Ethiopia’s role of counter terrorism and its implication in the horn of Africa.pdf

Seminar Paper on
Ethiopia’s role of counter terrorism and
its implication in the horn of Africa

2
Seminar Paper on
Ethiopia’s role of counter terrorism and
its implication in the horn of Africa
Belayneh Zelelew is consultant with fourteen years of experience working with
different organizations. Belayneh specializes in Social Psychology, and
Diplomacy and international relation, and Peace and Development Studies is
responsible for conducting researches, crafting projects and consulting.
Belayneh is a powerful force in the workplace and uses his positive attitude and
tireless energy to encourage others to work hard and succeed.
Seminar on Regional Peace and Security
Addis Abeba, Ethiopia, September 24-25, 2022

3
List of Abbreviations
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
AU African Union
CT Counter Terrorism
FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
HOA Horn of Africa
ICU Islamic Court Union
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IR International Relations
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OLF Oromo Liberation Front
TFG Transitional Federal Government
UN United Nation

4
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations ....................................................................................................................................3
Abstract.........................................................................................................................................................5
Chapter One ..................................................................................................................................................6
1.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................6
1.2 Statement of the Problem..............................................................................................................7
1.3 Research Questions.......................................................................................................................8
1.4 The Objectives ..............................................................................................................................8
1.4.1 General Objective.................................................................................................................8
1.4.2 Specific objectives ................................................................................................................8
1.5 Hypotheses....................................................................................................................................9
1.6 Justification of Research...............................................................................................................9
1.7 Scope of the Study ........................................................................................................................9
1.8 Limitation of the Study ...............................................................................................................10
Chapter Two................................................................................................................................................11
2.1 Literature Review .....................................................................................................................11
Chapter Three..............................................................................................................................................20
Methodology...........................................................................................................................................20
3.3.1 Secondary data ...................................................................................................................20
Chapter Four ...............................................................................................................................................21
Data Presentation and Analysis ..............................................................................................................21
4.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................21
4.2 The Ethiopia’s roles of counter terrorism in horn of Africa.....................................................21
4.3 The geopolitical implications of Ethiopia’s counter terrorism role..........................................26
4.4 Grand strategy that can be employed to enhance Ethiopia’s roles of counter terrorism in
horn of Africa............................................................................................................................................28
4.5 Summary........................................................................................................................................30
4.6 Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................31
4.7 Recommendation...........................................................................................................................32
4.8 Areas of Further Research...........................................................................................................33
Reference ....................................................................................................................................................34

5
Abstract
7KLVSDSHULVVHHNVWRUHYLHZ(WKLRSLD¶VURO
analysis presented in the article is based on the qualitative data provided by international
organizations, governments, research institutions and others concerned bodies in the area.
Secondary data was collected by analyzing the literature in academic journals, policy
documents, periodicals, books, newspapers, and academic papers and magazines, TV
documentaries on the research questions of this study. This study intends to contribute to
UHVHDUFKHVDERXWWKH(WKLRSLD¶VUROHVRIRX
bridging the gaps in previous studies part of which was the non-inclusion of regional and
international actors in the fight against terrorism. The government of Ethiopia has attempted
to improve its Counter Terrorism cooperation with Kenya and the Federal Government of
Somalia to combat threats. Ethiopian offiFLDOVUHPDLQPRUHZLOOLQJV
cooperate with the U.S. government against Al-Shabaab. Ethiopia is a key ally of the
Western world, especially the U.S., which considers it as an important regional security
partner in the global war on terror, and recently as negotiators in conflict resolution stages in
most of Horn of African states. The government of Ethiopia generally supports international
directives that seek to stem terrorism. This study prove that Ethiopia is the major roles player
of counter terrorism in the horn of Africa, and the counter terrorism operation has more less
positive implication in the region. Ethiopia cannot ignore the rising threat of Islamic
radicalism in Somalia, but it needs to act carefully and wisely to avoid hostile relations with
its large Muslim community and with Muslim-dominated neighboring states.

6
Chapter One
1.1Introduction
In late 2004 report from the office of the United Nations Secretary General, terrorism is an
act projected to cause death or grave body-harm on civilians or non-combatants with the
determination of intimidating a population or coercing the State-government or an
international entity to desist or champion from performing any acts or duties (UN, 2005). In
contemporary times, terrorism is a major risk to societal existence and hence an illegal act
under counter terrorism laws of States (like the Ethiopia Anti-Terrorism Proclamation).
Terrorism is also considered a war crime under the laws of war when applied to target non-
combatants, such as unprejudiced military personnel or civilians. The symbolism of terrorism
can harness human fear to help achieve certain goals (Ruby, 2002).
The Horn of Africa (HOA) has been troubled by incessant conflicts and the region could be
considered as one of the most conflict-prone regions of the world. It is affected by the
scourges of chronic political instability, a massive influx of refugees and domestic displaced
persons, clandestine migration, humanitarian crisis, and maritime insecurity. All these factors
have undermined peace and security in the region, a weakness terrorist organizations have
exploited. Pressures to decisively address these threats are testing the limits of national
capabilities and resilience. The State is often incapable to meet the elementary needs of local
communities, and additionally the secondary needs complicated by political dynamics and
instability (peter, 2016).
Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center terrorism was concentrated more
in Latin America and Asia, but after 9/11 it has significantly shifted to the Middle East and
Africa. In 2016, about 75 per cent of terror-related fatalities were in the Middle East and
Africa (Roser, Nagdy, Ritchie, 2019). Some scholars are defining Africa as the new
frontier for terrorism (AON, 2015; Gall, 2016; IISS, 2015; Inboden Waterfield, 2016;
6HDUFH

DQG RWKHUV FODLP WKDW µMLKD
for some time been gaining
DGKHUHQWV IXUWKHU VRXWK¶ ,QERGHQ :DWHUIL
µJURZLQJLQIOXHQFHRI¶'DHVKDQGDO
-Qaeda in Africa (IISS, 2015). Also, statistics indicate
WKDWWHUURULVPKDVLQFUHDVHGIURPµDURXQG
QXDOOLQWRRYHU

7
Africa (Feldstein, 2018). In 2016, General Donald Bolduc noted that the likely impact of
terror activities from Africa might be higher than the current threat that the USA faces from
conflict in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria (Turse, 2016). This point to a continent unlikely to be
safe for citizens across the globe.
Ethiopia is increasingly described as a regional power in the Horn of Africa, in consideration
of its military and diplomatic power and demographic size. EWKLRSLD¶VLQFUHDVLQ
in regional peace and security issues, play a significant role on combating terrorism in the
region. The government of Ethiopia has attempted to improve its Counter Terrorism
cooperation with Kenya and the Federal Government of Somalia to combat threats. Ethiopia
was involved and played a significant role in combating terrorism in the region, because of
GLIIHUHQW UHDVRQV LW¶V QRW JHWWLQJ HQRXJ
the international
communities' attention. Ethiopian diplomats are also unaware of using this role for
diplomatic purposes, which helps to secure Ethiopia's national interest. This study seeks to
UHYLHZ(WKLRSLD¶VUROHRIFRXQWHUWHUURULVP
1.2Statement of the Problem
Apparently a host of factors stand for the crisis of the state and the concomitant festering
conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Among the factors that can be accounted for the state crisis
and conflict are international interventions that invariably pertain to colonialism, neo-
colonialism, cold war superpower competition driven by strategic, economic, political and
security interest. Recently also concern of global war on terror and anti-piracy off the coast
of Somali that brought virtually the entire world naval forces to the region have compounded
to the host of the factors.
The Horn of Africa faces an increasingly complex, and evolving, threat of terrorism and
targeted violence. There have been several studies on countries terrorism and Counter
Terrorism roles in the Horn of Africa.
An influential player in geopolitical and diplomatic affairs of the African continent, the
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) is a key ally to the US and other countries
in the region in combating terrorism and terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa. The US and
FDRE have established multiple counter-terrorism partnerships that specifically target

8
designated terrorist groups such as Al-Shabab in neighboring Somalia. For many experts
closely following events in the Horn of Africa and the fight against terrorism, Ethiopia stands
out as having been exceptionally successful. But, until now there are no studies that focused
RQ(WKLRSLD¶VUROHLQFRXQWHUWHUURULVPDQG
on the international community engagement on counter terrorism in the horn of Africa and
this study seeks to focus only the role of Ethiopia in counter terrorism operation and bring up
to date researches in this area. In addition, most of the studies did not go into the broader
context of addressing the role of each countries role they played in countering terrorism in
the horn of Africa and the geopolitical factories of counter terrorism operation in the region.
The researcher has examined most of these related materials and observed that most of them
concentrated on Kenya, USA, UK, IGAD, AU, and other countries and multilateral
OrganizationsUDWKHUWKDQ(WKLRSLD¶VUROHLQFRXQW
This study seeks to review
(WKLRSLD¶VUROHRIFRXQWHUWHUURULVPLQWKH
1.3Research Questions
,QWKLVOLJKWWKLVVHPLQDUUHVHDUFKORRNVD
of Africa by trying to answer the following questions:
i. What are the major roles of (WKLRSLD¶VFRXQWHUWHUURULVPLQK
ii. What DUHWKHJHRSROLWLFDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRI(WKL
Role?
iii. How effective have the (WKLRSLD¶V UROHV RI FRXQWHU WHUUR
what
grand strategy can be employed to enhance them?
1.4 The Objectives
1.4.1 General Objective
The broad objective of this study is to investigate WKH(WKLRSLD¶VUROHRI
the horn of Africa.
1.4.2 Specific objectives
I. To investigate WKH(WKLRSLD¶VUROHVRIFRXQWHUWHUUR
II. To examine the geopolitical implications oI(WKLRSLD¶VFRXQWHUWHUU
role
III. To VXJJHVWJUDQGVWUDWHJWKDWFDQEHHPSOR
terrorism in horn of Africa

9
1.5 Hypotheses
i. Ethiopia is the major roles player of counter terrorism in horn of Africa
ii. (WKLRSLD¶V FRXQWHU WHUURULVP RSHUDWLRQ KDV
of Africa
geopolitics and view as constructive by regional countries
iii. A combined effort by both Ethiopia and International actors in the region will succeed in
Combating terrorism.
1.6 Justification of Research
7R WKH DFDGHPLD WKLV VWXG LQWHQGV WR FRQWU
Counter Terrorism measures in the Horn of Africa by bridging the gaps in previous studies part
of which was the non-inclusion of regional and international actors in the fight against terrorism.
The recommendations from the study will contribute to informing and improving on policy
matters of government, diplomacy and other relevant stakeholders by offering an appropriate and
effective strategy to SURPRWH(WKLRSLD¶VUROHLQFRPEDWLQJ
terrorism.
1.7Scope of the Study
This research was from scientific relevance since; (WKLRSLD¶VUROHRIFRXQW
implication in the horn of Africa has been an important topic. However, in the age of
globalization, its importance has grown more rapidly than ever because of the recognition that
FRXQWU¶VVXUYLYDODQGGHYHORSPHQWDOVRGHSHQ
environment. Some of the significant practices in the past reflect that various tools of counter
terrorism FRXOGEHLPSOHPHQWHGWRVWUHQJWKHQFRXQWU
security.
The study focused on operations of the (WKLRSLD¶VUROHRIFRXQWHUWH
the horn of Africa. The study covered the role of Ethiopia in the achievement of counter
terrorism operation. The main areas of research were to find out and analyze the conduct of
counter terrorism and its implication in the horn of Africa. 6HFRQGDUGDWD¶V
was collected from
national defense force, security sectors, Ministry of defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs that
were directly related with counter terrorism and security.

10
1.8Limitation of the Study
It is expected in conducting the research, several challenges will be experienced. The security
nature of the research may be scare some respondents bearing in mind some of them are security
officers and government officials. On the sensitivity of the study getting some information
ZDVQ¶WDQHDVWDVNIRUWK
HUHVHDUFKHUEHFDXVHRIWKLVWKHV
overcome problem the researcher was assured the respondents that the study was purely
DFDGHPLFKHQFHQRIHDURIYLFWLPL]DWLRQ7RV
use similar researches to fill the existing information gap.

11
Chapter Two
2.1Literature Review
This chapter reviews literature on Terrorism and Counter Terrorism and (WKLRSLD¶V URO
counter terrorism in the horn of Africa. It aims at identifying and evaluating knowledge and
findings of various studies that have been carried out in this area. From the literature review, a
lot will be mentioned in respect to Terrorism at various levels.
2.1.1 Terrorism definition and Historical Background
The topic of terrorism is both complex and emotive. It is complex because it combines so many
different aspects of human experience, including subjects such as politics, psychology,
philosophy, military strategy, and history, to name a few. Terrorism is also emotive both because
experiences of terrorist acts arouse tremendous feelings, and because those who see terrorists as
justified often have strong feelings concerning the rightness of the use of violence. Without a
doubt, terrorism evokes strong feelings whenever it is discussed. A key challenge of
understanding terrorism is both acknowledging the moral outrage at terrorist acts, while at the
same time trying to understand the rationale behind terrorism (United States Institute of Peace,
2001).
Terrorism is commonly understood to refer to acts of violence that target civilians in the pursuit
of political or ideological aims. In legal terms, although the international community has yet to
adopt a comprehensive definition of terrorism, existing declarations, and resolutions and
XQLYHUVDO ³VHFWRUDO´ WUHDWLHV UHODWLQJ WR VS
HOHPHQWV,QWKH*HQHUDO$VVHPEO¶V'HF
Terrorism, set out in its resolution 4VWDWHGWKDWWHUURULVPLQF
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular
SHUVRQV IRU SROLWLFDO SXUSRVHV´ DQG WKDW VXF
whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or
other nature that may be invoked to justify them,́(OHCHR, 2008).
7KHZRUG³7HUURULVP´RULJLQDWHVIURPWKH)UHQ
te
terrorism as practiced by the French during the 1793-HUDRIWHUURU7KH
a derivative from a Latin verb terrere (e, terreo) which means to frighten( Kim,2001). The

12
Terror Cimbricus was a state of emergency and panic in Rome, this was a result of the actions of
the warriors of the Cimbri tribe in 105 BC that the Jacobins cited as a precedent when imposing
an era of terror during the French Revolution (Geoffrey, 2001). After the Jacobins lost power, the
word terrorist became a term of abuse.
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon in human experience. Violence has been used throughout
human history by those who chose to oppose states, kings, and princes. This sort of violence can
be differentiated from what is termed as terrorism. Violence in opposition to a government is
often targeted against soldiers and those who govern. Terrorism, however, is characterized by the
use of violence against civilians, with the expressed desire of causing terror or panic in the
population. Terrorism is not unique to the 20th and 21st centuries. Terrorism existed in 18th
century revolutionary France during the reign of terror, as well as among the Zealots of Palestine
in opposition to Roman rule some 2000 years ago. Today, terrorist activity can be found in
Israel, Indonesia, United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, Colombia, and the United States, to name a few.
Of particular concern here are the September 11 suicide attacks against the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon and the attempted attack that resulted in the plane crash in Pennsylvania
(United States Institute of Peace, 2001).
As a consequence of various terrorist attacks, the U.S. government initiated a war against
terrorism and its sponsors, targeting Osama bin Laden, a Saudi-born anti-Western, Islamic
mLOLWDQW UHVLGLQJ LQ $IJKDQLVWDQ DQG KLV DO
%DVH´

LVDQRUJDQL]DWLRQEDVHGLQ$IJKDQLVWD
Qaeda is allied to the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Using the military, law enforcement,
diplomacy (including coalition formation), the treasury department, and other instruments of
state, the U.S. government undertook a campaign against bin Laden and his al Qaeda group. The
U.S. government has taken great pains to state that its efforts are not directed against Islam, but
against the terrorism and its sponsors (United States Institute of Peace, 2001).
The Al-Qaeda emerged in 1988, and carried out the 11/9/2001 terrorist attack in the United
States which has been termed the emergence of contemporary terrorism. This has been
worsened by the emergence of its sister terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram
and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), (peter, 2016).

13
2.1.2 Counter terrorism
The Greater Horn region is one of the most conflict-ravaged areas on the African continent. The
Horn of Africa proper is a geographical concept referring to the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, and Somalia. The Greater Horn, on the other hand, is largely a political concept that
incorporates Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda into the Horn region and encompasses all the countries
of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), (Kidane, 2011). The rise of the
Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia, the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to install the President
Abdullahi Yusuf in power, the U.S. bombing raids aimed at suspected al-Qaida members, the
Ethiopian-Eritrean War, the decade-long Somalia War, the emergence of Al-6KDEDDE.HQD
Post election violence, and the Sudan-South Sudanese just ended War have highlighted the
display of violence in its extreme form in the Horn of Africa (peter, 2016).
The Somali tragedy lies at the heart of developments with internal governance systems. 1991
marked the start of an endless murderous civil war, paving way for the emergence of
contemporary terrorists. Terror in Somalia have been continually featured in international
headlines since the past two decades: firstly as State terror, during the civil war that featured clan
warfare and humanitarian catastrophe; secondly as domestic terror, featured by the failure of the
State to prevent the States geographical boundaries from becoming a terror breeding site and a
safe- haven terrorists; and lastly as international terror, where coordinated attacks can be
launched from, as evident in the 1998 US embassy bombing and the subsequent attacks on the
Kenyan soil (Thomson,2016).
7R GHQRWH HIIRUWV WR FRPEDW DQG SUHYHQW WHUU
-WHUURULVP¶
DQG µDQWL
-
WHUURULVP¶DUHERWKXVHGDVWKHKDYH
both become a standard part of the United Nations lexicon.
In contrast to some national definitions, notably those suggested by the US military doctrine,
µFRXQWHU
-WHUURULVP¶
should not necessarily be viewed as being limited to offensive or active
measures to fight terrorism, nor VKRXOGµDQWL
-WHUURULVP¶EHXVHGWRHPEUD
or passive
strategies only. As used in this report, neither of the two terms carries any evaluative
connotation. The choice between them is determined by a functional approach: while
counterterrorism is seen as a security task performed by the security component of a national or
international authority, the use of political, legal, economic, civil society and other peace-

14
building instruments for the purposes of both countering and preventing terrorism is more
broadly referred to as anti-terroris(Ekaterina,2003).
Thus, implementing counter-terrorism measures is not a matter of national policy anymore.
$IWHU810HPEHU6WDWHVDUHQRWRQOHQW
ULW´DJDLQ
terrorist threats but now have an obligation under international law to implement specific
PHDVXUHV DV VHW RXW LQ 5HVROXWLRQ DV
to combat
terrorism(REDRESS, 2004).
There are underlying conditions in East Africa and the Horn that contribute directly to conflict
and the use of terrorist tactics. Poverty and social injustice are widespread. Borders are porous
even by African standards. Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, and Eritrea have long and poorly patrolled
coasts on the Red Sea or Indian Ocean. Weapons are readily available throughout the region, but
especially in Somalia. All of the countries have a severe shortage of financial resources and
trained personnel to counter the activities of terrorist elements. Corruption is endemic in the
region and a particularly serious problem in several countries. Transparency International
surveyed 102 countries in 2002 for its annual Corruption Perceptions Index. Kenya tied
Indonesia for position 96 on the list while Uganda shared 93 with Moldova. Tanzania vied with
several nations for position 71 and Ethiopia shared position 59 with several nations. There were
not sufficient data to rank the other countries in the region (Transparency International, 2002).
Countries facing serious corruption combined with low pay for security personnel leave officials
wide open to the temptation of accepting money from terrorists in return for support.
2.1.3 Terrorism and Threat to Security
The 11/9/2001 attack by terrorists in the US has indeed raised the awareness about contemporary
terrorism; it however did so in a rather narrow manner. Nowadays, it seems that terrorism is
equated with Islamic violence and Al-Qaeda in particular. Terrorism is however a broad concept
that has its origins in the French Revolution. Therefore, terrorism is not a phenomenon of recent
years and is certainly not exclusLYHOUHODWHGWR,VODP6FKPLGW¶
s typology of terrorism illustrates
LWVEURDGFKDUDFWHU6FKPLGW¶
s distinguishes between five types of terrorism: social revolutionary
terrorism (left-wing), right-wing and racist terrorism, single issue terrorism, nationalist and
separatist terrorism (including ethnic terrorism), and finally, religious terrorism (USDGS, 2016).

15
In the previous decades, the typical nature of terror was held on the premise of national patriots
and revolutionaries, however, this have changed and proved contrary in the modern day context;
WKXVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKH³QHZ
-VWOHGWHUURU´,QVFLHQW
ific literature, differentiating aspects of the
new form of terror are: the broader scope of assertions by terrorists, the ruthlessness of violence,
and lastly the structural networks of terrorists. With regard to the first characteristic aspect,
Giddens states that new style terrorism has a global spread because it wants to restructure world
society (Schmid, 2005).
Together with being global in its ambitions, new-style terrorists use extensive and ruthless ways
of violence as well. From this perspective, Gupta stresses that the new form of terror have caused
the rise of increased and massive destructions and causalities; this is not unconnected to the
advancement in state of the art weapon, technology, transportation and communication systems
(Gupta, 2005).
Finally, the organizational structure of terrorist groups is noteworthy when naming
distinguishing aspects of new-style terrorism. Terrorist groups are very comparable to so-called
network organizations. In other words, the new form of terror groups is highly loosely
networked, resulting to a unique levels coordinated operations (Sahar, 2005).
Although these three aspects are being presented as typical for new-style terrorism, one could
doubt about this notion. With regard to the first aspect, before 9/11even before the existence of
Al-Qaeda there were groups aimed at restructuring world society. Most notorious examples are
of course communist-groups trying to establish communism globally. Also the second aspect of
what would be typical for new-style terrorism is only partial true. Indeed, it is correct that 9/11
was the deadliest terrorist attack. However, the statement that the new form of terror is ruthless
due to the advancement of technological and weapon development appears over stated, since
there are no records of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by terrorists. Also with
concern to the third aspect of new-style terrorism, one could doubt if this is exclusively typical
for new-style terrorism. The network structure is no invention of new-style terrorists since there
has been communist-groups using this kind of communication in the beginning of the 20 century
(USDS, 2009).

16
2.2Regional Security Frameworks: A Theoretical Analysis
There are various theoretical arguments (functionalism, neo-functionalism, intergovermentalism)
that examine integration processes (Haas, 1958; Hans, 1985; Hix, 2005; Schmitter, 2004;
7DOOEHUJ

DQGLQYHVWLJDWHPHPEHUVWDWHV
RUµUHVSRQVHV¶UDWLR
constructivism and liberalism) to regional treaties related to security (Gelderman, Ghijsen,
Schoonen, 2010; Simmons, 1998; Tallberg, 2002). The foremost of these theories is the
rationalist±
realist cost±
EHQHILWDQDOVLVZKLFKDVVXPHVWKDW
weighing the cost against expected benefits or gains (Ford, 2011; Gelderman et al., 2010;
Keohane, 1986; Oberdörster, 2008; Tallberg, 2002). The state is the unit of analysis in rationalist
theories. When it comes to complying to international regulations, treaties, resolutions or
protocols, a state will most likely ratify a treaty when material benefits are perceived
(economically, politically, diplomatically or otherwise); or when a state is yielding to the forces
or pressures of a more powerful VWDWHRU JURXS RIVWDWHVHLWKH
conformity or the FRVWVRIQRQFRQIRUPLWWKURXJKPDWHULD
Jinks, 2004

RU µWKURXJK HFRQRPLF VDQFWLRQV HPED
IRUFH¶ KD]RX
1995). The rational argument agrees with realist scholars who argue that states act only in their
own interest and that they will only ratify agreements that directly serve that interest (Maluwa,
2012). Therefore, FRPSOLDQFHLVPRWLYDWHGPRUHESHUFHL
rather than the threat of legal sanctions by regional groups. It is interest-driven, and incentives
play a crucial role.
Relatedly is the liberalism argument (Abbott, 1999; Moravcsik, 1997; Simmons, 1998). A liberal
theory of ratification has two assumptions. First is that states ratify treaties or international
agreements due to pressures from powerful domestic actors who lobby for ratification
(Moravcsik, 1997). The focus is on the impact of domestic politics on state behaviour.
Understanding domestic politics within the realm of state±
society relations, the interest-group
dynamic will have an impact on the ratification of and compliance with international agreements
(Oberdörster, 2008). Second is the democratic culture and credentials of a member state to
influence positive compliance with or ratification of a treaty.
Simmons (1998) noted that democratic governments are more likely to comply with international
OHJDO REOLJDWLRQV EHFDXVH µOLEHUDO GHPRFUDWL
share in the culture of prevailing

17
LQWHUQDWLRQDOOHJDOSURFHVVHVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQ
are more likely to accept rule-based regulated
international behaviour. For the constructivist, a member government may ratify treaties based
on normative reasons, which, believe it is appropriate or right to comply with treaty obligations
(Franck, 1990; Hathaway, 2005; Hawkins 2004; Meyer, 2005; Reus- Smit, 2005). Compliance
with international treaties based on a cost±
benefit analysis may not be the only motivating
factors, but member states do comply due to what is right or wrong or what ought to be done
(Hurrell, 2002). Root (1908 cited in Simmons, 1998) mentioned moral force as a reason for
compliance with the decisions of arbitration panels. A state may ratify a treaty due to its
commitment to the norms or power of the underlying ideas embodied in the treaty (Hathaway,
5LVVH 6LNNLQN

RUZKHQWKHVWD
of the truth, validity,
RUDSSURSULDWHQHVVRIWKHQRUPVRIWKHWUHDW
(Oberdörster, 2008). There is a strong
nexus between national constructs of ideas, beliefs and identities and the willingness and abilities
of PHPEHU VWDWHV WR FRPSO ZLWK WKH FRXQWHUWHU
values are
engaged or developed within a state, the state will be motivated to ratify a particular treaty.
Compliance with international law, according to Heywood (2011), can enhance the standing and
reputation of a state, projecting such VWDWH DV D JUHDWHU µVRIW¶ SR
members of the international community to work with it rather than against it. Meyer (2005)
infers that if the threat of terrorism has enveloped national consciousness over a long period, the
norms regarding strategic behaviour of a state indicate that such a state is likely to develop a
protective shield against these fears.
The cost±
benefit analysis is remarkably different from the constructivist theoretical explanations
of security policy, cooperation and implementation among the member states of a regional and/or
sub-regional organization. Rationalist±
realist theory emphasizes on the fact that states ratify
international treaties based on the perceived economic benefits, military forces that compel
compliance and rational±
liberal theory emphasizes on the fact that states ratify international
treaties due to superior forces or economic sanctions. We relied on this theory to establish the
relationship between low rate of compliance to AU treaties and lack of enforcement mechanisms
on one hand, and the increasing incidents of terrorism attacks and fatalities as a result of the
implementation challenges by member states on the other.

18
2.3 Theoretical Review
This study will be based on International Relations (IR) theory of Constructivism.
Constructivism theory at the most rudimentary level is concerned with the role of collective
human consciousness ±the role of ideas in IR. It seeks to understand international activity in
terms of interaction of actors and intangible ideational structures (group norms in particular).
This can be identified as an offshoot of Idealism, stating the collective efforts against Terrorism.
The term Constructivism was coined by Nicholas Onuf, to describe the socially constructed
characters in IR (David,2011). This theory was later expanded by Alexander Wendt in his 1992
article: Anarchy is what states make of it. In the article, he challenged realists and neoliberals
commitment to material power and asserts that structures of human associations are determined
primarily by shared ideas rather material forces and that the identities and interests of purposive
actors are constructed by this shared ideas rather than given by nature(Wendt.1992). Since
11/9/2001 attacks in the US, traditional IR scholars have been finding it difficult to understand
acts of terror. Realists and liberalists approaches hardly make substantial contributions to the
understanding of significant attacks that are motivated by multidimensional convictions.
Constructivist theories are best suited to explain groups like Al-Shabaab, ISIS, Boko Haram etc.
Constructivist theories help to analyse how identities and interests can change overtime,
furthermore Constructivism is essential in understanding the ever changing state responses to
Violence and Extremism. It further emphasizes the importance of understanding culture, identity,
religion and ideas through IR theories (David.2011). The challenge of traditional IR theories in
predictions of the post-cold-war craved a spot for the emergence of Constructivism in order to
fill such gap. Constructivism is identified as the social theory of International Politics. According
to Alexander Wendt, identities expresses who or what actors are and how they have developed,
been sustained or have transformed, although interests refer to what actors want and interactions
shows the true identities (Wendt, 1987).
Terrorism is a social construction as what sociological thinkers believe it to be. It is an
interpretation of events and their presumed causes (one person¶
s terrorist is another¶
s freedoms
fighter.) Counter Terrorism as a social construct gives insight into policies for such (David,
2011). Terrorism can be constructed as a war, crime, or an uncivilized evil. This contributes to
the formulation of certain counter terrorism policies such as immigration policies, military
reactions and judicial measures, while excluding responses such as negotiations and induced

19
socio-economic changes that can alter the motivations for terrorism (David, 2011). More often
than not, acts of terror by terrorists were perceived as war against the West due to their
militaristic response to terrorism. Terrorism looked at as both a war and a crime. Terrorists use
the basic tenets of constructivism such as ideas, identities and norms. For example, Al-Qaeda
seeks to promote an Islamic identity, define the interest of all Muslims as necessarily being in
confrontation with the West. Here, ideas matter and persuasion is a key. The failure of
rationalists to understand Constructivists orientation of terrorism led to state-centric policies on
War on Terror (David, 2011). Constructivists believe that states will act differently to friends and
enemies based on their threat perceptions, their behaviors will be shaped by their shared
understanding and collective knowledge of self and the other. Constructivism is also a cultural
theory explained by different cultures of anarchy such as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. The
cultural aspects may help to explain the approach in fighting terrorism (Wendt, 1999).
Constructivism views terrorism as a social problem that cannot exist, independent of the ideas of
the people involved in it. The value added by constructivism to war on terror includes the
creation of diverse notions, the understanding of self and others which help to understand states¶
responses to terrorism, disclosing the ever changing notion of ideas and identities (Wendt, 1998).
Empirical Review

20
Chapter Three
Methodology
3.1 Research Design
The study approach was qualitative entirely based on secondary data. The researchers used
previous research findings, governmental and intergovernmental reports, article and interviews,
treaties as the sources of data. The data collected were analyzed using a combination of
interpretive and constructivism to guide the qualitative method of research. The scope of this
study is describing the role of (WKLRSLD¶VLQFRXQWHUWHUURULVP
in the region. The researcher tried
WRH[DPLQHGLIIHUHQWSHUVSHFWLYHRQ(WKLRSLD¶
in counter terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
The perspectives analyzed without biases.
3.2 Data source
Using quantitative charts derived from the Afrobarmeter database, the author illustrates the role
of (WKLRSLD¶VLQFRXQWHU
terrorism in Horn Africa and its implication.
3.3 Methods of Data Collection
3.3.1 Secondary data
Secondary data was collected by analyzing the literature in academic journals, policy documents,
periodicals, books, newspapers, and academic papers and magazines, TV documentaries on the
research questions of this study.
3.4 Data analysis
This research used content analysis. Qualitative data was analyzed using content analysis to
reduce the wide variety of information to a more limited set of attributes composing a variable. It
ZDVXVHGWRGUDZFRQFOXVLRQVRQWKH(WKLRSLD¶
the horn of Africa.
3.5 Research Ethics
Considerations like professional practice; like ensuring data validity and research instruments
reliability, and research ethics was adhered to by the researcher.

21
Chapter Four
Data Presentation and Analysis
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents and analyzes the data collected IURPVHFRQGDUVRXUFHDQ
4.2 The Ethiopia’s roles of counter terrorism in horn of Africa
Terrorism in East Africa occurs in a geopolitical context characterized by weak states and
dominated by authoritarian governments. Historically, aggrieved groups have lacked avenues for
peaceful expression of dissent, while state governments in the region have typically met dissent
with repression. Furthermore, governments in the region are highly corrupt, while lacking
control over their hinterlands and borders, which frequently are typified by informal governance
structures. Large populations of displaced persons and refugees (from long histories of conflict)
live throughout the region. Internal politics suffer from ethnic, tribal and clan divisions. And
state-to-state relations are often tense as well (Camp, 2017).
After the collapse of the Somali state in 1991²an anarchic Somalia poses new forms of threats
to Ethiopia. In the absence of a central government controlling the entirety of the Somali
territory, Islamist extremist groups use Somalia as a safe haven and a launching pad to carry out
terrorist attacks in Ethiopia and the region at large. Apart from the threat of terrorist attacks,
Ethiopia feels threatened by the prospect of emerging Islamist extremist movements and
governments in neighboring states, amid increasing religious militancy within Ethiopia (Erich,
2010).
On the eve of Christmas Day 2006, roughly a month after Ethiopia officially declared war on the
Islamic Court Union (ICU) and in a dramatic escalation of hostilities; Ethiopian Air Force jets
bombed Mogadishu International Airport. Following that attack, Ethiopian troops crossed into
Somalia with the goal of overthrowing the ICU which the Ethiopian government had designated
as a terrorist organization supported by Eritrea. Within days, Ethiopian troops seized control of
Mogadishu and instated the fledgling Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the interim
government of Somalia recognized by the international community. However, what began as a
OLPLWHG LQFXUVLRQ WR HOLPLQDWH WKH WKUHDW RI

22
having no interest in a long-term presence on Somali soil, Ethiopian forces remained until 2009
and left only after peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi took over under the aegis of
AMISOM, 2009,( Yonas, 2016).
However, this was not the first Ethiopian military intervention into Somalia since the collapse of
central authority in 1991, nor would it be the last. From 1996 until 1999, Ethiopia sent troops
into towns close to the Ethiopian border which had been used as operational bases by a group
known as al Ittihad al Isalmiyya (Le Sage, 2001). However, the 2006 invasion was markedly
different from previous forays in the extent of militDUSRZHUWKDWZDVXVHGD
strategic and
ultimate objectives. First, unlike previous incursions which were shrouded in secrecy and
revealed to the public ex post facto, the build-up lasted for months and involved an open
declaration of war by the Federal Parliament. Second, while previous offensives had been limited
to surgical attacks by a small group of Special Forces, this was a full-blown overt war involving
unprecedented ground and air power. And third, whereas previous interventions took a modest
aim of crippling the capacity of specific armed groups, in 2006 Ethiopia assumed the role of
nation-building that ultimately proved unsuccessful (Yonas, 2016).
Ethiopian intelligence services maintain a significant presence throughout much of Somalia,
monitoring al-Qaeda, al-Itihaad and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Despite a public
preoccupation with jihadist groups in Somalia, Addis Ababa in fact considers the OLF a more
serious challenge to Ethiopia's stability. Formed in 1974, the OLF fought side by side with other
Ethiopian opposition movements against the military regime of Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam.
Towards the end of the 1970s, a militant Islamist splinter group broke away to form the Islamic
Front for the Liberation of Oromiyya (IFLO). After the victory of the Ethiopia Peoples'
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in 1991, dissatisfaction with the transitional
arrangements led it to withdraw from the governing coalition the next year. Following the OLF's
withdrawal from government, the EPRDF sought to eradicate the organisation, establishing large
internment camps and killing thousands of its members and sympathisers. These draconian
measures, however, did not succeed; instead, they served primarily to drive the OLF's senior
leaders into exile and transform its domestic wing from a political party into a clandestine,
underground movement. The OLF remains an active force within Ethiopia and still commands a
ODUJH IROORZLQJ DPRQJ 2URPR¶V
Ethiopia believes it should be designated a terrorist

23
organization on the grounds that its units attack civilians and government officials in Oromo
areas, including the burning of schools, the bombing of the popular Blue Tops restaurant in
Addis Ababa in April 1997, and the bombing of a hotel in Addis Ababa's Piazza neighborhood
on 11 September 2003. Other attacks attributed to the OLF include the 1997 bombing of a
private hotel and the post office in Harar, the bombings of the Makonnen Hotel in Dire Dawa,
the Tigray Hotel, and Tana market in Addis Ababa (David, 2002). Ethiopian security forces also
claim to have thwarted OLF attempts to blow up two fuel tankers in public places in 2003, and in
early 2004 to have intercepted 21 OLF fighters trying to enter Ethiopia with twenty kilos of
explosives.
Ethiopia is increasingly described as a regional power in the Horn of Africa, in consideration of
LWVPLOLWDUDQGGLSORPDWLFSRZHUDQGGHPRJUD
regional peace and security issues further indicates that it has the will to lead and influence the
region. However, its aspirations are neither explicitly acknowledged by the government, nor
GHILQHGLQLWVRIILFLDOIRUHLJQSROLFGRFXPH
constrained by historical factors, the vulnerability of neighboring VWDWHV DQG (WKLRS
economic capacity. Yet, Ethiopia maintains a central position in the region and plays an
important role in regional peace and security issues, serving for instance as a bulwark against
Islamist extremist groups in the region²as a mediator and as a peacekeeper. Ethiopia has also
managed to drive regional agendas through the existing regional and continental organizations,
namely the Intergovernmental Authority of Development and the African Union (Kidist, 2014).
The government of Ethiopia has attempted to improve its Counter Terrorism cooperation with
Kenya and the Federal Government of Somalia to combat threats. Ethiopian officials remain
PRUHZLOOLQJVLQFH$EL¶VVHOHFWLRQWRFRRSHU
the U.S. government against Al-Shabaab.
The government of Ethiopia participated in African Union (AU)-led Counter Terrorism efforts as
part of AU Mission in Somalia forces. At the AU, Ethiopia participated in Counter Terrorism
related efforts. Ethiopia participates in the IGAD and its Counter Terrorism programs and
trainings, including the IGAD Security Sector Program, which builds regional capacity to
mitigate, detect, and deter terrorist activity. In multilateral efforts against terrorism, the
government of Ethiopia generally supports international directives that seek to stem
terrorism. IGAD, recognizing that terrorism is a transnational issue, continued to encourage the

24
cross-border dissemination of information concerning terrorist activity. The literature on counter-
terrorism suggests that kinetic responses ±applied in isolation ±are ineffective in reducing
terrorist violence over the long term. Rather, multiple responses that span both coercive and
cooperative strategies are generally needed for long-term success against not only individual
terrorist groups but also the broader movements they represent.
(WKLRSLD¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWR6RPDOLD¶VVWDELOLW
criticized by many as a mistake and counterproductive, because it seemingly resulted in allowing
Al-Shabab to mobilize local support using nationalistic symbols and to gain more territory and
power. Although Ethiopia successfully averted the immediate threat posed by the UIC, it was
bogged down in a violent insurgency for two years, which caused civilian deaths and
GLVSODFHPHQW 7KH LQWHUYHQWLRQ ZDV FRVWO WR
F

0RUHRYHU HYHQ WKRXJK (WKLRSLD FODLPH
invitation DQG SUHVHQWHG WKH LQWHUYHQWLRQ DV GULYHQ
-defence, Ethiopia was seen as a
KRVWLOHLQYDGHU´0ROOHU

(WKLRSLD¶VLQ
extension of American security policy (Interview with former Reuters correspondent 2012). Such
SHUFHSWLRQVUDLVHGTXHVWLRQVDERXW(WKLRSLD¶V
Ethiopia made a strategic mistake by intervening conventionally, when it could have tacitly dealt
with the radical elements of the UIC, namely the Al-Shabab. Although the UIC posed a threat to
(WKLRSLD¶VQDWLRQDOVHFXULWLWZDVQRWLPPL
divided in terms of clans. Thus, instead of launching a large-scale conventional intervention, the
Ethiopian government could have opted for a more covert counter insurgency operation;
attacking some selected bases and forces of the UIC as it did with Al-Ittihad (Kidist, 2011). As
rightly noted by Erlich (2010), Ethiopia cannot ignore the rising threat of Islamic radicalism in
Somalia, but it needs to act carefully and wisely to avoid hostile relations with its large Muslim
community and with Muslim-dominated neighboring states.
2Q D SRVLWLYH QRWH (WKLRSLD¶V PLOLWDU LQWHU
opportunity for the deployment of AMISOM, which in turn gave some hope and impetus for the
consolidation of the peace process and state building in Somalia. It also encouraged regional
VHFXULW FRRSHUDWLRQ DV 8JDQGD %XUXQGL .HQ
military intervention in Somalia in 2011 has made a difference in pushing Al-Shabab out of its

25
PDMRU VWURQJKROGV $FFRUGLQJ WR -DUOH +DQVHQ
-Shabab
were inflictHG E (WKLRSLDQ IRUFHV´
). A number of regions and towns in south-central
Somalia²including Hiiraan, Beledweyne, Baidoa, Bay, Bakool, and Galgaduud²were liberated
by and with the support of Ethiopian troops (The East African 2012). It is also playing an
important role in establishing regional and local administrations in liberated areas, although the
progress on the ground appears to be slow. The agreements and meetings that led to the
establishment of the South West region and the Jubaland region were facilitated by Ethiopia
(Interview with a Somali Political Analyst, 2014).
Ethiopia has definitely taken lessons from its 2006 intervention, and its military is now making a
positive contribution to the stabilization of Somalia. The Ethiopian military has shown restraint,
unlike in 2006, and less civilian causalities have been reported. Ethiopia has also limited its area
of activity and is now operating under AMISOM. Ethiopia is also working with the local
population to re-establish local civilian administrations in liberated areas (Interview with an EU
official, 2014). Similar views were reflected by respondents working with aid agencies. Indeed,
(WKLRSLD¶VSUHVHQFHLVVDLGWRKDYHLPSURYHG
to aid (Interview with Development Alternatives Incorporated 2012). The Ethiopian military has
DOVR WUDLQHG 6RPDOL VROGLHUV WR LPSURYH ORFD
internal political process is a departure from the previous approach of imposing itself on the
Somali leadership and government. For instance, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed²the first president of
the TFG²ZDVZLGHOVHHQDV(WKLRSLD¶VVWRRJHDQG
-central Somalia.
+HQFH(WKLRSLD¶VUHFHQWHQJDJHPHQWLQVRXWKH
and positive. The international community, at least publicly, applauds Ethiopia for its role in
Somalia and considers Ethiopia as a reliable and capable partner.
(WKLRSLD¶VUROHLQ6RPDOLODQGDQG3XQWODQGLV
positive engagement. Ethiopia is a close ally of Somaliland, which declared its independence in
1991, but has not yet been recognized by the international community. The relationship between
Ethiopia and Somaliland goes back to the 1980s. Ethiopia provided military support to and a
EDVHIRUWKH6RPDOL1DWLRQDO0RYHPHQW610

northern Somalia. Ethiopia also hosted thousands of refugees from Somaliland during the civil
war. Unlike the southern part of Somalia, Somaliland emerged as a stable political system with a

26
functioning government, a disciplined and regularly paid military and police, and democratic
elections (Arieff 2008). A Somaliland official says Ethiopia is the first state that participated in
6RPDOLODQG¶VVWDWH
-building process and describes the relationship as strategic. Ethiopia has been
SURYLGLQJPLOLWDUWUDLQLQJIRU6RPDOLODQG¶V
relative peace achieved there (Interview with a Somaliland Official 2012).
Ethiopia also established a close working relationship with the autonomous administration of
Puntland. Again, relations between the two began in the 1980s when Ethiopia provided weapons
and training for the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), led by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed,
ZKRODWHUEHFDPH3XQWODQG¶VILUVWSUHVLGHQW
LQ $FFRUGLQJ WR D 3XQWODQG RIILFLDO ³
WKUHDWHQHG LI LW ZDVQ¶W IRU (WKLRSLD¶V VXSSR
He specifically said that
(WKLRSLD¶VVXSSRUWZDVGHFLVLYHGXULQJ3XQWOD
-Ittihad. Ethiopia has a strong
intelligence presence in Puntland and it provides military training to Puntland forces. Ethiopia
also opened a consulate in Puntland in 2010 (Interview with a Puntland Official 2012). As we
can see from the above role of Ethiopia in counter terrorism, the first hypothesis approves, which
is Ethiopia play the major roles' in counter terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
4.3 The geopolitical implications of Ethiopia’s counter terrorism role
In a narrow geographic sense, the Horn of Africa is that north-eastern part of the African
continent which faces the Red Sea to the east, the Indian Ocean to the south-east and the Nile
Basin to the west. The Horn of Africa conventionally comprises the key states of Ethiopia,
Somalia and Djibouti, although it embraces geopolitically the adjoining states of Sudan and
Kenya. It should also be pointed out that Uganda(Tafesse,2001), which is a member of the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Yemen, Libya and Egypt are no less
involved in the issues and processes of the region and certainly have an impact on power
balances and developments. All these states share social and cultural values emanating from a
centuries-old tradition of interrelationships, common religious practices and economic linkages.
Furthermore, the political fate of each state in the region has always been inextricably
intertwined with that of neighbouring states. Indeed, no individual state in the Horn of Africa has
EHHQLQVXODWHGIURP WKHRWKHUVWDWHV¶SUREOHP
strengths or weaknesses.

27
(WKLRSLD¶VVHFXULWLQIOXHQFHLQWKH+RUQRI
ayers
such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates (UAE)²even if it cannot match those
states in economic terms. ,WVSUR[LPLWWR6RPDOLDDQGWKHO
pursuit of its perceived interest vis-à-vis its Somali-inhabited lowland periphery has made it the
dominant foreign policy actor in the Somali arena. Elucidating the broader dynamics of the Horn,
in particular how states are affected by and responding to external influences, largely hinges on
understanding the transition underway in Ethiopia (Jason,2020).
(WKLRSLD¶VILUVWPLOLWDUHQFRXQWHULQ6RPDOL
-
Ittihadal-Islamia in the 1990s. Al-Ittihad was a Somali fundamentalist movement, with the
primary objective of establishing an Islamic state in Somalia by uniting all Somali-inhabited
territories in the Horn of Africa, including the Somali inhabited area of Ethiopia. It launched a
series of terrorist attacks in Ethiopia in 1996, which led the group to its final days when Ethiopia
responded by successfully attacking and dislodging its bases in Luuq and Buulo Hawwa²near
the Ethiopian border²in late 1996 and in 1999 (Medhane 2002). Since then, Ethiopia has
closely followed political developments in Somalia, and its military has repeatedly intervened to
contain problems emerging from Somalia.
Obviously, Somalia is not a problem that can be fixed with simple solutions. It is a place where
the international community and the most powerful states have failed to find solutions for two
decades²perhaps out of sheer neglect, or the failure to find the right panacea. Too many
interests and actors are involved, and it is difficult to find a genuine partner to work with on the
6RPDOL VLGH ,QGHHG VRPH RI (WKLRSLD¶V DFWL
roblem in Somalia. Ethiopia
DWWHPSWHG WR LPSRVH SROLWLFDO VROXWLRQV VXSS
WHUURU´WRLWVRZQDGYDQWDJHZKLFKLQWXUQX
also played similar political games. UgaQGD¶V 3UHVLGHQW RZHUL 0XVHY
6RPDOLDWRVHFXUHGRQRUV¶VXSSRUWDQGPXWH:H

6LPLODUPRWLYHVSDUWOGURYH(WKLRSLD¶
2006, and it seems to have worked in both cases (Woldemariam 2005). Kenya is also keen to
create a buffer zone in Jubaland, the region in southern Somalia bordering Kenya. Despite these
self-LQWHUHVWHGPRWLYHVIRULQWHUYHQWLRQ6RPDOLD
ave real and

28
legitimate security concerns and most of their actions can indeed be justified based on these
grounds.
7RIDFLOLWDWHFRRSHUDWLRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKH
be a good step forward on the part of Somali leaders. The latter need to show political maturity
and acknowledge the need to seriously engage with Ethiopia, not only for survival, but also to
establish mutually beneficial relations. Unless there is a clear message from Mogadishu, Ethiopia
will continue to suspect that the vision of a greater Somalia is still entrenched in the mindset of
most Somalis. Thus, a marked change of discourse and dialogue is needed, and this requires
JUHDWFRXUDJHDQGGHWHUPLQDWLRQ2Q(WKLRSLD¶
carefully design and
execute its policies towards Somalia to avoid misperceptions. Ethiopia also needs to deal with its
internal vulnerability in the Somali inhabited area and improve its cooperation with regional and
international partners, in order to be perceived as a credible actor working for regional stability.
7KLVVWXGDFFHSWVWKHVHFRQGKSRWKHVLVWKDW
implication in the Horn of Africa geopolitics and view as constructive by regional countries.
4.4 Grand strategy that can be employed to enhance Ethiopia’s roles of counter
terrorism in horn of Africa
The Greater Horn of Africa is one of the most conflict-affected parts of the world. All countries
in East Africa have been victimized by terrorist acts, whether perpetrated by and against a
FRXQWU¶VQDWLRQDOVIRUDGRPHVWLFFDXVHRUI
-national or extra-regional targets,
for example, embassies of Western countries. More than half the countries in the wider
geopolitical neighborhood have experienced full-scale civil war within the past 30 years, and
those that have not still contend with intermittent episodes of inter-communal and one-sided
violence, insurgent groups, and state-perpetrated violence. Observers in the international
community have increasingly raised conFHUQVDERXWWKHUHJLRQ¶VYXO
ability to terrorism and
violent extremism, particularly from al-Shabaab, which has experienced setbacks in Somalia but
demonstrated its ability to conduct attacks in neighboring countries. The regiRQ¶VDEXQGDQFH
structural conditions conducive to violence, coupled with the recent global proliferation of
violent extremist groups, contributes to concerns about ongoing threats to the stability of the
region (EELCO, 2016).

29
The Horn of Africa does not rhyme with development, wealth, or peace. Ethiopia is currently
making measurable progress because of its oppressive government. Somalia has become arun-
off-the-mill case study for every potential failed state in the world and is currently more
abandoned than ever by the international community. In Eritrea, thousands of migrants are
escaping a brutal dictatorship; while Kenya, a relative success story, has been doing its best to
combat terrorism. It now becomes a question by pundits, whether these countries are effectively
trying to combat terrorism and enforce human rights by all means possible, or their governments
are now taking advantage of these domestic challenges and regional conflicts for their own
political benefit. In actuality, the region has experienced continued and devastating intra-and
inter-state conflicts, leading to instability, political isolation and poverty. This makes it
vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. Terrorism in the HOA is a complicated issue requiring a
broad and continued apSURDFKIRU DVROXWLRQ ULWLFDO NQR
and objectives are important as it informs the basis of counterterror operations. The Al-Shabaab
aims to take over the governance and administration of Somalia and additionally replaces the
existing civic law with strict Islamic laws (Peter, 2016).
Ethiopia has begun making efforts to shift from hard line security responses to more measures to
prevent and counter violent extremism. Like most of its regional peers, Ethiopia is a member of
the U.S. Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, known as PREACT, and in 2014
cohosted a dialogue on strategic approaches to CVE in the Greater Horn of Africa with the
Africa Center for Strategic Studies (Paul, 2014). Additionally, Ethiopian government officials
participated in a workshop organized by the IGAD Security Sector Programme to promote rule
of law±
based approaches to countering terrorism in the country. The Ethiopian Muslim
community has also supported efforts to build resilience against violent religious extremism. In
2015, Ethiopian Grand Mufti Abdullahi Sharif Ali served as a co±
keynote speaker for a meeting
of more than 300 delegates representing Sufi orders from Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda,
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Rashid, 2015).
On Counter Terrorism strategies in the region, International actors such as the UN, the EU, the
US and regional actors such as the AU and IGAD have been playing enormous roles. This is
because of several advantages that they have: Firstly, they have the knowledge and expertise of
local issues that makes them well tailored to develop mechanisms that take into account cultural

30
and other contextual issues (Patrick, 2011).Through this, they can undertake region- or sub-
region-specific initiatives that complement and build upon global Counter Terrorism objectives.
They are also in a position to increase a sense of local ownership of global initiatives; and
fostering interest and maintaining momentum that is significant enough to counter terror.
Secondly, is the facilitation of expertise and information exchange among the multi-
governmental and non-governmental entities in Horn of Africa. In addition is the sharing of good
national practices and lessons learned from national implementation among the countries in the
Horn of Africa.
The study accepts the third hypothesis that a combined effort and strategy by both Ethiopia and
International actors in the region will succeed in combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
4.5 Summary
This part JLYHVGHWDLOHGVXPPDURI(WKLRSLD¶VUROH
and counter terrorism effectiveness and the strategies for counter terrorism Ethiopia used in the
horn of Africa.
The broad objective of the study was to investigate the (WKLRSLD¶VUROHRIFRXQ
horn of Africa. The study approach was qualitative entirely based on secondary data. The
researchers used previous research findings, governmental and intergovernmental reports, article
and interviews, treaties as the sources of data. The data collected were analyzed using a
combination of interpretive and constructivism to guide the qualitative method of research.
Ethiopia is increasingly described as a regional power in the Horn of Africa, in consideration of
its military and diplomatic power and demographic size.
(WKLRSLD¶VLQFUHDVLQJHQJDJHPHQWLQUHJLRQDO
has the will to lead and influence the region. Ethiopia has also managed to drive regional
agendas through the existing regional and continental organizations, namely the
Intergovernmental Authority of Development and the African Union. The government of
Ethiopia has attempted to improve its Counter Terrorism cooperation with Kenya and the Federal
Government of Somalia to combat threats. The government of Ethiopia participated in African
Union (AU)-led Counter Terrorism efforts as part of AU Mission in Somalia forces. At the AU,
Ethiopia participated in Counter Terrorism related efforts. Ethiopia participates in the IGAD and

31
its Counter Terrorism programs and trainings, including the IGAD Security Sector Program,
which builds regional capacity to mitigate, detect, and deter terrorist activity. In multilateral
efforts against terrorism, the government of Ethiopia generally supports international directives
that seek to stem terrorism. IGAD, recognizing that terrorism is a transnational issue, continued
to encourage the cross-border dissemination of information concerning terrorist activity.
The study tried to arguments various theoretical perspectives but the study was based on
International Relations (IR) theory of Constructivism. Constructivism theory at the most
rudimentary level is concerned with the role of collective human consciousness ±the role of
ideas in IR. It seeks to understand international activity in terms of interaction of actors and
intangible ideational structures (group norms in particular). This can be identified as an offshoot
of Idealism, stating the collective efforts against Terrorism. Constructivist theories help to
analyze how identities and interests can change overtime, furthermore Constructivism is essential
in understanding the ever changing state responses to Violence and Extremism. Constructivism
views terrorism as a social problem that cannot exist, independent of the ideas of the people
involved in it. The value added by constructivism to war on terror includes the creation of
GLYHUVHQRWLRQVWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIVHOIDQ
to terrorism, disclosing the ever changing notion of ideas and identities.
The study accepts the three hypotheses that the Ethiopia is the major roles player of counter
terrorism in the horn of Africa, and Ethiopia counter terrorism operation has more less positive
implication in the region. The study shows that, regional commitment and cooperation within the
Horn of Africa is crucial in order to win the fight against terror.
4.6 Conclusion
This study prove that Ethiopia is the major roles player of counter terrorism in the horn of Africa,
and Ethiopia counter terrorism operation has more less positive implication in the region, and
identified the existing strategy for countering terrorism in the HOA. Ethiopia has one of the
largest and most powerful militaries in Africa and is the FRQWLQHQW¶VVHFRQGPRV
Moreover, the relative political stability that it has witnessed over the last two decades has
enabled Ethiopia to position itself as a regional power. Ethiopia is playing an active role in
regional peace and security issues through diplomatic engagement, military intervention,
mediation, and peacekeeping activities.

32
As a regional power, Ethiopia has been dealing with immediate threats to both its national
security and stability in the Horn of Africa. It is real politics for regional powers to act based on
their national interests. The relevant question is thus whether or not their actions help stabilize
the region. The consolidation of peace in Somaliland and Puntland is considered a requirement
IRUSHDFHDQGVWDELOLWLQWKHUHJLRQ,QOLJ
stability in these two areas should irrefutably be seen as a positive development. Terrorism is one
of the greatest threats to democracy, economic development, human and peace today. Terrorism
cuts across the boundaries of race, religion, ethnicity and nationality. Terrorism is not the
problem of a single country and there is a pressing need for joint counterterrorism efforts both at
the regional and the global level.
4.7 Recommendation
2Q (WKLRSLD¶V SDUW LWV OHDGHUVKLS QHHGV WR
Somalia to avoid misperceptions. Ethiopia also needs to deal with its internal vulnerability in the
Somali inhabited area and improve its cooperation with regional and international partners, in
order to be perceived as a credible actor working for regional stability.
Ethiopia cannot ignore the rising threat of Islamic radicalism in Somalia, but it needs to act
carefully and wisely to avoid hostile relations with its large Muslim community and with
Muslim-dominated neighboring states.
The Study suggests a national Counter Terrorism and counter violence and extremism plans;
other effective Counter Terror strategy that includes elements of border managements,
diplomatic arrangements, addressing marginalization of Muslims and equipping the security
forces; and finally a grand strategy to countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopian
diplomats and government officials need strategy to promote the roles of the country in
combating terrorism in the region and for world peace and security, which can benefit in
diplomatic relation and international arena. To the extent that Ethiopia is central to US counter-
terrorist strategy in the region, need to the government to get developmental assistance from US
and international communities. In the final analysis, helping to eliminate the conditions that give
rise to the alienation of groups that use terrorism, better intelligence on those that persist anyway,

33
and carefully designed counter-terrorism programs are the most effective ways to deal with the
threat in the Horn of Africa .
4.8 Areas of Further Research
After conducting this study, the research identified new issues, which is open for another
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mixed bag. Ethiopia's military intervention was criticized by many as a mistake and
counterproductive because it seemingly resulted in allowing Al-Shabab to mobilize local support
using nationalistic symbols and to gain more territory and power. In my opinion, the above
issues are in need of further research.

Ethiopia’s role of counter terrorism and its implication in the horn of Africa.pdf

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