HTAU August 2015 Report final

Report on the Population Affected by
Armed Conflict in Syria
NGO Forum - Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit
August 2015 Report
This report is intended for organizations working on the humanitarian response to the Syrian
crisis. This report should not be distributed outside of your organization or posted on the Internet.

HTAU August 2015 Report Page 2
For more information on this report contact:
NGO Forum HTAU Coordinator
Email: ngoforumhtau@gmail.com
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ...............................................................................................................3
Table 1: Statistics on Syrian people...................................................................................3
Summary of findings..........................................................................................................4
About the NGO Forum and Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit .........................................5
Methodology ..........................................................................................................................5
General Findings....................................................................................................................6
Armed conflict dynamics for Northern Syrian for August 2015 .......................................6
Chart 1: Security incidents by armed group: Jan-Oct 2015...............................................8
Chart 2: Security incidents by governorate: Jan-Oct 2015 ................................................8
Chart 3: Civilian deaths by armed group: Jan– Oct. 2015.................................................9
Chart 4: Civilian deaths by armed group by month: Jan. – Oct. 2015.............................10
Population movements and demographics.......................................................................11
Sectoral Findings..................................................................................................................12
Protection and threats to physical safety..........................................................................12
Most vulnerable groups....................................................................................................12
IDP Camp issues ..............................................................................................................14
Shelter and non-food items ..............................................................................................14
Fuel and electricity...........................................................................................................15
Food security and livelihoods ..........................................................................................16
Nutrition...........................................................................................................................17
Health...............................................................................................................................17
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene ........................................................................................19
Education..........................................................................................................................19
Affected Population Issues...................................................................................................20
Affected population coping mechanisms.........................................................................20
Affected population satisfaction ......................................................................................20
Relations between groups ................................................................................................21
Cultural and social issues.................................................................................................22
Discussion and Summary.....................................................................................................23
Appendix A: HTAU interview questionnaire ..................................................................26
Appendix B: Acronyms and Secondary Sources on Syria...............................................27
Appendix C: Areas of control in Syria.............................................................................28

Executive Summary
While the armed conflict in Syria continues to have a devastating impact on the civilian
population in Syria, information on the needs, problems and coping mechanisms of the
affected population in Syria remains difficult to obtain. A brief review of statistics from
2014 and the present underscores the huge scope of the humanitarian crisis and the rapidly
changing nature of the crisis.
Table 1: Statistics on Syrian people
Demographic October 20141
Oct. 20152
Total population n/a 16.4 million3
People in need 6.6 m. 13.5 m.
Internally displaced persons 4.8 m. 6.5 m.
Syrian refugees 4 m. 4.18 m.
People killed 191,000 (April 2014) 330,0004
People injured 329,000 (Dec 2013) 1.3 m.
People living in camps or collective shelters 165,000 1.74 m.
People in besieged and hard to reach areas 5.2 m. 5.2 m5
With a pre-conflict population of about 22 million people,6
of whom about 2.5 million
were refugees from Iraq, Palestine and Armenia, the changes since 2011 in the number of
people affected by the armed conflict are astounding. Recent estimates of the total Syrian
population are about 16.4 million, a reduction of about 20%. The population in need of
assistance has risen to 13.5 million, which means that about 75% of population still living
in Syria needs humanitarian assistance of some kind. Furthermore, the number of IDPs
has risen to 6.5 million, many of who have been displaced multiple times, which means
that about 40% of the remaining population usually has a much higher level of need –
since most of them have lost their homes, livelihoods, local resources and everyday
routines. These numbers and the corresponding levels of humanitarian need make the
Syrian conflict one of the most deadly and tragic armed conflicts in decades.
This report summarizes the needs and problems facing the affected population in Hama,
Aleppo and Idleb Syria Governorates during August 2015. Due to restrictions on data
collection in ISIS and GOS areas, the findings are relevant only for opposition armed
group (OAG) controlled areas. The Methodology section describes the qualitative research
methods used in this report. The Findings section summarizes the findings produced from
the data analysis. The Discussion and Summary section addresses broader issues arising
from this report. The interview questionnaire is found in Appendix A in English (Arabic
version available on request). Appendix B contains Acronyms and secondary sources.
Appendix C has maps of armed groups areas and air attacks by GOS/GOR .
1
Syria Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment October 2014.
2
OCHA 2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview, October 2015.
3
Aldo Benini, September 2015. Based on triangulation of multiple sources.
4
Source: http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/08/more-than-330000-people-die-while-about-13000000-
wounded-and-displaced-since-the-beginning-of-syrian-revolution/
5
OCHA Humanitarian Bulletin Syria June 2015.
6
For recent demographic data see http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/syria-population/.

Summary of findings
 In August 2015 heavy fighting continued in the Sahl al Ghab, Idleb, Mare, Aleppo,
and Aleppo City areas, although there were only small changes in front lines.
 There are an estimated 85 deaths per day or 2,550 deaths per month, and 15,300 to
20,400 injuries per month, in Syria from the armed conflict.
 Protection for civilians remains a high priority. There were 14,200 civilians killed
between January and October 2015, with 4,896 of those women and children, and
817 killed by torture. The peak months for civilian casualties was April, May, June
and October 2015, and August for women and children killed. The GOS is
responsible for 97.0% of deaths by torture during this period.
 There were 46,601 security incidents from January 1 to October 31, 2015. The
GOS was responsible initiating 72% of all security incidents, and 77% of civilians
killed and 81% of women and children killed. OAGS were responsible for 14% of
security incidents and 7% of civilian casualties. ISIS initiated 7% of security
incidents and was responsible for 10% of civilian deaths. Coalition forces
accounted for 3% of security incidents and 1% of civilian casualties.
 Geographically, most security incidents occurred in Rural Damascus governorate
(19%), followed by Aleppo (17%), Dara (10%), and Idleb (10%). Very few
security incidents occurred in Tartous, As Sweida, Damascus, Ar Raqqa and Der E
Zor governorates. Peak time for security incidents was from July to October 2015.
 During August Idleb governorate witnessed IDPs movements from north-western
Hama Governorate area of Sahel Al-Ghab and from Idleb governorate communities
near frontlines and GOS aerial bombardment areas. There have been large-scale
Syrian population movements in September and October.
 Rural IDPs prefer to be close to their extended families, while urban IDPs prefer
any shelter other than IDP camps. The high cost of rental units, lack of savings and
space with host families, and areas safe from air attacks appeared to be major
factors in both population movements and shelter decision making for IDPs.
 The groups most at risk and vulnerable were: children, chiefly orphans; women,
especially widows and divorced; disabled persons; chronically ill; the elderly;
minorities; besieged populations; unemployed men; detainees; and new IDPs.
 In August the high cost of rental units, combined with lack of savings, and lack of
space with host families, and areas safe from air attacks appeared to be the major
factors for shelter decision making for IDPs.
 GOS air attacks on hospitals, clinics and ambulances have had a major impact on
civilian casualties, and the availability and safety of medical services in August in
Aleppo and Idleb governorates. The large influx of IDPs, who often have
considerable health needs, strained medical centers.
 Various coping mechanisms were noted for the affected population, for dealing
with GOS air attacks, accessing electricity, finding cooking or heating materials,
and finding work.
 Relations between the various social groups were generally good in August. IDPs
and host communities were generally cooperating with each, with some exceptions.
Traders and landlords were pleased with having IDPs in their communities due to
the extra income from market trade and rental income. There may be increasing
tension between IDPs and host communities as resources become scarcer.

About the NGO Forum and Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit
The NGO Forum is a coordination platform for international and Syrian NGOs providing
humanitarian assistance to populations affected by the Syria conflict in predominantly
northern Syria. Member organizations are mainly based in Gaziantep and Antakya, Turkey.
The Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit (HTAU) is a research unit of the NGO Forum for
NGOs Operating in Northern Syria.
The HTAU is a pilot research initiative on the affected population in Syria. The HTAU
goals are 1) To inform humanitarian programming in order to develop more effective
humanitarian and protection responses; and 2) To provide evidence for advocacy activities
of the humanitarian community operating throughout the region. HTAU data collection
has been continuous since June 2015, leading to general reports for June, July and August
2015. The HTAU is intended to meet a gap in the information needs of humanitarian
organizations working in Syria. There are currently about five standardized assessment
processes taking place on the affected population in Syria, but these highly-structured
assessments have various limitations. Unlike those assessments, the HTAU primarily uses
a qualitative, semi-structured interviewing methodology that is both exploratory and
explanatory. The HTAU aims to complement, not duplicate, other Syrian assessments.
The HTAU is designed as a pilot project to continually assess the methodology, and
quality and usefulness of the information being provided to humanitarian organizations.
One of the advantages of the HTAU’s methodology is its ability to respond to rapidly
changing contexts in Syria and information needs of humanitarian organizations.
Methodology
The HTAU follows systematic data collection, analysis and reporting protocols to ensure
the credibility of findings, and confidentiality and protection of information sources. The
methodology is mainly qualitative and available upon request. This report primarily
covers Aleppo, Idleb and Hama Governorates during the period of August 2015. The
primary sources of information are NGO staff and key informants working inside Syria in
opposition-controlled areas, due to lack of access to areas controlled by ISIS and the GOS.
This report was based on 28 interviews of NGO staff and key informants in August
2015, averaging 43 minutes each, with an average word count of 3,361 words. Informants
consisted of 21 men and 7 women, and worked in 10 different sectors with 13 Syrian and
international NGOs. Geographically, 13 informants worked in Idleb, 11 in Aleppo and 4
worked in multiple governorates (Idleb, Aleppo and Hama). It is important to note the
primary source of data are informant interviews, which are their perceptions of what is
occurring in their local areas – such perceptions may or may not be an accurate picture of
the situation on the ground in their local area. Data from interviews are supported by and
triangulated with reports from security organizations, cluster working group data, regional
needs assessments, and conflict analysis reports on Syria.
The HTAU uses semi-structured interviews for most of its data collection due to the fact
the primary source of information is NGO staff and key informants in Syria. The HTAU
interview questions were developed with NGO Forum stakeholders and the HTAU
Advisory Group. All questions focus on recent issues, within the last month, for the
affected population. Questions explore the most important problems, emerging issues and
major changes for the affected population inside Syria; their coping mechanisms; recent

population movements; urgent humanitarian needs; which groups are the most vulnerable;
relationships between key groups; and affected population satisfaction. Public sources
used to support and triangulate interview data are cited. Additional data and findings on
the Syrian affected population were obtained from cluster working group documents, local
security reports, recent needs and protection reports by NGOs, academic and research
organizations. Generally only recent secondary sources are used.
By its nature, the HTAU research focuses on the needs and problems of the affected Syrian
population, and not the humanitarian response: there is a tremendous amount of
humanitarian assistance work being done to meet the needs of Syrians, but which is not
documented here. The HTAU analysis focuses on the affected population inside Syria, not
on Syrian refugees elsewhere. The affected population in Syria is defined as anyone who
is impacted by the armed conflict inside Syria: women, men, children, adolescents, elderly;
people killed, injured, displaced; people who had family members affected; besieged
communities; minority groups; host communities that are assisting people in need; and any
other group of people affected by the conflict in Syria.
As a pilot project using qualitative methods, its credibility is high (credibility reflects the
extent to which the findings would be believable from the perspective of the affected
population in Syria - see Lincoln and Guba 1985), given the detailed accounts of issues
facing the affected population. However, the methodology limits making generalizations
to larger populations and is susceptible to researcher and informant bias.
General Findings
Armed conflict dynamics for Northern Syrian for August 2015
For most of Syria there has been limited changes in front lines since 2014. As a brief
summary of the general security situation in northern Syrian in August 2015,7
heavy fighting
continued in the Sahl al Ghab, Idleb, Mare, Aleppo, and Aleppo City areas, although there
were only small changes in front lines. For a good summary of current opposition groups in
Syria, see ISW “Syrian Opposition Guide: October 7, 2015.”8
Ground offensives by the
various groups, along with GoS and the coalition air strikes, had increased population
displacement, and need for emergency health services, food, water, shelter, and other
humanitarian assistance for the affected populations.
In Idleb Governorate in August fighting was heavy in the Sahel al Ghab area, especially near
the villages of Ziyara, Tal Wassit, and Kherbet Elnaqus and the Zaizon power plant. The
GOS Abul Thohur military airport was under siege by OAGs with heavy fighting in that
area. There were many GOS air strikes throughout southern Idleb in towns away from the
front lines. In Ariha city a GOS fighter jet was shot down which impacted within the city
causing 50 causalities and more than 100 injured, and about 1,500 families were displaced
due to the heavy GOS air attack that followed that incident. Idleb City was also under heavy
GOS aerial attack, including medical points and Saraqb hospital. This continuous violence
7
There have been a number of major changes in the armed conflict since August 2015, while this report was
in process, including the escalation of Govt. of Russia air and ground support for the GOS mainly against
opposition groups, and more weapons for OAGs by external sources. This report does not summarize these
recent conflict dynamics.
8
http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Syrian%20Opposition%20Guide_0.pdf

impacted nearby communities like Maaret Tamsrin, where most civilians abandoned the
town.
In Atmeh, Idleb, where many IDP camps were located, a JAN position was targeted by a
coalition air strike, leading to 25 IDPs being killed, mostly women and children. Also during
August the GOS-held villages of Kafraya and Fuaa were under heavy siege by OAGs, with
their mainly Shia populations of 7,000 to 8,000 people. Most OAGs were Sunni Muslim.
In Aleppo Governorate in August the security situation was not stable with continuous
clashes between ISIS and FSA in the Azaz district around the city of Mare, which led to a
displacement in surrounding villages. ISIS has led a number of attacks on Mare, even though
coalition air strikes were heavy in ISIS-held areas east of the ISIS-FSA front line. See
Appendix D for a map of the current areas of control by armed groups in Syria.
Actual attacks increased in August, according to a security source, with the major armed
groups all increasing attacks slightly from July to August, with 4,003 GOS-initiated
incidents, 932 OAG incidents and 518 ISIS incidents in August. ISIS had the largest
increase in incidents from July to August.
An analysis of the number of Syrians killed is insightful to understand the full impact of
the conflict. Since the United Nations stopped reporting in August 2014, with a finding of
220,000 killed, estimates are less verifiable. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights
documented 330,000 people killed as of August 2015, of which about 240,000 are Syrians
and 90,000 are fighters from other countries.9
According to a study by the Human Rights
Data Analysis Group in August 2014, there were 191,369 Syrians killed between March
2011 and August 2014, of whom 85.1% were male and 9.3% female, with the rest
unknown.10
The Syrian Network for Human Rights documented 15,220 fighters and
civilians killed from December 2014 to September 2015, for an average of 1,522 per
month, of whom 14,201 were civilians (93.3%), although the number of total people killed
is likely higher.11
If we combine Syrians killed and injured, about 5% of the total
population has been killed or injured. As we look at these numbers, we must remember
that each Syrian affected by the armed conflict is a person with specific needs.
The findings of a separate HTAU study on security incidents by armed groups and civilian
casualties in early 2015 in Syria showed clear trends that are informative for humanitarian
protection and response. The total number of security incidents or attacks was 46,601
from January 1 to October 31, 2015. It should be noted that the Government of Russia
(GOR) started its attacks in Syria on Sept. 30. Attacks by GOR and GOS allies, including
Hezbollah, NDF and Iranian militias, increased significantly in October 2015.
 The GOS with its allies initiated 33,796 of all incidents, or 72.5%.
 All the OAGs combined initiated 6,505 attacks, or 14.0%.
 ISIS started 3,271 attacks, or 7.0%.
 Coalition forces initiated 1,270 attacks, or 2.7%,
All other armed groups combined started 1,759 attacks, for 3.8% of the total. This includes
9
Source : http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/08/more-than-330000-people-die-while-about-13000000-
wounded-and-displaced-since-the-beginning-of-syrian-revolution/
10
Source: https://hrdag.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/HRDAG-SY-UpdatedReportAug2014.pdf
11
Source: http://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/people_were_killed_in_September_2015_en.pdf

local ethnic militias, YPG, unknown groups, other groups, and criminal groups.
Chart 1: Security incidents by armed group: Jan-Oct 2015
As seen below, further analysis identifies patterns for attacks by governorate over time.
 The highest number of attacks, 8,863, occurred in Rural Damascus governorate, for
19.2% of the total attacks.
 Aleppo governorate had 7,961 (17.3%) attacks.
 Dar’a governorate had 4,386 (9.5%) attacks.
 Idleb governorate had 4,099 (8.9%) attacks.
Chart 2: Security incidents by governorate: Jan-Oct 2015
33083
695
6505
3271
1362 1270
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
GOS GOR OAGs ISIS YPG Coalition forces
#securityincidents
Armed group
Security incidents by armed group,
Jan. - Oct. 2015
8863
7961
4386 4099
3615 3634 3499
2689 2398 2130
1403
720 614
34
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
#securityincidents
Governorate
Syria Security Incidents (attacks) by Governorate

Building on the security incident analysis, we can see trends in the impact of the Syrian
armed conflict on civilian populations using human rights data. The Syrian Network on
Human Rights (SNHR) provides data on the number of people killed in Syria, with a
breakdown by total people killed, fighters killed, civilians killed, women killed, children
killed, and people killed using torture, by armed group.12
While there are some problems
with the data reliability (see Methodology), it shows critical trends that are informative for
humanitarian programming and advocacy.
Analyzing this data from SNHR, we can identify trends in civilian deaths by armed group
and by month.
 Most notably, the highest number of civilian deaths were caused by GOS actions:
of the 14,200 total deaths, 10,971 (77.3%) were GOS initiated. The number of
Syrian civilians killed by the GOS is three times higher than all other groups
combined (10,971 to 3,229).
 ISIS was responsible for 1,422 (10%) of all civilian deaths during that period.
 OAGs were responsible for 938 (6.6%) of all civilian deaths.
 Other groups caused very few civilian deaths: coalition forces, 144 (1%); YPG, 111
(0.8%); and JAN, 96 (0.7%).
Chart 3: Civilian deaths by armed group: Jan– Oct. 2015
Looking at trends over time, the highest civilian death rates have been for April, May and
June 2015, with an average of 1,750 deaths for each of those months, much higher than
average of 1,420 per month for the ten month period.
12
Source for data: http://sn4hr.org/blog/category/report/monthly-reports/victims-death-toll/. There is some
imprecision in the definitions in the SNHR data for the various types of people killed: all people, fighters,
civilians, women and children. For example, it appears that SNHR assumes that all women and children are
civilians, while some could be fighters.
10971
1422 938 518 144 96 1110
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
GOS ISIS OAG Unknown
group
Coalition
forces
JAN YPG Kurdish
Civiliandeaths
Civilian deaths by armed group
Jan. - Oct. 2015

Chart 4: Civilian deaths by armed group by month: Jan. – Oct. 2015
The data on civilian deaths by armed group by month is informative as well. Overall, the
peak months for civilian deaths were April (n=1,724), May (n=1,787) and June (n=1,739).
Civilian deaths caused by GOS increased in April, May and August, while ISIS had an
increase in June. The peak month for women and children killed was August (n=680).
Geographically, the highest number of attacks occurred in Rural Damascus governorate
(n=8,863, 19.2%), followed by Aleppo (17.3%), Dar’a (9.5%), and Idleb (8.9%). Very few
security incidents occurred in Tartous, As Sweida, Damascus, Ar Raqqa and Der E Zor
governorates, reflecting GOS targeting priorities and areas of support for the GOS. Based
on these data, the GOS did not target ISIS much in this period (and does not generally fight
Kurdish forces), meaning that civilians are much safer from direct violence from the armed
conflict in Kurdish, ISIS and GOS areas, than in OAG-controlled areas.13
The offensive started by the GOS, GOR, Hezbollah and Iranian forces in early October
2015 (see Appendix C), was likely to continue the trends found here: higher numbers of
security incidents and civilian casualties from GOS actions in opposition-controlled areas.
For example, there were recent reports of 48 people from one family killed in Homs City
by a GOR air strike on October 17 and 120 people killed by GOR bombing in Lattakia on
October 20.14
Anecdotal reporting shows that civilian casualties may be higher in October,
and directly related to GOS, GOR and allied forces’ actions.
13
Other sources of violence may be higher in Kurdish, ISIS and GOS areas, such as torture.
14
Source: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/10/russian-strike-kills-48-single-family-syria-
151018080911182.html and http://www.syriahr.com/en/2015/10/about-120-persons-died-and-wounded-in-a-
massacre-by-russian-warplanes-in-areas-at-the-northern-countryside-of-latakia/
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
Jan Feb March April May June July August Sept Oct.
Civiliandeaths Civilian deaths by armed group, Jan. - Oct. 2015
GOS ISIS OAGs Unknown groups Coalition forces JAN YPG Kurdish

Population movements and demographics
During August Idleb governorate witnessed IDPs movements from north-western Hama
Governorate area of Sahel Al-Ghab and from Idleb governorate communities near
frontlines and GOS aerial bombardment areas. In Aleppo Governorate continued
movements occurred in the Mare area due to clashes between ISIS and OAGs. These
reports of displacement have not be independently verified, but do come from
knowledgeable NGO staff in the local areas. Anecdotal reports from sources state that
rural IDPs prefer to be close to their extended families more than have better shelter, while
urban IDPs prefer any shelter other than IDP camps, although other factors like finances
effect these decisions as well. The high cost of rental units, combined with lack of savings,
and lack of space with host families, and areas safe from air attacks appeared to be the
major factors in both population movements and shelter decision making for IDPs.
In Idleb Governorate, one source mentioned Maaret Tamasrin City, Idleb was virtually
empty since residents were displaced, then returned and later re-displaced again to the
Dana, Idleb area, with 80% of the Maaret Tamasrin population displaced. Many people in
Bennesh City, Idleb were displaced towards Dana, Idleb due to hostilities between OAGs
and GOS in the Foah and Kafraya Maar Tamsarin areas. One source mentioned that 90%
of the population of Tramla, a community of Kafr Nobol, was displaced to northern IDP
camps. Some IDPs have also relocated in the south of Idleb closer to their area of origin,
like the example of Kafr Nonoda community, where the population surge affected all
sectors including shelter and non-food items.
Some Syrians have been displaced multiple times as they preferred to flee to safer places
near their homes or where their relatives resided. Often the initial displacement location
was near their homes so they could go back once the situation was safer. However, due to
the heavy fighting and bombing their home villages and local areas were not safe for long,
so it resulted in additional displacement to safer areas farther north. The sources noted that
the decision to flee north to the Dana area was challenging for IDPs, because IDPs from
urban centers preferred not to stay in IDP camps and the safer areas were very crowded,
with people even living in vacant, rented concrete shelters. This was the case of the
Kansafra community, which had a considerable number of IDPs who were living with host
families and were later displaced to Dana. Other populations that moved temporarily to
local surrounding areas include residents of Maree, Arnaba, Marata, Ein Laruz and Morza,
Idleb. Some IDPs from Idleb had to relocate to Hama Governorate, because they were
government employees and if they wanted to still be on the government payroll they had to
live and work in GOS-controlled areas.
In Aleppo Governorate, there were population movements due to clashes between ISIS and
OAGs in Mare’ and the villages of Mare’ Azzaz, Tel-Refa’at and Sheikh Issa. Most IDPs
went towards Aleppo City. Sources noted that as many as 100,000 IDPs moved to Aleppo
City, in part due to fewer airstrikes there, which put a strain on already exhausted services
in the city. IDPs from Sahel Al Ghab, Hama relocated to Bennesh, Idleb and then had to
move further north to the Qah and Atmeh camp areas, but still had problems finding
shelter, according to a source.
In September and October there have been significant population movements in Homs,
Hama, Idleb and Aleppo governorates, due to heavy fighting and increased air attacks by
GOS/GOR.

Sectoral Findings
Protection and threats to physical safety
Supporting the findings from prior HTAU reports, the need for more security and
protection for the affected population was prominent in source interviews in August. Most
notably, the targeting of opposition-controlled areas by GOS air attacks was frequently
cited as a cause of danger and impetus for displacement in Aleppo and Idleb Governates.
These continuous security incidents led to direct physical harm, such as death and injury,
destruction of homes and businesses, and an increase in sectoral needs like food, shelter,
water and health. As we document in various sections of this report, the heavy fighting had
a number of consequences for the civilian population. For example, in July one health
source estimated 85 deaths per day (2,550 deaths per month), and 15,300 to 20,400 injuries
per month, in Syria from the armed conflict.
Civilians have been affected by fighting and armed hostilities between the various armed
groups. Some towns and villages in Mare, Aleppo and Idleb were completely evacuated in
August due to the fighting or threats of GOS air attacks. Sources noted that security
incidents reduced population movements on local streets and at markets, and often caused
population movements to the outskirts of the impacted community, depending on the
severity and frequency of the attack. Sources mentioned the problem of unexploded
ordinance in frontline areas, which were a major risk for children and farmers. Sources
also noted that weapons were much more prevalent in Syria, even in the IDP camps like
Qah and Atmeh, and disputes sometimes end in shootings and killings.
Idleb Governorate witnessed multiple GOS air and missile attacks in August, which
sometimes appeared to intentionally target vital service centers or civilians, while others
were described as haphazard. Numerous GOS barrel bombs were dropped on Tamanaah,
Hbit, Khan Shaykun, Abul Thohur, Idelb City, Bara, Jisr al Shugur and nearby sub-
districts resulting in civilian casualties, damaged buildings and population movement. In
Aleppo Governorate GOS barrel bombs were dropped on the opposition-controlled parts of
Aleppo City, Haritan, Tal Hattabat Elbab, and other locations in Al Bab district.
Furthermore, Azaz district witnessed heavy clashes between OAGs and ISIS, with many
VBIED’s and missile attacks causing a massive population movement from the
surrounding communities.
Most vulnerable groups
NGO staff and key informant sources identified the following groups as most being at risk
and most vulnerable: children, especially orphans; women, especially widows and
divorced; people with disabilities; chronically ill; the elderly; minorities; besieged
populations; unemployed men; detainees; and new IDPs. According to sources, even in
cases were NGOs provide assistance, there were still significant needs that remain.
Children of all ages were at risk for various reasons. One reason was the lack of schools to
educate and protect children. Schools were often targeted by GOS air strikes and used by
armed groups or IDPs. Many parents stopped sending their children to school after aerial
attacks. The distance to school was cited as another reason parents were not sending their
children to school. The lack of educational opportunities also increased concern by Syrian
parents about the lack of diplomas and certifications. The absence of functioning schools

has led to families to refrain from sending their children to school, instead sending them to
work to support their families.
Secondly, children were sent to work in various types of work, including commercial
markets, farms, metal shops, and welding. Some parents sent their children to work in
shops without wages so they could learn a craft and not get into trouble. Other sources
confirmed that some children work in hazardous jobs like recycling, begging or selling
candy - these activities were very prominent in Azaz, Aleppo.
Third, orphaned children were often sent to members of their extended family, who were
given temporarily custody. Since family members often have limited means to support the
orphan, the child may be sent to other family members, or, if all family members lack
resources, to a shelter or a camp. According to one source, such camps provided food, but
other needs were not met. Orphaned children usually had to quit school to start working
to earn money for food or shelter – those orphans who did stay in school often work after
school. Orphans and their families often sought help from their local councils.
Lastly for children, one source noted that early marriage was increasing the number of
children in families, and young parents sometimes lacked the skills to take care of their
children. One source noted that the prevalence of early marriage in IDP camps among 13
to 15 year old girls was due to many factors: overcrowding of the girl’s original family,
absence of income, and the tradition of considering a female child a burden until she gets
married. Since any 18 year old male in an IDP camp was considered eligible for marriage,
and once married he could get a tent and humanitarian aid, early marriages sometimes
happened without any exchange of a big dowry. Also, one source noted some female
children were getting married to OAG group members, who then were killed or lost in
action. This left the widow and children without support, which then led to second
marriages and child abandonment.
Other sources noted that most cases of child recruitment by armed groups occurred in rural
areas and IDP camps, and much less in urban areas. The unstable security situation has
traumatized many children, who reacted fearfully to the sound of fighter jets, helicopters
and explosions.
Women were also noted as a vulnerable group, with gender-based violence incidents
appearing more frequently in IDP camps and rural areas, according to sources. There have
been women empowerment campaigns in the Atmeh camp area about gender-based
violence and early marriage, which were supported by local leaders. Meanwhile, many
women have become family supporters due to the absence of male providers. Some
women worked on farms, others in sewing or similar jobs. Women who could not find an
income were forced to rely on aid or get remarried. When women remarry, it sometimes
led to abandoning the children to their extended family, since many second husbands don’t
want to provide for previous children.
Regarding the restrictions on women’s movement and dress, sources mentioned that it
differed from one area to other, and depended on local traditions and which OAG was
controlling the area. These restrictions varied in severity, with more severe constraints in
Aleppo City and other parts of Aleppo Governorate compared to Idleb Governorate.
Some sources noted that new IDPs were also very vulnerable, due to the lack of food, non-
food items, shelter, and other basic survival needs. The poorest IDPs often stayed in

collective centers until they could get admitted to camps or receive aid. Disabled persons
were also considered vulnerable because of the continuous targeting of medical centers,
and difficulty in getting medicine due to limited imports or high prices.
The few Christians (estimated at 100-150) in Idleb City were identified as vulnerable by
one source, although they were not targeted by either the GOS or local opposition groups,
since they attempted to remain neutral in the conflict. They were living like the rest of the
people and their situation is viewed as similar to the Druze. There was a church they go to,
but they must wear the hijab and refrain from drinking alcohol due to pressure from
conservative leaders.
IDP Camp issues
In August sources reported a variety of issues for people living in IDP camps in Idleb and
Aleppo Governorates. According to the Turkey-based CCCM cluster, there were 246
camps or settlements with about 200,000 residents as of August.
According to sources the Atmeh and Qah camps were full in August, with no space for the
influx of IDPs coming from Sahel Al Ghab, Idleb and Mare, Aleppo areas. In Atmeh and
Qah many IDPs families were spotted on the side of the roads with no place to go, some
sleeping in their vehicles. One source mentioned IDP camp residents at two camps near
the Al Fateh2 camp offered support to newly arrived IDPs with non-food items and other
services. Reportedly some IDPs were setting up camps in a mined area near the Turkish
border near Atmeh, Idleb, because they felt they had no other place to go.
Some camp residents in Al Karama and Qah claimed the piece of land on which their tent
was located and started to build walls for rooms without solid roofs, just tarps. Although
camp managers don’t usually allow camp residents to build roofs, some were using zinc
plates for roofs. Some new camps were reportedly in need of WASH services and
graveled roads in August.
One source mentioned the value of setting up camps closer to home areas in southern Idleb
and northern Hama for the many IDPs coming from those areas. However, security and
logistical factors made that impossible, since the lack of security prohibits camps closer to
home villages, as evidenced by GOS barrel bombing of Abedin IDP camp in southern
Idleb in October 2014 with a large loss of life.15
Shelter and non-food items
In August the high cost of rental units, combined with lack of savings, and lack of space
with host families, and areas safe from air attacks appeared to be the major factors in both
population movements and shelter decision making for IDPs.
Shelter and shelter improvement or winterization were reported as the most important
needs for IDPs in Aleppo, Idleb and Hama governorates as winter was approaching,
according to sources. Most newly arrived IDPs were in need of non-food items, since they
had to flee their area of origin suddenly when the attacks started.
High rental prices in northern Idleb Governorate was a prominent issue for new IDPs, as
15
Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/30/us-mideast-crisis-syria-camp-
idUSKBN0II1S320141030

one source mentioned that rent for one room in Termanin cost SP15,000-20,000 and in
Sarmada rental units started at SP30,000 for a one room house. One source mentioned that
25% of IDPs in Idleb were staying either in open spaces or in informal tented settlements,
while the rest were either renting or staying with relatives for free. New IDPs had to pay
rent for the land for their tent, with annual rents of SP8,000 - 9,000 for the land. Since
some IDPs could not find tents, one source mentioned that some IDPs have started to build
concrete shelters, which might consist of just one room depending on their finances, at
SP50 per brick. As noted elsewhere, since the IDP camps in Sarmada, Bab al-Hawa, and
Atmeh were full, IDPs have had to find land in farming areas, and pay rent to the landlord.
Reportedly many IDP families were sleeping in their cars.
IDPs from Sahel Al Ghab had difficulty finding shelter, and were looking for shelter with
relatives or in public buildings or on olive farms in northern Idleb Governorate. For those
who resided in schools, some were asked to vacate the premises to make room for students
when the new school year started in September; some were told to move to different areas
in the building and others were given tents to set up in the school yard, such as in Atareb,
Aleppo.
Some IDPs have also relocated in the south of Idleb closer to their area of origin, like some
from Kafr Nonoda, where the population surge increased demand for shelter and non-food
items.
Fuel and electricity
In August fuel supplies stabilized in Aleppo and Idleb governorates, although prices
appeared to remain relatively high following shortages and price hikes in June and July.
Fuel costs continued to impact the cost and availability of electricity, since most of the
affected population in opposition-controlled areas relied on diesel generators for
electricity. Fuel costs have also affected transportation costs and availability.
According to sources, in the Atmeh, Idleb area fuel prices were stable and lower than the
peak prices in June. Poorly refined fuel from ISIS areas was selling at SP125 per liter
while better refined fuel from government controlled areas was selling at SP250 per liter.16
In Atareb, Aleppo, one source said he saw a considerable number of families scavenging
for burnable garbage to use in cooking fires. Some medical centers that rely on generators
for electricity reportedly had fuel shortages and had to rely on donations to purchase more
fuel. Public transportation has been affected by the armed conflict and fuel prices, with
fewer buses and other forms of public transportation available, and more limited bus
routes. This has led to a greater reliance on taxis, with a higher cost. Since the last fuel
crisis, the affected population has expected another fuel crisis, so they are storing fuel
when possible to use in a case of a shortage or sell for a profit, according to one source.
Electricity supply depended on access at the village or municipality level to government
power lines. Some cities, such as Zarbah, Aleppo, had access to government electricity
supplies, although most villages in opposition-controlled areas of Idleb and Aleppo
governorates lacked such access, according to sources. Those communities without public
electricity supplies depended on private generators for electricity. The cost of one ampere,
which is enough to run a few appliances, for eight hours per day was SP 2,500-3,000.
16
The current black market exchange rate for Syrian pound to US dollar in Idleb is SP345 to the dollar.

Food security and livelihoods
The food security and livelihoods situation was in a difficult situation in August, but the
current livelihoods situation reflected past GOS economic policy, macro-economic factors
and the armed conflict.
As early as 2008, the reduced GDP diminished the government’s ability to subsidize key
sectors, which led to lower employment rates. The public sector was the largest employer
in Syria before the conflict, with about 30% of the workforce, with jobs in 260 agencies for
civil administration, public health, education and military. In 2008 about 17% of Syrian
workers were employed in agriculture and 16% in industry.17
Public sector jobs were
mainly for educated Syrians, 18
increasing socio-economic inequality. Between 2011 and
March 2013, the Syrian GDP was reduced a further 40-60%.19
By 2013, employment had
been further reduced in the public sector, agriculture and industry. Since 2011 the sectors
with the most employment growth were the informal sector and work with armed groups,
with approximately 80% of non-public sector workers employed in the informal sector in
2013.20
While the per capita GDP in Syria had risen by 2011 to US$4,816, there was
extreme income inequality due to corruption and skewed economic development, with
poverty rates rising between 2005 and 2011 by 10%, especially in the northeast and
south.21
The extensive socialist, Ba’ath party welfare policies from the 1970s were cut
considerably both prior to and during the armed conflict. This recent historical analysis
may inform current livelihoods discussions for Syria.
In August HTAU sources noted that employment and income generation were driving
factors for displacement. Some IDPs, such as teachers and public employees, who had left
Idleb and Hama recently returned to their homes or GOS-controlled areas to receive their
GOS salaries. Other IDPs who had skills or special resources moved to safer areas and
opened new businesses there. A third group of IDPs lacked both skills and resources to
start new businesses, and were having difficulties finding employment. This latter group
was particularly dependent on humanitarian assistance. Reportedly, the lack of
employment has pushed many Syrians to try to go to Europe.
Employment appeared to vary geographically and demographically, with wages depending
on local markets, agriculture, construction and security factors. In the Atmeh and Qah
camp areas opportunities existed as street hawking or farming depending on the season.
Some people with college or high school degrees work with NGOs. Wages were low in
August, about SP500 (US$1.45) per day, which is does not buy much due to inflation.
Farming jobs were sometimes available through local contractors who manage day labors.
While most farm jobs were done by women, men looked for jobs that require heavier
lifting. In the Aleppo various factories and businesses were still functioning, such as the
Tall Ed-daman pharmaceutical factory, and diaper and tissue factories, and small
businesses. While these businesses created some employment, sources said wages were
low.
17
Source: http://www.mapaction.org/component/mapcat/download/2960.html?fmt=pdf
18
Source : http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7494.pdf;
http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/political-economy-syria?print
19
20
21
Source: http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/political-economy-syria?print

Women were finding work in sewing and knitting, farming, and food preparation. One
source mentioned that due to government layoffs in Idleb many women lost their income
as government employees. Much of the farming work in the Qah and Atmeh camp areas
was done by women, often by widowed women who take their children with them.
Sources reported that child labor was increasing in parts of Idleb governorate, with
children working in auto repair, shops and as street hawkers. In some cases children were
paid, and in other cases parents sent them to work pro bono, to stay out of trouble and earn
job skills. Some children reportedly worked in hazardous labor, like lifting bricks,
working as porters, selling fuel or working with armed groups.
Camp managers were affecting NGO hiring, even threatening to block NGO activities
unless the preferred person was hired. The affected population and NGO staff in Syria
continued to request employment, such as cash for work, arguing that it would help
stimulate local markets. Some NGOs were implementing small cash for work projects in
Azaz, Aleppo, cleaning parks and roads.
For food security, various coping mechanisms and projects were noted by sources in
August. One NGO in Azaz, Aleppo was supporting small scale agriculture projects of
wheat and lentils, but the project was hindered due to lack of fuel for irrigation and
problems with traders over supplies. Sources mentioned that wheat was being smuggled to
ISIS areas or Turkey, while vegetables were brought from the ISIS areas, since vegetable
cultivation requires more water and fuel. In Aleppo people were adapting by using roofs
and unused roads for planting vegetables and by breeding rabbits for meat. Bread prices
reportedly rose in August, from SP40-50 to SP150 for an eight loaf basket, due to reduced
subsidies and higher cost for flower and fuel. However, some NGOs were providing bread
or supporting bakeries. As in previous HTAU reports, there were reports of complaints by
the affected population over the contents of the food baskets, with poor quality or not
enough calories; beneficiaries selling food basket items at lower prices so as to purchase
other food, such as meat; and demand for more cash vouchers.
Nutrition
Some IDPs were selling part of their food basket at half price to purchase more meat and
fruit. They were also selling the Turkish tea from the food basket so they could purchase
Syrian tea, according to sources. Similar to past months, the affected population was often
asking for infant formula, but some NGOs refused to provide it. Mothers were reportedly
giving cow’s milk to infants, which supposedly was causing diarrhea, diabetes, and
anemia. Reportedly lactating mothers were not receiving adequate nutrition. NGOs were
reportedly conducting educational campaigns and providing support for breast feeding
mothers.
Health
As mentioned in previous HTAU reports, GOS air attacks on hospitals, clinics and
ambulances have had a major impact on civilian casualties, and the availability and safety
of medical services in August. Security directly impacted the ability of NGOs to support
the medical sector in Syria, according to sources. The large influx of IDPs, who often have
considerable health needs, to northern Idleb strained medical centers and service providers.
One source mentioned that these hospitals were overcapacity and admitting patients for
hospitalization for a maximum of two days. The early release forced patients to return for

further checkups and pay for extra commuting costs. More serious cases were being
transported through the border crossings to Turkish hospitals.
Due to constant air attacks in August some hospitals were established in more protected
areas that were more difficult to attack by air, either underground or away from residential
areas. Since some of the more specialized hospitals were located near the Turkey border
area, it could take an injured person up to six hours by ambulance to get to these hospitals.
According to one source, Idleb and Aleppo governorates had 15 to 20 kidney care centers
treating about 1000 patients, and within one week three of these centers were bombed. All
the medical personal and patients had to be transferred to the other kidney treatment
centers that were already overworked, which reduced weekly sessions for patients.
Also, there is a lack of ambulances due to the large number of civilian injuries and long
distances to medical facilities. One source in Aleppo mentioned that there were six
ambulances attached to one hospital, but these ambulances were not always available due
to rising fuel prices, so they were just used for emergency cases like aerial attacks or life
threating situations. Separately, the affected population continued to prefer Syrian over
Turkish medications. However, the price of the Syrian medications rose 50% around
August. Medications to treat inflammation, cancer, and kidney illnesses were reported in
short supply in August.
The Syrian armed conflict was creating a wide variety of health-related problems for the
affected population. The heat wave in August, with temperatures over 40 degrees Celsius,
led to many cases of diarrhea and heat stroke, and to the death of an elderly IDP. A source
in Atareb, Aleppo stated that there was one community where many children had
amputated limps and needed more assistance. Pregnant women were in need of care, for
problems such as urinary tract infections, since there were few gynecologists available.
For elderly people with respiratory problems who need oxygen cylinders, the cost rose to
about SP5,000, and free transportation to oxygen providers was difficult to find.
There were reports of various diseases: cases of typhoid fever in Atareb, Aleppo and
Janudiyeh, Idleb due to polluted drinking water; tuberculosis and brucellosis in Aleppo
City; Leishmaniosis and typhoid fever in Sarmada and surrounding areas; in Aleppo there
was an outbreak of Hepatitis A and B diseases, with little capacity to respond to these
diseases; in northern Idleb, polio cases spread due to some children not being vaccinated;
in the Qah and Atmeh camps, Tilaada village, and al-Zawya Mountain there were many
cases of lice, scabies, and skin diseases, due to poor hygiene and fear of being stigmatized
if other people found out they had scabies or lice. One informed source noted that a
confluence of factors increased the risk of epidemics and related health problems,
including overcrowded living areas, unawareness of personal hygiene, lack of clean water,
waste and garbage accumulation, and the lack of necessary tools for a healthy living.
While some NGOs were responding to these epidemics, there was a lack of resources for
both patients and medical centers, and more need for public education campaigns and staff
training, according to sources.
The persistent violence in certain areas resulted in considerable physical and psychological
harm to the affected population, especially among children. Anecdotal reports find that
many children were suffering psychological trauma, such as enuresis, headaches and
stomachaches. One source noted that the violence has led to bad habits such as lying, and
inappropriate sexual behavior for children. NGOs responding to the psychological trauma

were doing so in subtle ways to reduce stigma with getting help, and found that children
who received support showed more emotional stability. Women were reportedly reacting
to the psychological and physical trauma by going into early labor, and having
miscarriages and minor heart attacks. The psychiatric hospital in Azaz, Aleppo was run by
concerned volunteers and staffed by doctors, nurses and mental health counselors.
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
Like in July, water was in high demand due to the heat in August and lack of electricity for
water pumps. Water costs continued to be high due to increased demand, lack of
electricity, and increased fuel prices. It should be noted that the Syrian government
historically had been unable to provide adequate water supplies to the people, with per
capita water usage at 300 m3 as of 2011, below the global standard of 1,000 m3 per
capita.22
The drought from 2006-2011 caused considerable displacement and increased
poverty for many families.
Water sources and quality varied considerably. Most sources said water was supplied by
tanker trucks from local wells and springs. In some communities local councils and NGOs
provided water for free, usually treated with chlorine. Most people in Idleb and Aleppo
governorates had to purchase untreated water. Some of the affected population used
chlorine tablets, others boiled their water, and others did not use any treatment. Poor
people who could not afford water were sometimes getting water from rivers. In Sahel al
Ghab, Hama area, water was readily available due to the shallow wells (only 10 meters
deep), but some of this water was not potable due to bacteria in the shallow wells. Sources
noted that hygiene habits changed depending on the availability and quality of the water.
There were continued reports of stolen water taps at Atmeh camps and of a camp near Jisr
al Shughur where families were only receiving 10 liters per day.
Health and hygiene issues were noted more in camps than urban areas for several reasons.
First, in the camps, sewage systems usually flowed between tents. Also, sources stated
that some NGOs put their WASH activities on hold. Another reason was the poor hygiene
habits of camp residents: there were reports that some IDPs sold their hygiene kits. The
most reported cases in camps were lice, skin diseases and scabies. Also, pests and
poisonous insects were reported around Atmeh and Qah camps, and in Al Zawiya
Mountain. An NGO insecticide campaign in the Atmeh camp was reportedly unsuccessful
due to camp residents not allowing the team into their tents, since residents were not
notified beforehand. It was reported that GOS air attacks were damaging water systems,
leading to sewage in the water systems. NGOs and local councils were continuing to work
on water and sewage systems. Regarding sanitation issues, the town of Salquin, Idleb
resolved the problems with garbage disposal. In Aleppo City, hospital wastes were either
buried or burnt.
Education
Many of the education issues reported in previous HTAU reports in Idleb and Aleppo
Governorates continued in August. Schools were functioning in many camps and the
quality of schools appeared to be a pull factor for some IDP parents, influencing their
decision to move to places with functioning schools, like Salqeen, Idleb or Turkey.
22
Source: http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/political-economy-syria?print

Problems with schools included inaccessible school locations, muddy roads, limited
curricula, class rooms being overcrowded, child marriages reducing girls’ attendance, and
fear of using of mosques for classes due to GOS targeting. New concerns in August
included GOS intentions for schools that had been taken by OAGs in Idleb and Hama
governorates, and what would happen with teachers from those schools. One source
mentioned that in Kafr Noboda, a Hama governorate council project planned to open five
technical institutes, for students from opposition and government-held areas.
Affected Population Issues
Affected population coping mechanisms
In the previous sections we identified diverse responses by the affected population to the
armed conflict. These included population movements, searching for and sharing shelter,
tents and houses, actions to find and obtain food, water and other essential items, and
responses to larger problems like the lack of electricity, fuel, sewage, and sanitation. Some
coping mechanisms were more positive than others for long term development and
empowerment of the Syrian affected population.
Various coping mechanisms were noted by sources for dealing with GOS air attacks. In
urban areas, civilians were avoiding upper floors of buildings and living on the ground
floors. Some schools in Aleppo and Idleb were using underground bomb shelters equipped
with first aid kits and fire extinguishers. In some communities, observers were posted to
provide warning of GOS air attacks, communicating with the local village via walky talky.
However, these warnings were less effective with fast moving attack aircraft. The affected
population was also limiting their movements in crowded places, such as markets.
Many Syrians in Aleppo, Idleb and Hama were purchasing electricity from portable
generators, which was more expensive than public electrical supplies. Some poor Syrians
were scavenging for anything burnable for cooking and heating. There were many reports
of Syrians selling parts of their food baskets or hygiene kits to get cash or purchase other
goods. Teenage boys were sometimes pushed to leave school to find work to financially
support their families, and sometimes were finding work with armed groups.
Some women, especially those who were widowed or divorced, were finding work in
farming, or in handicrafts. Some widowed or divorced women were getting re-married,
which sometimes led to the children being sent to extended family members for care.
Affected population satisfaction
Like in previous HTAU reports, most of the affected population was satisfied with the
NGO efforts in the humanitarian response, according to sources. They were generally
pleased to receive assistance with food, water, shelter, healthcare and the other basic needs
provided by humanitarian organizations.
However, some affected population complaints existed. Complaints existed on how aid
was distributed, especially the selection of beneficiaries by NGOs and local councils, and
perceived unfair hiring for jobs. The affected population also expressed concerns about the
lack of diversity in food baskets or poor quality of food. In some cases beneficiaries were
found to be selling unwanted food items, such as rice, while local merchants waited
outside distribution points to purchase unwanted food at very low prices. Sources noted

that beneficiaries preferred cash or vouchers to food baskets. The affected population also
complained about the lack of employment from NGOs, as in previous HTAU reports.
While the affected population expressed satisfaction regarding available medical services
in northern Idleb, it was noted that the growing population and increasing health service
needs, especially chronic cases, could not be handled within existing capacities. Others
stated that even though there were medical centers in various locations, transportation was
still an issue due the distance and transportation costs.
Relations between groups
Relations between the various social groups were generally good in August, according to
sources. IDPs and host communities generally were cooperating with each, with some
exceptions. Traders and landlords in communities that were hosting IDPs were pleased
with having IDPs in their communities due to the extra income from trade at the markets
and rental income, according to sources. While it is difficult to determine trends on these
relationships, sources noted that there may be increasing tension and conflict between IDPs
and host communities as resources and savings become scarcer.
In August sources described the relationship between local populations and local councils
in detail. Local councils were civil bodies that were dependent on external funding, which
was often very limited. Due to limited funding, local councils had little ability to provide
community services. Local councils also usually had some OAG representatives or
influence. In this context, local populations sometimes viewed local councils as corrupt (a
finding supported by anecdotal reports in past HTAU data collection). However, sources
noted that the local population did not understand how local councils and NGOs work,
especially the lack of funding and how aid was distributed. Due to these perceptions many
disputes have erupted between local populations and local councils over perceived
favoritism in aid distribution and corruption. In some cases local councils were charging
money in return for assistance, according to sources.
Relationships were also different in camps and local communities, according to sources.
In the camps all administrative and humanitarian tasks were within the jurisdiction of the
camp management. Many disputes occurred over aid distribution and perceived favoritism
by camp management. NGOs sometimes had disputes with camp managers when they
interfered with NGOs hiring IDPs for projects. Some camp managers wanted their
relatives or friends hired, even when they lacked the necessary qualifications for the job,
and would threaten to block NGO activities if their interests were not met. Some NGOs
accommodated these requests while others negotiated reasonable solutions.
Also, it was noted that when IDPs moved to camps they preferred to stay near their
relatives, which has created camp sectors consisting of people from the same community.
This space dynamic had positive and negative consequences: it helped provide support for
social issues, but sometimes reinforced existing tribal norms and created problems between
people from different villages.
For the local population near IDP camps their main contact with the IDPs was the
landowner on which the camp was constructed. Another problem was that because the
IDP camps were located on farm land, the landlords sometimes accused IDPs of stealing or
vandalizing their crops. Most camps in Atmeh and Qah were located in olive farms,
leading to frequent disputes over crops and land. Sometimes IDPs have claimed the piece

of land on which their tent was built, and charged money from the next family when they
moved – this sometimes happened with camp management knowledge and a supposed
kickback to the camp manager, according to sources.
Tensions between groups may exist for several reasons according to sources. IDPs were
noted for complaining more often that landlords were taking advantage of the current
situation and charging very high rent. All groups appeared to have exhausted their savings
and lack income, which may generate more conflict. Also, the continued lack of privacy
for women created tension between some Syrians affected by the conflict.
Cultural and social issues
A variety of cultural and social issues arose in the August HTAU interviews, building on
findings from previous HTAU reports. Some of the issues include socio-economic factors
that affect shelter decisions for IDPs, early marriage, grandparent care for children of
divorced women, and beneficiaries’ acceptance of humanitarian assistance.
Multiple sources noted that socioeconomic factors play a major role in shelter decisions by
IDPs, with overlapping economic and social issues. The poorest IDPs, those from rural
areas, or most used to living in rustic conditions, were the most likely to choose IDP camps
as their first destination. These groups include IDPs who have exhausted their financial
resources, such as many female-headed households. IDPs with more financial resources
and from urban areas usually preferred non-camp living conditions, whether renting, living
with relatives or friends, or staying in schools, mosques, or abandoned buildings. For
those IDPs living outside of camps, humanitarian services appeared to be more difficult to
access, according to sources. IDP and host family tensions were noted by some sources.
Space and gender segregation issues continued to be problem both in IDP camp and host
family situations, pushing IDPs to find separate living spaces or rent when possible.
However, IDPs preferred to rent in areas where they already have relatives or friends, such
as the eastern side of Al Zawiyah Mountain. Also, IDPs preferred living near people from
the same ethnic group and with the same social customs. For example, IDPs from Maree,
Aleppo had conflicts with Kurds in Afreen, Aleppo, due to more liberal social norms and
ethnic discrimination. Statistically, many more IDPs live outside of camps than in camps:
about 200,000 IDPs lived in camps in Idleb, Aleppo and Hama governorates, out of
2,450,000 IDPs total in those three governorates.23
Sources also explained various issues that affected early marriages and divorce in August.
Early marriages appeared to be more common for several reasons: lack of education for
both teenage boys and girls; population density and more interaction between youth; lack
of stable income for families pushed some families to encourage early marriage so the
daughter would be cared for; fathers being killed or missing, which reduces income for
families, and increases need for children to get married or be independent. Sources noted
that many young women preferred to be married, so they would have their tent or space to
live, and were not being forced to marry. The early marriage practice appeared to be
growing in semi-urban and rural areas of Idleb, Hama and Aleppo governorates, even
though it was not very common in past social customs in northern Syria, as stated by
23
Source: August 31, 2015 CCCM Dashboard; 2016 Humanitarian Needs Overview.

sources. For divorced women, there were conflicting reports regarding the children of
divorced women, due to the fact that many second husbands do not want children from the
previous marriage: in some cases the woman’s parents ask to take care of the children and
in other cases the parents are forced to take the children. Many divorced and widowed
Syrian women appeared to prefer re-marriage over living with their parents. The HTAU is
not able to systemically confirm the preferences of young, divorced or widowed women,
and determine how prevalent such attitudes and preferences are.
Regarding gender-based violence, such as sexual harassment or assault, sources noted that
various social and cultural factors influenced whether families seek assistance. Factors
such as the survivor’s and her family’s educational and social status, the community they
live in, and the armed group that controls the local area, all affect the response. Some
victims kept the victimization secret, while others got help from their family, psychosocial
support centers, or local legal bodies. One problem was that most sexual assault appeared
to be committed by family members, so victims viewed it as something that is socially
accepted and not changeable. While some NGOs were trying to raise awareness of gender-
based violence, some of the more conservative armed groups made it difficult to do so.
More generally, it appeared that camp managers and armed groups placed more restrictions
on women in the Bab al Salameh, Aleppo camps than in the Atmeh and Qah, Idleb camps.
Several sources noted mixed responses by some beneficiaries to humanitarian assistance:
in some cases beneficiaries were becoming dependent on aid, partly because they were
very poor before the crisis, and in other cases didn’t take assistance because they felt
humiliated and didn’t want to be stigmatized socially. Separately, there were reports that
conservative OAGs were banning cigarette smoking around the Atmeh camps for
ideological reasons, which increased local population concerns about social controls from
such groups.
Discussion and Summary
The limits of the HTAU methodology must be stated. Since it is qualitative research based
on the perceptions of a small number of sources who are working in a volatile, rapidly-
changing armed conflict, biases and inaccurate information are possible. Also, it is
important to limit generalizations from these findings: what may be true in one area or with
one Syrian community may not be the same with others. Below are a number of issues
that stand out for understanding future dynamics of the Syrian conflict and corresponding
humanitarian response. On most of these problems, more research is needed to better
understand the frequency which they take place, the specific groups that are affected, and
how and why the problems occur. Also, wider distribution of reports is necessary to
improve both the humanitarian response and public awareness about humanitarian
problems in Syria.
First, protection and security for the civilian population is paramount. As seen in this
analysis, offensives and actions by many of the armed groups kill, injure, traumatize and
displace large numbers of civilians. Furthermore, critical analysis finds that some armed
groups implement more attacks that cause significantly more harm than other armed
groups. In effect, civilians are more at risk from attacks by some armed groups than other
armed groups. Also, some civilians are more at risk than others, whether differentiated by
where they live (opposition versus GOS versus ISIS held areas) or their unique social or
religious status (Alawi, Druze, Kurd, Sunni, Shia, Christian, etc.). These findings should

inform protection efforts and help guide future humanitarian responses for such issues as
displacement and trauma health care, to name a few sectors.
Initial data from various sources for September and October supports the belief that the
trends identified to date on attacks by armed groups, casualties, and displacement will
likely continue in the near future: offensives by the GOS and its GOR, Iranian and
Hezbollah allies, and counteroffensives from OAGs and ISIS will lead to increased
casualties, displacement, trauma, and urgent needs for the affected population in Syria.
The GOS/GOR air attacks are especially worrying, and likely to cause much more than the
average of 1,400 civilian deaths per month as they have in the past. Increased harm to the
affected population from OAG and ISIS attacks is likely as well.
Second, analysis of Syrian population movements and shelter preferences shows that the
majority of the displaced population prefer to live outside of IDP camps. Shelter
preferences and options for the affected population vary depending of their origin (rural or
urban); experience with rustic living; income and savings; relatives and friends who are
able to host the displaced persons; and access to humanitarian assistance. These shelter
factors are compounded by safety issues: few opposition-controlled areas have been
continuously safe in recent times, with many towns that had been safe earlier from GOS air
attacks receiving random attacks in recent months. It is also evident that many IDPs have
been displaced multiple times, in some cases because they choose shelter locations near
their home village so they can monitor the security situation and return home quickly.
This practice leads to multiple moves to and from nearby locations and their home village,
and sometimes farther away when attacks become more intense in their home area. An
upcoming displacement study by the HTAU will explore displacement, shelter, resource
and IDP decision making matters.
Third, a combination of increasing prices, and decreasing jobs, income, and savings have
made economic survival more difficult for the Syrian affected population. Rising prices
for shelter, food, water, medicine, transportation, fuel and electricity have increased costs
for the fundamental goods needed for survival. While some factories and businesses still
operate, most livelihoods are in the informal sector or with armed groups, curtailing stable
incomes. After almost five years of conflict, most savings have been exhausted as well.
Furthermore, a large number of adult age men have been killed or injured, reducing the
number of traditional head of household income earners and their income. Also, some of
the most at-risk economic groups face significant hurdles to income generation, whether
the lack of transferable skills for the poorest people or cultural barriers to employment for
groups like single, divorced or widowed women. This confluence of factors makes
economic survival increasing difficult.
Fourth, the continued functioning of the health sector in Syria is at risk. GOS air attacks,
whether intentional or not, have systematically battered health facilities throughout
opposition-controlled areas – and hospitals in GOS-held areas had significantly fewer
attacks and obstacles to their effective functioning. Healthcare staffing in opposition-
controlled areas has been made more problematic by deaths and injuries to medical staff,
and high levels of psychosocial trauma in healthcare staff from working under the fear of
constant attack. Meanwhile, these hard-pressed hospitals are handling an astounding
25,000 trauma cases per month. How long the health sector in opposition-controlled areas
can continue to function under these conditions is uncertain, and the impact on the Syrian
affected population has yet to be seen for both trauma and preventive medical care.

Finally, relations between ethnic and religious groups in Syria have become increasingly
strained over time. Even though the Syrian conflict may not be fundamentally about ethnic
or sectarian (religious) issues, incidents and dynamics that are essentially ethnic and
religious are common in this conflict. While further research is needed on this issue,
manipulation by political leaders, social and economic marginalization of some groups,
and ethnically-charged human rights violations and massacres has led to fear and distrust
within many ethnic groups. While some of these ethnic or sectarian tensions existed
before the conflict started (e.g., Assad regime conflict with conservative Islamist groups),24
political dynamics and military actions since 2011 have intensified these tensions. It has
become even more difficult to stay neutral for those ethnic or religious groups which want
to avoid the conflict, as witnessed by recent events with the Druze community. In
opposition-controlled areas in the past year tensions between moderate armed groups and
civilian populations, and more conservative Muslim armed groups and leaders have
developed, as conservative groups occasionally attempt to impose more conservative social
norms on local populations. These strained relations affect everyday decisions for
civilians, such as when and where to move during displacement, what areas they feel safe
in, and with whom they interact. The future peace prospects are also impacted by these
ethnic and religious relations.
24
Sources: Nikolaos van Dam, The Struggle for Power in the Middle East. 4th
edition. 2011; Carter Center
“Southern Syria Conflict Update July 10, 2015”; Philippe Droz-Vincent, “The State of Barbary (Take Two)”,
Middle East Institute, 2014; Christopher Phillips, “Sectarianism and conflict in Syria”, Third World
Quarterly 2015; Bernard Lewis, The Multiple Identities of the Middle East, 1998.

Appendix A: HTAU interview questionnaire
Hello. My name is __________. I work with the NGO Forum in Antakya. We are
conducting interviews of NGO staff to get better information about the current situation for
the affected population in Syria. We want to know more about what problems they are
facing and how they are dealing with these problems, as well as good things that are
happening. These NGO staff interviews will be analyzed to make monthly reports that will
be shared with NGO and UN staff coordinating the humanitarian response and advocacy.
These reports will help NGOs to better understand the humanitarian situation for the
affected population in Syria and provide more effective humanitarian assistance.
Please answer the questions based on what you know, or have seen or heard about the
affected population in Syria from your most recent trip. There are no right or wrong
answers. You can stop the interview at any time or refuse to answer any questions. You
only have to give as much information as you feel comfortable giving. If you had a
dangerous trip, you don’t have to provide too much detail. Your responses will be
anonymous and confidential. Do you have any questions before we start?
1. Can you please tell me about your most recent trip to Syria? Where and when did
you go? What were you doing there? Please explain.
2. What are the most important problems or issues for the local affected population
where you were working? How many people are impacted by each of these issues?
How are these issues affecting the local population? What caused these issues to
begin now? Please explain.
3. How is the affected population responding to existing problems? What are their
coping mechanisms? What consequences do you think will happen from their
responses to the problems? Please explain.
4. Have there been any major changes recently for the local affected population? Are
any changes expected in the near future? Why are they taking place? Please
explain these changes.
5. Have there been any recent population movements? In or out? Who is moving?
Why?
6. What are the most urgent humanitarian needs for the local affected population?
Why?
7. Who are the most vulnerable groups among the local populations? Why? What
information exists on women, children, orphans, minorities, elderly and disabled
persons? Please explain.
8. How are relationships between the various local groups where you were working in
Syria, such as IDPs, host communities, besieged communities, camp managers,
local councils, and assistance providers? Is there conflict or cooperation between
these groups?
9. What does the affected population think about the humanitarian aid and services?
Are they satisfied? What are they doing with the aid? Please explain.
10. Is there any other information about the affected population that you think is
important to tell us?
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND INFORMATION!!!

Appendix B: Acronyms and Secondary Sources on Syria
Acronyms
1. CCCM: Camp Coordination and Camp Management
2. FSA: Free Syrian Army
3. GOS: Government of Syria
4. GOR: Government of Russia
5. HTAU: Humanitarian Trends Analysis Unit
6. IDP: Internally Displaced Person
7. ISIS: Islamic State
8. JAN: Jabhat Al Nusra
9. NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
10. NFI: Non-Food Item
11. OAG: Opposition Armed Group
12. PIN; People in Need
13. SP: Syrian Pound
14. SVBIED: Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
15. USD: United States Dollar
16. VBIED: Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
17. WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
18. YPG: Kurdish People’s Protection Units
Secondary Sources
1. Institute for the Study of War Syria Updates. http://iswsyria.blogspot.com.tr/
2. Syria Comment. Joshua Landis. http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/
3. BBC. Syria’s War. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-17258397
4. Al Jazeera. Syria. http://www.aljazeera.com/topics/country/syria.html
5. CNN. Syria. http://edition.cnn.com/specials/middleeast/syria
6. Brookings Institute. Syria. http://www.brookings.edu/research/topics/syria
7. RAND Corporation. Syria. http://www.rand.org/topics/syria.html
8. Assistance Coordination Unit. http://www.acu-sy.org/en/information-management/
9. The Carter Center. Southern Syria Conflict Update. July 10, 2015.
http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict-mapping.html
10. The Islamic State in Southern Syria. May 15, 2015. The Carter Center.
http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict-mapping.html
11. The Carter Center. The Syria Countrywide Conflict Report #5. Feb. 28, 2015.
12. http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/conflict_resolution/syria-conflict-mapping.html
13. Syria Needs Analysis Project. SNAP: summary of work Dec. 2012 – June 2015.
14. http://acaps.org/img/documents/s-snap-summary-of-work-dec-2012-june-2015.pdf
15. SNAP: Conflict Dashboard May 2015. http://acaps.org/img/documents/i-snap-
conflict-dashboard-may-2015.pdf

Appendix C: Areas of control in Syria
Source: http://www.iswresearch.blogspot.com.tr/2015_09_01_archive.html

Source: http://www.iswresearch.blogspot.com.tr/

HTAU August 2015 Report final

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