1. OFFER CAN BE MADE TO THE WORLD AT
LARGE (PUBLIC)
Facts: D offered to pay 100 to anyone
who still suffer influenza after taking
the medicine acc to the prescription.
The P bought and used the smoke ball
but still caught influenza. She claimed
the 100 but the D (denied) argued that
the contract cannot be made into the
entire world.
Held: The advertisement was a made
to the whole world & constitute as a
proposal. Anyone who consumed the
medicine as prescribed was said to
have accepted the offer. D has to pay
to the plaintiff
GOODS DISPLAY IN A SHOP
Facts: The Defendant was charged in
offering flick-knives with the price tag on
it. According to the law, it was an
offence to offer such knife for sale.
Held: The display of goods in a shop was
an ITT rather than an offer. Whether the
offer is accepted or not, it depends on
the discretion of the shop owner.
GOODS DISPLAY ON THE SHELVES
Facts: The Boots introduced a self-service
system whereby the customer pick his
desired goods from the shelf & take them
to the counter to make the purchase.
Meanwhile, the pharmacist would be
seated at the counter & supervise the sale
involving the drugs. The Pharmaceutical
Society objected the system & alleged that
the display of drugs constituted “an offer”
(u can’t offer drugs to society, infringe
Pharmacy & Poisons Act 1933). They
considered Boots infringed the Act.
Held: The display of goods on shelves was
merely an ITT. A customer makes an offer
to buy but the pharmacists will choose to
accept or not
ADVERTISEMENT
Facts: The defendant placed an advert
in a classified section of a magazine
offering some bramble finches for sale.
S.6 of the Protection of Birds Act 1954
made it an offence to offer such birds
for sale. He was charged and convicted
of the offence and appealed against
his conviction.
Held: The defendant's conviction was
quashed. The advert was an invitation
to treat not an offer. The literal rule of
statutory interpretation was applied.
AQILAH NASRIN ☺
“It won’t be easy but it’ll be worth”
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v
Boots Cash Chemist Ltd
Fisher v Bell Harris v Nickerson
ADVERTISEMENT
Facts: An auctioneer made an
advertisement in the newspaper that an
auction office furniture would be held on
that particular day. The P travelled to
the auction with the hope of purchasing
some of the furniture. However, the
auctioneer withdrew the items from the
auction. He brought an auction for the
breach of contract to recover his
expenses in attending the event.
Held: The advertisement of the auction
was only an ITT & not an offer. Claim
was failed.
PROPOSAL MUST BE
COMMUNICATED & COMPLETE
Facts: The Australian Gov. advertised
offer of a reward: £1000 for
information leading to arrest of
murderers of two police officers.
Clarke saw offer but he was not
aware about the reward, he was later
accused of murders and then gave
information leading to conviction of
the murderers. Clarke was released
and subsequently claimed the
reward.
Held: His claimed was failed bc he
didn’t aware about the offer made by
the gov. Offer can only be accepted if
party was aware offer existed.
R v Clarke
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.
Williams v CarwardineCoelho v The Public Services
Communication
ADVERTISEMENT
D advertised a job vacancy (as
passport officer) in the newspaper.
P applied the job and he was
employed by the D. After a while,
D wanted to terminate his post on
the ground he was on probation &
D has right to terminate the post
Held: Ads= ITT. When P applied,
he’s making proposal. When he
was employed, D was accepting
the proposal. There’s a valid
contract between them & D can’t
simply terminate his post
Partridge v Crittenden (1968) 2 All ER 421
PROPOSAL MUST BE COMMUNICATED
Facts: A reward was offered for information
relating to the identity of a murderer. P was
dying and wanted to confess her sins. P
provided information on the murderer as
requested by the offer. P was aware of the
offer, however, her purpose for providing
the information was to protect her from
eternal damnation – therefore =
unconnected motive
Held: P was entitled to the reward,
regardless of her ulterior motive in giving the
information – all that was necessary was
that she knew of the reward before giving
the information
2. REVOCATION OF OFFER – S.5(1)
Facts: Defendant offers to sell a house to
the plaintiff and open the offer until 9 AM
of June 12. Before the end of the deadline,
the defendant sold the house to the third
party and informed the plaintiff by another
person (revoked the offer). Afterwards, the
plaintiff gave LOA to the defendant before
9 AM of June 12 – S.5(1)
Held: Contract is not valid as the offer
had revoked with communication to the
plaintiff before the acceptance and
there’s no any contractual obligation
INSTANTANEOUS COMMUNICATION
Facts: Plaintiff, a London company, sent an
offer by telex to defendant, US company
based in Amsterdam. Defendant sent an
acceptance by telex. The contact was not
fulfilled & so plaintiff attempted to sue the
owner of the defendant’s company for
damages. Defendant argued that the
contract was formed in Amsterdam.
Held: The contract was formed in London. In
instantaneous communication, the contract
is only complete when the acceptance is
received by offeror. The acceptance was
deemed to have been in London when the
telex was read.
REVOCATION OF OFFER
Facts: Defendant offered to sell 266
hogshed at a certain price & promise
to keep the offer opened for
acceptance by the Plaintiff till 4PM of
that day. Before that time, Defendant
sold then the third party, B accepted
before 4PM but after the revocation
by Defendant.
Held: Offer was already revoked.
Hyde v Wrench (COUNTER OFFER)
R1: Acceptance must be absolute &
unqualified/ S.7(a)
- no modification, counter offer not
an acceptance
Facts:
6/6 – D offered to sell his farm to the
P for $1000
8/6 – P made a counter offer of $950
but defendant refused to sell
27/6 – P wrote again offering to pay
$1000. The D refused & the P sued
for the breach of contract
Held: By making the counter offer,
the plaintiff rejected the original
offer. There was no valid binding
contract between the parties.
Felthouse v Bindley
(SILENCE ≠ ACCEPTANCE)
R2: Acceptance must be expressed/
S.7(b)
Facts: Plaintiff write letter of offer to
buy nephew’s horse. He added that “if
I hear no more about him, I consider
the horse is mine”. The nephew gave
no answer but told the auctioneer
(Bindley) to reserve for plaintiff.
However, Bindley mistakenly sold it to
someone else. Felthouse (P), claiming
that the Bindley (D) shouldn’t sell the
horse to another person bc there was
already a contract between him & his
nephew.
Held: No contract between Felthouse &
his nephew bc the nephew had never
signified to Felthouse his acceptance of
the offer before the auction sale took
place.
Ignatius v Bell (POSTAL RULE)
Exception for 4(2) – acceptance must
be communicated. Proposer is bound
when the acceptor posts the letter even
tho the proposer has no knowledge of
the acceptance.
Facts: D offered to sell his land to the
P on the condition that if the P would
like to accept the offer, he must
make an acceptance on or before
20/8 by letter. The P sent an
acceptance by registered post on
16/8 but the letter didn’t reach the D
til 25/8 bcs the D was away.
Held: The acceptance was exercised
by the P when the letter was posted
on 16/8. Therefore, D was bound to
the contract.
Adams v Lindsell (POSTAL RULE)
Facts: The defendant wrote to the
plaintiff offering to sell wool. The
defendant misdirected the letter and
arrived at 5th
September. Plaintiff
immediately posted his acceptance on
5th
September & arrived to defendant at
9th
. The defendant (thinking that the
plaintiff was not interested in the offer)
had already sold the wool to the third
party. Plaintiff sued.
Held: It was held by the court that
acceptance was complete upon posting.
Byvre v Tienhoven
REVOCATION OF OFFER
LOO: Letter of Offer
LOA: Letter of Acceptance
LOR: Letter of Revocation
Facts: 1/10- D posted a LOO to P
8/10- D posted a letter of revoking
the offer
11/10- P receive LOO & sent an
acceptance by telegram on the
same day
20/10- P received the D’s LOR
Held: Revocation of offer wasn’t
effective because the P received
the revocation notice after he
already accepted the offer
Dickinson v Dodds Entorres v Miles Far EastCooke v Oxley
3. Consideration can move from the promisee
or another person. Refer to Sec 2(d) CA
Facts: A sister agreed to pay an annuity of
Rs653 to her brothers who provided no
consideration for the promise. On the same
day, their mother had given the sister some
land stipulating that she must pay the annuity
to her brothers. When the sister subsequently
failed to fulfil the promise, her brothers sued
her.
Held: She was liable on the promise on the
ground that there was a valid consideration
for the promise even though it did not move
from the brothers.
CONSIDERATION – must have some
value in the eyes of the law.
Facts: A promise had been made to
pay a witness, who was under an
order to attend the court as
subpoena, 6 guineas for his trouble.
Held: The promise was
unenforceable because there was no
consideration for it. The duty to
attend was ‘a duty imposed by law’.
BUSINESS AGREEMENT (GR); parties intend to
hv legal consequences unless the parties
specify otherwise (alter the rules and
regulations)
Facts: D agreed with P in writing to take a
lease of a house ‘subject to the preparation
and approval of a formal contract’.
However no formal contract was entered
into between the parties.
Held: There was no binding contract. The
clause “subject to the preparation and
approval of a formal contract” means
“subject to and is dependent upon a formal
contract being prepared”.
Consideration – only need to be sufficient, it
does not need to be adequate (enough)
Facts: On the day of John Thomas's death, he
told the witnesses that he wanted his wife to
have 1 of his house for life, although it is not
written in his will. After his death, his
executors gave one of the houses to his wife,
if and only if she paid a rent of 1 pound per
year and kept the house in good condition.
The wife paid the rent and kept the house in
good condition. Later, the executor tried to
dispossess the house, but they failed.
Held: Contract was enforceable, not because
it was the death wish of the husband BUT,
merely because of the fact that the wife had
paid rent.
DOMESTIC AGREEMENT GR); no legal
relations contemplated but such
presumption may be rebuttable by
bringing the actual evidence; docs
Facts: The defendant, who was a civil
servant stationed in Ceylon, came to
England with his wife. Later he returned
back to Ceylon but his wife stayed back in
England on doctor’s advice. Before sailing,
the husband promised her £30 a month
until he returned. Later he wrote to her
saying that it would be better if they
remained apart. The wife sued him on the
promise to pay her £30 per month.
Held: There was no contract as the parties
did not intend that the agreement should
be attended by legal consequences.
Collins v Godefroy
Re Tan Soh Min v Tan Saw Keow
(CONSIDERATION – exception)
Natural love & Affection/S.26(a)
Facts: A woman on her deathbed
expressed her intention to leave all
her properties to her four adopted
children.
Held: Claims of the adopted children
weren’t effective as it contrary to
S.26(a), not in writing, no natural
love & affection between parties
standing in near relation to each
other. Adopted children didn’t have
blood ties to that woman. Claim was
failed.
Thomas v Thomas Phang Swee Kim v Beh I Hock
CONSIDERATION NEED NOT BE
ADEQUATE BUT MUST BE
SUFFICIENT
Explanation 2 to section 26: an
agreement is not void merely because
the consideration is not adequate
Fact: Respondent agreed to transfer
to the appellant a parcel of land on
payment of RM500.00 when the land
was subdivided although the land was
worth much more. The respondent
later refused to honour the promise
contending that the promise was
unenforceable.
Held: the inadequacy of the
consideration was immaterial and the
agreement between them is valid.
Venkata Chinnaye v. Verikata Ma’ya
Winn v Bull Balfour v Balfour Merritt v Merritt
Presumption – rebuttable
Facts: Husband left the matrimonial house
and went to live with another woman. They'd
a discussion in which the H agreed to pay the
wife £40/mon out of which she would pay the
mortgage payments & the H signed a note of
these agreements & an undertaking to
transfer the house into her sole name when
the mortgage had been paid off. H refused to
transfer. W sued for BOC.
Held: There was an intention to create legal
relations thereby binding the parties to the
agreement. Wife’s claim was successful
because of the evidence
4. Necessary
Facts: The minor is a professional boxer. He
had a contract with British Boxing the Board
of Control. By the agreement, the minor
would lose his ‘purse’ (payment for the fight /
competition) if he were disqualified.
Held: Binding not only to encourage clean
fighting but also proficiency in boxing and
therefore to benefit the minor.
Business Agreements
Facts: Plaintiff claimed to have won
football pools. The coupon stated that
the transaction was “binding in
honour”.
Held: Plaintiff wasn’t entitled to
recover because the agreement was
based on the honour of the parties. No
legal binding.
Necessary
Facts: A minor (infant widow) whose
husband had recently died contracted
with the undertakers for his funeral. She
later refused to pay the cost of the
funeral, claiming her incapacity to
contract
Held: She was liable to pay the bill. The
funeral was a necessary as she had
obligation to bury her dead husband.
UNCERTAINTY
S.30: “Agreement, the meaning of which is
not certain, or capable of being made
certain, are void”
Facts: The parties agreed to lease of RM35
a month “as long as he likes”
Held: The agreement was void due to
uncertainty
Minor – luxury not necessary
Facts: Plaintiff, tailor. Defendant,
undergraduate at Cambridge University.
D had ordered 11 waistcoats. P claimed for
payment from the D. D argued that he was
a minor at the time the clothes were
supplied to him. It was provided by the D’s
father, that he had amply supplied the D
with proper clothes according to his
condition.
Held: Clothes supplied to the defendant
weren’t necessary to the D’s actual
requirement. D wasn’t bound to the
contract
Jones v. Vernon Pools Karuppan Chetty v Suah Thian
Nash v Inman Doyle v White City Stadium LtdChapple v CooperMohori Bibee v Dhurmodas Ghose
Agreements entered into by a minor
Facts: Appellant lent the Respondent (a
minor) the sum of
Rs 20,000. The loan was secured by
mortgage on some houses belonging to
the R. The A knew that the R was a
minor. Later, the R brought an action for
a declaration that the agreement was
void because he is still a minor and lack
of capacity.
Held: The agreement was void.
Tan Hee Juan v The Boon Keat
GR: All Agreements entered into by a
minor are VOID – to protect minor
against any consequences of its own
actions & presumed lack of judgement
Facts: The P (infant) executed transfers
of land in favour of the D and the
transfers were witnessed and registered.
Then the P applied to the court for an
order to set aside the transfers.
Held: Transactions were void and
ordered the restoration of property to
the minor.
Rajeswary & Anor v Balakrishnan & Ors
Exceptions on GR (minor can enter into a contract
in matters of – marriage, necessities &
scholarship, insurance
MARRIAGE
Facts: Both parties were Ceylonese Hindus.
According to the customary practice, a marriage
agreement was made on behalf of the plaintiff and
the defendant by their fathers. Under the
agreement, it was agreed that the dowry was
RM3000. If there is any breach of the agreement
by either party, the penalty is RM5000.
Subsequently the defendant refused to perform
the contract. Plaintiff then brought an action for
damages against the defendant for the breach of
promise of marriage. The defendant pleaded that
the contract was not binding because at the time
of the contract, the plaintiff was a minor.
Held: The contract was binding, as the
contract of promise of marriage entered
into by minors or their parents on their
behalf are valid
5. Necessary – S.69
Facts: Sturzaker (minor) cycled 19KM to
work every day. Thus, a bicycle was a
necessary because the minor had only one
and used it to travel to work. He traded in
his old bicycle to Scarborough and made a
part payment on a new one. Sturzaker
refused to pay the unpaid amount.
Held: The bike was a necessary. Contract
was enforced and Sturzaker had to pay the
unpaid amount
Necessary
It was held that a holiday is a necessary
if it were for recovery after an illness/
the minor’s condition of life Is such a
holiday spent in hotel were the
inevitable part of it
Elkington v Amery Imperial Loan Co. v. StoneScarborough v Sturzaker
Unsound mind – S.12
Facts: A person of unsound mind was
sued on a promissory note. He had signed
it as surety. The jury found that he was
insane when he signed the note but there
was no finding as to the creditor’s
knowledge of such insanity. The judge
entered a verdict against the creditor,
who appealed.
Held: A contract made with the party who
is insane is binding on him unless he ran
prove that at the date of the contract his
insanity was known to the party.
Gov of Malaysia v Gurcharan Sigh
NECESSARY - Education
Facts: The plaintiff sued the defendant for
breach of contract. The claim was $11500-
alleged to be the sum actually spent by the
government in educating the first
defendant. At the time of the contract, the
defendant was a minor. The defendant had
served the government for 3 years and 10
months out of the contractual period of 5
years.
Held: Education was ‘necessary’, thus the
first defendant was liable for the repayment
of a reasonable sum spent on him. The
plaintiff was however, awarded RM2683 as
the amount of damages payable based on
the defendant’s completed months of
service.
K. Murugesu v Nadarajah
(EXECUTORY CONSIDERATION)
Facts: Appellant agreed to sell a
house to the respondent & the
agreement was written on a piece
of scarp paper. It read as follows “I
agree to sell my house to Mr
Nadarajah, the present tenant of
house at RM26K within 3 months
from date”
Held: The agreement was a case of
executory consideration. Where,
there’s a promise against a
promise, each promise is the
consideration for the other.
Wong Hon Leong David v Noorazman bin
Adnan (EXECUTORY CONSIDERATION)
Facts: The appellant promised to pay
respondent RM268888 in return for
respondent’s application to convert
and subdivide certain land to be
developed into a hosing estate
Held: the exchange of mutual promise
though it is executory consideration,
was a good consideration. Therefore,
there was a binding agreement
between them and the respondent’s
claim for the fee succeeded
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.
(EXECUTED CONSIDERATION)
A promise for an act
A consideration is executed when an act
is performed in return to a promise.
eg: an offer of a reward for an act
*Promise comes first, then there will be
an action
*Reward Cases/ Lost & Found
Kepong Prospecting Ltd & Ors v Schmidt
(PAST CONSIDERATION)
Facts: Schmidt, a consulting engineer, had
assisted another in obtaining a prospecting
permit for mining iron ore in the state of
Johore. He also helped in the subsequent
formation of the company, Kepong
Prospecting ltd, and was appointed
Managing Director. After the company was
formed, an agreement was entered into
between them under which the company
undertook to pay him 1% of the value of all
ore sold from the mining land. This was in
consideration of the services rendered by
the consulting engineer for and on behalf of
the company prior to its formation, after
incorporation and for future services
Held: There was valid consideration and
Schmidt was entitled to his claim on the
amount
6. Lampleigh v Braithwaite
(PAST CONSIDERATION)
Facts: The defendant had killed a man due
to be hung for murder. He asked the
plaintiff to do everything in his power to
obtain a pardon from the King. The
plaintiff went to great efforts & managed
to get the pardon requested. The
defendant than promised to pay him £100
for his efforts but never paid up.
Held: Since promise to make payment
came after the performance & was thus
past consideration. The defendant was
obliged to pay the plaintiff £100
Facts: The respondent was the registered
proprietor of land, claimed that she was
induced by the fraud and undue influence
of the first and second appellants to
transfer her land to the second appellant.
Held: The appellants and the respondent
were in solicitor-client r/ship, the
transaction was unconscionable, and in
t/fore, the burden was on the appellants to
rebut the presumption of UI. Since they
had not discharged that burden, the
transaction was set aside. In addition,
because the appellants’ conduct had been
fraudulent, the court has exercised its
discretion awarding the respondent
damages.
Coercion – S.15
Facts: A transfer of property which was
made under “the orders of the Sultan,
issued in the ominous presence of 2
Japanese officers during the Japanese
occupation of Malaysia
Held: Transfer executed under the orders
of the Sultan (which was issued in the
ominous presence of two Japanese
officers) during the Japanese occupation
in Malaya, was invalid. Due to the fact that
consent was not freely given & therefore,
is voidable at the option of the party
whose consent was so caused.
Allcard v Skinner
Datuk Jaginder Singh and Ors v. Tara
Rajaratnam – S.16 Undue Influence
Kesarmal S/O Letchman Das v. Valiappa
Chettiar
UNDUE INFLUENCE – S.16
When Miss Allcard (P) was about 35 years of age she felt a desire to devote her
life to good works. She became associated with the sisters of poor and after a
few years became a professed member of that sisterhood and bound herself to
observe the rules of poverty, chastity and obedience. The rule as to poverty
required a member to surrender all her property either to her relatives, the poor
or to the sisterhood itself. The rules also provided that no sister should seek
advice from anyone outside the order without the consent of the Lady Superior.
Within a few days of becoming a member Miss Allcard made a will leaving all her
properties to Miss Skinner, the Lady Superior, and in succeeding years made
gifts to the value of about £7000 to the same person. When Miss Allcard left the
sister-hood she revoked the will and wished to claim all her properties back
Held: The contract was voidable due to undue influence. At the time of the gift,
the P was a professed sister and bound to make absolute submission to the D
as superior of the sisterhood. She had no power to obtain independent advice.
She was in such a position that she could not freely exercise her own will as to
the disposal of her property
Inche Noriah v Shaikh Allie bin OmarChin Nam Bee Development Sdn Bhd v
Tai Kim Choo & 4 Ors
COERCION – S.15
Facts: R purchased houses from A’s
house whereas additional sum of
RM4,000 had paid to cancel their
booking for the house. R claimed the
refund for additional payment as it
was under a threat of A. The lower
court had found that payment was not
voluntarily but had been made under
threat.
Held: The appeal was dismissed by the
High Court which ruled that there was
coercion as defined in s. 15
S.16 UNDUE INFLUENCE- one of the parties is in
a position to dominate the will of the other and
uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage
over the other
Facts: In this case, an old and illiterate Malay
woman executed a deed of gift of a landed
property to her nephew, respondent who had
managing her affairs. The court found that she
was a feeble old woman unable to leave the
house, relying entirely upon the respondent for
everything. She had no knowledge of her own
affairs nor to the value of her properties.
Held: When the appellant executed a deed, her
relationship with the respondent was sufficient
to raise presumption of the influence over the
Appellant. The gift should be set aside as the
presumption which arose was not rebutted.
Derry v Peek – S.17 Fraud
Facts: In a company prospectus, the
defendant stated the company had the right
to use steam powered trams as oppose to
horse powered trams. However, at the time
the right to use steam powered trams was
subject of approval of the Board of Trade,
which was later refused. The claimant
purchased shares in the company in reliance
of the statement made and brought a claim
based on the alleged fraudulent
representation of the defendant.
Held: The statement was not fraudulent but
made in the honest belief that approval was
forthcoming.
Lord Herschell defined fraudulent
misrepresentation as a statement which is
made either:
i) knowing it to be false,
ii) without belief in its truth, or
iii) recklessly, careless as to whether it be true
or false
7. S. 21 of CA – Mistake
Facts: A contract was made by the
parties for the sale of a cargo of corn,
supposedly in transit from Salonica to
the United Kingdom, but unknown to
both parties, the master of the ship had
already disposed of it by sale to a third
party. The seller claimed the price of the
cargo.
Held: The buyer was not liable for the
price as there was nothing to be sold
under the contract.
S.21 – MISTAKE AS TO IDENTITY OF THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CONTRACT
Facts: Raffles (P) contracted to sell 125 bales
of cotton to Wichelhaus (D). The goods were
to be shipped from Bombay to Liverpool,
England on the ship “Peerless”. Neither party
was aware that there were two ships names
“Peerless” carrying cotton from Bombay to
Liverpool, one arriving in October and the
other in December. Wichelhaus thought he
had purchased the cotton arriving on the
October ship, but Raffles sent his cotton on
December ship. Wichelhaus refused to
accept delivery of the cotton arriving on the
December ship and Raffles brought this
lawsuit for breach of contract.
Held: The contract was void for mutual
mistake.
Misrepresentation
vs
Fraud
In fraud, the maker of the statement
does not believe in the truth of the
statement made whereas in
misrepresentation, the maker believes
that the statement is true.
The respondent had been persuaded to
enter into a second contract on the false
representation that the area of the land to
be transferred, was of the same size as the
land which the respondent had agreed to
buy under the first contract.
Held: The respondent was induced by
misrepresentation into signing the second
agreement. Therefore, the respondent has
the right in repudiating the agreement on
the ground that it was induced by fraudulent
misrepresentation.
Elements of misrepresentation
(s.18)
1. False representation – either
through a positive statement or some
conduct
2. The representation must be one the
fact, not a mere opinion.
3. The statement was addressed to the
party misled
4. The maker believes in the truth of
the statement made.
Kheng Chwee Lian v. Wong Tak Thong -
S.17 Fraud
Raffles v Wichelhaus
Letchemy Arumugan v Annamalay – S.17
Couturier v Hastie
Facts: D made a fraudulent misrepresentation
to the plaintiff (an illiterate Indian woman
rubber tapper) and had induced her to enter
into a sale and purchase agreement. The D had
fraudulently represented to the P that she was
required to sign was for a loan she took and to
free the land from the charge, and further
agreements to purchase three unapproved
sub-lots in her own land.
Held: the agreements were voidable at the
option of P. the initial agreement and further
agreements relating to purchase of the three
unapproved sub-lots could be rescinded and
the court awarded her damages for the loss
suffered by the P due to the D’s fraudulent
misrepresentation.
Bisset v Wilkinson – S.18
Sheik Brothers v. Ochsner
S.18 – false representation induces the
other party to enter into the contract.
Facts - The defendant sold a land to the
plaintiff and said that the land could
accommodate up to 2000 sheeps. Relying
on this statement, the plaintiff bought the
land but later discovered that the land
could not accommodate up to 2000
sheeps as represented by the defendant.
Held - The contract was not voidable
because the statement was only an honest
opinion of the defendant. He never carried
on sheep-farming on that land but
poultry-farming.
S.21 – MISTAKE AS TO POSSIBILITY OF
PERFORMING THE CONTRACT
Facts: Appellant granted to the Respondent
the license and authority to cut and
manufacture all sisal growing on 5,000
acres of land in Kenya, and to deliver to A
50 tons per month of the sisal fibre for sale.
R was then unable to do so as the leaf
potential of the sisal was not sufficient to
produce that much.
Held: it was a mistake as to the possibility
of performing the contract. The agreement
was VOID.
8. DISCHARGE BY IMPOSSIBILITY OF
PERFORMANCE/FRUSTRATION
Facts: The defendant agreed to let to the
plaintiff the use of his music hall and garden
for the purpose of entertainment. Before
the day of performance arrived, the music
hall was destroyed by fire. The plaintiff sued
the defendant for damages for breach of
the contract which the defendant, through
no fault of his own, was unable to perform.
Held: Defendant was not liable. The
performance of the contract becomes
impossible
DISCHARGE BY PERFORMANCE
The app and the resp agreed to transfer land
to each other. The price of the app’s land
was $25,000 and the resp’s land was
$14,000. It was also agreed that the
difference of $11,000 would be settled by
the 2 sons of the resp. 1 son would be
responsible for $4,000 and the other son for
$7,000. The $7,000 was not paid, and the
app claimed payment from the resp.
Held: Since the app had agreed to accept
performance of the contract from a third
party, he could not enforce it against the
resps.
Taylor v. Caldwell Smith Construction Co Ltd v Phit KiribatiHj Nik Ishak b Hj Nik Daud v.
Nik Zainab bt Nik Jaafar
Krell v Henry – Performance/
Frustration
Facts: The plaintiff placed advertisements
outside his flat to the effect that windows
to view the coronation procession were
to be let. The defendant was told by the
plaintiff that the flat gives a good view of
the procession. The defendant hired the
flat for £75 from the plaintiff for 26-27
June. The defendant paid £25 when the
contract was made and promised to pay
the balance £50 on 24 June. The
procession was cancelled due to the
serious illness of the King. The plaintiff
claimed the balance of £50.
Held: The contract was void. *Refer to
Sec 66 of CA.
DISCHARGE BY BREACH OF CONTRACT
Facts: The refusal of issuing an architect
certificate as agreed to the contract
amount to breach because it prevents
the contractor to continue his project
Held: Since time is important, the
innocent party has the choice whether to
repudiate the contract or treat contract
as subsisting
BREACH/RECESSION OF CONTRACT
Facts: Plaintiff provides a less number of
workers compared to what he was
supposed to do under the contract.
Due to this, the defendant stopped
payment.
Plaintiff then proceed to sue the
defendant for damages claiming that he
had been prevented by the defendant’s
default from completing the contract.
Held: the act of the plaintiff in
employing less number of workers
constitutes breach of contract which
renders the contract repudiated.
PERFORMANCE
GR: Performance must be strictly in
accordance with the terms of the
contract unless the parties have
agreed otherwise
Facts: The claimant installed central
heating in the defendant's home. The
agreed contract price was £560. The
defendant was not happy with the
work and refused to pay. Defects in
the work amounted to £174.
Held: The action by the claimant to
enforce the payment failed since the
court held there was no substantial
performance
FRUSTRATION – DEATH/PERMANENT
INCAPACITY
Facts: P entered into the contract with
the D’s wife (a pianist). His wife was
prevented from doing so by a
dangerous illness so the concert had to
be postponed. P lost his money
Held: a good health of his wife was a
condition annexed to the agreement
where contract was discharged and not
broke by her failure to perform as she
was unfit to do so.
FRUSTRATION – WAR
Facts: The P worked at the Ds’ in mine at
Tanjong Tuallang, Perak. When Japanese
invaded Malaya, the Ds’ European staff
members evacuated from Malaya. The P,
a swiss national elected to remain and
claimed damages from the Ds.
The Ds contended that consequent of the
Japanese occupation of Perak, the
contract of employment between them
and the P was discharged by frustration.
Held: The invasion of Malaya by Japanese
forces frustrated the contract, no breach
of contract by the Ds.
Robinson v DavidsonHA Berney v Tronoh Mines Bolton v Mahadeva Chow Yin Lou v Visuvalingam Pillay
9. Case: Kerpa Singh v Bariam Singh
DISCHARGE BY AGREEMENT
Facts: son of debtor made offer of
RM4,000.00 (in cheque) to creditor’s
solicitor in discharge of his father’s
debt of RM8,650.00 on condition that
creditor either returned the cheque to
him if offer not accepted or retained it
and discharged debtor’s debt if offer
accepted.
Creditor cashed the cheque and
retained money.
Held: conduct of creditor cashing the
cheque was consent to discharge
debtor from further liability