Jason Wilson pleaded guilty to two counts of identity theft. His offender score was incorrectly calculated as 8, including a prior misdemeanor as a felony. The Supreme Court held that (1) for an anticipatory offense to be included in an offender score calculation, it must be a felony itself, and (2) an incorrectly calculated offender score due to a mischaracterized prior conviction is a legal error, not a factual one, that cannot be waived. Wilson was entitled to be resentenced using the correct offender score.
Order reversing in part and affirming in part, the Final Divorce Order - Halb...Putnam Reporter
Order reversing in part and affirming in part, the Final Divorce Order in the appeal of the Final Divorce Order in the case of Dolores Jean Halburn v. Mark Vance Halburn. Case #11d-516 in Putnam County Circuit Court.
Order reversing in part and affirming in part, the Final Divorce Order - Halb...Putnam Reporter
Order reversing in part and affirming in part, the Final Divorce Order in the appeal of the Final Divorce Order in the case of Dolores Jean Halburn v. Mark Vance Halburn. Case #11d-516 in Putnam County Circuit Court.
Emmanuel Roy alias EJR III coupable des cinq chefs d'accusations de fraudes e...GerardPradel
Emmanuel Roy alias EJR III a été reconnu coupable de cinq chefs d'accusations et condamne a sept mois de prison. Les crimes commis sont:
1. Complot pour commettre la fraude
2. Complot pour commettre la fraude électronique
3. Complot pour commettre la fraude bancaire
4. Fraude 1047 A Herkimer Street
5. Fraude 377 Quincy Street et Snedike Ave
The concept of Marriage under Private International Lawcarolineelias239
Marriage is a broad concept under Private international law. Many new rules had been laid down in various decisions, which had developed the international matrimonial law. The relevancy of monogamous or polygamous marriages. And the validity matters like formal validity and essential validity is also discussed here
Selecting Your Jury For A Criminal Jury Trial in New YorkBarry Simon
Ony your New York Criminal defense attorney can provide you with specific advice and guidance with regard to your case; however, a better understanding of the jury selection process may be beneficial if you are contemplating a jury trial. Learn more about New York jury selection process in this presentation.
Conditional Residents who obtained their green card based on marriage to a US Citizen or Permanent Resident, where the marriage was less than 2 years old at the time the green card was issued, must apply to remove conditions on permanent residence based on marriage, within the 90 day period preceding the expiration of their green card.
This presentation was made jointly by Brisbane Family Law Centre Director, Clarissa Rayward, and mediator Jenny Rimmer, of JDR Solutions.
The presentation was made on behalf of the Family Law Practitioners Association of Queensland, in May 2012.
Emmanuel Roy alias EJR III coupable des cinq chefs d'accusations de fraudes e...GerardPradel
Emmanuel Roy alias EJR III a été reconnu coupable de cinq chefs d'accusations et condamne a sept mois de prison. Les crimes commis sont:
1. Complot pour commettre la fraude
2. Complot pour commettre la fraude électronique
3. Complot pour commettre la fraude bancaire
4. Fraude 1047 A Herkimer Street
5. Fraude 377 Quincy Street et Snedike Ave
The concept of Marriage under Private International Lawcarolineelias239
Marriage is a broad concept under Private international law. Many new rules had been laid down in various decisions, which had developed the international matrimonial law. The relevancy of monogamous or polygamous marriages. And the validity matters like formal validity and essential validity is also discussed here
Selecting Your Jury For A Criminal Jury Trial in New YorkBarry Simon
Ony your New York Criminal defense attorney can provide you with specific advice and guidance with regard to your case; however, a better understanding of the jury selection process may be beneficial if you are contemplating a jury trial. Learn more about New York jury selection process in this presentation.
Conditional Residents who obtained their green card based on marriage to a US Citizen or Permanent Resident, where the marriage was less than 2 years old at the time the green card was issued, must apply to remove conditions on permanent residence based on marriage, within the 90 day period preceding the expiration of their green card.
This presentation was made jointly by Brisbane Family Law Centre Director, Clarissa Rayward, and mediator Jenny Rimmer, of JDR Solutions.
The presentation was made on behalf of the Family Law Practitioners Association of Queensland, in May 2012.
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IN RE QUINLAN
70 N.J. 10 (1976)
355 A.2d 647
IN THE MATTER O F KAREN Q UINLAN, AN ALLEGED INCO MPETENT.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey.
Argued January 26, 1976.
Decided March 31, 1976.
Mr. Paul W. Armstrong and Mr. James M. Crowley, a member of the New York bar, argued the cause
for appellant Joseph T. Quinlan (Mr. Paul W. Armstrong, attorney).
Mr. Daniel R. Coburn argued the cause for respondent Guardian ad Litem Thomas R. Curtin.
Mr. William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey, argued the cause for respondent State of
New Jersey (Mr. Hyland, attorney; Mr. David S. Baime and Mr. John DeCicco, Deputy Attorneys General,
of counsel; Mr. Baime, Mr. DeCicco, Ms. Jane E. Deaterly, Mr. Daniel Louis Grossman and Mr. Robert E.
Rochford, Deputy Attorneys General, on the brief).
Mr. Donald G. Collester, Jr., Morris County Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent County of
Morris.
Mr. Ralph Porzio argued the cause for respondents Arshad Javed and Robert J. Morse (Messrs. Porzio,
Bromberg and Newman, attorneys; Mr. Porzio, of counsel; Mr. Porzio and Mr. E. Neal Zimmermann, on the
brief).
Mr. Theodore E.B. Einhorn argued the cause for respondent Saint Clare's Hospital.
Mr. Edward J. Leadem filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Catholic Conference.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by HUGHES, C.J.
[ 70 N.J. 18 ]
THE LITIGATION
The central figure in this tragic case is Karen Ann Quinlan, a New Jersey
resident. At the age of 22, she lies in a debilitated and allegedly moribund state at Saint Clare's
Hospital in Denville, New Jersey. The litigation has to do, in final analysis, with her life, — its
continuance or cessation, — and the responsibilities, rights and duties, with regard to any fateful
decision concerning it, of her family, her guardian, her doctors, the hospital, the State through its law
enforcement authorities, and finally the courts of justice.
The issues are before this Court following its direct certification of the action under the rule, R.
2:12-1, prior to hearing in the Superior Court, Appellate Division, to which the appellant (hereafter
"plaintiff") Joseph Quinlan, Karen's father, had appealed the adverse judgment of the Chancery
Division.
Due to extensive physical damage fully described in the able opinion of the trial judge, Judge
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Muir, supporting that judgment, Karen allegedly was incompetent. Joseph Quinlan sought the
adjudication of that incompetency. He wished to be appointed guardian of the person and property of
his daughter. It was proposed by him that such letters of guardianship, if granted, should contain an
express power to him as guardian to authorize the discontinuance of all extraordinary medical
procedures now allegedly sustaining Karen's vital processes and hence her life, since these
measures ...
Case Brief InstructionsYou will prepare a Case Brief on th.docxmichelljubborjudd
Case Brief Instructions
You will prepare a Case Brief on the provided judicial opinion regarding a criminal justice topic included below , CAVITT v. STATE. DO NOT USE INFORMATION FROM THE CASE BRIEF SAMPLE. The judicial opinion that you will prepare a Case Brief on can be found below. The Case Brief must include the following sections: Caption, Facts, Procedural History, Issue, Rule of Law, Holding, and Rationale. The Case Brief must be 1 page. A heading must be provided for each section of the Case Brief. Save your work as a Microsoft Word document and review the Sample Case Brief provided below.
CAVITT v. STATE Miss. 1199 Cite as 159 So.3d 1199 (Miss.App. 2015) preme court’s notation in Bounds, Bounds asserts that the judge, not the jury, set his sentence at life in prison. Id. Hence, he claims that the imposition of a life sentence by the circuit court judge created an illegal sentence that defeats the statute of limitations on his appeal. ¶ 3. In its order dated January 7, 2014, the circuit court summarily dismissed Bounds’s PCR motion—in part because Bounds failed to seek leave from the supreme court to file the PCR motion and in part because the circuit court found that his case is not excepted from the statute of limitations. On January 21, 2014, Bounds, having reviewed the circuit court’s order, filed a motion for leave from the supreme court to proceed with his PCR motion. On January 27, 2014, Bounds filed the instant appeal. Nonetheless, on June 25, 2014, the supreme court denied Bounds’s request for leave, stating: In the application for leave before this panel, Bounds merely states that his sentence was illegal. He offers no argument and does not support his contention. Bounds’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court, and the mandate issued in 1972. Accordingly, we find that Bounds has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right, and his application for leave should be dismissed as timebarred. Despite the supreme court’s denial of Bounds’s motion for leave to proceed with his PCR motion, Bounds has continued in his appeal of the matter. DISCUSSION [1, 2] ¶ 4. Mississippi law requires that a movant must obtain permission from the supreme court to file a PCR motion in a circuit court if the movant’s conviction has been affirmed by the appellate court on direct appeal or if the direct appeal has been dismissed. Miss.Code Ann. § 99–39– 7 (Supp.2014). ‘‘This procedure is not merely advisory, but jurisdictional.’’ Bownes v. State, 963 So.2d 1277, 1278 (¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (citation omitted). We have consistently held that when a movant fails to obtain the requisite permission from the supreme court, all other courts lack the jurisdiction necessary to review the movant’s PCR motion. See Doss v. State, 757 So.2d 1016, 1017 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct. App.2000); Bownes, 963 So.2d at 1279 (¶ 4). Accordingly, both the circuit court and this Court are without jurisdiction to review Bounds’s appeal. As ...
SAMPLE CASE BRIEFCaption Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523 (.docxrtodd599
SAMPLE CASE BRIEF
Caption:
Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523 (1891)
Facts:
Two boys were in a classroom during school hours; the class had just been called to order by the teacher. The defendant reached across the aisle with his foot and kicked his toe against the plaintiff’s shin. Afterward, the shin area became infected, and the plaintiff eventually became lame.
Procedural History:
The case was originally brought before the circuit court. A trial in the circuit court resulted in a Plaintiff’s verdict. The Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The case was reversed for error, and the Court awarded a new trial. The case was tried again and resulted in another Plaintiff’s verdict. The Defendant appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
Issue:
Whether a boy satisfied the intent element of battery when he kicked another boy in the knee (while in class) and, as a result, the knee later became infected and diseased.
Rule of Law:
In an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery, the plaintiff must show either that the defendant intended to do the act and the act was unlawful or that the defendant intended the ultimate result. If the intended act is unlawful, then the intention to commit it must necessarily be unlawful.
Holding:
Yes. Because the defendant’s intentional act of kicking the plaintiff was unlawful, his intention to kick plaintiff was also unlawful. Defendant was at fault for any harm resulting from his unlawful act.
Rationale:
Here, the boy did not intend the end result (injuring his friend’s leg so severely), but he did intend to kick him in the shin during a time (class in session) and a place (the classroom) where this action (the kicking) was unlawful. Because he intended the act (kicking) and the kick was unlawful, he satisfied the intent element of battery.
794 Va. 797 SOUTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES
does not establish the presence of such a
danger.
The trial court expressed its reasoning as
follows,
Driving under the influence has inherent
dangers [when] a vehicle [is] being operat-
ed by someone who’s impaired by alco-
holTTTT Considering the evidence as a
whole, it [was] a dark, wet, and curvy
road[.] [T]here was an accident [and Coom-
er’s] blood alcohol content at the time of
the accident was .10 to .11, well over the
presumption of intoxication set forth by
the laws of the Commonwealth of Virgi-
niaTTTT An accident of the type that one
would expect to be occasioned because
one’s abilities to respond to situations and
safely operate a motor vehicle had been
impaired through the use of alcohol.
We do not in any way condone Coomer’s
actions in operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated and with her child in the car. Her
actions support her conviction for DUI. How-
ever, the mere speculative possibility of harm
alone was insufficient for conviction pursuant
to Code § 18.2–371.1(B)(1) in this case. As
such, the trial court’s finding was plainly
wrong.
III. .
JUDICIAL THREATS OF SANCTIONS - Against Vogel Denise Newsome
case brief
1. Jazzari Moore
Case Brief
Party Names
State v. Wilson, 168 Wn.2d 1018, 228 P.3d 17 (2010)
Procedural History
This case originated in Grays Harbor County. The defendant Jason Wilson entered into a plea
agreement with the State on December 10, 2007. In the plea agreement, a criminal history was
listed for the defendant. There was also a section in the plea agreement where the defendant
agrees that his offender score is eight on each count charged. The defendant also declined a
sentencing hearing by crossing out the section the sentencing hearing request in the plea
agreement. It was later discovered in a separate case that the sentence score was incorrect and a
misdemeanor charge was counted as a felony. The trail court judge refused to resentence the
defendant based on the correct offender score. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Review was
granted by the Supreme Court and the decision of the Superior Court was reversed.
Key Facts
Jason Wilson pleaded guilty to two counts of identity theft in the second degree in Grays Harbor
County. The statement of prosecuting attorney listed seven prior convictions, all of which were
characterized as felonies. One of these is a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act
(UCSA), chapter 69.50 RCW, with "pled attempt" written in the margin. By including this
UCSA violation, Wilson's offender score was calculated to be 8 and his standard sentencing
range to be 33-43 months. Wilson initialed this section of the plea agreement, evidencing his
agreement with the listed criminal history. Wilson was sentenced to 43 months on each count, to
be served concurrently. Following sentencing, Charles Clapperton, Wilson's attorney for the
Grays Harbor County matter, was contacted by Jeannette Jameson, Wilson's attorney for another
matter in King County. Ms. Jameson informed Mr. Clapperton that she believed Wilson had
been improperly sentenced because the violation of UCSA was prosecuted as a gross
misdemeanor, not a felony, and therefore his offender score had been incorrectly calculated. MS.
Jameson included a copy of Wilson's judgment and sentence, which included a non-felony on the
attempted violation of the UCSA, and advised Mr. Clapperton to file a CrR 7.8 motion to correct
the error so that Wilson could be resentenced using the correct range. At the motion hearing, the
prosecutor argued that the plea deal was in part based on the presumed offender score and that
Wilson's only potential remedy was to withdraw the guilty plea as a mutual mistake. The trial
court judge agreed with the prosecutor, giving Wilson the choice of taking the plea deal or not,
but refused to resentence based on the correct offender score.
2. Jazzari Moore
Issue
1. Must an anticipatory offense be a felony to be included in computing an offender score under
RCW 9.94A.525 (4)?
2. Does an offender score based on an erroneously scored prior conviction constitute a factual or
legal error?
Reasoning
1. Anticipatory felony offenses under RCW 9.94A.525 (4)
State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 621, 106 P.3d 196 (2005). Only if the language of a
statute is amenable to more than one reasonable interpretation is it deemed ambiguous, and must
then turn to legislative history, principles of statutory construction, and case law to guide our
interpretation.
Both Wilson and the State agree that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute is
unsupported by normal rules of grammar. The subsection at issue in RCW 9.94A.525 states:
(4) Score prior convictions for felony anticipatory offenses (attempts, criminal solicitations, and
criminal conspiracies) the same as if they were convictions for completed offenses.
2. An erroneously scored prior conviction is a legal error The parties agree that the real issue in
this case is whether an erroneously scored prior conviction constitutes a legal error, in which
case Wilson is entitled to be resentenced, or a factual error, in which case Wilson may have
waived any challenges. Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 50 P.3d 618 (2002) In Goodwin, the court
held that, in general, a defendant cannot waive a challenge to a miscalculated offender score and
that a sentence based on an improperly calculated score lacked statutory authority. A sentence
that lacks statutory authority cannot stand, absent perhaps the factual waiver discussed below.
The law in this area is well settled. "[A] sentence that is based upon an incorrect offender score is
a fundamental defect that inherently results in a miscarriage of justice." Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d at
867-68
Holding
1. No. According to RCW 9.94A.545 (4): to be included in an offender score calculation
under subsection (4), an anticipatory offense must itself be a felony.
2. Yes. An offender score that is calculated based on the mischaracterization of a prior
conviction is a legal mistake and not a factual mistake and therefore the offender cannot
waive a challenge.