International Relations MA Dissertation

When is organised crime considered
terrorism? A case study of FARC
Dissertation
By
Mohammed Abdalla
M00298534
Supervisor
Dr Peter Hough
2015
This dissertation is submitted in part of fulfilment of the requirements for MA
International Relations at Middlesex University, 2015.

Mohammed Abdalla M00298534
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank god for giving me the strength and health to complete my masters
study. To my mum who tolerated my stressful times and my friends for the good advice
they given me. My wonderful supervisor, Dr Peter Hough, for being the best supervisor
anyone can ask for and allowing me for spamming his email inbox. And lastly, Sulaiman
Lkaderi for his insight on how the cruel world of politics works!

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Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................... 1
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... 3
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 4
LITERATURE REVIEW............................................................................................... 9
2.1 Narcoterrorism .........................................................................................................11
2.2 Kidnappings for ransom.............................................................................................18
2.3 Money Laundering....................................................................................................24
2.4 Chapter Summery .....................................................................................................26
STATE AND NON-STATE RELATIONSHIPS ........................................................ 28
3.1 US Relation with Colombia and its view on OC and terrorism .....................................28
3.3 Colombia’s view on OC and terrorism........................................................................33
3.4 Colombia’s Neighbouring Relationships.....................................................................35
3.4 Terrorist Relationships and OC connections ...............................................................37
3.5 Chapter Summery .....................................................................................................39
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 42
BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................... 46

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ABSTRACT
The objective of this dissertation is to look at the linkage between organised crime and
terrorism. Since this is often overlooked, it has created a problem for many people are
whom this nexus affects. It is imperative to show how this linkage has come about, but it
even through they are separate entities, they still overlap. To make this dissertation clear,
the most commonly used organised crime will be mentioned while using FARC, a
known terrorist group operating in Colombia, as a case study. This to show how
organised crime has intensively grown inside terrorist networks. It will be shown how
Government policies have changed to aid countries to combat the interconnection. It will
also be shown what methods need to be addressed to minimise any risks and incidents
such as countries uniting to stop organised crime from widening their global activities.

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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Over the course of history, organised crime (OC) has played a significant part in
the world’s economy. A huge share of the economy belongs to crime groups
whom facilitate in creating a crime network that has been plagued with violence
and acts of evil that has not only cost lives but also diminished any chances of
creating a better society. Furthermore, money that is generated from these
crimes is used to fund terrorism. Because of this, an unseen link has been
established between OC and terrorism. It is imperative to know what the distinct
line between OC and terrorism is and how the two has come to be.
In some cases, it is considered that there is little difference between the two
since OC is loosely connected to terrorism because of funding. Makarenko
(2004) indicated that OC has played a crucial role when it came to the evolution
of terrorism due its role of expanding in regions. Although OC and terrorism are
widely seen as two separate entities, their connection is missed and the link
between them is ignored. There are some researchers such as Williams and
Savona (1995) who state that there is a theoretical possibility of terrorism
mutating into OC and vice versa. Although they are separate, they are still linked
and can come together to form a bigger problem.
It is necessary to start from the beginning to show how the link emerged, see
where is has transpired and what has become the catalyst to their connection.
OC is normally looked down upon when it comes to the international system.
However, it is not entirely ignored but rather underestimated. Liddick Jr (2004:1)
stated that the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US is a simple manifestation of
transnational crime and it demonstrates that OC is a growing problem as well as
vulnerability of nations and the terrible impact it has globally.
OC can have many forms such as trafficking women and children, creating and
distribution of illicit drugs, money laundering, extortion etc. However, when these
crimes have been used in groups to gain advantage for their war against
governments, the crime groups would be classed as terrorists. This dissertation

5
will explore what makes terrorist groups resort to OC as well as see what has
caused crime groups to pursuit these methods to become a terrorist group.
Terrorism is defined as politically motivated acts of violence that can cause
much harm to a country’s security. The US state department defines it as
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to
influence an audience” (National Institute of Justice, 2014).
For this dissertation, The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is
going to be used as a case study to see how groups have evolved. FARC is
considered a well-known example of a terrorist group that uses OC to fund their
actions. FARC has a dedicated webpage that explains their motives and how
the mass media presents misinformation that puts them in the light of negativity.
They have expressed themselves as “Colombian insurgency, proudly
subversives” (FARC, 2013). They are known to drug trade, specifically cocaine,
to gain money to carry out their terrorist activities in Colombia. However, in their
website, they claimed this is disinformation and does not comply in their
delegation. They further explain “As People’s Army we undertake military
actions against our class enemy and their repressive apparatus. Our actions
never aim at doing any harm to the civil population.”
The most intriguing fact about FARC is that they claim to be liberating Colombia
and disposing of the current regime with their own theology, however it seems
the citizens disagree with them because of FARC’s acts of violence and
extortion. This has led to about 5.5 million Colombians to be internally displaced
(Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2013)
This dissertation is not limited to just looking at FARC, other terrorist groups will
be looked at to compare and contrast with FARC. Terrorist relations are
important to assess due to how OC creates a relationship for groups to manage
their flow of operations. The crime groups have supported themselves
throughout their missions but also gained allies. From this, they have increased
their skills, which upsurges their terrorist activities. An example of this is when

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IRA (Irish Republican Army) was seen training FARC members (Engel, 2002).
This movement from both terrorist groups shows that affiliations are an
important trait to have when it comes to growing and expanding their networks.
The dissertation will continue to examine most of the contributions that make
crime groups pursue methods to wage their war for their political views. FARC
has used various methods, one such method is narcotics, which is used to try
and gain money to overthrow the Colombian government. It is estimated that
80% of the worlds cocaine originates from Colombia (Bibes, 2001: 245). If this
product is what helps produce the requirements FARC needs to fund their
networks as well as give them the means to fund themselves, then it would be
inevitable they would exploit this for their gain.
Another major factor to consider is the role of the US since they issued their war
on terror policy. By not directly being involved with FARC and terrorism in South
America, the US becomes a key ally to such countries. An example of this is the
US’s finance aid to the Colombian government between 1982 and 2000 which
grew exponentially up to $800 million in counter-narcotics assistance thus
making Colombia the third leading recipient of US assistance in the world
(Crandell, 2002:1).
To keep the paper concise, research aims were drawn that would help make the
topic clear to understand and the highlight the purpose of the paper. The
following questions were made to focus on the main issues of organised crime
and terrorism:
1) How heavily does FARC rely on cocaine money to fund their activities? This
will then be compared to other terrorist groups on how their reliance on a
specific activity to gain money affects funding of their network.
2) What crimes do FARC use that seems to be working for them and how deep
is it linked to terrorism? What are the benefits for them?
3) What sorts of crimes are terrorist groups focusing on and compare it to others
to see the similarities? What has motivated them to pursue these methods?
4) Are other groups seen differently to FARC? What makes them an OC
syndicate rather than a terrorist group?

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5) How far can an OC group go before it can be labeled a “terrorist group”?
6) What makes OC be linked to terrorism and the differences?
7) What are the constitutional implications of blurring the lines between OC and
terrorism?
These questions will be the basic foundation of this paper and it will address
them in accordance with the research that was made. The aims are also for
establishing the link between OC and terrorism and what other factors are
considered that connects the two.
The introduction briefly explained how OC and terrorism are connected while
using FARC as the case study. With funding becoming a problem, FARC
became reliant on drug trafficking and in most cases, kidnappings as financing
methods. This section continued to indicate the relation crime groups have with
each other, which gives them the key skills they need. Aims and objectives are
defined to make sure what is expected from the research and where the paper is
leading.
Reviewing the literature is the next chapter and the research that was made to
show authors perspectives of OC and terrorism. This chapter is fundamental
since it explores the different opinions of known researchers and the different
policies that have existed to manage the growing threat. The impact it has on
other states will be seen and what have become of the crime groups over the
years. For example, what has FARC changed in their methods and why. As
there are many OC that are associated with terrorism, the literature review will
only focus on the main ones; narcoterrorism, kidnapping for ransom and money
laundering. From research it was seen they were the main ones that most
terrorists tend to turn towards. Each one will focus on FARC and how they used
it to gain power while comparing them to other groups that are associated with
the crimes. With various authors stating how the link has strengthened terrorist
groups and what made them a threat over the years.
State and Non-State Relationships will then be explored in the third chapter.
This will touch on the US’s involvement following the realist theoretical approach
because of how terrorism that’s developing below them. This can be seen as a
quiet danger that could grow if nothing is done about it. Plan Colombia will be

8
explored here, as this foreign policy is important to know the aspect of how
connected OC is with terrorism. Colombia’s struggling solution and their view of
terrorism will follow up along with its neighbour’s attitudes towards them. Lastly,
terrorist group relationships will then be addressed and how important it became
for them to expand their networks and learn new methods to help them in their
ever-growing terror. This is important because without their partnerships, their
OC networks would struggle to work and would not generate enough funds.
Discussion and conclusion will be the final chapter and it will summarise the
dissertation along with a personal view of how the future of the nexus between
OC and terrorism looks and what can be done to prevent it from growing to a
point where it becomes too strong.

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Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
When discussing OC, many people would assume members of a mob and bank
robberies from movies such as Scarface and The Godfather. Although this idea
was a result from the entertainment industry, it is long forgotten that OC is
greater than any of those assumptions. Since there has been a boom in
agriculture and production, OC has grown exponentially up to a point where it
has began to grow into the world’s economy. The United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported in 2009 that transnational OC generated
$870 billion (UNODC, 2011). These figures are alarming since there has been
many set ups of taskforces around the world to keep it from escalating.
Dordevic, a researcher from the Belgrade school for Security Studies, stated
that OC has since evolved from what it used to be, particularly in 1990s under
the influence of “contemporary social movements and globalisation” (2009:40).
She continues to state how this has been because of the evolution of technology
and economy such as ways and methods for faster modes of mobility to
constant development of information systems and communication particularly,
the Internet.
In the late 20th century, OC and terrorism would have been perceived differently
since they were driven by differences of motivation. For example, terrorism was
more seen as politically and ideologically motivated whereas OC was mostly
economically driven and about wealth. This took a wide step to forming a strong
relationship once the Cold War ended due to the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. Liang (2011) explained that because of this collapse, there was a
reduced availability of state financing for terrorists who made them resort to
criminal activities. She clearly supports Dordevic’s theory of Globalisation since
it shows terrorists have moved globally to maintain their finances as time has
progressed. It can be seen that these features acted as a catalyst for OC and
terrorism to come together. With the merger of free trade and the facility of
global travel, OC spread to areas easily that were out of reach from before.

10
FARC’s violent opposing of the right wing government has allowed them to
become terrorists first before the option of using OC resources to continue their
work similar to other groups such as the IRA. From this we could see that
terrorism becomes the main ambitions for groups and they focus on their
objectives but using OC helps them spread themselves. As Globalisation is
transpiring, it has become easier to access many resources as there is global
trade and countries working together to prosper. Exploiting this method, OC has
helped grow terrorists.
As previously mentioned, it took some time for OC and terrorism to come
together. Strategies have changed and better solutions for terrorist groups
emerged to resolve their problem of lack of funds. This is how FARC began
using narcotics as a means to fund themselves after they began taxing farmers.
Sanderson (2004:51) stated that this “evolved from a strategy of simple taxation
to one of direct control and distribution”. With this approach, it has allowed
FARC to equip themselves with high-level weapons, communication technology
and to gain a portion of territorial control from the Colombian government. It
became apparent that this method was working in their favour, which prompted
them to continue using the resources they have and allow the distribution of
narcotics. However, other writers (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001:40) do not entirely
agree with this, stating that drug trafficking and the direct control of it is only a
small strategy that FARC are implementing towards their goals. They argue that
there are other bigger methods such as direct control of Colombian territories
that are more effective than making and distributing of drugs. This is due to
when the Colombian forces try to attack FARC, the control of these key areas is
a defensive move to help them rebel against the Colombian forces. This
opposes Sanderson’s view about the major strategy of drugs distribution.
As there are many acts of OC, only the common ones will be focused on while
keeping it concise and coinciding with the main theme of this paper and the
aims. Although there are distinctions between the two, it should be taken into
account that both terrorism and OC have strong similarities that can be crossed
over between them.

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2.1 Narcoterrorism
The most common form of OC that is used is the smuggling and distribution of
narcotics. With cocaine being one of the highest drugs in demand, the European
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) reported that it is
the second most used illicit drug in Europe (2010). Likewise, the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) reported that in
the US, cocaine was the most used illicit drug that involved the emergency room
in hospitals. In fact, there were 548,608 visits to the emergency department that
involved cocaine in 2006. These figures are higher than heroine and marijuana
combined (SAMHSA, 2006). From this, we can see that there is much high
demand for cocaine in the world, which makes South America a popular country
for distribution.
During the 1970s and 80s, it was estimated by a UN survey that the worldwide
value for drugs is only second to the amount spent on arms trade (Leduc & Lee,
1996). The UNODC described that during those times, the production, trafficking
and sales of illegal drugs was generating as much as $400 billion a year.
However, Jacobson and Levitt (2010:118) argue against this by saying, “The UN
estimates that the international drug trade generate $322 billion a year”. Even
so, the figures still remain large enough to imagine the scale of the problem.
This has continued to make the drug trade the most illegal trades activity to
occur. With this in mind, terrorist groups have found the means to fund
themselves with the drugs, which brings in the revenue. Likewise this sum is
substantial since FARC generates $300 million a year from cocaine smuggling
(Luxner, 2014). Furthermore, UNODC further estimates that the opium harvest
in Afghanistan has reached $3.1 billion, which makes it a powerful financing
source to use for the Taliban. However the drug trade revenue could be biased
since it includes Mexican cartel drug trades, which have a total different agenda,
compared to terrorist groups who use OC as a financial method. From the
estimates, it is very difficult to differentiate between terrorist motives or OC
power motive.

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With the intent to sell narcotics growing, it appeared to show that it became an
investment for groups to exercise this act of selling and to use the profits of
trafficking drugs. The United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) defines
narcoterrorism as “an organized group that is complicit in the activities of drug
trafficking in order to further, or fund, premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against non-combatant targets with the intention to influence (that is,
influence a government or group of people)” (DEA, 2002).
FARC began from taxing coca farmers to grow and distribute cocaine as it soon
became apparent they needed to use the resource. Demand was high
everywhere, which gave a good motive to start dealing with this sort of
trafficking. With FARC taking up the drugs trade, their funds has increased
greatly and helped them wage war against the current regime of the Colombian
government (Stokes, 2005:101). This is an example of how an insurgent group
has created a network of an OC where it funds them. This can then be directed
into their acts of terrorism. This later stretches to other types of OC and creates
a vast system that provides the insurgent groups means to continue with their
war. It may not start with cocaine or drugs, but OC still has a strong introduction
for many groups.
Due to this production, FARC began to grow their military power up to a point
where it became problematic for Colombia. With the conflict growing and FARC
showing their military strength, the government was ready to bargain with them
by giving them a block of land where it is off limits to the government and
paramilitaries (BBC, 2009). Up to this point, with the entire struggle FARC had, it
can be seen as a large success since the government is now taking them
seriously, and their objectives are being met. Because of narcoterrorism, FARC
grew in size and wealth. Kushner (2002:252) wrote that the FARC is a unique
type of danger in the world of narcoterrorism because of how they saw the
potential to use the drug profits for a rebellion turn it into a network of a criminal
initiative.
With the use of narcoterrorism, it is evident that FARC is thriving and influencing
other terrorist groups to turn to an act that would see them continue their

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movement. An example of this is how some IRA members resorted to selling
drugs internationally to pursue their goals (McDermott & Harnden, 2001).
Furthermore, the Taliban implemented the same techniques of FARC such as
taxing farmers and the movement of drugs and chemicals in Afghanistan (Baun,
2009:2). Terrorist influence has changed the idea of OC and terrorism.
Since FARC was doing well with the selling of narcotics, it became apparent that
they are relying on the cocaine money for the funds. Kushner (2002) stated that
as FARC has high dependency on the growing and trade of cocaine, it grew its
network vastly that it no longer was relying on public support, which it later lost.
However, this changed in early 2014 when they renounced illicit drugs and
started working with the government against it (Weinburg, 2014). Nonetheless,
FARC eventually began to produce revenue from $300 million to $1 billion yearly
when they first started. This later allowed them to equip their soldiers with a
weapon that is equal to their enemies. The US objected to this and so, started
funding to the Colombian government to contain the situation. This came in
many forms such as providing training to their army.
The IRA is different compared to FARC, as they do not heavily rely on drugs to
pursue their goals. Although in the early years of when they first started, they
may have utilised the use of drugs-selling in the beginning but this later
deteriorated as they saw that it was more worthwhile to focus on other types of
OC such weapons trafficking and making partnerships with other terrorists.
Although they are not directly involved with the shipping and growing of
narcotics, they do however, establish relationships with other crime groups with
drugs to make way for weapons they need. An example of this is providing
FARC with training in exchange for narcotics, which they then used to pay
Croatian smugglers for armoury (Curtis, 2002). This interconnection of groups is
more important for IRA since they are more focused on obtaining weapons
rather than setting up an OC network.
Likewise in Afghanistan, the Taliban followed the same suit as protecting the
poppy fields and opium production and drug trades (Perl, 2001:3). However
Farrell & Thorne (2005:81) argued that eventually they destroyed the poppy

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fields and the Taliban resented the use of heroin. They no longer had any
reliance on narcotics since there was an alternative. With Osama Bin Laden
hiding in Afghanistan and providing funds to them and private financers
sponsoring them, this has allowed them to continue their terrorist activities
without drugs.
The foundation still remains that money is a big factor that drives terrorism in
countries, with narcoterrorism being the easiest way to finance terrorist groups.
It can be questioned here, if the Taliban had no support with their activities,
would they have continued their drugs trade operation? It seemed that the drug
trades that the Taliban were accomplishing was a last resort for the group to
continue with their dangerous actions. This could be because of how they
wanted to establish Islamic law while they were in power and this prohibits any
association with drugs and narcotics especially when it involves the attaining of
finances from it.
Furthermore, with Afghanistan being the world supplier for opium production, it
is also reported that there was a concerning number of many Afghans being
addicted to heroin. Herat, an Afghan city, has a high culture but unfortunately it
has one of the highest heroin addictions in Afghanistan. From 10 year olds to 60
year olds, there is an estimation of 70,000 addicts in the city (Montagne, 2014).
Looking at it from this point of view, the Taliban were forced to move away from
drugs for the sake of their citizens. This was not enough, as they needed to
destroy the poppy fields to stop the production from being made.

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Figure 1 shows that towards the end of the Taliban’s regime, they have
successfully reduced the number of opium production and contributed to the
decline of its trade globally. Also, the number of opium fields is small compared
to the level when the US-NATO intervened after 2001 which means that the
Taliban were hugely part of that poppy field reduction.
Comparing this to FARC is a different situation since the Taliban had private
backings from Pakistan and other countries, which has become an alternative
for them instead of carrying on with narcotics. Since FARC has majority of the
cocaine in their territory, it seemed ideal to them to sell this rich resource to
external terrorist organisations and drug cartels which has not only benefited
them financially but also built a relationship which has given them necessary
training in other fields they were inadequate for.
The US saw that cocaine was a vast advantage for FARC as it was a prime
source for them. Since the US argue that FARC & narco-guerrillas make huge
profits from drugs, it needed to be stopped by destroying the coca fields. Stokes
(2005) reported that the US highlighted in their policy, Plan Colombia that
destroying the coca fields is the primary goal for the military while engaging the
Figure 1:
UNODC, 2013

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rebels is second. This plan is ideal in this situation because of how the US saw
that attacking the source of FARC’s funding would hinder them. But while this
may have stopped FARC, it should be remembered FARC has territories filled
with coca fields. Plan Colombia is an important aspect to look at that heavily
involves the US and the Colombian government to try and eradicate the
insurgency group within. This will be looked at later.
When it came to the opium fields in Afghanistan, the US had a different idea and
approach compared to how they dealt with it in Colombia. According to Global
Research, the US military are ordered to protect the opium fields in order to
appease farmers and government official that are involved with the drug trades
which can turn against the Afghan government. It further states that the opium
production is both the product of war and the cause of conflict (Voice of Russia,
2013). The protection of opium could be for the US interest in making Afghan a
controlled state that it once was. The Afghan government benefits from drug
trade, which makes them, sustain their finance and military efforts against the
Taliban.
However, the UK had a different approach to the heroin fields especially during
post 9/11 than the US. During that time, Prime Minister Tony Blair asked and
received backing for being the international lead for counter narcotics policy and
operations in Afghanistan (Committee of Foreign Affairs, 2009:9). This was
because of how the heroin trade was affecting the UK and people as well as
children were consuming the drug, which has created a moral panic. There was
pressure on the British parliament to act now on Afghanistan especially since
US-NATO were ready to occupy.
However, not all terrorist groups have resorted to narcoterrorism to fund
themselves. The National Liberation Army (ELN), another major guerrilla group
in Colombia, is a terrorist group that are slightly different to FARC. They follow a
Communist and Liberation ideology while FARC follows a Marxist-Leninist
approach to revolutionise Colombia. ELN are known to stage kidnappings,
extortion and attacks in economic infrastructure. They have abstained from drug
trafficking for a long time but until recently where they have been linked to other

17
drug trafficking organisations (Insight crime, 2010). This is understandable since
they saw FARC was benefitting from the drug trades.
Because cocaine is one of the highest grossing product in Colombia, it would
seen that drug trades are just limited to cocaine but according to the United
Nations Office of Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), the US reported that Colombia is
their main supplier for heroin. This is contradictory since Afghanistan is where
majority of the heroin is manufactured and distributed. The report continues to
say “there is insignificant information about the role played by heroin originating
in Afghanistan for the United States market” (UNODC, 2013). The
manufacturing of heroine is mostly in Afghanistan than in anywhere else.
Furthermore, guerrillas are not known to produce any poppy fields so it is
unlikely that heroine is coming from Colombia.
As well as combatting the government forces, FARC is also dealing with right-
wing paramilitary units that try to occupy most territories of Colombia. Likewise
when it came to funding, they resorted to narcotics as well. The paramilitaries in
Colombia control some coca fields and have challenged FARC to obtaining
some of the key territories that are needed to boost production (Youngers &
Rosin, 2005:103). With Colombia being the primary place for cocaine, it seems
that all groups want to benefit from this and export their products to as many
external organisations. This produces profit for them, which they then feed
towards their terrorism networks.
Narcoterrorism is a big issue that surrounds the world of OC and terrorism. It
bridges the gap between the two and makes the connection clear that it is easy
for a terrorist group to use narcotics. The supply and demand is high in most
parts of the world, which makes it easy for their trades to reach places. For
Colombia, setting their cocaine trades to the Caribbean and to the US is what
makes the groups grow their power. This OC is the ideal way for most terrorist
groups to arm themselves and use the resources that they have to stage
warfare for their political views. With narcoterrorism spreading, it is very hard to
contain the situation and to stop the flowing of drugs that not only ruins people’s
lives but also allows the groups to cause terror for their political gain.

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2.2 Kidnappings for ransom
Kidnappings for ransom is also one of the main focus crime groups use for
funding their terrorist activities. An investigation by the New York Times found
that Al Qaida and its affiliates have obtained at least $125 million in revenue
from kidnappings alone since 2008. Roughly half, or $66 Million, was paid out in
2013 (Callimachi, 2014). This type of funding has been easy for most groups
and it does not require suspicious movements unlike drug trades.
The Council of the European Union acknowledged that the use of kidnapping for
ransom by terrorist groups have been a financial method and they use it to
strengthen “their operational capability, carry out illegal trafficking, recruit new
operatives and buy weapons and equipment to launch and plan new attacks”
(Council of European Council, 2014). They continued to state that governments
should not submit to the terrorists’ demands due to how it contributes to their
goals.
FARC is known to use kidnappings for a very long time. In 2001, they kidnapped
714 persons in just that year (Jurith, 2004:158). They have claimed on their
website, “We have never kidnapped. When we arrested a person, generally
because of his unwillingness to pay revolutionary taxes, we called that a
“financial detention”, not kidnapping” (FARC, 2013). They see that it is their duty
to make sure individuals are paying these “taxes”. This statement can be seen
as a terrorist justification of resorting to OC. Colombian government seem to
suffer the most since most of the victims were government officials, there were
no choices but to listen to FARCs demands and agree to them. These figures
can be compared to other groups such as ELN who have kidnapped 875 but this
due to how they abstained from narcoterrorism.
Kidnappings for ransom is an effective OC strategy that terrorists use because it
has two purposes; the first being that it sends a message to the government and
the relatives that they are being serious and expect their demands to be met.
Secondly, the family or the government would try to negotiate or think of a

19
solution but this would normally be rejected because of how the terrorist groups
only demand money. This method of OC has gained advantage for many groups
and increased their reputation, which forced governments to now take them
seriously.
While FARC has been continuing to use kidnappings as financial method, they
have devised ways and tactics to exploit these methods to gain advantages.
These methods are unorthodox and tend to contribute more money from victims
families and government. For example, when they have kidnapped someone,
they would implement a technique where they would cut off all communications
between themselves and the victim’s family. This would then amount pressure
on the family thinking the worst case. This would then prompt them not just to
pay immediately but also double or triple the requested amount (Wright,
2009:124). This has allowed them to gain more money than typically and has
been an effective strategy. It shows how FARC has taken a simple organised
crime and expanded it towards their terrorist goals.
As mentioned previously, most of FARCs kidnapping victims are government
officials as they see this is the best way of demonstrating their seriousness. In
fact, an ambassador reported that they wanted to disrupt the election in 2001
but failed (testimony of Ambassador Mark Grossman, 2000). He also stated that
FARC along with other insurgency groups continue to pose a threat to
Colombia’s democracy, prosperity and security. Along with kidnappings, other
OC and terrorist acts can contribute to become a threatening menace to the
Colombian government. As kidnappings were increasing, the Colombian
government pleaded with FARC to stop any further kidnappings, as this would
strongly affect citizens and the economy. However, as the government did not
make any concessions, FARC felt that kidnapping still remained one of
strongest strategy available to them
As kidnappings are growing threat in Colombia, it is vital to see how much of an
impact they have had in the last few years. The graph below gives us an idea
about how FARC is compared to ELN and other kidnapping cases:

20
Figure 2 shows kidnapping has become an enormous issue for Colombia to deal
with especially when there are other groups out there aside from FARC and ELN
that are contributing towards abducting people and demanding ransom. This has
contributed more attention and pressure on the Colombian government.
Over the years, FARC began to change their ideas and began to stop
kidnappings. Just recently FARC was involved with a guerrilla kidnapping just
outside the Ecuadorian border However, they shortly freed them as they did not
hold them hostage or demanded a ransom as FARC recently refuted the idea of
kidnapping and ceased association of this crime (Hinchliff, 2014). This is a fine
example of how they did not care about funding or getting a payment but more
to do with showing a good gesture.
Another known group that has recently flourished from kidnapping for ransom
outside South America is North Africa’s Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM). This group has been at war with the local countries’ governments for a
long time, which has caused many conflicts across the Sahel region in Africa.
AQIM is considered to be the best example of a terrorist group that deals with
kidnappings because of how they grew fast to a point where they are a
Figure 2:
Escobar,
2004

21
considered abundant threat to the neighbouring states of Algeria.
An article in the National Post (Barber, 2013) further elaborated on kidnapping
for ransom especially in North Africa where they received powerful statements
from US Treasury official, David Cohen and Vicki Huddleston, a former US
ambassador to Mali. Huddleston argues that North Africa is going through
powerful terrorist activities. She stated, “What you’re dealing with in that region
is a nexus of crime, terror and religious extremism”. Cohen adds to this by
explaining how kidnapping in general is the “most significant terrorist financing
threat today”. We could say that kidnapping is a powerful motive for many
groups everywhere to show their power and authority. They are ready to
challenge the governments when it comes to meeting their demands. He
estimated that various groups have collected over $120 million in the last
decade.
With AQIM being a powerful threat in Africa, it is consequential to not underrate
a terrorist group that uses kidnapping as one of their main funding of their
terrorist acts. As most of the victims represent a government, AQIM pursue them
in attempts to kidnap them and to negotiate a demand. An example of this was
in 2008 when they kidnapped a Canadian diplomat in Niger (Barber, 2013). By
being in captivity for 130 days, he was finally released for money and prisoner
exchange. The Canadian government denies that they have negotiated with the
captors but there were speculations that they have secretly paid AQIM millions
and provided favours. Likewise this is another kidnapping for ransom trait that
terrorists have seen work when it comes to demand. They saw that when
governments comply with their demands, they are most likely to agree with other
demands in the future if they successfully kidnap important people.
It is true that AQIM uses this money to arm and look after themselves while they
continue with their terrorist actions. However, with kidnapping being their
primary source of income, this does not mean that they have limited themselves
to this act of OC. AQIM has increased from contrabands and smuggling
narcotics and weapons to Europe and other places. They have worked together
with other South American groups to learn these new methods. With the drugs

22
demand so high in Europe, it has become a means for AQIM to join the drug
trade and have a relation with drug cartels to resupply themselves with
armaments (Larémont, 2011:252). A brief statistic was provided regarding the
amount of kidnappings AQIM conducted between 2003-2011. It was revealed
that sixty-three westerners in total were kidnapped where majority were in 2003.
The number of victims is inconsequential because what is far more important is
the amount of money AQIM has managed to get from this which goes towards
deadly and more serious terrorist crimes that affects countries and destroys
lives. Kidnapping was just an OC that allowed AQIM to pursue their terrorist
motives.
AQIM is very different if they were to be compared with FARC. As they are
based in a different region they both have a different agenda but use the same
tactics and methods to pursue their goals. However, AQIM can be seen as more
religiously motivated as they are looking to establish pure Islamic sharia.
Furthermore when both groups are compared with their kidnapping methods, it
is seen that FARC is more motivated by ransoms whereas AQIM are more after
prisoner exchange as well as ransoms in most cases. Nevertheless, both
terrorist groups use iconic methods of OC that contributes towards their terrorist
activities. Through this, it allowed them to attain the money they need conduct
their activities.
The implications for paying off terrorist groups to release hostages have grown
and its benefits to the terrorist have not gone unnoticed. As they have
accumulated vast amount of money, something had to be done to stop them
from pouring this money into their terrorist network. In early 2014, the UN has
adopted a resolution to the Security Council to stop terrorists from benefitting
from ransoms to look for international cooperation instead (UN, 2014).
Furthermore, the UK ambassador specifically stated how the Security Council
needs to “eliminate it as a source of terrorist financing”. This shows how much
benefit terrorists gain and the threat it has become. Seeing countries unite
especially within the Security Council can stop terrorists from gaining a lot and
can also hinder further attacks. There have also been steps taken in for
countries to protect their people from easily being abducted. This is done by

23
working with private sectors and to see lucrative ways to help law enforcement
agencies.
FARC recently wrote on their website they will cease kidnapping but they are
determined to continue their illicit activities (Dudley, 2012). Vaguely explaining
the reason, there could be a number of factors such as not making enough
money from kidnappings, losing amount of armed rebels or even losing territorial
control. Its difficult to determine the reason but many Colombians feel relief from
this while others are sceptical about this stunt especially since FARC is still
operating in other areas of crime such as extortion.
Despite their pledge to cease kidnappings, there were still numerous reports in
early 2013 regarding kidnapping victims that fell prey to FARC (Insight Crime,
2014). This is bad for them as it adds mistrust from the government and also it
makes matters worse for the Colombian people since they had that false hope of
being safe from kidnappings. However, there are still some FARC rebels who
are adhering to stopping the practice of kidnapping but Colombia is far from safe
since there are other groups such as ELN who openly continue to focus on
kidnapping as a form of OC they can use.
Kidnapping for ransom is a deadly form of OC that terrorists use when they need
to money. It mainly focuses on gaining finances and sending a message to the
country. With most countries affected by kidnapping, it has become unstable for
many countries to try and combat alone. Hence, recently why the UN made that
resolution to stop groups expanding rapidly. This sort of OC lapses over to
terrorism because of how useful it has become for those groups. They see it as
a profitable way to expand their networks. This later contributes to how they
acquire their resources for their cause.
It has cons for them as well since some victims escape or get killed while they
are in their custody, which makes matters worse for them as it infuriates many
governments worldwide. With the affects on citizens, fear is being ordained and
a moral panic emerges. FARC has heavily experienced botched kidnappings for
ransom, this not only made them lose money but it gave a negative impact on
them. It is no wonder that they have decided to stop using this method in the

24
future but with some rogue members continuing with this, it has become hard to
eradicate this method entirely.
With the Sahel in Africa being a hot spot in the continent for kidnapping, it has
also caused a problem for countries within that region. Because of this, AQIM
has managed to grow and become a serious terrorist threat because of how
much money has been accumulated. Kidnapping for ransom is one of the most
profitable OC that exists and because of this, it has become a number one crime
for many terrorists to use to fuel their warfare for political change.
2.3 Money Laundering
As well as narcoterrorism and kidnapping for ransom, money laundering is a
well-connected OC that has made way for terrorists to hiding their accumulated
money. For instance, FARC continues to hide their assets from the government
and other anti-terrorist organisations in off-site areas. In fact, about 70% of their
annual assets are stored abroad (Pachico, 2012). It has become a lucrative
business for terrorist groups to sustain themselves using this method while
trying to divert the attention from governments and security organisations. The
UNODC estimated that in 2009, drug traffickers laundered about $1.6 trillion or
2.9% of the global GDP (UNODC, 2011). Of course, this stat is given from
laundered money that is seized or frozen, there are more which is not known
about that makes it difficult to determine the quantity that is hidden from anti
organised crime agencies or assets not accounted for. Furthermore, some of the
figures could not be terrorist related.
Determining the amount of money laundered money and counterfeit businesses
is extremely hard for anti-crime organisations to seize due to how accounts and
assets are transferable globally. With money laundering becoming popular
within terrorist groups, it is often linked to drug trafficking more money as a
whole. Money laundering then comes as a way to hide the money they have
obtained from this illicit act.
FARC is a known for using this method to plan their future motives with the
funds they have raised. FARC have their assets in many places such as Brazil
and Spain where they have small connections with some groups who manage
their money. Since these groups are dealing with FARC, it is vital for countries to
work together to try and quash the connections that can stop FARC from

25
continuing using their external funds (Telegraph, 2010). Since both OC and
terrorist groups use money laundering to hide money from authorities, it is vital
to consider this an important crime so that it can cut the flow of money being
transferred from one place to another. Reuter (2004:1) argues since there was a
rise in international terrorism, anti money laundering agencies have
acknowledged ways to tackle the problem and investigate widely the use of
money laundering and fake businesses. But it has become extremely hard to
investigate businesses with banks resisting government interference with their
clients.
Many groups such as The Shining Path and Al-Qaeda use money laundering,
Because of this mixture of groups using this method, it has become a purpose
for them to work together when it involved money being moved. This allowed
terrorist groups to grow to become very rich where captured assets do not affect
them greatly.
With individual people becoming involved with terrorist money laundering, it has
become a vast problem to look at overall since it shows that terrorists are
heavily influencing people to join their OC network. This touches on the theory of
OC being used as a focus of wealth rather than for terrorist motives. For
example, some terrorist groups tend to give a few of their assets to hide through
counterfeit businesses. This creates a partnership between them their
associated partners. Anti terrorist groups find it hard to find these businesses
because the evidence is minimal. It becomes further difficult when banks are
involved with the illicit businesses. For instance, HSBC has acknowledged that
they have allowed money laundering that is linked to terrorism and drug
trafficking (Jamieson, 2012). This has become problematic since it has put
heavy strain on the bank and also on the agencies for not investigating
especially since there was suspicious activity residing within accounts.
With many organisations set up to monitor and target the counterfeit businesses
that terrorists use, it became a necessary act for many state governments to
intervene and seize assets. The one predicament anti-money laundering
organisations are facing is the fact that many terrorists group have a substantial
amount of assets around the world. With a chunk of assets seized, it could not
be enough to completely stop terrorist groups from growing because of the other
assets they have in possession.
Money laundering is hard to emphasis due to how low media attention it has

26
compared to other major OC. Also, it is more to do with OC rather than with
terrorism as there are a substantial amount of crime groups such as drug cartels
and mafia who operate with fake businesses to make sure that their funding
network is not seized. As this is the fundamental way that most groups use to
attain their assets, it has become very hard for government and anti-organised
crime organisations to follow up on the businesses and make sure that it leads
back to specific groups. For instance, hard evidence such as HSBC admitting to
dealing with money laundering has to be admitted before any actions could take
place. Furthermore, terrorist groups tend to set up businesses in countries that
are out of reach of anti-terrorist units. Certain governments, which are classed
as US allies and other cooperate businesses, may turn a blind eye for regional
agendas or financial gain. An example of this is other gulf states secretly funding
ISIS according to US Gen. Martin Dempsey (Rothman, 2014).
With all these facts to consider about money laundering, it is very hard to
determine how this has links with both OC and terrorism. With it being an ideal
way for terrorism groups to use to fund themselves, it has become a factor for
many anti-terrorism taskforces to stop because of how much assets are worth to
terrorist groups but it is incredibly hard since there are other assets out there
that are beyond reach. It is always easy for these terrorist groups to make up
heir losses. Furthermore through research, it is found that money laundering is
not as a great deal compared to narcoterrorism or kidnapping for ransom since
both of those are a high level crime that endangers lives. This is the main priority
for most anti-organised crime & terrorism organisations since it stops the
terrorists from succeeding in growing their network and causing damage.
2.4 Chapter Summery
The chapter has provided an overview of what connects OC with terrorism. With
OC expanding and many groups using ways to enhance methods to continue
their terrorist activities, it has become crucial to examine how these OC has
helped terrorists grow and how funding has become attributed to them. The
three OC mentioned are most relevant to terrorism than other crime acts since
terrorists have found that they are more efficient. Of course, there are more
numerous crimes and improvement of methods. An example of this is FARC
moving from taxing farmers on coca fields to using the resources as
narcoterrorism. With terrorists exploiting these methods, it has grew their
network globally and allowed them to carry on their crusade. Now that we have

27
expanded the OC and how it fits with terrorism, the next chapter will show the
US’s involvement, what Colombia has done about the issues they were facing
Colombia’s neighbouring countries and terrorist relationships.

28
Chapter 3
STATE AND NON-STATE RELATIONSHIPS
In this section, countries view on OC and terrorism will be looked at as well as
terrorist connections. These connections are vital because of how OC helps
terrorists gain it. Countries’ view on OC and terrorism will be seen on how how
they affect national security especially when they are conducting such activities
near borders.
Through researching the US, it was seen Realism was a more adequate
theoretical approach to use. Realism is relevant as it shows how states act
towards situations that could undermine their authority or threaten their national
security and interests. An example of this is the US’s involvement in FARC and
their leading war against terror foreign policy. It is intriguing to know that during
that South America is considered the US’s back yard. Of course, the US does
not like the idea that terrorism is happening below them while the repercussions
of OC (e.g. Narcoterrorism) is spilling towards them.
Colombia’s government will then be seen and what precautions they have taken
to contain the situation. For example, how they managed to maintain order
within and not giving in to FARCs demands such as military strategy and means
of punishment. This then leads to their neighbouring countries’ view and how
OC and FARC became involved in conducting crimes beyond borders.
Relationship with terrorist groups will be briefly looked at and how they are
functioning at the moment in accordance to their methods of OC. This is to show
how some terrorist groups are growing compared to others.
3.1 US Relationwith Colombia and its view on OC and terrorism
It is an interesting view looking at South America from the US’s perspective as
they are located just below them. As OC has expanded during the late 80s, it
would have seemed ideal for FARC and other terrorist groups to export illicit
products to North America. With the US heavily focusing on tensions between
them and the Soviet Union, the US did not really focus on the situation in South
America up until the late 90s with Plan Colombia.
Plan Colombia was an initiative set up by the US government in combatting drug
cartels and left wing insurgents in Colombia. The initiative was set up to help

29
Colombia without getting directly involved. They gave heavy investments to the
Colombian government. Between 2000-2005, the US government spent
approximately $3.5 billion to Colombia in its war against narcoterrorism with
majority of it going to military components (Mejia & Restrepo, 2008:2). According
to the realism theory, the US acted as a controlling influence over less powerful
states in accordance with the international agreement that exists between the
two countries. As Colombia is seen as less powerful country to the US, it is in
the realism cycle that Colombia adheres to the US.
This is shown in the US’s backing of Plan Colombia, which focuses on the
eradiation of coca fields. As narcoterrorism has started and was reaching high,
coca fields had to be destroyed with combatting terrorists the second objective.
This strategy was devised because of how much contribution narcoterrorism has
towards terrorist objectives. However, with the US not directly intervening and
respecting Colombia’s sovereignty, it is still felt that the US is not happy with
how Colombia is trying to contain the situation alone. With military expenditure
high and sending troops to train Colombian government forces, the US had
patience and believed in Plan Colombia, which they thought, was a success
(Smith, 2010). However, some people disagreed with this.
Leech (2011: 81) argued that the US was economically interested in Colombia
and its resources. Those resources were situated in places that FARC was
occupying. The US believed that Plan Colombia contributes to maintaining
relationships with Colombia. He further went to explain how the foreign policy
brings the necessary security for the multinational cooperations on the ground to
exploit those resources. Because of the loan the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) gave to Colombia the previous year before Plan Colombia, the US
questioned if Colombia was economically stable. But when the US grant was
given, it has improved the economic situation there. This made the Colombia-US
relationship stronger. Judging from this argument, we can see that Leech’s point
of view that the US has strong economic interest in Colombia rather than heavily
focusing on reducing OC and terrorism in their region. Their hidden agenda is
more to do with the Colombia’s resources and using it while displaying an
alternative motive of helping the Colombian government combatting terrorism
and drug trafficking.
However, Livingstone did not agree with Leech’s view about economic
stabilisation. She emphasised that the US was directly involved with Colombia's
issue of OC and terrorism in a more of a war-like strategy. In fact, the original

30
Spanish-text Plan Colombia promoted for a peace plan with some social
reforms. The US took the document and ratified it entirely making it a plan for
warfare (2009:118). Her view of the US’s involvement with Colombia’s issue
supports Realism theory as the US is “flexing it’s muscles” and showing that
they are hard-hitting the issues Colombia faces. The US advocated a military
resolution for a social situation. With narcoterrorism threatening the relationship
between Colombia and the US, a economic problem but military solution that
falls in line with realism is presented as a way to deal with it.
Looking at both of these writers, we can see that they are both arguing about
two factors that the US is interested in Colombia; economically and militarily. As
both writers are expressing their difference in opinion, they still agree on how the
US was being a realist in their relationship with Colombia. Leech’s view on the
economic security of Colombia is stronger than Livingstone’s view on military
security as he explained how Colombia has rich resource that the US needs for
its multinational corporations. This has moved away from narcoterrorism and
more into acting on the US’s interest. Nonetheless, they both agree that this
foreign policy has done more bad than good. An example of this is the arial
spraying of pesticides on coca farms. The pesticides kill not only the coca plants
but also food crops and animals (Livingstone, 2009:119) (Leech, 2011:81)
Plan Colombia was a slow but there has been some minor progress in reaching
its goal. FARC’s military strength has weakened compared to how they were 10
years ago, violence has decreased and the Colombian government military has
strengthened doubling its size (Smith, 2010). From this, we could see that the
US has a hard attitude on OC and terrorism and are willing to use all their
resources to stop it hence they presented the Plan Colombia foreign policy.
Since the War on Terror has accelerated many policies to stopping terrorism, it
is clear that terrorism is growing due to how OC has played a part with its
expansion.
With the US pressing hard on Colombia to deal with the situation, it became
apparent Colombia did not do enough to stop the growing threat before the US
became involved. With the change of leadership throughout the years, many
Colombian leaders vowed to change the situation with some nearing success.
An example of this is president Alvaro Uribe who was re-elected in 2006 vowing
to defeat the rebels (BBC, 2013). The US saw that it needed to intervene with
using the financial resource they have. After 9/11, anti-terror laws and foreign
policies were accelerated by Congress including any new foreign aid to

31
Colombia. From this, it can be seen that the US’s relation to Colombia has
grown and they have continued to support them. However, the US’s
concentration on Colombia was limited as the US’s prime focus shifted to
terrorism in the Middle East and Asia. This was to capture the terrorists
responsible for 9/11 and making sure the US’s hegemonic status is restored.
They needed to demonstrate to other nations that the US would not tolerate any
form of terrorism. When dealing with the sudden escalation of terrorism just after
9/11, OC was included since the US saw that it was a primary source for
terrorists to grow their networks. So it can be questioned here, why not give
other countries such as Afghanistan and Yemen as much support as they did
with Colombia instead of using full military intervention? The answer could be
because of how Islamist terrorism became a priority to the US rather than any
other forms of terrorist (Ackerman, 2011).
Moving on from Plan Colombia, the US has strengthened its relationship with
Colombia and continued to do this over the years. With its approach to terrorism
and OC, it has become the leading country to declare war on terror. This makes
it the ideal country to define groups as terrorists. With this in mind, it can be
questioned here how the US differentiates between OC and terrorist groups.
The US has many OC syndicates within the country. Since these groups are not
connected to terrorism, the US has not placed them as a higher priority.
However, if there was terrorism found in the US that would be completely
different.
There are constitutional implications when defining OC and terrorism because of
a country’s constitution. Since no country can deploy an army from within their
own border, this means as long as OC and terrorism are considered separate,
OC groups in countries such as the US are considered normal crime groups
instead of terrorists. If they were considered as terrorists, then the US would
face many problems, as they would not be able to deal with it militarily as it
would go against their constitution. Military force can only be used in rare
situations such as a country declaring martial law for instance, when
government opposition was too high in Thailand (BBC, 2014). Using the same
methods to combat one form cannot be used to combat the other unless it is
considered the same (Liang, 2011). If the link between them were strong, then
the US would need to rethink about how they define state terrorists and OC
groups without having to change strategies and know that they might need to
send armies from within. This includes sending drones from within to target
groups since they would both be classed as the same. To avoid that, a

32
separation between them has to be established to deal with them in a distinct
way that does not violate any constitutional laws of a sovereign country.
Although US have the intention of dealing with OC and terrorism as separate
entities, they still link them together in regards to funding and are determined to
combat them. The US State Department recently assessed their counterterrorist
strategy and hope towards maintaining the international security. They stated
their department, Counter-Narcoterrorism Operation Centre (CNOC), which
coordinates intelligence of narcoterrorism, is the primary US effort to disrupt the
crime-terror relationship (US State Department, 2011). However, the US needs
to bear in mind all forms of OC that can be exploited to gain advantage for
terrorist groups instead of focusing on narcoterrorism. It is true that
narcoterrorism is the biggest use of OC for terrorists groups but OC is easily
interchangeable (Lauren, S, V, Leahy-Harland, S, Gottschalk, E, 2011).
The US has a valuable relationship with Colombia, which helped them remain
strong. Narcoterrorism there has reduced but it still remains about the US’s true
motives with Colombia. As long as their hegemonic status is intact, they will
continue to use tools to aggressively reduce the threats that can attack the
international security. OC and terrorism has been a working force that can
disrupt the international community. The US sees themselves as an influential
country that could abolish it. By looking at how the US has approached the
nexus of OC and terrorism, we could see that the US has made significant
amount of change towards protecting everyone from terrorism by attacking OC
used to fund it. They did this by setting up taskforces such as CNOC. But
because the line between the two is blurred, it has become hard to contain the
situation using the same methods. Different ways to tackle the problem and
different taskforces were set up to make sure that they are kept separate. For
instance, the FBI is handling any OC that is happening in the US whereas the
military and the CIA deal with international security and intelligence. The US’s
view of a group and labelling them a terrorist is a leading definition for most
countries and the UN because of their leading war against terror. Countries
need allies to combat terrorism and stop it from growing, with the US open to
helping such countries, it has become very hard for terrorists growing and
meeting their objectives, which some consider immoral.

33
3.3 Colombia’s view on OC and terrorism
With the US helping Colombia, it has become a primary objective to contain the
situation and make sure that terrorism does not escalate in the country.
Narcoterrorism and kidnapping has become a high liability for the Colombian
government. With stats rising and pressure from the US, Colombia has taken
many initiatives to stop terrorist groups. Most of these strategies are unorthodox
such as Law 48, which gave military permission to arm civilians and use them as
a paramilitary unit (Human Rights Watch, 1996:17). This in turn created right-
wing paramilitaries that became rogue and started to delve into cocaine trading
to fund themselves many years later. This backfire has been an example of
desperation Colombia had during its early years of battling OC and terrorism.
With failed strategies and negotiations, it could be said that they required aid
before the US officially joined.
Bibes (2001:246) argued that Colombia had a different approach to tackling OC
and terrorism. She continues to say that in some places in Colombia, the
difference between narco-war and guerrilla-war is blurred. The Colombian
government uses the same resources they have to tackle both whereas the US,
as has been shown above, see it as different and separate. With right-wing
paramilitaries and left-wing insurgency groups attacking from both angles, its no
wonder Colombia was struggling with the situation. The US was focused on
narcoterrorism rather than tackling guerrilla warfare due to the affects of how
terrorist groups are thriving from drug trafficking.
Posada (2002) adds to this by emphasising that Colombia is a weak state that
lacked any military initiative that was needed to tackle OC and terrorism. He
continues to state that any help to Colombia was meaningless and doomed to
fail. This was due to how the laws in place are inadequate to face the threats. It
has been weakened by decades of trying to negotiate with the terrorist groups
and finding a peace settlement. Corruption was very high and biased
prosecutors allowed endless fruitless investigations. Captured terrorists escape
or avoid prosecutions due to the corrupted officials in the judiciary. He has
heavily criticized the Pastrana government for giving FARC a safe haven the
size of Switzerland through three years of negotiations that has achieved
nothing. He finally says that peace should come from strength, not from
weakness. He’s view is very strong and does make valid point about how
Colombia failed to prepare for the expansion of the terrorists. Paramilitaries are
an example of how OC and terrorism became a big problem for the Colombian
government to involve non-military units.

34
Biettel (2014) also agreed with Posada on how the Pastrana government has
not achieved as much as they could with the failed negotiations. However, she
further expands on this by stating how giving FARC an area was one of the
biggest mistakes since it allowed them to grow rapidly during that time. This
could have been the turning point for FARC since they were booming during that
time of immunity. This has increased the problem for Colombia which then lead
to the US’s involvement. This is an example of how Colombia was not making
progress with negotiations and their diplomatic solutions. The US saw that
Colombia’s solutions were not working hence they needed to intervene.
These authors agree that the Colombian government did little to stop OC and
terrorism from escalating in the country. Biettel (2014) expanded on the
repercussions of the decisions the Pastrana government has made in
negotiating with FARC, while Posada (2002) criticised the entire Colombian
government on their actions with captured terrorists and their failed policies. It
was inevitable the US were getting involved since the problem was growing with
no progress. With Pastrana’s decision of giving FARC a haven, this has allowed
FARC to take advantage of that and turn it into a battle strategy.
Through this research, Colombia is a big country to close the gap between OC
and terrorism only because of how cocaine has played a major factor and
contributed to narcoterrorism. As nothing has been achieved until Plan Colombia
was implemented, it became a direct example of how terrorism has profited from
OC and gained a wider advantage for the terrorist groups. Teicher (2005:2)
argues that Colombia’s turning point in its war came in 2004 much later than
Plan Colombia. This supports the theory that Colombia was not achieving what
they have hoped and it only came years later to contain the situation that has
escalated throughout the years. The source of this leads back to narcoterrorism,
kidnappings and other OC that became a part of terrorist activities.
After 2004, Colombia has made significant amount of effort to quash terrorism
and OC. This is done by negotiations (in the aid of the US), intelligence and
counterstrategies that help stop drug trafficking and other crimes. Due to this,
FARC has decreased and became less powerful compared to before. Change of
leadership is another example, as presidents made this matter their top priority
as it has terrorised Colombia for many years. Technology has grown and
became useful in this war. From drones (DeYoung, 2011) to other technological
compatibility, this became an advantage for the Colombian taskforce and

35
military. There have been many successful negotiations with FARC such as the
recent one. President Santos stated “This is the farthest we have ever come in
trying to end the war” (Economist, 2014). The lead negotiator Humberto De La
Calle called this negotiation a major success as "With this we will eliminate the
gasoline that has fuelled the conflict in Colombia—drug trafficking.” Colombia is
closing in on its terrorism due to the US’s involvement and the War on Terror
foreign policy that allows countries such as Colombia to deal with threats that
emerge because of OC and its fundamental link to terrorism.
3.4 Colombia’s Neighbouring Relationships
With insurgency groups operating in Colombia, it caught the attention of
Colombia’s neighbouring countries; Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru. As all of
these countries speak Spanish and share similar culture, their relationship is
strong but as long as their sovereignty is intact. With FARC operating near the
borders of Venezuela, it is evident that Venezuela protects its borders and
makes sure that none of the outcome of terrorism affects them. There have
been a number of cooperations with Colombia and the Venezuelan government
to attack FARC and ELN members that are based near the borders (Sullivan,
Biettel, 2014:6). This relationship is an example of how countries need to work
together to stop OC and terrorism.
However, the relationship between Colombia and Venezuela remains vigilant
and the border between them is used in most cases to smuggle drugs and
perform terrorist activities. Likewise this could be compared to AQIM in the
African continent who operate in the middle sector of Africa and attack countries
in the Sahel region. Most terrorists group expand their OC in other territories to
gain exposure. With FARC entering the border, it is clear that Venezuela takes
this seriously as it increased its border security (Mallett-Outtrim, 2013)
FARC seems to grow in borders surrounding Colombia. Insight Crime reports
that in 2010, FARC has about 28 operating encampments in the Venezuelan
border (2012). This remains to be complicated as the Venezuelan president,
Hugo Chavez, was considered an ally of FARC and as harbouring rebel camps
(Aljazeera, 2011). This severed the relationship between the two countries and
made it difficult to work together. The US State Department reported in their
2010 antiterrorism report Colombia has been accusing the Chavez government

36
of aiding FARC in Venezuelan border (2010:147). This made Venezuela end
their diplomatic relations with Colombia. This impacted Colombia negatively as
they needed allies to combat the growing threat of OC and terrorism especially
with their neighbouring countries. However, with change of leadership and new
agreements, Venezuela resumed their diplomatic relations with Colombia and
offered their services to stopping FARC (Bird, 2011).
Colombia’s relation with Ecuador is different compared to Venezuela and a little
more hostile. This is due to an unprecedented attack Colombia made on the
Ecuadorian border to raid Raul Reyes, FARC commander at the time. The
attack not only killed the commander but also “massacred” innocent lives that
were living in the area (Lendman, 2008). This angered the Ecuadorian
government since there was no permission asked and sudden. OC and
terrorism together jeopardise lives and endangers relations with countries if it
spills over borders. As mentioned earlier, relationships are vital for countries to
maintain because of how aid can easily be given and joint operations can be
made to ensure the threat is neutralised. Colombia’s relation with Ecuador is the
worst relationship compared to Venezuela and Peru because of that attack.
Nonetheless, FARC may have lost a commander, but they have won in
destroying a relation between two countries that would have been useful in the
war against OC and terrorism.
Colombia’s relation with Peru on the other hand is the opposite compared to
Venezuela and Ecuador. Since Peru has a terrorist group of their own, The
Shining Path, it is evident they would require Colombia’s help in containing them
and offer intelligence to improve their strategies. An example of this is
Colombian and Peruvian air forces training together to maximise the
effectiveness of combatting narcoterrorism (Dialogo, 2014). Both countries have
an understanding on how OC and terrorism works and follow a relationship of
working together to deal with the problem. This is an example of the approach
countries need to undertake to deal with the growing problem that affects
countries such as Morocco and Algeria with the AQIM threat in the Sahel. With
both Peru and Colombia working together, it is evident that the Shining Path and
FARC will follow suit. Peru’s primary focus at the moment is combatting the

37
Shining Path that is challenging the government entirely. With Colombia next to
them and FARC operating in their border, it needs aid to stop terrorism ruining
the country.
3.4 Terrorist Relationships and OC connections
With Colombia and many other countries afflicted with terrorism and OC,
relations need to be maintained to make sure that it does not spill over to
neighbouring countries. Likewise, this is the opposite with terrorist groups as
they feel it’s important to exchange terrorism tactics and to make sure their OC
network covers as many dependant areas as possible. This means operating
outside their territory and into other countries and working with OC groups.
Shelly, Picarelli and Corpora (2007:143) did not agree with this and shared an
expression of how rare it is for two crime groups to form an alliance separately
motivated by economics and politics. Yet there are many different groups
working together regardless of different agendas they are driven by. The EU
proved this by stating an example of how the Kosovo mafia and the terrorist
group, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLN), establishing a heroine smuggling
operation during the Kosovo conflict (EU, 2012). This is because of how they
now have a shared interest in reaching their goals and working together is the
best way for that.
The most evident reason why terrorists tend to work together is the fact that they
are lacking skills they need to continue with their terrorist activities. As
previously mentioned, IRA was linked to FARC and they exchanged skills they
both lacked and saw that the other group had. This was necessary for them to
continue with their work and was vital to them. Likewise FARC needed weapons
so they traded with the Russian mafia in exchange for that (Guardian, 2001).
With these dealings and connections, terrorist groups has enhanced their OC
tools which gives them the necessary funds they need which they invest in their
activities.
Sometimes, terrorists group associate with other groups not just for skills and
weapons trades but also for sharing ideals with other groups. For example, it
was recently found out FARC was on a mission to revitalise the Shining Path,

38
whom are slowly decaying due to the elimination of their leader in the early
1990s (Borkan, 2010). This shows how unity is another factor that contributes
the connection terrorist groups have. This connection then serves as an
advantage to widen their OC networks.
With connections strong between groups, it is easy for groups to become
interchangeable and even recruit from each other. An example of this is again,
FARC using Shining Path rebels to join them since that group is slowly
saturating (McDermott, 2003). With this in mind, it becomes easy for terrorist
groups to establish new OC with new regions to explore and old assets being
used for new funding purposes. With AQIM’s connection to Al-Qaeda the two
groups are easily exchanging tactics, methods and members so that they both
benefit from the relationship they have made (Byman, D, L, 2012:5). This
becomes harder for countries involved to find out who exactly is responsible for
some acts that have affected them.
Likewise this follows Makarenko’s view on “hybrid groups”- terrorist and OC
groups that use as much factors from each other, that what they stand for is
entwined (2004:136). She uses the example of Albanian criminal organisations
and how they supply the tools KLA need in their war during 1993. This has
strongly followed the suit of how OC and terrorist groups can be merged into
one become more dangerous than when they were considered separate. With
this merger, she used FARC as an example of how they moved from a
“revolutionary purity” to shifting their terrorism to a development as criminal
cartels. However, this is very questionable as it differentiates groups and makes
countries ponder how they deal with groups if they become hybrid. To stop the
complications from that, most countries deal with these groups as either an OC
unit or terrorists.
Hybrid groups can only be considered with groups that are classed separate.
For example, AQIM is not a hybrid group with Al-Qaeda since they are both
terrorist organisations. She further describes how the relationship between OC
and terrorism is strong that it creates a “black hole”. This type of condition is
when government is almost non existent and how terrorist groups evolve their

39
primary motivation from political aims to criminal gains which causes states to
be taken over by a crime-terror group. An example of this is Iraq and
Afghanistan.
An interesting graph to show the cross between OC and terrorism is one that
was cited in Jane’s Intelligent Review in 2003 (Figure. 3, EU, 2012):
Figure 3 shows the direct affiliations both groups have with one another for
mutual benefits. The second is when both groups apply each others tactics to
reach their goals. OC groups would apply terrorism for operational aims while
terrorists would apply OC for a way of financing. The third linkage is when the
real transformation happens that makes all operations and OC acts last and
embedded onto the mission of each group.
However Stern (2005, cited in Clarke, 2011:13) disagrees with Makarenko
explaining simply how terrorist groups tend to hire organised crime groups to
conduct what she calls “dirty work”. From what is gathered, some terrorist
groups do not want to be deeply involved with what OC groups are doing so
they hire them to conduct the work they are good for, while the terrorist groups
continue with their terrorist activities. She continues to state how some OC
criminals join terrorist groups for the sake of violence or financial reasons but
still, do not believe the ideologies of the group. There is an overlap that occurs
between the two groups and how they work together.
3.5 Chapter Summery
With investigating countries’ relationships with one another and terrorist
organisations, we could see that maintaining relationships and working together
gave a better result. The US strongly encourages Colombia taking action on the

40
growth of drug trades because of the advantages it gives terrorists. With no hard
military intervention, they saw an alternative by giving aid and as much support
to their South American partner while combatting terrorism in other regions.
Their War on Terror policy has made them the leading country to define
terrorism and influence the UN to consider criminal groups as terrorists. Their
realist approach see that OC is a commodity to terrorism and as a hegemonic
state, they feel that it is their duty to control the situation and make sure that
terrorists are not thriving from OC acts and urge other countries that are affected
by this to take action.
Before the US got involved, Colombia was struggling and did not know how to
control the situation. With FARC growing and ELN now joining the drug trades, it
has become vital to seek help especially since it is affecting the US. By the US
backing them, it soon became apparent that Colombia is improving and
becoming volatile with their eradication of terrorism and OC. Colombia’s
counterattacks has spilled onto Ecuador that left them with an uneasy relation.
Venezuela’s border has become an infestation for terrorism activity but this is
collateral as it shows how Colombia is following the US’s stance on the
seriousness of terrorism. They want to make sure that FARC has not dealt any
damage inside Colombia. However, their alliance with Peru has been successful
and vice versa for Peru since they are already facing the Shining Path.
Through the later years, terrorist groups have found that they need OC groups
to form a connection and ensure that they are getting the right training and
weapons to combat their enemies. To do this, Globalisation has played a part
since they expanded their OC network across regions. This has benefited them
financially and formed a relationship that gave them the upper hand in most
cases. As previously mentioned, some groups are too merged into OC and
terrorism and consider themselves as hybrids. Hybrid groups have the
opportunity to gain the advantage of OC while focusing on terrorism. As
Makarenko adds to this, “terrorists by day, criminals by night” (2004:136). This
changed the way OC and terrorism are perceived and shows the nexus between
them. Since countries are dealing with them as separate, it is very hard to
pinpoint exactly what made hybrids groups appear and what best way to deal

41
with them.

42
Chapter 4
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
OC and terrorism has strong similar factors but are still considered separate in
most cases. With a very thin line between them, it is very easy for members to
overlap. But the differentiation between them is debateable for many countries,
which makes it more difficult to combat. The US is strongly combatting the less-
publicised terrorism; there is a wider perspective of the terrorism that is linked to
OC that endangers lives. OC is acting as a fuel for terrorist activities that many
groups are benefitting from. Due to Globalisation and failed states, it has
become very easy for groups to change the direction of their networks and
target places that is in need of their supplies.
The growth of FARC and how they have expanded from a peasant group to one
of the richest terrorist groups due to drug trafficking and other crimes they use to
fund themselves, has been demonstrated. They were relying heavily on their
coca fields, which is vulnerable to action by the Colombian government. Other
terrorist groups such as IRA and the Taliban used narcotics to fund themselves
but they were not as reliant. The Taliban is questionable since it generated more
than enough money and used the opium production to establish links with other
groups. In their later years, it was seen that they resented the use of narcotics
and abstained from it but due only to other financial methods such as private
sponsors.
There are many other OC that terrorist groups exploit to manage their funding,
such as weapons and human trafficking, but with the main ones mentioned
above, it was seen through research that they became the primary ones
terrorists groups tend to specialise in to increase their power and tools. But the
three that are mentioned does not always work for most groups. For instance,
narcoterrorism works for FARC because of the resources they have to produce
cocaine whereas kidnappings for ransom works better for AQIM because of how
they feel that it generates more money quickly and it weakens states.
Nonetheless, terrorists see that OC methods help them in many ways to do with
financing. Another example is IRA specialising in weapons trafficking and their

43
links to other OC groups because of how they needed to learn new methods.
Most terrorist groups focus on a specific OC act which works for them and if it
connects with their terrorist activities. With many terrorists groups performing
OC acts, they are still considered terrorists instead of an OC group because of
how they use the funds to perform deadly acts of terror. With the history of 9/11,
it has fast paced many groups to be considered terrorists because of how they
have similar ideologies to the ones responsible for 9/11. With the US leading the
war on terror, it is their definition of a terrorist that sets an example for many
other countries to label groups regardless if they are more to do with OC.
Through research, countries do not consider OC and terrorism to be
interchangeable. Both groups remain separate and as individual entities. They
may use crimes and tactics from each other but they are still considered
separate. However, terrorism is seen as a bigger threat than OC since it
endangers lives, challenges the current government and becomes very
unstable. With this in mind, if any OC group uses terror methods to obtain any
one of their goals, then in the view of the US, UN and other important countries,
they would be labelled as terrorists because of how those methods were used to
“terrorise” people and bring danger to the current order regardless of any
financial objective.
The linkage that makes OC connected with terrorism is mostly the funding that
terrorism needs. With OC being used by small groups for economic and wealth
purposes, terrorist groups see this as a solution to arm themselves. There is an
obvious difference between OC and terrorists groups since one is motivated by
wealth and the other by politics. However, since both are classed as different,
that does not stop the overlapping between the two and the relationships that
are established to help one go forward.
As previously mentioned, there are constitutional implications of tackling OC and
terrorism, which explains why taskforces, anti-crime organisations and countries
do not merge OC with terrorism. As there are many OC individual groups
operating in countries they cannot be classed as terrorists since it would create

44
such implications that would jeopardise the constitution of that country. Armies
cannot be deployed into a country from within and there would be moral panic.
To stop that from transpiring, OC and terrorism has to be classed as separate
but overlapping. With methods being used from both groups, OC and terrorism,
it creates a strong nexus that makes methods easily exchangeable.
Nonetheless, as long as crime groups have a motivation (either political or
economical), they then can be defined.
The connection between OC and terrorism needs to be acknowledged in a
higher level for countries to create policies that could help combat it. Because of
this nexus, strong countries are becoming weak and it weakens vulnerable
countries creating an expansion for criminal groups in that space. The financial
connection terrorism has with OC makes it more dangerous and gives it the
ability to challenge any government with the complex tools, weapons and
intelligence that they need. Also powerful nations need to work together to
protect the vulnerable countries from being used as a breeding ground for
terrorists to expand their networks. An example of this is the US and UK
occupation of Afghanistan. The US has already declared itself an ally to any
country that needs aid and support to harden its military forces. An example of
this is the US-Colombia joint military plan on FARC and other terrorists. This
shows how the situation can be contained and for other countries to work
together and acknowledge that OC and terrorism has a firm grip once it holds a
country hostage. Anti-terrorism and anti-OC organisations need to also work
closely together to exchange intelligence and to perform joint operations.
FARC carries an extensive amount of resentment in their website and justify
their actions through change and proposals of peace. They blame government
failures, the white house and the media for giving disinformation. They see
themselves as peace coordinators and are willing to push through it if it means
to fight government forces. They claimed to have already tried without violence
and “governments have repeatedly interrupted the attempts to find peace
through dialogues”

45
Now, with FARC slowly decaying, negotiations began with the Colombian
government. They were not as powerful as they once were since they began to
cut back in kidnappings and started to resent the use of drug trades. With new
negotiations and other countries acting as mediators, it has become a new era
for the acknowledgement of OC and terrorism. If FARC falls in line with the
Colombian government, then this would help improve many other countries’
determination to carry on dealing with OC and stopping it from linking to
terrorism in various global levels.

46
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