DAVID CULLICULLEN -OUT OF MOUNTAINS INTO NOWHERE

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David Kilcullens Out of the
Mountains-A Disappointing
Book
Book Review
I have not been a fan of
General Petraeus after what I
saw of his operations in
Afghanistan , nor of his
predecessor General Mc
Chrystal , so reading David
Kilcullen was not a priority.

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Nevertheless I was attracted to
the imaginatively chosen title
of this book “ Out of the
Mountains” and a nostalgic
reminder of the days of Che
Guevera when Urban Guerrilla
was a much hated or much
romantic word.
The book turned out to be a big
disappointment.
Firstly I contest the title and its
logic.The US did not head into
the mountains in 2001 and
thereafter and most US
casualties in Afghanistan did
not occur in the mountains but
in the plains and desert of
Helmand and Kandahar.
Kilcullen states on page. 7 that
Taliban main force was in
Eastern Afghanistan.This is a
factually incorrect

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statement.Main Taliban force
that inflicted over 60 %
casualties on the US forces is
based in South west
Afghanistan and not eastern
Afghanistan.
On page 25 he makes a fleeting
or passing reference to Obama
Doctrine i.e use of drones in
Afghanistan but simply leaves
this great faux pas of US policy
without any discussion or
analysis.
The word “ Drone” an
important albeit much misused
and ineffective US arsenal tool
is not mentioned in the whole
book at all.
On page 25 Kilcullen mentions
importance of acting against
“non state actors” but does
not explain that most non state

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actors encountered by the USA
in Afghanistan are Pakistani
proxies.
US action in Afghanistan is
concentrated on non state
actors as the USA has failed to
devise any clear strategy about
dealing with sponsors of non
state actors in Afghanistan , ie
Pakistani state thus it keeps on
beating the tail of the snake ie
the Taliban proxies.
While Kilcullen mentions
Pakistani advisors , in the
entire narrative he thinks that
Pakistani factor is not as
decisive as Talibans inner
dynamics which remains a
weak assertion as it has no
connection with hard facts of
the situation.

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The repeated references to the
war being mainly waged in the
mountains like again on
page.27 are factually incorrect
but Kilcullen repeats them
again and again.
The authors treatment of
Karachi is sketchy and
incomplete.He altogether
misses out MQM, Liari Gangs ,
Kathor gangs and the meddling
of the Pakistani state as a
result of which Pakistani
military intelligence midwife
MQM and many other
organizations that destroyed
Karachis peace.
Kilcullen concentrates on
clichés like massive population
growth but misses out more
important reasons why Karachi
for example became

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extremised and destabilized ie
meddling of state intelligence
agencies.
The chapter “ Future
Cities,Future Threats” is
inconclusive and the author
fails to precisely explain how
these future cities would
become future threats and to
whom ?
Theory of Competitive control
fails to explain real strategic
essence of Afghan War. For
example Kilcullen fails to
establish why Taliban were
irrelevant and in hibernation
from 2001 to 2006 ?
His theory of competitive
control holds weak ground.Like
his view that Taliban are more
effective in country side

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because they dispense quick
justice is fallacious.
Traditionally and historically in
Afghanistan , government
courts were never effective
specially in Pashtun rural areas
and the issues were settled by
local assemblies of tribal elders
known as Jirgas.This process
predated Taliban.
And then Kilcullen goes on
making sweaping and factually
incorrect statements.
Like on page- 157 he claims ,
and that too fallaciously “ they
(Taliban ) had been solidly
defeated in campaigns since
2001”.
Which campaigns ? Afghanistan
was captured by USA with zero
military casualties in 2001 !

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One CIA specialist died because
he was simply disregarding all
SOPs and trying to be a John
Rambo !
Not a single US soldier was
killed while USA occupied
Afghanistan in 2001 due to
enemy action ! The few who
died , did so because of
friendly fire , a JDAM bursting
inaccurately or some aerial
incidents unrelated to actual
fighting .
2002 , 2003 , 2004, 2005 hardly
saw any fighting ? So which
campaigns is Kilcullen talking
about ?
Now the second issue is
Kilcullens claim that Taliban
were “defeated”. What is
defeat . NATO versus Taliban
fights were hardly conventional

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battles and maximum NATO
casualties were suffered by
IEDs. How Kilcullen thrusts
terms like “ Defeat” is simply
out of place and unjustifiable.
Kilcullen nowhere explains why
2006 was a watershed between
hardly any fighting and a
marked escalation in fighting.
He fails to note that this
watershed had a major link
with Pakistani state
perceptions that the USA was
supporting an insurgency in
Baluchistan and that the
Pakistani state must escalate
to put the USA on a backfoot.
On page 157 Kilcullen
underrates and underestimates
the influence of Pakistani
support and regards Taliban

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system as superior and
Pakistani role not decisive.
He claims that Taliban bounced
back from “ Military defeats” .
Which military defeats and
which fighting as there was
hardly any fighting in
Afghanistan before 2006-7 ?
These military defeats remain a
mystery !

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With just 12 US deaths in 2002
we don’t see any major activity
and Operation Anaconda much
publicized in US media was in
reality a minor skirmish and a
philosophic degradation of the
name “Anaconda” !

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In 2003 again there was hardly
any worthwhile fighting and
many US deaths in actual
action resulted because of a
most incompetently sited US
post.

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From 2005 Pakistani state
escalated its support of Afghan
Taliban but our brilliant
strategist author bogged down
in minor tactics simply fails to
note it in his analysis.

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Kilcullen throughout his book
fails to note that the US Afghan
War as waged against Soviets
was the main factor that
changed the entire social
dynamics of Afghan society in

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general and Pashtun society in
particular.
The ISI and the CIA elevated
the “ Mulla” from the lowest
ladder of Pashtun society to
the highest ladder since these
Mullahs with no self esteem or
pride were most easy to
manipulate and kick into any
direction by the ISI handlers.
Colonel Qasim Abbas first
handler of Haqqani described
Haqqani as an absolutely third
rate village mullah who
emitted so much stink that
Qasim Abbas made him sit in
the rear open body of his truck.
But this lethal social
experiment which finally
worked against the USA in the
post 2001 US Afghan war is not
identified by Kilcullen at all ?

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Libyan Conflict which was a
case of overwhelming odds
against a puny third world
dictator is magnified by
Kilcullen into a conflict of
Napoleonic brilliance.
The bottom line is that
Kilcullen plays a lot with jargon
and sociology and tries to lure
the reader into minor tactics
and details that are largely
irrelevant to the strategic
context of a discussion.
He fails to establish how big
cities would be a threat to
world peace or to the USA.
He fails to explain the strategic
rationale of the so called
escalation of 2009-11 led by Mc
Chrystal and Petraeus that
resulted in pointless US
casualties.

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The book is a total
disappointment and barren in
real time operational and
strategic analysis.

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