1. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
BOOK II
FINAL REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE
TOGETHER WiTH
ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, ANt) SEPARATE
VIEWS
APRR. 26 (Ies1ative day. April 14), 1976
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The resolution creating this Coiiunittee placed greatest emphasis Ofl whether intelligence activities threaten the “rights of American citizens.’ I
The critical question before the Committee was to determine how the fundamental liberties of the people can he maintained in the course of the
Government’s effort to protect their securitw The delicate balance between these basic goats of our system of government is often difficult to strike, but
it can. and must, be achieved. We reject the view that the traditional American principles of justice and fair play have no place in our stnigstle against
the enemies of freedom. Moreover, our investigation has established that the targets of intelligence activity have ranged far beyond persons who could
properly be characterized as enemies of freedom and have extended to a wide array of citizens engaging in lawful activity.
Americans have riulitfsillv been concerned since before Workl War II about the dangers of hostile foreign agents likely to commit acts of espionage.
Similarly, the violent acts of political terrorists can seriously endanger the rights of Americans. Carefulb focused intelligence investigations can help
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2. prevent such acts. But too often intelligence has lost thu focus and domestic intelligence activities have invaded individual prn’acy and violated the rights
of Liwtiil assembly and political expression. Unless new and tighter controls are established by legislation. donsestie intelligence activities threaten to
undermine our democratic society and tiindamentallv alter its nature.
We lias’e examined three types of “intelligence” activities affectuig the rights of American citizens. The first is intelligence collection such as--
infiltrating groups with informants. wiretapping. or opening letters. The second is dissemination of material svlsicli has been collcctecL The tlurd is covert
action designed to disrupt and discredit the activities of groups ansI individuals deemed a threat to the social order. These three types of “intelligence”
activity are closely related in the practical world. lndermation wluch is dissenunated b’ the intelligeisce conussunity 2 or used in disruptive programs has
usually been obtained through surveillance. Nevertheless, a division between collection, disscmmmiation and covert action is analtically useful both in
understanding why excesses have occmmrrred mis the past and in devising remisedies to prevent those excesses fruns recurring.
.1. Iiurc/lrgciic’c .4svis’irt’: .4 Yew Form of (*ui’c’rytinc’iiral Posrcr to Impair Cit zeus’ Rug/irs
A tensiois between order aisd liberty is usevitablc in any society. A Goveriunent insist protect its citizens from those bent on engaging iii violence and
crinsinal behavior, or hi espionage and other hostile forepem iistelligeisce actisitv. Main of Use ustclhmgence programs reviewed in Usis report were
established for Usose purposes. Intelligence svorlc has, at tunes, successfully prevented daiigerous and abhorreist acts, such as honshings and foreisus
spviiig. aisd aided hs Use prosecution of those rcspoissible for suds acts.
But. iistdlligence activity us Use past decades Isas. all too often, exceedcd tIme restzausts on Use exercise of goverisineistal power svlsiehs are ummposed by our
country’s Constitution., laws, and traditioiss.
Excesses hi Use nansc of protecthsg sccmmmity arc not a recent dcvelopisscnt hs our natioii’s history. In 1798, for example. shortly after the Bill of Riglsis
was added to the Constitution, the Allen and Sedition Acts were passed. These Acts, passed us response to fear of proFrcnch “subversion”, made it a
crhne to criticize the Goveriuusent.3 Durhsg the (‘ivil War, President Abralsani Luicohs suspeisded Use writ sif habeas corpus. Hundreds of Ameriean
citizeiss were prosecuted for aisti—war statenients durhsg Workl ‘iVar I. and thoissaiids of “radical” aliciss were seized for deportation duruig Uic 1920
Paliuser Raids. Durhsg Use Secoiscl World War, over the opposition of 7. Edgar Hoover aiid milit’irv ustellistence, 4 120.000 Japanese-Ansericans were
apprehended and uscarcerated hi detention cansps.
Those actions. however. were t4indansentallv different froni Uie ustdlligcnce activities cxanshsed by this (‘onunittee. They were generally executed
overtly under the authority of a statute or a public executive order. The victhmis loiew what was bchsg clone to thens and could challenge the
Goveriunent hi the courts antI oUser foruisi.s. Intelligence activity, on the oUter hand, is generally covert. it is concealed front its victhns 5 and is seklons
slcscribed in statsitcs or explicit executive ordcis. The victusi nsay ncs’er suspect that his nsisfortiincs arc Use intended result of activities undertaken by
lieu goveriuiscnt, and accordingly niay has’e no opportunity to challenge the actions taken agausst bins.
It is. of cosu’se, proper mu maisy circunistaisccs such as dcvelopusg a crunusat prosecutic)lm fur Use Governmmient to gather int’nrmation about a citizeis
—- ——
and misc it to achieve legiiunate eisd.s. souse of which niiuslit he uteirintental to the eitizeis. But hi crhnmmial prosecutions. the courts have struck a hahaiscc
hetweeim protccthig the rights of Use accused citizen and protecting the society whuchi suffers the consequeisccs of crune. Essential to Uie halancuig
process arc Use i’ules of crunuial law which ch’cumscrihc the tcchuwques for gathuermiig es’idcnce 6 the bias of evidence that may be collected, and the
uses to w’hisch that evichcuce niaybe put. In addition. tIme cruiuiiah defendant is given an oppoi’tsmmsitv to discover and then challenge Use legality of how’ the
(iovcriuiseist collected uiforniatiois about him and the usc whsichs the Goveriiment intend,s to make of Usat uifonnatiois.
This Conmaittce has cxanshscd a realist of goverinnenta I hsfornsatiois collection which has not been governesh by restrahtts consparabhc to those hi
crhnhmal proceedhigs. We have exaniincct the collcctmon of intelligence about Use pohitmcal advocacy aisd actinn.s and Use private lives of Ansermcais
citizens. That hifonsiation has hteen used covertly to discredit the ideas advcueatcd and to “neutralize” the actions of them proponent.s. As Attonsey
General Harlamm Fiske Stone wanted us 1924. whemi lie souighst to keep federal agencies fronm uivestmgating “political or other otmuuiomi,s” as opposed to
“conduct orbidden by Use law’s”:
When a police systenm passes iscyomid thsese limits, it is dangerous to Use proper admmihsistration of jmmstice and to hsunsan hibemty. wlsich
it should be our first concenm to clserrhi.
There is always a possibility that a secret police may heconse a nscnace to free governnsent and free institutions because it
carries sviUi it the possibility of abuses of power whsichs are not ahsvass quickly apprehended or understood. 7
Our hsvcstigatmomm has confinised that svarmiing. We have seems scgmnestts of our Govermsmnemst, us Uscu’ attitudes aisd action. adopt tactics unworUmy of a
democracy, amid occasmonalbi rentusiscent of time tactics of totalitarian regimes. We have seen a consistent paftcrn us w’hmich programns initiated with
limssmted goals. such as prevemstmng crsissmmsah violence or ichemitmfrhsg foreigmm spies. were expamidesh to whm,’it witmmeeses characterized as “vacumumiss clcammers”.”
ssveephmg hi hifomsatmon about lawful activities of American citizcnue
The temmdemiey of intelligemice activities to expammd beyond their initial scope us a thenme w’huchs rsmms.s Uim’oumghs every aspect of our ssvestmgatmve findings.
Intdllmgemmce collection programs muaturally gemierate es’er-mmscreasusg demands for isew data, And once mntdlli ence has been collected, Usere are strcung
pressmmres to use it agausst the target.
Time pattermm of hitellmgemmce agemmcies expanding the scope of their activities was well dheseribed by one witness. who hi 1970 had eoordhmated an effort by
nsost of Use intelligence communumisity to obtammi asmthmority to smndertake more illegal donsestie activity:
The risk was that you w’ommld get people w’ho would he susceptible to political eonsideratiomss as opposed to national seeumrity
consideratiomss. or would construe political considerations to be national security con.sicherations, to move from the. kiul with a bomb
to the kid with a picket sigis, asid from Use kid with the picket sign to the kidh with the bumper sticker of Use opposhsg camididate. And
you just keep gohig down Ume line. 9
1mm 1940. Attomey General Robert Jackson saw’ time sante risk. He reeogmimzed that using broad labels 111cc “national security” or “snbversicsm” to invoke
tIme vast power of Use govennnent is dangerosis because there are “iso dlef’inite standards to determine what constitutes a ‘subversive activity, such as
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3. sre have for murder or larceny.” Jackson added:
Activities which seem benevolent or helpful to wage earners, persons on relief, or those who are disadvantaged in the struggle for
existence may be regarded as ‘subveisise’ by those whose property interests might be burdened thereby. Those who are in office
are apt to regard as subversive the activities of any of those who would bring about a change of administration. Some of our
soundest constitutional doctrines were once puirislied as subversive. ‘We must not forget that it was not so long ago that both the
term ‘Republican and the terni ‘Democrat’ were epithets with sinister meaning to denote persons of radical tendencies that were
‘subversive’ of’ the order of’ things then douiuiiant. 10
This wise wariiing was not heeded in the conduct of inteilisieiice activity, ss’liere the “eterisal vigilance” which is the “price of hibertc”lias Iseen forgotten.
IL The Questions
We have directed our investigation toward answering the, follosvusg questions:
isicli governmental agencies have engaged in doniestic spvnig?
How many citizens have been targets of Goveriuuenta I intelligence activity?
What standarrts have governed the opening of nitelligence investigations and sslien have intelligence investigations been terminated?
Where have the targets fit on the spectnim hetsveen those who conunit violent criminal acts and those who seek only to dissent peacefiilh from
Government poli_’y?
To svhat extent has the iiiformation collected included nitnnate details of die targets’ personal lives or their political views, and has ssich information
been rlissenunated and used to injure indivirhials’?
Wlsat actions beyond surveillance have aitelligence agencies taken, such as attempting to disrupt discredit, or destroy persons or groups who have beeis
the targets of surveillance’?
Have intelligence agencies been used to serve die political aims of Presidents, otlser hieh officials, or the agencies themsels’es?
Hosv have the agencies responded either to proper orders or to excessive pressures froni their superiors’? To what extent have intelligence agencies
disclosed, or concealed them from. outside bodies charged with overseeing them’?
Have intelligence agencies acted outside the law’? What has been the attitude of the intelligence community toward the rule of law’?
To what extent has die Executive branch and the Congress controlled intelligence agencies and held them accountable?
Generally, how’ well has the Federal system of checks and balances between the branches worked to control intelligence activity?
C. Sissisnssi-s’ of the Ala ii Prohlcs;ss
The answer to each of these questions is disturbing. Too many people have been spied upon by too many Government agencies and to nwieh
infonnation has been collected. The Goveriussent has often undertaken die secret ssirs-eillanee of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, es-en
syhen those beliefs posed iio threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power. The Goveniment openiting primarily throsigh secret
infisnnants, but also using other intmsive techniques such as sviretaps, microphone ‘bugs” surreptitious mail opening, and break—his, has swept in vast
amounts of infisnwation about the personal lives,views. and associatiows of .-5,.auerican citizens. Investigations of groups deenied potentially daiigerous --
and es-en of groups suspected of associating with potentially dangerous organizations have continued for decades, despite die fact diat those groups
--
did not engage in unlass-ful activity, Groups and nislis-idnals have been harassed and disrupted because of flick political viesvs and dick lifestyles.
Investigations have been based upon vague standards whose breadth made excessive collection inevitable, Unsas’on’ and vicious tactics base been
employed nichndmng anonymosis attempts to bieak up niai-riages. disrupt nieetings. ostracize persons froni dien professions, and pros-oke target gi-oups
--
nito rivafries that midst resnht in deaths. Intelligence agencies has-c sen-ed the political and personal objectives of presidenla and other Isighi officials,
While the agencies often coimnittcd excesses in response to pressure froni high officials in the Executive branch and Congress. they also occasion hIs
niits-ited anproper activities and then concealed dieni froni officials svhoni they had a duty to hiforni.
Gos-enwwentah officials nichuiding diose whose prnicipal duty is to enforce die lass --has-c s-iolated or ignored the law- over long periods of time and
--
have ads-nested and defended their right to break the law’.
The Constitutional systeni of checks and balances has not adeqsiatclv controlled intelligence activities. Until recently the Executive branch has neither
delineated the scope of penmssibhe actis-ities nor est’ihls’ihied procedures for supervising intelligence agencies- Congress has fIiiled to exercise sufficient
os-ei-sigjit, seldom upiestioning the use to whelm its api-opriatsnns were being put. Most domestic intelligeiice issues have not reached the courts, and hi
diose eases when diey have reached the courts, die judieian- has been reluctant to grapple wids diem.
Each of dicse points is briefly illristrated below, and covered in substantially greater detail in die frslhosving sections of die report.
I The Niouihes’ ri/People .4f/ècrcd by Dome-size Intelligence .4crzs’iri’
-
-
United States intelligeisce agencies have nis-estsaated a s-ast nnniber of American citcen.s and doniestie organizations. FBI headquarters alone has
des-eloped over SOtt.tt)0 doniestic intelligence files. 11 and dicse lias’e been auigissented by additionalfiles at FBI Field Ofi’iees. The FBI opened 65.000
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4. of these slomes tic intelligence files in 1972 a lone. 12 In flict. substantially more indivisluab and groups are subject to ustelhsence scrutiny than the
inunber of files would appear to indicate, since typically, each domestic intelligence file contains inforniation oii more than one inslisidoa I or group. and
this infonuation is readily retrievable through the FBI General Nanse Index.
The number of Ameneans and domestic groups caught in the donsestic intelligence net is further illustrated by the following statistics:
--Nearly a quarter of a million first class letters were opened and photographed in the United States by the CIA between 1953-1973. producing a CIA
computericed index of nearly one and one—ha if million names. 13
-- At least 130.0(1) first class letters were opened and photographed by the FBI between 1940-1966 in eight U.S. cities. 14
-—Some 300,OttO individuaLs were indexed in a CIA computer system and separate files were created on approximately 7.200 Americans and over 100
domestic groups shieing the course of CIA’s Operation CHAOS (1967-1973). 15
--billions of private telegrams sent from, to. or through the United States were obtained by the National Security Agency froni 1947 to 1975 umisler a
secret aiTaisgeisseilt widi three United States telegraph companies. 16
—— An estimatesl lOO.OOtt Americans were the ssmhiects ssf Uissted States Anny uiteffigence tiles created between die mid 1960’s and 1971. 17
-- Intelligence files on more than 11.000 inchvidnals aisd groups were created by Use Internal Revenue Service between 1969 and 1973 and tax
investigations were started ois the basis of political rather than tax criteria. IS
-- At least 26.0)))) uidivmduats were at one point catalosued on ass FBI lust of peisous to be rounded up us Use event of a ‘hatioisal ensergencv”. 19
.2. Too :1 1itch JnThrsusirussn Is Collected For Too Long
hitclligence agencies have collected vast aissotmmits of uifornsation about the intimate sletails of citizens’ lives and about their participatiois ii legal and
peacefid political activities. The targets of intelligence activity have uscludesl political adherents of Use right aisd the left ranging froiss activitist to castial
supporters. Investigations have been directed agausst proponents of racial cansea and womeis’s rights. outs apostles of nonviolence and racial
soken
1
lsarmssoisy: establislusseist politicians: religious groups: and advocates of iiew life stles. The widespread targetuig of citicens aiid domestic groups. and the
excessive scope of the collection of smsfornsation, is illustrated by the follosving exansples:
(a) The “Woissen’s Liheratiois Movenseist” ssas infiltrated by iufornsaists who collected material about the nsovensent’s policies, leaders, aml iisdivmdual
issembers. Oise report hscluded tlse nanse of cs-cry svonsais wlso atteisdesh meetings. 20 ansI another stated that each woman at a umeetuig Isad described
‘how she felt oppressed. sexually or otherwise”. 21 Another relsort concluded Usat the moveisseist’s psiqsose was to “flee svssiien frous die lmuiudruiss
existence of being only a wife and nucilser”. hut still reconusseuded dial tIme intelligence usvestmssatiois should be continued. 22
(h) A pronsiisent civil rights leader and advisor to Dr. Martus Lsitlier usg. Jr.. svas insestigatcd on the suspiciois tlsat lie nught be a Coisussunmst
synspadiicer”. Use FBI field office coiscluded he was isot. 23 Bureau headquarters directed Usat the usvestigation contintie using a theory of “guilty until
proven innocent:”
The Burreau does not agree with the expressed belief of Use field office that ‘‘‘‘-‘‘------‘---‘ 24 is not sxmpathetic to the
Party cause. While there may not he any evidence tlsat —‘‘————-‘---‘-‘‘—- is a t ‘onussummast iseitlser is there aity substantial
evideisce that lie is anti-Consusunist. 25
(c) FBI sources reported on the fonssation of die Conservative Aasserican Cluistiais Action Coiuscil in 1971. 26 In the 1950’s. Use Bureau collected
infornsation about the John Birch Society and passed it to Use White House because of the Society’s “scuirillosis attack” on Presishent Eisenhower and
odser high Govemnsent officials. 27
(d) Souse investigations of the lawful activities of peaceful groups have continued for decades. For exausple. Use NAACP was investigated to deternsiise
whether it ‘had coiuiectiou.s with” Use Consasuinrst Party. Use iisvestigation lasted for over twenty—foe years. although nothing was found to rebtut a
i-eport during the first ;ear of Use iisvestigation dial the NAACP had a “strong tenslency” to ‘(steer clear of Conuntusist activities.” 211 Sunilarlv. the FBI
has aslissitted Usat die Socialist Workers Party has conumtted no crinuiial acts. Yet the Btireasi has investigated Use Socialist Workers Party for more
than three decades oit die basis of its revolutionary rhetoric-which the FBI concedes falls shsoit of unciteusent to violence-and its clainsed ustensatmonal
links. Use Btireau is eiurrentlv sususg its umfornsants to collect usfonuation about S’9,’P nsensbers’ political vuesvs. mneludimsg those on “LT.S. usvolvcnsent us
Angola.” ‘Thod pnces.” “racial nsatters,” the “Vietssans War,” and about any of their efforts to support mson-SW’P candislates for political office. 29
(e) National political leaslers fell within Use broad reach of intelligeisce investigations. For exnnsple. Anus’ Intellmgnmce nec nsaintaiisesl files on Senator
Adlam Stevenson and Congressnsan Abner tshikva because of dseiu’ participation us peacethil political nseetusgs musder surveillance by Anny agents. 30 A
letter to Richard Nixon, wlule lie was a candidate for President us 1968, was intercepted under CIA’s imuail opeisimig program. In the 1960’s Presidemmt
Johus,sois asked die FBI to compare various Senators’ statensents on ‘ietnans with the Comuassuums.ast Party line 32 ansI to consluct name checks oms leasIng
antiwar Semsators. 33
(f) As pail of dick effort to collect iisfornsatmois which “related es-en rensotels” to people or grotups “actis’e” hi comsusssusmties w’lsihs had ‘She potential” for
civil disorder. Arnss’ usteffigeisce agencies took such steps as: semsdusg agents to a Hallosceen party for elenseustary selsool chldreum in Washimsgton, DC’.,
because they suspected a local “dissident” nsiglst he present: nuomutorhsg protests of weltisre nsothsers’ organfratiou.s in Ivlilwauhure: infiltrathsg a coalition
of church youth groups ii Colonmdo: and sending agemmts toil priests’ cousference hi Washusgton. D.C., hselsI to discuss birth comstrolmeassires. 34
(g) In Use, late 1960’s and early 1970s, student groups n-crc subjected to imutense scuutimsy. In 1970 Use FBI ordered iisvestigatious.s of every nscmuuber of
the Students for a Deiuuocratmc Society and of “every Black Student Umon ansI suuilar group regardless of their past or present usvolveuuent in
slisorders.” 35 Files were opemsed on thoumsaud.s of s-ouusg ussen ansI women so that, as the fonsser head of FBI ustelligence explained the imsformoation
.
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5. coukl be used if the; ever applied for a government job. 36
In the 1960’s Bureau assents were tnstnieted to increase their efforts to dsseredtt “New Left” student demonstrators by tactics including publishing
photoeraplts fliaturallv the ntost obnoxious picture should be used’). 37 using “misnufonnation” to falsely notify menibers events had been cancelled 18
and writing “tell—tale” letters to students’ tuarents. 39
(Is) The FBI Intelligence Division conunuottlv investigated an;- iitducatiout tlsat “subversive” groups already under investigation were seeking to influence
or control other groups. 40 tItle example of the extretue breadth of tltis “infiltration” theory was an FBI instruction in the mid- 1960’s to all Field Offices
to iinestigate every ‘flee university” because some of them Itad come under ‘huhversne influence. “41
(ii Each adnsineitration from Fraiuklin II. Roosevelt’s to Richard Nixon’s perissitted. and soituetnuses encouraged. goveriunent agencies to handle
essentially political uutelligenee. For exanuple:
-- President Ruosevelt asked the FBI to put in its fdes tIme nanses of citizens sendiisss telegrams to the Wlsite House opposing hss “national defense”
policy and supportitsg Cot Charles Lindbsigh. 42
-—Fresideist Truissais received inside iiiforinatioit on a former Roosevelt aide’s efforts to influence Isis appoiittinents. 43 labor union negotiatnig
plans. -14
and the publusluuig plans of journalists. 45
--President Enenliosver received reports on purely political and social contacts with foreign officials by Bernard Baruch. 46 Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt,
47
and Supreme Coui-t Justice Williani 0. Douglas. 47a
-- The Kenned;’ Adnuuiusstratmon had the FBI -wiretap a Congressional staff inenuber 48 tlu’ee executive officials. 49 a lobbyist. 50 aisd a. Washingtoii
-
law firm. SI Attorney General Robert F- Kenisedy received the fniits of a FBI “tap” on Martiii Luther Knsg. Jr. 52 and a “bug” on a Congressniai both
s
of which yielded inforiua lion of a political nature. 53
-- President Jolussotu asked the FBI to conduct ‘haute eluecks” of his critics and of metubers of tIme staff of his 1964 opponent Senator
Ban-v
Goldsyater. 54 He also requested purely political ustellsoence on his critics iii the Senate. and reeeis’ed extensive intelligence reports
on pcihtical aetn’itv
at the 1964 Democratic (.‘ousvention froni FBI electromc surveillance. 55
President Nixon authorized a pi-ograni of sviretaps whicls produced for tlse White House purdy political or
Isersulsil information uiurelated to national
——
security, including iumfhrnsation about a Supreme (.‘ouurt justice. 56
3. Cou-eu’tAc’ti’iuu ourS i/ic (‘so off/logo? or Jtsipuoper Meusuus
(a) Covert Actiots. Apart froni utucoverisug excesses in the collection of intehhistence. our investigation has disclosed covert actions directed against
--
Americans. and the use of illegal and improper surveillance techniques In gather imufonuation. For exansple:
(i) The FBI’s COINTELPRt) counterintelligence program
--
was desiened to “disrupt” groups and “neutralize” individuals deemed to he tlueats to
--
domestic secunty. The FBI resorted to counterintelligence tactics in part because its chief officials believed that the existing law
could not control the
activities of certanu dissideist groups. and that court decisions had tied the hands of the intehligeisce conusuuusitv. ‘sVliatever
opumunis oiue holds about tIme
policies of the targeted groups. niany ssf the tactics enuploved by tlse FBI syere indm.sputahlv degraulnig to a free society. COINTELPR
O tactics included:
— Anonvmuuoiuhv attacking the political lseliefs of targets us uider to induce their employers to time them:
-- Anonynsouislyiuuailiuug letters to the spouses of intelli enee targets for the put-pose of destroying their man-iages: 57
-- Obtainnug from IRS the tax return-s of a target and then attenuptnsg to provoke an IRS investigation for the express purpose
of deterriumg a protest
leader fronu attendimig the Densoeratie Natioiual Convention: 58
Falsely and anoiuynsouslv labeling as Goveriunent infonnants menshers of groups known to be violent. thereby exxuslumg flue falsely labelled
--
meniber to
expulsion or physical attact 59
Pursuant to nustruictious to use “misinformation” to disrupt demnoms.stratuon.s. enapkuving such nieans as broadcasting fluke orders
on the sanie citizens
--
baud radio frequuenev used by demonstratinis isuarslualls to attenipt to control deiuuonstration.s. 60 and duuplicatuiug anul
falsely fillimug out forms snhieitiuug
housing for isersons coining to a demonstration, thereby causing “long and useless jouruuevs to locate tlsese adult-eases”:
61
Seuuding au annn;-nuous letter to tlse leader of a Chuieago street gang (described as “sinlenee-proute”) statiuug that the
Black Pantluers were supposed to
--
have “a hit out for you”, flue letter was suggested because it “may iuutensifv atsimnosutv” and cause flue street gang leader to “take retaliatory aetious”.
- - -
62
(ii)Fronu “late 1963” until his death in 196$. Martnu Luutluer Kiiug, Jr.. was flue target of sum umuteuusms-e canupaign by tlse Federal
Bureau of huvestigatinn to
“useutralaze” hen as aim effective civil rights leader. Its flue words of flue nuan in charge of flue FBI’s “war” against
Dr- Kiuug. “No luohds were haired.” 63
The FBI gathered mnfornuatinn ahouut Dr. King’s plaiss amuul activities throuuglu an extensive surveillance programuu.
euuupksving iuearlv every intelligence
gatluernug teehsnuqume at the Bureauu’s disposal iuu oruler to ohtaiim infonuatuon abouut flue “private activities of Dr.
Kimug and his advisors” to uuse to
“completely discredit” tlsem. 64
The program to destroy Dr. Khug as the leader of the eivd rights nsovenseiut nuelusded efforts to discredit
hins witlu Executive bramuelm officials,
t:’ongressuonal leaders, foreign hears of state, Ausserican ansbassaulors. eluuirelses. universities, and flue press. 65
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6. The FBI ma dad Dr. King a tape recording made from microphones hidden in Ins hotel rooms winch one agent testified was an attempt to destroy Dr.
Kiiig’s marnage.66 The tape recording was accompanied by a note which Dr. King and his advisors interpreted as threatening to release the tape
recording unless Dr. King conunitted snicide. 67
The extra ordinary natnre of the campaign to discredit Dr. King is exident from two rtocuments:
—— At the August 1963 March on Washington. Dr. King tokt the country of his ‘dream that:
all of God’s chiklren, black men and wlnte men, Jews and Gentiles. Protestants and Catholics. will be able to join hands and sing in
the words of the old Negro spintnaL “Free at last, free at last, thank God Alinig)itv. I’m free at last.”
The Bureau’s Domestic Inteffigence Division concluded that this “demagogic speech” establsihierl Dr. King as the “most dangerous and effective Negro
leader ni the country.” 68 Shortly afterwards, and within days after Dr. King was nanied “Man of the Year” by Tinie niagazine. the FBI decided to
“take luni off his pedestaL” reduce hun completely in intisience.” and select and proniote its own candidate to “ssssune the role of die leadership of the
Negro people.” 69
—— In early 196g. Bureau headquarters explauied to the field that Dr. King must be destroyed because lie war seen as a potential “messiah” svhn could
‘)uufs and electrd*” the “black nationalist movement”. Indeed, to the FBI he was a potential threat because he nright “abandon Ins supposed ‘oberhience’
to white liberal doctrines (non—violence) 70 In short, a non-violent nian was to be secretly attacked and rlestroved as insurance against his abanrlnning
.“
non—violence.
(h) Illegal or Iniproper ?cleaii.s. --The surveillance which we investioated was not only vastly excessive ni breadth and a basis for degradnig
counterintelligence actions. hut was also often conrlucterl by illegal or improper means. For example:
(1) For approximately 20 years the CIA carried out a program of indiscrnuinatelv opening citizens’ first class niail. The Bureau also
had a mail opening program. but cancelled it iii 1966. The Bureau continued. liosvevci to receive die illegal fniits of CIA’s
irogrimr In 197tt, the heads of both agencies signed a documemit for President Nixon, which colTeetly stated that mail opening was
illegaL t’slselv stated that it harl been discontinued. anrl proposed that the illegal opening of niail shonkl be resumed becatmse it wonkl
provide useful results. The President approved the program. hut svithdrew his approsil five days later. The illegal opening
contiiuied nonetheless. Throughout diis perK CIA officiale kmiew dial mail opening was illegal, but expressed commcern about the
‘flap potential’ of exposure. not about die illegality of their activity. 71
(2) Froni 1947 suitil May 1975. NSA received from international cable couipaniss millions of cables which had been sent by
American citizens in the reasonable expectation dint they woukl he kept private. 72
(3) Snice the early 1930’s. intelligence agencies have t’requenllv wiretapped and hugged American citizens without die benefit of
judicial warrant. Recent court decisions have curtailed die use of diese techniques against domestic targets. But past subjects of
diese surveillances have included a United States Congressman. a Congressional staff’ nieniber, journalists and newsmen, and
ninuerous individuals anrl groups who engaged in no criminal activity and who poserl no genuine threat to die national securritv. such
as tsvo White House doniestic affairs advisers and an anti Vietnani War protest group. WIule the prior written approval of the
Attorney General has been required for all warrantless wiretaps since 19-ho. the record is replete with instances where this
requirement was ignored and the Attorney General gave only after-the-fact authorization.
Until 1965. microphone surveillance by intelligence agencies was wholly tinregulated ni certaui classes of cases. Within weeks
after a 1954 Suprenie Cosirt decision denouncing die FBI’s installation of a niierophone ni a defendant’s bedroom, the Attoniey
General nifonoed die Bureau diat he did not believe die decision applied to national security cases and pernu ted die FBI to
coutnisie to install microphones subject only to its own “nitelligeot restraint”. 73
(4) In several cases. purely political inforniation (such as the reaction of Congress to an Admiisistration’s legislative proposal) and
purely tiersomwl iu.forniatioii (such as coverage of die extra-marital social activities of a high-let-el Executive official under
surveillance) was obtained from electrrsmic surveillance and disseminated to die highest levels of die federal goveriuuent. 74
(5) Warrantless break-ins have been conducted by isitelligeoce agencies since World War II. Durisig die 1960’s alone, the FBI ansi
(‘IA coorlueterl htuidreds of break-nis, muanv against Anieriean citizens ansI doniestie organizatiomia. In some cases. these break-ins
ss’ere to nsstall niierophiones: in other eases, diev svere to steal such itenis as menihership lists froni organizations eoiisidered
“subversive” by the Bureau. 75
(6) The niost pervasive snn’eillance teehimquc has been the mnforniaut. lii a randoni sample of doniestie intelligence cases. 83%
involved inforniants and 5% involved electronic surveillance. 76 Infonuants have been sued against peaceful. law-abirhing groups:
duey have collected mnfonuatmon about personal and political views and activities. 77 To maintani their credentials in violence-prone
groups. nifonuants have nis’olved dienisels’es in violent activity. This phenoutuenon is ss’ell illustrated by an infonnant hi die Klan. He
syas present at the n-murder of a civil rights svorker in Mississippi and asibsequentis helped to solve die crime anrl convict the
perpetrators. Earller. however, while perforniing duties paid for by the Gos’ermoent. he hail prevms’uslv “beaten people severely, had
boarded buses and kicked people, had [gone] into restaurants and beaten them [blaclei] with blackjacks. chains. pistols.” 78
Although die FBI requires agents to instruct inforniants that diey cammot be involved hi violence, it svas understood that hi the Khaii,
‘lie eonklii’t be an angel and he a good infonnant.” 79
4. Igoou-oug f/ic Low
Officials of the intelligence agencies occasionally i’ecognized that certain activities were illegaL but expressed concern only for ‘flap Potential” Even
niore dnsturbuig was die frequent testimony diat the law, and the (‘onstitutmon were simply ignored. For example. the author of die so—called Hssston plan
testified:
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7. Question. kas there nov persoii sviio staled tisit the activity recommended. which you have previously sientified as being illegal
opening of (he niaih and breaking and entry or burglary was there an; single person who stated that such activity shonkl not be
——
done because it was unconstitutional?
Answer. No.
Question. Was there ails single person who said such activity should not he done because il was illegal?
Answer. No. XO
Similarly, the iuan who for ten sears headed FBI’s Intelligence Division testifed that:
never once did I hear anybody, ineludnig myself, raise the question: “Is this course of action which we have agreed upon lawful.
ii it legaL is it etlucalor moraL” ‘We never gave any thought to this line of reasoning. because we weie ust naturally pragmatic. 81
Although the statutory law and (be t’onstitution were often not ‘gtsen] a thonglit’ 82 there was a general attitude that intelligence needs were
responsive ma luglser law. Thin, as one witness testified at justifying the FBI’s mail opennug program:
It was my assimniption that what we were doing was gistitied Isy what we bad to do ... the greater good. the national security. 83
5. DefL’mc,meiex /n .4 s’connr,mb,lTh’ nod Congo!
The overwhelming number of excesses contintiimsg over a prolonged iseriod of tinse were due as large measure to the fact that the system of cheeks ansI
balances created ni our (‘oisstitution to limit abuse of t3overinnental power
—— was seldom applied to the intelligence conuuuiutv. Guidance and
——
regulation from otit.side the intelligence ageitcies where it has been imposed at all-- has been vague. Presidents and other seiuor Executive oftictalim,
--
particularly the Attorneys General. have virtsialh abdicated their Constitutional responsibility to oversee and set standards for inteffigence activity. Senior
government offic’iah generally gave the agencies broad, general niandates or pressed for mnuuediate results oii pressing problems. In neither case dad
they provide guidance to present excesses and their broad niandates and pressures themselves often restmhted in excessive or insproper intelligence
activity.
t:ongress has often declined to exercise meaninefial ovemsisdit. and on occasion has passed laws or niade slatenients whtls were taken by inlellmeenee
agencies as supporting overlv’hroacl investigations.
On die oilier hand, die record reveals instances when intelligence agencies have concealed nnproper activities from then superiors in the Executive
branch and lions the Coneress. or have elected to disclose only the less questionable aspects of their activities.
There has been, in short a. clear and stistansed failsire by those responsible to control die intelligence eonununitv and to ensure its accountability. There
has been an equally clear and sustained failure by intelligence agencies to filly inform die proper asitliorities of their activities aiid to comply with
directives frons diose authorities.
6. TIme Advem:se Jogioct of Jnmprojserlmmtelh,gemmce .4ettm’itm
Many of the illegal or unproper disruptive efforts directed against .Ainerican citizens and domestic organizations succeeded mis injuring their targets.
Although it is sonsetnues difficult to prove that a target’s misfortunes were causesl by a counter-intelligence program directed against hint, die possibility
dint an arm of the Untied States Govenunent imitended to cause die harm anil might have been responsible is itself abliolTaut.
The Committee has observed numerous examples of the nulsact of intelligence operations. Sometimes die barns was readily apparent destruction of --
marriages, loss of friends orjobs. Sometimes die altitudes of the public and of Govermnent officials responsible for forinsihatmng policy ansI resolving vital
essues were influenced by distorted intelligence. But the most basic harni was to the values of privacy and freedoiu which our Constitntion seeks to
protect and wluch intelligence aetivily infringed on a broad scale.
(a) General Efforts to Discredit. -. Several efforts against inslisiduats and groups appear to have achieved dieir stated aims. For example:
—— A Bureati Fiekl Office reported that die anonymous letter it had sent to an activisfs husband accusing his wife of infidelity “contributed very strongly”
to the subsequent breakup of the marriage. 84
— Anodser Field Office reported that a draft counsellor deliberately, and falsely, accused of being an FBI informant was “ostracfted” by his friends and
associates. 85
— Two instructors were reportedllv put on probation afler the Bureau sent an anonymous letter to a universits’ administrator about died funding of an
anti—adnunistration studeiit newspaper. 86
The Bureau evaluated its atteuspts to “put a stop” to a contrihsution to die Southern Christian Leadership Coiufereuce as “quite successfuL” 87
— An FBI doeuiiuent boasted dint a “pretext” phone call to Stokehey Canumichiael’s mother telling her dial niembers of die Black Paudier Party inteiuded
to kill her son left her “shocked’ The memorandum intiniated diat (lie Bsureau believed it bach 6 responsible for Cannichaets flight to .Africa die
een
following slav. 88
(b) Media Maiupuhatiniu. The FBI has attempted covertly to influence die public’s perception of persons and organizations by dissenuuinating
-.
derogatory infonnatioui to die pess. either anonymosrshy or through ‘friendly” news contacts. The inipach of diose articles is generally ditficuuht to
7of15 8/16/2010 8:51 AM

8. measure, although iii some cases there are fairly direct coiuiections to injury to the target. The Bureau a Iso attempted to nstlueuee iuedn reporting
which would have auv impact on the public image of the FBI. Examples include:
-- Plautnug a series of derogatory articles about Martin Luther Kmg, Jr.od the Poor People’s (‘ampaign. 89
For example. iii anticipation of’ the lX,t4 ‘‘poor people’s march on Va shnigton. D.C..’ Bureau l—leadquarters granted authority to turuislu ‘‘cooperative
news media sources” an article “desimied to enrtail success of hIartin Luther King’s fund raising.” 90 Another menioramluui illustrated how
“photographs of demonstrators” could he used in drscrediting the coil rushts movement. Six photographs of participants in the poor people’s campaign in
Cleveland accompanied the niemorandum with the following note attached: ‘These [photographs] show the militant aggressive appearance of the
participant.s and might be of interest to a cooperative news source.” 91 Information on the Poor People’s Campaign was prosided by the FBI to friendly
reporters on the condition that “the Bureau nnist not be revealed as the source.” 92
——Soliciting information from Field Ofl’ices “oii a contimiing basis” for “prompt clissenunation to die news media
... . . to discredit the New Left
movement and its artherent.s.” ‘[he Headquarters directive requested, among oilier things, that:
specific data should be fiunu,shed depicting the scurrilous and depraved nature. of many of the characters, activities, habits, and
living condations representative of New Led arllierents.
Field Offices were to be exhorteit that: “Even’ avenue of possible einbarrassnuent niust be vieorouslv ann enthissiasticallv exploreit.” 93
— Ordering Field Offices to gather information which woutd disprove allegations by the “liberal press. the bleeding hearts, and the forces on the led”
diat the Chicago tsobee used undue force in dealing with demonstrators at die 196$ Denuocratic Convention. 95
—— Taking artvantage of a close relationship widi die (.‘liainnan of the Board described hi an FBI menioranstuni as “our good friend”—— of a niagazimue
——
with national circulation to hifluence articles sihsiti relatest to die FBI. For example. dirongli tIns relationship the Bureau: “squelched” an “sunt’,ivorahle
article against die Bureau” written by a free—lance writer about an FBI mmivestigation: “postponed publication” of an article cii another FBI case:
‘forestalled publication” of an article by Dr. Martin Luther Kimig. Jr.: and received infonnation about proposed editing of King’s articles. 96
(s’) Distorting Darts to JnJhtn’iccc (3s’s’c,ions’nt Pohci’ and Pub/ic f’crc’eptioi;s
Acciu’ate intelligence is a prerequisite to sound government policy. However, as the past head of die FBI’s Donuestic Intelligence Divimumon reminded the
(‘oniniittee:
The facts hs’ themselves are not too nieanimugfimt The;’ are sonicdihig like stoiies east unto a heap. 97
On certain crucial subjects the doniestic intelligence agencies reported the “facts” in sva’m’s that gave rise to niisleailhig inipressions.
For exaniple. die FBI’s Doniestic Intelligence Division iiiitially mtiscoiuited as an “obvious failure” the alleged atteiiipt’s of Coinnnuiists to hifluence the
civil i’ighits movement. 9$ Widiout any siiiticant change hi the faetualsituatioii, the Bureau moved froni the Division’s conclusion to Dh’eetrir Hoovci”s
public congressional testhnony characterizing Comniunsust influence on the civil rights iiioveiiient as “vitally hnportant.” 9$a
FBI reporthig on lsrotests against die Vietnam War provides another example, of die nianncr hi wInch the hiformation provided to decisksn-niakers can
he skewed. In acquiescence with a udignent afready expressed by President Johimison. the Bureau’s reports on nlemonstradoii_s agahist the War hi
Vieuiamn einghiasned (‘onussnnsut efforts to mmit’liienee die anti-war niovenuent and underplayed die fact diat die vast majority of nlenion.strators were not
Coiiiiiiunsst controlled. 99
(ct) “Chil’ig” First Amendment Riglds. The First Ainendnient protects die Rights of American citizens to engage hi free ansI open discussions, and to
--
associate with persooss of their choosing. Intelligence agencies have, on occasion, expressly attenipted to hiterfere with diose rights. For example. one
internal FBI nienioraiidum called for “tuiore hitei’views” uvith New Left subjects “to enhance die pai’anoia endemic hi diese circles” and “get die pohit
across there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox.” 100
More impu.srtaimdv. the government’s snrveihhauice activities iii die aggregate whether or not expressly hitennled to rho so tends. as the Consmuiittee
-- -—
concludes at p. 290 to deter die exercise of First Amnemiclesh Rights by Aniermcan citisens who become asyare of the govermnemit’s domestic hitelligence
program.
(e) Preventhug die Free Exchange of Ideas. Speakers, teachers, writem’s, and publicatiomis dienssehves were targets of the FBI’s coummiterhitelligenee
--
program. The FBI’s efforts to interfere widi the free exchange of ideas huehushech:
--Anonynsonshv atteisspting to prevent an alleged ‘Comiuuuiinist-froiit” group froni holding a forum on a niidsvcst camumpu.s. and then hivestigathig the judge
who ordered that die meeting he allowed to proceed. 101
-- Ushig anodier “confidential snuuirce” in a foundation wInch comitributed to a local ccuflege to apply pressure on die school to fh’e an activist professor.
--Aiion;anoushv contacting a umnisersits’ official to urge luins to “persuade” two professors to stop funuhhig a student newspaper. in order to “elimhiate
what voice die New Led has” hi due area.
-- Targeting die New Ivlexmeo Free l.tnivcrsity for teaclumiug “eonffrniitatioui politics” and “draft counseling taahihig”. 102
7. Cost and Irs/use
8of15 8/16/2010 8:51 AM

9. Domestic intelligence is expensive. Pc have afreadv indica ted the cost of illegal and improper intelligence activities in ternis of the harm to victims, the
injury to constitutional values, and the damage to time democratic process itself The cost in dollars is also significant. For example, the FBI has hudgeted
tor fiscal year 1976 over $7 million for its domestic security mnfonnant program. more than twice the amount it spends on informants aganist organized
crane. 103 The aggregate budget for FBI domestic security intelligence and foreign counterintelligence is at least $80 million. 104 In the late 1960s and
early 1970s. svlmen the Bureau was joined by the CIA. the military, and NSA in collecting iisformatioii about the anti—war movenient and black activists.
the cost svas substantially greater.
Apart fi’oin the excesses described above, the nsefiiliicss of many domestic nmtelligence activities ni serving the legitimate goal of proteetnig society has
been questionable. Properly directed niteliigence investigation.s concentratuig upoii bostde foreign agents and violent terrorists can produce valuable
results. The Conamiuttee has exanummed cases where the FBI uncovered “illegal” agents of a foreigii power engaged in clandestine intelligence activities
iii violation of federal law. Iiiforination leading to the prevention of serious violence has been acquired by’ tIme FBI through its informant penetration of
teiTorist groups and through the inclusion in Bureau files of the names of persons actively involved with such groups. 105 Nevertheless, the most
sweeping doniestic intelligence surveillance progranm.s have produced surprisingly few useful returns ni viesv of their extent. For example:
-- Between 1960 antI 1974, tIme FBI conducted over 500.000 separate investigations of persons and groups wider the “subversive” category, predicated
oii the possibility that they might he likely to overtlwosv the govenunent of the United States, 106 Vet not a single individual or group has been
prosecuted since 1957 tinder the laws which pi’ohihit plauming or advocating action to overtlmm’ow the government and which are the main alleged
statutory basis for such FBI investigations. 107
—— A recent study by the General Accounting Office lass estimated that of sonic 17.528 FBI domestic intelligence investigations of individuals am 1974,
ouh’ 1.3 percent resulted am prosecution and conviction, and in unIv “about 2 percent” of the cases was advance knowledge of any activity legal or --
illegal obtained. 108
--
-- One of the main reasons advanced for expanded collection of intelligence about urban unrest and anti-war protest was to help responsible officiats
cope svitli possible violence. Hosvever. a former White House official with major duties in this area sumcler the Jolum.soii ailininistratioma has concluded, iii
retrospect. that ‘‘mum none of these s ituatiomm.s ...woukl advance intelligence about dissident groups [have] been of imich help.’’ that ss’hat svas neesled
svas “ph;sical inteffigence” about the geography of major cities, and that the atteiumpt to “predict violence” was isot a “successful undertaking” 109
--Domestic intelligence reports have sometimes even been counterproductive. A local police eluef, for example. described FBI reports ss’luclm led to tIme
positioning of federal troops near lao city as:
almost completely coimmposecl of unsorted and unevaluated stories. tlu’eats. and rumors that had crossed nay desk am Nesv
Haven. Many of these had long before been discounted by our Intelligence Division. But they had niade their svay from New
Haven to Washington. had gained completely unwarranted credmbilit3: and had been submitted by the Director of the FBI to the
President of tIme United States. They seenied to present a cons’incing picture of impending holocaust. 110
In considering its recommuanendations. the Comamamuttee undertook an evaluation of the FBI’s claims that domestic intelligence was necessary to combat
terrorism, civil disoi’ders, “subversion.” and hostile foreign intelligence activity. TIme Conaanittee reviewed voluminous materials bearing on this issue and
questioned Bureau officials. localpohuce officials, and present and t’onncr federalexceutive officials.
We have found that we are in funslainental agreenient with the svisdom of Attorney (3eneral Stone’s initial warning that intdlligeiacc agencies nmust not
be “concerned smith political or other opiniomss of isuclividuale” and nmrust be limitesl to investigating essentiillv only “such conduct as is forhislden by the
lasvs of the United States,.” ‘l’he (‘onunittee’s u’ecord deinonstm’ates that domestic intelligence which departs fi’onm this standard raises grave rislcs of
undcrmnimming the democratic process and harming the interests of individual eitiaeu.s. This danger sveighs heavily again.st tIme speculative or negligible
benefits of the ill-defined and overhroad investigations authmoriced in the past. Thus, the basic purpose of the reconuaaendations contained iii Part IV of
this report is to limit the FBI to imuvestigatimig conduct rather than ideas or associations.
The excesses of the past do not however, justly depriving the United States of a clearly defined and effectively controlled domestic intelligence
capability. The intelligence services of this nation’s nmternational advei’saries continue to attempt to conduct chandestume espionage operations witbin the
United States. Ill Our reconmssaendatuon.s pros’ide for intelligence investigations of hostile foreign immtehligence activity.
Moreover, terrorists have engaged iii serious acts of violence wbachm Isive brommglmt death and injury to Amamericans and threaten further smuch acts. These
acts. not time politics or beliefs of those svho svouhd conmait thmena. arc time proper focus for imms’estmgatmons to anticipate terrorist violemuce. Accorcliiaghv. the
Conummittee would penmmmt properly comutrolled nutelligemace nmvestmgatioum.s am those narrosv cmremmmnstammces, 112
Commcemmtration on iimmmmmiument violence can avoid the wasteful dispersion of resources whmichm has chmaractericed time ssseepimmg (amid fruitless) dommmestic
nmtehligence investigations of the past. But time most imnportammt reason for time fundanmental ehammge in time dommiestic intelligence operatiomm.s which onr
Reconunendations propose is time need to hmrotect tIme constitutional Rights of Americans.
In light of time record of abuse resealed by our iumquirv, the (‘oumummittee is mmot satisfied with the position that umuere exposmu’e of svhat has occmun’ed iii the
past will prevent its recurrence. Clear legal stammdards auth effective oversight and controls are necessary to ensure that dommuestic immtehligence activity
does not itself undernmimme time deammocratic system it is immtenched to protect.
Footnotes:
1 S. Res. 21, see. 2 (12). The Senate specifically charged this Committee with investigating “the condnct of
domestic intelligence, or cotulterintelligetlce operations against United States citizens.” (See. 2(2) ) The
resolution added several examples of specific charges of possible “illegal, improper or unethical” governmental
intelligence activities as matters to be filly investigated (See. (2) (1)-CIA domestic activities: See. (2)
9of15 8/16/2010 8:51 AM

10. (3)—Huston Plan See. (2) ( L0)—surreptitous entries, electronic surveillance, mail opening.)
2 Just as the term “Intelligence activity” encompasses activities that go far beyond the collection and analysis
of
information. the term “intelligence community” includes persons ranging from tie President to the lowest field
operatives of the intelligence agencies.
3 The Alien Act l)rovided for the deportation of all aliens judged “dangerous to the peace and safely” of
the
nation. (1 Stat. 570. June 25. 1798) The Sedition Act made it a federal crime to publish “false. scandalous
and
malicious writing” against the United States government, the Congress. or the President with the intent to “excite
against them” the “hatred of the good people of the United States” or to “encourage or abet any hostile designs
of
any foreign nation against the United States.” (1 Stat. 596. July 14. 1798) There were at least 25 arrests.
15
indictments, and 10 convictions under the Sedition Act. (See James M. Smith. Freedom’s Fetters: The Alien
and
Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press. 1956).)
4 Francis Diddle. In Brief Authority (Garden City: Doubleday, 1962).
p. 224: Roger Daniels. Concentration
Camps USA: Japanese Americans and World War H (New York: Holt. Ritehail. and Winston. 1971). 66,
p.
5 Many victims of intelligence activities have claimed in the past that they were being subjected to hostile
action
by their government. Prior to this investigation. most Americans would have dismissed these allegations.
Senator Philip Hart aptly described this phenomenon in the course of the Committee’s public hearings
on
clonestic intelligence activities:
‘As I’m sure others have. I have been told for years by. among others. some of my own fanmilv. that
this is exactly
what the Bureau was doing all of the tine, and in my great wisdom and high office. I assured them
that they were
(wrongj-it just wasn’t tune, it couldn’t happen They wouldn’t do it. What you have described is a series
of illegal
actions intended squarely to deny First Amendment rights to some Americans. That is what n’ children
have
told me was going on Now I did not believe it.
“The trick now, as I see it. Mr. Chairman, is for this committee to be able to figure out how
to persuade the
people of this country that indeed it did go omi And how shall we insure that it will never happen again?
But it
will happen repeatedly unless we can bring ourselves to understand and accept that it did go on.”
Senator Philip
Hart. 11/18/75. Hearings. Vol. 6. p. 41.
6 As the Supreme court noted in Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436. 483. 486 (1966). even before
tIe Court
required law officers (o advise criminal suspects of their constitutional rights before custodial interrogation
, the
FBI had “an exemplary record” in this area-a practice which the Court said should be emulated
by state and
local law enforcenent agencies.” This commendable FBI tradition in tie general field of law
enforcement
presents a sharp contrast to the widespread disregard of individual rights in FBI domestic
intelligence
operations examined in the balance of this Report.
7New YorkTines. 5/13/24.
8 Mary J Cook testimony. 12/2/75), Hearings. Vol. 6. p. 111: James B. Adams testimony. 12/2/75.
0 Hearings.
Vol. 6, p. 135.
9 Tom Charles Hustontestimonv. 9/23/75. Hearings. Vol. 2. 45.
p.
10 “TIe Federal Prosecutor”. Journal of the American Judicature Society (June. 1940), p. 18.
II Memorandum from the FBI to the Senate Select Committee, 10/6/75.
12 Meinoraixlum froni the FBI to the Senate Select Committee. 10/6/75.
13 James Angletontestinionv. 9/17/75. p. 28.
14 See Mail Opening Report: Section IV, “FBI Mail Openings.”
15 Chief. International Terrorist Group testimony. Commission on CIA Activities Within
the United States.
3/10/75. pp. 1485-1489.
l0ofl5
8/l6/20l08:5IAM

11. 16 Statenint by the Chairman. I 1/6/75 re: SHAMROCK. Hearings. Vol. 5. pp. 57-60.
17 See Military Surveillance Report: Section 11. “The Collection of Information about the Political Activities
of Private Citizens and Private Organizations.
18 See IRS Report: Section II. “Selective Enforcennt for Non-tax Purposes.”
19 Menxrandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardirnn. 12/8/54. Many of the iremoraiila cited in this report
were actually written by FBI personnel other than those whose nans were indicated at the foot of the docunnt
as the author. Citation in this report of specific nmoranda by using the naiurs of FBI personnel which so appear
is for docunntation purposes only and is not intended to presume authorship or even knowledge in all cases.
20 Memoraixlumfrom Kansas City Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 10/20/70. (Hearings. Vol. 6. Exhibit 54-3)
21 MeLnoralKiuni from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 5/28/69. P. 2. (Hearings. Vol. 6. Exhibit
54--i)
22 Memoraalum from Baltimore Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 5/11/70. P. 2.
23 Memorandinufrom New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 4/14/64.
24 Nan deleted by Committee to protect privacy.
25 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Meld Office 4/24/64. re CPUSA. Negro question
26 James Adams testimony. 12/2/75. Hearings. Vol. 6. P. 137.
27 MeIm)ralthuulfromF. T. Baunardnerto William C. SuLlivan. 5/29/6.3.
28 Memorandum from Oklahoma City Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 9/19/4 1. See Developiuent of FBI
Domestic Intelligence Investigations: Section IV. “FBI Target Lists.”
29 Chief Robert Shackleford testimony. 2/6/76. p. 91.
30 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. Report. 1973. p. 57.
31 Senate Select Committee Staff sunuuarv of HTLTNGUAL File Review. 9/5/75.
32 FBI Sumnurv Memorandum 1/31/75. re: Coverage of TX. Presentation.
33 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Marvin Watson. 7/15/66.
34 See Military Report: See. II. “The Collection of informationAbout the Political Activities of Private citizens
and Private Organizations.”
35 Memorandum from FBI headquarters to all SAC’s. 11/4/70.
36 Charles Brennan testimony. 9/25/75. Hearings. vol. 2 p. 117.
37 Memorandumfrom FBI Headquarters to all SAC’s. 7/5/68.
38 Abstracts of New Lefi Docuients #161. 115. 43. Memorandum from Washington Field Office to FBI
Headquarters. 1/21/69.
39 Meinoranduinfrom FBI Headquarters to Cleveland Field Office, 11/29/68.
40 FBI manual of Instructions. See. 87. B (2-f).
41 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Antonio Field Office. 7/23/69.
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12. 42 Memorandumfrom Stephen Early to J. Edgar Hoover. 5/21/40: 6/17/40.
43 Letter fromJ. Edgar Hoover to George Allen, 12/3/46.
44 Letter fromJ. Edgar Hoover to Maj. Gen. Harry Vaughn. 2/15/47.
45 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to M. T. Connellv. 1/27/50.
46 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Dillon AlKierson, 11/7/55.
47 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler. 2/13/58.
47a Letters fromT. Edgar Hoover to Robert Cutler. 4/21/53-4/27/53.
38 Menrai1um from J. Edgar Hoover to tl Attorney General. 2/16/61.
49 MemoraiilumfromJ. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney GeneraL 2/14/61.
50 Menxraithim from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General. 2/16/6 1.
51 Menraahun from J. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General 6/26/62.
52 MeniramJum from Charles Brennan to William Sullivan. 12/19/66.
53 MeniraiLunifromJ. Edgar Hoover to the Attorney General. 2/18/61.
54 MenraidiuufromT. Edgar Hoover to Bill Movers. 10/27/64.
55 Meinaraidum from C. D. DeLoach to JoIni Mohr. 8/29/64.
56 Letter from J. Edgar Hoover to HR. Haldeman, 6/25/70.
57 Meinaraalum from FBI Headquarters. to San Francisco Field Office. 11/26/68.
58 Meinarandum from [Midwest Citvj Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 8/1/68: inenrandum froni FBI
Headquarters to [Midwest City] Field Office. 8/6/68.
59 MenKraidumfronl Coluntia Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 11/4/70. re: COINTELPRO-New Left.
60 Menoraidum from Cbarles Brennan to William Sullivan 8/15/68.
61 Meirnraithuii from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68.
62 Meinarandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office. 1/30/69 re: COINTELPRO. Black
Nationalist-Hate Groups.
63 William C. Sullivan testimony. 11/1/75, p. 49.
64 nnurandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan. 2/4/64.
65 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 12/16/68: inenxrandum from FBI
Headquarters to Chicago Field Office. 1/30/69. re: COINTELPRO. Black Nationalist-Hate Groups.
66 William C. Sullivan. 11/1/75. pp. 104-105.
67 Andrew Young testinxniy 2/19/76. p. 8.
68 Memoraiilumfrom Sullivan to Belmont, 8/30/63. Menoranchunfrom Sullivan to Belmont. 1/8/64.
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13. 70 MeinaraiJum from FBI Headquarters to all SACs. 3/4/68.
71 See Mail Opening Report: Section IL “Legal Considerations and the ‘Flap’ Potential.”
72 See NSA Report: Section I. “Introduction and Summary.”
73 Memaramthim from Attorney General Brownell to 3. Edgar Hoover. 5/20/54.
74 See finding on Political Abuse. To protect the privacy of tie targeted iiiiviclual. the Committee has omitted
the citation to tie ireinarandum concerning the example of purely personal information
75 Meireramium from W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach 7/19/66. p. 2.
76 General Accounting Office Report onDonistic intelligence Operations of tie FBI. 9/75.
77 Maw Jo Cook testimony. 12/2/75. Hearings. Vol. 6. p. 111.
78 Gary Rowe deposition, 10/17/75. p. 9.
79 Special Agent No. 3 deposition. 11/21/75, p. 12.
80 Huston testimony 9/23/75, Hearings. Vol. 2.1).
81 William Sullivan testimony. 11/1/75. pp. 92-93.
82 The quote is from a Bureau official who had supen’ised for the “Black Nationalist Hate. Group”
CO1NTELPRO.
“Question Did anybody at any time that von remember during the course of the program. discuss the
Constitutionality or the legal authority, or anything else like that?
“Answer. No. we never gave it a thought. As far as I know, nobody engaged or ever had any idea that they were
doing anything other than what was the policy of the Bureau which had been policy for a long tine.” (George
Moore deposition. 11/3/75. p. 83.)
83 Branagan. 10/9/75. p. 41.
83 Meinaraalumfroni St. Louis Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 6/19/70.
85 Memoraithnufrom’San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 4/30/69.
86 MeinaraiLumfrom Mobile Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 12/9/70.
87 MemDrarKhnn from Wick to DeLoach, 11/9/66.
88 Memorandumfronî New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 9/9/68.
89 See King Report: Sections Vand VII.
90 Memoram:Iumfrom G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 10/26/68.
91 Memoraiilumfrom G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 5/17/68.
92 Menx)raalulu from FBI Headquarters to Ivliami Field Office. 7/9/68.
93 Memoraithunfrom C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, 5/22/68.
94 omitted in original.
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14. 95 Memoranduinfrom FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office. 8/28/68.
96 Memorandum from W. H. Stapleton to DeLoach. 11/3/64.
97 Sullivan. 11/1/75. p. 48.
98 Menrandum from Baumgardner to Sullivan. 8/26/63 p. 1. Hoover himself construed the initial Division
estimate to mean that Communist influence was “infinitesimal.”
98a See Finding onPolitical Abuse. p. 225.
99 See Finding on Political Abuse. p. 225.
100 ‘New Left Notes -- Philadelphia.” 9/16/70. Edition #1.
101 Memorandum from Detroit Field Office to FBI Headquarters 10/26/60: Memorandum from P1ST
Headquarters to Detroit Field Office 10/27. 28. 31/60: Memorandum fromBaumgardner to Belmont. 10/26/60.
102 See COTNTELPRO Report: Section 111. “The Goals of COINTELPRO: Preventing or disrupting the
exercise of First Ainendnnt Rights.”
103 The budget for FBI informant programs includes not only the payments to informants for their services and
expenses. but also the expenses of FBI personnel who supervise informants, their support costs. and
administrative overhead. (Justice Department letter to Senate Select Committee. 3/2/76).
104 The Committee is withholding the portion of this figure spent on domestic security intelligence (informants
and other investigations combined) to prevent hestile foreign intelligence services from deducing the anvnmt
spent on counterespionage. The $80 million figure does not inchide all costs of separate FBI activities which
imv be drawn upon for domestic security intelligence purposes. Among these are the Identification Division
(maintaining fingexprint records), the Files aiid Communications Division (managing the storage and retrieval of
investigative and intelligence files), and the FBI Laboratory.
105 Examples of valuable infornunt reports include the following: one informant reported a plan to aniush
police officers and the location of a cache of weapons and dynamite: another informant reported plans to
transport illegally obtained weapons to Washington. D.C.: two informants at one meeting discovered plans to
dynamite two cit’, blocks. All of these plans were frustrated by further investigation and protective measures or
arrest. (FBI menuranduin to Select Committee. 12/10/75: Senate Select Committee Staff menurandum
Intelligence Cases in Which the FBI Prevented Violence. undated.)
One exalr4,le of the use of information in Bureau files involved a “name check” at Secret Service request on
certain persons applying for press credentials to cover the visit of a foreign head of state. The discovery of data
in FBI files indicating that one such person bad been actively involved with violent groups led to further
investigation and ultimately the issuanoe of a search warrant. The search produced evidence, including
weapons. of a plot to assassinate the foreign head of state. (FBI nnurandum to Senate Select Committee,
2/23/76)
106 This figure is the number of “investigative matters” handled by the FBI in this area, including as separate
itenu the investigative leads iii particular cases which are followed up by various field offices. (FBI
memorandum to Select Committee. 10/6/75.)
107 Scluckelford 2/13/76. p. 32. This official does not recall any targets of “subversive” investigations having
been even referred to a Grand Jm-’, tuider these statutes since the I 950s.
108 FBI Domestic Intelligence Operations --Their Purpose and Scope: Issues That Need To Be Resolved.”
Report by the Comptroller General to the House Judiciai Committee. 2/24/76. pp. 13 8-147. The FBI contends
that these statistics may be unfair in that they concentrate on investigations of individuals rather than groups.
(Ibid.. Appendix V) In response. GAO states that its “sample of organization and control files was sufficient to
determine that generally the FBI did not report advance knowledge of planned violence.” Iii most of the fourteen
instances where such advance knowledge was obtained, it related to “such activities as speeches.
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15. denoiistrations 01 iietings—a11 essenthlllv i1OIP toleni.’ (Ibid.. p. [44)
109 Joseph Califano lestinunv. 1/27/76 pp. 7-8.
110 James Alieiiitestimonv. 1/20/76. pp. 16. [7.
I Ii An indication of the scope of the probLem is the increasing munber of official rcpresentati es of communist
governments in the United States. For example the niunber of So; jet officials in this country has increased from
333 in 1961 to 1.079 by early 1975. There were 2.683 East-West exchange ;isitors and 1.500 commercial
isitors in 1974. (FBI Meiwranduiu. ‘Intelligence Activities Within the United States by ForeLgn Governments.”
3/20/75.)
112 According to the FBI there were 89 bombmgs attributable to teriorist activity in 197S. as compaied with
45 in 1974 and 24 in 1 97. Six persons died in terrorist—claimed bombings and 76 persons were injured in
1975. Five other deaths were reported in other tpes of terrorist incidents. Monetary damage reported in
terrorist bontings exceeded 2.7 million dollars. It should be noted however, that terrorist bombings are only a
fraction of the total number of boinbing,s in this coiuflr. Thus. the 89 terrorist bombings in 1975 ‘aere alneng a
total of over l.90() bombings. nust of which were not according to the FBI attributable dearly to terrorist
.
activilv. (FBI memaranduin to Senate Select Committee 2/23/76.)
Trc,n,r r1Jfion and hint! by Paul Wolf 2002.
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