This document discusses the legitimacy of the judicial system in Taiwan. It examines examples of judicial systems in other countries like Germany, Italy, Japan, the US, France, and South Korea. It also analyzes the democratic legitimacy of the justice system through the lens of public choice theory. The document considers how external costs and decision-making costs impact individuals' willingness to participate in collective decision-making and influence the choice of constitutional rules. It ultimately aims to determine a framework that balances democratic legitimacy while also protecting minority interests.

1. Report on Judicial System Discussion on the Legitimacy Source of Court Judge in Taiwan Senior, Dep. Of Law, NTUB95A01150 Chia-ching Chen

2. Outline Origin of this report Proposition of the Question Definition, Issue and Limitation Examples in foreign countries Germany, Italy, Japan, USA, France and Korea Democratic Legitimacyof Justice Examination from Public Choice Theory Conclusion

3. omnisanima potestatibussublimioribussubdita sit non estenimpotestas nisi a Deo quae autemsunt a Deoordinataesunt － APOSTOLI AD ROMANOS EPISTULA SANCTI PAULI 13:1

4. Origin of this report 2007 .7th Resolution of Criminal Court in Supreme Court. “the Expectation of People” Different from Legislature & Execution Constitution Art. 80: Independent to judge  DEMOCRATIC LETIGIMACYv.IMPARTIAL JUST

5. Proposition of the Question

6. Definition of some terms:

7. Examples in foreign countries

9. Democratic Legitimacyof Justice

11. Examination from Public Choice Theory

12. ExternalCost In any case, participation in collective activity is costly to the individual, and the rational man will take this fact into account at the stage of constitutional choice.

13. DecisionMakingCost At the lower levels there is apt to be little real bargaining. As unanimity is approached, individual investment in strategic bargaining becomes highly rational, and the costs imposed by such bargaining are likely to be high.

14. TotalCost the individual will choose the rule which requires that K/N of the group agree when collective decisions are made

15. When it comes to Constitution…

16. The upper curve, that of external costs, remains relatively high throughout its range over the various decision-making rules until it bends sharply toward the abscissa when near-unanimity becomes the rule.  More fear on the result of the decision The lower curve, that of decision-making costs, may not, in such circumstances, be a factor at all.  More willing to take collective action

17. More External Cost, Less Decision Making Cost Not just Counter-Majority, But also Including More Minority

18. Conclusion