1. Assess whether repression is the most important determinant of authoritarian
resilience in the post-communist world.
Repression has perhaps been the most closely affliated tool to which
authoritarian leaders use to support their subsequent regimes. The repression
model is commonly reffered to as the oppression of all forms of political life,
through channels of discriminatory policies, human rights violations and severe
mechanisms of coercion carried out by the state. The regime which most
accurartley attaches itself this notion in the post-communist world is
Turkmenistan.
However, in an increasingly globalised, geopolitical and international connection
world, the implementation of cold, hard and prolific repression is becoming
more and more difficult for authoritarian leaders of the post-communist world
and beyond. The repression model fixes itself upon the assumptions that those
who endure authoritarian regimes are either longing to be free, or have been
indoctrinated by their leaders into beleiveing that their system of government is
just, fair and the supreme form of government. However, recent academic
literature has questioned the plausibility of these assumptions, suggesting that t
is seemingly shallow and reductive to assume that all those living in
authoritarian regimes possess no autonomy over their political lives. The
limitations of repression is however, especially apparent for the post-communist
world given its increasing pressure from international organisations like the EU
and NATO to democratize, and structurally, its geographic proximity to the west
and the subsequent cross national influence of value liberal, democratic values
invetibley limits the extent to which blatant repression can be the only, or even
most important tool for sustaining authoritarian regimes. The shift within the

2. international environment that has appeared to clamp down on repression, has
paved the way for new variables which ultimately, are crucial for maintaining
authoritarian resilience in the postcommunist world; Legitimisation, Cooptation
and Agenda setting.
REGIMES WITHOUT REPRESSION
If we look specifically at the post-communist world, it is becoming increasingly
more evident that regimes are rather paradoxically, repressing without
repression (Albania, Russia, Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine) in so far that their
appears to be widespread public consent over their regimes. This is perhaps
most clear in Russia, where Vladamir Putin enjoys remarkably high approval
ratings from his electorate, which has been as high as 80% (they have however,
decreased slightly since the 2010), in support of the state and authorian regime.
It is thus plausible to assume that authoritarian ressiliance is dependant upon
other variables which I will now discuss in more depth.
What has perhaps caused this shift away from repressive measures is that
the conceptualisation of authoritarianism as a system of governemetnt has
undergone a paradigm shift; levitsky and way have demonstrated their
dissatisfaction with the two binaries of democracy and authoritarianism and
more attention must be paid to ‘hybrid regimes’. Their theorising is around
the concept of ‘competetive authoritarianism’; where democratic instituions
are present, but they are dominated and controlled by the incumbent and
therefore whilst competition is present is is unfair. This is a system of
government that appears to be sustaining itself steadidly within the
postcommunist states of . The shift in conception of authoritarianism is

3. exactly what discredits the application of repression for authoritarian
resilience; in a world which is increasingly attentive to human rights abuses,
oppression and corruption, authoritarian leaders are conformed with a
dilemma whereby they must legimitaley sustain their regimes, through the
exertion of seemingly democratic practices, whilst simultaneously
suppressing the opposition from ever threatening their incumbency. This
paradigm shift can be illustrated in the balance of regime types across the
post-communist world; perhaps only Turkmenistan and Uzebekistan are the
remaining states to outwardly omit traits of pure repression. There now
appears to be a rise in those ‘hybrid’ regimes that sustain their authoritarian
tendencies, like supressing the opposition via other channels; Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, to greater and lesser extents either adhere to
some democratic values such as elections, or enjoy relative support for their
regimes, which further discredits the repression variable in authoritarian
resillence.
LEGITIMIMACY
There has been a significant rise within academia which draws increasing
attention to the ability of authoritarian leaders to legitimate their regimes; as
such, the regime itself relies less of repression in order to sustain itself, and more
upon structural, ideological and tactical measures. Gershewski postulates that
legitimacy is in fact the most important factor for which a regime needs to
sustain itself, and this thesis is parsimonious to be applied across the
postcommunist world. Legitimacy is the procesds by which authoritarian leaders
must base their policies and practices of legitmate ideas of governance, and

4. therefore gain the support of the majority. Legitimising the regime is that which
exactly determines the strength of the regime, the trust that the electorate will
have in their leader and thus the determine the breadth of authoritarian tools the
leader can utilise by the consent of his electorate. In the post-communsit world
in particular, the urgency of elites to gain support from their elctoate is perhaps
most pressing post- colour revolutions, which exhibited a degree of international
diffusion across post-communist countries such as Georgia and ukriaine and
therefore illustrated the strength of international factors in toppling repression.
_____ makes the similar assumption within his study of soft authoritarianism in
kazakstan (juxstaposed again krykstan, who’s leader ultimately failed to
maintain a regime legitimate enough to prevent upheaval). What _____ suggests is
unique about Nazabaev’s regime was ability to weild the support of the majority
and at the same time oppress the opposition, thorugh naked coercive tactics such
s blackmail; Nazabaev had a core base of support; a varibable that is crucial in
maintaining ‘soft authoritarianism’. Even in the ‘last dictatorship in Europe’,
Belarus leader Lukashenko appears to have legitimised his regime through
public approval. Korostelva notes how Lukashenko has managed to foster a
system that is highly oppressive without any violence or outright tactics of
repression.
DIFFERENT CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY- that fact that so many legitimate
autocracies exist in the Eurasia region, partially proves, strcutually that
collectively, this region does not desire demorscy in the same way that the west
does may partly explain a regimes actual ability to gain legitimacy, along with
structural factors like economic and institutional performance and the
leadership qualities

5. Howver, given the widespeard autrociteis of human right abuses and violence
against the opposition that does take place in Russia, Kazakstan and Russia it
does pose one to question how authoritarian leaders are able to legitimise their
regimes via widespread public approval given that they are so inherently corrupt
.
1. Soft and competitive authoritarianism
2. Belarus and Russia
3. Social contract theory
1. Sochi Olympics
Agenda setting
Another tatic that can be seen as highly prevelant in sustain authoritarian
resilience within the post-communist world is agenda setting. Where elites can
yield to correct resources by which to set the agenda in a way that supports their
regime, they ultimately increase widespread support and mobilisation. Putin is
perhaps the most remarkable example of this, but agenda setting is also a feature
in Lukashenkos mandate. Agenda setting can be explained through the prysm of
state funded ‘civil society groups’ that mobilise widespread support for their
regimes. As lng as civil society is state funded, it means that the state ulitimately
defines the political sphere of citizenship. NASHI.
These groups serve a very important purpose for authoritarian resilience, one
that does not require any oppression; they satisfy citizesn engagement in a
political life whilst fueling a nationalist agenda that reinforces the strength of
their regimes. The ability to actually achieve this mobilisation is ultimately

6. dependent upon the ‘cult of personalility of the leader’ and the wider structural
institutional factors that frame the srenght of the regime.
However, as Gereshewki reaffirms, repression remains a backbone of almost
all authoritarian regimes. To the extent that, by definition a regime would not
be authoritarian if it did not possess some repressive qualities such as