This document provides an overview of Victoria King's paper considering what it means to be human and live a moral life from the perspectives of philosophers Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein. King examines Kierkegaard's view that becoming human involves becoming aware of one's finite existence and gaining freedom through faith. King also discusses how Kierkegaard believes evil can be a form of self-actualization. The document then analyzes Wittgenstein's perspective that moral responsibility extends beyond any single religious group.

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Victoria King
Lovern – Existentialism
Spring 2011
Considerations on Being Human alongside a Moral Way to Live
What does it mean to be completely aware of what it means to exist? How do we know if
what we are doing is right? This paper only goes a small distance into considering these issues
from a limited amount of perspectives. However, it is acceptable to take these particular
perspectives into account, because they are published and here to be considered. In this paper, I
shall consider some of these questions from the points of view of a couple of philosophers; most
prominently, from the points of view of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein.
With the first portion of my paper, I shall lay the necessary groundwork behind the notion
of Kierkegaard concerning the method of self-actualization and realization of freedom in
becoming wholly aware of our individual existence. With the second article, I shall cover how it
is possible to still be evil and self-actualized at the same time. The third article used in my paper
comes from the point of view of Wittgenstein, and it argues that some issues in existence not
only involve Christians or one specific religious group, but includes the entirety of the human
population, and the guilt involved in not fulfilling one’s responsibility to another, regardless of
personal religion.
Kierkegaard attempts to lay out the requirements for becoming human in addition to
explaining that a person of faith becomes more sober the more that person suffers. Let us first
look at what it means to become human, according to Kierkegaard. In becoming human, first one
must become in finitude. The concept of finitude explains how to become oneself sincerely, in
the moment, as a result of teaching oneself what this entails. This part involves faith in the first

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degree, or a generic version of faith. This type of faith sheds light on the way that one can be
considered a hero, considered from a social context, rather than a knight of faith, which would be
marked by a purely internal consideration and involves faith in the second degree. We shall look
more at the former type for now.
Part of becoming human involves thoughtful honesty alongside a dash of humor. One
cannot become human by imitating others. Consider a man trying to become free within a
democratic society. Let us hypothetically consider trying to become free within the confines of
the United States, which is supposedly a democratic society. Within the confines of the United
States, the majority are said to rule, and everyone is said to be treated equally. This is a
generalized notion that the majority may accept as true; however, it is not necessarily true. Not
everyone is treated equally financially or personally. Certain jobs or professions receive more
merit and financial backing than others. This is only one example involved; going back to the
main point of my example, let us say that most people within the United States may claim that
we are free citizens as a result of being citizens of the United States. This is not necessarily the
case. We are free to the extent that we will not be granted a sanction so long as we act in
accordance with the local and federal rules set for us and fail to break any or get caught doing so.
This is not complete freedom. If we were free in this sense, I could live on a small plot of land
and provide nourishment for myself by farming and hunting alone. We can no longer live in a
place without paying taxes for living there. In order to pay taxes, we must work or produce
something to sell for a price in order to pay those taxes. Certain jobs are tax-free if one gets paid
in cash; however, most jobs or careers have a certain percentage of their checks taken out. Either
way, in this hypothetical example, I remain unable to legally live completely freely within the
confines of the United States, regardless of the supposed majority claim that this system does

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enable us to live freely. If becoming human involves that we observe our situation honestly, and
it also involves the understanding that we cannot become human via imitation but by serious
consideration of our particular conditions, then my hypothetical example above describes an
instance in which following the majority-held notion proves ineffective to becoming human. The
comical side of this is that the majority in question might accept titles or take on identities, yet
never consider what it means to become themselves, (Matustik, 251-252). By that same token,
one cannot learn didactically, or by formal instruction, what it means to be human. One must
accomplish this autodidactically, or by means of learning without formal instruction. This is
ironic on my part in that I am learning this autodidactically yet via means of formal instruction,
and it is doubly ironic in that I am didactically repeating in a paper the same claims of a
philosopher who held that we must learn these things autodidactically.
Matustik holds of Kierkegaard that “human becoming is a finite venture marked by…a
threefold dimension of existential pathos in the immanence of the moment: pathos in its initial,
essential, and decisive expression,” (252). I take pathos to mean the quality of an actual life
experience which evokes compassion and I take immanent to portray what goes on internally, or
within the mind. That being said, I understand the first sentence of this paragraph to mean that
becoming human involves a focused, internal awareness of actual life experience which takes
place in the present moment. One might also say it takes place within each present moment, with
time as a progressive series of present moments; but we are only worried about the finite here,
and the finite is concerned with the present and what exists. However, this also needs be tied to
ethical action, (252). The problem with this is that human becoming in its finite state escapes the
possibility of ethical action, thus, “in my becoming unfinished, I set myself for myself as a task,”
(252). The absurdity here is that I have to live life before I am able to finish it, (252). Next, I

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want to embrace an eternal aspect such as love or happiness. In order to do this, it is necessary to
transcend the finite in order to gain insight into the infinite. I do not want happiness for a time; I
want happiness for all time. “To care with existential pathos means to seek my eternal happiness
in every now,” (Matustik, 253). In the sense that one acquires happiness right now and here, for
all time, for existence, allows infinite and finite to merge, or it allows for the infinite to become
an aspect of the finite, (253). Also, if one henceforth fails to live by this regimen, nothing outside
of the individual can save them from the “path out of the anguish into the moment,” (253).
The absurdity of the above lies in the notion that one can care absolutely for something
relative. In order to do this, we had and continue having to distinguish between the immanent
degree of faith and the transcendent degree of faith. That is, to discern between what is absolute
and what is relative within life. The relation to the absolute cannot be experienced empirically,
and it can only be experienced subjectively and immanently. Once this task has been completed,
we must begin to discard all false senses of ourselves, (Matustik, 255). This is known as “dying
unto oneself,” and becoming human by this task is the suffering action, (255). It is in this action
that we realize that we are capable of nothing, or no-thing, while simultaneously our present
situation presents itself as being capable of everything—anything is possible, (255). We learn
that we cannot win love or gain anything infinite by any objective means. Consider having an
addiction for something and endeavoring to recover from it. In order to do this, the addict must
push him or herself further within the depths of withdrawal and angst by replacing the object of
his or her addiction with a void. This is done because to substitute the object of addiction with
something else would not be curing one of addiction absolutely, it would be replacing one
addiction with another. Therefore, what we are learning to love absolutely, we learn that it is an
uncertain venture to love it, (256). Indeed, this is risky business. It is there that we take the leap

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of faith and consider that what we do in our everyday, transformative actions determines the
paths of our existence and what physically lies therein, (257).
There are more modes of despair that reflect what has been stated already. My intention
has been to give enough background information over Kierkegaard in order to graze the surface
of what it means to be human and how to overcome personal transgressions, such as addictions,
as well as the level of anxiety this possibly entails. The next thing we shall look at is a
consideration of evil with regard to Kierkegaard.
Socrates held that to know what was good was to do it, and so to do evil was committed
out of ignorance, (Roberts, 364). Kant believed that committing evil acts came about as a result
of acting with regard to incentives rather than in accordance with the rational good will.
Augustine held that evil actions came about as a result of an inadequacy of the will that has lost
itself in the empirical world, (264). According to an article, “The Integrity of Evil: Kierkegaard
on the Actualization of Human Evil,” by David Roberts, “each of these renditions of
evil…leaves a person’s life weakened and disordered…. Thus, evil is a kind of disintegration,”
(364). Roberts counters this view of evil with Kierkegaard’s criticism of it. According to him,
effects of evil result from “a powerful integrity within the nature of moral evil itself,” (264).
Ultimately, according to this article, the foundation of existence is ordered. That which is
closer to the foundation is better, so that which is further away from the foundation is worse, or
more evil, or less rational. Evil involves a lack of order and rationality. It is void. This void, or
insufficiency of the will, leads to corruption of the soul, (365). These are the privation views
which conceive of

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“evil as a movement away from an integrity and order that are established in a
relationship of dependence on the Ground of existence (God, the Good, Fate,
Providence, Reason…), and toward a disintegration and disordered life of
emptiness,” (Roberts, 365).
In an ideal world, this view stands. We run into problems when considering it in actual
life situations. Roberts gives a couple of examples to explain. His first example was that Nazi
Germany did not seem to have more or less being than it does today; the second example he uses
is that Charles Manson does not seem to have less being or integrity than another person who
suffers from kleptomaniac tendencies. Roberts contrasts these privation views of evil with the
view of Kierkegaard that the unactualized forms of a positive form of evil are present in these
weaker forms of evil, (365). Let us continue to a Kierkegaardan analysis of evil.
Remember the comical or absurd contradictions of self we covered earlier in the paper. A
person gains freedom by getting into these contradictions and working through them, (Roberts,
366). The self is actually recognized by an external force; or, that force which determines the
entire relation of the self to itself, (366). Whether the self acts with good or evil intent is
determined by the way in which the self relates itself to its external force which recognizes that
relation.
Roberts delineates two poles of the contradiction: one involves aspects of the expansion
of the self (the infinite) and the other pole is involves aspects of the limiting of the self (finitude).
If one relates to only one pole of the contradiction, the outcome is spiritlessness despair. If one
relates the infinite to the absence of finite, the outcome is self-deception, (366). “Kierkegaard
says that what spiritless people want in life is comfort and ease, but since they do not want to see

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themselves this way, infinite willing is used as a means of deception,” (Roberts, 367).
Sometimes people fail to act upon the way they feel about an issue, or rather, they fail to act the
way they believe they actually act in accordance with how they feel that they should act when
faced with a given issue. One might claim universal love and respect for humanity and at the
same time may treat others cruelly or with contempt.
On the flipside, when one relates the finite to the absence of the infinite, the result is the
despair of finitude. In this type, a person gathers freedom by a range of limited possibilities with
regard to the self such that it fits the expectations of the conventional order, (Roberts, 367). The
one who does this may believe oneself to be oneself while in actuality he or she has been
imitating others. Within this sort of despair, everything is a means to some other end, and in its
cycle of restricted responses, the individual never considers pondering what everything actually
means, (367). This evil form of despair entails weakness, or “a privation of actuality and
integrity,” (Roberts, 367). All of their efforts are futile, their energy spent goes nowhere, for they
are merely coming along for the ride. At any time either of these poles are unbalanced, the
person in despair has the possibility of becoming free of the despair so long as she takes herself
up as a task, or takes responsibility for herself. (368).
When the poles are balanced and a person has overcome despair on the path to becoming
fully human, that person gains freedom. Freedom is gained by a self-positing that sheds light on
the sovereignty of the self, (Roberts, 368). With this comes ethical self choice, in which one
becomes responsible for the qualities assigned them by nature and transforms them into essential
qualities. Now, the self integrates these qualities into itself in an ordered, meaningful manner,
(368). The ethical person aims to actualize his or her ideal self, rendering what has been called

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the “paradigmatic human being,” (Roberts, 368). When the ethical self chooses to despair of the
ethical stage, it makes a leap toward the religious stage, (370).
In the religious stage, God has all the power of transforming the self and the world in
which the self exists. In addition to the relation of a being to that power which established the
structure of the self, self-consciousness increases in terms of actualization, and that renders a
new perspective concerning the nature of moral evil. This means that evil may be an additional
method of self-actualization, rather than good as the only method of self-actualization (Roberts,
370). This involves infinite resignation, which requires that one die to itself and also to its
egoistic aims at self-mastery. From this viewpoint, one realizes that he or she is not the center of
all that occurs in reality, and that he or she does not help merely by doing his or her own duty;
God does not require that duty to keep the world in order or toss it into chaos, (370). This entails
a new type of freedom: freedom from content. By this concept freedom is understood by means
of this deficiency of the finite within the infinite; freedom is without content, (370). One has to
struggle with the deficiency or void of what content one wishes to shed, and within this abyss
lies the evil foundation one must tackle. One binds their freedom within this dark abyss, and in
doing so they have only the void to experience upon craving some content. Only after one learns
not to crave content does that individual experience the absolute good, (Roberts, 372).
Again, once one is within the confines of the infinite after that individual has come to the
religious sphere, one must once again consider the process by which one freely returns back to
the finite sphere, (Roberts, 373). It is at this point that the individual must choose whether to
accept freedom by yielding to God or to accept freedom for oneself and gain the finite by means
of this freedom. The former type is an act of faith, the latter is an act of defiance.

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Roberts considers defiance as the actualization of evil, (Roberts, 373). Defiance is the
“despair of wanting in despair to be oneself,” (Kierkegaard, 98). It is the despair of infinite
resignation. Kierkegaard disagreed with the Socratic notion by claiming that it is possible for an
individual to have aversion to the good, even when they know the good as the good; they can be
off-put by what this relationship with God delivers, and so they may choose to shed this
relationship, (Roberts, 373). The relationship with God means one must experience the dread of
being nothing at the hands of the infinite. If one accepts God as this, that person may begin to
worship God; if the individual defies this, then it exalts itself in rebellion against the power of
God, or the infinite, (Roberts, 374). In defiance, the self attempts to create itself from out of the
dark abyss, and in doing so, it seeks to affirm its own particular will upon the world by rebelling
against the source of its creation, (374). By this token, the self makes itself what it chooses to be,
(375). It defies disintegration of itself because it establishes its integrity via its self-conscious
freedom. This process inevitably leads to despair since it provides freedom itself as its
foundation; nothing can bind or constrain this freedom, (375). The irony here is that the freedom
that allows one to establish itself in an act of defiance is the same freedom that may also
eliminate this act of self-creation. According to this, defiant individuals are not necessarily
weaker and more ignorant than others, (Roberts, 367).
So far we have seen freedom and actualization as being present alongside an aspect of
religion, whether self-actualization is achieved via evil or moral means, and primarily this has
been considered from the point of view of ideas stemming from Kierkegaard. Now let us
consider another point of view concerning a conception of belief itself.
Wittgenstein believes that the purely religious individual considers himself or herself to
be wholly wretched in nature, (Wittgenstein, 45). In an article titled “The Wretchedness of

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Belief: Wittgenstein on Guilt, Religion, and Recompense,” Bob Plant considers this point of
view, (Plant, 449). Plant argues that, in order to understand the importance of this point of view,
that absolutely religious people consider themselves as being wretched, it is necessary to
consider the function of guilt within the equation of many religious and ethical themes.
First, Wittgenstein explains that no contradiction exists between a “believer” and
“nonbeliever”. This is because their relative points of view are coming from entirely different
perspectives, (Plant, 454). He claims that both groups are united in their common, primitive,
natural human activities, (455). Plant lists a number of examples of connecting links between the
two groups:
i. “Certain religious and nonreligious acts of piety,
ii. A confession of sins and a confession of love or guilt,
iii. The adoration of a religious image and the devotion exhibited toward a
picture…of a loved one,
iv. Talk of ghostly “visitations”…
v. The absolute trusting demanded by religious faith and that which governs the
parental relation,
vi. Prayer and expressions of human vulnerabilities and needs,
vii. Notions of fate and predestination, and natural feelings of vulnerability in the
face of the world’s vacillations,
viii. Following the notion of something as the “Cause” [of everything]…may suggest
that certain eschatological beliefs correspond to a natural desire or hope for
justice,”
(Plant, 455-456).
What Wittgenstein manages to explain here is a common point by which all groups might
identify with each other on certain issues and this allows a dialogue between the two groups,
irrespective of differences in religion or culture, (457). He notes that a man of science might

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argue that all other explanations of reality fall short of the ability to adequately explain reality.
He counters the argument by explaining that one “can fight, hope, and even believe without
believing scientifically,” (Wittgenstein, 60). Humans might benefit from realizing that they
share common beliefs and experiences, regardless of personal belief. So far we have considered a
broad account of religious belief within Wittgenstein’s naturalism; now we shall consider a
specific approach.
If there is personal existence after death, we will continue to suffer, (Plant, 459). This
may lead us to ethical considerations concerning responsibilities or duties to fulfill. If, even in
death, we consider these tasks as still requiring accomplishment, then we might imagine a form
of guilt which could be involved in knowing one has not and cannot complete those unfinished
tasks which linger on after death, (459). Those who live must attempt to complete these tasks
while living; else, there is the possibility that one might have to continue existing while enduring
a bad conscience over having not finished a certain project or task, (464). In this sense, “a bad
conscience is the minimal manifestation required of the genuinely religious life,” (Plant, 464).
Wittgenstein admitted the possibility of these notions, though he did not consider himself
a proponent of any specific religion in full. The way this ties together even more is that he grants
the possible truth of any of these notions, although he cannot personally conceive of a creator. In
granting the possibility of religious notions even though he does not belong explicitly to any
specific religion, he also includes himself among those allowed to have an allowable opinion
concerning what considerations are being made by these religions. His opinion may be
considered allowable although he may still not be able to understand it from the point of view of
the religious individual involved, (465). Going from this, he explains a sort of all-Powerful God
who smites or punishes those of his followers who fail to obey His command, (467). In this

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example, not even death can relieve them of their responsibilities, for God is with them always;
therefore, they must experience religious life as wretched insofar as they must do as they are
commanded by an external force rather than by the will of their own freedom, (468).
Wittgenstein explains that a factual and necessarily true book on ethics is not possible
because ethics are unexplainable while we are only capable of explaining facts; however, while a
conversation or dialogue upon what constitutes the ethical may be objectively hopeless, it is not
without its respectful merit (Plant, 469). I will give an example of the absolute relativity
involved in considering a code of ethics. Consider that a man is playing baseball when another
individual comes up and tells him that his baseball skills are in dire need of improvement. The
man playing baseball explains that it is not his aim to become good at it, to which the other
person replies with understanding and makes no more issue of it. Now, consider that the second
man comes up to the first and charges him of having an irrefutably rotten demeanor; to which,
the first man replies once again that he is not concerned about changing his behavior. This time,
the difference in critique between the first and second man is that the second believes the first
ought to improve his demeanor, (470). The importance of either situation could be reasonably
argued from relative standpoints. However, the first example of not caring whether a person
wants to improve at baseball does not involve a normative moral dilemma. From here,
Wittgenstein delineates that the right road is the one “which leads to an arbitrarily predetermined
end” by which one might be “ashamed for not going,” (Plant, 471).
This is what brings us to a connection among this article and the last that failure to follow
the right path does not constitute wrongness, but only shame or guilt for not following it.
Granted, it may be sanctioned by the wrath of God. However, if a person follows the right road
out of fear of guilt or sanction for not following it, then he is not purely religious at all, (Plant,

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472). By this token, it might be understood that religious faith or a reason for doing anything
might be most purely upheld without regard for the rewards offered by its actual fulfillment.
Still, if our souls are immortal and everlasting, and if being religious is wretched in the sense that
we must complete external obligations and receive guilt when we fail to do so, then this eternity
leads to the possibility of a state of eternal guilt or wretchedness, (473). Although Wittgenstein
does not claim any specific religion, he sides with the view of Dostoevsky that “Every one of us
is responsible for everyone else in every way, and I most of all,” (Dostoevsky, 339).
In conclusion, I have answered the questions posited at the beginning of this paper
through the points of view of various authors. Kierkegaard provides a meaning of what it means
to exist and be aware of the nature of one’s existence. Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein both
consider what it means to perform the right. Kierkegaard allowed us to see that even defiant
beings are capable of self-actualization and freedom, however they risk a great chance at despair
in that their possibility of freedom lies upon the foundation of freedom itself. Wittgenstein
showed that the failure to follow the right path does not necessitate wrongness in being, although
it may still render guilt or shame for not fulfilling one’s responsibility to another. He personally
believed everyone to be responsible for everyone else, although he makes no outright claim to
belong to any specific religion.

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Works Cited
Dostoevsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Karamazov. 1. England: Penguin, 1967. Print.
Kierkegaard, Soren. The Sickness Unto Death. London: Penguin Books, 1989. Print.
Matustik, Martin Beck. "Becoming Human, Becoming Sober."
Springer Science+Business Media. (2009): Print.
Plant, Bob. "The Wretchedness of Belief: Wittgenstein on Guilt, Religion, and Recompense."
Journal of Religious Ethics, Etc.. 32.3 (2004): Print.
Roberts, David. "The Integrity of Evil: Kierkegaard on the Actualization of Evil."
Philosophy Today. 54.4 (2010): Print.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Culture and Value. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994. Print.