The document is a court case summary regarding a dispute over the deposition of an in-house counsel. It discusses the following key points:
1. The plaintiffs sought to depose the defendant's in-house counsel regarding pre-litigation matters. The magistrate judge allowed this but the defendant objected.
2. The district court found that the magistrate judge erred by not applying the three-part test from Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp for determining if opposing counsel can be deposed. This test should also apply to attempts to depose in-house counsel.
3. While some courts had only applied the Shelton test to depositions of trial counsel, the rationale for the test, such as protecting
CitySt.Paul heinous Civil,Criminal,Constitutional Rights to Shut off Sharon Water, www.sharonanderson.org
then Steal Sharons Cars,Trailers,Propertys, but Theft,Trespass,Treason, must be abated,Damages Award
A judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the past 11 years, Sonia Sotomayor is now high on lists that lawyers and politicians have assembled of possible replacements for Justice David H. Souter of the Supreme Court. She has a reputation as a sharp, outspoken and fearless jurist, and many of her opinions have demonstrated a willingness to take the government to task whenever she believes the circumstances warrant it.
See if you can see the NEXUS/CONNECTION/RELATIONSHIP with the Anna Louise Inn Scandal/Lawsuit and Ladye Margaret Townsend's BANKRUPTCY Action. If NOT, we are going to show the PUBLIC/WORLD the PATTERN-OF-CRIMINAL practices that have United States of America's President Barack Obama's and his Legal Counsel Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz' PARTICIPATION all OVER IT!
CitySt.Paul heinous Civil,Criminal,Constitutional Rights to Shut off Sharon Water, www.sharonanderson.org
then Steal Sharons Cars,Trailers,Propertys, but Theft,Trespass,Treason, must be abated,Damages Award
A judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the past 11 years, Sonia Sotomayor is now high on lists that lawyers and politicians have assembled of possible replacements for Justice David H. Souter of the Supreme Court. She has a reputation as a sharp, outspoken and fearless jurist, and many of her opinions have demonstrated a willingness to take the government to task whenever she believes the circumstances warrant it.
See if you can see the NEXUS/CONNECTION/RELATIONSHIP with the Anna Louise Inn Scandal/Lawsuit and Ladye Margaret Townsend's BANKRUPTCY Action. If NOT, we are going to show the PUBLIC/WORLD the PATTERN-OF-CRIMINAL practices that have United States of America's President Barack Obama's and his Legal Counsel Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz' PARTICIPATION all OVER IT!
Andrew Livernois and Keith Cormier of the Belknap County Attorney's Office Ta...Rich Bergeron
This is the Amicus Brief filed by Gilles R. Bissonnette, Esq. (N.H. Bar No. 265393) and Henry Klementowicz, Esq. (N.H. Bar No. 21177) of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire Foundation. This is in response to the Belknap County Attorney's Office asking for a gag order on the case. Andrew Livernois and Deputy Keith Cormier appear to have misjudged the power of the press here. Stay tuned.
A judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the past 11 years, Sonia Sotomayor is now high on lists that lawyers and politicians have assembled of possible replacements for Justice David H. Souter of the Supreme Court. She has a reputation as a sharp, outspoken and fearless jurist, and many of her opinions have demonstrated a willingness to take the government to task whenever she believes the circumstances warrant it.
Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion to Dismiss on Speedy Trial GroundsRich Bergeron
Judge James D. O'Neill III denied my motion to dismiss. He had to overlook a great deal of facts and precedent law to come to the conclusion he did. I lay it all out for him in this motion to reconsider. Can he admit he was wrong, or will he keep being an ignorant and unethical disgrace to the bench? See WWW.NHDRUGTASKFORCE.COM to find out.
Reply to State's Objection to Request For Court-Ordered SanctionsRich Bergeron
This is my quick reply to the ridiculously deficient objection to my sanctions motion filed by Deputy Grafton County Attorney Tara Heater. The judge ended up not giving Heater an extension and set the hearing for March 5, 2021.
Response Letter to NH Attorney Discipline Committee Refusing to Docket Andrew...Rich Bergeron
My response to the Attorney Discipline Committee's general counsel in regard to his reasoning behind refusing to docket my grievance against Belknap County Attorney Andrew Livernois and Deputy Belknap County Attorney Keith Cormier.
Defendant's Reply to State's Objection to Motion to Dismiss (Speedy Trial)Rich Bergeron
Here I take the prosecutor from Grafton County to task for all her mistakes and lack of proper legal analysis. Judge O'Neill will still rule in her favor, no matter how lax in her duties she is. I do go overboard and keep insisting the state had no motion pending. There was actually a motion to amend before the court, so I screwed up myself there, but not nearly as badly as Deputy Grafton County Attorney Tara Heater did.
Grievance Filing Against Belknap County (NH) Attorney Andrew Livernois and De...Rich Bergeron
This is a detailed complaint I filed recently regarding an attempt by the local prosecutor's office to eviscerate my First Amendment rights and deny me my rights to due process throughout the case.
Defendant's Motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial rightsRich Bergeron
I prepared a very crisp and professional motion to dismiss just to watch Judge James D. O'Neill shoot it down with junk logic and misrepresentation of the law. He continues to show his blind loyalty to the bumbling prosecutors on my case. I had more than one lawyer tell me this was an excellent motion and hit on all the right points. This is where an appeal would expose how biased the judge really is.
Andrew Livernois and Keith Cormier of the Belknap County Attorney's Office Ta...Rich Bergeron
This is the Amicus Brief filed by Gilles R. Bissonnette, Esq. (N.H. Bar No. 265393) and Henry Klementowicz, Esq. (N.H. Bar No. 21177) of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire Foundation. This is in response to the Belknap County Attorney's Office asking for a gag order on the case. Andrew Livernois and Deputy Keith Cormier appear to have misjudged the power of the press here. Stay tuned.
A judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the past 11 years, Sonia Sotomayor is now high on lists that lawyers and politicians have assembled of possible replacements for Justice David H. Souter of the Supreme Court. She has a reputation as a sharp, outspoken and fearless jurist, and many of her opinions have demonstrated a willingness to take the government to task whenever she believes the circumstances warrant it.
Motion to Reconsider Denial of Motion to Dismiss on Speedy Trial GroundsRich Bergeron
Judge James D. O'Neill III denied my motion to dismiss. He had to overlook a great deal of facts and precedent law to come to the conclusion he did. I lay it all out for him in this motion to reconsider. Can he admit he was wrong, or will he keep being an ignorant and unethical disgrace to the bench? See WWW.NHDRUGTASKFORCE.COM to find out.
Reply to State's Objection to Request For Court-Ordered SanctionsRich Bergeron
This is my quick reply to the ridiculously deficient objection to my sanctions motion filed by Deputy Grafton County Attorney Tara Heater. The judge ended up not giving Heater an extension and set the hearing for March 5, 2021.
Response Letter to NH Attorney Discipline Committee Refusing to Docket Andrew...Rich Bergeron
My response to the Attorney Discipline Committee's general counsel in regard to his reasoning behind refusing to docket my grievance against Belknap County Attorney Andrew Livernois and Deputy Belknap County Attorney Keith Cormier.
Defendant's Reply to State's Objection to Motion to Dismiss (Speedy Trial)Rich Bergeron
Here I take the prosecutor from Grafton County to task for all her mistakes and lack of proper legal analysis. Judge O'Neill will still rule in her favor, no matter how lax in her duties she is. I do go overboard and keep insisting the state had no motion pending. There was actually a motion to amend before the court, so I screwed up myself there, but not nearly as badly as Deputy Grafton County Attorney Tara Heater did.
Grievance Filing Against Belknap County (NH) Attorney Andrew Livernois and De...Rich Bergeron
This is a detailed complaint I filed recently regarding an attempt by the local prosecutor's office to eviscerate my First Amendment rights and deny me my rights to due process throughout the case.
Defendant's Motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial rightsRich Bergeron
I prepared a very crisp and professional motion to dismiss just to watch Judge James D. O'Neill shoot it down with junk logic and misrepresentation of the law. He continues to show his blind loyalty to the bumbling prosecutors on my case. I had more than one lawyer tell me this was an excellent motion and hit on all the right points. This is where an appeal would expose how biased the judge really is.
John J. Pankauski is a partner with Pankauski Hauser PLLC in West Palm Beach, Florida. Mr. Pankauski has spent over 20 years of his career handling matters involving wills, trusts, estates, probates, and guardianships. His practice is limited to disputes, trials and appeals of such matters. He is AV Preeminent rated by Martindale Hubel.
WANDA ABIOTO Sanctions. She is an attorney retained to represent me in the Spring Lake Apartments matter and Civil Rights violations involving the 02/14/06 KIDNAPPING incident.
Jon Lewis (i.e. organized KIDNAPPING from residence at Spring Lake Apartments) served as CHAIRMAN of Mississippi Athletic Commission under Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour. Haley Barbour's Legal Counsel/Advisor is Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz (i.e. also Legal Counsel to United States President Barack Obama)
Garretson Resolution Group appears to be FRONTING Law Firm for United States President Barack Obama and Legal Counsel/Advisor (Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz) which has submitted a SLAPP Complaint to OneWebHostin.com in efforts of PREVENTING the PUBLIC/WORLD from knowing of its and President Barack Obama's ROLE in CONSPIRACIES leveled against Vogel Denise Newsome in EXPOSING the TRUTH behind the 911 DOMESTIC TERRORIST ATTACKS, COLLAPSE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY, EMPLOYMENT violations and other crimes of United States Government Officials. Information of PUBLIC Interest!
Lawweb.in judgment of us district court on motion for a negative inference ba...Law Web
Judgment of US District court on motion for a Negative Inference Based upon Plaintiff’s Alleged Deletion of Emails - See more at: http://www.lawweb.in/2016/04/judgment-of-us-district-court-on-motion.html?#sthash.T5WQGg2Q.dpuf
This CLE presentation from Kegler Brown's 12th Annual Seminar on Professional Responsibility covers duties to report and cooperate, confidentiality, professionalism, advertising guidelines and more for attorneys admitted to the bar in Ohio. The speakers were Geoffrey Stern, Christopher Weber, Rasheeda Khan and Carol Costa.
Legal/Regulatory Developments Are Changing the Economic Landscape of TruckingWalt Metz
Changes to U.S. laws, primarily changes to FMCSA, EPA and NHTSA regulations, are “driving” up the cost of conducting the business of trucking and forever changing the economic landscape of trucking. The regulatory changes seem to be tipping the scales to the advantage of larger carriers, which may lead to substantial further consolidation of the industry. This article summarizes the regulatory changes and other factors making having this impact.
NEW LAWSUITS AND INTEREST GROUP CONCERNS KEEP CSA CONTROVERSIES BREWINGWalt Metz
Back in February I wrote a comprehensive review of Compliance, Safety, Accountability (“CSA”), the safety compliance monitoring program administered by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”). Since then I have written three articles updating the constantly changing CSA landscape. My most recent CSA update was published in the July, 2012 edition of The Transportation Lawyer, a quarterly legal journal by the Transportation Lawyers of America, entitled “Recent Developments Show CSA Continues to be a Work in Progress”. At the conclusion of that latest article I said, that “[t]he implementation of CSA will be ongoing for the near future … The process has already been much slower than many would like, has not been without controversy and will likely generate new controversy. Stay tuned!” It did not take long before the filing of two major lawsuits and other developments called for yet another update article, this article entitled: “New Lawsuits and Interest Group Concerns Keep CSA Controversies Brewing”. CSA continues to be a controversial work in progress and this article summarizes the two new lawsuits and the other controversies that have recently arisen over CSA and the related Pre-Employment Screening Program (PSP).
how can i use my minded pi coins I need some funds.DOT TECH
If you are interested in selling your pi coins, i have a verified pi merchant, who buys pi coins and resell them to exchanges looking forward to hold till mainnet launch.
Because the core team has announced that pi network will not be doing any pre-sale. The only way exchanges like huobi, bitmart and hotbit can get pi is by buying from miners.
Now a merchant stands in between these exchanges and the miners. As a link to make transactions smooth. Because right now in the enclosed mainnet you can't sell pi coins your self. You need the help of a merchant,
i will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant below. 👇 I and my friends has traded more than 3000pi coins with him successfully.
@Pi_vendor_247
how can I sell pi coins after successfully completing KYCDOT TECH
Pi coins is not launched yet in any exchange 💱 this means it's not swappable, the current pi displaying on coin market cap is the iou version of pi. And you can learn all about that on my previous post.
RIGHT NOW THE ONLY WAY you can sell pi coins is through verified pi merchants. A pi merchant is someone who buys pi coins and resell them to exchanges and crypto whales. Looking forward to hold massive quantities of pi coins before the mainnet launch.
This is because pi network is not doing any pre-sale or ico offerings, the only way to get my coins is from buying from miners. So a merchant facilitates the transactions between the miners and these exchanges holding pi.
I and my friends has sold more than 6000 pi coins successfully with this method. I will be happy to share the contact of my personal pi merchant. The one i trade with, if you have your own merchant you can trade with them. For those who are new.
Message: @Pi_vendor_247 on telegram.
I wouldn't advise you selling all percentage of the pi coins. Leave at least a before so its a win win during open mainnet. Have a nice day pioneers ♥️
#kyc #mainnet #picoins #pi #sellpi #piwallet
#pinetwork
how to swap pi coins to foreign currency withdrawable.DOT TECH
As of my last update, Pi is still in the testing phase and is not tradable on any exchanges.
However, Pi Network has announced plans to launch its Testnet and Mainnet in the future, which may include listing Pi on exchanges.
The current method for selling pi coins involves exchanging them with a pi vendor who purchases pi coins for investment reasons.
If you want to sell your pi coins, reach out to a pi vendor and sell them to anyone looking to sell pi coins from any country around the globe.
Below is the contact information for my personal pi vendor.
Telegram: @Pi_vendor_247
Currently pi network is not tradable on binance or any other exchange because we are still in the enclosed mainnet.
Right now the only way to sell pi coins is by trading with a verified merchant.
What is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone verified by pi network team and allowed to barter pi coins for goods and services.
Since pi network is not doing any pre-sale The only way exchanges like binance/huobi or crypto whales can get pi is by buying from miners. And a merchant stands in between the exchanges and the miners.
I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi merchant. I and my friends has traded more than 6000pi coins successfully
Tele-gram
@Pi_vendor_247
How to get verified on Coinbase Account?_.docxBuy bitget
t's important to note that buying verified Coinbase accounts is not recommended and may violate Coinbase's terms of service. Instead of searching to "buy verified Coinbase accounts," follow the proper steps to verify your own account to ensure compliance and security.
Introduction to Indian Financial System ()Avanish Goel
The financial system of a country is an important tool for economic development of the country, as it helps in creation of wealth by linking savings with investments.
It facilitates the flow of funds form the households (savers) to business firms (investors) to aid in wealth creation and development of both the parties
Poonawalla Fincorp and IndusInd Bank Introduce New Co-Branded Credit Cardnickysharmasucks
The unveiling of the IndusInd Bank Poonawalla Fincorp eLITE RuPay Platinum Credit Card marks a notable milestone in the Indian financial landscape, showcasing a successful partnership between two leading institutions, Poonawalla Fincorp and IndusInd Bank. This co-branded credit card not only offers users a plethora of benefits but also reflects a commitment to innovation and adaptation. With a focus on providing value-driven and customer-centric solutions, this launch represents more than just a new product—it signifies a step towards redefining the banking experience for millions. Promising convenience, rewards, and a touch of luxury in everyday financial transactions, this collaboration aims to cater to the evolving needs of customers and set new standards in the industry.
Even tho Pi network is not listed on any exchange yet.
Buying/Selling or investing in pi network coins is highly possible through the help of vendors. You can buy from vendors[ buy directly from the pi network miners and resell it]. I will leave the telegram contact of my personal vendor.
@Pi_vendor_247
Falcon stands out as a top-tier P2P Invoice Discounting platform in India, bridging esteemed blue-chip companies and eager investors. Our goal is to transform the investment landscape in India by establishing a comprehensive destination for borrowers and investors with diverse profiles and needs, all while minimizing risk. What sets Falcon apart is the elimination of intermediaries such as commercial banks and depository institutions, allowing investors to enjoy higher yields.
The Evolution of Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) in India: Challenges...beulahfernandes8
Role in Financial System
NBFCs are critical in bridging the financial inclusion gap.
They provide specialized financial services that cater to segments often neglected by traditional banks.
Economic Impact
NBFCs contribute significantly to India's GDP.
They support sectors like micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), housing finance, and personal loans.
Financial Assets: Debit vs Equity Securities.pptxWrito-Finance
financial assets represent claim for future benefit or cash. Financial assets are formed by establishing contracts between participants. These financial assets are used for collection of huge amounts of money for business purposes.
Two major Types: Debt Securities and Equity Securities.
Debt Securities are Also known as fixed-income securities or instruments. The type of assets is formed by establishing contracts between investor and issuer of the asset.
• The first type of Debit securities is BONDS. Bonds are issued by corporations and government (both local and national government).
• The second important type of Debit security is NOTES. Apart from similarities associated with notes and bonds, notes have shorter term maturity.
• The 3rd important type of Debit security is TRESURY BILLS. These securities have short-term ranging from three months, six months, and one year. Issuer of such securities are governments.
• Above discussed debit securities are mostly issued by governments and corporations. CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITS CDs are issued by Banks and Financial Institutions. Risk factor associated with CDs gets reduced when issued by reputable institutions or Banks.
Following are the risk attached with debt securities: Credit risk, interest rate risk and currency risk
There are no fixed maturity dates in such securities, and asset’s value is determined by company’s performance. There are two major types of equity securities: common stock and preferred stock.
Common Stock: These are simple equity securities and bear no complexities which the preferred stock bears. Holders of such securities or instrument have the voting rights when it comes to select the company’s board of director or the business decisions to be made.
Preferred Stock: Preferred stocks are sometime referred to as hybrid securities, because it contains elements of both debit security and equity security. Preferred stock confers ownership rights to security holder that is why it is equity instrument
<a href="https://www.writofinance.com/equity-securities-features-types-risk/" >Equity securities </a> as a whole is used for capital funding for companies. Companies have multiple expenses to cover. Potential growth of company is required in competitive market. So, these securities are used for capital generation, and then uses it for company’s growth.
Concluding remarks
Both are employed in business. Businesses are often established through debit securities, then what is the need for equity securities. Companies have to cover multiple expenses and expansion of business. They can also use equity instruments for repayment of debits. So, there are multiple uses for securities. As an investor, you need tools for analysis. Investment decisions are made by carefully analyzing the market. For better analysis of the stock market, investors often employ financial analysis of companies.
what is the future of Pi Network currency.DOT TECH
The future of the Pi cryptocurrency is uncertain, and its success will depend on several factors. Pi is a relatively new cryptocurrency that aims to be user-friendly and accessible to a wide audience. Here are a few key considerations for its future:
Message: @Pi_vendor_247 on telegram if u want to sell PI COINS.
1. Mainnet Launch: As of my last knowledge update in January 2022, Pi was still in the testnet phase. Its success will depend on a successful transition to a mainnet, where actual transactions can take place.
2. User Adoption: Pi's success will be closely tied to user adoption. The more users who join the network and actively participate, the stronger the ecosystem can become.
3. Utility and Use Cases: For a cryptocurrency to thrive, it must offer utility and practical use cases. The Pi team has talked about various applications, including peer-to-peer transactions, smart contracts, and more. The development and implementation of these features will be essential.
4. Regulatory Environment: The regulatory environment for cryptocurrencies is evolving globally. How Pi navigates and complies with regulations in various jurisdictions will significantly impact its future.
5. Technology Development: The Pi network must continue to develop and improve its technology, security, and scalability to compete with established cryptocurrencies.
6. Community Engagement: The Pi community plays a critical role in its future. Engaged users can help build trust and grow the network.
7. Monetization and Sustainability: The Pi team's monetization strategy, such as fees, partnerships, or other revenue sources, will affect its long-term sustainability.
It's essential to approach Pi or any new cryptocurrency with caution and conduct due diligence. Cryptocurrency investments involve risks, and potential rewards can be uncertain. The success and future of Pi will depend on the collective efforts of its team, community, and the broader cryptocurrency market dynamics. It's advisable to stay updated on Pi's development and follow any updates from the official Pi Network website or announcements from the team.
when will pi network coin be available on crypto exchange.DOT TECH
There is no set date for when Pi coins will enter the market.
However, the developers are working hard to get them released as soon as possible.
Once they are available, users will be able to exchange other cryptocurrencies for Pi coins on designated exchanges.
But for now the only way to sell your pi coins is through verified pi vendor.
Here is the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor
@Pi_vendor_247
how to sell pi coins at high rate quickly.DOT TECH
Where can I sell my pi coins at a high rate.
Pi is not launched yet on any exchange. But one can easily sell his or her pi coins to investors who want to hold pi till mainnet launch.
This means crypto whales want to hold pi. And you can get a good rate for selling pi to them. I will leave the telegram contact of my personal pi vendor below.
A vendor is someone who buys from a miner and resell it to a holder or crypto whale.
Here is the telegram contact of my vendor:
@Pi_vendor_247
2. Positive
As of: August 6, 2013 3:13 PM EDT
Massillon Mgmt., LLC v. Americold Realty Trust
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division
January 21, 2009, Decided
Case No. 5:08CV0799
Reporter: 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22415; 2009 WL 614831
MASSILLON MANAGEMENT, LLC, Plaintiffs, v.
AMERICOLD REALTY TRUST, Defendants.
Core Terms
deposition, in-house, magistrate judge, trial counsel,
depose, district court, opposing counsel, clearly
erroneous, pending case
Case Summary
Procedural Posture
Plaintiffs, property owners and operators, sued defendant
tenant alleging multiple claims in connection with a com-
mercial property lease. Plaintiffs sought to depose the ten-
ant’s in-house counsel. A magistrate judge granted plain-
tiff’s request. The tenant filed objections.
Overview
The in-house counsel worked for the tenant and was re-
sponsible for planning and directing all aspects of the
tenant’s legal affairs, overseeing all of its litigation and
provided legal advice to the tenant’s various depart-
ments. Plaintiffs sought to depose the in-house counsel
on it pre-litigation, non-privileged matters. The district
court found that the magistrate erred when it failed to
apply the test set forth in Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp. It
appeared both that the tenant’s in-house counsel had
been intimately involved in this dispute since well be-
fore it blossomed into a lawsuit, and had played an inte-
gral role in developing the tenant’s litigation strategy.
Thus, plaintiffs’ attempt to take the counsel’s deposition
implicated the Shelton test. Plaintiffs failed to satisfy
the three-part test in order to obtain the deposition in this
case because the information they sought was available
from third parties.
Outcome
The tenant’s objection to the order of the magistrate
judge that permitted plaintiffs to depose its in-house attor-
ney was sustained, and the magistrate’s order was re-
versed.
LexisNexis® Headnotes
Civil Procedure > ... > Methods of Discovery > Depositions > Oral
Depositions
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Opposing Counsel & Par-
ties
HN1 Pursuant to the standard announced in Shelton v.
Am. Motors Corp., the deposition of opposing counsel
may be ordered where the party seeking the deposition es-
tablishes that (1) no other means exist to obtain the in-
formation; (2) the information sought is relevant and non-
privileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the
preparation of the case.
Civil Procedure > Judicial Officers > Magistrates > Pretrial Refer-
rals
HN2 A district court reviews nondispositive orders of a
magistrate judge under a ″clearly erroneous or contrary to
law″ standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C.S. §
636(b)(1)(A). A decision is ″clearly erroneous″ when al-
though there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. If
there are two permissible views of the evidence, a magis-
trate judge’s choice between them cannot be ″clearly er-
roneous.″
Civil Procedure > ... > Methods of Discovery > Depositions > Oral
Depositions
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Opposing Counsel & Par-
ties
HN3 Depositions of ″opposing counsel″ should be permit-
ted only in limited circumstances. Deposing opposing
counsel has long been discouraged, disrupts the adver-
sarial nature of our judicial system, lowers the standards
of the profession, and also adds to the already burden-
some time and costs of litigation.
Civil Procedure > ... > Methods of Discovery > Depositions > Oral
Depositions
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Opposing Counsel & Par-
ties
HN5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit has followed the United States Court of Appeals
Walt Metz
3. for the Eighth Circuit in adopting the Shelton v. Am. Mo-
tors Corp., rule.
Civil Procedure > ... > Methods of Discovery > Depositions > Oral
Depositions
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Opposing Counsel & Par-
ties
HN4 Under the law as it exists in the Sixth Circuit,
there is no basis for disregarding the Shelton v. Am. Mo-
tors Corp., test when determining whether the deposi-
tion of an in-house attorney may be taken.
Civil Procedure > ... > Methods of Discovery > Depositions > Oral
Depositions
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Opposing Counsel & Par-
ties
HN6 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division , does not hold that the
Shelton v. Am. Motors Corp., rule applies in all situa-
tions where a party seeks to depose an attorney. Rather,
the Court concludes that the test may apply to in-house
counsel and is not limited exclusively to trial or litiga-
tion counsel.
Counsel: [*1] For Massillon Management, LLC, as Au-
thorized Agent for other Prophecy Massillon LLC, Plain-
tiff, Counter-Defendant: Ann-Marie Ahern, Charles P.
Royer, LEAD ATTORNEYS, McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal
& Liffman, Cleveland, OH.
For Prophecy Massillon LLC, Plaintiff: Charles P.
Royer, McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Liffman, Cleveland,
OH.
For Americold Realty Trust, Defendant: Michael John
King, William M. Mattes, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Dins-
more & Shohl - Columbus, Columbus, OH.
For Americold Realty Trust, Counter-Claimant: William
M. Mattes, LEAD ATTORNEY, Dinsmore & Shohl - Co-
lumbus, Columbus, OH.
Judges: HONORABLE SARA LIOI, UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE.
Opinion by: SARA LIOI
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on an objection (Doc.
No. 40) by the defendant Americold Realty Trust (″Ameri-
cold″ or ″Defendant″) to the order (Doc. No. 37) is-
sued by Magistrate Judge George Limbert granting the re-
quest by the plaintiffs Massillon Management, LLC
and Prophecy Massillon LLC (″Plaintiffs″) to take the de-
position of Defendant’s in-house counsel Walter R.
Metz, Jr. concerning pre-litigation, non-privileged mat-
ters. Plaintiffs responded to the objection. (Doc. No. 40.)
Thereafter, Defendant supplemented its objection
[*2] with a declaration from Walter Metz (Doc. No.
47), to which Plaintiffs filed a separate response. (Doc.
No. 50.) The issue is now ripe for resolution.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This case involves a dispute between parties to a commer-
cial property lease. Plaintiffs own and operate the prop-
erty. Defendant is the tenant. Attorney Walter Metz is em-
ployed by Defendant as in-house counsel and has been
so employed at all times relevant to this action. Plaintiff
indicated their intention to take Metz’s deposition as
to pre-litigation, non-privileged matters, Defendant ob-
jected, and the Court referred the matter to Magistrate
Judge George Limbert for resolution. (Doc. No. 31.)
On December 12, 2008, Magistrate Judge Limbert is-
sued an order overruling Defendant’s objections and al-
lowing Plaintiffs to take Metz’s deposition, with the sub-
ject matter of the deposition limited to pre-litigation, non
-privileged matters.
Defendant now objects to the Magistrate Judge’s order, ar-
guing that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly held that
the standard for obtaining the deposition of opposing
counsel announced by the Eighth Circuit in Shelton v. Am.
Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986), and ad-
opted [*3] by the Sixth Circuit in Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 278 F.3d 621, 628 (6th Cir.
2002), applies only to trial or litigation counsel. Defen-
dant argues that the heightened Shelton standard 1
also ap-
plies to in-house counsel such as Metz, and therefore
Plaintiffs should be barred from taking his deposition be-
cause they otherwise failed to satisfy the standard. Plain-
tiffs filed a memorandum in response to Defendant’s
objection, arguing that the Magistrate correctly applied
the applicable law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs contend, Defen-
dant’s objection is without merit and should be over-
ruled.
II. Law & Analysis
HN2 The district court reviews nondispositive orders of
a magistrate judge under a ″clearly erroneous or con-
trary to law″ standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A). A decision ″is ’clearly erroneous’ when al-
though there [*4] is evidence to support it, the review-
ing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.″
1
HN1 Pursuant to the standard announced in Shelton, the deposition of opposing counsel may be ordered where the party
seeking the deposition establishes that (1) no other means exist to obtain the information; (2) the information sought is relevant
and nonprivileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the preparation of the case. 805 F.2d at 1327.
Page 2 of 6
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22415, *22415
Walt Metz
4. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395,
68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948). If there are two per-
missible views of the evidence, a magistrate judge’s
choice between them cannot be ″clearly erroneous.″ An-
derson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.
Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985).
In this case, the Magistrate Judge directly addressed De-
fendant’s contention that the Shelton standard applied
to Plaintiffs’ request to depose Defendant’s in-house at-
torney Metz. The Magistrate Judge concluded that
″the courts in this Circuit have applied the Shelton/
Nationwide [standard] to only the depositions of trial
counsel.″ (Doc. No. 37 at 4, citing Vita-Mix Corp. v. Ba-
sic Holdings, Inc., No. 1:06 CV 2622, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 59755, 2007 WL 2344750, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug.
15, 2007), and cases cited therein). Consequently, the
Magistrate Judge found that the standard did not apply
to Metz, who is an in-house attorney and does not serve
as trial or litigation counsel for Defendant in this case.
Defendant now argues that Magistrate Judge Limbert’s de-
cision was contrary to law because, counter to his con-
clusion, the Shelton [*5] standard indeed covers in-
house attorneys such as Metz. In support of this
contention, Defendant cites Fresenius Med. Care Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., No. 2:05-cv-0889, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12018, 2007 WL 543929 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 16, 2007). Defendant correctly notes that the court in
Fresenius applied Shelton in a situation involving in-
house counsel. However, the court in Fresenius simply as-
sumed that Shelton applied; the party seeking discovery
apparently did not argue otherwise. Consequently, the case
does not directly address scope of Shelton’s application
and, therefore, does not resolve the dispute at issue here.
Nevertheless, Defendant’s position finds strong support
in the Shelton case itself, which involved a party seek-
ing to depose its adversary’s in-house counsel. In Shel-
ton, a product liability action against a vehicle manufac-
turer, a dispute arose when an in-house attorney in the
defendant’s litigation department 2
refused during her de-
position to confirm or deny the existence of certain docu-
ments in the client’s files. 805 F.2d at 1324-26. Based
upon this refusal, the district court eventually granted a de-
fault judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as to liability.
Id. at 1325-26. The Eighth [*6] Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court, concluding that HN3 depositions of ″oppos-
ing counsel″ should be permitted ″only in limited circum-
stances.″ Id. at 1327. In setting forth the test for
determining whether to permit a party to take opposing
counsel’s deposition, the court in Shelton explained sev-
eral motivations underlying the analysis. The court
noted that deposing opposing counsel ″has long been dis-
couraged,″ ″disrupt[s] the adversarial nature of our judi-
cial system,″ [. . .] ″lowers the standards of the profes-
sion,″ [… and] ″also adds to the already burdensome time
and costs of litigation.″ Id. (citing Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 513, 517, 67 S. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451
(1947)). The court explained further that
the practice of deposing opposing counsel de-
tracts from the quality of client representa-
tion. Counsel should be free to devote his or
her time and efforts to preparing the cli-
ent’s case without fear of being interrogated
by his or her opponent. Moreover, the
″chilling effect″ that such practice will have
on the truthful communications from the cli-
ent to the attorney is obvious.
Id.
In declining to apply Shelton in this case, the Magistrate
Judge relied exclusively on the Vita-Mix decision
which, in turn, relied largely on the district court deci-
sion in Ellipsis, Inc. v. Color Works, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 496,
497 (W.D. Tenn. 2005). The court in Ellipsis concluded
that ″the Shelton test applies to limit depositions of attor-
neys in only two instances: (1) when trial or litigation
counsel are being deposed and (2) when such question-
ing would expose litigation strategy in the pending case.″
Id. The court in Vita-Mix appears to have misread this
statement from the Ellipsis decision as a conjunctive,
rather than disjunctive, explanation of Shelton’s applica-
bility. The analysis in Vita-Mix is limited to two sen-
tences:
While the Nationwide court did not under-
take to define ’opposing counsel,’ the Nation-
wide test has thus far been applied by the
courts of the Sixth Circuit exclusively to de-
positions of litigation counsel. [footnote
omitted]. Accordingly, the Court agrees with
defendant and the Ellipsis court and finds
that Nationwide is appropriately [*8] lim-
ited to instances in which a party seeks to de-
pose opposing counsel.
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59755, 2007 WL 2344750,
at *3. The court in Vita-Mix clearly viewed the ques-
tion of whether or not the attorney served as trial
counsel in the case as a threshold requirement for
applying the Shelton test. Here, relying strictly
upon Vita-Mix, the Magistrate Judge answered the
same question in the negative and, finding it dis-
positive of the issue, refused to apply the Shelton
test. This interpretation misconstrues the Ellipsis
decision, completely ignoring the second category
2
According to the opinion, the attorney involved was employed by the defendant ″as an attorney in its Litigation Department,
[*7] and she was assigned specifically to the case at bar as [the defendant]’s supervising ’in-house counsel.’″ Shelton, 805 F.2d at
1325.
Page 3 of 6
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22415, *4
Walt Metz
5. of situations in which the test applies, i.e., where
the questioning would expose litigation strategy in
the pending case.
With the exception of Ellipsis, none of the other cases
cited by the court in Vita-Mix actually addressed the ap-
plication of Shelton to in-house counsel. Rather, those
decisions merely support Plaintiff’s position -- and the
Magistrate Judge’s ruling -- by implication, in much the
same way that the Fresenius decision supports Defen-
dant’s position. That is, the cases cited in Vita-Mix nearly
all happened to involve trial or litigation counsel and,
consequently, the courts applied the Shelton test in a
straightforward manner. See [*9] Chesher v. Allen, 122 F.
App’x 184 (6th Cir. 2005); Invesco Institutional (N.A.),
Inc. v. Paas, 244 F.R.D. 374, 392-93 (W.D. Ky. 2007);
Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc.,
No. 04-84-GFVT, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22128, 2007
WL 926985, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 26, 2007); El Bannan v.
Yonts, No. 5:06-cv-173-R, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34870, 2007 WL 1428653 (W.D. Ky. May 11, 2007);
Iron Workers Local No. 25 Pension Fund v. Watson Wy-
att & Co., No. 04-40243, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24833, 2006 WL 1156723, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 1,
2006); Kammeyer v. City of Sharonville, Ohio, No. 1:01-
CV-00649, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24058, 2006 WL
1133241, at *7-8 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2006); Nisus Corp.
v. Perma-Chink Sys., Inc., No. 3:03-CV-120, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29387 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 17, 2004), Ross v.
City of Memphis, 224 F.R.D. 411, 415 (W.D. Tenn.
2004), rev’d on other grounds, 423 F.3d 596 (2005).
None of the cases explored the limits of Shelton’s appli-
cation and, therefore, they provide little guidance on
the issue before the Court. 3
Under the circumstances, the implication raised by such
cases in favor of limiting Shelton to cases involving
trial counsel is comparatively weak, and certainly no more
forceful than the opposite implication created by the Fre-
senius decision. 4
Given that the Shelton case itself --
the nascence of this entire line of authority -- developed
and applied the heightened standard to a deposition of
an opponent’s in-house attorney, it could not be clearer
that the standard was intended to apply to in-house attor-
neys engaged by the opposing party with involvement
in the matter being litigated. The Sixth Circuit undoubt-
edly was aware of this when it adopted the Shelton
analysis in Nationwide (since Shelton’s own facts in-
volved an in-house attorney), and never once has it so
much as hinted that the test applies exclusively to trial
counsel.
As [*12] explained, the majority of the cases cited in
the Magistrate Judge’s order do not directly address the
scope of Shelton’s application, and none expressly articu-
lates any compelling rationale for limiting its applica-
tion to litigation counsel. Both the Magistrate Judge’s or-
der and Plaintiffs’ memorandum in opposition to
Defendant’s objection stress the importance of the Ellip-
sis decision which, by espousing a two-category frame-
work for applying Shelton, suggested it was appropriate to
focus (at least in part) 5
on whether or not the attorney
was employed by the party resisting the deposition as trial
counsel. However, the focus on the attorney’s status as
trial counsel appears, at least in terms of Sixth Circuit au-
thority, to be a completely artificial construct, and is
not controlling.
The court in Ellipsis based its decision upon two cases:
Pamida, Inc. v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 281 F.3d 726 (2002)
and United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 209 F.R.D. 13,
17 (D.D.C. 2002). Pamida is instructive since it in-
volved the Eight Circuit clarifying the breadth of its
holding [*13] in Shelton, but it does not support the con-
clusion that the Shelton is limited to situations involv-
ing trial counsel. In Pamida, the Eighth Circuit ex-
plained that ″Shelton was not intended to provide
heightened protection to attorneys who represented a cli-
3
Indeed, in only two of the cases was the attorney deposition allowed to go forward over the deponent’s objection. Both are
completely consistent with Shelton. Nisus was a patent infringement case where the defendant asserted as defenses fraud and ineq-
uitable conduct [*10] during the prosecution of the patent. The district court allowed the defendant to depose the plaintiffs’ at-
torneys who had participated in the prosecution of the patent and possessed ″unique knowledge of the facts related to the allega-
tions of fraud and inequitable conduct[,]″ finding that ″the prosecuting attorney’s mental impressions are crucial to any claim
of inequitable conduct in a patent infringement action.″ 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29387, at *9 (citations omitted).
In El Bannan, the district court distinguished Shelton and allowed an attorney deposition to go forward because the attorney
whose deposition testimony the plaintiff sought had failed to prove the existence of an attorney-client relationship and the court
was unable to determine whether he had acted as the defendant’s counsel in the case. 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34870, [WL] at *6. Fur-
thermore, the attorney at issue was also the defendant’s father and, therefore, the court concluded that he was likely to possess
knowledge of facts outside the scope of legal representation relevant to the case. Id. El Bannan is thus both consistent with a straight-
forward application of Shelton and readily distinguishable from the instant case because, here, Metz’s attorney-client [*11] rela-
tionship with Defendant is not in dispute.
4
In addition to Fresenius, at least one other district court decision within this circuit applied Shelton where a party sought to de-
pose an attorney that was not litigation counsel (the attorney is described as the plaintiffs’ ″ERISA counsel″). Pipefitters Local
No. 636 Pension Fund v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., No. 05-CV-74326, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91491, at *8 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 13, 2007).
5
As explained above, by relying upon Vita-Mix, the Magistrate Judge failed to address the second of these two categories.
Page 4 of 6
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22415, *8
Walt Metz
6. ent in a completed case and then also happened to repre-
sent that same client in a pending case where the infor-
mation known only by the attorneys regarding the prior
concluded case was crucial.″ 281 F.3d at 730. This rep-
resents the full extent of the limitation of the Shelton test
set forth in Pamida. Indeed, the court in Pamida specifi-
cally distinguished Shelton based upon these facts, con-
cluding that ″the concerns raised in Shelton regarding
abuse of the discovery process and adding time and ex-
pense to litigation are not implicated in this case where
[the defendant] seeks relevant information uniquely
known by Pamida’s attorneys about prior terminated liti-
gation, the substance of which is central to the pending
case.″ 281 F.3d at 731. The Pamida case simply did not
limit the Shelton test to instances involving trial coun-
sel, and any such reading of the opinion is overbroad. 6
In contrast, the Philip Morris decision, while slightly more
supportive of Plaintiffs’ position than Pamida, is far
less persuasive because it was authored by a district court
in a circuit that (unlike the Sixth Circuit) has never ad-
opted Shelton. 7
HN4 Under the law as it exists in this cir-
cuit, there is no basis, under the facts presented, for dis-
regarding the Shelton test when determining whether
the deposition of an in-house attorney may be taken. 8
In any event, even if the Court followed the analysis set
forth in the Philip Morris decision (which formed the
basis for the two-category framework employed by the
court in Ellipsis), the same result would obtain. In Philip
Morris, the district court concluded that the Shelton cri-
teria ″only apply to depositions of trial counsel--or
counsel directly representing the party in the pending liti-
gation--and then only if the deposition would reveal liti-
gation strategy in the pending case.″ 209 F.R.D. at 17
(emphasis added). Thus, the court in Philip Morris ex-
pressly made allowance for applying Shelton in situa-
tions not involving trial counsel, i.e., where the attor-
ney involved directly represented the party in the pending
litigation.
Here, Metz serves as Americold’s General Counsel and
bears responsibility for planning and directing all
[*16] aspects of the company’s legal affairs, overseeing
all of its litigation, and providing legal advice to the
company’s various departments. (Declaration of Walter
Metz, Doc. No. 47-2, P 2.) Metz was involved with the
lease at the center of this lawsuit from the beginning, ne-
gotiating and drafting some of its terms, and advising
Americold representatives on legal issues relating to the
lease. (Id. P 3.) As Defendant’s in-house counsel,
Metz was told by an attorney for Plaintiffs early on in
this dispute that litigation would ensue if the matter could
not be resolved. (Id. P 5.) From that point forward,
Metz has acted as Americold’s attorney and legal coun-
selor. (Id. P 6.) Since the lawsuit was filed, Metz has
″worked with outside counsel to develop a litigation
strategy, attended depositions, assisted in the preparation
of witnesses, overseen the litigation efforts, and been ac-
tively involved in the defense of this lawsuit.″ (Id. P 7.)
Under these specific circumstances, it appears both
that Metz has been intimately involved in this dispute
since well before it blossomed into a lawsuit, and has
played an integral role in developing Defendant’s litiga-
tion strategy. Both requirements set [*17] forth in
Philip Morris are therefore satisfied. Thus, Plaintiffs’ at-
tempt to take Metz’s deposition therefore implicates
the Shelton test, whether viewed strictly as a matter of
Sixth Circuit law (which, having adopted Shelton whole-
sale, clearly applies to an in-house attorney in Metz’s po-
sition), or even under the considerably more nuanced ap-
proach articulated in Philip Morris (which requires non
-trial counsel seeking to avoid deposition by invoking
Shelton to establish both a certain level of direct involve-
ment in the litigation and a likelihood that the deposi-
tion topics would reveal the client’s litigation strategy).
In light of the foregoing discussion, this Court disagrees
with the limitations imposed upon the Shelton analysis
by the district court in Vita-Mix, finding them unsup-
ported by the referenced authorities and untenable un-
der Sixth Circuit precedent. Indeed, as explained above,
the reasoning underlying the Shelton decision applies
with full force to an in-house attorney in Metz’s posi-
tion. Consequently, the Court finds that heightened stan-
dard of Shelton [*18] applies in this case and, there-
fore, the Magistrate’s decision declining to apply that
standard was contrary to law.
Based upon the Court’s conclusion that Shelton applies,
Plaintiffs must satisfy its three-part test in order to ob-
tain Metz’s deposition in this case. This requires Plain-
tiffs to demonstrate that (1) no other means exist to ob-
tain the information than to depose Metz; (2) the
information sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and
6
The interpretation of Pamida adopted by the district [*14] court in Ellipsis may stem from the statement in the Pamida opin-
ion that the Shelton test was intended ″to protect trial attorneys from [. . .] depositions.″ Id. at 730 (emphasis added). However,
the allusion to trial attorneys is unrelated to the court’s holding and nowhere in the decision is any effort made to create a distinc-
tion based upon the attorney’s status. Certainly, in light of Shelton’s specific application to in-house attorneys, such a distinc-
tion, if intended, would have represented a significant departure from precedent that would not have gone unexplained.
7
See In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman, 350 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2003) (″only HN5 the Sixth Circuit has followed
the Eighth in adopting the Shelton rule.″)
8
HN6 The Court [*15] does not hold that Shelton applies in all situations where a party seeks to depose an attorney. Rather,
the Court concludes (1) that the test may apply to in-house counsel and is not limited, as the Magistrate held in this case, exclu-
sively to trial or litigation counsel, and (2) that the test in fact does apply to Metz based upon on the facts of this case.
Page 5 of 6
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22415, *13
Walt Metz
7. (3) the information is crucial to the preparation of Plain-
tiffs’ case. 805 F.2d at 1327. While Plaintiffs attempt
to make the requisite showing, their effort falls short.
Plaintiffs wish to depose Metz concerning, inter alia, com-
munications he had with third parties regarding construc-
tion on Plaintiffs’ property. While Plaintiffs argue that
obtaining this information from the third parties is imprac-
tical, the standard requires more. Because Plaintiffs ef-
fectively concede that this information is available from
third parties 9
(albeit potentially more difficult to ob-
tain), they fail to establish that no other means exist. In ad-
dition, Plaintiffs have not properly demonstrated that
the information they seek from Metz is crucial to their
case. Plaintiffs [*19] cursorily suggest that the informa-
tion they seek from Metz is relevant to their fraud and
breach of contract claims, but fail to articulate this con-
tention in sufficient detail. Having failed to satisfy
two of the Shelton test’s three requirements, Plaintiffs
are not entitled to take Metz’s deposition. 10
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s objection to the or-
der of the Magistrate Judge permitting Plaintiffs to de-
pose in-house attorney Walter Metz is SUSTAINED, and
the Magistrate’s [*20] order is REVERSED. The analy-
sis set forth in Shelton applies in this case and Plain-
tiffs, having failed to establish two of the three required
factors, are barred from taking Metz’s deposition in
this matter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 21, 2009
/s/ Sara Lioi
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9
Indeed, the documents attached as exhibits to Plaintiffs’ response to the Metz declaration confirm the availability of this in-
formation from other sources. (See Exhibits A, B, & C to Pls.’ Response, Doc. No. 50.)
10
Of course, by refusing to allow Plaintiffs to take Metz’s deposition and arguing that the information is available from third par-
ties, Defendant significantly weakens its contention that Plaintiffs should be strictly limited to ten depositions. The Court hereby
grants Plaintiffs leave to conduct the (up to four) additional third-party depositions (previously mentioned to the Court) in order to
obtain the information it is precluded from questioning Metz about by the terms of this order.
Page 6 of 6
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22415, *18
Walt Metz