This document discusses the enforcement and follow-up of decisions made by international human rights bodies. It argues that this is the weakest link in achieving universal respect for human rights. The document examines the enforcement procedures of judicial bodies like the European Court of Human Rights as well as quasi-judicial bodies under the UN. It also analyzes the relatively new Universal Periodic Review mechanism of the UN Human Rights Council and discusses strengths and weaknesses of its follow-up system. Overall, the document provides a detailed analysis of enforcement challenges across different human rights mechanisms and considers whether weaknesses in follow-up pose the greatest obstacle to universal human rights.

1. StudentIDNumber:650042321
The enforcementandfollow-upof the decisionsof international humanrightsbodiesis the weakest
link in the effort to achieve universal respect for human rights.- Critically discuss this statement
Word Count: 3727
Human rightsenforcementbodiesfall intotwobroadcategories.Firstly,the judicialbodiesthatpass
judgements,suchasthe EuropeanCourtof Human Rights,the Inter-AmericanCourtof Human
Rightsand the AfricanCourton Human andPeoples’Rightsandsecondly,quasi-judicial bodiesthat
issue viewsorrecommendations,suchasthe UnitedNationstreatybodies,the InterAmerican
CommissiononHumanRights, the AfricanCommissiononHumanandPeoples’Rights andthe
UnitedNations Universal PeriodicReview mechanism. Inbothinstances,the respondentstatesina
givencase are expectedtocomply withthesejudgementsand decisions byvirtue of beingaparty
that has acceptedthe obligationsunderaspecifictreaty.1
However,asOette hasasserted:“The
enforcementof judgementsand decisionsof regionaland internationalcourtsand treaty bodies
constitutesa litmus test forthe effectivenessof the human rightssystem.Delaysand non-compliance
at the enforcementstageposea continuouschallengethatfrustratesvictimsand threatensto
underminetheimpact of the human rightsbodies’decisions.”2
Therefore,itisappropriate toconsideredtowhatextentthe enforcementandfollow-up
procedures,orlackthereof,canbe consideredthe weakestlinkinthe efforttoachieve universal
respectforhumanrights. Generally, there appearstobe a greaterdegree of compliance with
judgementsof judicial bodies,namelythe EuropeanCourtandthe Inter-AmericanCourt.3
Due in
large to the judicial andbindingnature of theirjudgmentsdecisionsbycourtsare consideredto
carry more weightandconsequentlyinstigategreaterlevelsof compliance thantheirquasi-judicial
1 Lutz Oette, “Bridgingthe Enforcement Gap: Complianceif State Parties with Decisions of Human Rights
Treaty Bodies.” (2010) 16(2) INTERIGHTS Bulletin,51 column 1
2 ibid
3 ibid

2. counterparts.4
Yet,within the lastdecade twonotable reformshave occurredwithinthe quasi-
judicial arenaspecificallywithinthe UN humanrightsmechanisms.In2014 the UN treaty body
systemunderwent modifications withthe objectof increasingitsresourcesand effectiveness5
while
in2006, the UnitedNationsCommissiononHumanRights wasreplacedbythe Human RightsCouncil
and a Universal PeriodicReviewMechanism (UPR) introduced.6
Inlightof these developments,
discussion willfocusonwhetherornotthe enforcement/follow-upproceduresof these twobodies
are the weakestlinkinthe efforttoachieve universalrespectof humanrights.
As consideredbyEgan “An obvious starting pointforproposalson intensifying implementation rates
is that of measuresand procedurestaken to follow up a […] recommendation.”7
Indeed,therehave
beenseveral proposalsastohow bestto improve thisaspectof the system.8
However,the
enforcementof humanrightsisjust one aspectof a longerprocess. Assuch,the shortcomingof the
otherstagesof the humanrightsmechanismsmust alsobe discussed.
The UPR isa peerreview mechanism9
mandatedto“promote the universality,independence,
indivisibilityandinterrelatednessof all humanrights.”10
Designedtoreview the humanrights
situationsin all UN MemberStatesandthe implementationof international normsandtreatieson
the ground, 11
the UPR WorkingGroup (consistingof the 47 Membersof the Council), alongwithany
otherUN MemberState thatwishes totake part in the dialogue, 12
reviews the humanrights
4 Ibid column 2
5 Navanthem Pillay, Reportof the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the strengthening of the Treaty
Body System (June 2012)
6 Weissbrodt,D. “United Nations Charter-Based procedures for addressinghuman rights violations”(2011) in
Gilbert, G. Hampson, F and Sandoval,C. (eds) The Delivery of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Professor Sir
Nigel Rodley, (Routledge, 2011) 13-38;
G.A. Res.60/251, Establishing the Human Rights Council and the Universal Periodic Review
7 Egan, S. “Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System” 13(2) (2013) 13(2) Human
Right Law Review 209,234
8 Systematisation of better coordinated and inclusivefollow-up procedures;the development of a specific
intern-committee ‘treaty body follow-up mechanism’ for all treaty bodies,or the establishmentof a dedicated
unit of follow-up or senior level ‘Treaty Body FollowUp Coordinator’post within the Officeof the High
Commissioner for Refugees.
9 Analytical Assessmentof the UPR, 2008-2010,upr-Info.ord (2010) 8
10 Human Rights Council Res.5/1 Institution Building of the United Nations Human Rights Council, B1 (para 3) a.
11 Analytical Assessment(n-9) 7
12 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/BasicFacts.aspx

3. situationof the subjectstate andproduces an outcome documentdetailing the Group’sdecisions on
that state’shumanrightsstatus and itsrecommendations forimprovement.13
Consideredtobe the “cornerstone”of the UPR, these recommendationsconstitute the state’s
roadmapfor the nextfouryearsto improve humanrights.14
Inhisassessmentof the
recommendationsof the UPR’sfirstsevensessions,ProfessorEdwardR.McMahon foundthat,of
the 10262 recommendationsmade,15
the majorityinvolvedeitherarecommendationtotake a
general action,suchas improvingthe situationof minorities,orcomprisedaspecificaction,suchas
amendingalawor establishingamechanism.16
However,asnotedbyOberleitner,acceptance of a
recommendationdependsonthe subjectmatterratherthanthe wordingor provisionsof the
recommendation.Forinstance: “statesopposedtodiscussingsexual orientationasahuman rights
matterare likelytorejecteventhe vaguestmentionof the topicwhiletheyare preparedtoaccept
other,more specific,action-orientatedandcostlyrecommendationwithouthesitation.”17
Alternatively, the “care forcomparative advantage”i.e.the desiretobe at leastas ‘good’butnot
betterthanothercomparable statesnevertheless,maybe adrivingforce foradherence to
recommendations.18
Promisingly,the UPRmaintaina100% participationrate andtherefore “isa
significantinnovationof the HumanRightsCouncil whichisbasedonequal treatmentforall
countries.”19
Assuch,thisaspectof the processappearsunsullied. However,the real questionarises
as to howeffective the UPRisinfollowing-upandenforcingitsrecommendations.
13 ibid
14 Analytical Assessment(n-9) 9
15 UPR Infor,“Data Base of UPR Recommendations” availableat http://www.upr.info.org/database/ accessed
04/01/2016
16 McMahon, Edward R. “Herding cats and Sheep: AssessingStateand Regional Behaviour in the Universal
Periodic Review Mechanismof the United Nations Human Rights Council,”July 2010.
17 Oberleitner, G., “Countering Ritualism:WhatDoes ItMean To Follow-Up Human Rights Recommendations?”
Paper Delivered at‘The Rituals of Human Rights Workshop Centre for International Governanceand Justice,
Regnet Australian National University Canberra,Australia,25-27 June 2014.
18ibid
19 Analytical Assessment(n-9) 11

4. Promisingly,some stateshave alreadystartedthe follow-upprocesstoimplementthe report
recommendations.20
AsnotedbyBrett,followingitsreviewBarbadosoptedforthe abolitionof the
mandatorydeathpenaltyanda change in itsdomesticlegislation.21
Furthermore,Barhrain’s
National Plansof ActionincludedUPRrecommendationsanditsgovernmentformedasteering
committee withNGOrepresentativestomonitorthe implementationof the ActionPlan.22
One reasonfor the apparentsuccessof the implementationof the recommendationsisthatstates
are affordedthe opportunitytorespond tothe recommendations anddetail whetherthey‘accept’
or ‘reject’23
the suggestionwithonlyacceptedrecommendationgoingontobe implemented.24
However,this‘freedomof decisionmaking’alsopermitsstatestorejectrecommendations.25
Thisis
a keyweaknessof the UPR systemasthe implementationof astate isbasedon the ‘good-will’and
responsibilityof the state.Thiscanbe comparedtothe treatybodiessystemwherethe committee
of expertsimposethe recommendationsformandatoryimplementation. Nevertheless,reasonsfor
rejectionsshouldbe valid. Forinstance, bothPakistanandIranrejectedrecommendationsasserting
that they“were neitheruniversallyrecognisedhumanrightsnorconformtoitsexistinglaws,pledges
and commitments.”26
Assumingthata recommendationcanbe irrelevanttoa state,itisuseful to
have thisrejectionoption.However:
“Statesgiving irrelevant reasonsforrejecting recommendationsthatcould protectthehuman rights
of its peoplepreventthe HRC fromsuccessfully implementing theUPRmandate.Such actionshinder
the objectiveof the UPRwhich is to improvetheglobalhuman rightssituation.”27
20 ibid 12
21 Brett, Racel,A Curate’s Egg. UN Human Rights Council: Year 3. 19 June 2008 to 18 June 2009,Haman Rights
and Refugee Publications,Quaker United Nations Office.August 2009,11
22 IPR Info,“Follow-Up” availableathttp://www.upr-info.org/Follow-up-html accessed 02/01/2015
23 Other responses include:not clear/ general responseand pending/no response.
24 Analytical Assessment(n-9) 14
25 ibid16
26 FIACAT, “Universal Periodic Review: An Ambivalent Exercise,” Report and Recommendations April 2008-
December 2009 (December 2009) 19
27 Analytical Assessment(n-9) 16

5. Treatybodiesandspecial rapporteursare alsoable toofferrecommendations duringthe UPR
process.However, theirrecommendations shouldbe distinguishedfrom those of states.28
The legal
nature of the treatiesmakesitmandatoryforstatesto complywithrecommendations of treaty
bodies.Assuch,a state cannot rejectsuch a recommendation underthe guise of ‘freedomof
decisionmaking.’29
Furthermore,whilstthe subject state maybe requestedto submitamid-reportonhow itis
complyingwithitshumanrightsobligations, the lackof amechanismtomeasure the
implementationof arecommendationbyastate acts to furtherundermine the system inits
enforcementandfollow-up.30
Therefore,there are limitstothe follow-upand enforcementaspectof the process.However,itis
not the onlyshort-fall tothe system. Intermsof participation,duringmostsessionsthe Western
Europeanand Others Groupwas the mostactive and ingeneral,regional groupsplayanimportant
role instates’contribution.The trendisthatmostactive group inthe review sessionsthe one to
whichthe state underreviewbelongs. 31
However,there isthe notedriskthatstatesmayact more
favourablytowardsstateswithintheirregionorwithwhomtheyhave otherrelationsandtherefore,
not provide anunbiasedcritiqueof theirhumanrightsstatus.32
Therefore,thisposesachallengeto
the pursuitof universal respectof humanrights inthatnot all humanrightsviolations of states will
be ‘prosecuted’withequal vigour.
The secondfour-yearcycle of the UPR (2012-2016) is currentlyunderwayand islargelydevotedto
following-upthe recommendationsmade inthe firstcycle.Assuch,the effectivenessof the system
28 ibid 19
29 ibid
30 For recommendations on improvingfollow-up process including,establishinga concretemechanism to
evaluate the implimentation of recommendations by states see: Analytical Assessment (n-9) 22
Analytical Assessmentof the UPR, 2008-2010,upr-Info.ord (2010) 17
31 Human Rights Council Res.5/1 Institutional buildingof the United Nations Human Rights Council E 3 Para 32
Analytical Assessmentof the UPR, 2008-2010,upr-Info.ord (2010) 8
32 Analytical Assessment(n-9) 16

6. to promote universal respectforhumanrightscan betterbe examined once completed.Promisingly,
the systemhas publicised itspotential forthe wayitcaters for the ‘triangulation’33
of reporting,
recommendingandfollow-up.34
Some innovationshave beendevisedinthe firstcycle,suchasthe
submissionof mid-termreportonimplementationbyanumberof statesand the involvementof
civil societyactorsandotherstakeholdershasbeenhigh.35
However,the potential forfailure is
equally great.The UPRhas issuedover11,000 recommendationsthatneedtobe implementedby
statesand reportedbackon,there are alsouncertaintiesonhow progress(onimplementation) will
be measured,andmaintainingthe motivationgeneratedinthe firstcycle will remainachallenge.36
Furthermore,uncertaintysurroundsthe follow-upandenforcementof the UPR,it maynevertheless,
transpire thatthe recommendationsthemselvesare weak,potentiallydue tobias,anddonot
promote humanrightscompliance tothe bestof theirabilityinthe firstinstance. Itisonlyupon
examinationof the resultof the secondcycle thatthe effectivenessof the systemcan be truly
measured.
It isimportantto rememberthatthe UPR doesnotwork inisolationformotherhumanrights bodies’
mechanismsandspecificallyseekstocomplimentthe workdone by the humanrightstreaty
bodies.37
Accordingly,itisalsorelevanttoexamine the workof the treatybodiesintheirabilityto
monitorthe implementationof the keyhumanrightstreatiesandensure universal respectfor
humanrights.
ProfessorHeynes andProfessorFransVijoenbothregardthe treatybodysystemas“custodiansof
the legal normsestablishedbythe humanrightstreaties”38
while UN Secretary-GeneralBanKi-Moon
has chimed:
33 Miloon Kathari,“From Commission to the Council:Evolution of UN Charter Bodies,” in The Oxford Handbook
of International Human Rights Law, ed Dinah Shelton (Oxford University Press,2013) 618
34 Oberleitner (n-17) 9
35 ibid
36 ibid
37 Analytical Assessment(n-9) 10
38 Heynes, C. and Vijoen, F. The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level,
(Kluwer Law International,2002)

7. “The United NationsTreatyBody System,which combinesnobleideals with practical measuresto
realise them,is oneof thegreatestachievementsin the history of the globalstruggleforhuman
rights.The Treaty Bodiesstand atthe internationalhuman rightsprotection systemasengines
translating universalnormsinto social justiceand individualwell-being.”39
Despite this,in2006 the High CommissionerforHumanRights,Louise Arbour,voicedconcerns
aboutthe “ad hoc mannerinwhichthe treatybody hasgrown [and] the oftenabsence of effective,
comprehensive follow-upmechanismsforrecommendations.” 40
Thisechoedthe earlierstatement
by the Secretary-General that:
“the existing treatybodiesand human rightsmechanismsand proceduresconstitutea largeand
intricate network.Thegrowing complexity of the human rightsmachinery and thecorresponding
burden of reporting obligationsstrain theresourcesof memberstatesand thesecretariat. Asa result
the benefitsof the currentsystemare notalwaysclear.”41
In June 2012, the UN HighCommissionerforHumanRights,NavanethemPillay,publishedherreport
on treatybodyreform.42
Drawingheavilyfromthe earlierworkof O’Flaherty43
andthe Dublin
39 Forward to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the strengthening of the human
rights treaty bodies, UN Doc.A/66/860, 26 (June 2012) at 7
40 O Flaherty, M. “Reform to the UN Human Rights Treaty Body System: Locatingthe Dublin Statement” in
Gilbert, G, Hampson, F, and Sandoval C (eds) The Delivery of the Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Professor
Sir Nigel Rodley (Routledge, 2011) 68, 70
41 ‘Strengthening the United Nations:an agenda for change,’ Report of the Secretary-General A/57/387, (9
September 2002) 11 para 52
42 Pillay (n-2)
43 Sustained published research in the area of UN treaty body reform has positioned O’Flaherty as the principle
international specialistin thearea. He led the ‘Dublin Process on Strengthening the United Nations Treaty
Body System’ a process that is acknowledged globally astheprimary forum for the reform of the treaty body
system.
See: REF2914, Impact casestudy Ref3b availableat
http://www.ref.ac.uk/about/guidance/faq/impactcasestudiesref3b/ accessed 27/12/2016

8. Outcome Document44
the reportmade several recommendationspertainingtoimprovingthe treaty
bodysystem. In2014 General AssemblyResolution68/268 wasadoptedand gave life tosome,but
not all,of report’ssuggestionsforreform;mainlyatthe administrative andprocedural level.
However,Ploton45
hascriticised that:
“Variousproposals focused on improvingtreaty body impact,such ashaving systematicfollow-up
mechanismsatnationallevel forthe implementation of their recommendations,wereignored.Asa
result, thetreaty bodiesare likely to continueadopting thousandsof recommendationsin dozensof
countriesevery year,withunsatisfactory impacton theground.”46
The resolutionstreamlines the treatybody process;savingonresources whichare then re-invested
inthe process.47
Fundamentalcriticismsof the systemincluded:the late submissionbystate parties
of theirstate reportsdue, inpart,to burdensome reportingrequirements;48
the inabilityof the
committeestoreview statesinatimelymannerthusresultinginrecommendationsbasedon
44 The Dublin Process was initiated by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in September 2009.The aim
was to encourage all relevantstakeholders—states,treaty body experts, NGOs, national human rights
institutions (NHRIs),academics and UN entities—to develop proposals to strengthen the treaty body system.
In November 2009,a group of current and former treaty body experts convened in Ireland and issued the
“Dublin Statement” (January 2010) to establish principles to underpin the discussionson treaty body
strengthening. Stakeholder discussionsand consultationstook place(2010-2012) and the OHCHR (2011) put
together a non-exhaustivelistof proposals based upon the consultations.In the sameyea, stakeholders
reconvened in Dublin and issued the Dublin II Outcome Document. It provides a summary of the proposalsand
recommendations that emerged from all stakeholder consultations
- See more at: http://www.ishr.ch/news/treaty-body-reform-dublin-process#sthash.IqCcYR5T.dpuf accessed
03/01/2016
45 Vincent Ploton is the Head of External Relations of the Geneva-based Centre for Civil and Political Rights.He
has worked for nearly seven years at the Association for the Prevention of Torture, and has more than 10 yea rs
of experience in the humanitarian and human rights field.
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/vincent-ploton/more-ambition-required-to-reform-un-
treaty-bodies accessed 03/01/2016
46 Vincent Ploton, “More ambition required to reform UN treaty bodies” Open Democracy, 10 July 2014
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/vincent-ploton/more-ambition-required-to-reform-un-
treaty-bodies accessed 03/01/2016
47 Pillay (n-2)
48 The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Right, OHCHR Plan of Action: Protection and
Empowerment (May 2007) para 7

9. outdatedinformation;49
committee membersaccreditingmore weighttoNGOsupporting
documentsratherthanstate reports;50
duplicationinthe issuesraisedbythe differentcommittees51
and finally;concludingobservationsare ineffective, containinglittleguidance onhow lawsare tobe
interpreted,implementedorupheldbystates.52
The resolutionpromotes streamliningthe processbyintroducinga ‘SimplifiedReporting
Procedure’53
,the optionforstatestosubmit a ‘CommonCore Document’54
toeachof the
committeesalleviatingthe burdensome nature of the process. Fundamentally, Point6“[E]ncourages
the human rightstreatybodiesto adoptshort,focused and concreteconcluding observations,…”
aimedat improvingthe efficiencyof the systemandalsothe abilityforstatesthe clearlyunderstand
theirobligations.55
Point26alsoincreasesthe meetingtime of the treatybodies allowingforamore
thoroughprocess.56
Finally,Point38promotesharmonisationof the system: “in relation to
proceduralmatters,including withrespect to formulating conclusionson issuesrelated to working
methodsand proceduralmatters,promptly generalizing good practicesand methodologiesamong
all treatybodies,ensuring coherenceacrossthetreaty bodiesand standardizing working methods.”57
These Points,aswell asothers,are aimedat alleviatingthe aforementionedshortcomings.
Optimistically,reducedwaitingtimes,carefully considered reportsandreduced duplication of issues
will mitigate state parties’frustrationwiththe system.58
The increasedtimeof the Committee
49 Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified StandingTreaty Body, Report the
Secretariat,(22 March 2006) HRI/MC/2006/2 para 18
50 “Effective implementation of international instruments on human rights,includingreportingobligations
under international instruments on human rights”, Note by Secretariat(5 September 2003) A/58/350 para 43
51 “Methods of work relatingto the State reporting process:Background document prepared by the
secretariat’,Second inter-committee meeting of the human rights treaty bodies,(18-20 June 2003)
HRI/ICM/2003 para 28
52 The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Right (n-48) para 7
53 General Assembly Resolution 68/268 Point 1
54 ibid Point3
55 Pillay (n-2)
56 ibid
57 General Assembly Resolution 68/268 Point 38
58 Pillay (n-2)

10. bodiestoconsiderastate will enablethemtoproduce amore tailoredresponse intheirconcluding
observations;providing greaterguidance onhow besttoimplementthe recommendations.59
After
all,withouteffectiverecommendations,how cana State,inturn, be expectedtoimplement them
effectively? Inthisinstance,the questiondoesnoteven progress toissuesof enforcementbut
rather, stagnateson the presentation of arecommendationthatastate isexpectedtoenforce.
Ultimately,the reformsshouldresultinstatesbeingreviewedmore regularly andprovidedwith
more proficientrecommendations. Positively,thisshould increase the ‘integratednature’of the
systemaspart of regularstate practice resultingin“greateracceptance of state parities”of the
committee recommendations.60
Nevertheless,the follow-upproceduresof the treatybodies are recommendedforimprovement.61
However, “whileis seems thata combination of thesevariousideaswould undoubtedly enhancethe
ratherbare-bonesfollow-up procedurecurrently operated by many of thetreaty bodies,it is equally
clear that thecurrent resourcing of the treaty body systemmakesit almostimpossibleto envisage
their adoption in practice involving asthey would a significantinjection of human and financial
capital.”62
In bothinstances,the UPRand treaty bodies canuse rapporteurstoorganise andmanage follow-up
and to ensure the flowof information,assessimplementationandpersuadestatestoimplement
recommendations.63
Forexample,the Rapporteurof the HumanRightsCommittee in1990 was
59 ibid
60 Oette (n-1) column 2
61 For instance,the idea for the systematisation of better coordinated and more inclusivefollow-up
procedures, the development of a specific,inter-committee ‘treaty body followup mechanismfor all treaty
bodies or the establishmentof a dedicated unit on follow-up or senior level Treaty Body Follow-up Coordinator
with in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Egan (n-7) 234
62ibid
63 Oberleitner, (n-17)

11. taskedwith,amongotherthings,advisingthe committee onmattersof implementation64
after
whichthe committee couldissue the state anotherrecommendationbasedonthe information.65
However,giventhatnoothermeansare available,the rapporteursystemseemstohave little effect
beyondsimply obtaininginformation.66
Alternatively,humanrightsbodiesmandatedtoconduct
countryvisitscan resortto follow-upcountry visitstopromptstatesof theirobligations, inviting
progressreportsandusuallytargeting specificstatesbyincreasingthe frequencyof state visits.67
However,these visits,asall otheraspectsof the system, are constrainedbytheirfinances.Indeed
there isno specificbudgetallocatedto these follow-upactivities.68
Moreover,asOberleitner
concludes:“such practicesto managefollow-upgenerally replicatethe activities of human rights
bodiesin generating and processing information and ishampered by many of thesame
constraints.”69
Therefore,increasingitsfinancesuntoitself maynot yieldanygreaterresultsor
enhance compliance beyondthatwhichalready exists.Assuch,the enforcementaspecttothe
systemis feeble.
Overall,‘follow-upprocedures’remainthe leastdeveloped70
andunderfinanced aspectwithinthe
UN humanrightssystems.71
The adherence toUN humanrightsbodies’recommendations,remainat
the mercy of the state’swill tocomply. Nevertheless,the needforfollow-upproceduresmaybe
mitigatedbythe improvedqualityof committeereportsanticipatedbythe re-allocationof
64 See Report of the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. A/45/40 (1990), Vol. I,144-145 and Voll II,Appendix XI,
205-2-16.The functions have sincebeen carried over to the Committee’s Rules of the Procedure.
65 See: Open Society JusticeInitiative,FromJudgment to Justice, 123-124 availableat
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/from-judgment-to-justice-20101122.pdf accessed
21/12/2015
66 ibid 141
67 See: Piccione,T. “The Future of the United Nations Special Procedures”(2013) Brookings Institution 733
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/future-united-nations-special-procedures-piccone
accessed 12/12/2015
68 See: Open Society JusticeInitiative(n-65) 124-135
69 Oberleitner (n-17)
70 Ibid 2
71 OHCHR, “Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System- Dublin II,Meeting: Outcome
Document” (November 2011) 20

12. resources.Toinvestinenforcementandfollow-upwithoutfirstaddressingthe earliershortfallsof
the systemwouldbe muchlike puttingthe cartbefore the horse.
Overall,the critique that:“[T]hetreatybody systemremainsprocessdriven ratherthan rightsand
results driven.All effortsare focussed on reviewing thereportsstatessubmit,buttoo little is being
doneoncerecommendationsareadopted to ensurecomplianceand implementation”72
isjustified.
However,itisvital torememberthat:“The implementationof treatybodyrecommendationsremain
the primaryresponsibilityof the state parties.”73
Therefore,efforttofirstimprove the efficiencyof
the reporting,the qualityof the committees’ recommendationsandconsequentlyimprovethe
abilityof state partiestoimplementthe recommendationsiswarranted;tofocusonenforcement
and follow-uppriortoaddressingtheseissueswouldbe futile.Nevertheless,if the aimsof the
reformare realised,yetstatesstill failtocomplywithtreatybodyrecommendations, enforcement
can only then be consideredthe weakestlinkinthe system.
So far,discussionhasfocussedonthe assumptionthatall states‘want’toimplement
recommendationsbutare unable todo soeffectivelyasaresultof shortcomingsin the treatybody
system.However,thisisanaive assumption.There are amyriadof reasonsforlack of state
compliance withboththe UN human rightsbodies,as-wellasotherquasi-judicial andjudicial
decisions. Forinstance, statesmayhave limited resourcestoimplementameasuresorsimply lack
the political will.Furthermore,evenwhere arecommendationis implemented,suchasdomestic
legislation,itmayneverthelessfail totranslate intoameaningful practice onthe ground.For
instance,despitehavingone of the “world’soldestandmostdevelopedlegal frameworksfor
respondingtointernal displacement”74
Colombia, hasa“a crisis of protection”75
whereby
72 Ploton (n-46)
73 Pillay (n-2)
74 Norwegian Refugee Council and Internal Displacement MonitoringCentre. “Global Overview 2014.People
Internally Displaced by Conflictand Violence,” (May 2014), 42.
75 Anyadike, Obinna.”Colombia’s internally displaced peoplecaught in corri dor of instability,”The Guardian,
(Aug. 12, 2013) http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/aug/12/colombia-internally-
displaced-people-instability accessed 04/01/2016

13. “improvementsforIDPsremain limited and gapsexistsin theimplementation of public policy and
specific programmesatnationaland locallevel.”76
Consequently,one ispoisedtoask:Are human
rightstreaties andconsequentlyhumanrightsenforcementmechanismsthe answer?
Hathaway’sstudyintothe relationshipbetweenhumanrightscomplianceandthe ratificationof
treatiesconcludedthat,onaverage,violationsof abusesare lowerinstatesthathave not ratifieda
particularinternationalhumanrightstreaty. 77
Moreover, Thynne contributes the difficultiesin
enforcinghumanrightswithinthe UN treatybodiestothe ‘fragmentationof international law.”78
While onthe one hand,newtreatieshave beencreatedtoaddressnew issuesastheyarise,79
onthe
other,the expansionposesdifficultiestothe implementationof humanrightslaw asa whole
creating“the dangerof conflictingandincompatiblerules,principles,rule-systemsandinstitutional
practices.”80
Ultimately,conflictsininterpretationof rightscouldaffectthe wayinwhichstates
implementtheirobligationsandtheirreadinesstodosowhentheyare facedwithdifferingand
preferencesfromhumanrightsbodies.81
However,Hathaway’sobservations were retortedby
Goldmanand Jinksintheircritique thathermethodsof gatheringempirical evidence failedto
considercritical factorsof humanrightscompliance82
andshe acknowledgedthat,despite her
evidence,onthe whole: “treatiesremainanindispensable tool forthe protectionof human
76 UNHCR, “2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profiles- Colombia”
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e492ad6.html accessed 14/12/2015
77 Hathaway, O. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” 111 (1935) (2002) Yale Law School, 1976-2025
78 Thynne, Kelisiana “Reform of United Nations Human Rights Institutions:CurrentDevelopments - Enhancing
the rule of lawin international rights treaty bodies.”9 (2007) World Legal Information Institute.7
79 See “Fragmentation of International law:Difficulties arisingfrom the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law” Report to the Study Group of the International Law Commission,18 July 2006
A./CN.4/L.702 para 9
80 Thynne, Kelisiana“Reform of United Nations Human Rights Institutions:CurrentDevelopments - Enhancing
the rule of lawin international rights treaty bodies.”9 (2007) World Legal Information Institute. 7
81 Ibid;
“Fragmentation of International law:Difficulties arisingfromthe Diversification and Expansion of International
Law” Report to the Study Group of the International LawCommission,(18 July 2006) A./CN.4/L.702
For further readingsee: Mechlem, K. “Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights” 42(905) (2009)
VanderbiltJournal of Transnational Law905-947
82 Goodman, R. and Jinks,D. “Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties 14 (2003) European Journal of
International Law171-183

14. rights.”83
Nevertheless,evenjudicial humanrightsbodiesabletoimpose legal sanctionsonviolating
stateshave arguablylimitedeffectwithinthe sphere of actuallyenforcinghumanrightscompliance.
As notedbyOette,“even herecompliance is often confined to paying compensation and in some
instancesmaking restitutionsand/oradopting measuresto preventreassurancesuch aslegislative
reforms, albeitoften belatedly.”84
For instance,Russiainresponse tothe decisionsof the European
Court of Human Rights has beencriticisedforitsapparentwillingnessto payreparations forits
humanrights abuses ratherthan undergolegislative reform.85
Huneeushasequallyreportedonthe
strugglesof the Inter-AmericanCourttoenforce itsrulings.86
Withthisinmind,issanctionasa
meansof enforcementappropriate?
Accordingto Goodmanetal, the socialisationof legal normsisthe mosteffectivemethodfor
guaranteeingobedience tohumanrights.87
Identifiedas‘acculturation’,itisthe processbywhich
actors adoptthe beliefsandbehaviourof the surroundingculture.88
Due tothisprocess,the human
rightsvaluesnowheld withina‘liberal international society’are now sointernalisedthatany
disobedienceisall “the more shocking”andtriggerscriticismof the enforcementmechanismsof the
international humanrightslaw.89
However,asnotedcriticismandevensanctiondoesnotensure
enforcementof humanrights.Instead,abottom-upapproachmaybe more appropriate whereby
statescomplywithhumanrightsbecause itisthe practice of itssubjects. The challenge hasshifted
away fromenforcementtowardschanging the attitude of acountry’speople.
83 Hathaway, O. “Testing Conventional Wisdom”14(1) (2003) European Journal of International Law185 -200
84 Oette (n-1) column 2
85 Meleshevich, A. and Forstein, A. “BringingHuman Rights Home: The Challenges of EnforcingJudicial Rulings
in Ukraineand Russia”24(2) (2014) IndianaInternational and ComparativeLawReview 269-311
86 Huneeus, A. “Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human
Rights.” 44 (2011) Cornell International LawJournal 493- 533
87 Goodman, R. and Jinks,D. “How to Influence States: Socialisation and International Human Rights Law” 54(3)
(2004) Duke Law Journal 621,622
88 ibid
89 ibid

15. Cultural practices,forinstance,are the source of much contentionwithinthe international
community;whatiscondonedbyone state iscondemnedbyanother.90
One suchexample isthatof
Female Genital Mutilation. Despitebeingprohibitedunder international law,91
the practice
continuesglobally.92
Asa‘self-enforcingsocial norm’;93
itsprohibition isviewedas“nothingmore
than an example of cultural imperialism…thecurrentWesternonslaughtonIslam.”94
Ultimately,
“international declarationsforthe benefitof women[…] have nocurrencywhatsoeverif the words
do nottranslate intopractice on the ground.”95
For instance,certaincountriesinAfricacontinuethe
practice despite itsprohibitionunderthe AfricanCharteronHumanand Peoples’ Rightsonthe
Rightsof Womenin Africa.AsnotedbyBaker: “Rarely do customary leadersfollow full international
human rightsinstruments…thereare still customary elderswho arereluctant to denounce…FGM.”96
However, thisreluctance hasbeenovercome throughgrass-rootinitiatives;workingwithlocal elders
and communitiestoeducate themonthe harmful consequenceof the practice: “Communities
themselvesplay a crucial role on providing theadvocatesforchange,asthey aremore likely to be
listened to than theauthorities.”97
In such instances,while legal sanctionisappropriateandcanact
as deterrence,aholisticapproachismore appropriate thatcombinessanctionwitheducation.98
90 Shelley, C. “Beating Children Is Wrong,Isn'tIt? ResolvingConflicts in theEncounter Between Religious
Worldviews and Child Protection”15 (2) (2013) Ecclesiastical LawJournal 130- 143
91 The Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination againstWomen 1979. Although not
specifically listed in the Convention FGM is still captured by it; the UN Convention againstTorture and Other
Cruel, Inhumane or DegradingTreatment or Punishment 1989; The UN Convention on Rights of the Child;The
Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and combatingviolenceagainstwomen and domestic violence,
(the Istanbul Convention).
92 World Health Organisation,“EliminatingFemaleGenital Mutilation:An interagency statement” UNAIDS,
UNDP, UNESCO, UNEPA, ENHCHR, UNIFEM, WHO (200) 8
93 WHO, Global Health Strategy to stop health care providers from performing female genital mutilation (2010)
2
94 Castledine,J. “Female Genital Mutilation:An Issueof Cultural Relativismor Human Rights (2008)
95 Gerry, F. “Let’s talk about vaginas…FGM:The failureof international obligationsand howto end an abusive
cultural tradition”2(2) (2014) Griffin Journal of Law and Human Dignity, 78,82
96 Cited in ibid 86
97 FORWARD: http://forwarduk.org.uk/key-issues/fgm/ accessed 07/01/2016
98 Mujuzi,J. “Female Genital Mutilation in Uganda:a glimpseof the abolition process”(2012) Journal of African
Law 139,150

16. Therefore, while enforcementof human rightslaw isa challenge itisnotone necessarilysolvedby
legal sanction.Rather, a“more carrot and lessstick”approachisappropriate.
Overall, the enforcementandfollow-upof the decisionsof the international humanrightsbodiesis
challenging. Onthe one hand,the absence of effectiveenforcementandfollow-upproceduresof the
quasi-judicial bodiesmeansthatstateshave ‘flaked’intheirobligationsto implementtheirdecision.
On the otherhand,despite beingable toimposelegal sanctions, judicial-bodiesare nevertheless,
limitedinthattheirjudgmentsmayonlyresultinthe impositionof finesratherthatmeaningful
change.Improvingthe systemthroughdialogue,whetherthatbe throughgrass rootsinitiativeson
the planesof Africaor fromwithinthe UN BuildingsinGeneva,talkingthroughhumanrights,the
reasonsfora recommendation,mayprove thatthe challenge facingthe universalrespectforhuman
rightsisnot lack of enforcement,butlackof knowledge.
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