available. When things do not work as
planned, the police claim that the community is as much to blame as they endorsed the options.
To have a successful relationship between communities and police there must be trust, openness,
accountability (Crew, 2007, http://www.charo.org/html/olicingthecomm.html), communication
and an ongoing effort to work together.
13) “United States of America, Ill-treatment of inmates in Maricopa County Jails, Arizona.”
Amnesty International
August 1997, AI Index: AMR51/51/97
National and International attention has been focused on the Maricopa County Jails and
Sheriff Joe Arpaio. While many of his methods are considered controversial, Amnesty
International as well as the US Justice Department have declared some of these methods to be
dangerous; both to inmates and staff (Amnesty International, 1997, p. 1).
In June of 1997, Amnesty International launched its own investigation of the Maricopa
County Jail system in Arizona; which is one of the largest jail systems in the United States. The
visit was prompted by the death of inmate Scott Norberg in the Mason Street Jail. Scott Norberg
died in the restraint chair at the Mason Street Jail (Amnesty International, 1997, p. 1).
The Maricopa County Jails have been investigated by the US Justice Department. In March,
1996, the US Justice Department condemned the conditions, going as far as to declare them
unconstitutional in respect to “the excessive use of force by detention officers against inmates,”
and “deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious medical needs.” (Amnesty International, 1997, p.
1).

Amnesty International’s report focused on five areas: 1) allegations of excessive force, 2)
the restraint chair, 3) other observations on facilities in the jails, 4) “In-Tents,” and 5) chain
gangs. Amnesty International, upon conclusion of its investigation, issued thirteen
recommendations to the authorities. These standards included improving conditions to meet
international standards (Amnesty International, 1997, pp. 1-12).
Allegations of excessive force are prevalent in the Maricopa County Jails. Some specific
examples include the death of Scott Norberg while in the restraint chair. Mr. Norberg was
tackled by fourteen detention officers and placed in a restraint chair with a towel on his face,
causing him to die of asphyxiation (Amnesty International, 1997, pp. 1-3). Another is the
mistreatment of Richard Post, a paraplegic who was denied the use of a catheter and then put in a
restraint chair in such a manner as to cause significant loss of his upper body mobility as well as
other medical problems. Mr. Post was also threatened with a stun gun while restrained in the
restraint chair (Amnesty International, 1997, p. 2). Other cases included guards beating inmates.
These beatings included guards smashing faces into concrete walls, breaking arms, breaking
teeth, kicking inmates, prolonged periods of restraint in the restraint chair and repeatedly
stunning inmates with stun guns; including stunning inmates who are already restrained. Stun
guns have also inappropriately used to rouse inmates from sleep (Amnesty International,
1997, p. 4).
Several cases involve the abusive use of stun guns. Stun guns are “designed to incapacitate
without injury;” however, there has been little independent medical research on the effect of their
use. Stun guns can cause high levels of pain and death. Stun weapons have been banned for
law enforcement and correction use in: Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, Spain, Swede, the United Kingdom, as well
as other countries. Some US States have banned stun weapons, including: New York, Illinois,
New Jersey and Washington, D.C.
The four-point restraint chairs are being used inappropriately as well. They are being used
as a front-line method of control, rather than as a last resort. They are also used as a punitive
measure; which violates both US and international standards. Furthermore, they are to be used
only when trained medical personnel are on staff, and should under no circumstances be used for
more than eight hours. The Maricopa County Jails do not adhere to either of these guidelines
(Amnesty International, 1997, pp. 6-7).
Other observations on facilities in the jails included the treatment of juveniles in jail.
International standards place a special obligation on states to ensure that children in confinement
are treated humanely with the object of rehabilitation, and it is not appropriate or humane to
house children in solitary confinement or deny them access to programs or recreation for
extended periods. Other concerns are that male guards can enter female inmate areas
unaccompanied by female staff. This is a violation of international standards (Amnesty
International, 1997, pp. 7-8).
“In Tents” is a tent facility that houses approximately 800 male and 214 female prisoners. It
has been declared a health hazard due to: inadequate air circulation, dust, sanitation and rodents.
Furthermore, it is dangerous due to security concerns. The tents are difficult to monitor due to

their construction, they can hide potentially dangerous items and there is a lack of segregation
between violent and non-violent criminals. In some cases, guards do not respond to inmate calls
for help from within the tents (Amnesty International, 1997, pp. 8-9).
Chain gangs are an option for prisoners who do not wish to be locked down for 23 hours per
day. However, Amnesty International does not recognize any legitimate penological purpose
other than punishment, which is a violation of both US and international standards. Furthermore,
the Maricopa County Jail plan to introduce juveniles to chain gangs is inconsistent with respect
for their dignity and the purpose of rehabilitation. The juvenile chain gangs is also a violation of
US and international standards (Amnesty International, 1997, p. 11).
The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 7) and the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment specify that “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading
treatment or punishment” (United Nations, 1976,
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm) and (United Nations, 1984 & 1987,
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm). Amnesty International points out that the
allegations of abuse in the Maricopa County Jails is a violation of international human rights
standards and treaties (Amnesty International, 1997, p. 4). The thirteen recommendations that
Amnesty International presented to the authorities would help ensure compliance to international
standards.
14) “Guarding the Guardians: Police Officer Trust in Internal Affairs”
Journal of California Law Enforcement; 2000.
Swim, David, Ph.D. & Smith, Val, Ph.D.
This article starts out with a quote from James Madison in 1829: “The essence of
Government is power; and power, lodged as it must be in human hands, will ever be liable to
abuse.” The relevance is whether or not the public can trust law enforcement with the power that
has been granted to them. This raises several questions: Can the public trust law enforcement to
police itself? Does law enforcement trust their own internal mechanism of self-policing? Can
the public have confidence in law enforcement’s ability to police themselves? And, does a “code
of silence” exist, and if so, why? (Swim & Smith, 2000, 1).
Survey research indicates that many police officers feel that Internal Affairs investigations
are out to get them and that they do not trust the internal affairs process. This mistrust often
triggers the “code of silence.” Specifically, the nature of the complaint, the identity of the
complainant, internal politics, external politics, the attitude and actions of the Internal Affairs
investigators, the involvement of police administrators, potential discipline, potential liability,
the validity of the complaint, the magnitude of the offense, the officer’s prior history and
relationship with the administration all play into an officer mistrusting Internal Affairs (Swim &
Smith, 2000, pp. 1-2).
Research indicates that Internal Affairs are often lacking in key areas that will create
mistrust and influence an officer to stonewall. These areas often include: timeliness, lack of
protocols, lack of time limits and lack of effective discipline (Swim & Smith, 2000, p. 6). Until

these issues are resolved it is likely that many, if not most, police officers will distrust the
Internal Affairs process; thereby eroding the public confidence in law enforcement.
15) “ The Use of Citizen Surveys as a Tool for Police Reform.”
Robert C. Davis
Vera Institute of Justice, Inc.
While people’s feelings about the police are affected by direct experience, their feelings are
more strongly influenced by culturally transmitted norms and beliefs. A survey was taken in
Jackson Heights, New York to assess the public’s views of the police. The finds indicated that
people who belonged to ethnic communities that experienced a low sense of political
empowerment were less likely than other to believe that the police were effective and more
likely to believe that the police engaged in misconduct. Similarly, this pattern carried over to
behavior. People from communities with low political empowerment were less likely to contact
the police to report crimes, discuss their concerns or to simply stop and talk to a police officer
(Davis, 2000, pp. 2-3).
While many interesting facts were presented in this paper, the main focus of the paper is the
use of surveys as a way of testing hypothesis about the interaction between police and citizens.
This paper argues that the survey can provide an accurate snapshot of police relations within the
community. Not only can surveys gauge police misconduct, but they can also assess what is
right about the relationship between the police and the community, they can measure citizen
satisfaction and they can be used to make mid-stream adjustments when reforms are
implemented (Davis, 2000, p. 11).

Newspaper & Trade Journals (10 Articles).
1) “Bad Thai Cops to Endure Kitty Shame.”
Associated Press.
Retrieved on August 06, 2007 from the World Wide Web at:
http://apnews.excite.com/article/20070806/D8QRGHE80.html.
“Hello Kitty” is a Japanese cartoon character that is popular with young girls and children
the world over. Hello Kitty is about as far from masculine as one could imagine. The “Hello
Kitty” website is: http://www.sanrio.com/ (Sanrio.com, 2007, http://www.sanrio.com).
The Police Colonel in Bangkok, Thailand has decided to punish police officers who are
caught littering, parking in prohibited areas, arriving late, as well as various other misdemeanors.
His method of punishment is to assign these officers to office jobs for the day and make them
wear “Hello Kitty” armbands all day. The officers will not wear the armbands in public.
Colonel Pongpat Chayaphan issued a statement saying “Police caught breaking the law will be
subject to the same fines and penalties as any other members of the public.” He went on to say
“We want to make sure that we do not condone small offenses.” His reasoning is that by
cracking down on petty crimes will lead to fewer cases of more serious offenses including abuse
of power and mistreatment of the public by police officers (Associated Press, 2007,
http://apnews.excite.com).
It would seem that this is a strong deterrent to petty crime by police officers. The cause
can very well be construed to be machismo. Being humiliated among one’s peers by having to
wear something so very un-macho is a good way to head off a problem. This is somewhat like
the school teacher who tires of students throwing baskets into the trash can and decides to
penalize those who make a basket by having an hour detention and those who miss by having a
half hour detention. Either way the outcome is not macho, especially for the one who scores the
basket. Suddenly, there is an absence of aspiring wastepaper basketball payers in the classroom.
2) “LAPD Computer Targets Rogue Cops.”
Associated Press.
http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2005/07/68294.
Los Angeles is a city that has been plagued by police problems. In an effort to head off
officer misconduct the Los Angeles Police Department has chosen to integrate a high-tech
computer system at a cost of $35 million. The installation of this computer system is in response
to a federal oversight program that was ordered by the U.S. Justice Department because of
numerous allegations of abuse in the 1990s, notably the Rodney King videotaped beating
(Associated Press, 2005, www.wired.com).
The computer system works by mining data from complaints, pursuits, lawsuits, uses of
force and other records and data. Often this data is spread throughout the police force. The
benefit of the computer is that it allows for a centralized access point. The data is then processed

through algorithms and presented in a statistical report that highlights irregular behavior.
Supervisors can then investigate these abnormalities to see if any intervention is required
(Associated Press, 2005, www.wired.com).
Proponents feel that this system facilitates the Los Angeles Police Department’s ability
and willingness to police themselves. Other police departments who have experienced similar
troubles including New Orleans Police Department and Miami-Dade Police Department have
implemented similar computerized tracking systems. According to the US Justice Department,
the New Orleans Police Department has since recorded a drop in citizen complaints and the
Miami-Dade Police Department has seen a decrease in use of force reports. It should also be
noted that the computer system can single out officers who deserve commendations for doing
exemplary work (Associated Press, 2005, www.wired.com).
Opponents feel that the computer system will single out anyone who is not a “middle of
the pack” officer, which will cause officers to be hesitant in critical moments thereby
jeopardizing their well-being. Others feel that nothing will end police abuse and corruption, and
that it is an intrinsic part of police work and humanity. There is also the argument that number
crunching cannot predict human behavior (Associated Press, 2005, www.wired.com).
3) “Drugs, Police & the Law.”
Drug Policy Alliance.
http://www.drugpolicy.org/law/police/.
The nation’s war on drugs is contributing to the corruption and abuse of police officers.
Many police officers are tempted by the financial opportunities of drug dealing, while other
police officers are demoralized by the drug trafficking problem coupled with the public’s
indifference to police efforts to combat drug trafficking (Drug Policy Alliance, 2007,
www.drugpolicy.org). This is leading to a dangerous situation where many officers in America’s
police forces are turning to crime.
The General Accounting Office released a report in 1998 noting that on-duty police
officers who are engaged in drug-related corruption often engage in serious criminal activities.
These criminal activities include:
1) Conducting unconstitutional searches and seizures;
2) Stealing money and/or drugs from drug dealers;
3) Selling stolen drugs;
4) Protecting drug operations;
5) Providing false testimony; and
6) Submitting false crime reports.
The study goes on to report that “approximately half of all police officers convicted as a result of
FBI-led corruption cases between 1993 and 1997 were convicted for drug-related offenses…”
Furthermore, every federal law enforcement agency with significant drug enforcement
responsibilities has had an agent implicated (Drug Police Alliance, 2007, www.drugpolicy.org).

The ‘Rampart’ scandal in California was one of America’s worst drug-related police
corruption cases. It was exposed when an officer stealing eight pounds of cocaine from a police
evidence locker was caught and cooperated with authorities in exposing other officers. As a
result of the ‘Rampart’ scandal, more than one hundred convictions have been overturned (Drug
Policy Alliance, 2007, www.drugpolicy.org).
Finally, this article discusses the way that minorities (especially African-Americans and
Latinos) are disproportionately prosecuted. In King County, Washington there is a class action
lawsuit (Washington v. Varner) which alleges that Seattle police are targeting African-American
and Latino communities for drug usage, despite evidence that Caucasians use and sell drugs at
similar rates (Drug Policy Alliance, 2007, www.drugpolicy.org).
4) “4th Cop in Probe Sentenced: A Former Hollywood Police Officer was Sentenced to 9 Years
in Prison Friday for His Role in a Mob-Style Federal Drug Sting.”
Moskovitz, Diana. Knight Ridder Tribune Business News.
August 11, 2007.
The FBI conducted a sting operation in Hollywood, Florida, named “Operation Tarnished
Badge.” The operation was abruptly ended because of a leak that threatened the operation.
However, four Hollywood, Florida police officers were arrested They were: Jeffrey Courtney,
52; Kevin Companion, 41; Stephen Harrison, 47; and Thomas Simcox, 50. Also associated with
the case was Charles Roberts, who plead guilty to making a false statement (Moskovitz, 2007,
http://proquest.umi.com).
The four officers charged were involved in illegal activities including: extortion, bribe-taking,
dealing in stolen property, protecting a crooked high-stakes card game and transporting a
multi-kilo load of heroin from Miami Beach, Florida to Hollywood, Florida. They eventually
plead guilty to the conspiracy count of providing protection to transport more than one kilogram
of heroin (Moskovitz, 2007, http://proquest.umi.com).
The officers were convicted and sentenced as follows: Jeffery Courtney, nine years;
Kevin Companion, 14 years; Stephen Harrison, nine years; and Thomas Simcox, 11+ years,
though this is expected to be reduced due to cooperation with the FBI in the investigation
(Moskovitz, 2007, http://proquest.umi.com).
5) “Daley Defends Special Cop Unit Amid Complaints.”
Washburn, Gary and Heinzmann, David. Knight Ridder Tribune Business News.
July 19, 2007.
Mayor Richard Daley defended the Chicago Police Department from criticism that its
Special Operations Section was engaging in a pattern of brutality and wrongdoing. Citing that
the police have seized between 12,000 to 15,000 guns from gang members and other criminals,
Mayor Daley felt that many of these claims were unfounded.

According to the Tribune “over the last five years…30 officers from the section [Special
Operations] have been subjects of a total of 862 allegations of brutality and other wrongdoing. .
.” The Tribune article continued “. . .the 10 officers with the most complaints in Special
Operations had a total of 408 lodged against them,” noting that of these complaints, only three
were sustained and only one resulted in a suspension (Washbum & Heinzmann, 2007,
Interestingly enough, many officers who have robbed drug dealers and made false arrests
have been found to have complaints lodged against them with the Office of Professional
Standards that have mirrored their crimes. However, veteran officers object to this noting that
gang members and drug dealers “routinely lodge bogus complaints against those who arrest them
as a defense tactic” and that complaints are often not sustained. It seems to be a mixed bag,
however, as an ongoing corruption investigation has produced charges against six Special
Operations members with charges ranging from robbing to kidnapping (Washburn & Heinzman,
2007, http://proquest.umi.com).
6) “Mexico Purges Federal Police Chiefs.”
Enriquez, Sam. Financial Times, Ltd.
2007.
Mexico has had a long history of police corruption. Recently elected President Calderon
has taken action to curb the corruption and to reduce the flow of drugs through Mexico. Shortly
after taking office in December, 2006, President Calderon had the army work alongside federal
police in nine different states. In June, 2007, President Calderon took further action by removing
all federal police chiefs from the 31 states pending polygraph and drug tests (Enriquez, 2007,
In Mexico, the army is considered to be more trustworthy than the police. President
Calderon decided to take these drastic steps because more than 2,000 people were killed last year
in Mexico from drug violence. Furthermore, street prices remain stable in the United States
suggesting that the smugglers are still successful in moving their product into the United States
(Enriquez, 2007, http://proquest.umi.com).
Noting that U.S. drug users spent US$65 billion in 2006, the Mexican government
concedes that the drug war will be difficult to fight. Money buys power, and drug trafficking
results in a lot of money. Furthermore, the United States has been somewhat reluctant to share
intelligence with Mexico. There has also been a decrease in the amount of U.S. military
resources patrolling the air and seas around Mexico and Central America due to the war in Iraq
(Enriquez, 2007, http://proquest.umi.com).

7) “Jury Awards Victim $1 Million.”
Kraemer, Kristin M. Knight Ridder Tribune Business News.
Washington: May 02, 2007.
On July 13, 2002, Mr. Ken Rogers was sleeping in his fenced back yard in Kennewick,
Washington (State) when a police dog mistakenly followed a scent from a minor traffic pursuit
(Grigg, 2007, www.lewrockwell.com) into his back yard. The police dog, named Deke, bit him
several times on the hand, back, neck and face while Sergeant Richard Dopke, police officers
Brad Kohn and Ryan Bonnalie and Sheriff’s Deputy Jeff Quackenbush beat him with their fists,
knees and a flashlight (Grigg, 2007, www.lewrockwell.com). Mr. Rogers was not wearing his
eyeglasses and believed he was being attacked by prowlers, thereby fighting back. He has
suffered permanent nerve damage to his left hand (Mr. Rogers is left-handed), hearing loss in his
right ear, his pre-existing disabling back injury has been aggravated, and he also suffers from
mental anguish and anxiety (Kraemer, 2007, http://proquest.umi.com).
Mr. Rogers case was heard in Richland Federal Court and eventually wound up going to
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. The lawsuit accused the
Kennewick Police Department (Grigg, 2007, www.lewrockwell.com) of unlawful imprisonment,
false arrest, undue search and seizure and of failing to get him adequate medical treatment. Due
to the extensive costs of his legal battle and medical expenses, Mr. Rogers had to cash in on
some of his savings and stocks (Kraemer, 2007, http://proquest.umi.com).
Mr. Rogers and his wife sued for $2.35 million in compensatory damages, including
physical and emotional losses, and $1 million in punitive damages against three officers of the
Kennewick Police Department and one against the deputy sheriff’s officer. The jury found that
the conduct of all four officers was “malicious or in reckless disregard for Rogers’ Constitutional
rights.” However, the jury only ordered punitive damages against two officers for a total of
$250,000. The entire award was one million dollars (Kraemer, 2007, http://proquest.umi.com).
As a postscript to this incident the following facts should be noted:
1) Sergeant Richard Dopke retired from the Kennewick Police Department in
2003 after an internal affairs review of the incident recommended his
demotion to a patrolman and relief of his supervisory duties (Kraemer, 2007,
http://proquest.umi.com);
2) Officer Bonnalie was fired from the Kennewick Police Department (Kraemer,
2007, http://proquest.umi.com) after a road rage incident where he threatened
a 63 year old Meals on Wheels volunteer (Grigg, 2007,
www.lewrockwell.com) by brandishing his loaded police gun while off duty
(Kraemer, 2007, http://proquest.umi.com);
3) Kennewick Police Chief Ken Hohenberg stood by the internal investigation
that determined that Deke (the police dog) “should have never been called into
the neighborhood,” but he maintains that the police officers “had no intent to
violate department policies or to inflict any personal injury on Rogers”
(Kraemer, 2007, http://proquest.umi.com);

4) Corrections officer Gary Hillard was actually the man the police were
pursuing and misdirected Sergeant Dopke. According to the TriCity Herald
(Sirocchi, 2007, http://www.tri-cityherald.com), approximately two years after
this incident Gary Hillard was fired from his job as a corrections officer and
served a three month jail term for “having sexually explicit pictures of
children on a personal computer” (Grigg, 2007, www.lewrockwell.com);
5) Deke (the police dog) was retired in early 2006 (Kraemer, 2007,
http://proquest.umi.com); and
6) Kennewick’s insurance carrier, who is financially liable for the verdict, could
appeal this decision (Kraemer, 2007, http://proquest.umi.com).
Consider the following question: How could the Police Chief claim that the police officers
“had no intent to violate department policies or inflict any personal injury on Rogers?”
Apparently, the police had difficulties impressing this “interpretation” of the events on July 13,
2003 to the jury. Also, consider the following: If any non-law enforcement person were to
commit this type of crime against a law enforcement officer would they not also be tried
criminally, as well as civilly?
8) “NYPD test officer integrity”
Anonymous. Law & Order.
Wilmette: November 1999. Vol. 47, Iss. 11; pg. 6.
The New York City Police Department, starting in 1997, conducted an unusual program
that was designed to weed out police officers that had a propensity for violence. Called Force-
Related Integrity Testing, this program conducts 600 sting operations each year to test the
integrity of the officers of the New York City Police Department. In the first two years of the
program only four officers have failed a force-related test (Law & Order, 1999,
The way the Force-Related Integrity Testing works is by setting up an elaborate sting
operation that puts the officers in a predicament where there is a volatile situation. A common
example would be for the target officer, who typically has a history of civilian complaints, to
receive a radio call for a domestic dispute. When the officer arrives he is confronted by an
undercover officer posing as a belligerent husband. The Force-Related Integrity Testing
determines if the office behaved appropriately or not (Law & Order, 1999,
Because of the volatility of the situation, and the fact that the target officer is armed there
is a grave concern for safety. As such, careful planning goes into each sting operation, scripts
are rehearsed and often times additional under cover officers are in place should the situation get
out of hand (Law & Order, 1999, http://proquest.umi.com).

9) “’Time and again, I stepped over the line.’”
Foote, Donna and Figueroa, Ana. Newsweek
New York: Mar 6, 2000. Vol. 135, Iss. 10.
Former Los Angeles Police Department Officer Rafael Pérez plead guilty to stealing
three kilos of cocaine. His plea, entered in 2000 was for an incident in 1998 where he stole three
kilos of cocaine with a street value of $800,000from a police evidence locker (WikipediA, 2007,
www.wikipedia.org). Officer Perez cooperated with investigators for a lighter sentence, and
everything he confessed to (except stealing the three kilos of cocaine) he was granted immunity
for. Based on his testimony, 106 Los Angeles Police Department arrests were overturned
(WikipediA, 2007, www.wikipedia.org). It is unclear how many cases may be tainted, perhaps
hundreds, maybe even thousands. The City of Los Angeles is expected to pay out over $125
million in lawsuits as a result of the police corruption that was exposed by Officer Perez (Foote
& Figueroa, 2000, http://proquest.umi.com). This unfortunate chapter of Los Angeles Police
Department misconduct is what is known as the “Rampart Scandal.” In the “Rampart Scandal,”
Officer Perez implicated 70 other Rampart officers in misconduct (WikipediA, 2007,
www.wikipedia.org).
According to Officer Perez, police officers used one suspect as a “human battering ram.”
His head was smashed against a target that was drawn on the wall. In another case of abuse,
Officer Perez and his partner shot an unarmed gang member and then planted a gun on him, and
then testified that he attacked them. Other malfeasances included unjustified shootings and
consuming alcohol on the job (WikipediA, 2007, www.wikipedia.org). For Officer Perez’s
“cooperation” with investigators he was given a sentence of five years (Foote & Figueroa, 2000,
http://proquest.umi.com). He was initially released from prison on July 24, 2001, but he then
went on to serve time in Federal prison. He was also convicted of numerous felonies since his
initial incarceration (WikipediA, 2007, www.wikipedia.org).
Officer Perez is was also involved of the cover-up of a $722,000 bank robbery. He is
accused of being a member of the Bloods gang of Los Angeles. He is accused of murdering
rapper, Notorious B.I.G. at the behest of Suge Knight, CEO and co-founder of Death Row
Records. The family of Notorious, B.I.G. filed a wrongful death lawsuit in Los Angeles Superior
Court on April 16, 2007, against the City of Los Angeles, Rafael Pérez and his partner, Nino
Durden. The lawsuit seeks unspecified general compensatory and punitive monetary damages
(WikipediA, 2007, www.wikipedia.org).
At Officer Perez’s sentencing he made the following statements: “Whoever chases
monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster himself.” “The
moment you cross that first line, it will be impossible to step back.” And, “I will ask that you use
me as an example of who you will avoid becoming” (PBS-Frontline, 2005, www.pbs.org).

10) “Abner Louima NYPD Torture: 10 Years Later”
CBS Broadcasting, Inc. & The Associated Press
August 09, 2007.
Abner Louima, a Haitian immigrant living in New York City, was arrested outside a
nightclub in 1997. Mr. Louima was beaten by police officers with their fists, nightsticks and
hald-held radios while en route to the police station for booking. Mr. Louima was then strip-searched
and put into a holding cell. The police then decided that he needed to be further beaten.
So they proceeded to beat him again and then took him into the bathroom of the 70th Precinct
Station House in Brooklyn. Inside the bathroom officer Justin Volpe kicked Mr. Louima in his
testicles. Mr. Louima then had his hands cuffed behind his back. Using either a broken broom
handle or a plunger (accounts vary) Mr. Louima was sodomized in his anus and his mouth. This
caused severe internal damage to his colon, bladder and his teeth. Officer Volpe threatened to
kill Mr. Louima in an effort to intimidate him. Officer Volpe admitted in Federal Court that he
was trying to humiliate [Mr. Louima] (New York Times, Date of original publication
unavailable, http://www.nytimes.com). Officer Volpe then paraded the bloody, excrement-stained
instrument in his hands bragging that he “broke a man down.” Mr. Louima underwent
several surgeries to repair the damage done to his colon and bladder. (WikipediA, 2007,
http://www.wikipedia.org). Amnesty International has classified the Abner Louima case as
“torture” (Amnesty International, 2005, www.amnesty.org).
Charges against Mr. Louima were dropped, and Mr. Louima later won an $8.7 million
settlement against the City of New York and the police union. This was the largest settlement
ever in a police brutality case in New York. Officer Volpe pleaded guilty to civil rights
violations and is currently serving a thirty-year prison term. Officer Schwarz pleaded guilty to
perjury for his attempt to cover-up the assault and he served a five-year prison term (CBS
Broadcasting & The Associated Press, 2007, http://www.wcbstv.com).
Former Officer Volpe, writing from Federal prison, stated that he found the “maturity and the
knowledge that regardless of the immediate environment and surrounding violence not to give
into it.” Inmate Volpe is scheduled to be released from Federal prison in 2025 (CBS
Broadcasting & The Associated Press, 2007, http://www.wcbstv.com).
Meanwhile, Mr. Louima is living in the Miami area in Florida. He recently wrote as a guest
columnist where he stated that he hoped the attention to his case had deterred future police
violence. However, he feels that more needs to be done. Mr. Louima called for state and
national law makers to require independent prosecutors, rather than local district attorneys, to
handle all police brutality cases. Noting the 2006 death of Sean Bell, an unarmed man who was
killed in a hail of fifty police bullets as he left his bachelor party; Mr. Louima wrote that things
have not improved enough. He further noted that “After what happened to me, I consider myself
lucky to be alive” (CBS Broadcasting & The Associated Press, 2007, http://www.wcbstv.com).

Section 3
Discussion.
Evaluate your Literary Review findings, addressing the following:
a. The nature of the type of crime within your industry and its impact on the
victims, associated costs, and relevant legal issues. (60 points).
Law enforcement is an industry that is beset with criminal activity by the very ones who are
supposed to be upholding and enforcing the laws. The corruption of police forces and police
services is not limited to the United States, but rather it is worldwide in scope. Incidents are not
isolated, they are not the exceptions—they are the rule.
The nature of these crimes varies extensively. These crimes include, but are not limited to:
bribes, kickbacks, assault, battery, theft, abuse under the color of authority, drug trafficking,
homicide, sexual assault, drug usage, falsifying records and reports and conspiracy. While this
list is not exhaustive, it gives the reader a sampling of the types of crimes that are prevalent in
law enforcement.
The reasons for these crimes vary from incident to incident. However, there are some
factors that are prevalent. As noted in “The Measurement of Police Integrity” by Klockars et al.,
“…policing is an occupation that is rife with opportunities for misconduct. Policing is a highly
discretionary, coercive activity that routinely takes place in private settings, out of the sight of
supervisors, and in the presence of witnesses who are often regarded as unreliable.” (Klockars et
al., 2000, p. 1). In short, the opportunities to commit crimes are very abundant.
Some police officers commit crimes because they know they can get away with it. Take
Officer Crawley of the NYPD. When he was interviewed about beating up people, not just
suspects, but people in general he replied “Who’s going to catch us? We’re the police.” (Rosoff,
Pontell & Tillman, 2002, p. 371). Some officers adopt an air of invincibility that they can do
whatever they want simply because they are the police. Other reasons include personality traits
that, mixed with the wrong environment, can turn a law enforcer into a law breaker (Rosoff,
Pontell & Tillman, 2002, p. 368).
The impact of these crimes on individuals can range from very minor to very costly.
Regardless of the monetary costs, all of these crimes erode t he public confidence in the police.
There have been several high profile cases in cities such as Los Angeles and New York that have
cost these cities millions of dollars because of police misconduct. Scores of smaller settlements
have been paid out across the country for cases of police misconduct. Ultimately, these
settlements are paid by the taxpayers.
The legal implications of these crimes extend beyond monetary costs. Many officers have
ended up serving prison time for their crimes. Many victims of police misconduct have been
killed or maimed. Policies and procedures often must be revised to avoid repeat incidents and to
reduce the impact of police misconduct. Again, all of these concerns cost money. And, again, it
is the taxpayers who ultimately pay the price. Socially, police misconduct causes a distrust of
the police and of authority. If you cannot trust the police, who can you trust?

b. The role of environmental and cultural factors in relation to the types of
crime in your industry. (60 points).
1) Social: Has our societal culture forced individuals to engage in crime
(i.e., the need to succeed)?
There is a wide variety of societal pressures that influence individuals to engage in crime.
The need to succeed is often cited as one such cause. While this does hold true with law
enforcement there are several other reasons. These include that law enforcement officers often
feel that they are unappreciated, or that they lack the resources to properly enforce the laws.
They often feel that they are in an “us [police] against them [bad guys, the world, et cetera]”
situation (Rosoff, Pontell & Tillman, 2002, p. 368).
2) Institutional: Are there industry dynamics that create the means and
opportunities that attract individuals to engage in criminal activities?
The institutional aspect of law enforcement personnel engaging in criminal activities is very
strong. The environment in which those in law enforcement operate is highly conducive to
criminal enterprise. The various institutional mechanisms that create criminal opportunity
include: unauthorized material inducements, kickbacks, shakedowns, fixing cases, opportunistic
theft, protection from illegal activities as well as the code of silence (Rosoff, Pontell & Tillman,
2002, pp. 364-366). Those in law enforcement are often afforded opportunities that private
citizens are not to commit these crimes.
3) Organizational: Are there organizational policies and operational
directives that encourage employees to break the law for personal gain or
to meet organization objectives and goals?
The lack of internal controls often times makes it easy for those in law enforcement to
commit crimes. There is often little supervision and training. Couple this with the fact that
officers are often found in bad areas, surrounded by bad people doing bad things and the law
enforcer often turns into a law breaker. Because of their position of authority they often become
brazen about their crime knowing that their word will be taken over a criminal’s word (Rosoff,
Pontell & Tillman, 2002, pp. 368-369).
There are generally no specific operational directives that encourage law enforcement
personnel to break the law. However, there often exists a sense of competitiveness among
officers and this could lead to some criminal activity. There is also the “quota theory” that is
espoused by the majority of the population and universally rejected as a falsehood by the police.
Implementing quotas (even informally) can lead to officer misconduct.

c. The preventative measures or remedies for the crime within your industry.
(30) points.
There are various preventative measures that address corruption in law enforcement. Many
departments are turning to drug, alcohol and integrity testing. Integrity testing can be a difficult
subject to address. In conducting integrity testing, it is important not to entrap or induce the
officer into doing something that they would not normally have done. For various ethical and
legal reasons integrity testing is not a very good solution.
Drug and alcohol testing are prudent because officers should be sober and they should also
comply with Federal and state drug laws. In the United States medical insurance often covers
treatment for drug and alcohol abuse. Medical insurance also often covers psychological health
as well. It should be noted that drug and alcohol abuse are often signs of a deeper psychological
issue.
Other remedies exist as well. These are often legal and handled in the court system. Some
countries; however, such as Thailand (mentioned supra), shame police officers when they
commit minor infractions (Associated Press, 2007, http://apnews.excite.com). Since there is
such a broad spectrum of misconduct, the remedies are equally broad. Some officers end up
spending time in prison as convicted felons.

Section 4
Conclusion.
Summarize your research findings. State your opinion on the findings and give support for
your opinion. (20 points).
Corruption in law enforcement is not restricted to the United States. The geography of
corruption spans the globe and exists in all levels of law enforcement. There are a wide variety
of ways that different countries deal with corruption, and it is generally conceded by top
administrators that corruption is a problem and needs to be dealt with. While some forms of
corruption are relatively minor, there are other forms which are catastrophic to the victims.
However, corruption at any level is undesirable and should be dealt with swiftly and effectively.
Because of the nature of law enforcement there are many opportunities for corruption.
Those who work in criminogenic occupations often succumb to the temptations present and
become criminals themselves. Law enforcement is no different. Unfortunately, those in law
enforcement who break the law are often not dealt with as harshly as private citizens who break
the law. The “Blue Wall of Silence” often prevents many cases of corruption from even being
reported.

Section 5
Recommendations.
Recommend a total of four (4) changes you would make to current prevention methods,
governing regulations, or remedies imposed for the type of crime you selected. Include
your reasoning behind these recommended changes. (40 points).
1) Proposed Remedy:
All law enforcement agencies need to implement mandatory training in ethics. This
training needs to be done on an annual basis, and must include everyone from the
clerical/support staff to the Chief/Warden. Included in this ethics training should be
sensitivity training. It is imperative that law enforcement understand the various cultures,
religions and ethnic diversities in the communities that they serve.
Reasoning:
Ethics is an important part of any profession, and an increase in responsibilities calls for
an increase in ethical training. Law enforcement personnel are in a position that requires
integrity, honesty and trustworthiness. In a world where the distinction between right and
wrong is blurred, where black and white become shades of grey, it is imperative that our
law enforcement personnel have a solid foundation in ethics to ensure that they make
decisions that demonstrate the highest levels of integrity. Those in law enforcement need
to make decisions that are not only legal, but ethical as well.
2) Proposed Remedy:
Establish an independent review board that is wholly separate from the police department
and reports to another government branch/agency. Furthermore, all law enforcement
corruption cases should be handled by special prosecutors, not the local district attorney!
Reasoning:
Quite simply, the police cannot control themselves nor can they police themselves. The
police and the local district attorneys are merely extensions of one another. Their
relationships are too close for unbiased prosecution. For these reasons there needs to be
separation and accountability to outside third parties. When the police know that they
need to be accountable to a third party that is independent it will cause them to be more
careful and to act more ethically while upholding the law rather than breaking the law.
3) Proposed Remedy:
Mandatory scheduled and random drug tests and alcohol testing of all police officers and
staff from the Chief of Police (Sheriff, Warden, et cetera) to the administrative clerks
should be implemented.
Reasoning:
Drug and alcohol abuse is common in law enforcement. Those charged with upholding
the law should not be breaking the law. For this reason, it is crucial that law enforcement
staff be drug free at all times, and be sober while working. This should hold true for
everyone in the department, regardless of rank.

4) Proposed Remedy:
Hold officers fiscally responsible for the crimes that they commit. While officers should
be shielded from legitimate mistakes, they should not be shielded from crimes and torts
that they commit.
In early America there existed a “court of sessions.” One function of this court was to
ensure the obedience of most of the public officials. Certain offences would be fined and
this fine would be levied individually on all inhabitants (Alexis de Tocqueville, 1848 &
1969, pp. 76-78). Though these particular fines were for a different type of offence,
imagine how differently those in law enforcement would act if they knew that their
transgressions would be levied upon all the citizens of the city that they represent!
Reasoning:
This will act as a deterrent to misconduct. Furthermore, it will place at least some of the
financial burden on the individual officer, not the city, thereby reducing insurance costs;
which in turn reduces taxes.
The “court of sessions” no longer exists in the United States as it did in the early 19th
century. Yet, imagine how differently law enforcement would act if they knew that twice
yearly they could be dismissed from their position for failure to perform their jobs. The
aspect of fines for their misdeeds being levied upon the entire city would most certainly
curb an enormous amount of law enforcement malfeasance.
Corruption has always existed and will continue to exist. However, there are ways to
combat corruption. These four proposed remedies will make it much more difficult for those in
law enforcement to continue a life of corruption. Combating corruption should not be restricted
to these four mechanisms. There should be an ongoing concern for corruption in law
enforcement, and there should be a sustained effort to combat this corruption. There is a caveat
however; these methods and those who utilize them should not themselves become corrupt in the
process.

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