1. www.iacsp.com
A member
of the Israeli
police bomb squad
surveys the scene of a
suicide bombing in the southern
town of Dimona February 4, 2008.
A Palestinian carried out the first suicide
bombing in Israel in a year on Monday, killing a
woman in a desert town where a top-secret nuclear
reactor is located. REUTERS/Amir Cohen (ISRAEL)
Vol.14, No.2
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International

2. Introduction and based on policies and training by emergency
medical service (EMS) responders, and subse-
The frequency of mass casualty incidents (MCI) due to terrorist attacks has increased quently, lethal force was utilized to neutralize
the threat by law enforcement. The effective
in recent weeks in Israel and worldwide. These events can occur in central or peripheral work by law enforcement in neutralizing the
towns, and in urban or rural areas. Numerous events, mainly involving conventional imminent and life threatening presence of the
second suicide bomber prevented a much more
bombs detonated in heavily populated areas, have occurred throughout the world extensive attack and minimized casualties.
Incident Control and Management
as indicated in the London bombing (Almogy, 2004), and in Israel in the vicinity of
After more than a year without a suicide attack
surrounding trauma centers (Bloch, Y., Schwartz, D., Bar-Dayan, Y., et al., 2007). in Israel and in a place that had never experi-
enced an attack, security forces generally have
become complacent to the immediate threat of
The last successful suicide bombing attack in Israel was in the southern City of Eilat suicide bombers and shooting attacks occurring
in Jewish towns throughout Israel. Supporting
on January 29, 2007. The attack was carried out by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad this is the fact, only a week before the attack,
the special transportation security unit created
(PIJ) in collaboration with a Fatah terror cell. The suicide bomber originated from the to prevent bus bombings a few years earlier,
was disbanded. It also should be noted that
Gaza Strip and detonated himself at bakery, killing three Israelis (Ministry of Foreign during the production of this article, on March
6, 2008 a terrorist infiltrated the library at the
Affairs, 2007). Prior to the Eilat bombing, the last Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al- Mercaz Harav Yeshiva seminary in Jerusalem
Islamiyya) suicide attack was on August 12, 2005. This attack also took place in the killing eight students and wounding 11 others
with an automatic rifle (Ministry of Foreign
southern part of Israel in the City of Beersheba. The target for this attack was the Affairs, 2008).
central bus transportation node where 40 civilians were injured and responsibility Because of the timing and place of the attack,
and days after Hamas destroyed the wall sepa-
claimed by the PIJ (BBC News, 2005). rating the Gaza Strip from the Northern Sinai
Peninsula, it was widely speculated the bombers
came from Gaza by way of Sinai and through
The management of a terror incident the unfenced area only a few dozen kilo-
differs according to the location, the meters south of Gaza. Final reports disprove
character of the event, the number and this concept after the bombing was claimed
severity of casualties, the rate and ease by the Al Aksa Martyr Brigades—the
of evacuation, experience and skills of militant wing of the Fatah in Hebron. The
the command and emergency teams After more than a year without a bombers most likely infiltrated to Israel
operating in the arena, and the number from the 26 km wide gap in the southern
suicide attack in Israel and in a section of the Security Barrier, approxi-
and level of the nearby hospitals and
their capacities. Researching the unique place that had never experienced mately 30 km north of Dimona. The desert
characteristic of the management and moon-like landscape demands that local
outcomes of every one of these events an attack, security forces generally Bedouins residents, most knowledgeable
has taught us different new lessons and have become complacent to the about the region paths of movement, helped
it was suggested that proper manage- in some way with or without knowledge of
ment of the event can be a key factor immediate threat of suicide bombers the bombers intent. It is a known fact that
in reduction of the mortality rate in a hundreds of illegal Palestinian workers
and shooting attacks occurring in infiltrate this area weekly with the help of
mass casualty incident (Bloch, et al.,
2007). Therefore, we believe that les- Jewish towns throughout Israel. local Bedouins (Barzilai, 2008).
sons learned from every event must be
prospectively described and analyzed Supporting this is the fact, only a What is known is that the two suicide bomb-
using the same methodology to allow week before the attack, the special ers arrived to the same location. The intent
generalization from the accumulated was for the first suicide bomber to direct the
experience and to draw conclusions transportation security unit created detonation towards civilians at the commu-
from them. nity center. Once this attack was executed,
to prevent bus bombings a few years the second suicide bomber would target the
Incident Background earlier, was disbanded. first responders inbound to the scene as well
as operating within the seat of the explosion.
On February 4th, 2008, at approximately Immediately upon knowledge of the attack,
1030 hours, (Israel local time 0830 GMT), emergency medical services responded to the
two suicide bombers arrived at the open mar- scene. Their mission is the immediate evacuation
ket in the City of Dimona. The terror group of the injured from the potentially dangerous scene,
that planned and executed the attack was the while law enforcement secure the scene as bomb
Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, a terrorist squad technicians render any suspicious devices safe.
from Hebron—the military wing of the Hamas
organization (Jerusalem Post Online, 2008). The The planned adversarial operation was designed Behavior, Target,
first bomber detonated himself on a crowd of and intended to be a double suicide attack with and Attack Operation
innocent bystanders at the open market while the first bomber detonating himself in an open
inadvertently injuring the second bomber that market, and the second bomber targeting first Local Pizza Café owner “Ravital” reported after
arrived with him. As a result of the attack, a responders operating within the scene. Prior to the attack she believes that one of the bombers
female was killed and 48 civilians were injured. detonation, the second bomber was identified ordered coffee at her establishment only minutes

3. www.iacsp.com
before the attack. Her statement as reported was from the first on scene officer and relieves the Lessons Learned
that a “nervous Arab man in a red coat came in first arriving officer of incident command du-
and demanded ‘coffee, quick!’” Although not ties. Once a ranking officer is on location, the and Outcomes
confirmed, this action is considered rare in cases officer ultimately has the overall responsibility
of Palestinian suicide bombings and if confirmed to maintain command until an officer of higher Perhaps the single most important lesson learned
true, shows a level of cool headedness and self rank transfers the authority. The first command is the continued need to conduct and review
confidence that is unprecedented. Most reports on the scene, upon arrival will rendezvous with interagency field exercises to improve agency
of civilian interactions with suicide bombers in the emergency personnel on site, receive an up- response an interdiction to an incident. The
the minutes before acting were short, evasive date from the personnel on location, and in turn, Dimona incident was a classic presentation of
and somber. Terrorists justifiably believe they maintain command and control of the incident the “secondary device” against first responders
are being watched and are seconds away from a while relaying the details of the incident to the and would have proven deadly if not for proper
special forces “take-down” before leaving their upper level command. training and effective decision making skills.
residences. Although their has been reports of Moreover, many organizations have policies
calm and collected behavior prior to an attack, With the first suicide bomber killed in the and procedures in place specific to blast inci-
(for example the 9/11 terrorists; but these were a primary attack, the second suicide bomber was dents, but as in the case of Dimona, responders
group of hand picked special well trained “cream critically injured and had been identified by were well into casualty evacuations before the
of the crop” terrorists who made a mission out of secondary device was discovered. This devel-
the operation) the natural psychological behavior oping crisis prompted law enforcement to make
of someone who is about to detonate himself, can fast operational and tactical decisions in order
be noticed. If covered up by some type of drug to minimize responder and civilian casualty.
use (which is common), the bomber will likely Learning from Dimona, it is clear training and
act sedated, again raising suspicions through exercise objectives should include an evaluation
prior law enforcement training. of emergency communications between agen-
cies for evacuation of personnel from scenes
The fact Dimona has not been hit by acts of terror determined to be unsafe.
is both expected and a surprise. As a target, it is
small and far away from Palestinian cities, and References
has a larger city (Beer Sheba) between it and
the Southern Palestinian Territory of the Hebron Almogy, G., Belzberg, H., Mintz, Y., Pikarsky, A.K.,
Hills. On the other hand, the (supposed) exis- Zamir, G., Rivkind, A.I. (2004). Suicide bombing
tence of a nuclear reactor and weapons facility attacks: update and modifications to the protocol.
near the city makes it a high profile target rather Ann Surg., 239(3), 295-303.
than a target-rich environment. Nearly every Barzilai, A. (2008, March). The Bedouin intifada:
news report outside of Israel added at the end it’s not if, but when. Retrieved March 9, 2008,
of the report the nuclear facility in the vicinity from http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.
portrays Dimona as a high profile target city. jhtml?itemNo=431607&contrassID=2&subCont
rassID=20&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y
Incident Command
Bloch, Y., Schwartz, D., Bar-Dayan, Y., et al.
and Scene Mitigation (2007). Distribution of casualties in MCI with
emergency personnel. As per law enforcement three local hospitals in the periphery of a densely
Response was immediately initiated by (EMS) personnel on location, the second suicide bomber populated area: lessons learned from the medical
and incident command was established. Again, posed a clear and imminent threat to the rescuers management of a terrorist attack. Prehospital and
for Dimona, it is the first time residents have and civilians on location. The intended plan of Disaster Medicine, 22, 176-182.
ever experienced a terror attack, and therefore action of this bomber can only be speculated that
operating and response procedures could have Bomb hits Israeli bus station. (2005). BBC News.
he intended to target the first responders entering
potentially been slower to coordinate a smooth Retrieved August 28, 2005, from http://news.bbc.
the seat of the explosion. This is considered a
and safe process. The response was fast by all co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4192208.stm
known criteria and a successful tactic perpetrated
agencies. EMS was supported by local medical Suicide bombing in Eilat bakery. (2007). Israel of
by adversarial elements of such globally. The bomb
clinics that dispatched “Good Samaritans” to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved March 9,
technician as well as the superintendent had used
the scene to assist emergency crews. The Good 2008, from: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
lethal force against the second bomber; however,
Samaritan team comprised of a physician and the threat had not been fully neutralized. The +Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since
nurse. The pair immediately began to treat the danger associated with such an attacker, is the po- +2000/Suicide+bombing+in+Eilat+bakery+29-
seriously injured, which included the would- tential for the injured bomber to use what strength Jan-2007.htm
be bomber. While treating the injured suicide is left of him to initiate any switch to detonate the Terror shooting at Mercaz Harav Kook Yeshiva
bomber, the crew identified an imminent threat, explosive device. in Jerusalem. (2008, March). Ministry of Foreign
evacuated the scene and notified law enforce- Affairs. Retrieved March 8, 2008, from http://www.
ment. As the team evacuated the scene, and Until the threat can be rendered safe, no addi- mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/
relayed the details of the threat to law enforce- tional rescue attempts can continue. Identifying Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Terror+shootin
ment on location, they were able to continue to the danger to the civilians, rescuers, himself, and g+at+Mercaz+Harav+Yeshiva+in+Jerusalem+6-
meet their mission objectives and successfully operating off of training and policy, a superinten- Mar-2008.htm
dragged an additional wounded woman with dent from the Israeli Police fired several shots,
them to safety. fatally wounding the second suicide bomber Woman killed, 38 wounded in Dimona suicide
before he could detonate his explosive device. bombing. (2008, February). Jerusalem Post Online.
In Israel, the patrol commander tends to be one As soon as the threat was neutralized, and bomb Retrieved February 4, 2008, from http://www.jpost.
of the first commanders on location at an at- technicians rendered the explosive device safe, com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost
tack. The patrol commander or the equivalent emergency crews were able to re-enter the scene %2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1202
in similar police units receives the initial report and continue with their overall mission. 064575658
50 Vol.14, No.2
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International