Benetton what next - styleintelligence recommendations feb 2016

Benetton – what next?
1Contact: haesoon@styleintelligence.com +44 (0)7967 812542, London, UK
Styleintelligence
Published Feb 2016
LONDON, SEOUL
IQ

BENETTON – WHAT NEXT?
SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT:
• Benetton was hugely successful throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, but has
remained stagnant since the mid 1990’s.
• In 2012 the company was taken private by the Benetton family, reportedly to
allow a restructuring of the organisation.
• This report makes a limited number of key recommendations on how the
company may be able to re-invigorate its brand based on its current market
position. (for further analysis and recommendations please contact sales)
• This report is suitable for:
• Apparel Retailers / Etailers
• Brand owners/ companies
• Apparel & Fabric manufacturers
• Companies involved in the fashion supply-chain
• Brand/ Marketing/ Advertising agencies
• Investment companies
• Human Resource agencies
Styleintelligence is a strategy consultancy focusing on fashion, retail,
ecommerce and wholesale industries in Europe, the UK and South Korea. Our
products include regular industry insights and bespoke reports.
For further guidance, in-depth reports, and/or strategic advice please contact Ms
Haesoon Jung at Styleintelligence haesoon@styleintelligence.com
IQ
Styleintelligence, Feb 2016

List of Content
• EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• BACKGROUND
• INDUSTRIAL FASHION
• CURRENT POSITION
• UK BACKGROUND
• SELECTED HISTORICAL EVENTS

Executive Summary
• Benetton enjoyed explosive growth from 1965 to the start of the 1990’s but has since been eclipsed by its competitors who stole the
market initiative with fast fashion in the mid 1990’s.
• The company was unable to leverage its vertically integrated manufacturing base, huge network of franchisees or take advantage of the
drop in the value of the Italian Lira in the 90’s to respond to the competition.
• As a family-owned company it has naturally been heavily influenced by the Benetton’s. However, as a result the company has remained
stuck around €2bn revenues for well over a decade and, growth between 1997 and 2011 was 0.57% (CAGR), even less than Italian
GDP growth at about 0.8% per year in the same period.
• Part of Benetton’s many problems has been its highly efficient supply chain and manufacturing operations, but this alone is not the only
issue facing the company as it aims to compete with H&M, Fast Retailing, Inditex, and others.
• Its successful postponement strategy worked magic with margins, but have also created bottlenecks in the company’s handling of a
wider range of products and materials.
• The company’s attitude has also caused problems with many of its downstream partners whom are referred to as franchisees, but
endured a one way relationship without any exclusivity or promises from the company. This was also influenced by the extensive use of
Italian sales agents in its international operations, incentivised by a 4% commission on sold goods.
• Its successful, but controversial, advertising campaigns devised by Mr Toscani are remembered by older consumers in key markets. In
the same way that French Connection used its FCUK campaign successfully for a number of years, Benetton has had to pay dearly for
not putting a stop to the campaigns before they got out of hand.
• Edizione, the parent company, acquired numerous brands and other non-core companies during the good times. The appointment of Mr
Aldo Palmieri from the Bank of Italy emphasised the approach to Benetton as a finance vehicle (cash cow). Mr Palmeri was the first non-
family CEO appointed in 1992. Since then the company has only hired male white Italian CEO’s, in direct contrast to the marketing
messages of “United Colors” and its most recent campaign for “Female Empowerment”. The only women on the board are Benetton
family members (two).
• So - What next for Benetton?
1 www.benetton.com, retrieved Feb, 2016.
1

List of Content
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• BACKGROUND
• UK BACKGROUND

StyleIntelligence Recommendations
• Benetton recently worked together with Boston Consulting and has started restructuring the company dividing the business into three
divisions: Clothing, Manufacturing and Retail.
• StyleIntelligence recommendations are limited to three areas (public report, contact sales for further information):
BENETTON
GROUP SPA
FABRIC
TECHNOLOGY
MARKETING
STRATEGY

StyleIntelligence Recommendations (Cont’d)
• STRATEGY
• Integrating Marketing & General Company Strategy (Do as you say):
• The company’s marketing campaigns, more recently the “Unhate campaign” and other UCB material are not perceived as
pushing the envelope and are not creating the free PR that the company used to do under their former creative director,
Mr Oliviero Toscani. Reversing to a controversial advertising strategy is not a realistic option.
• The “United Colors” campaigns often include models from various ethnic backgrounds.
• The company is currently running a campaign - “Empowerment of Women”.
• This type of advertising may be suited to emerging markets where a more orthodox advertising style is prevalent.
However, in order to appeal to customers in key markets such as the US and Europe the company should look to engage
with their own messages
• Since the Benetton family first hired an external CEO in 1992 there has only been male, white, Italian CEO’s in charge of
the business.
• Styleintelligence recommends that the company hire a CEO which reflects its marketing messages, “Women
Empowerment” and “United Colors”.
• Possible alternative Benetton CEO candidates:2
• Melody Harris-Jensbach, CEO, Jack Wolfskin
• Shama Zehra, CEO, Aligned Independent Advisors
• Angela Ahrendts, SVP Retail, Apple
• Tyra Banks
• Jenny Ming, CEO, Charlotte Husse Clothing
• Mireia Brancos, MD, Determine
• Bindiya Vakil, CEO, Resilience
• Paula Schneider, CEO, American Apparel
• “Benetton’s return to a corporate communication focused on globally important issues, which have always been part of the company’s
heritage, was possible thanks to new global communications campaigns which were very well received by the public.”1
1 Benetton Group SpA, Annual Report, 2011. 2 StyleIntelligence does not have any professional or personal connections with the people mentioned.

StyleIntelligence Recommendations (Cont’d)
• MARKETING
• Aim to become the “Japan of Europe”, e.g. with an extraordinary style, different and cool without caring what
others say:
• Identify and exaggerate niche trends in Italy that may be exclusive to the country, such as cosa nostra, living at home
with mum until 40, and so on.
• Creating a new genre and a strong brand identifier among a younger audience
• The Italian plumber was hijacked by Japanese game producer… how to reverse this and use to an advantage?
• Capsule collections with celebrities:1
• H&M collaborating with David Beckham, Zara (Inditex) collaborating with Elle MacPherson and Claudia Schiffer for
example.
• Go one step further and collaborate with Kpop celebrities (note LVMH’s investment in YG Entertainment) working with
emerging trends from the Far East.
• For example: Mario Balotelli, Maria Grazia Cucinotta, Monica Belucci, Amal Clooney (formerly Alamuddin), Versace, or
even digging up retro-fashion brands from Italy’s past.
• Pricing improvements:
• The company’s basic ranges are more than 20% more expensive than the competition.
• Vertical integration of retail operations, local warehousing & distribution and lower cost suppliers is key to this.
• This may prove difficult to implement with an already vertically integrated supply chain for knitted garments.
• PR events:
• Each major event should be combined with PR events in the flagship shops.
• To celebrate Benetton’s Italian heritage the company should hold events in their shops (Festa della Repubblica) on June
second every year with special offers, some particular Italian foods, or drinks, etc.
• TECHNOLOGY
• Fabric technology advancements:
• Collaborate with fabrics manufacturers to develop new fabrics with innovative technology such as antibacterial, etc.
• This could/should be used for the basics range and may fit within Benetton’s postponement strategy and to compete head
on with Fast Retailing and The Gap for basic garments.
1 Capsule collections are not new. In the Far East the company explored these options in China and South Korea in 2010.

List of Content
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• BACKGROUND
• UK BACKGROUND

Benetton’s growth has been stagnant since the 1990’s
• Colourful knitwear accelerated the Benetton brand onto the global retail scene reaching €2bn revenues in 2000, from humble
beginnings some 35 years earlier. However, its problems had started some 10 years earlier.
• The company grew quickly based on loosely arranged “franchise” agreements where retailers were not required to pay any expensive
up-front fees or royalties based on sales. On the other hand, retailers agreed only to sell Benetton supplied goods, could not sell back
non-selling stock, did not have any say in the running of the business, or any other aspects of the business. Like it or skip it was the
Benetton mantra.
• The company was an early adopter of warehousing technology in the 1980’s and had also adopted a business model of “supply chain
postponement”, which was executed by ordering blank/undyed knitwear and dyeing them locally in Italy to meet fashion colour
demands from markets and by seasons generating valuable positive margin points for the company. Its vertical integration of the
supply chain extended from manufacture to its outgoing warehouse.
• During the 80’s and 90’s Benetton dealt with a number of lawsuits by retailers complaining about cannibalisation with competing stores
opening in close proximity, the controversial Benetton adverts and other issues. As the retailer agreements were not very onerous on
the Benetton Group part these lawsuits often failed. Even in its domestic market there were lawsuits from retail operators. Perhaps the
response from Benetton typified their feeling at the time “Shops that complain have bad management.” (SOURCE???)
• With its core supplier base in Italy costs are increasing and the company is forced to expand its supplier base to Eastern Europe and
North Africa. As a result many of Benetton’s Italian exclusive suppliers start selling to other buyers to survive. Benetton later move a lot
of its manufacturing to the Far East which also brought improved margins.
• In 2004 imports from China was worth €14m, this had increased to €231m by 2007
• Around 2005 the company invests heavily in retail systems and marks a shift from manufacturing investments to investments in its
retail chain. Around this time the company implements the EPOS-type system in 500 shops to get information about what is selling. The
company operated and owned just less than 300 stores in the same year. The company also moved towards offering its retailers faster
re-ordering, in-season styles and faster drops.
• In the 1990’s, in keeping with fashion houses at the time the company released new collections twice a year SS and AW.
• The group’s rapid growth had left a vacuum in its management structure and In the early 1980’s Mr Aldo Palmieri was poached from the
Bank of Italy to become the group’s first CEO and to create a corporate strucutre. In 1990 he is sacked as a result of disagreements
with the board. After two years he is re-hired again, only to resign a couple of years later. Benetton family disagreements are thought
to have been behind the resignation.
• In 1987 Benetton unsuccessfully tried to acquire Lanerossi, its main Italian supplier of carded yarn. Instead Marzotto acquired the
company and became the largest textile company in Italy. Marzotto later went on to acquire Hugo Boss and Valentino.
• In the late 1980’s the company reduced the number of styles available from 4,000 to 2,600. At the same time Oliviero Toscani is given
a free reign over the company’s communications with the brief to create free PR. The company spent about 4% of its revenues on
advertising

The competition has outperformed Benetton
• Benetton has been unable to keep up with its competition for more than a decade.
Source: Companies accounts, StyleIntelligence research and analysis.
Revenues, (1997-2011), €m
€m
Benetton
Fast
Retailing
H&M
Inditex
CAGR%
1997-2011
0.57%
13.8%
18.93%
19.27%
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Asia has replaced sales lost in the US and European markets
• In 1998 the Americas (including the US) accounted for 14% of global sales. This had dropped to 3% in 2006 partly due to the
company’s “Sentenced to Death” advertising campaign which caused huge offence in the US. In 2011 the region had recovered to 4%
of global sales, much due to the company’s growth in South and Latin America.
• Non-Italy rest of Europe accounted for 43% of global sales in 1998. This had dropped to 34% by 2011. Openings in Eastern European
territories offset some of the losses incurred in key geographic areas such as Germany, France and the UK.
• Italy remains the company’s key geographic market with about 40-50% share of its global revenues.
• Due to partnerships in South Korea and China, both markets which includes partial local design and manufacturing, and more recently a
very good performance in India the company has managed to grow sales in Asia to 16.4% in 2011 from nothing in 1998.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1998 2006 2011
RoW
Americas
Asia
Europe
Italy
Geographic Revenue Origination,
(1998, 2006, 2011), %1
1 Company accounts. Domestic specific sales (not included in “Europe”) only provided in 1998, 2006 and 2011.

Italian GDP grew with approximately 0.8% between 1997-2011
• A large proportion of Benetton’s revenues (about 40-50%) originate in the domestic market which has been sluggish at best compared
to the rest of Europe.
Source: OECD
Italy vs Europe GDP constant prices (1997-2011), %
Italy GDP (cp)
% Growth (1997-2011)
0.8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Italy GDP
EU GDP EU GDP (cp)
% Growth (1997-2011)
1.82%

The Italian Lira exchange rate benefitted the company
• In the 10 years leading up to the introduction of the Euro, the Italian Lira dropped by about 40% in value against Sterling.
• In Jan 2002 Italy swapped to the Euro having introduced the currency in 1999.
• In 2015 the Euro had gained about 10% on its introduction rate against Sterling.
• For an Italian wholesale company exporting during a period of currency deflation would have had a net positive effect adding to the
success of the company.
• In Jan 2002 Italy swapped to the Euro which had a slightly negative effect on Benetton’s business in the 2000’s.
Exchange rate Lira (000’s), Euro and US$ to
GBP1.00 (1975-2001)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
exchange rate, US $
exchange rate, Euro
Italian Lira (000's)

Benetton grew from 1,000 to 7,000 stores in about 15 years
• The primary reason for the rapid rate of expansion has been attributed to Benetton’s definition of a franchise.
• Franchisees did not have to pay an up front fee
• No royalties were due on sales
• No exclusivity was granted
• Franchisees did not have any influence on how the company acted, how its supply chain worked, how its advertising affected
local trading
• No returns were accepted
• In effect, Benetton acted as a wholesale company with a captive customer base in a one way relationship where the main risk
proportion was handed over to its retailers.
• In the end of the 1970’s the company had about 1000 stores in Italy through its network of sales agents, many of whom also ran their
own stores. In the end of the decade the company decided to expand internationally to continue its growth projections.
• In the early 1990’s the company had 7,000 stores worldwide.
• In the mid 1990’s H&M, Fast Retailing, The Gap, and Inditex emerge.
• The latest published store numbers showed that there was 4,000 Benetton stores worldwide.
• In 2011 The company revealed the number of Benetton stores
• India – 480 stores in 100 cities, including 90 openings in 2011
• Mexico – 30 openings
• Russia – 170 stores (130 stores in 2010)
• Recent developments seems to draw advantage from developing economies, Easter Europe, Non-US/Canda Americas, the Far East and
India.
• In 2011 Italy accounted for 44.7% of total revenues, rest of Europe 34.3% and Asia at 16.4%.
Benetton Group SpA revenues, (1992-2013), €m1
€m
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

List of Content
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• BACKGROUND
• UK BACKGROUND

IT investments ensured a smooth operation of the postponement strategy
• The company strived to develop Industrial Fashion by using
technology and its well known postponement strategy to
become an efficient manufacturer of garments.
• By keeping a network of manufacturers and sales agents
separate from the core business it managed to keep costs at a
minimum.
• In 1980 the company was already using advanced CAD CAM
technology. This was connected to a cutting machine allowing
15,000 full garments to be cut every eight hour day with less
than 15% cloth wastage.1
• In the mid 1980’s the company developed an IT system
allowing retailers to order directly to Benetton, bypassing
agents, and automating payments due to Benetton. Partially
due to the loose arrangement between Benetton and its
franchisees this was not welcomed by agents and retailers.
• A network of Mark III computers was set up to collect orders
from agents
• As shops were designed without any particular stock keeping
facilities logistics became key to the operations and, in 1986
Benetton opened Europe’s then most advanced robotized
warehouse at a cost of $32m. No human handling was
required and the operation was managed by five staff.
• In the 1980’s the company spent about 1.2% of revenues on
IT, including hard & software and personnel.
• In 1992 the company employed about 1,000 staff on about
€1.6bn revenues.
• In 2002 Benetton invested in SAP Apparel & Footwear solution
for 1,500 of its staff to consolidate all its IT into a simple ERP
solution. The implementation of this took three years and cost
more than €30m.
• In 2003 the company introduced RFID to over 15m garments
but not long after withdrew the initiative in the wake of public
criticism.
• In 2010 the company implemented Oracle Retail systems to
support its retail operations.2
• In the end of 2012 the company implemented a PLM system
(WFX)
1 European Cases in Strategic Management, John Hendry. 2 Quickborn Consulting LLP, 2010

Benetton’s supply chain and outlets were treated as separate entities
• Benetton’s business model was very successful in the 1980’s and the early 1990’s but has since been unable to match the competition
of Fast Retailing, H&M or Inditex.
• In the early 1990’s the company sold its products through more than 7,000 stores worldwide with revenues €1.7bn
• In 2012 Inditex sold its goods through just over 6,000 stores with revenues of close to €16bn
• In 2013 H&M had just over 3,100 stores globally with revenues (excluding VAT) of €14.8bn
• In Jan 2016 the Benetton press pack stated that Benetton products are available from a network of 5,000 stores around the
world. The latest figures would suggest that revenues are in between €1bn and €2bn.
• Inditex, H&M and Fast Retailing has almost exclusively decided to operate their own stores in most markets. Franchisees exist, but are
few and far between. Some of the larger Middle Eastern companies such as Landmark and Alshaya are running franchises and, other
peripheral markets or where the political climate is not beneficial to the companies there have also been franchise opportunities.
• The company shipped blank garments to its warehouse which were then dyed depending on the colours in demand at the time.
• Benetton’s franchise model could be better defined as a license agreement where a franchisee did not have to pay any up front fee or
royalties on sales, but on the other hand did not get any major support from Benetton. For example, stock returns were not accepted.
• Retailers were tied into buying Benetton whatever the company did. This led to numerous legal cases against Benetton from
disgruntled retail operators in the US and European markets, even their largest customer in Italy joined in at one point.
Postponement Strategy
Supply Chain
Blank
Garments
Storage Blank
Garments
Dyeing

Retail problems caused by its supply chain, advertising, etc.
• In the early 1990’s the company boasted 7,000 stores globally. This had dropped to 4,000 stores by 2011.
• In the mid 1990’s franchisees revolted and sued the company for a variety of reasons:
• The US business increased to 750 stores, but quickly dropped to just over 100 stores on the back of the Toscani advertising
campaigns. The company’s franchise model was also criticised and subject to a lawsuit in the US market.
• In 1998 the Americas (including the US) accounted for 14% of the company’s global revenues.
• The company was working with two major season lines, Autumn/Winter and Spring Summer. This was also increasingly
becoming an issue with its retail partners:
• "The highly public spat over advertising may be hiding a more serious operating problem. Benetton is embroiled in a
lawsuit with Santomo Abbigliamento, one of Italy's largest operators of Benetton shops. Marco Prosperi, a Santomo
executive, gripes that Benetton often ships goods late--and that it's lagging behind rivals who change their product lines
far more frequently. They're selling us tired clothes, Prosperi says.”1
• Despite this criticism from its franchisees/ retail partners the company maintained its heading and blamed poor store performance on
poor store management.
• In 2000 the company departed with its creative director, Mr Toscani and toned down its controversial advertising strategy.
1 Bloomberg, "TIRED CLOTHES, 1995. (http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/1995-04-09/the-faded-colors-of-benetton).

List of Content
• RECOMMENDATIONS
• BACKGROUND
• UK BACKGROUND

Changes made in 2014-2015 may improve this
• In 2014, after two years of taking Benetton Group SpA private, Edizione Srl announced that they would split the group into three
separate divisions – Clothing, Manufacturing and Retail – after working with Boston Consulting.1
• Overall, this strategy makes sense. However, it remains to be seen if the Benetton supply chain can manage the transition easily
Benetton
Retail
Manufac-
turing
Clothing
• Benetton’s clothing has been a
streamlined affair and driven by its
supply chain as opposed to consumer
demand.
• Changing the way a company designs
apparel might seem easy. However,
one does not need to look further
than at The Gap and French
Connection to foresee problems in
this division
• Working closer with and, in some
cases, buying out its franchisees
makes sense for the group. It has
struggled to get valuable data
feedback from the front end.
• In the UK the Benetton company has
taken control of a number of
franchisees and merged the
operating company with the parent.
• Benetton has a large manufacturing
base in knitted goods. Separating
this into its own division may lead to
supply issues if the company aims to
grow sales to competitors
• The existing network of sales agents
may be used to drive this division
further.
• Used carefully this may provide
competitive data on what styles
others companies are forecasting and
to what extent.
1 TextilWirtschaft, 2015.

Pricing has become an issue in key markets
• Benetton’s prices are not only perceived to be higher, but are also higher than its main competitors.
uniqlo.co.uk
£39.90
hm.com
£39.99
hm.com
£3.99
uniqlo.co.uk
£9.90
benetton.com
£69.90
benetton.com
£13
zara.com
£5.99
zara.com
£39.99
Source: Websites checked on 31/1/16. None of the items were on sale at the time of checking. Price comparison based on UK prices for garment only (excl delivery).
Source:

Full vertical integration may prove tricky with a franchise model
• Benetton operated a centralised warehouse where stock arrives and was distributed to its franchisees.
• Integration of the ERP system only got as far as to the franchisee delivery point. When the company attempted to develop and
integrate an ordering and payment system to be used by franchisees they discovered that the retailers were less than keen on this.
• By opening own operated flagship stores the company has been able to collect valuable, but geographically limited, insights to be used
by all stake holders in the supply chain.
• Moving towards a fast fashion model (or what is most likely – a mix of fast fashion and basic knitwear) may not be the solution for
Benetton.
• Integrating its ERP systems with consumer facing systems should prove helpful to inter-store stock management, returns and a more
flexible franchise business model.
Source:
Local Market
Warehouse
Network of
factories
Interchange
between local
stores

Competing with the fast fashion giants may take a lot of work
• Zara and H&M deliver 100’s of new products to its stores on a monthly basis.

Adopting a fast fashion model is not the only solution
• Entering Fast Fashion is not a certain way to grow revenues.
• New Look UK’s experience shows that fast fashion can be at the very least as unpredictable as any other fashion models.
• Over the past six years the company’s revenues have remained stagnant. Part of this may have been due to PE involvement and
multiple attempts at floating or selling the company during this period.
• In 2004 New Look was taken private by Apax, Permira and Mr Singh for £669m.
• In 2007 the owners attempted to exit the business for £2bn
• In 2010 the company dropped plans for an IPO citing market volatility
• In 2015 Brait (South Africa) acquired 90% of the group for £790m. Apax and Permira exited the buinsess leaving Mr Singh with a
minority stake. The company has about £1bn in net debt.
UK revenues, not including franchisees, ecommerce
New Look Revenues
CAGR% (2007-2014)
4.61%
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
New Look Revenues, £m 2007-2014

• RECOMMENDATIONS
• BACKGROUND
• UK BACKGROUND
List of Content

Benetton UK
• In 1996 Benetton opened a 17,000sqft store in the corner of Regent Street and Oxford Street in London’s Oxford Circus. The company
previously had a smaller shop in the same location.
• In 2000 Benetton set up a number of local operating companies to support the management of its megastores
• The UK subsidiary Benetton Retail (1988) Ltd acquired Denware Ltd from third parties. This company managed the Regent
Street megastore in London. Benetton Retail (1988) Ltd was also responsible for direct sales operations throughout the United
Kingdom.
• In 2003 Benetton Retail (1988) Ltd transferred all its lease obligations to Bencom SpA. Remaining activities of the company was that of
an agent in relation to selling Benetton goods in the UK market. In the same year Benetton was rumoured to be looking to divest
properties (source: Retail Property Briefing Paper 17, End of Year Roundup, 2003. Chase and Partners)
• In 2011 wholesale accounted for about 66% of revenues in Switzerland.
• In 2011 the company report described its returns policy as “The Group’s policy regarding returns by customers is quite restrictive,
allowing these only in very specific circumstances (eg. Defective goods, late shipment)”. (Source: Benetton Group, Annual Report
FY2011)
• In May 2012 Benetton Group SpA was delisted from the Milan stock exchange after 36 years and transferred under the ownership of
Edizione Srl, a company controlled by the Benetton family. The primary reason given for the delisting was to give Benetton Group
breathing space to increase profits as the share value had dropped
• In 2013 Benetton Retail (1988) Ltd was liquidated.
• In Jan 2016 the company had a number of stores in the UK, many of which are trading as concessions with key department stores
Fenwick and House of Fraser.
• Fenwick: Bracknell, Brent Cross, Canterbury, Colchester, Kingston, Leicester, Newcastle, York (not online!)
• House of Fraser: Mens and Kidswear only (online)
• Shop locations listed on Benetton’s UK website are: Armagh, Ballymena, Beaconsfield, Belfast, Birmingham, Bristol, Canterbury,
Cardiff, Colchester, Coleraine, Croydon, Dungannon, Edinburgh, Enfield, Enniskillen, Esher, Glasgow, Guernsey, Harrogate,
Huddersfield, Jersey, Kingston upon Thames, Leicester, Liverpool, London, Manchester, Newbury, Newcastle-upon-Thyme,
Norwich, Penrith, Portadown, Reigate, Torquay, Truro
• Only a small number of the listed locations are independent operators.
• The London Regent Street Flagship store has been the focus for quite a few protests, but is positioned in a strategically significant
location in the middle of Oxford Circus with about 500,000 people passing by every day.
• According to Glassdoor the location suffers from high staff turnover and abolished commissions to floor staff in 2015 (Note: none
of these claims has been independently confirmed by the authors of this report)
• In Dec 2014 the company was the target of an anti-fur protest in London Oxford Circus
• In Jan 2016 the company announced it is going to open a 15,300 sqft store in 73-89 Oxford Street to open in 2017-2018. GPE Plc is the
developer and annual rent is thought to be £2.6m (New Look who are taking a 31,800sqft shop in the same development has quoted a
rent of £3.65m).
Source: 1 Wikinvest.com

Benetton History – Selected Events
1980 1990 2000 2010 2015
• Castrette plant opened
• 7,000+ shops globally
• Oliviero Toscani advertising gained traction
• Reduced number of styles from 4K to 2.6K
• Fashion brands such as H&M, The Gap, Diesel, Zara (Inditex) emerge
• The Italian Lira has depreciated 50% from 1975. The € is introduced
• Acquired sports equipment brands
• Divested sports equipment divisions
• Brand Licensing push
• CEO: Luigi de Puppi (Electrolux Zanussi)
• CEO: Silvano Cassano (Fiat)
• 1000+ stores in Italy
• Europe and US expansion
• Renamed to Benetton Group SpA
• Lists on Milan exchange
• State of the Art warehouse
• Launches Sisley in response to H&M, Zara, Diesel
• Revenues in excess of €2bn
• Toned down controversial advertising
• Revenues of $78m, 98% from domestic market
• MD: Aldo Palmieri (Bank of Italy)
• Sacked: Aldo Palmieri
• Rehired: Aldo Palmieri
• Revenues of $303m, 45% from domestic market
• The company raised funds on stock markets for acquisitions
• Benetton Formula 1 launched
• Benetton Formula 1 divested
• Incorporated Bencom SpA, a financial services company to suppliers and customers
• 5000+ stores globally
• Europe accounted for 68% of sales, North America 20%, the Far East 2%.
• Non-domestic sales made up 65.5% of total revenues
• The company delisted from the NY stock exchange
• Partial listing on the NY stock exchange • Benetton Group taken
private by Edizione Srl
• CEO: Marco Airoldi
(Boston Consulting,
Autogrill)
• Reported a loss
• Co-CEO’s: Franco Furnò (Gucci) + Biagio
Chiarolanza
• CEO: Gerolamo Caccia Dominioni (Warner Music)
• CEO: Cassano, resigned
• Luciano Benetton hands over chairman role to his
son, Alessandro Benetton
• Resigned: Palmieri
• CEO: Carlo Gilardi
• Legal action by US store operators
• Legal action by European/German store operators
• Launched a joint-venture with Inditex to launch & operate stores in Italy
• 750+ stores in the US
• ~120 stores in the US (from 750)
• 4000+ stores globally
• Hired You Nguyen (Levis) as head of
designer and merchandising
• FT reported that one of the
key distribution centres in
Italy was only operating at
30% of capacity
• €1.6bn revenues (source:
wikipedia)

Contact: haesoon@styleintelligence.com +44 (0)7967 812542, London, UK
ABOUT US
• Consultancy + Fashion, Trend and Retail Specialist in UK, Europe and South Korea
• Periodical Monthly Generic Market Reports (FREE!!)
• Customised Reports / UK Style Reports / European Style Reports (fee based $)
• New Brands Discovery Report (free simple reports + fee based $)
• Trend Research (fee based $)
• Market Research, Company Research, Due Diligence Reports (fee based $)
Ms Haesoon Jung
Founder, Director, Consultant,
Journalist
Background:
• Founder of StyleIntelligence
• Design & fashion business
Journalist and EMEA editor for
Fashionbiz, DesignLife and others
in the South Korean market
• Fabrics, footwear and apparel
fashion development industry
experience.
• Networker connecting South
Korean and UK/European
companies.
• Expert in UK and European style
trends
• Undertake in-depth interviews
with pan-European fashion
industry CEO, CFO, and CMO’s.
• Haesoon has deep knowledge of
the UK fashion markets & trends
and have used this knowledge to
create multiple opportunities for
luxury and mid market brands in
South Korea.
Mr Thomas Andersson
Consultant
Background:
• CDD Consultant on 50+ mid-
market deals in the UK and
Europe. Including mapping and
origination work for a top five PE
company.
• Former director of retail company
partnering with Arcadia Group,
Selfridges Retail, New Look and
others.
• Consultant on new brand,
product, and concept launches in
the UK market.
• Thomas has also worked as a
Business Development Manager
in R&D consultancy targeting
primarily Blue Chip companies.
Sector exposure includes
industrial, consumer,
pharmaceutical, retail &
wholesale, IT, healthcare, and
manufacturing among others.
STYLEINTELLIGENCE - ABOUT US
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