The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) launched the Future Integrated Soldier Technology (FIST) program to modernize equipment for frontline troops. The program aims to improve soldiers' survivability, mobility, and lethality according to NATO standards. The article examines whether the MoD is acquiring the right capabilities through FIST and progressing on schedule. It analyzes two key components of FIST - Surveillance and Target Acquisition and Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence. While the MoD appears to be procuring capable equipment, the schedule faces delays and the new gear may not reach troops until 2011, later than desired given ongoing conflicts.

1. Sighting excellence
T
he UK Government launched the Future Integrated
Soldier Technology (FIST) modernisation programme
with the aim of inserting new capability that would
significantly increase the combat effectiveness of the
dismounted infantry section. The target was for close
combat effectiveness to be be realised in terms of NATO-
defined parameters of survivability, mobility and lethality.
The immediate aim, as reiterated recently by Quentin
Davies, the Minister for Defence Equipment and Support,
was to supply frontline troops with the best equipment
the MoD could buy, using the latest technological
advances. This article addresses whether or not the MoD
is on the right track in terms of fulfilling its outlined aim.
The answer has to be sought on two fronts: whether
already awarded contracts suggest the MoD is acquiring
the right capability and is it progressing thus far against
the agreed programme schedule. I would try to seek the
answers around the following questions:
■ Are lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan sufficiently
reflected in the FIST programme?
■ Is soldier modernisation being realised with a focus on
present day frontline needs, such as counter-IED
(Improvised Explosive Devices)?
■ Is the programme progressing enough to reflect Urgent
Operational Requirements?
To address these questions, I would try to narrow down
my analysis on already approved components of the
programme: Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA)
and Command, Control, Communications, Computer
and Intelligence (C4I), which are obviously the focus of
the MoD at the moment. I found that, wisely, the MoD
was taking a modular approach to the delivery of the
FIST programme.
In 2003, Thales UK was chosen by the MoD as the prime
contractor for the overall FIST programme, a reflection of
its track record of equipping soldiers with the latest
technology in the UK and neighbouring countries.
Following an assessment phase (AP) between 2003 and
2006, the stakeholders decided to move forward with the
programmes incrementally, with two components of the
programme being taken under the first phase: STA
capability enhancement (increment 1a) and C4I capability
enhancement (increment 1b). This followed the process of
selecting appropriate equipment and their test and trial
regime. Following a rigorous test and trial, since early
2007, the equipment received Main Gate (MG) approval,
with an in-service date (ISD) of 2010.
‘…augmenting the front
line with the new kit is
unlikely to happen before
early 2011. Under this
scenario, it might be worth
reviewing the programme
and seeing if the schedule
could be squeezed…’
As a result, in September 2009, ELCAN Optical
Technologies (part of Raytheon Network Centric Systems)
was awarded a contract worth £150m by the prime
contractor Thales UK. Under the contract, ELCAN would
supply approximately 3,000 units of its Specter optical
combat sights by November 2010, to equip an infantry
brigade. The equipment approval was based on the
test and trial result, where similar equipment from
participants such as ACOG day sight, Qioptiq VIPIR sight,
ISTEC quadrant sight with EOTECH optic and Vectronix
Moskito sight were tested, analysed and compared.
The selection of the equipment and its underlying
technology was based not just on the core capability of
the sight but also associated critical factors – such as
weight and usability. As far as core capability was
concerned ELCAN’s thermal imaging-based optical sight
transcended its daylight capability to prove effective even
in zero light, when even the night sight was rendered
ineffective. Its thermal imaging technology not only
allowed tracking of signatures of concealed weapons,
but also IEDs planted on patrol routes or elsewhere,
invaluable for the front line. Also, its net weight of 528g
was below the industry average for similar equipment.
Other important factors included its effectiveness in
terms of parameters such as: engagement times, detection
Examining the latest thermal sights, Major Sabbir Ahmed (Ret’d), Industry Analyst with Frost and
Sullivan, asks if the MoD is on track for the delivery of its FIST programme…
1 Defence Management Journal 47

2. and recognition ranges, first-round target hit probability
and target location accuracy. Defence Science and
Technology Laboratory DSH, the organisation in charge of
analysing test and trial results, found the ELCAN sight
superior in core capability, weight and usability.
On the C4I front, Cobham’s C3I system with Raytheon’s
MicroLight SR was chosen for the test and trial, and
successfully received MG approval. It is worth noting here
that the lessons learned from the experience, reflecting
frontline experiences, as well as field tests with soldiers at
platoon level, in different conditions of terrain and events
of training and exercise, were factored in as part of the
successful test and trial. More emphasis was placed on
factors such as continuous connectivity, robustness,
integration with the Bowman system and usability during
the trial process. MicroLight is a hands-free wideband,
software-defined radio that simultaneously provides
voice, data, video, and other elements of situation
awareness. It is also currently being used by the US Army,
and competed against Thales’ own version of SR PR4G
VS4, ITT’s Spearnet and Selex’s H4855, among others. Its
lightweight (0.5kg), longer battery power (six hours for
one set of rechargeable batteries) and, more importantly,
compatibility with legacy systems such as Bowman radios
were particularly important.
As far as the programme schedule is concerned, as
indicated by the procurement trends, I might conclude
that the MoD would actually be ready to equip about
10,000 troops by 2014, provided budgets flow as
contracted – overlooking the current crunch. There might
be a possibility of delays in line with a fall in the overall
defence budget allocations. Given the urgent requirement
of sending better equipped troops to the front line in
Afghanistan, it is not, though, expected that there would
be cuts in the FIST programme. But we can’t guarantee
there won’t be any schedule slips until the next
government sets forth its priorities.
However, extrapolating the progress in procuring various
components of the programme and their subsequent
integration, it is quite likely that there could be schedule
slips of two years, and it would probably be unlikely to
reach 10,000 marks before 2016. We have to remember
that the programme hasn’t gone into full-scale production
yet; and we can’t expect it to happen until 2010. That
means the MoD would only be able to ready a troop of
brigade size by early 2011 at the earliest, in order for them
to be fully deployed in Afghanistan.
By 2011, the thick of the battle is predicted to be over, and
the UK Army would then be involved in the reorganisation
and training phase. Would it serve any purpose for the
armed forces, having sent the FIST-equipped troops that
late? The fact is that the UK is at war and that it is all
important for the government to send better equipped
soldiers to the front line at the earliest opportunity. Many
defence experts expected a ‘pacing up’ of the programme
so as to mobilise at least 10,000 FIST soldiers, augmenting
or replacing the present forces before the thick of the
battle is over. This is something that can not be
overemphasised; given the life and death situation the
troops are facing on a daily basis in the battle zone. But it
seems nothing is moving with that urgency in the MoD to
reschedule and bring things up front. Rather, trends
indicate the ominous sign of delays, even with the first
phase (STA and C4I) due to be delivered by 2014.
‘The selection of the
equipment and its underlying
technology was based not just
on the core capability of the
sight but also associated
critical factors – such as
weight and usability.’
Based on the above analysis, I might conclude that the UK
MoD is apparently in the right direction in terms of
procuring the right equipment with the best possible
technology; but augmenting the front line with the new kit
is unlikely to happen before early 2011. Under this
scenario, it might be worth reviewing the programme and
seeing if the schedule could be squeezed and if anything
additional could be done to make the new C4I system
compatible with legacy systems deployed at the front line,
such as SELEX’s H4855 and Enhanced Low Latency
Situational Awareness (ELSA) system, as well as SATCOM
systems such as Reacher Terminals. After all, scope creep
is something that is difficult to entertain but unavoidable
on many occasions, especially when ambiguity prevails in
the direction and pace of technology changes, integration
and interoperability.
2
Major (ret’d) Sabbir Ahmed
Industry Analyst
Frost and Sullivan
Tel: +44 (0)20 7343 8397
Sabbir.Ahmed@Frost.com
www.frost.com
Defence Management Journal 47