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1. Is a Genuine Link Requirement the Future of EU Citizenship?
Abstract
EU authorities have maintained that national and EU citizenship should not be granted if there is no
real connection to the Member State in question.
Legal academics have criticised Nottebohm, claiming that he was mistaken in terms of international
law and moral principles.
According to the study, advocates and detractors fail to recognise that they have been speaking with
differing concepts of the true connection criterion in mind.
Such a mandate would have far-reaching repercussions and would be unenforceable under EU law.
Introduction
Many states have recently curtailed the ability of most immigrants to obtain citizenship via
naturalisation. Several EU member states provide citizenship in return for cash transfers, the
purchase of real estate, or the purchase of government bonds.
The European Commission initiated legal procedures against Cyprus and Malta in 2019 in relation
to their investor citizenship programmes.
There is rising opposition to making the acquisition and loss of citizenship subject to a real
connection criterion. The practical problems of implementing such a rule, as well as its normative
grounds, have been questioned.
Critics also question the EU's legal action against national investor citizenship programmes.
They contend that the EU should not force Member States to employ a link requirement to decide
who should be granted nationality and, thereby, EU membership.

2. Supporters and opponents of this idea have frequently failed to recognise that they were speaking at
cross purposes.
The researchers will begin by attempting to de
fi
ne the parameters of the dispute about actual
linkages.
Although it may be desirable for member states to condition the acquisition of national and EU
citizenship on the existence of a real relationship, the EU seems to
fi
nd such a requirement dif
fi
cult
to implement.
Genuine Connections: Recognizing and Assigning Nationalism
Citizenship and migration theorists have argued over what states owe to people who are not their
citizens but live on their territory.
Many people believe that what is ethically important is social membership.
They base their social membership ideas on the real linkages concept established by the ICJ in the
Nottebohm judgement.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) read a principle of real linkages into international law in
Nottebohm v Guatemala, a notion that has subsequently been rejected by many international courts.
More troublesome than the fact that the actual connection criterion is a dead letter is that its
implementation would have a negative moral impact.
In a globalised society, it would deprive literally millions of people of diplomatic protection.
The ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nottebohm case has led many to believe
that EU citizenship is no longer legal.
The acquisition and loss of EU citizenship, and hence the rights that come with it, is dependent on
acquiring Member State nationality, explains Simon Tisdall.
Proxies and Practice: Genuine Links
People identify differently with the society in which they live and have various social and political
relationships with its political institutions.
This has resulted in two closely related arguments for basing membership borders on the premise of
real relationships. One criticism is that such realistic criteria will be both too broad and too narrow.
The second issue is that they will be unable to accurately assess immigrants' social links.
A voting age is a practical measure that is
fl
awed, if not arbitrary.
However, we do not disagree with the notion that the distribution of political rights must be based
on political ability.
According to the experts, the use of proxies is also the best technique to measure immigrants' social
links to their nation of residency, as Joseph Carens has clearly shown.

3. According to French sociologist Philippe Carens, residence and time are proxies for the degree to
which a person has become a member of society in terms of legal rights and legal status.
The right to permanent residence is subject to a continuous duration of residency of
fi
ve years for
both EU citizens and third-country nationals.
Should Genuine Links Matter for the Acquisition of
Citizenship?
The idea of real ties is used to argue that some people do not have the status and entitlements of EU
citizens.
Is it, nevertheless, appropriate to condition citizenship on a true link?
The scholars will argue that migrants who have real ties to their home nation have a moral claim to
participation in this community.
Despite growing immigration rhetoric and tougher migrant policies over the past two decades,
democratic nations throughout the globe have progressively integrated social membership principles
into their domestic legislation.
The European Council committed itself in 1999 to bringing third-country nationals' legal status as
close to that of EU members as feasible.
The majority of people continue to identify with their nationality in the powerful sociopolitical
sense outlined by the real connection hypothesis.
States with rigorous citizenship standards may reject naturalisation of huge groups of migrants
whose social af
fi
liation is unquestionable.
On the other hand, the requirements for naturalisation might be too broad.
Some governments provide citizenship to a small set of people who have no relevant social links.
Excluding migrants from third-country nations with strong social links from citizenship is not just a
democratic error at the national level, but also a failure of democratic inclusion on the part of the
EU.
An EU devoted to democratic justice has a vested interest in ensuring that migrants are not barred
from national and EU citizenship inde
fi
nitely or for an inordinately long length of time.
The discussion over the borders of EU citizenship has been more concerned with restricting access
to individuals who do not have real connections to the EU than with securing access to those who
do.
EU citizens have the right to travel freely within the EU, to live in a Member State even if they are
not a national, and to enjoy the bene
fi
ts of national citizenship.
Critics of too broad naturalisation programmes point to the potential negative consequences for
other Member States of citizenship acquisition policies that are not founded on the premise of real
connections.

4. More information is required to determine if these impacts may be addressed in large part by ways
other than a real connection requirement, such as improved enforcement or updating of current EU
anti-money laundering or immigration laws.
Would granting citizenship in return for investment still be problematic if other migrants
were treated fairly?
If inequality is not inherently evil, the equality argument cannot be used to justify overly broad
naturalisation requirements.
If it is true that the trust required to promote communal goods is generated primarily by citizens
with suf
fi
ciently strong reciprocal social and political connections, then granting citizenship in the
absence of such linkages may be ethically unacceptable.
Genuine Connections in Union Law
A true connection requirement as a prerequisite for gaining EU citizenship is ethically justi
fi
able,
particularly in light of under-inclusive naturalisation standards.
As the researcher will explain, present naturalisation methods may be ethically questionable, but
they are not illegal under EU legislation as it exists.
The Commission's concerns about investor citizenship schemes should apply to a far broader range
of naturalisation regulations than only investor citizenship programmes.
Genuine ties and the allocation and recognition of EU
citizenship
According to Spiro and Kochenov, the European Commission is incorrect in emphasising the
necessity of a real connection criterion for EU citizenship in respect to Nottebohm.
There are moral grounds to oppose the application of that concept to nationality recognition and to
support it when it comes to nationality acquisition.
When defending real linkages, the Commission should simply cease invoking Notteaubohm.
The Implications of a Genuine Link Requirement
The European Commission is contesting Cyprus's and Malta's admission to EU citizenship for pre-
determined contributions or investments that have no true relationship to the Member States
involved, arguing that it contradicts the core of EU membership.
The researchers will solely look at the rami
fi
cations of the Commission's argument against giving
national and European citizenship without a real relationship.
If the CJEU accepts the Commission's arguments in its legal procedures against Malta and Cyprus,
it will be a watershed moment in the connection between national and EU citizenship.
Three more techniques permitted by domestic naturalisation legislation are incompatible with the
idea of real relationships.

5. States all around the globe have laws in place that allow for discretionary nationalisation and the
waiver of one or more of the naturalisation requirements for migrants who have made or are
projected to make an outstanding contribution.
The idea of "real linkages" cannot be construed in the manner suggested above.
The notion of real ties expresses the aim that citizenship should be granted only to people who have
social membership in the providing state.
Applying this idea as a fundamental part of EU citizenship law, on the other hand, would have far-
reaching effects and would target many other naturalisation activities.
Genuine Connections and EU Law
The Commission believes that giving EU citizenship in exchange for pre-determined payments or
investments with no true relationship to the Member States involved breaches the norm of honest
collaboration inherent in Article 4(3) of the Treaty.
The Commission's only argument in favour of this stance is that since acquiring EU citizenship is
related to the granting of nationality, "the implications of investor citizenship programmes are
neither restricted to Member States."
There is no precedent for the idea that national regulations on nationality acquisition and loss must
be consistent with the criterion of a real relationship.
Existing case law limits the Member States' rights in the area of nationality in two ways. The CJEU
ruled in Micheletti and Garcia Avello that it is unlawful for Member States to limit the implications
of granting another Member State's nationality by setting extra requirements for recognition.
Rottmann and Tjebbes' legal arguments were probably groundbreaking, but it is uncertain how
much they affected practise.
Micheletti and Garcia Avello simply ask that Member States acknowledge each other's judgments
on acquiring nationality.
They do not, in and of themselves, challenge national norms governing the loss and gain of national
citizenship.
Although the CJEU believes that "EU citizenship is destined to become the basic status of nationals
of Member States," this interpretation of EU citizenship has always been dif
fi
cult to reconcile with
the Treaties.
Article 20 of the Treaty of Rome and the Declarations on Nationality support the concept that
nationality standards that are not based on a true connection are consistent with the essence of
European citizenship.
It seems doubtful that the connection between the EU and national citizenship will change
dramatically in the foreseeable future.
Unless the CJEU is willing to disregard the Treaties' limitations, the acquisition of national and EU
citizenship will not be made conditional on the existence of a real relationship.

6. Although supporters of a connection requirement may disagree with this conclusion, not everything
that is unethical is also criminal.
Conclusion
This article aims to differentiate a number of issues surrounding the implementation of a real
connection requirement under EU citizenship law that are often misunderstood by both proponents
and detractors of the idea of genuine ties.
The researcher believes that distinguishing between four questions is useful.
Should the notion of real relationships govern nationality recognition?
Should the notion of real relationships govern nationality allocation?
Should the idea of real ties govern the distribution of EU citizenship?
Should the notion of real relationships be made a legal requirement of EU citizenship?
The second and third questions are closely connected since EU citizenship is drawn from the
nationalities of the Member States.
In response to the
fi
rst question, the researcher stated that it is ethically wrong to make nationality
recognition contingent on a true relationship.
Such a situation would create unacceptably high levels of uncertainty for mobile people.
However, the researcher clari
fi
ed that this does not imply that nationality allocation should not be
subject to a real relationship criterion.
On the contrary, the researcher considered migrants with real ties to a certain culture to have a
moral entitlement to be included as full members of that society.
Furthermore, the researcher suggests that in certain cases, excluding people with no true ties may be
ethically permissible.
These issues also apply to obtaining EU citizenship.
As a result, the answers to questions 2 and 3 are af
fi
rmative.
The researcher, on the other hand, has indicated why the answer to question 4 should be negative.
Although a true connection criterion is desirable, it is unenforceable as a principle of EU law.
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8. 23. Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash
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