Robert Watts was prosecuted under a 1917 statute prohibiting threats against the President after stating at a public rally that he did not want to kill black people but "if they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, finding his statement was made in the context of a political debate. Three men belonging to the Ku Klux Klan burned a cross and were convicted under a Virginia statute prohibiting cross-burning with intent to intimidate. The Supreme Court upheld the statute as constitutional if intent to intimidate is shown. Andrew Osantowski was convicted of making a terrorist threat for online chat room statements about

1. Citation: Watts v United States, 394 US 705, 707; 89 S Ct 1399, 1401; 22 L Ed 2d 664
(1969)
Parties: United States, Plaintiff-Appellee
Robert Watts, Defendant-Appellant
Facts: Prosecuted for threatening the life of the President of the United States. This
incident which led to Robert Watts (Watts) arrest happened on the 27th of August,
1966, during a public rally on Washington Monument grounds. The crowd had
broken up into small discussion groups and Watts joined a gathering to discuss
police brutality. Watts who was 18 at the time came into the discussion after a
member of the group suggested that the young people amongst the group should
get more education before talking about their views. An Army Counter
Intelligence Corps that was present stated that Watts had the response of, “they
always tell us to get more education. I have already received my draft
classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming
up. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in
my sights is L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.”
Prior
Proceedings: Watts’s trial counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal. He noted that there was
absolutely no evidence on the basis of which the jury would entitled to find that
watts made the threat against the President of the United States since it was a
discussion during a debate. Trial counsel says that Watts does not want to shoot
black people because I do not consider them enemies, and if they put a rifle in my
hand it is the people that put that rifle in my hand, as symbolized by the president,
who is my real enemy.

2. Issue: Under a 1917 statute that prohibits any person from knowingly and willfully
making a threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of
the United States. Would this still be in tact during a group debate?
Holding: Yes, any person threating the life or inflicting harm on the President is at stake for
breaking the statute of 1917.
Reasoning: Threatening the President of the United States is a class E felony under United
States Code Title 18, Section 871.[1][2][3] It consists of knowingly and willfully
mailing or otherwise making "any threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict
bodily harm upon the President of the United States. The act of verbally saying
that Watts would want L.B.J in front of his rifle makes him liable for his actions.
Disposition: The judgment of the trial was reversed and case remanded with instructions.
Comments: If, in the client’s case Watts was to speak in a different manor of words not using
the initials L.B.J he wouldn’t be held liable, it may be valuable to review other
cases to get educated on similar cases to see the outcome for other violators.

3. Citation: Virginia v Black, 538 US 343; 123 S Ct 1536; 155 L Ed 2d 535 (2003)
Parties: Virginia, Plaintiff-Appellee
Barry Elton Black, Richard J. Elliot, Jonathan O’Mara, Defendant-Appellants
Facts: Respondents are convicted separately for violating a Virginia statute of burning a
cross with the intent and conspiracy to commit a felony. Also, defendants were
convicted of attempting cross burning with intent to intimidate a person or group.
All three men were a part of the Klu Klux Klan. It was reported that on August
22, 1998, the men attended a Klan meeting prior to the cross burning. The
members talked about and what they would do to blacks as well as Mexicans.
They even mentioned how President Clinton and Hilary Clinton’s tax money had
gone to the black people. After circling around a 25 to 30 foot cross which stood
about 300 to 350 yards from the road, it had gone up in flames.
Prior
Proceedings: Each respondent appealed to Supreme Court of Virginia, arguing § 18.2–423 is
facially unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Virginia consolidated all three
cases, and held that the statute is unconstitutional on its face
Issue: The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the
intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of
intimidation.
Holding: Yes. A person or group can be held liable for violation of the First Amendment if
there is intent to intimidate a person, race or group.

4. Reasoning: It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any
person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property
of another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall violate any
provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. Any such burning of a
cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of
persons.
Disposition: The judgment of the trial was, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
Comments: If, in the client’s case, there was no intent to intimidate a person, or group, it may
be valuable to review other cases to determine the type of encouragement
necessary to constitute violation of the First Amendment. Here, the three men
were intending to intimidate a person or group of persons.

5. Citation: Osantowski v Wolfenbarger, No. 2:08-CV-13759, 2010 WL 2804938 (ED Mich
June 8, 2010)
Parties: Andrew Paul Osantowski, Plaintiff-Appellee
Hugh Wolfenbarger, Defendant-Appellant
Facts: Plaintiff is a state prisoner at Macomb Correctional facility in New Haven
Michigan. He was convicted for making a false report or threat of terrorism over
an electronic chat room conversation. Andrew Paul Osantowski (Osantowski)
used a computer to commit the crime and possessed a firearm during the
commission of a felony. Plaintiff discussed infliction of death upon family
members during and electronic chat room conversation. Saying, “I can’t imagine
going through life without killing a few people, nothing wrong with killion.
People can be kissing my shotgun straight out of doom, I tell it how it is. If u
don’t like it, u die. I choose who loves and whos dies.” He had the screen name
of, “nazi_bot_sadistic.” His primary topics were infliction of death and terror on
his own family members and others whom he sought deserving the fate he had
chosen for them. Osantowski talks about being bullied in school and school
shootings. He also bragged about weapons at his disposal and referring to a
“stolen AK.”
Prior
Proceedings: Prior to the trial, trial court had entered an order granting partial suppression of
his confession to the police. Prosecution filed an application for leave to appeal
the issue to the Michigan Court of Appeals. Once granted leave to appeal, the

6. court of appeals reserved and concluded that Osantowski’s confession was
voluntary.
Issue: The crime of making a terrorist threat or false report of terrorism, set forth in
M.C.L is unconstitutional. Osantowksi stating he wanted to inflict death and terror
on his own family members and others is unconstitutional in Michigan court of
Laws.
Holding: Yes. Any person may be liable for making a false death and terrorist threat to a
person or group of persons.
Reasoning: A person is guilty of making a terrorist threat or of making a false report of
terrorism if the person does either of the following: Threatens to commit an act of
terrorism and communicates the threat to any other person as well as, knowingly
makes a false report of an act of terrorism and communicates the false report to
any other person, knowing the report is false.
Disposition: The judgment of the trial by the Michigan Court of Appeals was affirmed
Comments: If, in the client’s case, if the context of his language and text was used differently,
it may be valuable to review other cases to determine the type of encouragement
necessary to constitute a felony of a terrorism act. Osantiwski’s language was
very aggressive. Would he be liable if he simply said, “I can’t imagine going
through life killing people?”