Case update

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CASE UPDATE
Prepared by Stephen C. Steele
Moore Ingram Johnson & Steele, LLP
AAML GEORGIA CHAPTER FAMILY LAW SEMINAR
Friday, December 10, 2021

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASE SUMMARIES
Page
A. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
1. Duffy vs. Sanders, A20A0383, 354 Ga. 684;
841 S.E.2d 415 (2020)…………………………………….…………………...…9
B. ARBITRATION
1. King vs. King, A20A0034, 354 Ga. App. 19;
840 S.E.2d 108 (2020)……………..……...…………….……….……………....10
C. ATTORNEY’S FEES
1. Bennett vs. McClam, A21A0134,
358 Ga. App. 550 (2021)..……………………………………..………………..11
2. Dovel vs. Dovel, A19A1375,
352 Ga. App. 423; 834 S.E.2d 918 (2019)…………………………….….....….12
D. CHILD SUPPORT
1. Cousin vs. Tubbs, A19A1805, 353 Ga. App. 873;
840 S.E.2d 85 ** (2020)……………………….………………………….……..13
2. Cousin vs. Tubbs, A20A2050,
358 Ga. App. 722, 856 S.E.2d 56 ** (2020)…………………………...…...…..15
3. Day vs. Mason, A20A0964,
357 Ga. App. 836 (2020) ………………..………………………………..….…17
4. Johnson vs. Collins, A19A2277, 354 Ga. App. 589;
841 S.E.2d 189 (2020)………..…………………………………………...…..…19
5. Johnson vs. Johnson, A20A2061,
358 Ga. App. 638 (2021)………………………...………………..…………….20
6. Lockhart vs. Lockhart, A21A0760,
863 S.E.2d 174 (2021)……………………………………………….… ……….22
7. Park-Poapes vs. Poapes, A19A2032 & A19A2033,
351 Ga. App. 856; 833 S.E.2d 554 (2019)……………………………..….……24
8. Perez vs. Cunningham, A20A601,
355 Ga. App. 393; 844 S.E.2d 253 (2020)…………………………………...…26

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9. Ross vs. Small, A20A0372,
355 Ga. App. 483 (2020)………………………………………………………..27
10. Spirnak vs. Meadows, A20A0158
355 Ga. App. 857 (2020) ………………………………..…...……….………...28
11. Steed vs. Steed, A20A0316,
843 S.E.2d 21 (2020)………….…..…………………………………………..…30
12. Wilson vs. Guerrero, A19A2475,
353 Ga. App. 501; 838 S.E.2d 588 (2020)………………………....………...…31
13. Winchell vs. Winchell, A19A1531 & A19A2119,
352 Ga. App. 306; 835 S.E.2d 6** (2019)……………………..…….…………32
E. CHOICE OF LAW
1. Mbatha vs. Cutting, A20A1303,
356 Ga. App. 743 (2020)……………………………..…………………………34
F. CIVIL CASE DISPOSITION FORM – MOTION TO VACATE
1. Paul vs. Paul, A20A194,
390 Ga. App. 846 S.E.2d 138 (2020)……………………………………….......36
G. CLERICAL ERROR
1. Ekhorutomwen vs. Jamison, A20A1539,
356 Ga. App. 807 (2020)…………………………………………..……………37
H. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
1. Walia vs. Walia, A20A1305,
356 Ga. App. 387 (2020)………………………...………………..…………… 39
I. CONTEMPT
1. McCarthy vs. Ashment, A19A0788,
353 Ga. App. 270; 835 S.E.2d 745 (2019)……………………………………...41
2. Rose vs. Clark, A21A0172; 360 Ga. App. 440;
859 S.E.2d 137 (2021)…………………………...………………………………44
3. Sullivan vs. Harper, A19A1629,
352 Ga. App. 427; 834 S.E.2d 921 (2019)……………………...…….………...46

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4. Wall vs. James, A20A2058,
358 Ga. App. 121 (2021)…………………………..……….……….…………..48
J. CUSTODY
1. Blackwelder vs. Shugard, A21A0483; 360 Ga. App. 306;
861 S. E.2d 141 (2021)…………………………………………….…………….50
2. Brazil vs. Williams, A21A0037; 359 Ga. App. 487,
859 S.E. 2d 490 (2021)…….…………………………...………………………..52
3. Burnham vs. Burnham, A20A1243; 350 Ga. App. 580;
851 S.E. 2d 202 (2020)………………………………………..…………………53
4. Capehart vs. Mitchell, A20A1697,
851 S.E.2d 846 (2020) …………………………………..……………………...55
5. Harrison vs. Whitaker, A21A0755.
862 S.E.2d 597 (2021)…………………………………………………………..56
6. Kasper vs. Martin, A20A0244,
354 Ga. App. 831; 841 S.E.2d 488 (2020)…..………………….………….….. 57
7. Longino vs. Longino, A19A1386,
352 Ga. App. 263; 834 S.E.2d 355 (2019)………………………….…....……..58
8. McManus vs. Johnson, A20A1185,
356 Ga. App. 880 (2020) ………………………………………..…………….. 59
9. Mitchell vs. Capehart, A19A2139,
353 Ga. App. 461; 838 S.E.2d 125 (2020)………….……………...……..….... 61
10. Ortega vs. Temple, A20A1716,
856 S.E.2d 471 (2021) …………………………………………..…...…………62
11. Perry vs. Jenkins, A21A0969,
862 S.E.2d 734 (2021)…………………………………………………………..64
12. Pryce vs. Pryce, A21A0056; 359 Ga. App. 590;
859 S.E. 2d 554 (2021)………………………………….………………………66
13. Wallace vs. Chandler, A21A0648; 360 Ga. App. 541;
859 S.E. 2d 100 (2021)…………...…………………………………..………….68

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K. DISQUALIFICATION OF ATTORNEY
1. Samnick vs. Goodman, A20A0562,
354 Ga. App. 805; 841 S.E.2d 468 (2020)………………..…………..…….…. 70
L. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE
1. Hill vs. Hill, A21A0285; 360 Ga. App. 530;
859 S.E. 2d 906 (2021)..…………………………………………………………72
2. McLaws vs. Drew, A20A0695,
355 Ga. App. 162; 843 S.E.2d 440 (2020)…..………………….…………...….73
M. EQUITABLE CAREGIVER
1. Skinner vs. Miles, A21A0980 (2021)…………………………………………..76
N. EQUITABLE DIVISION
1. Calloway-Spencer vs. Spencer, A20A0546,
355 . App. 743 (2020)………………………..………………………………79
2. Dixon vs. Dixon, A19A1179,
352 Ga. App. 169; 834 S.E.2d 309 (2019)……………….…………...….…….80
3. Messick vs. Messick, A21A0600
858 S.E.2d 758 (2021) …………………….………………………...…….…….81
4. Spruell vs. Spruell, A20A1077,
356 Ga. App. 722 (2020)……………………………………..…………………82
O. EVIDENCE
1. Swearngin v. Rowell, A20A0236,
846 S.E. 2d 263 (2020)………………………..…………...…………….………83
P. EXPERT WITNESS
1. Lee vs. Smith, S18G1549; 307 Ga. 815,
838 S.E.2d 870 (Ga. 2020)………………………………….……..…...………..85
Q. GARNISHMENT
1. Smith vs. Robinson, A20A0591,
355 Ga. App. 159; 842 S.E.2d 917 (2020)………………..…………….………86
R. GRANDPARENTS
1. Brock vs. Brown, A19A2083,
354 Ga. 63; 840 S.E.2d 155 (2020)…………………....……………………..…87

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3. Davis vs. Cicala, A20A1116,
356 Ga. App. 873 (2020) …………………………..……………..….…………88
3. Enlow vs. Enlow, A19A1074,
352 Ga. App. 865; 836 S.E.2d 128 (2019)…………………………….....….….90
4. Fyffe vs. Cain, A19A1162,
353 Ga. App. 130; 836 S.E.2d 602 (2019)…………………….…………….….91
5. Gnam vs. Livingston, A19A2055,
353 Ga. App. 701; 839 S.E.2d 200 (2020)…………….…….…………….……92
6. Hannah vs. Hatcher, A19A1448,
352 Ga. App. 186; 834 S.E.2d 307 (2019)……………………………..…….…93
7. Leach vs. Warner, A21A0774; 862 S.E. 2d 153 (2021)…………….…………94
8. Mashburn vs. Mashburn, A19A1616 & A19A1617,
353 Ga. App. 31; 836 S.E.2d 131 (2019)………………………..……….……..95
9. Reder vs. Dodds, A19A1668,
354 Ga. App. 598; 839 S.E.2d 708 (2020)…………….…………….…..….…. 97
10. Steedley vs. Gilbreth, A19A1413,
352 Ga. App. 179; 834 S.E.2d 301 (2019)………………………………….…..99
11. Steedley vs. Gilbreth, A21A0356; 389 Ga. App. 551;
859 S.E. 2d 520 (2021)…………..…………………………..…………………101
S. GUARDIAN AD LITEM
1. Perkins v. Hayes, A20A0204,
356 Ga. App. 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)…………………………...…………...102
T. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
1. Vanterpool vs. Patton, A19A1108,
352 Ga. App. 584; 835 S.E.2d 407 (2019)………………………….....………103
U. LEGITIMATION
1. Belliveau vs. Floyd, A21A0505,
858 S.E.2d 763 (2021) ………………….……………………………….…….105

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V. MARRIAGE LICENSE
1. In Re: Shawn Donovan Stroud, et al, A21A0931 (2021)…………..….……107
W. PARENTING TIME
1. Brown vs. Brown, A21A0122,
857 S.E.2d 505 (2021) …………….…………………..………….………..…..108
2. Cockerham vs. Cockerham, A21A0553; 359 Ga. App. 891;
860 S.E. 2d 163 (2021)……………...…………………………..………….110
X. PROCEDURE – APPLICATION FOR APPEAL
1. Barnes vs. Barnes, A21A1079 (2021)………………………………….……..112
Y. PROCEDURE – COUNTERCLAIM TO MODIFY CUSTODY
1. Pascal vs. Pino, A21A0913 (2021)……………………………………………113
Z. PROCEDURE – MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
1. Norrod vs. Willingham, A21A0746 (2021)…………………...….………..…114
AA. PROCEDURE – NOTICE OF HEARING
1. Bass vs. Medy, A20A2120; 854 S.E.2d 763 (2021) …………..….…………..115
2. Fiffee vs. Jiggetts, A20A0131,
353 Ga. App. 730; 839 S.E.2d 224 (2020)…………………......………..…….117
3. Nadal vs. Nadal, A20A0770; 355 Ga. App. 756 (2020) ……………..………119
4. Threatt vs. Threatt, A21A0637; 360 Ga. App. 223;
860 S.E. 2d 883 (2021)………………………………………………..……….121
BB. PROCEDURE – REQUIRED FINDINGS OF FACTS, PARENTING PLAN,
AND CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET
1. VanVlerah vs. VanVlerah, A21A0700; 359 Ga. App. 577;
859 S.E. 2d 546 (2021)…………………………………...…………...………..122
CC. PROCEDURE – SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
1. Ernest vs. Moffa, A21A0269; 359 Ga. App. 678;
859 S.E. 2d 834 (2021)…………………………………...…………………….123

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DD. PROTECTIVE ORDER
1. Copeland vs. Copeland, A21A0921 (2021)……………………..……………125
2. Oliver vs. Field, A19A1730,
353 Ga. App. 891 (2020)…………………………..………………….…….…126
EE. QDRO
1. Gilreath vs. Connor, A21A0816 (2021)………………………………..…….127
FF. RESIDENCE – DOMICILE
1. Crittenden vs. Crittenden, A19A1866,
354 Ga. App. 672; 840 S.E.2d 496 (2020)……………………….….….……..128
GG. SUPPORT PRE-DATING TEMPORARY HEARING
1. Daniel vs. Daniel, A20A1938; 358 Ga. App. 880;
856 S.E. 2d 452 (2021)……………….…………………………..…………….129
HH. UCCJEA – HOME STATE
1. Alden vs. Yarborough, 21A0678; 862 S.E. 2d 148 (2021)………………..….131
2. Kerr vs. Wilson, A20A1668,
854 S.E.2d 777 (2021)……………………………...……………………….….132
3. Razi v. Burns, A19A1936,
354 Ga. App. 608; 841 S.E.2d 407 (2020)………………..….……………..…134
II. UIFSA
1. Serluco vs. Taggart, A20A1368,
357 Ga. App. 296 (2020) …………………………..………………………….136

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APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Duffy vs. Sanders
Court of Appeals of Georgia
A20A0383
354 Ga. 684; 841 SE2d 415 (2020)
Decided 3/20/2020
Opinion by Judge Hodges, joined by Chief Judge McFadden and Presiding Judge Doyle
Patricia Duffy (“Wife”) sued her ex-husband, Steven Sanders (“Husband”) for tortious
interference with business relations. The trial court granted the Husband’s Motion to Dismiss.
The wife filed a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Husband moved to dismiss because
the wife had not followed the procedure for discretionary appeal. The Court of Appeals agreed
and dismissed the appeal.
Patricia Duffy and Steven Sanders divorced in 2014. In relevant part, the wife was
awarded the marital residence and their brokerage business.
Shortly thereafter, the husband filed bankruptcy, which the wife alleged to have caused
her to default on the mortgage and leaving the brokerage business unable to front customs duties
and taxes for its customers.
Judge Hodges, writing for the Court of Appeals, held that the wife’s claim was “ancillary
to the divorce proceedings or derived from the marital relationship or both”. Thus, wife was
required to follow the procedure for application of discretionary appeal.

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ARBITRATION
King vs. King
A20A0034
354 Ga. App. 19; 840 S.E.2d 108 (2020)
Decided 2/27/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judge Gobeil and Senior Appellate Judge Phipps
In this action for divorce, Deborah King and Daniel King agreed to arbitration. The arbitration
agreement required the arbitrator, as part of the award, to prepare Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
The wife, satisfied with the arbitration award, moved to enforce the award, to which the husband
objected. The Trial Court vacated the award, and the wife appeals.
First, Judge Barnes, writing for the Court of Appeals, held that the wife properly pursued the
appeal by applying for discretionary appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(2). The Court of
Appeals rejected the husband’s argument that the wife was required to follow the interlocutory
appeal procedure set forth in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b), including obtaining a Certificate of
Immediate Review from the Trial Court which the wife failed to do.
The Trial Court was within its authority to vacate the arbitration award. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b)
sets out five narrow circumstances under a Superior Court can vacate an arbitration award:
“The [arbitration] award shall be vacated…if the court finds that the rights of
that party were prejudiced by: (1) corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the
award; (2) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as a neutral; (3) an overstepping by the
arbitrators of their final authority or such imperfect execution of it that a final and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made; (4) failure to follow the
procedure of this part, unless the party applying to vacate the award continued with the
arbitration with notice of this failure and without objection; or (5) the arbitrator’s
manifest disregard of the law.”
In addition to showing one of the five listed statutory grounds, a party seeking vacatur of the
arbitration award must show that his or her rights were prejudiced as the result of one of the
listed grounds.
In this case, a number of sections of the arbitration award begin with the phrase “based upon the
testimony and evidence presented at the arbitration”. However, the award did not cite to or
discuss any of the testimony or evidence presented at the arbitration hearing.
Because the arbitrator “imperfect(ly) execute(ed)” his authority, as explicitly required by the
contract, vacatur by the Trial Court of the arbitrator award was proper and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.

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ATTORNEY’S FEES
Bennett vs. McClam
ATTORNEY’S FEES
A21A0134
358 Ga. App. 550 (2021)
Decided 2/23/2021
Opinion by Chief Judge McFadden, joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge Hodges
Letobra McClam and Frank Bennett, who have never been married, are the parents of the
child. Bennett has primary physical custody. McClam sued Bennett, seeking to modify custody,
parenting time, and child support. There was no transcript of the trial. Following McClam’s
presentation of her case, the Trial Court granted Bennett’s Motion to Dismiss, finding that
McClam had not proven a change in circumstances substantially affecting the welfare of the
child – a prerequisite to the Court’s consideration of a change of custody under O.C.G.A. §19-9-
3(b).
Bennett sought attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. §9-15-14(a) and (b) and O.C.G.A. §19-9-
3(g). The Trial Court denied his Motion.
(1) Although the order of the Trial Court stated that McClam had not established a
change in circumstances substantially affecting the welfare of the child, the order nonetheless
stated that it “could have accepted” her claim. Absent a transcript, the Court of Appeals cannot
determine whether McClam has presented any evidence to support the Trial Court’s findings that
it could have accepted McClam’s claim. Absent a transcript, the Court of Appeals assumes that
the Trial Court’s finding that the Court could have accepted McClam’s claim is correct. Because
such a finding is the basis for the Court’s denial of Bennett’s Motion for fees under O.C.G.A. §9-
15-14, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s denial of fees premised upon O.C.G.A.
§9-15-14.
(2) The Trial Court erred in concluding that O.C.G.A. §19-6-2(a) required her to
considered the financial circumstances of the parties when deciding whether or not to grant
Bennett’s claim for attorney fees under O.C.G.A. §19-9-3(g). O.C.G.A. §19-6-2 requires the
Court to consider the financial circumstances of both parties when awarding fees only in “actions
for alimony, for divorce and alimony, and for contempt of an order arising out of an action for
alimony or divorce and alimony”. O.C.G.A. §19-9-3(g), on the other hand, applies to custody
actions other than those covered by O.C.G.A. §19-6-2.
(3) The judgment was affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part.

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ATTORNEY’S FEES
Dovel vs. Dovel
A19A1375
352 Ga. App. 423; 834 SE2d 918 (2019)
Decided 10/20/2019
Opinion by Judge Gobeil, joined by Presiding Judge Dillard and Judge Hodges
As part of the Settlement Agreement incorporated into the Final Judgment and Decree of
Divorce, both parties waived alimony, but reserved the issue of attorney’s fees for the
determination by the trial court.
At the hearing on the attorney’s fees, the trial court requested clarification as to which
statutory provision applied. Wife’s counsel confirmed twice that the attorney’s fees were sought
under O.C.G.A. §19-6-2. The parties introduced evidence of their respective financial
circumstances as required by O.C.G.A. §19-6-2, and the trial court confirmed that it was only
considering whether to award attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. §19-6-2. The husband’s counsel
objected, arguing that recovery was prohibited under O.C.G.A. §19-6-____ because the parties’
Settlement Agreement had waived alimony. The trial court nonetheless awarded attorney’s fees
of $5,000 to the wife under O.C.G.A. §19-6-2.
The husband filed an Application for Discretionary Appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. §5-6-
35(a)(2) which was granted. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding, “when, as
here, the parties enter into an agreement barring the recovery of alimony, an award of
attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. §19-6-2 likewise is barred”.

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CHILD SUPPORT
Cousin vs. Tubbs
A19A1805
353 Ga. App. 873; 840 S.E.2d 85 ** (2020)
Decided 2/26/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Dillard, joined by Judge Gobeil and Judge Hodges
Herbert Cousin, Jr. is the father of the minor child KT who was born in November, 2011. Tubbs
is the mother. Tubbs and Cousin never married.
In 2012, Cousin was ordered to pay child support of $217.00 per month, provide health
insurance, pay a portion of KT’s unreimbursed medical expenses. In June, 2013, the parties
agreed to a parenting plan which was made part of the Court Order. Under the parenting plan,
Tubbs retained legal and primary physical custody of KT, and Cousin was entitled to visitation
every other weekend, as well as additional times during holidays and vacations.
Over the next several years, Cousin exercised his visitation infrequently. By December, 2015
(when KT was 4 years of age) Cousin had not seen KT for 27 months. Cousin and Tubbs agreed
that they would reestablish Cousin’s relationship with KT by conducting visits supervised by
Tubbs. Such supervised visits began in January, 2016 but ended in June, 2016.
Tubbs filed a Petition to Modify Child Support in March, 2017. Cousin filed a counterclaim,
seeking, among other things, to hold Tubbs in contempt for refusal to allow visitation.
The Trial Court refused to hold Tubbs in contempt. The Trial Court also increased Cousin’s
obligation with the child support obligation to $11,439.00 per month based upon gross monthly
income of over $60,000.00.
Cousin filed a Motion for New Trial which the Trial Court denied, and this appeal followed.
(1) The Court of Appeals refused to disturb the Trial Judges’ ruling refusing to hold Tubbs in
contempt. Cousin failed to meet his burden of establishing that the Trial Court abused its
discretion. The evidence showed that Cousin and Tubbs mutually agreed to the schedule
of supervised visitation, since that Tubbs had not interfered with Cousin’s visitation
rights to an extent that rose to the level of willful contempt of the parenting plan.
(2) (a) The last tax year preceding the hearing in 2018 was 2017. The Court found Cousin’s
representation of his income for 2017 to be not credible, so the Trial Court averaged his
“other income” and adding to that amount his 2017 W2 wages to arrive at monthly gross
income of $63,550.18. A substantial part of Cousin’s income for 2015 and 2016 was
gambling income, against which he also showed gambling losses. Statutory exclusions
from income stated in O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(b) do not include gambling losses. The Trial
Court did not err in failing to exclude Cousin’s gambling loss and other itemized
deductions.

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(b) Cousin also complained that the Court failed to apply theoretical child support for his other
five children. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, stating that applying theoretical
child support was discretionary with the Trial Court.
(c) However, the Trial Court abused discretion in awarding a high income deviation of
$9,352.00 per month. The Court of Appeals provided several numerical examples as to why the
high income deviation of $9,352.00 was an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals noted that
the Child Support Tables fixed the presumptive amount of child support at $2,236.00 per month
for a combined adjusted income of $30,000.00 per month, which is 7.5% of the monthly
combined adjusted income. The current guidelines employ a “regressive sliding scale”,
suggesting that for income in excess of $30,000.00, the applicable percentage should probably be
something less than 7.5%, but even assuming that the percentage remains at 7.5% of income in
excess of $30,000.00 per month, the presumptive amount of child support which should have
been awarded against Cousin was $4,995.30 per month. The Trial Court’s reliance upon the old
guidelines, suggesting applicable percentage of 18% was incorrect. Further, it appeared that the
Trial Court attempted to punish Cousin for his failure in previous years to pay an increase
amount in child support while he simultaneously was spending large amounts of money on
gambling.

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CHILD SUPPORT (continued)
Cousin vs. Tubbs
CHILD SUPPORT
A20A2050
358 Ga. App. 722, 856 S.E.2d 56 ** (2020)
Decided 3/4/2021
Opinion by Judge Hodges, joined by Chief Judge McFadden and Presiding Judge Doyle
This the second appeal of this case.
K.T. was born in November, 2011 and has lived with Tubbs his entire life; the parties
never married.
In March, 2017, Tubbs filed this action in the Trial Court, and in July, 2018, the Trial
Court issued a “Final Order”, increasing Cousin’s child support obligation from $217.00 per
month to $11,439.00 per month based upon a gross monthly income greater than $60,000 per
month. The Final Order also provided, in part, that in the event of an appeal of this Order, that
provisions of this Order shall constitute a new Temporary Order (superseding all prior temporary
or final relief to the contrary) during the pendency of the appeal. “This is to ensure that the child
support obligation created herein shall remain in force and effect during any such appeal.
Failure to comply with any such Temporary Order could subject the offending party to a finding
of contempt of court”.
Cousin’s Motion to Renew Trial was denied, following which he filed a Notice of
Appeal.
During the pendency of the first appeal, Cousin and Tubbs entered into a Consent
Judgment in which Cousin agreed to an arrearage of $82,273 and further agreed to pay an initial
payment of $40,000 toward the arrearage on or before 1/29/20 and the remainder of $42,273 on
or before 4/28/20. Cousin also agreed to pay attorney’s fees to Tubbs of $4,137.96.
On 2/26/20, the Court of Appeals vacated the upward high-income deviation, which
“appeared to have a primary punitive purpose”. The Trial Court filed the Remittitur on 3/19/20,
and, the next day, entered an Order imposing a new upward high-income deviation of $2,591,
resulting in total monthly child support obligation of $4,678.
In the Trial Court, Cousin filed a Motion to Set Aside Consent Order, stating that the
parties negotiated the consent judgment in reliance upon the previous Final Order which was
vacated. In the Motion to Set Aside, Cousin sought either reimbursement or credit against future
payments. The Trial Court disagreed, denied the Motion to Set Aside and request for
reimbursement, but granted a Certificate of Immediate Review. The Court of Appeals granted
Cousin’s Application for Discretionary Appeal.

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s denial of Cousin’s request for
reimbursement or credit against future obligations:
“…as a general matter, where, as here, no…complaint of fraud or mistake was
made, and where the parties reached an agreement on all questions at issue,
which agreement was reduced to writing, was styled an ‘order’, and recited that it
was signed by the Judge, and was agreed to by counsel of the parties, and it was
unquestionably considered by all parties thereto, as well as the Judge, to be an
order of the Court settling the questions involved, the parties consenting thereto
will not be heard to question its validity”.

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Day vs. Mason
CHILD SUPPORT – EXTRACURRICULAR EXPENSES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES
A20A0964
357 Ga. App. 836 (2020)
Decided 11/18/2020
Opinion by Judge Brown, joined by Presiding Judge Dillard and Judge Rickman
Brandon Day and Ariel Mason, who were never married, are parents of a daughter,
K.R.D. who was born in December, 2016. In October, 2018, Day filed the instant action for
legitimation, custody, and visitation. Mason filed an Answer and Counterclaim for paternity,
child support, past child support, K.R.D.’s medical expenses not covered by insurance, and
attorney’s fees. Day and Mason agreed to a Parenting Plan, and the case proceeded to a bench
trial on the remaining issues.
Mason presented evidence that since K.R.D.’s birth, Mason had spent $15,164.44 on non-
childcare, non-medical expenses for K.R.D. since her birth, including clothes, diapers, formulas,
groceries, and toys; $2,272.65 from K.R.D.’s Mother’s Morning Out program. Mason wanted
Day to pay for half of the expenses.
Day presented evidence that he had already voluntarily contributed $16,304 toward
K.R.D.’s expenses, even in the absence of a Child Support Order. The Trial Court awarded
“past expenses” to Mason, including $2,051.32 toward K.R.D.’s childcare expenses – including
the Mother’s Morning Out program – and $7,582.22 toward the other reasonable and necessary
expenses for the minor child prior to the establishment of child support. The Court of Appeals
held that such reimbursement for Day’s share of reasonable and necessary actual past
expenditures was allowable, provided that the Child Support Guidelines are followed. This will
require that the Trial Court include at least a consideration of the following:
(a) The custodial parent’s income.
(b) The non-custodial parent’s income; and
(c) Other child support obligations of the parents.
The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded to the Trial Court consistent with its
instruction. The Court of Appeals further held that laches did not bar such a claim.
The Trial Court ordered Day to pay for half of the extracurricular activities of K.R.D.
The Court of Appeals reversed this, even though Mason contended it to have been as agreed
between she and Day. Requiring Day to pay one-half of the extracurricular activities is a
deviation which must be supported by factual findings.
The Trial Court did not attach a CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET. The Court of
Appeals held that written factual findings are necessary only if the Trial Court determines the

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deviation and Presumptive Amount of Child Support is warranted, and if the Trial Court’s Order
states forth the Court’s factual findings regarding the parties’ income and expenses.
The Trial Court awarded attorney’s fees against Day of $4,757.00 for failure to comply
with discovery. However, in the absence of any showing that Day violated a Court Order
regarding discovery, the fee award was an abuse of discretion and was reversed.
O.C.G.A. §19-9-3(g) does not authorize an award of appellate attorney’s fees.

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Johnson vs. Collins
A19A2277
354 Ga. App. 589; 841 SE2d 189 (2020)
Decided 3/13/2020
Opinion by Judge Coomer, joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge Markle
A Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce was filed on 5/9/1997 (before the current Child
Support Guidelines went into effect) between Daniel Johnson and Roxanna Collins. Johnson
was required to pay child support for their two daughters born on 7/18/1988 and 6/27/1991.
The amount of child support was ordered as 28% of his gross annual income while both
children were in the physical custody of the mother. Child support reduced to 23% of his gross
income once the older child was no longer eligible for support.
Johnson never paid any child support.
On 2/27/2018, Collins filed a Pro Se “Petition to Renew Final Judgment and Decree from
Dormancy so that Proof of Income and Payment of back child support can be collected”.
Johnson filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition, which the trial court granted on the basis that the
divorce decree was dormant. The trial court granted wife’s Motion for Reconsideration, reviving
the entire child support due since the Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce was filed.
Judge Coomer, writing for the Court of Appeals, vacated and remanded the decision of
the trial court and held the following:
1. O.C.G.A. §9-12-60(a)(1) provides that a judgment becomes dormant and shall not be
enforced after seven years. However, O.C.G.A. §9-12-61 allows a dormant judgment
to be revived within 3 years after the date of dormancy.
2. O.C.G.A. §9-12-60(d) provides that the Rule of Dormancy does not apply to child
support awards. However, the statute only applies to judgments entered after
7/1/1997 – and this divorce decree was entered on 5/9/1997, less than two months
before O.C.G.A. §9-12-60(d) became effective.
3. The trial Judge erred when he applied an interest rate of 12% which is the applicable
rate of interest on a judgment stated in O.C.G.A. §7-4-12.1. However, in 2007,
O.C.G.A. §7-4-12.1 was amended which changed the interest rate to 7% and was
stated to “apply to all pending civil actions on or after January 1, 2007”. Although
the instant divorce case was filed when the former version of the statute was
effective, it remained pending on or after January 1, 2007, so the applicable rate of
interest was 7% - not 12%.

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Johnson vs. Johnson
CHILD SUPPORT – DEVIATION FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL
A20A2061
358 Ga. App. 638 (2021)
Decided 3/2/2021
Opinion by Presiding Judge Reese, joined by Judges Markle and Colvin
Brandilyn Kay Johnson and James Herbert Johnson married in 2003. They had two sons
together who were born in 2006 and 2008. In 2017, Brandilyn filed for divorce, seeking custody,
child support, alimony, division of assets, and attorney’s fees. The case was tried in August,
2019, and on 10/30/2019, the Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce was filed with the Clerk.
On 11/25/2019, the husband filed his Motion for New Trial which was denied in February, 2020,
at which time the Court also entered an Amended Divorce Decree correcting some of the
deficiencies alleged by the husband. This appeal followed the Court of Appeals’ grant of the
husband’s Application for Discretionary Review.
(1) First, the husband argued that the Trial Court erred in entering an Amended
Divorce Decree after the term for court had expired. In this case, the original judgment was
entered in the September, 2019 term, and the Amended Decree was entered in the January, 2020
term. “A Judge’s power to revise, correct, revoke, modify, or vacate a judgment does not extend
beyond the same term of court, unless a Motion to Modify or Vacate, etc. is filed within the
same term of court”. Because the Motion was filed in the same term of court that the original
judgment was entered, the Court had the power to amend the original judgment.
(2) The husband contends that the deviation for private school should have applied to
him as a credit because he was the one paying the tuition. However, the Trial Court found that
“the contract for the private school is in the wife’s name and the Court finds it appropriate for
the wife to pay such cost”. The Trial Court committed no error.
(3) The husband complained that the Trial Court erred by requiring him to carry life
insurance in an amount greater than the total amount of alimony and child support. O.C.G.A.
§19-6-4(a) allows a Trial Court to include in its order of support provision for life insurance on
the life of either parent or on the lives of both parents for the benefit of the minor children. This
statute does not limit the value of any such insurance that the future Child Support Obligation of
the parent. The amount is within the Trial Court’s discretion. Similarly, a Trial Court may order
a spouse to carry life insurance for the benefit of the other spouse. The Trial Court committed no
error.
(4) The husband complained that the Trial Court incorrectly computed the
distribution to the wife for her share of equity in the house. The court granted ownership of the
home to the husband in order to pay $71,581.24 to the wife, calculated as follows:

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(a) The value of the marital home was $365,385.
(b) The wife contributed $53,447.19 of her separate property toward the down
payment.
(c) The wife withdrew $5,000 from her IRA for improvements.
(d) The equity in the house is $26,268.10 computed as follows:
(i) Fair Market Value…………………………..$306,937.81
(ii) LESS remaining balance of mortgage…….. <280,669.71>
(iii) Equity……………………………………… $ 26,268.10
(e) Half of the equity is $13,134.05.
(f) The total amount due to the wife was $53,447.19 plus $5,000 plus
$13,134.05 equaling $71,581.24.

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Lockhart vs. Lockhart
CHILD SUPPORT – IMPUTED INCOME
A21A0760
863 S.E.2d 174 (2021)
Decided 9/27/2021
Opinion by Presiding Judge Doyle joined by Judges Reese and Brown
Markiyas Anaz Lockhart (the husband) appealed a Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce
from his former wife, Sharaye Donielle Lockhart. The wife was awarded sole legal custody and
primary physical custody of the four minor children along with child support, alimony, and
attorney’s fees.
The case was tried in a bench trial. The Court of Appeals will not set aside a Trial
Court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and the standard by which findings of
facts are reviewed by the Court of Appeals is the any evidence rule under which a finding by the
Trial Court supported by any evidence must be upheld.
In 2018, the husband moved out of the home and relocated to Las Vegas, NV. In the
three years leading up to his 2018 departure, the husband’s annual earnings ranged from
approximately $58,000 to $61,000 in the towing industry. After he moved to Las Vegas, the
husband’s income faltered. The husband claimed that the COVID-19 pandemic caused him
trouble finding stable work, and at the time of trial, the husband had applied for unemployment
benefits of $181.00 per week which he had not yet received because of a backlog from the
pandemic.
The income of the husband at the time of the Final Hearing was approximately $27,000
per year.
Nonetheless, the Court imputed income to the husband of $4,000 per month and ordered
him to pay child support of $2,076 per month. Additionally, the Court awarded lump sum
alimony of $20,000 to be paid at $800.00 per month.
The Court of Appeals reversed.
“While the parties’ past income is some evidence of earning capacity, it
alone is not conclusive, but must be considered along with other relevant
circumstances. Many other factors need to be examined in order to
determine earning capacity… In order to sustain an award of child
support premised upon earning capacity, there must be evidence that the
parent then has the ability to earn an amount sufficient to pay the
award of support; otherwise, the award cannot stand”.

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Additionally, the husband contended that the Trial Court erred by failing to include in the
wife’s income the support she received from her mother in the form of housing and car
assistance. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the husband and affirmed the Trial Court,
stating that the wife’s testimony was that the payments from her mother were not permanent but
were instead a stop-gap effort made by the grandmother so the wife and the children could avoid
living in a family shelter.
Based upon the finding that the Trial Court erroneously imputed income of $4,000 per
month to the husband, the award of alimony was also reversed and remanded.
The award of attorney’s fees was reversed because the statutory authority was not stated
by the Trial Court.

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Park-Poapes vs. Poapes
A19A2032 & A19A2033
351 Ga. App. 856; 833 SE2d 554 (2019)
Decided 9/18/2019
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judges Mercier and Brown
Haesun Park-Poapes and Richard C. Poapes were married in 2009. Their two daughters
were born in 2010 and 2011. Their Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce was filed in March,
2014 in the Superior Court of Cherokee County. The Parenting Plan awarded them equal
parenting time. The mother was awarded child support. Each parent was allowed to claim one
of the daughters as a dependent on his and her respective Federal and State income tax returns.
In 2014, the mother accepted a college teaching position in Maryland and moved there.
The father continued to reside in Georgia with the children. The mother filed a Petition to
Modify Child Custody, requesting that the children relocate to Maryland with her. The father
filed a reciprocal Petition to Modify Custody, requesting the children continue to reside with him
in Georgia. In August, 2015, the Court entered a Final Order granting the father primary custody
and allowing the mother parenting time on the 1st
and 3rd
weekends, 3-day weekends, certain
holidays, and all but two weeks of the summer.
The same Order modified child support and allowed the mother a travel deviation of
$700.00 to reduce the cash required to be paid to the father to $250 per month. The parties were
also ordered to divide the payment of costs of the children’s extracurricular activities on a pro
rata basis.
In May, 2018, the mother then moved to Ohio to accept a new college teaching and
research position. The father filed a Petition for Modification of Child Support, alleging that the
mother was earning more and that she was not exercising her court-ordered visitation. The father
argued that child support should increase by reason of the mother’s increased income. Also, the
travel deviation should be eliminated.
At the hearing, the trial court found that the income of the mother had increased, and the
court eliminated the travel deviation. Instead of setting the travel deviation at a fixed amount,
the mother received – “a travel deviation for the round-trip air flight of the children, not to
exceed five trips per year. The travel costs will be an unaccompanied minor round-trip plane
ticket for each child for a direct flight purchased at least 30 days in advance. The mother shall
be allowed to deduct the cost of the ticket from the month’s child support payment immediately
following the return trip (i.e. an April Spring Break flight will be deducted from the May
payment). She shall provide proof of the costs of the ticket with the reduced payment amount”.
The trial court also concluded that the father, as primary physical custodian, was
authorized to claim both daughters as dependents for tax purposes, and the Court ruled that the
parties were to divide the costs of extracurricular activities on a pro rata basis.

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1. The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding by the trial court that there had not been a
material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of custody. The
Court of Appeals noted that continued bickering between parents that has “occurred
continuously since the parent’s divorce” does not constitute a material change in
circumstances.
2. The trial court erred in apportioning costs of extracurricular activities on a pro rata
basis. The trial court did not limit its pro rata award to “the additional amount of
special expenses” that exceeded 7% of the Basic Child Support Obligation in
accordance with O.C.G.A. §19-6-15(i)(2)(j)(ii).
3. Allowing the mother to subtract visitation-related travel expenses was a “new
deviation for travel expenses”. As such, it was required to be supported by statutory
written findings required by O.C.G.A. §19-6-15(c)(2)(E)(i)(1)(B). Further,
modification of child support cannot be predicated upon “speculative” future
circumstances, and §19-6-15(c)(2)(a) requires that the trial court’s order specified a
“sum certain amount of child support that a parent must pay as determined by use of
the CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET”. The travel deviation granted by the trial
court, which failed to include any cost information, was too speculative to fall within
the parameters of the Child Support Guidelines. Further, the trial court failed to make
all of the required statutory findings. On remand, the trial court was directed to
reconsider the travel deviation, consistent with the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
4. The trial court was not authorized to award the Federal Income Tax Dependency
Exemption for either child to the mother as non-custodial parent, citing Hulsey vs.
Hulsey, 300 Ga. 45; 792 SE2d 709 (2016).

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Perez vs. Cunningham
Court of Appeals of Georgia, First Division
A20A601
355 Ga. App. 393; 844 S.E.2d 253 (2020)
Decided 6/4/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Doyle, joined by Chief Judge McFadden and Judge Hodges
Cunningham and Perez were unmarried parents of a minor child. On 12/15/2017,
Cunningham filed a Petition for Modification of Child Support against Perez, arguing
that Perez’ income had increased and that he had failed to exercise any visitation with the
child since June, 2014.
In its Order entered on 1/18/2019, the trial court determined that Perez was
responsible to pay increased child support obligations beginning 1/1/2018, the month
after Cunningham filed their Petition. So, the trial court ordered Perez to pay
Cunningham an arrearage of $12,831.00. The retroactive modification is contrary to law
and was vacated and remanded.
The trial court also awarded a parenting time deviation of $300.00 to Cunningham
to increase the amount of child support to be paid by Perez. The Court of Appeals
acknowledged that O.C.G.A. §19-6-15(i)(2)(K)(i) authorized the trial court to deviate
from the Presumptive Amount when the Presumptive Amount is excessive or inadequate
due to inter alia, “visitation rights not being utilized”. However, the explanation for the
deviation on the Child Support Worksheet was not adequate. Specifically, the answer
shown to two of the questions in the Worksheet were simply “yes”. These are held to be
inadequate. The Court of Appeals remanded for entry of appropriate factual findings.

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Ross vs. Small
A20A0372
355 Ga. App. 483 (2020)
Decided 6/11/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Doyle, joined by Presiding Judge McFadden and Judge Hodges
Small sued Ross to establish paternity and child support. Ross failed to answer, and the
Court conducted a hearing, following which Small was awarded periodic child support of
$1,441.00 per month, retroactive child support of $14,835.00 to be paid in monthly installments
of $618.80. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees of $2,771.00.
Judge Doyle, writing for the Court of Appeals, vacated the award of retroactive child
support. The Order of the trial court indicated that the mother testified, stating monthly expenses
for the total number of unsupported months, but the trial court awarded Ross to pay 60% of the
retroactive amount rather than his actual pro rata share of 52.53% as calculated according to the
Guidelines. The trial court did not state any reason for deviation.
Additionally, the award of attorney’s fees was vacated due to the absence of any citation
or statutory authority.

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Spirnak vs. Meadows
A20A0158
355 Ga. App. 857 (2020)
Decided 6/8/2020
Opinion by Judge Markle, joined by Presiding Judge Reese and Judge Colvin
Spirnak and Meadows are parents to a child born in 2009. The parties never married, but
Spirnak legitimated the child in 2010. Meadows retained custody. Spirnak was ordered to pay
child support of $650.00 per month. At the time of the initial custody order, Meadows lived in
Savannah, and Spirnak lived in Atlanta.
Meadows moved to several different states. Spirnak exercised visitation infrequently.
Spirnak worked as a Marketing salesperson until he was laid off in July, 2014, when he began
treatment for cancer. He began working only part-time as a self-employed Tree Specialist and
ceased paying most of his child support. Meadows filed a claim for recovery of unpaid child
support, then Sprinak filed the incident Petition, seeking to modify child support and requesting a
modification of visitation because the child lived in another state. Meadows filed a
Counterclaim for Contempt to collect child support. She also requested a modification of the
Custody Order to impose an upward deviation in child support due to Spirnak’s lack of
visitation. She also sought to require visits to be supervised.
The trial court imposed the condition that overnight visitation be supervised by Spirnak’s
mother, and the court also required Spirnak to provide contact information for his mother and
any of his roommates. The Court of Appeals noted that under O.C.G.A. §9-19-3(b), proof of a
change in circumstances was not necessary to consider the change in visitation.
Spirnak complained that the alleged act of family violence was not upon the child or
upon Meadows. The Court of Appeals noted that O.C.G.A. §9-9-7(a)(2) allows a court to
impose supervised visitation where a parent has committed an act of family violence – the
statutory language does not require that family violence be against the parent or the child.
Spirnak complained that the trial court erred when making his visitation contingent upon
payment of child support and travel expenses. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that the
Order simply relieved Meadows from pre-payment of travel expenses. The trial court’s Order
did not make visitation contingent upon payment of child support.
Requiring Spirnak to provide contact information for his roommates was upheld.

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The trial court awarded interest on the past due child support payments. The Court of
Appeals reversed the award of interest, citing O.C.G.A. §7-4-12.1(a):
“The Court shall have discretion in applying or waiving past due interest. In determining
whether to apply, waive, or reduce the amount of interest owed, the court shall consider
whether:
1. Good cause existed for the non-payment of the child support;
2. Payment of the interest would result in substantial and unreasonable
hardship for the parent owing the interest;
3. Applying, waiving, or reducing the interest would enhance or detract
from the parent’s current ability to pay child support, including the
consideration of the regularity of the payments made for current child
support of those dependents for whom support is owed;
4. The waiver or reduction of interest would result in substantial or
unreasonable hardship to the parent to whom interest is owed”.
The court allowed Spirnak to challenge the award of attorney fees on the grounds that there was
no evidentiary hearing on the amount of the fees – even though he did not challenge the
reasonableness of the fees at trial. The award of attorney’s fees was remanded for the court to
make additional factual findings under O.C.G.A. §§9-15-14 and 9-16-15(k)(5).

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Steed vs. Steed
Court of Appeals of Georgia, Second Division
A20A0316
843 SE2d 21 (2020)
Decided 5/7/2020
Opinion by Judge Coomer, joined by Presiding Judge Miller and Judge Mercier
The father sued his ex-wife to modify the Parenting Plan and child support. The trial
court refused to modify custody, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The trial court increased
child support, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees, and
the Court of Appeals reversed.
The Court of Appeals recognized frequent moves, change of schools, and turning the
children against the non-custodial parent to warrant a finding of change in circumstances.
However, the court in the instant action concluded that the parents simply did not get along, and
evidence of ongoing parental discord and bickering was not a material change of circumstances.
Moreover, even if there had been a material change in circumstances, in this case, it would not
have been in the best interests of the child to modify the original Parenting Plan.
The father also complains that the trial court refused to grant his request for downward
modification of child support. He contended that because he had shoulder surgery, his income
was reduced by more than 25%, and O.C.G.A. §19-6-15(j)(1) states:
“the portion of child support attributable to lost income shall not accrue from the date of the
service to the Petitioner of the modification….”
The Court of Appeals restated the rule that O.C.G.A. §19-6-15(j)(1) does not simply
authorize such child support obligor to begin paying what he or she calculates as the new amount
of child support. “What it does provide is that should the parties seeking the downward
modification prevail on a petition seeking to do so, ‘then the portion of child support attributed
to lost income shall not accrue from the date of service to the petition for modification’ citing
Friday vs. Friday, 294 Ga. App. 687; 690-691 (2) (755 SE2d 707) (2014).
The award of attorney’s fees was reversed because there no bills presented, no testimony
from either of the mother’s attorneys as to the reasonableness of the fees, and no breakdown to
establish what services were provided by the attorneys.

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Wilson vs. Guerrero
A19A2475
353 Ga. App. 501; 838 S.E.2d 588 (2020)
Decided 1/28/2020
Opinion by Judge McMillian, joined by Presiding Judge McFadden and Senior Appellate Judge
Phipps.
Wilson is the father and Guerrero is the mother of a daughter born in December, 2007. In
November, 2009 the parties entered into a final consent order pursuant to which the father
legitimated the child, awarded primary custody to the mother, visitation to the father, and set
child support to be paid by the father to the mother.
In 2016, the father filed a petition for modification to which the mother filed a counterclaim
seeking an increase in child support.
At the hearing, the Trial Court granted the mother’s request for an increase in child support and
awarded her attorney’s fees of $5,000.00.
The father filed a motion for new trial and a motion for reconsideration, challenging the award of
attorney’s fees and challenging the finding by the Trial Court that the mother had paid $4,195.00
per year for extra-curricular activities for the child.
The award of attorney’s fees was reversed because no statutory basis was stated.
The award of child support was remanded. The mother testified at the hearing that she spent a
total of $4,195.00, but it was not clear whether the expenses included child care, extra-curricular
activities, summer care, school care, or a mixture thereof. If the expenses for work related child
care, then they were properly included in Schedule D. If the expenses were extra-curricular
activities, then they should have been included in Schedule E with the appropriate statutory
explanations.

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Winchell vs. Winchell
A19A1531 & A19A2119
352 Ga. App. 306; 835 SE2d 6** (2019)
Decided 10/16/2019
Opinion by Judge McMillian, joined by Chief Judge McFadden and Senior Appellate Judge
Phipps
Following a three-day bench trial, a Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce was filed on
12/15/2017. The final judgment included a Child Support Addendum and attached Child
Support Worksheet which stated the income of both parents and ordered the father to pay $1,973
per month in child support. The Child Support Addendum stated that none of the deviations
from the Presumptive Amount of Child Support applied, and the trial court ordered the following
under a section entitled, “Additional Provisions”:
“A. The Father shall be responsible for all costs associated with the child’s full-
time attendance at the Sanctuary Child Learning Center.
B. The Father shall be responsible for all expenses incurred by the child to
obtaining private school education from 1st
grade through 12th
grade. The costs he shall
be responsible for include tuition, books, matriculation fees, and other incidental
expenses billed by the school. His liability under this paragraph shall not exceed the
costs required for a day student to attend Savannah Christian Preparatory School in
Savannah, Georgia.
Prior to entry of the judgment, the father, through counsel and in his testimony, objected
to payment of private school expenses. Regarding Sanctuary Child Learning Center expenses,
the father agreed he would continue to pay for the child to go to the daycare center, but he
requested a “nominal parenting time deviation to get the child support figure to $1,500” to
account for paying the cost.
Both parties filed timely Motions for Reconsideration which were never ruled upon. The
father’s Application for Discretionary Appeal was accepted by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held that the father waived his right to appeal in the issues related
to calculation of child support and the failure of the trial court to make written findings required
by O.C.G.A. §19-6-15:
“…when the appellant has chosen to file a motion in the trial court in which the
issue of compliance with the fact finding requirements of O.C.G.A. §19-6-15 could
properly have been raised and brought to the trial court’s attention and fails to do so,
that issue is waived on appeal. But, the issue of compliance may be properly raised on
appeal for the first time if the appellant chooses not to file a post-judgment motion in the

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trial court or files a motion in which the issue could not be raised, such as a Motion to
Set Aside”.
Based upon the foregoing, the father in this case waived appellate review of child
support.

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CHOICE OF LAW
Mbatha vs. Cutting
CHOICE OF LAW
A20A1303
356 Ga. App. 743 (2020)
Decided 9/21/2020
Dion Cutting was an attorney in New York before taking time off and traveling to South
Africa. While there in early 2017, she met Senso Mbatha, an attorney living and working in
Johannesburg, South Africa. Cutting returned home to New York, but in September, 2017, she
returned to South Africa and began a romantic relationship with Mbatha.
In January, 2018, Cutting learned that she was pregnant. The couple married in a civil
ceremony in New York on 1/25/18, after learning that it would be easier for Cutting to obtain a
South African Visa if they married outside of South Africa and applied for a Visa with an
embassy. Mbatha returned to South Africa while Cutting stayed behind in New York to pack all
of her belongings and apply for a Visa.
In February, 2018, Cutting secured the Visa and moved to South Africa. The couple then
embarked on a one-month honeymoon in Europe during which the relationship began to sour.
Two months after returning to South Africa from the honeymoon, the parties separated. Mbatha
rented a separate apartment in South Africa for Cutting, but instead of moving to the apartment,
Cutting flew to Georgia in August, 2018 to be with her parents for the remainder of her
pregnancy.
In September, 2018, Cutting gave birth to a daughter. Both Cutting and the child
continue to reside in Georgia with her parents.
On 1/24/19, Mbatha filed a Complaint for Separate Maintenance in the Superior Court of
Forsyth County. On 2/13/19, he converted it to a Complaint for Divorce, seeking joint legal
custody and visitation with the daughter and requesting that each party be awarded all property
held in his or her individual names. Cutting answered and filed a Counterclaim for Divorce. In
September, 2019, she amended her Counterclaim, contending that the appropriate choice of law
to determine her division of marital property is South Africa.
South Africa has a “in community of property” regime, as compared to Georgia’s system,
equitable division.
Following the hearing, the Trial Court entered an Order concluding that because the
parties executed their marital contract in New York, the Court would look to New York law to
determine how New York would undertake a conflict of laws approach concerning a New York
contract. The Trial Court then applied the New York “Center of gravity” approach to conclude

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that the law of South Africa should apply to the parties’ property distribution and alimony
claims.
The Court of Appeals granted Mbatha’s Application for Interlocutory Review. On
appeal, Mbatha contends that the Trial Court erred in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction
over his claim for divorce. He also contends on appeal that the Trial Court erred in concluding
that South African law, rather than Georgian law, should govern the division of the parties’
property.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Mbatha that the Trial Court erred in determining that it
lacked jurisdiction over his claim for divorce.
The Court of Appeals rejected the Trial Court’s Application of New York’s “Center of
Gravity” approach. “In our view, a Georgia court should apply Georgia’s approach in a conflict
of law analysis”. Under the Georgia approach, contracts are to be governed as to their nature,
validity, and interpretation by the law of the place where they were made, except from where it
appears from the contract itself that it is to be performed in the state other than which it is made,
in which case the laws of the sister state will be applied. Accordingly, the parties’ interest in any
real property should be determined under the law of the jurisdiction in which it is located, while
interests in personal property should be determined under the law of the owner’s domicile at the
time the property was acquired.

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CIVIL CASE DISPOSITION FORM – MOTION TO VACATE
Paul vs. Paul
A20A194
390 Ga. App. 846 S.E.2d 138 (2020)
Decided 6/25/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Doyle and joined by Judge Hodges with concurrence by
Chief Judge McFadden
On November 5, 2015, the Superior Court of Cobb County entered a FINAL
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE, incorporating the Settlement Agreement.
On November 2, 2018 – three days before the expiration of the three-year period allowed
to move to set aside the judgment due to fraud – the wife filed a Motion to Vacate Final Decree.
She provided the husband’s attorney with a copy of the Motion, but she did not effect personal
service on the husband until February 5, 2019, a few weeks before the hearing on March 1, 2019.
On December 17, 2018, the husband filed a Limited/Special Appearance, moving to
dismiss the wife’s Motion, arguing that it should have been filed as a new action and thus, timely
personal service on him was required by O.C.G.A.§9-11-60(f).
On May 3, 2019, following the hearing, the Superior Court granted the husband’s Motion
to Dismiss, complaining that the Final Judgment and Decree “terminated the litigation with
prejudice, resolving all pending issues between the parties in closing the action”.
Judge Doyle, writing for the Court of Appeals, held that service upon the husband’s
attorney was sufficient, and personal service upon the husband was not required. Importantly,
Judge Doyle cited O.C.G.A.§9-11-58(b):
“The filing with the Clerk of the judgment, signed by the Judge, with the
fully completed Civil Case Disposition Form constitutes the entry of the judgment, and,
unless the Court otherwise directs, no judgment shall be effected for any purpose until
the entry of the same, as provided in this sub-section”.
Here, the husband who was the Petitioner in the original action for divorce, did not file a
Civil Case Disposition Form with the Final Divorce Decree, leaving the case “open” for
purposes of determining service of the Motion to Set Aside. The husband’s attorney had not
filed a Notice of Withdrawal and remained as counsel of record.
In his concurrence, Chief Judge McFadden relies upon O.C.G.A.§9-11-60(f) which
allows Motions to Set Aside Judgment to be served “as any other motion” on the attorneys who
represented the husband, and in the divorce and who continued to represent the husband in
related litigation between the parties.

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CLERICAL ERROR
Ekhorutomwen vs. Jamison
CLERICAL ERROR
A20A1539
356 Ga. App. 807 (2020)
Decided 9/29/2020
Opinion by Judge Pipkin, joined by Presiding Judge Barnes and Judge Gobeil
Dominishe Jamison (the mother) and Osagie Ekhorutomwen (the father) had two children
born out of wedlock: J.E. who was born in 2011, and N.E. who was born in 2015.
In 2013, during a break in the relationship between Osagie and Dominishe, the father
successfully petitioned to legitimate J.E. His Petition was granted in February, 2014 and ordered
the father to pay child support. However, at the hearing, the father testified that his income was
$1,600 per month, but the Trial Court found the father’s income to be $3,600 per month.
According to the Child Support Worksheet and a Child Support Addendum, the Child Support
Obligation should have been $587.00 per month, but the Order of the Court required the father to
pay only $160 per month.
The parties then reconciled, and N.E. was born. In 2016, the relationship between the
mother and the father ended. In 2018, the father filed a Petition to Legitimate N.E., accompanied
by an Emergency Motion to Modify Custody.
Following the hearing, the Trial Court awarded joint legal custody and awarded primary
physical custody to the father. The Court ruled on child support and noted that its Order from
February, 2014 awarded only $160.00 per month – and that was inconsistent with the Child
Support Worksheet and the Child Support Addendum. The Trial Court concluded that the
ordered amount of $160.00 was a scrivener’s error. Child support should have been fixed at
$587 per month, which would give rise to an arrearage of $29,036 (($587 - $160) x (68 months)
= $29,306).
The father’s Application for Discretionary Appeal was granted.
Ordinarily, the power of a Trial Court to amend or modify judgment ends with the term
in which the judgment was entered. However, a Trial Court may correct clerical mistakes in
Orders “arising from oversight or omission” at any time, upon its own initiative or the Motion
filed by a party (O.C.G.A. §9-11-60(g)). The Court of Appeals holds that the award of $160 per
month was not a new clerical error. Although the Child Support Worksheet and the Child
Support Addendum showed a different amount, the Trial Court’s Order contained no reference
to either the Worksheet or the Addendum.

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Furthermore, even if the $160 per month were properly construed as a clerical error, the
Trial Court erred in ordering payment of $29,306 in past due child support. It is well settled that
a Trial Court may not retroactively modify child support. Any change to child support must
operate prospectively.
The judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

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CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
Walia vs. Walia
A20A1305
356 Ga. App. 387 (2020)
Decided 7/30/2020
Opinion by Judge Colvin, joined by Gobeil and Pipkin
The father, Gursharanjit Walia, sued his son, Harpreet Walia, to collect on a loan.
(1) The son, Harpreet Walia, selected a condominium that he wished to purchase.
(2) His father, Gursharanjit Walia, gifted Harpreet the down payment of $27,500.
(3) Harpreet failed to qualify for the mortgage.
(4) So, the father, Gursharanjit, paid the remainder of the purchase price of $110,000 in cash.
(5) The rules of the condominium development required each condominium to be owner-
occupied, so when the condominium was purchased, father and son each took a 50%
share as joint tenants with right of survivorship. The closing was on 7/24/2009.
(6) About two weeks later, on 8/4/2009, father and son executed a “notarized document”
wherein the son promised to repay his father $110,000 in 360 equal semi-monthly
payments of $305.55 each with no interest accruing. The “notarized document”
provided for such payments to begin on 1/1/2011.
(7) The “notarized document” also provided that the son would pay taxes, association fees,
maintenance, and utilities.
(8) The son lived in the condominium for five years before he moved to another city. He
never paid any payments to the father, and the father had to invest an additional
$20,170 to pay property taxes, insurance, and association dues which the son failed to
pay.
(9) After the son moved out of the condominium, the father conveyed his 50% to another
son, Sonny, who lived there for a while, but then moved out and conveyed what was
originally the father’s 50% interest back to the father.
(10) When it became clear that the condominium was to be sold, the father, Gursharanjit,
sued Harpreet for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, misappropriation,
conversion, and constructive trust. The father filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
The trial court held a hearing on father’s Motion for Summary Judgment, but the
hearing was not transcribed. The trial court granted the father’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, and the son appealed.

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On appeal, the son argued that the father’s breach of contract claim failed for lack of
consideration because the “notarized document” attesting their repayment terms was executed
after the father closed on the mortgage. The Court of Appeals acknowledged the rule that Past
Consideration will not support a subsequent promise. However, at the hearing, the father
provided uncontested testimony in his affidavit that he paid for the condominium with the
intention that all but the down payment would be a loan to his son and that both parties
understood this agreement at the time the purchase was closed. The trial court concluded that the
loan document and repayment terms were all contemplated by the parties at the time of purchase
of the condominium and were part of the same transaction and occurrence. So, the Court of
Appeals rejected the son’s argument that the “notarized document” was unenforceable because
there was no present consideration.
At the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court also granted the
constructive trust demanded by the father in his lawsuit. Even though the father waited nine
years after the “notarized document” was signed to file his lawsuit, the Court of Appeals found
that the father had not waived his right to a constructive trust.
The son argued that constructive trusts are not available for breach of contract actions.
However, the trial court granted summary judgment on the father’s claim not only for breach of
contract, but also unjust enrichment. Because the constructive trust is a remedy available to a
Plaintiff who prevails on a claim for unjust enrichment, the Court of Appeals affirmed the award
of constructive trust to the father.
The trial court awarded punitive damages which the Court of Appeals held were not
recoverable in this case, even if the party breaching the contract did so in bad faith. The award
of punitive damages was reversed.

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CONTEMPT
McCarthy vs. Ashment
A19A0788
353 Ga. App. 270; 835 S.E.2d 745 (2019)
Decided 10/30/2019
Ashment and McCarthy divorced in 2012. Ashment was awarded primary physical
custody of the four children, and the Decree obligated McCarthy to pay child support of $800.00
per month.
McCarthy was found to be in arrears, and in 2013, he was twice found in contempt and
ordered to jail until he purged himself.
In the instant action filed in November, 2016, Ashment filed a Motion for Contempt
based upon McCarthy’s failure to pay over $50,000 in child support and an award of attorney’s
fees. McCarthy had the case removed to Federal Court. The case was remanded back to
Superior Court in December, 2016. McCarthy filed multiple motions to recuse the Trial Judge
and the entire Cobb County Judicial Circuit, all of which were denied. McCarthy also filed the
following Motions:
(1) A Motion to Dismiss the contempt citation based upon failure of Ashment to comply
with O.C.G.A. §19-6-28(b).
(2) A Motion to Disqualify Ashment’s attorney.
(3) A Demand for Jury Trial.
Following the hearing on 6/28/2018, the Trial Court found McCarthy in contempt and
ordered him incarcerated until he purged himself of contempt by paying $10,000 toward his
arrearage and paying an additional $800 per month.
Holdings:
(1) O.C.G.A. §19-6-28(b) requires a Motion for Contempt to be heard promptly:
“A child support contempt motion shall be served upon a respondent with a notice
that contains a date certain for hearing which shall be no later than 30 days from the
date of service of the motion, unless good cause for a later date is found by the court,
in which event the time for a hearing may be extended for up to 30 days”.
Ashment filed her Motion for Contempt on 11/11/2016, and McCarthy was served on
11/14/2016. McCarthy was later served with a Rule Nisi on 12/7/2016 which set the matter
down for trial on 1/10/2017. Judge Coomer, writing for the Court of Appeals, held that the 30-

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day requirement of O.C.G.A. §19-6-28(b) was satisfied if the notice of the hearing was served
within 30 days following the date of service of the Motion for Contempt.
(2) McCarthy attempted to disqualify Ashment’s attorney, Hylton B. Dupree, Jr.
McCarthy claimed that his mother telephoned Dupree, asking if Dupree could represent
McCarthy. McCarthy claimed that his mother spoke with Dupree for 37 minutes, and during the
call, Dupree was provided with privileged information by McCarthy’s mother about McCarthy.
Dupree denied that there was a conflict and filed an Affidavit from his law firm’s administrator
to that effect. The Court of Appeals held “despite McCarthy’s contentions to the contrary, he
has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in its refusal to disqualify Ashment’s
attorney”. The refusal of the trial court to disqualify Dupree was affirmed.
(3) McCarthy claims that O.C.G.A. §15-1-4(b) grants him the right to a jury trial in
an action for contempt. The Court of Appeals restated the rule in Brannon vs. Brannon, 225 Ga.
677; 171 SE2d 123 (1969) that a “person is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of ability to
pay or contempt for failure to pay alimony and child support”.
McCarthy also complained that the trial court erred in granting Ashment’s Motion for
Contempt because McCarthy was not provided with notice that Ashment sought to have him held
in contempt for (1) failing to provide medical insurance for the children; and (2) failing to pay
50% of the children’s uncovered medical expenses; and (3) failing to pay 50% of extracurricular
activities and school expenses. However, at the hearing, McCarthy testified as to all such issues,
and “made no indication to the trial court that he was not prepared for or aware that those
matters would be discussed”. The Court of Appeals found that actions and motions gave
McCarthy adequate notice of the nature of her claims for contempt.
(4) McCarthy claims that the trial court erred by failing to follow the mandates of
O.C.G.A. §§7-4-11 and 7-4-12.1 in applying interest to his arrearage of child support or
attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals found the trial court’s findings of fact to be adequate such
that the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in awarding interest on the arrearage of child
support and attorney’s fees.
(5) The trial court entered an order awarding attorney’s fees on 6/5/2015. During the
pendency of the divorce, McCarthy filed a Motion on 11/18/2013 to recuse Judge Reuben Green
and the entire Cobb Judicial Circuit. On 8/25/2014, Judge Kell of the Superior Court of Cobb
County entered a Sua Sponte Order of Recusal and Transfer. McCarthy contends that no order
was ever entered that resolved his Motion for Recusal prior to the Order of 6/5/2015 awarding
attorney’s fees. McCarthy relied upon the following language of U.S.C.R. 25.4 to support his
contention that the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to enter an order on attorney’s fees:
“…when the motion pertains to all like judges in the circuit, the District
Administrative Judge will select a Judge outside the circuit to hear the motion”.
The Court of Appeals recognized that this procedure was not followed as it related to
McCarthy’s Motion for Recusal filed on 11/18/2013. However, the Court of Appeals stated that
it found no legal authority to support the proposition that the filing of the Motion for Recusal

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automatically divests a court of jurisdiction of a case until the Motion is subsequently ruled upon
by another Judge. Additionally, McCarthy never appealed the Order of 6/5/2015 awarding
attorney’s fees, nor did he move to have the Order set aside, vacated or reversed. The Court of
Appeals accordingly found the Order awarding attorney’s fees to be valid and affirmed.

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CONTEMPT (continued)
Rose vs. Clark
CONTEMPT – TUITION PAID OUTSIDE OF CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET
A21A0172
360 Ga. App. 440; 859 S.E. 2d 137 (2021)
Decided 6/16/21
Opinion by Presiding Judge Doyle, joined by Judges Reese and Brown
Timothy Rose and Bethany Clark were divorced in 2014. They entered into a
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT which was approved by the Court and made a part of the Final
Judgment and Decree of Divorce. According to the Agreement, the mother (Clark) was awarded
primary physical custody, and Rose (the father) agreed to pay Clark $518.00 per month for child
support and to pay half of the child’s school tuition expenses.
In August, 2018, the parties filed Motions for Contempt and Modification of Child
Support which were consolidated for trial. In 2019, following an Evidentiary Hearing, the Court
entered a Final Order finding that Rose had a net tuition arrearage of $4,966.95 and an ongoing
obligation to pay $7,630 for the 2019/2020 school year. The Trial Court also increased Rose’s
monthly child support obligation from $518.00 per month to $1,048 per month. Clark was
awarded $10,050.47 in attorney’s fees. Rose appealed.
(1) Rose contended that he could not be held in contempt because his obligation to
pay half of the child’s school tuition was part of the Settlement Agreement and not part of the
Child Support Worksheet. The Court of Appeals held that because the Settlement Agreement
was incorporated into the Final Judgment and Decree, Rose’s failure to comply with the
Agreement was also a violation of the Divorce Decree, thereby exposing him to contempt.
(2) To justify the increase in child support, the Trial Court found that Rose’s income
had increased, and the Court further applied a deviation of $225.39 per month for “extraordinary
education expenses. Rose contended that such a deviation was inconsistent with the terms of the
Settlement Agreement which was intended to share the tuition costs equally between the parents.
Notwithstanding Rose’s argument that the Trial Court improperly shifted some of the tuition
costs to him, the Court of Appeals found no basis for reversal. The standard for review of the
Trial Court’s ruling on a Petition to Modify is “abuse of discretion”, and the Court of Appeals
will uphold the factual findings underlying the ruling if supported by any evidence.
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence authorized the Trial Court to conclude that
the parties had each experienced a substantial change in their incomes and financial status.
Additionally, a deviation for extraordinary educational expenses was based upon findings of
changed income and the tuition costs of private school. The Child Support Worksheet and
supporting Schedule adequately memorialized the rationale for the deviation, and the increase in
child support was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

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However, The Court of Appeals reversed the award of attorney’s fees because the Trial
Court failed to identify the statutory basis or the findings necessary to support the award. The
Court noted that Clark’s answer to Rose’s Petition for Contempt contained a counterclaim for
attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. §9-15-14, but when the Court exercises its discretion and
assesses attorney’s fees and costs of litigation under O.C.G.A. §9-15-14, it is incumbent upon the
Trial Court to specify the conduct upon which the award is made and whether or not the award is
under O.C.G.A. §9-15-14(a) or (b). If the award was pursuant to O.C.G.A. §19-6-2, then the
Trial Court must “make findings of fact regarding the relative financial circumstances of each
party, or otherwise cause the record to show that such has been properly considered”.

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Sullivan vs. Harper
A19A1629
352 Ga. App. 427; 834 SE2d 921 (2019)
Decided 10/22/2019
Opinion by Judge Hodges, joined by Presiding Judge Dillard and Judge Gobeil
Mary Julius Sullivan and John Anthony Harper are the parents of W.H., their older son
who requires academic tutoring and various therapies for Autism Spectrum Disorder. They were
divorced in 2016, and a Consent Final Parenting Plan awarded joint legal custody of the boys to
both parents with primary physical custody to Sullivan. The following are relevant provisions
from the Parenting Plan:
“Both parties have the right to consult with and receive any and all information,
records, paperwork, report cards, or other documents concerning the children
directly from the children’s schools, camps, healthcare providers, tutors, therapy
facilities, and the like, and the other shall not object to that party so doing.
The party who has physical custody of the children shall be responsible for taking
them to their therapy appointments…..
Both parties have the right to a full and complete disclosure of any and all
information relating to the children, and to directly request informational
documents from any educational, health,….and neither will interfere with the
other party’s right to receive or obtain such records.
The child, W.H., began seeing a new psychologist who performed a comprehensive
evaluation that required both parents to complete written questionnaires. Sullivan expressed
concern that Harper was “manipulative and child-like, which with his girlfriend and her two
sons, and emotionally abused or neglected W.H. and minimized the bullying W.H. experienced”.
In addition, Sullivan indicated on the form that “Dad” had drug/alcohol problems, domestic
violence, physical sexual abuse, and ADHD, and anxiety.
In one of the “feedback” sessions, Harper brought his fiancé. Sullivan complained and
informed the psychologist that Harper was the “only person authorized to attend the sessions and
insisted that Harper’s ‘latest girlfriend’ was not permitted to attend the therapy sessions”.
Harper asked the trial court to release her files to him. Before doing so, the trial court
sought the counsel of Sullivan who withheld her consent at first, but then consented. Harper
filed the instant Petition for Contempt, alleging that Sullivan had violated the Parenting Plan and
the Divorce Decree by disparaging him to the children’s doctors, interfering with disclosure of
records and information to Harper, and by prohibiting Harper’s fiancé from attending the
feedback sessions.

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The trial court found Sullivan to be in contempt. The Court of Appeals held that the trial
court’s clarification of the Order did not improperly modify the Parenting Plan. The Court of
Appeals noted that the Parenting Plan was silent as to whether a parent could bring a third party
to an appointment.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Sullivan’s derogatory comments on the questionnaire about Harper, even though in a therapeutic
setting, were contentious.
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion by finding Sullivan in contempt for failure
to immediately release the documents and therapist file to Harper. When Harper was asked, she
first stated that she “requested to receive consultation prior to W.H.’s documents being
released”. The next day, the documents were released. The trial court nonetheless found
Sullivan to be in contempt, and the Court of Appeals upheld such finding by the trial Judge.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in finding that Sullivan was in
contempt for refusing to allow Harper’s fiancé to attend the therapy sessions. The Court of
Appeals held that the Parenting Plan was “sufficiently vague on this point that the trial court
found it necessary to clarify Harper’s right to bring his fiancé. In the absence of a clear
directive that either parent could bring a third party to the appointments, Sullivan could not be
found in contempt in this regard”.

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Wall vs. James
CONTEMPT - VISITATION
A20A2058
358 Ga. App. 121 (2021)
Decided 1/15/2021
Opinion by Presiding Judge Dillard, joined by Judges Rickman and Brown
Angela Wall and Donny James were never married, but they are the parents of E.J., a 15-
year-old daughter. In 2017, a court decreed that E.J. was James’ legitimate child and awarded
primary custody to Wall who lived in Georgia. James lived in Maryland. James continues to live
in Maryland.
Relevant portions of the Parenting Plan follow:
(1) Daily phone calls from James to the minor child’s phone shall be restricted, and both
parents may Facetime, Skype, or use other social media to communicate with the
minor child on an unrestricted basis when the child is in the custody and care of the
other parent.
(2) Wall was awarded custodial time on Thanksgiving in the odd-numbered years from
“Thanksgiving 2017 forward (from 6:00 p.m. on the day school recesses for
Thanksgiving until 6:00 p.m. on the Sunday night before school resumes), and James
will have such time in even-numbered years”.
(3) James was awarded the first half of Christmas holidays in the odd-numbered years
“from after school lets out for Christmas break until 9:00 a.m. on December 27th
”.
(4) The holiday parenting time/visitation takes precedence over the regular parenting
time/visitation schedule during the school year.
On 10/10/2019, Wall filed a Petition for Modification of Visitation against James. She
attached an “Affidavit of Election” in which E.J. stated “While I love my father, I do not want to
visit with him at this time, and I would like for all future visits with him to be as he and I can
agree”.
James filed a Counterclaim against Wall, contending that she was in contempt of the
Parenting Plan by preventing him from (1) visiting with E.J. during November, 2019; (2) visiting
with E.J. during his allotted time for Christmas, 2019; and (3) speaking with E.J. by telephone
between October, 2019 and February, 2020.
The Trial Court denied Wall’s Motion to Modify Visitation and instead granted James’
Counterclaim for Contempt. On appeal, Wall challenged only the Trial Court’s order finding her
in contempt. The Court of Appeals reversed.

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The Court of Appeals will not disturb the Trial Court’s determination on issues of
contempt absent an abuse of discretion. So, the Court of Appeals will affirm a ruling of
contempt if there is any evidence in the record to support it. In this case, there was no
supporting evidence.
The Parenting Plan awarded parenting time to Wall during the Thanksgiving Break of
odd-numbered years beginning on the last day of school. At the hearing, counsel for James
produced a school calendar which showed Monday as the first day of Thanksgiving Break. That
should not have mattered. The Parenting Plan clearly stated that for purposes of interpreting the
Parenting Plan, Thanksgiving Break began on the last day of school. So, Wall was not in
contempt.
No specific definite time was stated in the Parenting Plan for commencement of
Christmas parenting time for James. Wall was at the pick-up point at 1:30 p.m. James as at the
pick-up point at 4:00 p.m. There was no evidence to show what, if any, effort was made by
either Wall or James to resolve the discrepancy in meeting time, and the record is completely
silent. The Trial Court abused its discretion in finding Wall in contempt on those grounds.
James is not able to contact E.J. by telephone because E.J. neither picked up nor returned
his calls. However, there was no evidence that Wall restricted E.J.’s telephone access. In fact,
E.J. testified “in-camera” that Wall instructed her to call her father during the relevant period,
but she did not do so because she was “scared” and knew that any phone call was “going to be
awkward”. The Trial Court abused its discretion by finding Wall in willful contempt on this
ground as well.
Wall correctly argued that the Trial Court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to James
under O.C.G.A. §19-6-2. Because the Court of Appeals determined the evidence did not support
the Trial Court’s finding of contempt, the award of attorney’s fees was also erroneous and was
reversed.
The Trial Court also sanctioned Wall by ordering her to repay the cost of airline tickets
purchased by James for “aborted visitation efforts”. This was reversed as well. The components
of cost were either not related to a count of contempt or were related to a count of contempt
which was reversed on appeal. Such sanctions were reversed also.

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CUSTODY
Blackwelder vs. Shugard
CUSTODY – ACTIONS BY GRANDPARENTS AND THIRD PARTIES
A21A0483
360 Ga. App. 306; 861 S.E. 2d 141 (2021)
Decided 6/28/21
Opinion by Judge Reese, joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge Brown
Ronald Blackwelder and Krista Shugard have three minor children. Blackwelder filed a
Petition for Legitimation, and in an emergency hearing, the Trial Court found that Shugard had
allowed the children to excessively miss school; that Shugard appeared to be intoxicated,
delusional, and incoherent when Blackwelder retrieved the children for visitation; and that
Shugard’s home was filthy. The Trial Court awarded primary physical custody to Blackwelder.
Further, after Shugard failed a hair follicle test after intentionally falsifying a urine test to
conceal use of amphetamines, DFCS intervened and temporarily placed the children with
Blackwelder.
The maternal grandmother, Debbie Dye, filed a Motion to Modify and Clarify the Interim
Order. At a subsequent hearing, the Court awarded temporary custody to Dye because
Blackwelder failed a drug test and was living with a woman to whom he was not married,
contrary to the best interests of the children. The Court also found that Blackwelder had a
history of domestic violence, and while drinking beer and engaging in an angry barrage of text
messages to Dye, he allowed the youngest of the three children to fall into the pool and almost
drown.
Custody disputes between a parent and a close third party relative, including
grandparents, are governed by O.C.G.A. §19-7-1(b.1). The parent may lose custody of his child
to a grandparent only “if the Court hearing the issue of custody, and the exercise of its sound
discretion and taking into consideration all of the circumstances of the case, determines that an
award of custody to such third party is for the best interests of the….children and will best
promote their welfare and happiness. This finding must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence”.
The best interests of the child’s standard of O.C.G.A. §19-7-1(b.1) requires the third
party to show that parental custody would harm the child. Such harm to the child must be
proven to rebut the statutory presumption in favor of the parent. Once this presumption is
overcome, the third party must show that an award of custody to him or her will best promote the
child’s health, welfare, and happiness. Harm in this context means “either physical harm or
significant long-term emotional harm”.
The Court of Appeals affirmed and held that the Trial Court addressed the factors
required by Clark vs. Wade, 273 Ga. 587; 544 SE2d 99 (2001):

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(1) Who are the past and present caretakers of the child?
(2) With whom has the child formed psychological bonds and how strong are those
bonds?
(3) Have the competing parties evidenced interest in, and contact with, the child over
time?
(4) Does the child have unique medical or psychological needs that one party is better
able to meet?

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CUSTODY (continued)
Brazil vs. Williams
CUSTODY – RELOCATION
A21A0037
359 Ga. App. 487; 859 S.E. 2d 490 (2021)
Decided 5/19/2021
Opinion by Presiding Judge Miller, joined by Judges Hodges and Pipkin
Tannis Brazil and Oliver Williams divorced in 2017. The Trial Court granted the father
primary physical custody of their daughter, H.N.W. Williams (the father) relocated from
Georgia to Michigan. Brazil finished a sentence of incarceration and was now more able to care
for their daughter. At the hearing on Brazil’s Petition asking the Court to award her primary
custody, the Guardian Ad Litem recommended that Brazil have primary physical custody
because it would be easier for Williams to visit the child than to have the child travel back and
forth.
The Trial Court granted Williams’ Motion for Directed Verdict, concluding that his
relocation was not a material change in circumstances. Brazil appealed.
Presiding Judge Miller, writing for the Court of Appeals, affirmed, finding no abuse of
discretion in the Trial Court’s grant of Motion for Directed Verdict against the mother. The
Court found that the father’s relocation was not a material change in circumstances, specifically
reasoning that the parties lived two hours away from each other before the move, and they were
now located less than 2 hours away from each other by airplane.
Bodne vs. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445; 588 SE2d 728 (2003) established the two-part test to be
used in actions to modify custody:
(1) The Trial Court must determine whether there has been a material change in
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child since the last custody award.
(2) If so, the Trial Court then determines whether the child’s best interests will be served
by a change in custody.
No language in Bodne intimates that a parent’s out-of-state relocation automatically and
necessarily constitutes a material change in circumstances that warrants the second-prong Best-
Interests Inquiry. The Trial Court’s finding of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless abused,
and even slight evidence supporting the Trial Court’s ruling will suffice. Here, the Court of
Appeals determined that the father’s relocation was not a material change because (1) at the time
of the divorce, the parties lived 2 hours away from each other, which was contemplated by the
Final Decree; and (2) given the father’s move to Michigan, the parties were located less than 2
hours away from each other by plane.
Having found no material change, the Trial Court properly declined to proceed to the
Best-Interests Inquiry. Thus, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the father’s
Motion for Directed Verdict.

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CUSTODY (continued)
Burnham vs. Burnham
CUSTODY - RELOCATION
A20A1243
360 Ga. App. 580; 851 S.E. 2d 202 (2020)
Decided 11/2/2020
Opinion by Judge Gobeil, joined by Presiding Judge Barnes and Judge Pipkin
Alexa and Bruce Burnham divorced in June, 2016. They had two children together, a son
born in 2007, and a daughter, born in 2010. Neither had a lawyer during the divorce. The
Separation Agreement was downloaded from Legal Zoom. The Separation Agreement awarded
joint legal custody, with Alexa having primary physical custody and Bruce having visitation
from Wednesday afternoons until Sunday afternoons on the 1st
and 3rd
weekends of each month,
as laid out in a separate Parenting Plan. Bruce agreed to pay child support of $1,746.00 per
month. Alexa was awarded the marital home located in Palmetto, Coweta County, GA. Under a
heading titled “Miscellaneous Agreements”, the parties agreed to live within 120 miles of their
current home address in the marital home until the minor children were 18 years of age unless
either party and/or their spouse relocates due to employment.
In November, 2017, Alexa informed Bruce that she intended to move from Coweta
County to a new residence located in Marietta – still within 120 miles of the marital residence.
Based on the move announced by Alexa, Bruce filed a Complaint to Modify Child Custody,
Parenting, and Child Support, asserting that the move would constitute a material change in
circumstances warranting a change in custody. Alexa filed her own Petition for Modification of
Visitation, explaining that her upcoming move would “necessitate a modification in the current
visitation schedule”. After a hearing, the Trial Court issued the Final Order granting Bruce’s
Petition, finding that it was in the best interest of the children to remain in Coweta County.
Primary physical custody was transferred from Alexa to Bruce. Alexa appealed that original
Order, and the Court of Appeals vacated the original Order because the original Order of the
Trial Court failed to consider the threshold question of the material change in circumstances
before moving on to the issue of what was in the children’s best interests. The Court of Appeals
remanded for further proceedings, and the Trial Court issued a second Final Order, explicitly
finding four material changes in circumstances to justify the change in custody:
(1) A significant reduction from the visitation and parenting time that the children
had enjoyed with Bruce since 2017;
(2) Alexa’s relocation to Marietta;
(3) Bruce buying a home within the children’s school district in Coweta County,
which would allow them to remain in the same school district; and

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(4) The son’s enrollment in counseling after he exhibited behavioral changes
related to the divorce. Primary custody was again awarded to Bruce, and
Alexa was ordered to pay child support to Bruce of $669.00 per month. Alexa
filed a Motion for New Trial which was denied after the hearing. This appeal
followed.
In this appeal, Alexa contends that the Trial Court erred in finding a material change in
circumstances affecting the children’s best interests to justify a change in custody. Specifically,
she argues that the Separation Agreement, executed by the parties and incorporated into the
Divorce Decree, contemplated that the parties would live within 120 miles of the marital home in
Palmetto, GA and precluded such a finding.
The Court of Appeals noted “Relocation of one parent does not alone constitute a
material change in circumstances”. In this case, however, the Trial Court found several changes
in circumstances.
Additionally, the language in the Separation Agreement stating that the parties’ plan to
live within 120 miles of each other was not accepted by the Court of Appeals as a waiver by
Bruce of his right to modify custody as long as Alexa stays within 120 miles of the marital
residence. Such a waiver must be cast and “very clear waiver language”. Additionally, at the
hearing, when asked about this provision, Bruce stated that “It was part of the Legal Zoom
paperwork” and he believed it to be “commonplace” language. Because she failed to prove any
specific intent behind the provision, Alexa’s claim that Bruce waived his right to modify custody
was denied by the Court of Appeals.

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CUSTODY (continued)
Capehart vs. Mitchell
CUSTODY
A20A1697
851 S.E.2d 846 (2020)
Decided 11/25/2020
Christopher Capehart and Mayah Mitchell divorced in 2014. Immediately thereafter,
Capehart petitioned to modify the custodial arrangement. Capehart alleged that Mayah’s new
husband, Todd, abused the children. The Trial Court entered a series of Consent Orders that
awarded Mayah initial visitation with the children, but barred Todd Mitchell from being around
them. On 3/28/17, the Trial Court entered an Order modifying the earlier custodial arrangement
to award Capehart sole legal and physical custody of the children. That same Order identified
Todd Mitchell as an intervening party in the case.
In February, 2019, Mayah filed a Motion to Set Aside under O.C.G.A. §9-11-60(d). The
Trial Judge granted the Motion to Set Aside on the ground that Todd Mitchell lacked standing
and so was not a proper party with the modification action originally filed in 2014. Capehart
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.
By setting aside the custodial arrangement established in the Order of 3/28/17, the Trial
Court effectively modified child custody. However, Capehart’s appeal from the Order to Set
Aside does not directly challenge a substantive ruling regarding child custody – so Capehart
cannot directly appeal under O.C.G.A. §5-6-34(a)(11) which permits direct appellant review of
“all judgments or orders in child custody cases awarding, refusing to change, or modifying child
custody…”. Instead, the Order from the Trial Court merely setting aside the judgment was not a
substantive ruling regarding child custody. Capehart therefore should follow the Interlocutory
Appeal Procedure set out in O.C.G.A. §5-6-34(b).

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CUSTODY (continued)
Harrison vs. Whitaker
CUSTODY – MODIFICATION
A21A0755
862 S.E.2d 597 (2021)
Decided 8/26/2021
Opinion by Judge Markle, joined by Presiding Judge Barnes and Judge Gobeil
Brian Harrison and Jennifer Whitaker divorced in 2015 in Wisconsin. They had one
child, a daughter. The divorce decree granted sole legal custody to Whitaker. Whitaker was also
awarded primary physical custody.
Five years later, Harrison filed his petition in the Superior Court of Walker County to
domesticate and modify the Wisconsin decree. He sought sole legal and physical custody.
Whitaker answered and attached the Affidavit of the now-14-year-old child, who stated that she
was receiving psychological treatment; she preferred her mother to be her sole legal and physical
custodian; and she did not wish to visit with her father.
Following a hearing in which the trial court heard testimony from the child outside the
presence of the parties, the trial court entered a Final Order awarding sole legal and physical
custody to Whitaker, but granting visitation rights to Harrison solely at the discretion of the
child.
So, the original divorce decree awarded joint physical custody with Whitaker as the
primary physical custodial parent. Following the hearing, the trial court modified physical
custody from (a) joint to both parents (with Whitaker as primary physical) to (b) sole physical
custody awarded to Whitaker.
The Court of Appeals vacated the decision by the trial court: “The Trial Court must find
that a material change in circumstances has taken place before it can consider whether
modification of custody is in the child’s best interests. Accordingly, the Trial Court must make a
threshold finding that there has been a material change in circumstances before it considers
what is in the child’s best interests.”
Because the trial court did not make any finding touching upon such threshold issue of
material change, the Court of Appeals vacated the ruling by the trial court and remanded the case
with direction.

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CUSTODY (continued)
Kasper vs. Martin
A20A0244
354 Ga. App. 831; 841 S.E.2d 488 (2020)
Decided 4/3/2020
Opinion by Judge Rickman, joined by Presiding Judge Dillard and Judge Brown.
The minor child at issue tested positive for narcotics at birth in 2016. His mother died thereafter,
and Glynn County Department of Family Children Services assumed legal custody, placing the
child first into foster care, then with his maternal grandmother in Florida. The Kaspers are the
maternal aunt and uncle living in Florida. They moved to intervene in the Glynn County
Juvenile Court dependency proceeding, and they also filed a separate action for custody in the
Superior Court of Glynn County.
The biological father did not object to the Kaspers having custody, but the grandmother in
Florida who had custody of the child moved to dismiss the custody action because the Juvenile
Court proceeding was already pending and the Kaspers had moved to intervene in that
proceeding.
At the hearing in Superior Court on the grandmother’s Motion to Dismiss, the Judge stated “For
all practical purposes (permanent guardianship) is equivalent to permanent custody.” The
Superior Court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction.
Judge Rickman, writing for the Court of Appeals, found that the Superior Court Judge erred in
dismissing the custody action. Judge Rickman noted that O.C.G.A. § 15-11-15(a) allows a
Superior Court to transfer a custody matter to Juvenile Court, but there was no such transfer in
this case. Further, the Juvenile Code clearly distinguishes between permanent guardianship and
permanent custody. Original jurisdiction is granted to Juvenile Court for permanent
guardianship. Exclusive jurisdiction for permanent custody is with Superior Courts.

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CUSTODY (continued)
Longino vs. Longino
A19A1386
352 Ga. App. 263; 834 SE2d 355 (2019)
Decided 10/11/2019
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judge Mercier and Judge Brown
Anthony and Sandra Longino divorced in 2017. The wife was awarded primary physical
custody of the two daughters. In January, 2018, Anthony filed an Emergency Motion for
Temporary Custody of the girls and contemporaneously filed a Petition for Modification of
Custody based, in part, on the wife’s alleged abuse of alcohol and prescription drugs, and
educational neglect of the children. In his Petition for Modification of Custody, the husband
claimed that there had been a substantial change in circumstances such that it was in the
children’s best interests for him to become their permanent primary physical custodian. In
January, 2018, the couple entered into a Temporary Consent Order in which the husband was
awarded physical custody of the children, and the wife was awarded supervised visitation.
On November 8, 2018, the trial court held a hearing during which it heard from
witnesses.
Neither the father nor the mother requested specific findings of fact as authorized by
O.C.G.A.§19-9-3 or O.C.G.A.§9-11-52(a). On December 14, 2018, the trial court entered an
Order granting the couple joint legal custody, with the husband as the designated primary
physical custodian and the couple sharing alternating weeks of physical custody. The Order in
the trial court did not state that it had found a material change in circumstances that affected the
children or that the best interest of the children would be served by a change in custody. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the trial Judge informed the parties that she was going to take the
evidence “under review,” noted that the daughter she had spoken to privately within chambers
was a “neat kid” and that the parents “have done a good job”.
The husband appealed from the Order, contending the trial court erred in finding that the
award of joint physical custody was in the children’s best interests.
Judge Anne Barnes, writing for the Court of Appeals, remanded the case to the trial court.
Judge Barnes restated the following rule from Viscup vs. Viscup, 291 Ga. 103; 727 SE3d 97
(2012):
“A petition to change child custody should be granted only if ‘the trial court finds
that there has been a material change of condition affecting the welfare of the child since
the last custody award”.
As applied to the Longinos, “there is nothing in the trial court’s Order or the hearing
that assists this court in its evaluation of whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion
in finding a material change in circumstances that affected the children”. Such must be found
before the trial court advances to a decision based upon the best interests of the children.

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CUSTODY (continued)
McManus vs. Johnson
CUSTODY – CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
A20A1185
356 Ga. App. 880 (2020)
Decided 10/5/2020
In 2014, Felicia McManus and Nicholas Johnson had a child out of wedlock. The
following year, Johnson legitimated the child and was granted joint legal custody with McManus
maintaining primary physical custody. The original Parenting Plan awarded visitation to
Johnson on alternating weekends and on two weekends per week plus holidays and school
breaks.
A few years later, McManus and Johnson withdrew the child from daycare so that he
could instead be cared for by Johnson’s wife who worked from home. The parties then began to
deviate from the visitation schedule in an unstructured manner, with the child spending
significantly more unplanned nights at the home of Johnson and his wife.
In January, 2019, Johnson filed a Petition for Modification of Custody, alleging that he
had been the primary custodial parent for more than one year and should accordingly be awarded
temporary and permanent primary physical custody as well as child support. McManus
counterclaimed to maintain primary physical custody.
Following the Temporary Hearing, the Trial Court issued a Temporary Order changing
the custody and visitation schedule to alternate weekly and leaving the child support obligations
intact. McManus filed a Motion to Vacate the Temporary Order and return primary custody to
her. The Trial Court held a second hearing during which the Guardian Ad Litem tested and
stated that all of the preceding visitation changes in the back-and-forth schedule created by the
Court after the first hearing were creating too much chaos. The Trial Court then issued a second
Temporary Order denying the Motion to Vacate its previous Order but finding that there was a
substantial change in circumstances due to the parties’ agreement to modify visitation, the
unstructured nature of the deviation in visitation, and the parties’ behavior. The Trial Court
further indicated that a schedule was in the best interests of the child. McManus filed a direct
Appeal, relying on O.C.G.A. §5-6-34(a)(11) which allows direct appeals of Temporary Orders
where custody is at issue.
In her enumerations of error, McManus argued that the Trial Court erred in granting the
Temporary Order to Modify Custody because the deviation from the visitation schedule was not
a material change in circumstances.

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The Court of Appeals “cautioned(ed) the Trial Court at an agreed-upon change in the
visitation schedule, as opposed to a voluntary surrender of custody, does not alone constitute a
change in circumstances that would trigger modification of custody”.
Further, unlike a Final Order modifying custody, a Temporary Order does not require a
finding of change of circumstances.
The Trial Court’s denial of McManus’ Motion to Vacate the Temporary Orders was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

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CUSTODY (continued)
Mitchell vs. Capehart
A19A2139
353 Ga. App. 461; 838 S.E.2d 125 (2020)
Decided 1/21/2020
Opinion by Judge Barnes, joined by Judges Mercier and Brown
Mayah Mitchell and Christopher Capehart divorced in 2014. In March, 2017, the Superior Court
entered an Order altering custody provisions and awarding Capehart sole legal and physical
custody of the children.
Mitchell filed this petition Capehart, seeking to modify custody from sole to joint.
Mitchell’s petition alleged a “substantial change in circumstances”. Specifically, Capehart had
failed to co-parent with her on several occasions. Capehart had disallowed her schedule of
visitation on several occasions. Capehart had willfully refused to allow the children to
communicate with her. Capehart had alienated the children from her. Thus, Mitchell claimed
that the “current schedule” was no longer conducive to the best interests of the children, and that
she was a fit and loving parent. Mitchell went on to request “joint legal custody” of the two
children.
Mitchell amended her petition to add more reasons. In his answer, Capehart moved to dismiss
the petition under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b). The Trial Judge granted the motion to dismiss.
Judge Barnes, writing for the Court of Appeals, reversed the order granting the motion to
dismiss, stating “complaints do not have the allege facts sufficient to set forth the cause of action
and are no longer to be construed most strongly against the pleader. And it is no longer
necessary for a complaint to set forth all of the elements of a cause of action in order to survive a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. If, within the framework of the complaint, evidence
may be introduced which will sustain a grant of relief to the plaintiff, the complaint is sufficient.”

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CUSTODY (continued)
Ortega vs. Temple
CUSTODY – THIRD PARTIES
A20A1716
856 S.E.2d 471 (2021)
Decided 3/15/2021
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judges Gobeil and Pipkin
Prosper Ortega is the mother of the minor child, A.U. Seven days after she gave birth,
the biological father of A.U. severely beat Ortega, resulting in substantial and serious injuries.
The father remained incarcerated at the time Ortega filed the underlying Petition.
Because Ortega could not care for her newborn son (A.U.), the maternal grandmother
filed a Petition for Custody of A.U. On 1/20/17, following a hearing, the Trial Court issued a
“Final Custody Order” placing custody of A.U. with the grandmother. The Order indicated that
Ortega and the father had agreed to grant sole legal and physical custody to the grandmother with
the following provisos:
(a) The grandmother shall consult and discuss any major decisions for the minor child
with Ortega before making such decisions;
(b) Visitation between Ortega and the child shall be as agreed upon by Ortega and the
grandmother, with the understanding that such agreement shall not be unreasonably
withheld.
Subsequently, the child’s godparents, Leigh and Anita Temple filed a Complaint to
Modify Custody against Ortega, the grandmother, and the father. On 9/29/17, the Trial Court
issued a “Final Consent Order” stating that the parties had reached a “full and final settlement of
all issues” and consented to entry of the Order which awarded sole legal and physical custody of
A.U. to the Temples. Visitation between Ortega and the minor child “shall be as agreed upon by
Ortega and the Temples, with the understanding that visitation shall not be unreasonably
withheld”. The Order found that Ortega had no income and ordered the father alone to pay child
support to the Temple’s.
In December, 2018, Ortega filed her Petition to regain custody of A.U. In December,
2019, the Trial Court heard testimony from several witnesses.
The Temples argued that by Ortega agreeing to the Consent Order, she had entered into a
voluntary contract releasing all of her parental power to a third person under O.C.G.A. §19-7-
1(b)(1). Therefore, the standard articulated in Durden vs. Barron, 249 Ga. 686; 290 SE2d 923
(1982) should apply. Durden held that the non-custodial biological parent has the burden to
show by clear and convincing evidence that she is a fit parent and that it is in the child’s best
interest that custody be changed.

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Ortega, on the other hand, argued that the standard in Lopez vs. Olson, 314 Ga. App. 533;
724 SE2d 837 (2012) should apply. According to Ortega, Lopez requires that prior to the entry
of the Consent Order, an Evidentiary Hearing should have been held, followed by a finding that
she was unfit.
The Court of Appeals held that by agreeing to the Consent Order with the Temples,
Ortega did not permanently surrender her parental power or custody rights to A.U. Further,
there was no indication from the Consent Order that the Trial Court considered A.U.’s best
interests, or that it determined that custody would be permanently granted to the Temples. “The
Consent Order reflects only that Ortega, the grandmother, and the Temples agreed to certain
custodial terms related to A.U.” Also importantly, the Consent Order with the Temples merely
sought to modify the Order between Ortega and the grandmother. The Consent Order of 1/20/17
between Ortega and the grandmother also directed the grandmother to “consult and discuss any
major decisions for A.U. with Ortega before making any such decisions”.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court’s decision that Durden was the appropriate
legal standard. The prima facie right to parental custody had not shifted to the Temples, but
remained with Ortega, as the mother. The case was remanded to the Trial Court with direction.

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CUSTODY (continued)
Perry vs. Jenkins
CUSTODY – JOINT CUSTODY
A21A0969
862 S.E.2d 734 (2021)
Decided 8/31/2021
Opinion by Senior Appellate Judge Phipps, joined by Chief Judge Rickman and Presiding Judge
McFadden
Tyler Perry and Kaitlyn Jenkins were never married, but they had a son together in 2015.
The child was approximately 2 years old when the couple split. After the breakup, Jenkins and
the child went to live with her parents, and Perry continued to be actively involved in the child’s
life. However, Jenkins limited Perry’s visitation after Perry began dating someone of which
Jenkins did not approve.
Perry petitioned the Trial Court for legitimation, custody, visitation, and child support.
The Trial Court awarded primary custody to Jenkins. Perry appealed.
In the first appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court’s ruling as to custody
and remanded the case to the Trial Court to enter findings and conclusions in accordance with
the applicable statutory scheme “and to give due consideration to the issue of joint physical
custody”. On remand, the Trial Court concluded that joint physical custody was not in the
child’s best interests based on several factual findings. In particular, the Court found that a
change of custody would be detrimental to the child’s best interests because Jenkins had cared
for, bonded with, and maintained a stable, nurturing, and safe environment for the child since
birth. The trial court also found that Perry worked between 40 and 48 hours per week.
Additionally, the distance between each parent’s home was at least 40 minutes each way. The
trial court awarded visitation to Perry from 9:00 to 5:00 every other Saturday and Sunday until
the child turned 5 at which time a more comprehensive visitation schedule took effect.
In this second appeal, Perry argued that the trial court simply added magic words to the
original custody order. The Court of Appeals is bound to uphold the ruling of the trial court
unless the trial court clearly abused its discretion – and if there is any evidence to support the
decision by the trial court, an Appellate Court will not find an abuse of discretion.
The Court of Appeals concedes that the trial court could have “engaged in a more robust
analysis”, but the trial court had “done at least the minimum “that was required on remand. The
Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion, thus upholding the trial court’s award of primary
physical custody to Jenkins.
Perry also challenged the visitation schedule that was in effect until the child reached age
5. However, it was undisputed that the child turned 5 in 2020, and those provisions were no
longer in effect. Because Georgia has adopted “a narrow exception to the doctrine of mootness

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when the issue is capable of repetition and yet evades review” the now-expired visitation
schedule is moot, and the Court of Appeals refused review.
The judgment of the Trial Court was affirmed.

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CUSTODY (continued)
Pryce vs. Pryce
CUSTODY – PARENTING PLAN
A21A0056
359 Ga. App. 590; S.E. 2d 554 (2021)
Decided 5/28/2021
Opinion by Judge Colvin, joined by Presiding Judge Dillard and Judge Mercier
In May, 2019, Maurice Pryce filed his Complaint for Divorce against his wife.
Following the Final Hearing, the Trial Court issued a Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce
which awarded primary physical custody of the children to the husband and joint legal custody.
If the parties could not agree on major decisions, then the husband’s decision would control. The
Decree awarded child support of $390.00 per month to be paid by the wife to the husband, and
the husband was awarded to pay alimony of $1,190.00 per month to the wife until she died or
remarried. The Decree ordered one-half of the husband’s retirement plan, which amounted to
approximately $131,000, to the wife and directed the husband to maintain medical insurance for
the two children. The Trial Court ordered the husband to pay $2,000 of attorney’s fees to the
wife and further ordered the husband to pay the balance of the GAL fees.
A little strange, but the husband argued that the Trial Court erred by failing to incorporate
a Permanent Parenting Plan. Judge Colvin, writing for the Court of Appeals, agreed. The
Parenting Plan issued by the Trial Court failed to include the following required by O.C.G.A.
§19-9-1(b)(1):
(A) A recognition that a close and continuing parent-child relationship and continuity in the
child’s life will be in the child’s best interest;
(B) A recognition that the child’s needs will change and grow as the child matures and
demonstrates that the parents will make an effort to parent that takes this issue into account so
that future modifications to the Parenting Plan are minimized;
(C) A recognition that a parent with a physical custody will make day-to-day decisions in the
emergency decisions while the child is residing with such parent;
(D) That both parents will have access to all of the child’s records and information, including
but not limited to education, health, health insurance, extracurricular activities, and religious
communications.
The Decree of the Trial Court also failed to provide transportation arrangements and
failed to specify whether supervision was required for visitation. Because of the foregoing, the
Court of Appeals remanded the case for compliance with O.C.G.A. §19-9-1.
The Court of Appeals also remanded the case to the Trial Court because the Decree failed
to include uninsured health care expenses for the minor child in the Child Support Worksheet.

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The Court of Appeals found that the Trial Court properly weighed the relative finances of
each party, and the award of attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. §19-6-2 was proper.
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding lifetime alimony, nor did the
Trial Court abuse its discretion in awarding one-half of the husband’s retirement to the wife.

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CUSTODY (continued)
Wallace vs. Chandler
A21A0648
360 Ga. App. 541; 859 S.E. 2d 100 (2021)
Decided 4/22/2021
Opinion by Judge Pipkin, joined by Presiding Judge Miller and Judge Hodges
The minor child of Lensley Wallace (mother) was born in 2016 and was placed in the
care of Stephanie and George Chandler by Order of the Juvenile Court of Catoosa County in a
dependency action.
The Chandlers filed their Petition for Custody in the Superior Court of Catoosa County
on 5/5/2017 naming the mother, biological father, and the maternal grandmother as Respondents.
The Chandlers’ Petition noted that the mother was currently incarcerated. The Petition alleged
that the minor child was deprived and sought removal of the minor child from the custody of her
biological parents, demanding that custody be awarded to the Chandlers.
The mother, who remained incarcerated, did not file a response to the Petition, and on
8/1/17, following a hearing at which only the Chandlers and their attorney appeared, the Trial
Court entered a “Final Order of Custody/Parenting Plan”. Therein, the Chandlers were
described as the child’s “fictive kin”. The Court found, by clear and convincing evidence, facts
sufficient to warrant placement of the minor child in the exclusive care of the Chandlers.
On 4/2/20, the mother filed a Motion to Set Aside the Final Order pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§9-11-60, raising three arguments:
(1) The Chandlers lacked standing, citing O.C.G.A. §19-7-1(b.1);
(2) The Superior Court lacked subject matter over the Petition for Custody, and
accordingly, the Final Order was void on its face and void ab initio;
(3) The Chandlers Petition was more in line with a Dependency Petition and thus within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court pursuant to O.C.G.A. §15-11-
10(1)(C).
The Trial Court denied the Motion to Set Aside. The Court of Appeals granted the
mother’s Application for Discretionary Appeal.
Third parties have no right to seek custody of a child whose parents have not lost custody
by one of the means established in O.C.G.A. §19-7-1 or O.C.G.A. §19-7-4 or have not been
deemed unfit. O.C.G.A. §19-7-1(b.1) limits the right of a third party to pursue custody to only
grandparent, great-grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adoptive parent.
Because the Chandlers lacked standing, the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction, and the Motion to Set
Aside should have been granted.

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The Court of Appeals also noted that the Chandlers were not without redress. First, they
could have filed a Dependency Petition under O.C.G.A. §15-11-150. Secondly, effective July,
2019, O.C.G.A. §19-7-3.1(d)(4), (G) & (J) grants standing to “equitable caregivers” to seek
custody of a minor child without “disestablishing” the parentage of the child.

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DISQUALIFICATION OF ATTORNEY
Samnick vs. Goodman
A20A0562
354 Ga. App. 805; 841 S.E.2d 468 (2020)
Decided 4/1/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judge Gobeil and Senior Appellate Judge Phipps.
Yaacova Goodman and David Samnick were married in December, 2016. In December, 2018,
Goodman filed her Petition for Divorce against Samnick. Attorney Miles Rich filed an Answer
and Counterclaim on behalf of Samnick. Rich had been Samnick’s attorney in business and
family law matters for several years, but Rich had also consulted with Goodman when Goodman
sought advice from Rich about collecting on commissions due to her from her employer.
Goodman and Samnick had also formed a personal friendship with Rich and Rich’s wife.
Goodman moved to disqualify Rich. Following a 2 day hearing, the Trial Judge disqualified
Rich, and Samnick appealed.
Presiding Judge Barnes, writing for the Court of Appeals, affirmed the disqualification of Rich,
confirming the following rules of precedent:
(1) It is a long standing rule that a lawyer is disqualified from representing a party against a
former client in a matter that is substantially related to the lawyer’s prior representation.
(2) The right to counsel is an important interest which requires that any curtailment of the
right to counsel of choice be approached with great caution.
(3) Disqualification of chosen counsel should be seen as an extraordinary remedy and should
be granted sparingly, but the decision over whether disqualified counsel ultimately falls
within the sound discretion of the Trial Judge.
(4) In this case, Goodman and Rich formed an attorney client relationship. The employment
of an attorney is sufficiently established when it is shown that the advice or assistance of
the attorney is sought and received in matters pertinent to his profession. Addition, while
the payment of fee is relevant to the inquiry that may in some circumstances be
controlling, an attorney client relationship may be found to exist when no fee is paid, and
the payment of the fee does not necessarily demonstrate the existence of the relationship.
All that is necessary is a reasonable belief of the would be client that he or she was being
represented by the attorney. A reasonable belief is one which has reasonably induced the
representations or conduct on the part of the attorney.
In this case, Goodman shared detailed information about her compensation plan and earnings
with Rich. Such could be relevant and important in defending against Samnick’s counterclaim
for alimony and equitable division of property.

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Judge Barnes also acknowledged that while it is true that “the mere fact that an attorney has
general financial information about a former client does not necessarily warrant
disqualification”. The former client is “still required to show a substantial relationship between
the attorney’s knowledge of her assets in the pending suit.” In this case, Goodman demonstrated
that Rich had knowledge of specific information about her commission structure and earnings
that were of substantial relationship to the issues being litigated in the case. Hence, the case was
not one where the attorney had simply acquired “general financial information”.

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DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE
Hill vs. Hill
A21A0285
360 Ga. App. 530; 859 S.E. 2d 906 (2021)
Decided 6/29/2021
Julia Morgan Hill filed a Motion for Contempt against her ex-husband, Christopher Allen
Larkin Hill in the Superior Court of Camden County, Brunswick Judicial Circuit. Julia’s
Complaint was signed by Attorney Jacqueline Fortier. Attorney Fortier represented Julia in the
action for divorce upon which Superior Court Judge Stephen Scarlett entered the Final Judgment
and Decree.
Immediately after Julia filed her Motion for Contempt, Christopher filed a Motion to
Recuse Judge Scarlett and the entire Brunswick Judicial Circuit. Christopher argued that Chief
Magistrate Judge Jennifer Lewis had chosen Fortier as part-time Magistrate in the same circuit.
Judge Lewis’ choice of Attorney Fortier as a part-time Magistrate was approved by all of the
Superior Court Judges.
The Trial Court denied the Motion to Recuse and certified the matter for interlocutory
review.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court’s refusal to recuse all Superior Court
Judges in the Brunswick Judicial Circuit. The Trial Court agreed that O.C.G.A. §50-10-22(c)
prohibits a part-time Magistrate from practicing in the Magistrate’s own court or appearing in
any other matter as to which that Magistrate has exercised jurisdiction. However, the Court of
Appeals declined “to construe the Superior Court in which Fortier works as a County Magistrate
Court as ‘her Court’”.

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DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE (continued)
McLaws vs. Drew
A20A0695
355 Ga. App. 162; 843 S.E.2d 440 (2020)
Decided 5/15/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judges Gobeil and Pipkin.
Monica and Jay Drew had one child of their marriage which ended with a Final Judgment and
Decree of Divorce filed in 2017. In July, 2018, Monica filed a Petition for Contempt seeking
monies owed to her for a number of items, but she did not specifically allege an arrearage in
child support.
On 10/4/18, the Trial Court held a hearing at which Jay appeared, represented by attorney Justin
Chen. In an affidavit submitted by attorney Chen, he stated that he requested that the hearing be
taken down, but he was told that the court reporter was busy. Chen further stated in his affidavit
that during the lunch break of the hearing on 10/4/18, Jay began experiencing symptoms of a
heart attack, whereupon Chen drove Jay to a local hospital and left him there while Chen
returned to Court. Chen informed the Court of Jay’s condition and offered to show the Court a
video of Jay at the hospital. Chen requested a continuance. The Trial Judge declined to view the
video and denied the request for continuance.
The Trial Court found Jay in contempt. The amount that Jay was required to pay totaled
$14,505.00, of which $4,411.00 was the alleged arrearage in child support –not specifically
alleged in the petition. The Trial Judge ordered Jay to pay the entirety of $14,505.00 to the Cobb
County Sheriff’s Office by 11/5/18, further ordering that if Jay failed to pay by that date, the
Cobb County Sheriff was to arrest Jay and hold him in jail until he purged himself of contempt
by paying the entire amount due.
Rebecca McLaws then substituted as counsel for Jay, and on 11/5/18, McLaws filed a Motion for
New Trial. Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-62(b), the Motion for New Trial operated as supersedeas to
stay enforcement of the judgment of contempt. However, the Trial Court failed to communicate
that fact to the Cobb County Sheriff, and on 11/26/18, Jay was arrested and incarcerated.
McLaws contacted the Trial Court to inform of the supersedeas effect of Jay’s Motion for New
Trial, and McLaws presented the Court with a proposed Order allowing for Jay’s immediate and
unconditional release. The Court declined to enter the Order and conditioned Jay’s release on
payment of $8,000.00 to Monica. On 11/30/18, the Trial Court entered a Consent Order
releasing Jay from jail, noting his payment of $8,000.00, and requiring him to pay the balance of
$6,505.00 on or before 12/17/18.
On 12/7/18, McLaws filed a motion seeking the disqualification or recusal of the Trial Judge,
arguing that the Trial Court’s repeated violation of Jay’s constitutional right to due process had
created an appearance that the Trial Judge could not be impartial in deciding Jay’s Motion for
New Trial. McLaws supported her motion with her own affidavit and the affidavit of previous

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attorney, Chen, detailing the Trial Court’s refusal to continue the hearing after Jay’s medical
emergency and his decision to hold Jay in jail despite his filing the Motion for New Trial.
Three days later, on 12/10/18, the Trial Court entered an order denying Jay’s motion to recuse.
One week later, on 12/17/18, the Trial Court held a hearing on both Jay’s compliance with the
Contempt Order and his Motion for New Trial. That same day, Jay filed notice of a Chapter 13
bankruptcy petition which stayed enforcement of the Contempt Order. The Court therefore only
heard the Motion for New Trial. Less than three hours after the hearing, the Trial Court entered
an Order denying the Motion for New Trial, but failed to address the following arguments
advanced by McLaws and Jay:
(a) The Court’s refusal to grant a continuance based on Jay’s medical emergency.
(b) Failure to consider the parties’ financial conditions before awarding attorney’s fees.
(c) The lack of evidence supporting the amounts owed under the divorce decree.
Following the Order denying the Motion for New Trial, Monica then moved for an award
of attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), seeking reimbursement of fees associated with
defending against both the Motion to Recuse and the Motion for New Trial. The Court heard
that motion on 8/29/19, and the following morning entered an order granting attorney’s fees of
$4,765.75 against both McLaws and Jay. McLaws filed an Application for Discretionary Appeal
which the Court of Appeals granted.
Presiding Judge Barnes, writing for the Court of Appeals, reversed the award of
attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b).
First, Monica argued that the Motion for New Trial did not set forth the statutory basis as
required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.1. Judge Barnes wrote that Uniform Superior Court
Rule 6.1 requires citation of authority only as to pretrial motions, and no such requirement
exists with respect to motion for new trial.
Further, Monica argued that McLaws had failed to identify an “intrinsic defect” not
appearing on the face of the record of pleadings, but Judge Barnes held that a motion for new
trial is a proper vehicle to raise errors allegedly committed by the Trial Court, including factual
findings made by a Judge in a trial-like setting such as a finding of contempt.
Further, the record shows that the grounds for new trial were not “substantially frivolous,
groundless, or vexatious.” First, the contempt petition did not provide notice that Monica was
seeking payment of back child support. Secondly, the Trial Court violated Jay’s due process
rights when it refused to grant a continuance following his medical emergency. Based upon the
foregoing, the award of attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. §9-15-14 as to the Motion for New Trial
was an abuse of discretion.

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Additionally, the attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. §9-15-14 defending against the motion recused
were also an abuse of discretion. Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11(A)(1) provides “Judges
shall disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be
questioned” including when “the Judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the party or a
party’s lawyer. In this case, the possibility or likelihood of such personal bias is shown by – (1)
incarcerating Jay in the violation of his due process rights when failed to grant a continuance
upon Jay’s medical emergency, and (2) failing to recognize Jay’s Motion for New Trial operated
as supersedeas and (3) failing to remedy the refusal to recognize supersedeas and instead
requiring him to pay $8,000.00 before being released.

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EQUITABLE CAREGIVER
Skinner vs. Miles
EQUITABLE CAREGIVER
A21A0980
Decided 10/4/2021
Opinion by Judge Reese joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge Brown
Under O.C.G.A. §19-7-3.1, which became effective on 7/1/2019, courts are permitted to
“adjudicate an individual to be an equitable caregiver”. As an equitable caregiver, an individual
may be awarded child custody and visitation.
Robin Miles and Sarah Skinner worked as teachers at the same school in 1997. They
began dating approximately two years later and eventually purchased a home together. The
women also wore rings on their left ring fingers as symbols of their commitment to each other,
and they discussed having children.
In 2009, Miles and Skinner flew to Dallas, TX to begin an adoption process, but Skinner
was the only parent listed on the adoption paper because Texas law did not allow same-sex
couples to adopt. After they returned to Georgia, they discovered that Skinner was pregnant, and
she gave birth in January, 2010. The couple decided to use Miles’ surname as the middle name
for both children in recognition of her role in the lives of each child.
The children referred to Miles as “Mama” or “Mambo” and Skinner as “Mommy”. Both
women assisted in the care for the children, including bathing, feeding, and changing the
children. Both women took the children to extracurricular activities. They went on vacations
together, celebrated holidays together, mailed Christmas cards to friends and family featuring
pictures of themselves and the children.
Miles and Skinner separated in approximately 2015, and Skinner married Kelly Walter in
2018.
Once O.C.G.A. §19-7-3.1 became effective on 7/1/2019, Miles filed an action seeking
designation as a caregiver and a determination of visitation and custody rights. Following a four-
day bench trial, the Trial Court ruled in favor of Miles and granted joint legal and physical
custody and visitation to Miles.
The Court of Appeals first held that actual findings by the Trial Court must not be set
aside unless they are clearly erroneous. However, the Court of Appeals reviews de novo the
legal conclusions of the Trial Court draws from the facts.
O.C.G.A. §19-7-3.1 requires the Plaintiff seeking equitable caregiver status to file an
Affidavit – with the initial pleading – supporting the existence of equitable caregiver

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relationship. After the Defendant has filed a responsive pleading and accompanying Affidavit,
the Court must undertake a two-part analysis:
FIRST, on the basis of pleadings and affidavits, the Court must determine whether such
individual has presented prima facie evidence of the requirements set forth in sub-section (d) of
O.C.G.A. §19-7-3.1. The Court may, in its sole discretion, if necessary and on an expedited
basis, hold a hearing to determine undisputed facts that are necessary and material to the issue of
standing. If the Court finds that the Plaintiff has satisfied this requirement (i.e. establishment of
a prima facie case), then the individual has standing to proceed to adjudication under O.C.G.A.
§19-7-3.1(d).
SECOND, after the Court finds standing, then by clear and convincing evidence, the Trial
Court must find that the Plaintiff has fulfilled all five of the following statutory requirements:
(a) Fully and completely undertaken a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and
responsible parental role in the child’s life;
(b) Engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
(c) Established a bonded and dependent relationship with the child, which relationship
was fostered or supported by a parent of the child, and such individual and the parent
have understood, acknowledged, or accepted that or behaved as though such
individual is a parent of the child;
(d) Accepted full and permanent responsibilities as a parent of the child without
expectation of financial compensation;
(e) Demonstrated that the child will suffer physical harm or long-term emotional harm
and that continuing the relationship between such individual and the child is in the
best interests of the child.
In determining the existence of harm under the fifth statutory prong, the Court shall
consider factors related to the needs of the child, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Who are the past and present caretakers of the child?
(2) With whom has the child formed psychological bonds and the strength of those
bonds?
(3) Whether competing parties evidenced an interest in, and contact with the child over
time;
(4) Whether the child has unique medical or psychological needs that one party is better
able to meet.
Following this analysis, the Court may enter an Order as appropriate to establish parental
rights and responsibilities, including custody and visitation.
The Court of Appeals recognizes that parents have the constitutional right under the
United States and Georgia Constitutions as to the care and custody of their children. This right
should be infringed upon only under the most compelling circumstances. Aligned against such
constitutional right of the parent is the child’s constitutional right to protection of his or her
person and the State’s compelling interest in protecting the welfare of the children.

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The Court of Appeals deferred to facts found by the Trial Court under the clearly
erroneous standard. Notably, in determining whether Miles had “established a bond and
dependent relationship with the children”, the Trial Court found that by the time of trial, the
bond between Miles and the children was “currently fractured” but was “repairable”.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court, awarding equitable
caregiver status to Miles and also issued an Order regarding custody and visitation pursuant to
O.C.G.A. §19-7-3.1.

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EQUITABLE DIVISION
Calloway-Spencer vs. Spencer
Court of Appeals of Georgia, Fifth Division
A20A0546
355 Ga. App. 743 (2020)
Decided 6/23/2020
Opinion by Judge Reese, joined by Judges Markle and Colvin
Ebony Calloway-Spencer and Frederick M. Spencer began dating in September, 2002. In
March, 2003, they held a marriage ceremony, but they did not obtain a marriage certificate until
July, 2007.
In February, 2002, before they began dating, the wife signed a Purchase Agreement for a
new construction townhome in Florida. She paid a down payment of $1,000, and she received a
forgiveable loan from the local government. The husband paid nothing toward the down
payment, and he did not participate in the government program. The wife never conveyed by
deed any interest in the townhome to the husband. The couple moved into the townhome
together in August, 2003, about one month after their first child was born.
While living in the townhome, the husband deposited his paycheck in their joint bank
account from which the wife paid the mortgage. They moved out of the townhome to Georgia in
the summer of 2008, and the wife began renting the townhome to her cousins. The rent was paid
into a separate account, and the mortgage payment was automatically withdrawn from that
account. The wife only charged enough rent to cover the mortgage and homeowner’s association
fees.
The husband filed for divorce in November, 2017. The trial court found that the
townhome was a “gift to the marriage by the wife”.
Judge Reese, writing for the Court of Appeals, held: Even under an ‘Any Evidence’
standard, we disagree such facts supported a finding that wife gifted the townhome to the marital
unit. Wife never took an action after marriage manifesting an attempt to transfer her separate
property into a marital asset, such as transferring a ‘full, partial, or joint ownership in the
property to’ husband”.
Where, as in this case, one spouse separately bought the house before the marriage and
provided for the down payment, and the marital unit thereafter contributed to the mortgage, the
Source of Funds Rule should be applied.
Related to child support: The husband was a schoolteacher. For purposes of computing
child support, the wife contended that additional income should have been imputed to the
husband during the summer months. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err
and declined to do so.

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EQUITABLE DIVISION (continued)
Dixon vs. Dixon
A19A1179
352 Ga. App. 169; 834 SE2d 309 (2019)
Decided 10/19/2019
Opinion by Judge Gobeil, joined by Judge Dillard and Judge Hodges
From his settlement of an automobile accident case, Richard Dixon invested $240,000
into the purchase of a residence which was titled in the joint names of Richard Dixon and his
wife, Rhonda. Fourteen months later, they divorced. The husband moved for partial summary
judgment, arguing that the settlement from the personal injury was non-marital property and the
residence was therefore non-marital property, not subject to equitable division.
The trial court held that the personal injury settlement was, in fact, separate property, but
the husband converted it into a marital asset by titling the house in their joint names. The trial
court then applied the “Source of Funds” Rule, reasoning that because the husband had
purchased the residence with his separate property, the husband was entitled to the residence.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly classified the residence as marital
property. However, the trial court erred in reclassifying the marital residence as non-material.

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Messick vs. Messick
EQUITABLE DIVISION
A21A0600
858 S.E.2d 758 (2021)
Decided 5/18/2021
Opinion by Chief Judge McFadden, joined by Presiding Judge Rickman and Senior Appellate
Judge Herbert E. Phipps
On 3/5/21, Mary and John Messick signed a Settlement Agreement. On the same day,
Mary filed an action for divorce against John and asked that the Trial Court incorporate
Settlement Agreement into the Decree.
Subsequently, Mary won a substantial amount of money in a lottery. In his Answer and
Counterclaim, John Messick argued that the Trial Court should set aside the Settlement
Agreement because it did not address Mary’s lottery winnings. Mary filed a Motion to Enforce
Settlement Agreement. After an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court denied Mary’s Motion and
set aside the Settlement Agreement, pertinently finding “that the lottery proceeds are marital
property subject to division by the Court, and the Settlement Agreement did not contemplate the
acquisition of such property, nor provide for how any such property should be divided”.
Because the Trial Court had not yet entered a Final Judgment and Decree at the time
Mary won the lottery, her winnings were acquired during the marriage and were a marital asset.
The standard of review for the Court of Appeals in determining enforceability of the
Settlement Agreement is de novo review of the Trial Court. Because the plain language of the
Settlement Agreement does not address the equitable division of a significant marital asset – the
lottery proceeds – a decree incorporating that agreement would not dispose of all of the parties’
marital property. Accordingly, the decision by the Trial Court declining to enforce the
Settlement Agreement was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

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Spruell v. Spruell
EQUITABLE DIVISION
A20A1077
356 Ga. App. 722 (2020)
Decided 9/18/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Dillard, joined by Judge Rickman and Judge Brown
Military Disability Retirement & Veteran’s Disability Compensation are not marital
assets such that equitable division in an action for divorce.
The Supreme Court decision of Howell vs. Howell, 581 U.S. ____; 137 S.Ct. 1400; 197
LE2d 781 (2017) held that a State may treat as community property, and divide at divorce, in
military veteran’s retirement pay. However, the Howell Court also explained that Uniform
Service Former Spouse’s Protection Act exempts from this grant of permission any amount that
the government deducts ‘as a result of the waiver’ that the veteran must make ‘in order to receive
disability benefits’. That is to say, Federal law completely pre-exempts the States from treating
waived military retirement pay as divisible community property.

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EVIDENCE
Swearngin v. Rowell
Court of Appeals of Georgia, Third Division
A20A0236
846 S.E. 2d 263 (2020)
Decided 6/30/2020
Opinion by Judge Hodges joined by Chief Judge McFadden and Presiding Judge Doyle
Gid Rowell and Dina Swearngin were involved in a sexual relationship for ten years
while Swearngin was married to another man. Rowell broke up with Swearngin, and Rowell
began dating another woman. Swearngin did not take the break-up well. Swearngin sent
hundreds of texts and emails to Rowell, pressuring him to resume the adulterous affair.
Swearngin’s husband worked in the same corporate office at the company where Rowell worked
as a contractor. In a text message, Swearngin threatened Rowell that if he did not return to her,
“Your job is gone”. Rowell received a positive work review on 10/17/2016, but he was fired
three days later on 10/20/2016. He immediately filed his Petition for Temporary Protective
Order under the Stalking Statute. The Ex Parte Temporary Protection Order was entered on
10/21/2016 pending a hearing. At the 10-day Hearing, Swearngin and Rowell agreed to stay
away from each other, but Swearngin began contacting Rowell again almost immediately.
Rowell then requested entry of a new Order, and the trial court issued a Consent 12-Month
Protective Order on 1/10/2017.
After the Consent Temporary Order was issued on 1/10/2017, Rowell began receiving a deluge
of text messages and emails from an anonymous source. The messages called Rowell, “dumb”
for dating another woman. The messages called the other woman, “sick”, abusive, and
promiscuous. Rowell attempted to discover the source of the emails by extracting metadata from
emails known to have been previously sent to him by Swearngin previously. He determined that
the anonymous emails were sent from the same computer as the emails known to be sent by
Swearngin.
Rowell also tried to establish a new email account, but the name, “Gid Rowell” had already been
taken. Rowell discovered that the email account was linked to Sweargin’s telephone number.
Rowell filed a Motion to hold Swearngin in contempt of the Protective Order, but the trial court
found that there was insufficient evidence that Swearngin had sent the anonymous emails.
Thereafter, Rowell a “Motion to Release Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses” in order to obtain
additional information related to the source of the anonymous emails. The trial court granted
Rowell’s motion, and using the information he obtained as a result of the order, Rowell moved to
convert the protective order to a three-year protective order. Rowell attached to his motion
prepared by a forensic computer analyst setting forth how IP addresses are assigned. The report
concluded that the anonymous emails Rowell received originated from a computer address
belonging to Swearngin’s husband.

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At the hearing, Swearngin objected to the admission of the forensic report unless the expert who
provided the report was available to testify. The trial court sustained the objection. Rowell had
retained an expert to testify about the report, but the trial court found that the expert need not
testify since the report was not admitted.
Importantly, at the hearing, Rowell himself testified that he printed out the metadata attached to
emails known to be previously received from Swearngin. He compared the metadata from the
known emails from Swearngin to the metadata from emails sent anonymously. Judge Hodges
wrote: “Stated differently, Rowell provided testimony that the documents were what they
purported to be – printouts of data associated with anonymous emails he had received”.
The Court of Appeals found no error in admitting Rowell’s testimony (presumably that the
metadata associated with the anonymous emails was the same as the metadata associated with
the emails known to have been previously sent by Swearngin).
Further, however, immediately after Swearngin testified, the trial court found her to lack
credibility, and even if admission of the metadata was erroneous, there was no harm to warrant
reversal.

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EXPERT WITNESS
Lee vs. Smith
Supreme Court of Georgia
S18G1549
307 Ga. 815
838 S.E.2d 870 (2020)
Decided 2/10/2020
Opinion by Chief Justice Melton
Smith sued Lee for personal injury and loss of earning capacity. Before the Pre-Trial Hearing,
Lee identified an expert witness to rebut Smith’s claim for lost earning capacity. Lee failed to
list his expert in the Pre-Trial Order, so the trial court excluded Lee’s expert witness from
testifying. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Smith, and Lee appealed. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, but the Georgia Supreme Court reversed and
stated the following rule:
“When determining whether to exclude a witness who is not timely identified in
compliance with the pre-trial scheduling, discovery, or case management order, the trial
court should consider:
1. The explanation for the failure to disclose the witness.
2. The importance of the testimony.
3. The prejudice to the opposing party if the witness is allowed to testify.
4. Whether a less harsh remedy than the exclusion of the witness would
be sufficient to ameliorate the prejudice and vindicate the trial court’s
authority”

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GARNISHMENT
Smith vs. Robinson
A20A0591
355 Ga. App. 159; 842 SE2d 917 (2020)
Decided 5/13/2020
A Defendant in a garnishment action is not allowed to exempt from garnishment a
portion of his wages equal to his child support obligation.

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GRANDPARENTS
Brock vs. Brown
A19A2083
354 Ga. 63; 840 S.E.2d 155 (2020)
Decided 3/4/2020
Opinion by Judge Coomer joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge Markle
Jeffrey Brock and Janet Brown were formerly married. Janet Brown is the mother of Gena
Louise Brown and is the maternal grandmother of the child who is the subject of the underlying
action. Gena Louise Brown is the sole legal parent of the minor child.
The Stephens County Probate Court appointed Brock and Janet Brown as the temporary co-
Guardians in October, 2008. Brock and Janet Brown were divorced in November, 2014, but the
temporary co-guardianship remained in effect despite their divorce.
After the divorce, the child lived primarily with Janet Brown, but Brock spent alternating
weekends with the child before disputes began to arise between Brock and Janet Brown.
Jeffrey Brock filed a complaint seeking permanent custody and visitation which the Trial Court
dismissed on the basis that he lacked standing.
Judge Coomer, writing for the Court of Appeals, held that Brock was not a grandparent, a great
grandparent, aunt, uncle, great aunt, great uncle, sibling, or adopted parent within the context and
meaning of O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1) and he did not have standing. The Trial Court was correct in
dismissing his complaint.

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GRANDPARENTS (continued)
Davis vs. Cicala
GRANDPARENTS
A20A1116
356 Ga. App. 873 (2020)
Decided 10/5/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Miller, joined by Judges Mercier and Coomer, concurs dubitante
Elicia Davis and Kevin McKinney are the parents of two minor children, D.M., born in
2004 and S.M., born in 2009. McKinney is also the father of another minor child, J.M., born
during his current marriage, but not involved in this action.
Davis and McKinney divorced in 2014. The Final Decree awarded shared joint legal
custody and named the mother as the primary physical custodial parent.
In June, 2019, the mother (Davis) filed a Petition for Modification and Motion for
Contempt. The paternal grandmother, Tami Cicala, filed a Motion to Intervene.
Following a hearing, the trial Judge granted mandatory grandparent visitation to Tami
Cicala under O.C.G.A. §19-7-3, satisfying the statutory requirements by stating that clear and
convincing evidence established that harm would result if the children were denied independent
grandparent visitation, and that it will be in the best interests of the children to allow such
visitation with Cicala. The parents filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration which was denied.
The parents appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia which transferred the appeal to the Court
of Appeals.
First, the Court of Appeals rejected Cicala’s claim that the parents’ appeal should be
dismissed because the visitation issue was ancillary to an action for divorce and the parents were
required to file a Discretionary Application. However, the divorce had already been finalized,
and the action below was the suit filed by the mother, Elicia Davis, to modify custody. This is
therefore a “direct appeal from a judgment in a child custody case” which the Court of Appeals
may properly consider.
The Standard of Review to be applied by the Appellate Court requires the Appellate
Court to review the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment and to defer
to the trial court’s finding if a rational factfinder could have found that the trial court could have
determined by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the children were suffering emotional harm
unless visitation was granted and (2) that visitation was in the best interests of the children.
Importantly, Judge Coomer concurred, but stating that he believed the majority corrected
applied the statute. However, he believes the statute (O.C.G.A. §19-7-3) to be unconstitutional.
O.C.G.A. §19-7-3(c)(3) explicitly creates a presumption in favor of family member visitation if
the child has a pre-existing relationship with that family member. “This presumption violates the

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constitutional protection of parent’s rights to raise their children without interference from the
state. In fact, O.C.G.A. §19-7-3(c)(3) places an unconstitutional burden on Davis and McKinney
to prove that the children would not suffer emotional injury if the trial court did not order
visitation.

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Enlow vs. Enlow
A19A1074
352 Ga. App. 865; 836 SE2d 128 (2019)
Decided 10/31/2019
Glen Enlow molested his six-year-old granddaughter. Glen’s son, Michael, who was the
father of the six-year-old granddaughter, threatened to sue Glen Enlow and his wife, Marilyn.
The grandparents (Glen and Marilyn) owned five parcels of real property in a Trust. On
6/16/2016, the grandfather and grandmother, as Trustees, executed QUITCLAIM DEEDS
transferring all five parcels from Trust I to the grandmother as Trustee of the Trust in the
grandmother’s name (Trust II). The grandmother and her daughter were named as beneficiaries
of Trust II.
The grandfather and the grandmother signed a divorce settlement dated 8/18/2016 in
which the grandfather agreed that all five parcels of real property were to be awarded to the
grandmother. The grandfather and the grandmother’s Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce
incorporating the settlement was entered on 11/18/2016.
On 10/11/2017, the six-year-old child, through her Guardian (Deanna Enlow) sued the
grandfather (Glen Enlow) asserting claims for Negligence, Battery, Fraudulent Conveyance
under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (UVTA), and other claims.
Deanna Enlow then filed a Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on all of the claims, including
the claim for Fraudulent Conveyance under the UVTA.
The trial court granted Summary Judgment on all of Appellant’s claims except the UVTA claim,
stating that it could not conclude any “transfer” had taken place in any of the UVTA because the
grandfather never truly “parted” with any asset because the property it issued was marital
property, subject to equitable division upon the parties’ divorce.
Judge Coomer, writing for the Court of Appeals, held that the plain language of the UVTA
makes such a transfer instant to divorce voidable as to a creditor. The refusal to grant summary
judgment on the claim of the UVTA was vacated and the case remanded to the trial court.

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Fyffe vs. Cain
A19A1162
353 Ga. App. 130; 836 SE2d 602 (2019)
Decided 10/30/2019
Opinion by Presiding Judge McMillian, joined by Chief Judge McFadden, dissent by Senior
Appellant Judge Phipps – Physical Precedent Only
In a custody dispute between grandparents and the biological mother, two of three Judges
of the Court of Appeals, as physical precedent, reversed the decision of the trial court as to
custody and visitation. In doing so, the Court of Appeals wrote:
“Under Georgia law, a parent’s co-habitation with someone is not a basis for denying
custody or visitation absent evidence that the child was harmed or exposed to
inappropriate conduct”.
Additionally, a court is not permitted to terminate a parent’s natural right to custody
merely because it believes that the children might have better financial, education, or moral
advantages elsewhere, that is, the parent’s ability to raise their children is not to be compared to
the fitness of a third person.

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Gnam vs. Livingston
A19A2055
353 Ga. App. 701; 839 SE2d 200 (2020)
Decided 2/18/2020
Diane Gnam is the maternal grandmother of two minor children. The parents are
Stephanie Livingston and her former husband. Livingston and her former husband were
divorced in August, 2018. The divorce was not contested, and Livingston and her ex-husband
agreed to joint legal and shared physical custody of the children.
Gnam filed her Petition for Grandparent Visitation on September 10, 2018. On
December 11, 2018, Livingston filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The trial court granted Livingston’s motion and also awarded attorney’s fees under
O.C.G.A. §9-15-14(b).
Judge Coomer, writing for the Court of Appeals, affirmed the Dismissal and the award of
attorney’s fees:
1. O.C.G.A. §9-7-3(b) allows a grandparent to file an original action for visitation rights
to a minor child unless the parents of the minor child are not separated, and the child
is living with both parents. However, O.C.G.A. §19-7-3(c)(2) provides “an original
action requesting visitation rights shall not be filed by any grandparent more than
once during any two-year period and shall not be filed during any year in which
another custody action has been filed concerning the child”.
Even though the action for divorce was uncontested, it was still such an action within the same
year that Gnam filed her Complaint for Grandparent Visitation. The trial judge properly
dismissed the action.
2. At the Final Hearing, counsel for Gnam agreed to argue Livingston’s Motion for
Attorney’s Fees under O.C.G.A. §9-15-14 and claimed that fees under O.C.G.A.
§9-15-14 could not be recovered unless Livingston could prove “harassment and
intention to harass”. However, the Order from the trial Judge found that Gnam’s
Complaint “lacked substantial justification”, and Gnam proceeded with her action in
the face of explicit statutory authority barring such claim. Gnam’s action
unnecessarily extended the proceedings, and the trial Judge was within his authority
to impose fees under O.C.G.A. §9-15-14(b) which finds that a party brought an action
that “lacked substantial justification or….was interposed for delay or harassment”.

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Hannah vs. Hatcher
A19A1448
352 Ga. App. 186; 834 SE2d 307 (2019)
Decided 10/9/2019
Sara Paige Hatcher and Randy Keith Ray are the undisputed natural and biological
parents of the minor child, L.R. Randy never legitimated L.R. Wayne and Billie Hannah are the
parents of Randy Ray and the biological grandparents of L.R.
Wayne and Billie Hannah petitioned the Superior Court of Haralson County for
emergency and permanent custody of L.R., alleging that while Randy was incarcerated, L.R. had
resided with the Hannahs for about 80% of her life and was living with them at the time the
Petition was filed. The Hannahs also alleged that Hatcher had executed an agreement granting
temporary guardianship to Billie Hannah.
The Superior Court dismissed the Hannah’s request for emergency and temporary
custody, and Presiding Judge Dillard, writing for the Court of Appeals, reversed, holding that
O.C.G.A. §19-7-1(b.1) allows (paternal) grandparents to file an action for custody of a minor
child, even though their son (the father of the minor child) had not legitimated the child.

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Leach vs. Warner
GRANDPARENT VISITATION
A21A0774
862 S.E. 2d 153 (2021)
Decided 8/1/21
Opinion by Senior Appellate Judge Phipps, joined by Chief Judge Rickman and
Presiding Judge McFadden
In 2010, the child, P.B., was born of the marriage of Jody Leach and Joseph Barry.
Connie Warner is the mother of Joseph Barry and the paternal grandmother of P.B.
Warner filed a Petition for Grandparent Visitation under O.C.G.A. §19-7-3, which the
Trial Court granted, specifically finding the following:
(a) Warner had established a regular pattern of visitation with P.B.
(b) The welfare of P.B. would be harmed unless visitation was granted.
(c) It was in the best interests of P.B. to have contact and visitation with Warner.
Warner was granted a weekly Facetime or phone call with P.B., a monthly in-person 24-
hour visit, and one 3-day in-person visit each summer. Leach (the mother) appealed.
Senior Judge Phipps affirmed the Trial Court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence
that (a) the health and welfare of the child would be harmed unless visitation was granted; and
(b) that the best interests of the child would be served by the visitation.
Senior Judge Phipps also held that the four criteria of O.C.G.A. §19-7-3(c)(1)(A) through
(D) need not all be satisfied since the statute was written in the disjunctive and not the
conjunctive. That is to say, the Trial Court was not required to find both a pattern of regular
visitation and financial assistance – or a pattern of regular visitation and childcare – to award
grandparent visitation under O.C.G.A. §19-7-3.
The Court was not persuaded by Leach’s argument that if the Trial Court interfered with
her decision, her capacity as parent, that further visitation with her child by Warner was not in
the best interests of the child.
Leach’s argument that O.C.G.A. §19-7-3(c) is unconstitutional was not raised in the Trial
Court was therefore not considered by the Court of Appeals.

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Mashburn vs. Mashburn
A19A1616 & A19A1617
353 Ga. App. 31; 836 SE2d 131 (2019)
Decided 10/31/2019
Opinion by Judge Rickman, joined by Judges Miller and Reese
In these two cases consolidated for appeal, the biological mother initially had custody of
two children from two different fathers. The maternal grandparents sought custody of one child,
and the biological father sought custody of the second child.
The trial court entered Ex Parte Orders awarding temporary custody of each child to each
Plaintiff. The mother appealed.
Judge Rickman, writing for the Court of Appeals, restated the Rule of Clark vs. Clark,
273 Ga. App. 587; 544 SE2d 99 (2001):
“As used in O.C.G.A. §19-7-1(b.1), the best interests of the child standard means that
‘the third party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child will suffer
physical or emotional harm if custody were awarded to the biological parent. Once this
showing is made, the third party must then show that an award of custody to him or her
will best promote the child’s welfare and happiness”.
1. The Court of Appeals held that the standard of clear and convincing evidence
requires a heightened standard of proof but does not require the moving party to come forward
with unequivocal or undisputed evidence.
2. In cases such as this where, at the Final Hearing, custody had been previously
removed from the biological parent, “the question is not whether the child was in danger of harm
at the time of the initial temporary custody order. Instead, the question is whether the child
would suffer harm if custody were returned to the parent as of the date of the Final
Order….evidence of a parent’s past conduct and the possibility that such conduct might occur
again in the future does not support a transfer of custody away from the parent”. In this case,
the Plaintiff introduced evidence of the mother having stored marijuana in her child’s lunch box
– more than a year before the Final Hearing. Additionally, the Plaintiff introduced into evidence
nude photographs of the mother, but the mother stated that the children were never present while
the photographs were being taken, and such evidence should have been excluded. There was
also no evidence that the children were exposed to or otherwise aware of the mother’s marijuana
use.
3. For several months, the mother failed to exercise supervised visitation which had
cost her $70.00 per visit. The Court of Appeals held that there was no evidence to show that the

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failure to exercise visitation caused the children any emotional harm. O.C.G.A. §19-7-1(b.1)
does not allow a trial court to engage “in that kind of speculation with respect to future harm”.
4. The award of supervised visitation on a permanent basis was reversed. Clark vs.
Wade, 273 Ga. App. 599 requires the trial court, when deciding visitation, to consider four
factors in determining what type of visitation will “best promote the child’s welfare and
happiness”:
a. Who are the past and present caretakers of the child?
b. With whom has the child formed psychological bonds and how strong are
those bonds?
c. Have the competing parties evidenced interest in, and contact with, the
child over time?
d. Does the child have unique medical or psychological needs that would be
impacted by visitation?
The trial court also ordered that the mother would lose two visits with each child for
every positive drug screen. The Court of Appeals held such provision to violate the Rule
Against self-executing changes in visitation and was reversed.

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Reder vs. Dodds
A19A1668
354 Ga. App. 598; 839 SE2d 708 (2020)
Decided 2/24/2020
Opinion by Chief Judge McFadden, joined by Senior Appellate Judge Phipps with Presiding
Judge McMillian concurring in judgment only – physical precedent only under Court of Appeals
Rule 32.2(a)
In the custody dispute between an adoptive father of a Nicaraguan child and the
grandmother (presumably the mother of the adoptive father), the trial court awarded custody to
the grandmother and ordered the father to pay Guardian Ad Litem fees and child support. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
1. The trial court entered an Emergency Order, awarding custody to the
grandmother. Any error in doing so was rendered moot by the court’s award of permanent
custody.
2. The grandmother presented sufficient evidence to support the custody award.
3. The correct statute to be followed is O.C.G.A.§19-7-1(b.1) which establishes “a
rebuttable assumption that it is in the best interests of the child….for custody to be awarded to
the parent….of such child”. That presumption may be rebutted, however, by showing:
“With clear and convincing evidence, that the child will suffer either physical harm or
significant, long-term emotional harm, if custody is awarded to the parent. In addressing
the issue of harm, trial courts must consider a variety of factors beyond biological
connection or generalized notions of parental fitness. They must also consider the
parental needs and the circumstances of the child in question, including (1) who are the
past and present caretakers of the child or children; (2) with whom has the child or
children formed psychological bonds and how strong are these bonds; (3) have the
competing parties evidenced interest in, and contact with, the child or children over time;
and (4) are there any unique medical or psychological needs of the child or children
(citing Strickland vs. Strickland, 298 GA 630, 631(1); 783 SE2d 606 (2016)”.
4. Because the children’s grandmother amended her initial claim from grandparent
visitation under O.C.G.A.§19-7-3(e)(1) to grandparent custody (O.C.G.A.§19-7-1(b.1)), the
requirement under the Grandparent Visitation Statute that the petitioning family member pay the
Guardian Ad Litem is not applicable. The Grandparent Custody Statute (O.C.G.A.§19-7-1(b.1)
does not compel the Guardian Ad Litem fees to be borne solely by the grandparent.
5. Although the father complained that the trial court did not consider the income of
the mother who failed to appear for the trial, the trial court nonetheless ordered her to pay

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$236.00 per month, and the father did not explain how any error in calculation of the mother’s
child support affected his separate child support obligation. He therefore failed to show any
harm. Failure to show harm meant failure to present any reversible error.

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Steedley vs. Gilbreth
A19A1413
352 Ga. App. 179; 834 S.E.2d 301 (2019)
Decided 1/9/2019
The maternal grandmother, Diane Gilbreth filed a complaint for custody under O.C.G.A.
§ 19-7-1(b.1) in the Superior Court of Clinch County, naming the child’s mother, Laura
Steedley, as Defendant. The record shows that the minor child, C.B.G., was born out of wedlock
and the father had not legitimized or had any contact with the child. The child (“CBG”) and the
mother (Steedley) resided with the grandmother (Gilbreth) for a number of years until the mother
moved out to live with her new husband, following which Gilbreth continued to provide daycare
for the child.
When CBG was 3 years old, Gilbreth took the child from Steedley’s house because CBG
told Gilbreth his mother and stepfather were “mean to him, hollered at him, and whipped him.”
Gilbreth then filed this petition for custody, obtained an emergency order, and took
possession of the child. The ex parte order contained no findings of fact. The Judge who
granted the ex parte order recused himself, and a senior Judge was appointed to preside over an
evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, the Senior Judge issued a temporary order
continuing custody with the grandmother (Gilbreth) and the mother (Steedley) appeals.
Judge Hodges, writing for the Court of Appeals, reversed the Trial Court because the
order in the Trial Court failed to state adequate findings of fact to support its award:
“The Order lists only two reasons for continued custody with the
grandmother: ‘The Court does not believe that the mother can provide a stable
environment for the minor child at this time and is concerned about the minor
child’s behaviors during previous visitation with the mother’.”
In disputes between a parent and close third party relatives under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b.1)
there are three presumptions implicit in the statute:
(1) The parent is a fit person entitled to custody,
(2) A fit parent acts in the best interests in his or her child, and
(3) The child’s best interests is to be in the custody of a parent.
To overcome these statutory presumptions in favor of parental custody, the close third
party relative must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child will suffer physical
or emotional harm if custody were awarded to the biological parent, citing Clark vs. Wade,
273 Ga. 587; 544 S.E.2d 99 (2001). Harm within this context is defined as “either physical
harm or significant long term emotional harm; not merely social or economic disadvantages. In

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considering the issues of physical harm and custody, a Trial Court should examine a variety of
factors, including (1) who are the past and present caretakers of the child; (2) with whom has the
child performed psychological bonds and how strong are those bonds; (3) have the competing
parties evidenced interest in, and contact with, the child over time; and (4) does the child have
unique medical or psychological needs that one party is better able to meet.
Once the close third party relative has established by clear and convincing evidence that
parental custody would result in harm, the relative must then show that an award of custody to
him or her will best promote the child’s health, welfare, and happiness.

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Steedley vs. Gilbreth
GRANDPARENTS
A21A0356
389 Ga. App. 551; 859 S.E. 2d 520 (2021)
Decided 5/21/2021
This case involved a custody dispute between Laura Steedley, the mother of 7-year-old
C.B.G. and Diane Gilbreth, the maternal grandmother of the child.
In a prior appeal, the case was remanded to the Trial Court for additional analysis and
findings of fact required by Clark vs. Wade, 273 Ga. 587; 544 SE2d 99 (2001). The Trial Court
then issued an order which awarded the mother “primary physical custody” and granted
visitation rights to the grandmother. Although the order of the Trial Court did not specifically
award joint custody, the Court of Appeals interpreted the Order as awarding joint custody. The
case was remanded with direction that the Trial Court enter an Order awarding sole physical and
legal custody to the mother.
The grandmother can pursue sole custody under O.C.G.A. §19-7-1(b.1). However, only
O.C.G.A. §19-9-3 can award joint custody, and the dispute must be between parents only.
Further, in order to grant a third party family member reasonable visitation rights under
O.C.G.A. §19-7-3(c)(1), the Court must first find by clear and convincing evidence that the
health and welfare of the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted and the best
interests of the child would be served by such visitation.

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GUARDIAN AD LITEM
Perkins v. Hayes
A20A0204
Decided 7/2/2020
Opinion by Judge Coomer with partial concurrence by Judge Mercier and
partial dissent by Judge Miller – Physical Precedent Only
All three Judges concurred in judgment only as to Division 2 of the Opinion which held
that in actions to modify custody and visitation, a litigant has no right to access the files of the
Guardian Ad Litem.

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IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
Vanterpool vs. Patton
A19A1108
352 Ga. App. 584; 835 SE2d 407 (2019)
Decided 10/28/2019
In January, 2014, David Patton filed for divorce against Jocelyn Vanterpool. In
her Answer and Counterclaim, Vanterpool stated that there no children born or expected
of the marriage. While their divorce was pending, the parties consented to Vanterpool
undergoing in vitro fertilization (IVF) using donor ova and donor sperm. Vanterpool
began receiving preparatory treatment for the IVF procedure in August, 2014. On
9/15/2014, Vanterpool and Patton both signed an Informed Consent Agreement with the
IVF clinic which included standard, pre-printed language, stating that Patton would
accept the newborn child as his own with all parental rights and responsibilities. On
11/10/2014, Vanterpool underwent IVF procedure in the Czech Republic.
The trial court held a final hearing on the divorce complaint on 11/14/2014 at
which only Patton and his attorney appeared. The trial court entered a Final Judgment
and Decree of Divorce which had been signed and consented to by both parties and had
been prepared by Patton’s counsel. The Divorce Decree stated that there were no minor
children born or at issue in the marriage. The Settlement Agreement reached at
mediation was made part of the Final Judgment and Decree. Patton signed the Settlement
Agreement on 7/2/2014. Vanterpool signed it on 10/21/2014.
On 6/5/2015, Vanterpool gave birth to twins as a result of the IVF procedure.
Only one of the two twins survived.
Prior to the birth of the twins in May, 2015, Vanterpool filed a Motion to Set
Aside the Divorce Decree which was denied by the trial court.
On December, 2015, Vanterpool filed the instant paternity action against Patton.
Vanterpool filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of paternity under
O.C.G.A. §19-7-21 which provides:
“All children born within wedlock or within the usual period of gestation
thereafter who have been conceived by means of artificial insemination are
irrebuttably presumed legitimate if both spouses have consented in writing to the
use and administration of artificial insemination”. (emphasis added)
Patton appealed and the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed, holding that the
irrebuttable presumption of paternity created by O.C.G.A. §19-7-21 does not extend to
children conceived by IVF.

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Patton then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Motion to Dismiss with
the trial court, arguing that Vanterpool was barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata
from bringing her claim for paternity because the issue of a child being born of the
marriage had already been litigated during the divorce, and the trial court had issued a
final judgment and decree of divorce, stating there were no children born of the marriage.
The Court of Appeals agreed with Patton and held that Vanterpool’s claim for
paternity was, in fact, barred by both res judicata and collateral estoppel.

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LEGITIMATION
Belliveau vs. Floyd
LEGITIMATION
A21A0505
858 S.E.2d 763 (2021)
Decided 5/18/2021
Opinion by Presiding Judge Dillard, joined by Judges Mercier and Colvin
Evelyn and Daniel Belliveau separated, and during that time, Evelyn had a romantic
relationship with Wendell Floyd. According to Floyd, Evelyn never told him that she was
married. On 11/17/16, Floyd and Evelyn had a child together. Floyd was with Evelyn in the
hospital when the child was born, and he was listed as the child’s father on the Birth Certificate.
The couple executed a Paternity Acknowledgment, which was notarized. Floyd and Evelyn
lived together with their child until he was six months old, but eventually the Belliveaus
reconciled, and they raised Floyd’s child together since that time.
Floyd had not been allowed to see the child since 6/16/2017. At some point after she left
Floyd, Evelyn filed a Petition to change the child’s last name to Belliveau, and it was granted.
And, because the child was born during the Belliveaus’ marriage, Daniel Belliveau was the
child’s legal father.
On 11/6/17, Floyd filed a Petition to legitimate the child in Superior Court. Initially, the
case was transferred to Juvenile Court where a Guardian Ad Litem was appointed and genetic
testing was ordered and performed. Floyd was confirmed as the biological father of the child,
then on 11/13/18, the case was transferred back to Superior Court which, under O.C.G.A. §15-1-
110(3)(D) has exclusive jurisdiction to decide determination of parental rights issues in
legitimation cases.
A Final Hearing on the Legitimation Petition was scheduled but was never held.
Ultimately, the Trial Court granted Floyd’s Petition and terminated Daniel’s parental rights in the
same order. The Belliveaus filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the Trial Court
erred when it failed to hold an Evidentiary Hearing prior to terminating Daniel’s parental rights.
The Trial Court denied that Motion. The Belliveaus appealed. The applicable standard review is
abuse of discretion, but the Court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error and will be
sustained only if there is competence evidence to support them.
The Belliveaus first argued that the Trial Court erred in ordering genetic testing without
determining whether it was in the best interests of the child. The Court of Appeals disagrees.
The plain language of O.C.G.A. §19-7-22 - effective as of 7/1/16 – allows a court to order
genetic testing.
However, O.C.G.A. §19-7-22(d)(1) requires a Trial Court to hold a hearing for which
notice is provided to all interested parties, following which the Court may issue an order

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declaring the biological father’s relationship to the child to be legitimate. The Court clearly
failed to do so, and the case was remanded with direction.
The Court of Appeals also noted that it was unclear from the Trial Court’s Order whether
it applied the correct legal standard in determining whether or not legitimation was warranted.
To legitimize a child, a biological father must show that he has not abandoned his opportunity
interest in developing a relationship with his child. Only thereafter, the Trial Court proceeds to
determine whether legitimation is in the best interests of the child.

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MARRIAGE LICENSE
In Re: Shawn Donovan Stroud, et al
MARRIAGE LICENSE
A21A0931
Decided 9/28/2021
Opinion by Judge Mercier joined by Presiding Judge Dillard and Judge Pinson
Shawn Donovan Stroud and Chelsea-Sierra Lawson were married in August, 2018, but at
the time, Stroud’s name was “Shawn Courtney, Jr.”. In June, 2019, Stroud filed a Petition to
change his name from “Shawn Courtney, Jr.” to “Shawn Donovan Stroud”, which the Superior
Court granted. Thereafter, Stroud and Lawson filed a Petition in the Probate Court of Cobb
County to amend their marriage record, seeking to change Stroud’s name on the Marriage
Certificate from “Shawn Courtney, Jr.” to “Shawn Donovan Stroud”. The Probate Court denied
the Petition holding that the names on the Marriage Certificate were accurately stated at the time.
The Court of Appeals found no error and affirmed the decision of the Probate Court.
The Court of Appeals also noted that this appeal was initially filed in the Superior Court
of Cobb County. However, because the Probate Court of Cobb County sits in the county where
the population is over 90,000, its final orders are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals.

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PARENTING TIME
Brown vs. Brown
PARENTING TIME
A21A0122
857 S.E.2d 505 (2021)
Decided 4/13/2021
Opinion by Judge Phipps, joined by Presiding Judge Reese and Judge Markle
Pamela Gadams Brown and Brent Murdock Brown were previously married and had two
children together, who were born in 2008 and 2011. The Browns divorced in 2015, and the
Decree awarded joint legal and physical custody. The Parenting Plan included the following
provision for “SUMMER VACATION WEEKS”:
“Each parent shall be entitled to two consecutive weeks of uninterrupted
parenting time with the children during the children’s summer vacation from
school. Father shall have the first choice of dates for his summer vacation with
the children in all ODD-NUMBERED years, with mother having the first choice
of dates in all EVEN-NUMBERED years. The party with the first choice of dates
shall notify the other of his or her selection of dates by April 1st
of each year,
while the party with the second choice of dates shall notify the other party of his
or her selection of dates by April 15th
of each year”.
The mother admitted that by mutual agreement, she and the father deviated from the
Parenting Plan by taking non-consecutive summer time from 2015 through 2018. However, in
early 2019, the mother told the father that she intended to take the children on a summer trip to
Africa, so she requested that he select his two consecutive weeks of uninterrupted parenting
time, thus conforming to the Parenting Plan. The mother and father could not agree, so the
mother filed a “Petition for Modification of Child Custody and Visitation and Motion for
Declaratory Judgment”. The mother asserted that in 2017, the father selected six separate and
non-consecutive days throughout the summer – contrary to the intention of the Parenting Plan.
In the Trial Court, the father asserted that the Parenting Plan offered the parties “two
consecutive weeks” without any further definition how those weeks were allocated or exercised.
Both parents demanded attorney’s fees.
The mother filed a Request for Emergency Relief to enable her to take the children on the
trip to Africa, but the Trial Court denied her Motion. Curiously, at the Final Hearing of 4/29/20,
counsel for the mother stated that she would be introducing evidence regarding the Declaratory
Judgment. The Court stated: “My understanding is that the father is not opposing that. He
essentially is consenting to it? Isn’t that right?” The mother’s counsel agreed, but nonetheless
stated that she was going to put up evidence “to show the Judge what the issue is with the

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Declaratory Judgment, in defense of father’s request for attorney’s fees, and in support of
mother’s request for attorney’s fees”.
The Court of Appeals held that the Trial Court erred in denying the Motion for
Declaratory Judgment. The Court of Appeals also ruled that the Parenting Plan did not allow
each parent to select up to 14 additional days of visitation over the summer which could be
selected non-consecutively. Such an interpretation would defeat the intent of the Parenting Plan:
To allow each parent two weeks of uninterrupted time during which to take a vacation or
otherwise spend time with the children and not worry about the normal custody and visitation
schedule.
The Trial Court also awarded fees under O.C.G.A. §9-15-14 when they denied the
mother’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment. Since the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court,
then the concomitant award of attorney’s fees to the father was also reversed.

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PARENTING TIME (continued)
Cockerham vs. Cockerham
PARENTING TIME
A21A0553
359 Ga. App. 891; 860 S.E. 2d 163 (2021)
Decided 6/18/21
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judges Gobeil and Markle
Scott and Barbara were divorced in 2014. They have one child, a 13-year-old son, C.C.
The Divorce Decree awarded primary custody to Barbara, and Scott was awarded
parenting time every Wednesday night overnight, and alternating weekends from Friday after
school until Monday morning.
In the present action, Scott filed a Petition for Modification of parenting time, requesting
that he be awarded equal parenting time.
The mother counterclaimed, seeking an increase in child support.
The mother demanded attorney’s fees, asked that the Guardian Ad Litem who was
appointed in a previous modification action be appointed, and that the father pay the associated
costs for the appointment of the Guardian. The Guardian was appointed by consent with the
father agreeing to be responsible for payment of the retainer and invoices, but with the Court
granted the “authority to reapportion said fees and expenses between the parties as the Court
deems just and proper at the conclusion of this case”.
The parties entered into a Consent Order which increased child support to $3,500 per
month.
Following the hearing, the Trial Court entered a Final Order increasing the father’s
parenting time, but still awarding less than equal time. The Trial Court awarded attorney’s fees
of $5,706 to the mother as the prevailing party for the counterclaim for child support pursuant to
O.C.G.A. §19-6-15(k) and attorney’s fees of $25,000 pursuant to O.C.G.A. §19-9-3(g) for
mother’s defense of father’s Petition to Modify Parenting Time. The Trial Court further directed
the father to pay the outstanding balance of $5,100 owed to the Guardian Ad Litem.
The father appealed from that Order, contending that the Trial Court erred by failing to
state findings of fact and conclusions of law. He also complained that the Trial Court improperly
denied his Motion for Continuance and his Motion to Remove the Guardian Ad Litem. He
further challenged the Final Order as violative of his constitutional rights to parent his child.
The Court of Appeals found that it was clear that the father requested factual findings.
The Court of Appeals also found that it was unclear from the Trial Court’s Order why the Trial

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Court modified parenting time but declined to give the father equal parenting time. Further, the
Trial Court failed to explain the relevance of the factual finding that the father used foul
language in an email. Thus, the Court of Appeals vacated the Trial Court’s Order modifying that
the father’s parenting time and remanded the case to the Trial Court to enter father’s request for
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The award of attorney’s fees was affirmed. The Court of Appeals noted that this was not
a case where neither a statutory basis nor findings were entered by the Trial Court. Here, the
Trial Court’s Order specifically provided statutory basis for the awards and the Court of Appeals
held that specific findings of fact were not required to be stated in the Order. The Court of
Appeals further noted that the record reflected that at the time of the hearing on the Petition, the
mother’s attorney provided detailed billing records of the costs associated with both claims for
attorney’s fees.
As to the requirement that the father pay the entirety of the Guardian Ad Litem fees, the
Court of Appeals held that the Consent Order was a binding agreement and the parties were free
to enter into any agreement they wished unless the provisions of the contract were prohibited by
statute or public policy. The father was bound by his agreement to allow the Court to re-
apportion the Guardian Ad Litem fees.
The father complained that he had insufficient time to provide feedback to the Guardian
before the Guardian submitted written recommendations and opinions. Thus, he contended,
because the mother received additional information from the Guardian, but he did not, then it
was error for the Trial Court to deny his Motion for Continuance – but the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Trial Court’s decision to deny the Motion for Continuance.
The father’s constitutional argument was not sufficiently preserved in the Trial Court.

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PROCEDURE – APPLICATION FOR APPEAL
Barnes vs. Barnes
A21A1079
Decided 9/29/2021
Cameisha A. Barnes (the mother) and Jamar D. Barnes (the father) were divorced in 2014
in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County. The Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce
incorporated a Settlement Agreement, Parenting Plan, Child Support Addendum, and Child
Support Worksheet.
On 5/23/2018, the father filed a Petition for Modification of Child Custody. Following
negotiations and a pre-trial conference, the father moved to enforce a purported Settlement
Agreement and for attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. §9-15-14(a) and (b) and O.C.G.A. §19-6-2.
The Trial Court entered an Order enforcing the father’s Motion to Enforce the Settlement
Agreement. The mother filed a direct appeal of such order.
The Court of Appeals held that appeals from Orders in domestic relations cases generally
require a discretionary application. A direct appeal is proper under O.C.G.A. §5-6-34(a)(11)
from “all judgment or orders ‘in child custody cases’ that award, refuse to change, or modify
child custody, or orders that hold or decline to hold persons in contempt of child custody
orders”.
In this case, even though the Order involved child custody, the mother’s appeal is from
the Trial Court’s ruling enforcing a Settlement Agreement. Thus, the issue on appeal is
whether the Trial Court correctly found that the parties entered into an enforceable agreement as
opposed to whether the substantive portions of that Agreement that addressed custody were
proper. Because “custody is therefore not an issue on appeal in this domestic relations case
under O.C.G.A. §5-6-34(a)(2)”, it is not subject to a direct appeal pursuant to O.C.G.A. §5-6-
34(a)(11). The appeal was dismissed.

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PROCEDURE – COUNTERCLAIM TO MODIFY CUSTODY
Pascal vs. Pino
A21A0913
Decided 9/22/2021
Opinion by Senior Appellate Judge Phipps joined by Chief Judge Rickman and Presiding Judge
McFadden
The mother, Diana Marie Pascal, petitioned to modify the agreement with her ex-
husband, Jose Gonzalez Pino, related to custody. The father counterclaimed to modify child
support.
Before the father filed his Answer and Counterclaim, he (Pino) filed an Emergency
Motion for Custody based upon his assertion that the mother made “highly troubling” statements
to him and exhibited unusual behavior during a custody exchange. Following an emergency
hearing, the Trial Court granted the Motion and temporarily awarded the father sole legal and
physical custody of the children, limiting visitation by the mother.
Approximately one month after the emergency hearing, the father filed his Answer and
Counterclaim in which the father did not request a modification of child custody within the
pleading.
In August, 2020, the Trial Court conducted a bench trial on the mother’s Petition and the
father’s Counterclaim. In the father’s Opening Statement, his counsel indicated, for the first
time, that the father was seeking permanent primary physical custody of the children.
The Trial Court issued a Final Order concluding that it was in the best interests of the
children for the father to have primary physical custody. The mother appealed from the Trial
Court’s Final Order.
The Court of Appeals reversed. Before it was amended on 7/1/2019, O.C.G.A. §19-9-23
required that a complaint to modify custody be filed as a separate action. However, effective
7/1/2019, the statute was revised to explicitly authorize a party to bring a counterclaim for
modification of legal and physical custody in response to a complaint initiated to change
custody.
Here, the father did neither. That is to say, he neither initiated a complaint to modify
custody, nor did he bring the counterclaim to modify custody. He was therefore precluded from
seeking to modify custody in this action.

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PROCEDURE – MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Norrod v. Willingham
A21A0746
Decided 8/23/2021
Opinion by Presiding Chief Judge McFadden, jointed by Judge Rickman and
Senior Appellate Judge Phipps
Jonathan Norrod and Ashton Willingham were divorced in 2014. Willingham was
awarded primary physical custody of their children, and Norrod was required to pay child
support, originally in the amount of $420.00 per month and later increased in 2015 to $574.00
per month.
In 2018 Willingham filed a petition to modify the divorce decree and to hold Norrod in
contempt. Norrod counterclaimed for modification of child support. On 8/5/20, after a bench
trial, the Trial Court entered a Final Order increasing Norrod’s child support to $677.00 per
month and finding Norrod in contempt. Importantly, attorney’s fees were reserved.
On 8/31/20, the Court issued a separate Order on attorney’s fees, awarding Willingham a
total of $23,223 in fees.
On 9/30/20, Norrod filed a Motion for New Trial, and two weeks later, without holding a
hearing, the Court entered an Order denying the Motion for New Trial on the ground that it was
untimely filed since it was filed more than 30 days after the first Final Order of 8/5/20.
The Court of Appeals reversed, first holding that Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.3
requires the Trial Court to hold an oral hearing on a Motion for New Trial, even if the moving
party does not request such a hearing.
Furthermore, the Motion for New Trial was not untimely filed. Although the Order of
8/5/20 was labeled “Final Order” it was not actually a final judgment because it expressly
reserved the pending issue of attorney’s fees for determination in a later Order. There was no
Final Judgment and the case remains pending in the Trial Court where that Court has expressly
reserved issues related to costs and attorney’s fees for future judgment. In this case, the Order on
attorney’s fees was filed on 8/31/20, and Norrod’s Motion for New Trial was filed on 9/30/20 –
within 30 days after entry of the Order on attorney’s fees. The Motion for New Trial was
therefore timely filed within 30 days following the true Final Order, and the Trial Court failed to
conduct an oral hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court.

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PROCEDURE – NOTICE OF HEARING
Bass vs. Medy
A20A2120
854 S.E.2d 763 (2021)
Decided 2/12/2021
Narkeshia Bass (the mother) and Kettler Medy (the father), who were never married, are
the parents of two children born in 2003 and 2005.
In 2013, the Superior Court of Fulton County entered a Final Order adopting the parties’
mediated Settlement Agreement which:
(1) Granted joint legal custody;
(2) Granted primary physical custody to the father;
(3) Set up a visitation schedule for the mother;
(4) Ordered the mother to pay $150 per month in child support.
In 2019, the father filed the instant Petition for Modification of Visitation in the Superior
Court of Fayette County, requesting attorney’s fees, issuance of the Standing Order, and that the
mother’s visitation cease immediately. His Petition also asked the Trial Court to award him
“such other and further relief as it deems just and proper”.
On 5/3/19, the father filed a Motion for In-Camera Inspection of the children. On
7/31/19, the Trial Court entered a Scheduling Order, noting that the Motion for In-Camera
Inspection had been filed and scheduling a hearing on 9/18/19 “on this Motion and all other
pending Motions”. The Court also “requested that both minor children be available for meeting
with the Court”.
At the hearing on 9/18/19, the mother objected to the Court addressing any issue other
than the Motion for In-Camera Inspection, but the Trial Court proceeded over her objection and
heard testimony from the parties and the children and admitted evidence. At the conclusion of
the Hearing, the Trial Court orally announced that the mother’s long-term, unexcused absence
from the lives of the children constituted a substantial change in circumstances that materially
affected the children’s welfare. The Trial Court then awarded sole legal and physical custody to
the father, ordered that visitation and contact with the mother would be at the discretion of the
children, declared that discovery was closed, and directed counsel to run the child support
calculations based upon the evidence of income admitted at the hearing.

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Shortly thereafter, the mother filed a Motion to Recuse. A separate Judge denied the
Motion in February, 2020. In March, 2020 – before the Trial Court entered the written Order
which it had pronounced in September, 2019 – the father filed an Amendment to his Petition for
Modification of Visitation to include a request for a Modification of Custody and Child Support.
Eleven days later, the Trial Court entered a “Temporary Modification Order” granting the father
sole legal and physical custody, directing that the mother have visitation with the children at their
discretion, and ordering the mother to pay the father child support of $809.00 per month.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the mother that the Trial Court erred by modifying
custody and child support without notice to her and also because the father had not requested
such relief. The Scheduling Order filed on 7/31/21 scheduled a hearing on 9/18/19 for hearing
on the Motion that the children be examined in-camera “and all other pending motions”.
However, there were no other pending motions. The post-trial Amendment filed by the father,
adding claims to modify custody and child support, does not cure the error because the mother
was still denied the opportunity to present evidence and argument on those claims prior to the
ruling and pronouncement of the Trial Court.
The mother did not suggest that the Trial Court’s purported bias stemmed from an ex
judicial source, so her Motion to Recuse was properly denied by the Trial Court.

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PROCEDURE – NOTICE OF HEARING (continued)
Fiffee vs. Jiggetts
A20A0131
353 Ga. App. 730; 839 SE2d 224 (2020)
Decided 2/18/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judge Mercier and Senior Appellate Judge Phipps
Luerica Fiffee (the mother) and Michael Jiggetts (the father) are the parents of six
children. They were never married. The mother moved to New York with her four youngest
children, and the father remained in Georgia with the two oldest children.
In August, 2018, the trial court granted joint legal custody, and awarded primary physical
custody of the four youngest children to the mother and primary physical custody of the two
oldest children to the father. The trial court also ordered the father to pay child support.
Less than a month later, on September 7, 2018, the father filed a Verified Motion to
Vacate the Custody Order and other related Motions. On September 25, 2018, the trial court
entered an Order scheduling a hearing on the father’s Motion to Modify Custody on October 2,
2018. The bottom of the one-page Scheduling Order contained a notation, “cc” followed by the
names of each parties’ counsel and a telephone number for each. It is undisputed that the
Scheduling Order was sent to counsel only by facsimile.
At the hearing on October 2, 2018, neither the mother nor her counsel appeared. Two
days later, the mother’s counsel submitted a letter to the trial court asserting that he had not
learned of the October 2nd
hearing until after it occurred. He stated that he received all facsimiles
transmitted to his office as attachments to emails. He acknowledged that he had received the
Scheduling Order through his email system but said that he had been out of town from
September 25th
through October 1st
, had a backlog of accumulated emails and did not see the
faxed Scheduling Order until after the hearing of October 2, 2018. He asserted the Notice of
Hearing was insufficient and requested a date for the mother to be heard. The trial court denied
his request and entered an Order on October 2, 2018 granting the father’s Motion to Modify
Custody, awarding the father primary custody of all six children and ordering the mother to pay
child support.
On November 13, 2018, the mother filed a Motion to Vacate, arguing that service was
insufficient. Her Motion to Vacate was denied, from which she appealed.
Judge Barnes, writing for the Court of Appeals, first held that the denial of a Motion to
Set Aside on grounds such as this was within the purview of O.C.G.A.§9-11-60. Such denial
was reviewable through discretionary appeal procedures.

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Service by fax was not authorized or allowed as proper service under O.C.G.A.§9-11-5.
The mother was clearly harmed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the mother’s
Motion to Set Aside.

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Nadal vs. Nadal
A20A0770
355 Ga. App. 756 (2020)
Decided 6/23/2020
While Guillermo and Nancy Nadal were married, they owned a used car dealership and
associated finance business. When they divorced, their Settlement Agreement awarded the
business entity and accompanying debt to Nancy. In exchange, a Non-Compete Agreement
prohibited Guillermo from competing for five years within a 40-mile territory. If Guillermo
violated the Non-Compete provision, a liquidated damages provision fixed damages at half of the
debt of $485,000, i.e. $242,500.
About five months after they divorced, Nancy filed the following:
(a) Petition for Citation of Contempt, alleging that Guillermo violated the Non-
Compete Agreement;
(b) Motion for Immediate Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to
enjoin Guillermo from competing.
Nancy filed and served a “Notice of Hearing”, stating in material part: “Please take
notice that Plaintiff has scheduled a Temporary Hearing…. on June 24, 2019 at 1:30 p.m…..in
the Superior Court of Cobb County”. The Notice did not contain any other description of the
proceeding.
At the time of the hearing, there was also pending a Motion for Immediate Injunctive
Relief, Notices of Discovery, a Motion to Quash, and a Motion for Protective Order.
Over Guillermo’s objection, the Court held a final hearing on the merits of the contempt
petition and found Guillermo in contempt, also requiring him to pay $242,500 as liquidated
damages. The Court did not address Guillermo’s argument that liquidated damages were an
unenforceable penalty.
Judge Doyle of the Court of Appeals held that the Notice of Temporary Hearing was not
sufficient notice of a Final Hearing on the merits of the Petition for Contempt, and the judgment
for contempt was vacated.
The Court of Appeals further provided the following direction to the trial court to
determine whether the liquidated damages were, in fact, enforceable or, instead, were an
unenforceable penalty.

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(1) First, the injury caused by the breach must be difficult or impossible of accurate
estimation.
(2) Second, the parties must intend to provide for damages rather than for a penalty;
(3) Third, the sum stipulated must be a reasonable pre-estimate of the probable loss.

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Threatt vs. Threatt
A21A0637
360 Ga. App. 223; 860 S.E. 2d 883 (2021)
Decided 6/25/21
Opinion by Judge Reese, joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge Brown
The husband and wife married in 1986. In 2018, the husband filed a Petition for Divorce.
The wife answered and counterclaimed. The parties attended mediation but were unable to
settle. After mediation, the wife’s attorney withdrew, and the wife proceeded Pro Sé. Prior to
scheduling a final hearing, the Court required a Consolidated Pretrial Order from the parties.
Husband’s counsel attempted to contact wife, but she did not respond, so husband’s counsel filed
a proposed Pretrial Order without input from the wife.
The Court scheduled a hearing for 12/3/19. The Notice for Hearing does not appear in
the Appellate record, but both parties characterized the notice as for a status hearing. The wife
did not appear for the status hearing, and as a result, the Trial Court dismissed the wife’s Answer
and Counterclaim and immediately proceeded to trial.
On 1/9/20, the wife submitted a letter to the Court apologizing for missing the hearing
and stated that she had mistakenly thought the hearing was on 12/30/19.
The Court nonetheless issued its Final Judgment and Decree on 2/10/20, and on 3/3/20,
the Wife, now with counsel, filed a Motion to Set Aside judgment under O.C.G.A. §9-11-60(d).
A party’s failure to receive notice of hearing is a non-amendable defect that appears on
the face of the record under O.C.G.A. §9-11-60(d). Here, the wife did not have sufficient notice
that the Court will conduct a trial, and the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court’s denial of
wife’s Motion to set aside the judgment.

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PROCEDURE – REQUIRED FINDINGS OF FACTS, PARENTING PLAN, AND CHILD
SUPPORT WORKSHEET
VanVlerah vs. VanVlerah
PROCEDURE – REQUIRED FINDINGS OF FACTS, PARENTING PLAN, AND
CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET
A21A0700
359 Ga. App. 577; 859 S.E. 2d 546 (2021)
Decided 5/26/2021
Andrew Merle VanVlerah appealed from the Final Judgment and Decree awarding
Katelyn VanVlerah primary physical custody of their children and child support and granting
him supervised visitation.
In March, 2020, the Trial Court conducted a Bench Trial. In August, 2020, before the
Trial Court issued its Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce, the husband requested that the
Court make written findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to O.C.G.A. §9-11-52.
On September 11, 2020, the Trial Court entered its Final Judgment and Decree of
Divorce, awarding primary physical custody to the wife. The judgment did not include any
findings of fact or conclusions of law, did not incorporate a Parenting Plan, and did not
incorporate a Child Support Worksheet.
Presiding Judge Barnes, writing for the Court of Appeals, vacated the judgment and
remanded the case to the Trial Court with direction that the Trial Court do so.
The husband also filed a Motion for Contempt against the Wife, alleging that she
withheld visitation which was required to be supervised by a visitation center in Michigan called
The Family Connection Center. The Family Connection Center was closed due to COVID-19,
and because of that, the Trial Court refused to hold the wife in contempt. The Court of Appeals
upheld the Trial Court.
The Trial Court also ruled that prior to filing the Motion for Contempt, the husband
should have communicated in good faith pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.4B.
Uniform Superior Court Rule 6.4B only applies in certain discovery disputes and was
inapplicable in this context.

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PROCEDURE – SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Ernest vs. Moffa
A21A0269
359 Ga. App. 678; 859 S.E. 2d 834 (2021)
Decided 6/8/21
Opinion by Chief Judge McFadden, joined by Presiding Judge Rickman and Senior Appellate
Judge Herbert E. Phipps
The husband, Robert Moffa, filed a Complaint for Divorce in July, 2016. The wife, Lisa
Ernest, filed an Answer and Counterclaim. Both sought primary physical custody of the minor
children and both consented to a Temporary Order granting primary physical custody of the
children to Moffa. Under the Temporary Order, Ernest forfeited her parenting time when she
tested positive for alcohol.
Ernest did not appear in court for the Bench Trial which occurred on September 26 and
27, 2018. The opinion states that although Ernest claimed that she was out of state at a treatment
facility, the Court concluded that on the evening before trial, she was in fact seen at a local bar.
When Ernest did not appear for trial on the first day, her lawyer requested a continuance
which was denied. On the second day of trial, Moffa’s lawyer told the Court:
“We have worked out, I think 99.9% of our issues…we are still fine tuning the
details and we are going to stay [Ernest’s counsel] and I are going to stay and
start typing up things frantically and try to get things on paper. So we are not
really ready to read the settlement into the record, but we do, like I said, have an
agreement”.
Ernest’s lawyer did not dispute this characterization of the status of the Agreement.
Shortly thereafter, the Trial Court stated “We have…been here to negotiate a settlement today on
all property and equitable division”. Again, Ernest’s counsel did not dispute this
characterization.
Ultimately, the Trial Court entered a Decree which resolved the non-custodial issues and
referred to an agreement that did not expressly incorporate or attach any agreement. Now, on
appeal, Ernest argues that the Court of Appeals should reverse because the material terms of the
alleged Final Agreement were disputed, and there was no evidence in the record as to the terms
of any Final Agreement.
Chief Judge McFadden, writing for the Court of Appeals, refused to reverse the Trial
Court. While a Trial Court may incorporate an agreement between the parties into a divorce
case, it may also issue a Decree without doing so. The Decree in this case made several
references to a Settlement Agreement, but the Court of Appeals refused to construe those

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references to be an incorporation of the terms of the separate, enforceable Settlement Agreement
between the parties. The Final Judgment and Decree did not state or imply that it was a Consent
Judgment. Instead, the Final Judgment and Decree was entered as a resolution of a contested
case based upon counsel’s resolution of the non-custodial issues, while recognizing that such
resolution was not itself an enforceable agreement between the parties.
Ernest also attempted to supplement the record after entry of the Final Judgment and
Decree with an Affidavit from her lawyer. The Court of Appeals refused to consider the
Affidavit which was not considered by the Trial Court. The Trial Judge also ordered Ernest to
reimburse Moffa for his portion of the Guardian Ad Litem’s final bill. O.C.G.A. §19-9-3(g)
allows the Trial Court to award fees to a Guardian Ad Litem to “be paid by the parties in
proportions and times determined by the Judge”. Because Ernest failed to show an abuse of the
discretion afforded by O.C.G.A. §19-9-3(g), this claim of error was denied.
The Trial Court also awarded attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. §9-15-14. The Court of
Appeals will affirm an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to sub-section (b) absent an abuse of
discretion. Under that standard, the Court of Appeals reviews the legal holdings of the Trial
Court de novo and will uphold the Trial Court’s factual findings as long as they are not clearly
erroneous. This means that some evidence in the record supports them. In a lengthy discussion,
the Court found sanctionable conduct and then stated “lump sum or unapportioned attorney’s
fees awards are not permitted in Georgia”. The Trial Judge met the requirement and did not
award the lump sum. Instead, the Trial Judge listed in his Order the components of the fee award
with specific descriptions that tied the fees to sanctionable conduct.

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PROTECTIVE ORDER
Copeland vs. Copeland
PROTECTIVE ORDER
A21A0921
Decided 9/8/2021
On 5/15/2020 John Copeland’s ex-wife filed a verified Petition for Temporary Protective
Order against John Copeland. An ex parte order was entered.
On 6/15/2020 the father filed a motion for “Expedited Zoom Hearing and Motion to
Reinstate 30-Day Hearing Deadline Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-13-3(c).” Therein, the father
acknowledged the statewide judicial emergency declared by the Supreme Court of Georgia. The
Trial Court denied his motion, stating that the matter would be set for an in-person hearing on the
12 Month Petition after the Court safely reopened.
On 8/4/2020 the father filed a Motion to Dismiss the Ex Parte Order on the basis that a
hearing had not been held within 30 days as required by statute.
On 8/14/2020, with the parties appearing by video, the Court conducted an evidentiary
hearing and granted a 12 Month Family Violence Temporary Protective Order. The father
appeals from the Trial Court’s denial of his Motion for Reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Trial Court, stating “The judicial
emergency order did not mandate that the Courts conduct hearings (virtual or otherwise) on all
such cases during the judicial emergency.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeals rejected the father’s argument that a 12 Month TPO
must take affect on the date that the initial (ex parte) TPO was entered.

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PROTECTIVE ORDER (continued)
Oliver vs. Field
A19A1730
353 Ga. App. 891 (2020)
Decided 2/27/2020
Field obtained a Permanent Order of Protection against Oliver under the Stalking Statute.
Oliver moved to set it aside. The trial judge denied Oliver’s Motion to Set Aside the Permanent
Protective Order and further ordered that Oliver was restrained from filing any other lawsuits
Pro Se in the county until first reviewed by the Chief Judge or his or her designee.
Judge Coomer, writing for the Court of Appeals, affirmed such prohibition against
Oliver, citing O.C.G.A. §23-3-110:
“a. It being the interests of this State that there shall be an end of litigation, equity will
entertain a bill of peace:
(1) To confirm some right which has previously been satisfactorily
established by more than one legal trial and is likely to be
litigated again;
(2) To avoid a multiplicity of actions by establishing a right, in
favor of or against several persons, which is likely to be the
subject of legal controversy; or
(3) In other similar cases.
b. As ancillary to this jurisdiction, equity will grant perpetual injunctions”.

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QDRO
Gilreath vs. Connor
QDROs
A21A0816
Decided 9/21/2021
Opinion by Judge Reese
Edward Gilreath and Sherrie Connor divorced in 2014. The Settlement Agreement made
Connor responsible for preparation of a QDRO and awarded Connor an interest in Gilreath’s
pension as follows:
“Connor’s interest in Gilreath’s pension shall be equal to 27.4% of
Gilreath’s pension, based on the number of years they were married while
Gilreath was employed with said employer. The date shall be calculated from
February 1, 1983 to July 3, 2014. This date span shall be used as a valuation
date for said QDRO.”
Gilreath retired on 1/1/2019, but he paid nothing to Connor.
Connor filed a Motion for Clarification of the Final Judgment and Decree and a Motion
for Contempt. The Trial Court denied Connor’s Motion for Contempt but found that Gilreath
owed Connor 27.4% of his monthly pension payments from 1/1/2019 forward. Gilreath filed a
Motion for New Trial which the Trial Court denied. The Court of Appeals granted Gilreath’s
Application for Discretionary Appeal.
Even though the agreement stated a percentage to be awarded to Connor, the Court of
Appeals held “The plain language of the agreement…establishes a specific date range to be used
for the valuation of Gilreath’s pension plan for purposes of dividing benefits.” Because the Trial
Court did not use the explicit valuation period referenced in the agreement, it contravened the
“apparent intention of the original Decree” and thus erred by modifying its terms. The Court of
Appeals vacated the Trial Court’s Order to the extent that it did not utilize the valuation period
included in the Agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the
opinion.
Gilreath also argued that the Trial Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Connor’s Motion
for Clarification once it denied the Motion for Contempt. The Court of Appeals found no error,
stating “A Trial Court may interpret a divorce decree, or clarify a prior order or judgment, and
the request to resolve a contempt issue is placed before it. However, Courts have been allowed
to consider parties request for clarification of divorce decrees or orders, even in cases where
there was no finding of contempt.” As a result, the Trial Court did not lack jurisdiction to
consider Connor’s motion to clarify, even though the Court found that Gilreath was not in
contempt.

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RESIDENCE – DOMICILE
Crittenden vs. Crittenden
A19A1866
354 Ga. App. 672; 840 SE2d 496 (2020)
Decided 3/6/2020
Opinion by Chief Judge McFadden, joined by Presiding Judge McMillian and
Alan and Mariko Crittenden were married in 2004 in Japan where Alan was stationed as
a member of the United Stated Armed Forces. There are two children of the marriage.
Alan stated that until he joined the military, he lived in his parent’s home in Cherokee
County, Georgia. Alan filed income tax returns during his time on active duty which showed his
residence to be Georgia, but the address shown on the tax returns was an overseas post office
box.
Alan sued Mariko for divorce in the Superior Court of Cherokee County. The trial court
granted Mariko’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to Alan not
having been a bonafide resident of Georgia during the six months before filing the Complaint.
The dismissal by the trial court was affirmed. Alan had not shown that he had an actual
residence in Georgia that he could claim as his domicile. Further, he failed to show an intent to
remain in Georgia or to return after residing elsewhere.

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SUPPORT PRE-DATING TEMPORARY HEARING
Daniel vs. Daniel
A20A1938
358 Ga. App. 880; 856 S.E. 2d 452 (2021)
Decided 3/12/2021
The Court of Appeals granted Jamie Daniel an Application for Discretionary Appeal
from the Final Judgment and Decree of her divorce from Travis Daniel.
(1) The Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce recited the respective gross monthly
incomes, required each parent to pay 50% of the children’s medical expenses not
covered by insurance, but not including over-the-counter medications and
chiropractic visits unless they were medically necessary and ordered by the children’s
doctor. However, the Child Support Addendum did not attach the Child Support
Worksheet which was admitted during the trial. The Court of Appeals found no error
in the failure to attach the Child Support Worksheet because the relevant information
was referenced in the Addenum.
(2) In the Decree, the Court failed to mention or award to either party the parcel on
Westbrooks Road. The Court of Appeals found no error and stated the following
rule:
“It has now long been the rule that titled property not described in a
verdict or judgment is unaffected by the decree and remains titled in the
name of the owners as before the decree was entered. The rule of law is
clear that a divorce decree must specifically describe and dispose of
property in which both the parties have an interest or the decree will not
divest either party of their interest in the property…because the property
at issue was not specifically described in the divorce decree, title of the
property was unaffected by the decree and remained titled in the names of
both parties. Accordingly, the omission from the judgment of an explicit
award of property is not reversible error”.
(3) Jamie sought to recover expenses she paid for the children before the Court entered a
Temporary Order. The Trial Court ruled that it lacked authority to do so, but the
Court of Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals further stated that Travis could not
be held in contempt. “However, where a divorce action is pending, and the spouse
subsequently seeks temporary support for a minor child, the Trial Court may consider
awarding such support covering the period from the time the divorce is filed until a
Temporary Order or Final hearing is held, and it may exercise its discretion in

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determining the amount of that support, which will not be disturbed absent an abuse
of that discretion”.
(4) The Trial Court ordered Travis to pay Jamie $9,037.48 within 90 days, per the
Temporary Order representing half the children’s unpaid medical expenses not
covered by insurance owed since January, 2018, “to date”. Jamie submitted evidence
of medical expenses from 1/16/18 through 6/18/18, but Jamie did not submit evidence
of medical expenses she incurred after 6/18/18 up through the date of trial.1
The
Court of Appeals found that the phrase “to date” was unclear as to whether it meant
through the date for which Jamie submitted evidence at trial or through the date the
Final Divorce Decree was issued. The Court of Appeals remanded back to the Trial
Court with direction to clarify this portion of the Decree.
1
The date of trial was not stated in the Opinion.

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UCCJEA – HOME STATE
Alden v. Yarbrough
A21A0678
862 S.E.2 d 148 (2021)
Decided 8/5/21
Opinion by Presiding Judge Miller, joined by Judge Mercier and Senior Judge Herbert E.
Phipps
In April, 2005, the children’s father, Dale Yarbrough, filed a Complaint for Custody in
the Superior Court of Camden County, GA. In May, 2007, the Superior Court in Camden
County entered a Consent Order which awarded primary custody of the children to Alden.
Alden then moved to North Carolina with the children, and in 2017, North Carolina’s
Department of Social Services removed the children from her custody.
In December, 2019, Alden filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment in Georgia, seeking a
ruling that under the UCCJEA, Georgia has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction to determine
issues relating to custody of the children. The Superior Court denied Alden’s Request for
Declaratory Judgment, ruling that there was no actual and justiciable controversy because,
although there was clearly a pending action in North Carolina, there was no pending custody
action in Georgia.
In May, 2020, the Georgia Superior Court entered an Order releasing jurisdiction of the
UCCJEA to North Carolina. The Court stated that it was acting both sua sponte and upon the
request of the District Court of Allegheny County, NC. According to the Order, a North
Carolina Judge communicated to the Superior Court Judge in Georgia that the North Carolina
proceeding had been dismissed because the North Carolina Court determined that it lacked
jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The Superior Court in Camden County, GA determined that
North Carolina was a more appropriate forum to decide matters related to custody of the
children, and it released Georgia’s jurisdiction of the matter to North Carolina pursuant to the
UCCJEA.
Alden filed an Application for Discretionary Review which was granted. She then filed
this Appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court, holding that the Trial Court
committed reversible error by failing to inform the parties of the communications with the North
Carolina Court and by failing to allow the parties to present facts and arguments related to the
record of these communications. Further, even though the Superior Court of Camden County
denied Alden’s Request for Declaratory Judgment on the ground that there was no actual or
justiciable controversy, this denial did not address the substance of the jurisdictional issue.

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UCCJEA – HOME STATE (continued)
Kerr vs. Wilson
UCCJEA
A20A1668
854 S.E.2d 777 (2021)
Decided 2/22/2021
Opinion by Judge Phipps, joined by Presiding Judge Miller and Judge Mercier
In 2009, a Tennessee court granted a divorce to Stacy Wilson and Jonathan Kerr. Wilson
was awarded primary custody of their daughter, and Kerr was ordered to pay $500 per month in
child support.
In August, 2019, Wilson filed a Petition for Registration/Domestication of their Order of
Divorce in the Superior Court of Glynn County, Georgia. Kerr was served on 9/9/19, and he
filed a Pro Sé response on 9/24/19. He did not request a hearing, but on 10/3/19, the Superior
Court scheduled a hearing which was held on 12/3/19.
On 4/7/20, the Superior Court entered an Order granting the Petition to
Register/Domesticate the Divorce Decree. The Order of the Trial Court stated as its sole basis
for denial of Kerr’s objection to registration of the Decree was that Kerr had not requested a
hearing within 20 days of service – even though the Court conducted a hearing. The Court of
Appeals agreed with Kerr that the Superior Court erred in confirming the Decree.
In order to validly register a Child Custody Order, a litigant must file all of the following:
(1) A letter or other document requesting registration;
(2) Two copies, including onecertified copy, of the determination sought to be
registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the
knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the Order has not been
modified; and
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 19-9-69, the name and address of
the person seeking registration and any parent or person acting as a parent who
has been awarded custody or visitation in the child custody determination sought
to be registered.
The record shows that Wilson’s Petition did not contain two copies of the Divorce
Decree, but only a certified copy. The Tennessee Order was therefore not registered under
O.C.G.A. §19-9-85(a), and the Superior Court erred by automatically confirming the registration
of the Decree. Instead, the Superior Court should have treated the filing merely as a Petition to
Domesticate the Tennessee Decree.
Curiously, the Superior Court of Glynn County found Kerr in contempt. The Divorce
Decree provided that child support payments would begin once the parties sold the marital

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residence – an event which Kerr contends did not occur until three years after the divorce. Kerr
contends that the Superior Court erred by failing to credit him for those three year of gratuitous
payments which occurred prior to the sale of the house – but there was no transcript – so the
Court of Appeals presumed that the evidence supported the factual findings by the Trial Court.
Registering or domesticating a foreign Decree is a prerequisite to allow a Georgia court
to modify that judgment. The Decree may be enforced, however, upon the filing of the certified
copy. Kerr did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Tennessee court under the Order, and he did
not challenge his notice and opportunity to be heard. The Court of Appeals concluded that the
Superior Court of Glynn County properly exercised its authority to enforce the Order that the
Tennessee Court requiring Kerr to pay child support.

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Razi v. Burns
A19A1936
354 Ga. App. 608; 841 S.E.2d 407 (2020)
Decided 3/16/2020
Opinion by Judge Rickman, joined by Chief Judge McFadden, Presiding Judge Barnes,
Presiding Judge Doyle, Presiding Judge Dillard, Presiding Judge McMillian, and Judges
Mercier, Gobeil, Coomer, and Hodges. Judge Brown concurs in judgment only.
Dissent written by Judge Miller and joined by Judges Reese and Markle and Senior Appellate
Judge Phipps.
The parties are parents of two minor children. The father and mother never married. The
father’s paternal rights were established by a legitimation action in California which stipulated
that the father is the biological father of the children and that California was the home state.
In January, 2016, both parents and the minor children relocated to Georgia, and the children were
enrolled into a public school in Atlanta.
The father unsuccessfully attempted to file an action in California to have custody awarded to
him, and thereafter he filed a petition to modify custody in the Superior Court of DeKalb County.
The father moved for an appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem, and a Guardian was appointed.
Following about two years of proceedings, the Guardian stated that the father’s allegations that
the mother was abusing the children were unsubstantiated. The father appeared at a subsequent
hearing and filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice. The Trial Court vacated the
father’s voluntary dismissal from which the father appealed.
Even though the father filed the action in Georgia, he complained that the Georgia court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Specifically, he contended that the Trial Court
failed to make an express finding that Georgia is the “home state” of the children. The Court of
Appeals found that although there was never an express finding stated by the Trial Court, the
evidence was clear that Georgia was, in fact, the home state of the children.
The father also argued that O.C.G.A. §9-11-41(a)(1)(A) provides “an action may be dismissed
by the Plaintiff, without order or permission of the court…by filing a written notice of dismissal
at any time before the first witness is sworn.” The Court of Appeals found that even though
there is no final order, the Georgia Court had held multiple hearings at which witnesses testified,
and following which the Court issued a Temporary Order regarding custody and visitation. The
Court of Appeals therefore determined that a first witness had an in fact been sworn and the
father was not allowed to dismiss his Complaint.
The father also contended that every order issued in a Georgia court should have been vacated
because he (who filed the action) never had any standing to bring the action in the first place. He
contends that the California decree of legitimation was never domesticated in Georgia. The

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Court of Appeals rejected the argument, stating that the record was replete with the father’s
sworn averments he is the legal father of the children.
In the dissent written by Judge Miller, she stated that she would vacate the Trial Court’s orders
and remand the case to make factual findings required by the UCCJEA. Specifically, she would
require the Trial Court to make a specific finding that the children – not just the parents – were
residents of Georgia and that Georgia was the “home state” of the children.
The opinion is marked as PHYSICAL PRECEDENT ONLY, COURT OF APPEALS RULE
33.2(a).

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UIFSA
Serluco vs. Taggart
UIFSA
A20A1368
357 Ga. App. 296 (2020)
Decided 10/21/2020
On 11/2/2011, an Amended Judgment of Divorce was filed in New Jersey, dissolving the
marriage of Sarah Serluco and John Taggart. Under the Settlement Agreement incorporated into
the Amended Judgment, John was ordered to pay alimony of $3,000 per month and child support
of $1,500 per month. Both of the parties and their children relocated to Georgia. On 10/2/2018,
the New Jersey Judgment was registered in Georgia pursuant to UIFSA. Fourteen days
thereafter, on 10/16/18, the husband filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of DeKalb County
to domesticate and register the Amended Judgment of Divorce and to modify child support and
alimony.
Under the New Jersey Decree, all support continued until a child reaches the age of 18 or
completes four years of academic college, whichever last occurs.
On 9/18/2019, following a bench trial, the Superior Court of DeKalb County, GA issued
an Order domesticating the Amended Judgment of Divorce in accordance with the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law (UEFJL) (not under UIFSA). The same Order stated
“This Court shall have jurisdiction to modify and enforce the same”. The Trial Court then
modified alimony and child support, reducing child support to $1,099.00 per month until the
children reached the age of 20 and terminating the husband’s obligation to pay alimony to the
wife.
The Court of Appeals granted the wife’s Application for Discretionary Review.
The Court of Appeals held that the Trial Court should not have registered/domesticated
the New Jersey Judgment pursuant to the UEFJL. Instead, proceedings in the Trial Court were
controlled by UIFSA, a relevant portion of which includes O.C.G.A. §19-11-170 which, in
relevant part, provides as follows:
“c. A tribunal in Georgia may not modify any aspect of a child support order that
may not be modified under the law of the issuing state, including the duration of
the obligation of support.
d. In a proceeding to modify a child support order, the law of the state that is
determined to have issued the initial controlling Order governs the duration of the
obligation of support”.

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INDEX TO COURT OF APPEALS CASES
(By Category)
PAGE CASE
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
9 Duffy vs. Sanders
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A20A0383
354 Ga. 684; 841 SE2d 415 (2020)
Decided 3/20/2020
Opinion by Judge Hodges, joined by Chief Judge McFadden and
Presiding Judge Doyle
ARBITRATION
10 King vs. King
ARBITRATION
A20A0034
354 Ga. App. 19; 840 S.E.2d 108 (2020)
Decided 2/27/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judge Gobeil and
ATTORNEY’S FEES
11 Bennett vs. McClam
ATTORNEY’S FEES
A21A0134
358 Ga. App. 550 (2021)
Decided 2/23/2021
Opinion by Chief Judge McFadden, joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and
Judge Hodges
12 Dovel vs. Dovel
ATTORNEY’S FEES
A19A1375
352 Ga. App. 423; 834 SE2d 918 (2019)
Decided 10/20/2019
Opinion by Judge Gobeil, joined by Presiding Judge Dillard and Judge Hodges
CHILD SUPPORT
13 Cousin vs. Tubbs
CHILD SUPPORT
A19A1805
353 Ga. App. 873; 840 S.E.2d 85 (2020)
Decided 2/26/2020

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15 Cousin vs. Tubbs
CHILD SUPPORT
A20A2050
358 Ga. App. 722, 856 S.E.2d 56** (2020)
Decided 3/4/2021
Opinion by Judge Hodges, joined by Chief Judge McFadden and
17 Day vs. Mason
CHILD SUPPORT – EXTRACURRICULAR EXPENSES AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES
A20A0964
357 Ga. App. 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 11/18/2020
Opinion by Judge Brown, joined by Presiding Judge Dillard and Judge
Rickman
19 Johnson vs. Collins
CHILD SUPPORT
A19A2277
354 Ga. App. 589; 841 SE2d 189 (2020)
Decided 3/13/2020
20 Johnson vs. Johnson
CHILD SUPPORT – DEVIATION FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL
A20A2061
358 Ga. App. 638 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)
Decided 3/2/2021
Opinion by Presiding Judge Reese, joined by Judges Markle and Colvin
22 Lockhart vs. Lockhart
CHILD SUPPORT – IMPUTED INCOME
A21A0760
863 S.E.2d 174 (2021)
Decided 9/27/2021
24 Park-Poapes vs. Poapes
CHILD SUPPORT
A19A2032 & A19A2033
351 Ga. App. 856; 833 SE2d 554 (2019)
Decided 9/18/2019
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judges Mercier and Brown

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26 Perez vs. Cunningham
CHILD SUPPORT
A20A601
355 Ga. App. 393; 844 S.E.2d 253 (2020)
Decided 6/4/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Doyle, joined by Chief Judge McFadden and
Judge Hodges
27 Ross vs. Small
CHILD SUPPORT
A20A0372
355 Ga. App. 483 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 6/11/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Doyle, joined by Presiding Judge McFadden and
Judge Hodges
28 Spirnak vs. Meadows
CHILD SUPPORT
A20A0158
355 Ga. App. 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 6/8/2020
30 Steed vs. Steed
CHILD SUPPORT
A20A0316
843 SE2d 21 (2020)
Decided 5/7/2020
Opinion by Judge Coomer, joined by Presiding Judge Miller and Judge Mercier
31 Wilson vs. Guerrero
CHILD SUPPORT
A19A2475
353 Ga. App. 501; 838 S.E.2d 588 (2020)
Decided 1/28/2020
Opinion by Judge McMillian, joined by Presiding Judge McFadden and

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32 Winchell vs. Winchell
CHILD SUPPORT
A19A1531 & A19A2119
352 Ga. App. 306; 835 SE2d 6** (2019)
Decided 10/16/2019
Opinion by Judge McMillian, joined by Chief Judge McFadden and Senior
Appellate Judge Phipps
CHOICE OF LAW
34 Mbatha vs. Cutting
CHOICE OF LAW
A20A1303
356 Ga. App. 743 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 9/21/2020
Rickman
36 Paul vs. Paul
A20A194
390 Ga. App. 846 S.E.2d 138 (2020)
Decided 6/25/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Doyle and joined by Judge Hodges with
concurrence by Chief Judge McFadden
CLERICAL ERROR
37 Ekhorutomwen vs. Jamison
CLERICAL ERROR
A20A1539
356 Ga. App. 807 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 9/29/2020
Opinion by Judge Pipkin, joined by Presiding Judge Barnes and Judge Gobeil
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
39 Walia vs. Walia
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
A20A1305
356 Ga. App. 387 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 7/30/2020
Opinion by Judge Colvin, joined by Judges Gobeil and Pipkin

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CONTEMPT
41 McCarthy vs. Ashment
CONTEMPT
A19A0788
353 Ga. App. 270; 835 S.E.2d 745 (2019)
Decided 10/30/2019
44 Rose vs. Clark
CONTEMPT – TUITION PAID OUTSIDE OF CHILD SUPPORT
WORKSHEET
A21A0172
Decided 6/16/21
46 Sullivan vs. Harper
CONTEMPT
A19A1629
352 Ga. App. 427; 834 SE2d 921 (2019)
Decided 10/22/2019
48 Wall vs. James
CONTEMPT - VISITATION
A20A2058
358 Ga. App. 121 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)
Decided 1/15/2021
Opinion by Presiding Judge Dillard, joined by Judges Rickman and Brown
CUSTODY
50 Blackwelder vs. Shugard
CUSTODY – ACTIONS BY GRANDPARENTS AND THIRD PARTIES
A21A0483
Decided 6/28/21
Opinion by Judge Reece, joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge Brown
52 Brazil vs. Williams
CUSTODY – RELOCATION
A21A0037
Decided 5/19/2021
Opinion by Presiding Judge Miller, joined by Judges Hodges and Pipkin

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CUSTODY (continued)
53 Burnham vs. Burnham
CUSTODY - RELOCATION
A20A1243
Decided 11/2/2020
Opinion by Judge Gobeil, joined by Presiding Judge Barnes and Judge Pipkin
55 Capehart vs. Mitchell
CUSTODY
A20A1697
851 S.E.2d 846 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 11/25/2020
Opinion by Chief Judge McFadden, joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge
Hodges
56 Harrison vs. Whitaker
CUSTODY – MODIFICATION
A21A0755
862 S.E.2d 597 (2021)
Decided 8/26/2021
Opinion by Judge Markle, joined by Presiding Judge Barnes and Judge Gobeil
57 Kasper vs. Martin
CUSTODY
A20A0244
354 Ga. App. 831; 841 S.E.2d 488 (2020)
Decided 4/3/2020
Opinion by Judge Rickman, joined by Presiding Judge Dillard and Judge
Brown
58 Longino vs. Longino
CUSTODY
A19A1386
352 Ga. App. 263; 834 SE2d 355 (2019)
Decided 10/11/2019
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judge Mercier and Judge Brown
59 McManus vs. Johnson
CUSTODY – CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
A20A1185
356 Ga. App. 880 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 10/5/2020

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CUSTODY (continued)
61 Mitchell vs. Capehart
CUSTODY
A19A2139
353 Ga. App. 461; 838 S.E.2d 125 (2020)
Decided 1/21/2020
Opinion by Judge Barnes, joined by Judges Mercier and Brown
62 Ortega vs. Temple
A20A1716
856 S.E.2d 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)
Decided 3/15/2021
64 Perry vs. Jenkins
CUSTODY – JOINT CUSTODY
A21A0969
862 S.E.2d 734 (2021)
Decided 8/31/2021
66 Pryce vs. Pryce
CUSTODY – PARENTING PLAN
A21A0056
Decided 5/28/2021
Opinion by Judge Colvin, joined by Presiding Judge Dillard and Judge Mercier
68 Wallace vs. Chandler
A21A0648
Decided 4/22/2021
70 Samnick vs. Goodman
A20A0562
354 Ga. App. 805; 841 S.E.2d 468 (2020)
Decided 4/1/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judge Gobeil and

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72 Hill vs. Hill
A21A0285
Decided 6/29/2021
Opinion by Presiding Judge Doyle, joined by Judges Reece and Brown
73 McLaws vs. Drew
A20A0695
355 Ga. App. 162; 843 S.E.2d 440 (2020)
Decided 5/15/2020
EQUITABLE CAREGIVER
76 Skinner vs. Miles
EQUITABLE CAREGIVER
A21A0980
Decided 10/4/2021
Opinion by Judge Reese joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge Brown
EQUITABLE DIVISION
79 Calloway-Spencer vs. Spencer
EQUITABLE DIVISION
Court of Appeals of Georgia, Fifth Division
A20A0546
355 Ga. App. 743 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 6/23/2020
Opinion by Judge Reese, joined by Judges Markle and Colvin
80 Dixon vs. Dixon
EQUITABLE DIVISION
A19A1179
352 Ga. App. 169; 834 SE2d 309 (2019)
Decided 10/19/2019
Opinion by Judge Gobeil, joined by Judge Dillard and Judge Hodges
81 Messick vs. Messick
EQUITABLE DIVISION
A21A0600
858 S.E.2d 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)
Decided 5/18/2021
Opinion by Chief Judge McFadden, joined by Presiding Judge Rickman and
Senior Appellate Judge Herbert E. Phipps

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82 Spruell v. Spruell
EQUITABLE DIVISION
A20A1077
356 Ga. App. 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 9/18/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Dillard, joined by Judge Rickman and Judge
Brown
EVIDENCE
83 Swearngin v. Rowell
EVIDENCE
A20A0236
846 S.E. 2d 263 (2020)
Decided 6/30/2020
Opinion by Judge Hodges joined by Chief Judge McFadden and
EXPERT WITNESS
85 Lee vs. Smith
EXPERT WITNESS
Supreme Court of Georgia
307 Ga. 815
838 S.E.2d 870 (Ga. 2020)
Decided 2/10/2020
Opinion by Chief Justice Melton
GARNISHMENT
86 Smith vs. Robinson
GARNISHMENT
A20A0591
355 Ga. App. 159; 842 SE2d 917 (2020)
Decided 5/13/2020
Opinion by Chief Judge McFadden, joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and
Judge Hodges
GRANDPARENTS
87 Brock vs. Brown
GRANDPARENTS
A19A2083
354 Ga. 63; 840 S.E.2d 155 (2020)
Decided 3/4/2020
Opinion by Judge Coomer joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge Markle

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88 Davis vs. Cicala
GRANDPARENTS
A20A1116
356 Ga. App. 873 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 10/5/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Miller, joined by Judges Mercier and Coomer,
concurs dubitante
90 Enlow vs. Enlow
GRANDPARENTS
A19A1074
352 Ga. App. 865; 836 SE2d 128 (2019)
Decided 10/31/2019
91 Fyffe vs. Cain
GRANDPARENTS
A19A1162
353 Ga. App. 130; 836 SE2d 602 (2019)
Decided 10/30/2019
Opinion by Presiding Judge McMillian, joined by Chief Judge McFadden,
dissent by Senior Appellant Judge Phipps – Physical Precedent Only
92 Gnam vs. Livingston
GRANDPARENTS
A19A2055
353 Ga. App. 701; 839 SE2d 200 (2020)
Decided 2/18/2020
93 Hannah vs. Hatcher
GRANDPARENTS
A19A1448
352 Ga. App. 186; 834 SE2d 307 (2019)
Decided 10/9/2019
94 Leach vs. Leach
GRANDPARENT VISITATION
A21A0774
Decided 8/1/21

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95 Mashburn vs. Mashburn
GRANDPARENTS
A19A1616 & A19A1617
353 Ga. App. 31; 836 SE2d 131 (2019)
Decided 10/31/2019
Opinion by Judge Rickman, joined by Judges Miller and Reese
971 Reder vs. Dodds
GRANDPARENTS
A19A1668
354 Ga. App. 598; 839 SE2d 708 (2020)
Decided 2/24/2020
Opinion by Chief Judge McFadden, joined by Senior Appellate Judge Phipps
with Presiding Judge McMillian concurring in judgment only – physical
precedent only under Court of Appeals Rule 32.2(a)
99 Steedley vs. Gilbreth
GRANDPARENTS
A19A1413
352 Ga. App. 179; 834 S.E.2d 301 (2019)
Decided 1/9/2019
101 Steedley vs. Gilbreth
GRANDPARENTS
A21A0356
Decided 5/21/2021
GUARDIAN AD LITEM
102 Perkins v. Hayes
GUARDIAN AD LITEM
A20A0204
356 Ga. App. 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 7/2/2020
Opinion by Judge Coomer with partial concurrence by Judge Mercier and
partial dissent by Judge Miller – Physical Precedent Only

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103 Vanterpool vs. Patton
A19A1108
352 Ga. App. 584; 835 SE2d 407 (2019)
Decided 10/28/2019
LEGITIMATION
105 Belliveau vs. Floyd
LEGITIMATION
A21A0505
858 S.E.2d 763 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)
Decided 5/18/2021
Opinion by Presiding Judge Dillard, joined by Judges Mercier and Colvin
MARRIAGE LICENSE
107 In Re: Shawn Donovan Stroud, et al
MARRIAGE LICENSE
A21A0931
Decided 9/28/2021
Opinion by Judge Mercier joined by Presiding Judge Dillard and Judge Pinson
PARENTING TIME
108 Brown vs. Brown
PARENTING TIME
A21A0122
857 S.E.2d 505 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)
Decided 4/13/2021
Opinion by Judge Phipps, joined by Presiding Judge Reece and Judge Markle
110 Cockerham vs. Cockerham
PARENTING TIME
A21A0553
Decided 6/18/21
112 Barnes vs. Barnes
A21A1079
Decided 9/29/2021

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113 Pascal vs. Pino
A21A0913
Decided 9/22/2021
Opinion by Senior Appellate Judge Phipps joined by Chief Judge Rickman and
114 Norrod vs. Willingham
A21A0746
Decided 8/23/2021
Opinion by Presiding Chief Judge McFadden, jointed by Judge Rickman and
Senior Appellate Judge Herbert Phipps
115 Bass vs. Medy
A20A2120
854 S.E.2d 763 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)
Decided 2/12/2021
Judge Hodges
117 Fiffee vs. Jiggetts
A20A0131
353 Ga. App. 730; 839 SE2d 224 (2020)
Decided 2/18/2020
Opinion by Presiding Judge Barnes, joined by Judge Mercier and
119 Nadal vs. Nadal
A20A0770
355 Ga. App. 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 6/23/2020
Judge Hodges

- 150-
121 Threatt vs. Threatt
A21A0637
Decided 6/25/21
Opinion by Judge Reece, joined by Presiding Judge Doyle and Judge Brown
PROCEDURE - REQUIRED FINDINGS OF FACTS, PARENTING
PLAN, AND CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET
122 VanVlerah vs. VanVlerah
PROCEDURE – REQUIRED FINDINGS OF FACTS, PARENTING PLAN,
AND
CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET
A21A0700
Decided 5/26/2021
123 Ernest vs. Moffa
A21A0269
Decided 6/8/21
Opinion by Chief Judge McFadden, joined by Presiding Judge Rickman and
Senior Appellate Judge Herbert E. Phipps
PROTECTIVE ORDER
125 Copeland vs. Copeland
PROTECTIVE ORDER
A21A0921
Decided 9/8/2021
126 Oliver vs. Field
PROTECTION ORDER
A19A1730
353 Ga. App. 891 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 2/27/2020

- 151-
QDRO
127 Gilreath vs. Connor
QDROs
A21A0816
Decided 9/21/2021
Opinion by Judge Reese
RESIDENCE – DOMICILE
128 Crittenden vs. Crittenden
RESIDENCE - DOMICILE
A19A1866
354 Ga. App. 672; 840 SE2d 496 (2020)
Decided 3/6/2020
Opinion by Chief Judge McFadden, joined by Presiding Judge McMillian and
129 Daniel vs. Daniel
A20A1938
Decided 3/12/2021
131 Alden vs. Yarborough
A21A0678
Decided 8/5/21
Opinion by Presiding Judge Miller, joined by Judge Mercier and Senior Judge
Herbert E. Phipps
132 Kerr vs. Wilson
UCCJEA
A20A1668
854 S.E.2d 777 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021)
Decided 2/22/2021
Opinion by Judge Phipps, joined by Presiding Judge Miller and Judge Mercier

- 152-
134 Razi v. Burns
A19A1936
354 Ga. App. 608; 841 S.E.2d 407 (2020)
Decided 3/16/2020
Opinion by Judge Rickman, joined by Chief Judge McFadden, Presiding Judge
Barnes, Presiding Judge Doyle, Presiding Judge Dillard, Presiding Judge
McMillian, and Judges Mercier, Gobeil, Coomer, and Hodges. Judge Brown
concurs in judgment only.
Dissent written by Judge Miller and joined by Judges Reese and Markle and
UIFSA
136 Serluco vs. Taggart
UIFSA
A20A1368
357 Ga. App. 296 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)
Decided 10/21/2020
Rickman

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