"Human Rights, Information Integrity, and Democratic Values in a Digitized World" Class notes Stanford University, Winter 2024 Jan 25, 2024

1. Charles Mok, Global Digital Policy Incubator, Cyber Policy Center, Stanford University. Jan/Feb 2024.
Digital Repression and Techno-
Authoritarianism

2. Digital Repression/Techno-Authoritarianism
What does it mean to you?
• Censorship
• Disinformation / Propaganda
• Surveillance / Privacy
• Cyberattacks / Cybersecurity — state-sponsored
• Cyber Sovereignty
• Internet Shutdown / Fragmentation
• Trend:
• From defensive to o
ff
ensive
• From local to beyond borders

3. China’s Great Firewall (GFW)
Digital Repression 1.0
• “Keeping things out,” at
fi
rst
• Technology and laws, but also infrastructural and operational: Total control
• State-controlled telecom sector: from gateways to providers
• Massive human resources for real-time monitoring
• Tackling Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 (user-generated content) to the mobile/social media world
• More proactive surveillance and disinformation
• The future is AI?
• No longer de
fi
ned by boundaries of borders — GFW going global

4. But the GFW is not for everyone
Calling for GFW 2.0
• Example of Cambodia’s National Internet Gateway (work in progress since 2021)
• Telecom infrastructure control and huge cost to surveil
• Dependency on foreign/global platforms and telcos (except for China)
• The evolution of digital repression is still based on the four pillars of the GFW:
• Technology — The Digital Silk Road
• Law — more speci
fi
c and targeted local laws with global reach
• Infrastructure, and operation — exert control via legal enforcement

5. Digital Authoritarian Legal Developments
Some examples
• India
• IT Rules amendments 2021 — removal of misinformation, control over platforms
• Digital Personal Data Protection 2023 — to block services on vague grounds
• Telecom Act 2023 - interception of communications for national security
• Singapore
• Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) 2019 — content removal and punishment
against “fake news”
• Foreign Interference Countermeasures Act (FICA) 2023 — Heavy
fi
nes and jail terms against those deemed to be
“preparing or planning” to publish “forbidden” information online without declaring foreign involvement;
unprecedented powers of government scrutiny and restrictions on the
fi
nancial a
ff
airs of targeted individuals and
entities.
• The common characteristics: Broad and vague.

6. Example for even just a civil case
• //The sweeping order comes as a result of legal
action by a group purporting to represent Appin’s
digital training centers — who say their students’
reputations are damaged by Reuters’ allegedly
false reporting. Last month, Additional District
Judge Rakesh Kumar Singh ruled that the story
should be suppressed pending trial.//
• Other media (Wired, Lawfare, Brookings Institute
etc.) removed references or excerpts: //Several of
the U.S. platforms who later removed content
became aware of the disputed allegations not
because they were following Indian legal news, but
after hearing from Khare’s American
fi
rm, Clare
Locke.//
• “Everyone except” The Citizen Lab “complied”
• Beyond laws, think about the power of a
“cooperative” foreign judiciary
The power of a court

7. Democracies make bad laws too
Global assault on privacy by encryption is led by Western democracies
• UK’s Online Safety Bill has passed in 2023
• Australia proposing “industry standard for Relevant Electronic Services and Designated Internet Services” (2023)
• US laws in Congress:
• EARN IT Act (Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies Act of 2022): To establish
a National Commission on Online Child Sexual Exploitation Prevention, and for other purposes
• STOP CSAM Act (Strengthening Transparency and Obligations to Protect Children Su
ff
ering from Abuse and
Mistreatment Act of 2023)
• KOSA (Kids Online Safety Act of 2022): To protect the safety of children on the internet.
• Autocrats can justify themselves: “Democracies (you guys) do it too.”
• Exception: The EU and the European Parliament, which moved to act against mass surveillance and any ban on
encryption

8. What’s next? Transnational Digital Repression
Trend 1: In
fl
uencing global technology standards
• China’s e
ff
ort to sponsor and in
fl
uence global technology standard setting bodies:
ITU, IEEE, IETF, etc.
• Attempts to migrate standard-setting and Internet operational powers from multi-
stakeholder bodies such as IEEE, IETF, ICANN etc. to government-led bodies such
as ITU and its subgroups, under the UN
• E
ff
orts are often led via proxies such as Huawei and academic research institutions
• Attempts to set up its own axis of nations and corporations such as the World
Internet Congress to support its vision for more government control for better
“security, safety and harmony” of the future Internet, in the name of national and
global security, anti-terrorism and combatting cybercrime.

9. Trend 2: Extraterritoriality
• Manufacturing a new legal basis:
Extending global jurisdiction for data
laws, national security laws, etc.
• You’re not “safe anywhere”: A global
chilling e
ff
ect, at the minimum, and
more, wherever you are.
Transnational Digital Repression

10. Transnational Digital Repression
Trend 3: Taking over the Rule-based World Order
• Not taking it down, but taking it over!
• Case: UN Cybercrime Convention
• Governments cooperating to combat cybercrime (a truly huge problem!), that should be a good thing, right?
• How to de
fi
ne cybercrime? Anything done with a PC or phone, including expressing dissent?
• Broad community concerns: Gender, LGBTQ+, religion, labor, political dissent, etc.
• Power of secret investigation for governments to obtain and share data from global Internet platforms
• How can platforms not comply? The “follow local law” excuse.
• Serious erosion of the basis of MLAT and extradition agreements between countries — actually, bad for combatting
crimes!
• Western governments are quite muted in the convention discussion (except Canada)
• Largely represented by justice and law enforcement branches, not human rights and diplomatic branches
• Lack public awareness — perfect example of a process that excluded the civil society and private sector i.e. the “UN”

11. The Global Weaponization of Legal and
Technological Means to Limit Online
Freedom and Redefine Truth For
Citizens Anywhere

12. References
• The Everything, Everywhere Censorship of China (2023)
https://www.freiheit.org/publikation/everything-everywhere-censorship-china
• Internet Impact Brief: Cambodia National Internet Gateway
https://www.internetsociety.org/resources/2022/internet-impact-brief-cambodia-
national-internet-gateway/
• How a Judge in India Prevented Americans From Seeing a Blockbuster Report
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2024/01/19/india-judge-reuters-
story-00136339
• Joint Statement on the Proposed Cybercrime Treaty Ahead of the Concluding
Session
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
fi
les/media_2024/01/Joint.Advocacy.Statement-
Cybercrime.Convention-Jan.23.2024.pdf

13. Charles Mok
Global Digital Policy Incubator
Cyber Policy Center
Stanford University
cpmok@stanford.edu