This document discusses the cultural attributes that make Arabs effective as insurgents compared to their historical ineffectiveness in conventional wars against Western armies. It argues that Arab insurgent tactics are more in line with principles of warfare described in the Quran, and that the strong bonds of tribal solidarity and trust among insurgent groups contribute to their effectiveness over conventional Arab armies that lack cohesion. Insurgent forces are also more likely to operate in their local home territories where they know the terrain and people.
Air Power, Ethics and Civilian Immunity during the Great War and its Aftermat...Professor Joel Hayward
Little has been published on the ethical and legal basis of air attacks on non-combatants during the First World War. Existing works have focused mainly on the injustice of the German Zeppelin and Gotha raids on British towns. They present British air campaigns on German towns and the formation of the Royal Air Force as a reasoned self-defensive response. This article breaks new ground as it attempts to paint a richer picture by explaining the influence of retributive passions – vengeance – on British thinking about how best to respond to the villainy of German air raids. By using unpublished primary sources to uncover the moral and legal rationale used by British decision-makers, it shows that they (as their German counterparts had) exploited ambiguities or "loopholes" in the ethical and legal prohibitions on the bombardment of non-combatants and explained away their own air attacks on civilian towns and villages as legitimate acts of reprisal. It ends by demonstrating that, far from feeling grave concerns about the inhumanity of targeting civilians and their environs, the most influential air power thinkers after the war were relatively uninterested in moral concepts of proportionality and discrimination. They saw air power's ability to punish the strong and culpable by attacking the weak and vulnerable as a way of making wars shorter and therefore less expensive.
Revisiting the Past: The Value of Teaching Islamic Military History, by Pr...Professor Joel Hayward
This article will argue that Muslim scholars should not feel the slightest awkwardness or embarrassment about Islam’s past martial successes, and should indeed return to writing on Islamic military history, teaching it and ensuring its survival within the curricula of cadet and staff colleges. Far from damaging Islam’s reputation, an objective and fair-minded reading of Islam’s military history (according to the methodology and principles accepted within the discipline of history) will directly counter the current western misperception that Islam is somehow more aggressive and accepting of disproportionate or indiscriminate violence than the other great religions. It will in fact show that the Islamic laws and ethics of war have minimized violence and constrained misconduct and ensured that warfare was fought according to guiding principles which are very similar to those found within western “just war” teachings. And far from lending credence to Jihadist or Islamist assertions that warfare should be used by any Muslims who want to bring about political or social change, an honest and thorough recounting of Islamic military history will demonstrate clearly that recourse to violence had never been the prerogative of any individuals, however disgruntled they may be. It was always a right and responsibility bestowed only upon legitimate national leaders (caliphs, kings, emirs and presidents). The teaching of Islamic history is also replete with examples of strategic brilliance and leadership excellence that make wonderfully illuminating and inspiring case studies for today’s civil and military leaders. It goes without saying that studying the campaigns and commanders of the past will develop a Muslim’s civilizational self-respect and esprit de corps in the same way that any western reader would have their sense of civilizational or cultural pride enhanced by studying the World Wars or the strategies and lives of great commanders like Washington, Wellington, Nelson, Grant, Lee, Haig, Montgomery, and Patton.
“War is Deceit”: An Analysis of a Contentious Hadith on the Morality of Milit...Professor Joel Hayward
Particularly since that dreadful day in September 2001, when nineteen Muslims hijacked commercial airliners and deliberately crashed them into buildings or the ground in history’s worst terrorist attack, killing almost three thousand people, Islam has become a much-discussed and distrusted religion. Despite the fact that over 1.6 billion Muslims live entirely peacefully alongside or amidst people of other faith and cultural communities, Islam has attracted more ideological opponents than other religions have. In terms of the antipathy towards Islam expressed by these people, only anti-Semites seem as antagonistic towards a world religion.
This monograph is not an attack on Islam’s critics. The author believes that people have the right to like or dislike any or all religions and, regardless of perceived taste, to express their views via peaceful discourse. Islam’s most bitter critics, on the other hand, should not be surprised when their views are challenged. Islam has extraordinarily positive features which its adherents, including this author, believe should be presented as a counterbalance to the claims of its critics.
This monograph is not intended as an all-encompassing critique of Islam-hatred, nor even of its worst aspects. It is merely an attempt to build on the author’s previous work ― which argues that the Qur’an is not inherently martial and has a clear ethical code governing and constraining the use of violence for political purposes ― by analyzing one particular associated claim seemingly endlessly made by Islam’s critics. They assert that, far from being a paragon of virtue, the Islamic prophet Muhammad was deceitful and, indeed, boasted of it in several sayings recalled by followers. “War,” they quote him saying, “is deceit.” They contextualize their criticism of Muhammad’s statement that “war is deceit” by arguing that his unashamed statement proves that he was personally dishonest whenever expedient and that Islam consequently tolerates dishonesty in a way that other religions do not.
This study rejects the view that, in the wars fought by Muhammad, he acted immorally through any acts of wanton personal dishonesty (“deceit”) that constitute severe character imperfections and stain his reputation as a holy man. It argues instead that, in his quest to defeat the forces within Arabia which sought to destroy his fledgling community, Muhammad used ruse and bluff and strategic and tactical deception as a reasonable, necessary and eminently legitimate means of gaining military advantage so as to minimize suffering on both sides. It argues that, if Muhammad is to be condemned for using ruses during warfare, then for consistency and fairness his critics must also consider earlier prophets including Moses, Joshua and David, and all of history’s greatest military leaders, to have been morally corrupt merely because they also esteemed the advantages obtained through ruse.
Islamic Principles of War for the Twenty-first Century, by Professor Joel Hay...Professor Joel Hayward
Almost all western and other developed states use Principles of War as guiding ideas for military practitioners (especially those who serve at the operational and tactical levels) on how best to use combat power in order to gain maximum advantage. These Principles of War are virtually ubiquitous in cadet and officer colleges and in doctrine manuals. Islamic law, on the other hand, has nothing comparable, and least nothing from the modern world. It has always seriously and proactively engaged with ideas about how to ensure that war is fought for morally just causes. Yet, since the medieval period, Islam has not updated its thoughts on what principles might best enhance combat effectiveness in order to win battles and wars with the maximum effectiveness, the minimum use of force and the minimum likelihood of harm to the innocent. This study investigates whether one can draw such principles from the Qur’an and the life of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad that might serve as guidelines for Islamic armed forces in the twenty-first century, an era dominated by careless disregard for human life and by what is euphemistically called Collateral Damage. Within the earliest extant Arabic sources, this study identifies nine principles—these being Virtuous Objective, Legitimacy, Unity of Command and Effort, Consultative Decision-Making, Offensive Action, Defensive Security, Morale, Restraint, and Deception—that were integral in the warfighting of the Prophet. The author hopes that the analysis might, if widely read in the right circles, prompt further thought and research within Islamic states and their militaries so that something like an agreed set of Islamic Principles of War could eventually emerge and be of utility.
The Battle of Dhi Qar (Arabic: يوم ذي قار), also known as the Battle of Dhu Qar,was a pre-Islamic battle fought between Arab tribes and the Sassanid Empire in Southern Iraq. The battle occurred after the death of Al-Nu'man III by the orders of Khosrow II.
By the end of this lecture students should be able to:
Understand Middle Eastern political and strategic dynamics in late antiquity
Analyze the nature of Arab-Persian relations
Analyze the causes, the course, and the consequences of the Battle of Dhi Qar
Air Power, Ethics and Civilian Immunity during the Great War and its Aftermat...Professor Joel Hayward
Little has been published on the ethical and legal basis of air attacks on non-combatants during the First World War. Existing works have focused mainly on the injustice of the German Zeppelin and Gotha raids on British towns. They present British air campaigns on German towns and the formation of the Royal Air Force as a reasoned self-defensive response. This article breaks new ground as it attempts to paint a richer picture by explaining the influence of retributive passions – vengeance – on British thinking about how best to respond to the villainy of German air raids. By using unpublished primary sources to uncover the moral and legal rationale used by British decision-makers, it shows that they (as their German counterparts had) exploited ambiguities or "loopholes" in the ethical and legal prohibitions on the bombardment of non-combatants and explained away their own air attacks on civilian towns and villages as legitimate acts of reprisal. It ends by demonstrating that, far from feeling grave concerns about the inhumanity of targeting civilians and their environs, the most influential air power thinkers after the war were relatively uninterested in moral concepts of proportionality and discrimination. They saw air power's ability to punish the strong and culpable by attacking the weak and vulnerable as a way of making wars shorter and therefore less expensive.
Revisiting the Past: The Value of Teaching Islamic Military History, by Pr...Professor Joel Hayward
This article will argue that Muslim scholars should not feel the slightest awkwardness or embarrassment about Islam’s past martial successes, and should indeed return to writing on Islamic military history, teaching it and ensuring its survival within the curricula of cadet and staff colleges. Far from damaging Islam’s reputation, an objective and fair-minded reading of Islam’s military history (according to the methodology and principles accepted within the discipline of history) will directly counter the current western misperception that Islam is somehow more aggressive and accepting of disproportionate or indiscriminate violence than the other great religions. It will in fact show that the Islamic laws and ethics of war have minimized violence and constrained misconduct and ensured that warfare was fought according to guiding principles which are very similar to those found within western “just war” teachings. And far from lending credence to Jihadist or Islamist assertions that warfare should be used by any Muslims who want to bring about political or social change, an honest and thorough recounting of Islamic military history will demonstrate clearly that recourse to violence had never been the prerogative of any individuals, however disgruntled they may be. It was always a right and responsibility bestowed only upon legitimate national leaders (caliphs, kings, emirs and presidents). The teaching of Islamic history is also replete with examples of strategic brilliance and leadership excellence that make wonderfully illuminating and inspiring case studies for today’s civil and military leaders. It goes without saying that studying the campaigns and commanders of the past will develop a Muslim’s civilizational self-respect and esprit de corps in the same way that any western reader would have their sense of civilizational or cultural pride enhanced by studying the World Wars or the strategies and lives of great commanders like Washington, Wellington, Nelson, Grant, Lee, Haig, Montgomery, and Patton.
“War is Deceit”: An Analysis of a Contentious Hadith on the Morality of Milit...Professor Joel Hayward
Particularly since that dreadful day in September 2001, when nineteen Muslims hijacked commercial airliners and deliberately crashed them into buildings or the ground in history’s worst terrorist attack, killing almost three thousand people, Islam has become a much-discussed and distrusted religion. Despite the fact that over 1.6 billion Muslims live entirely peacefully alongside or amidst people of other faith and cultural communities, Islam has attracted more ideological opponents than other religions have. In terms of the antipathy towards Islam expressed by these people, only anti-Semites seem as antagonistic towards a world religion.
This monograph is not an attack on Islam’s critics. The author believes that people have the right to like or dislike any or all religions and, regardless of perceived taste, to express their views via peaceful discourse. Islam’s most bitter critics, on the other hand, should not be surprised when their views are challenged. Islam has extraordinarily positive features which its adherents, including this author, believe should be presented as a counterbalance to the claims of its critics.
This monograph is not intended as an all-encompassing critique of Islam-hatred, nor even of its worst aspects. It is merely an attempt to build on the author’s previous work ― which argues that the Qur’an is not inherently martial and has a clear ethical code governing and constraining the use of violence for political purposes ― by analyzing one particular associated claim seemingly endlessly made by Islam’s critics. They assert that, far from being a paragon of virtue, the Islamic prophet Muhammad was deceitful and, indeed, boasted of it in several sayings recalled by followers. “War,” they quote him saying, “is deceit.” They contextualize their criticism of Muhammad’s statement that “war is deceit” by arguing that his unashamed statement proves that he was personally dishonest whenever expedient and that Islam consequently tolerates dishonesty in a way that other religions do not.
This study rejects the view that, in the wars fought by Muhammad, he acted immorally through any acts of wanton personal dishonesty (“deceit”) that constitute severe character imperfections and stain his reputation as a holy man. It argues instead that, in his quest to defeat the forces within Arabia which sought to destroy his fledgling community, Muhammad used ruse and bluff and strategic and tactical deception as a reasonable, necessary and eminently legitimate means of gaining military advantage so as to minimize suffering on both sides. It argues that, if Muhammad is to be condemned for using ruses during warfare, then for consistency and fairness his critics must also consider earlier prophets including Moses, Joshua and David, and all of history’s greatest military leaders, to have been morally corrupt merely because they also esteemed the advantages obtained through ruse.
Islamic Principles of War for the Twenty-first Century, by Professor Joel Hay...Professor Joel Hayward
Almost all western and other developed states use Principles of War as guiding ideas for military practitioners (especially those who serve at the operational and tactical levels) on how best to use combat power in order to gain maximum advantage. These Principles of War are virtually ubiquitous in cadet and officer colleges and in doctrine manuals. Islamic law, on the other hand, has nothing comparable, and least nothing from the modern world. It has always seriously and proactively engaged with ideas about how to ensure that war is fought for morally just causes. Yet, since the medieval period, Islam has not updated its thoughts on what principles might best enhance combat effectiveness in order to win battles and wars with the maximum effectiveness, the minimum use of force and the minimum likelihood of harm to the innocent. This study investigates whether one can draw such principles from the Qur’an and the life of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad that might serve as guidelines for Islamic armed forces in the twenty-first century, an era dominated by careless disregard for human life and by what is euphemistically called Collateral Damage. Within the earliest extant Arabic sources, this study identifies nine principles—these being Virtuous Objective, Legitimacy, Unity of Command and Effort, Consultative Decision-Making, Offensive Action, Defensive Security, Morale, Restraint, and Deception—that were integral in the warfighting of the Prophet. The author hopes that the analysis might, if widely read in the right circles, prompt further thought and research within Islamic states and their militaries so that something like an agreed set of Islamic Principles of War could eventually emerge and be of utility.
The Battle of Dhi Qar (Arabic: يوم ذي قار), also known as the Battle of Dhu Qar,was a pre-Islamic battle fought between Arab tribes and the Sassanid Empire in Southern Iraq. The battle occurred after the death of Al-Nu'man III by the orders of Khosrow II.
By the end of this lecture students should be able to:
Understand Middle Eastern political and strategic dynamics in late antiquity
Analyze the nature of Arab-Persian relations
Analyze the causes, the course, and the consequences of the Battle of Dhi Qar
Pre-publication of Part Eight and Chapter XXII of my forthcoming book “Turkey is Iran and Iran is Turkey – 2500 Years of indivisible Turanian – Iranian Civilization distorted and estranged by Anglo-French Orientalists”; Part Eight (The Distorted Term ‘Persianate’) consists exclusively of Chapter XXII. The book is made of 12 parts and 33 chapters.
--------------------
First published on 7th November 2021 here:
https://megalommatis.wordpress.com/the-fake-persianization-of-the-abbasid-caliphate-2/
1965 war -Staff College Quetta's Teaching Handbook published with a single authors name
1965 war -Staff College Quettas Teaching Handbook published with a single authors name
July 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.24922.98244
Project: Military History
Agha H Amin
Educational system in the Time of the ProphetMuQeet
Prophet Muhammad as a Teacher, Dean and Rector, An important reference material to learn about the value of Education in Islam and Muslim society. Authored by Dr. M Hamidullah, this is a feature in Islamic Scholarship.
Students will discuss the selection of George Washington as commander of the Continental Army, evaluate his qualifications, and decide if he was, indeed, the right choice.
Pre-publication of Part Eight and Chapter XXII of my forthcoming book “Turkey is Iran and Iran is Turkey – 2500 Years of indivisible Turanian – Iranian Civilization distorted and estranged by Anglo-French Orientalists”; Part Eight (The Distorted Term ‘Persianate’) consists exclusively of Chapter XXII. The book is made of 12 parts and 33 chapters.
--------------------
First published on 7th November 2021 here:
https://megalommatis.wordpress.com/the-fake-persianization-of-the-abbasid-caliphate-2/
1965 war -Staff College Quetta's Teaching Handbook published with a single authors name
1965 war -Staff College Quettas Teaching Handbook published with a single authors name
July 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.24922.98244
Project: Military History
Agha H Amin
Educational system in the Time of the ProphetMuQeet
Prophet Muhammad as a Teacher, Dean and Rector, An important reference material to learn about the value of Education in Islam and Muslim society. Authored by Dr. M Hamidullah, this is a feature in Islamic Scholarship.
Students will discuss the selection of George Washington as commander of the Continental Army, evaluate his qualifications, and decide if he was, indeed, the right choice.
analysis of the Iranian Way of war based on historical evaluation of the Persian wars since the time oof the invasion pop Greece.
Mediocre at conventional war. superb at political-military warfare
The Battle of Yarmouk (20 August 634 CE) – Comments & Revelations I: without the Aramaeans' utilization of Islam, prophet Muhammad's religion would be blocked in Hejaz
First published on 22nd August 2021 here:
https://megalommatiscomments.wordpress.com/2021/08/22/the-battle-of-yarmouk-20-august-634-ce-comments-revelations-i-without-the-aramaeans-utilization-of-islam-prophet-muhammads-religion-would-be-blocked-in-hejaz/
-------------------------------
Contents
I. Ancient, Christian, and Muslim historiographers
II. Oversights and errors attested in the existing bibliography
A. 'Battle techniques'
B. 'Two great empires exhausted and weakened'
---------- EXCURSE I: HISTORICAL FOCUS ----------------
Borders, fronts, rebellions, divisions and fights
1- Post-conquest Iran
2- Eastern Roman Empire
3- Upper Egypt and the Sudan (: historical Ethiopia)
4- Internal conflicts transported from Hejaz to Syria and Mesopotamia
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. 'History of states' and not of peoples and cultures
D. Poor conceptualization of the early Islamic conquests by modern scholars
------ EXCURSE II: ETHNO-LINGUISTIC & RELIGIOUS FOCUS ---------
Ethno-linguistic groups
Religious groups
i- the Christian Aramaeans of the Syriac Orthodox Church (Monophysites)
ii- the Christian Aramaeans of the Great Church of the East (Nestorians)
iii- the Gnostic Aramaeans
iv- the Manichaean Aramaeans
v- the Copts (Monophysitic Christian Egyptians)
vi- the (Aramaic-speaking) Jews, followers of Rabbinical Judaism
vii- the Persians and other Iranians followers of various Iranian religions
viii- the Eastern Roman Orthodox Christians, who sided with the Patriarchate of Constantinople
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. The demographic structure of the eastern provinces of the Eastern Roman Empire and of the Western Iranian provinces: the Aramaeans
F. The central provinces of the Islamic Caliphates: the lands of the Aramaeans.
G. Lack of historical criticism in Islamic Studies and Interdisciplinary Studies
III. The astounding scarcity of contemporaneous sources
IV. Critical incidents during the Battle of Yarmouk
V. The true dimensions of the Battle of Yarmouk and of its outcome
The Art of War by Sun Tzu Essay
How Did Sun Tzu Divided The Concubines?
Which Army Leader Win A Better Battle Plan Essay
The Art of War
The Art of War Analysis
The Art of War
Art of War Summary
One of my most popular articles ever proved to be the devastating rejection and denunciation of Pan-Arabism that I published under the title "Progenitor of Wars and Tyrannies: the Falsehood of Pan-Arabism" in several portals notably American Chronicle, Buzzle and AfroArticles in the mid-2000s. It was thence extensively and widely mentioned, discussed, quoted and republished in portals, sites, and blogs. Indicatively, I herewith include the following links:
https://www.aramnahrin.org/English/Muhammad_Shamsaddin_Progenitor-of-Wars-And-Tyrannies_29-6-2004.htm
http://aramean-dem.org/English/History/8.htm (paragraph ending with note 5)
https://phoenicia.org/panarab.html
http://www.aramnaharaim.org/English/opinion_analyse.htm
https://goodmaniac.blogspot.com/2012/06/libyans-and-people-of-maghreb-are.html
https://www.maroc.nl/forums/het-nieuws-van-de-dag/217670-telquel-zijn-geen-arabieren-onze-geschiedennis-vervalst-4.html
https://arabracismislamofascism.wordpress.com/category/pan-arabism/
https://www.geocities.ws/panarabism/
https://mergueze.info/arabism-racism/
http://www.allempires.com/forum/forum_posts.asp?TID=2905&PN=3
Even here (!):https://context.reverso.net/translation/english-dutch/pan-arabism
Slightly edited, the integral standard version of the article can be found here:
https://www.academia.edu/23219268/Prof_Muhammad_Shamsaddin_Megalommatis_Progenitor_of_Wars_and_Tyrannies_the_Falsehood_of_Pan_Arabism
However, in its original form, this article was published in the Political Forum on 23rd June 2004, generating a fascinating polarization and many conflicting comments. That's why I am herewith reproducing the entire discussion, which can still be found here:
https://www.politicsforum.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=25086
I must however add that my very first publication on the topic goes back to 1988, and it took the form of a 11000-word entry (in Greek) in the Great General Encyclopedia Hydria (published by Etaireia Ellinikon Ekdoseon / Greek Publications Co) – Μεγάλη Γενική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια Υδρία (Εταιρεία Ελληνικών Εκδόσεων). The entry title was 'Φυλές και Λαοί της Μέσης Ανατολής' (Peoples and ethnic groups in the Middle East). In my Curriculum, it is mentioned as no 37 in the first unit of my Entries to Encyclopedias, here:
https://megalommatiscomments.wordpress.com/about-prof-muhammad-shamsaddin-megalommatis-entries-of-encyclopedias/
First published on 12th September 2021 here:
https://megalommatis.wordpress.com/extensive-discussion-about-my-article-progenitor-of-wars-and-tyrannies-the-falsehood-of-pan-arabism-in-the-political-forum/
Graham, Stephen. "Laboratories of War: United States-Israeli Collaboration in...
The Arab as Insurgent
1. The Arab as an Insurgent
Part I The Historical – Cultural
The historical ineffectiveness of Arab military organizations in conventional wars against
Western opponents was amply covered in the study by Kenneth Pollock, (Arabs at War) and
some of the cultural and societal rationale was illuminated in my study, “Why Arabs Lose Wars”
(http://www.meforum.org/441/why-arabs-lose-wars. However, since that article appeared a
frequent topic has been the “New Arab/MuslimWay of War,” expounding the view that in
irregular or unconventional warfare against Western armies the Arabs do much better. From the
historical record it appears to be true, and it is my thesis that the answer why is found in the
cultural attributes of Arab society.
However, in being touted as a new way of Arab warfare it is somewhat deceiving in that only the
weapons and techniques have changed, not the strategy or tactics. It is in fact a very old form of
Arab warfare. As depicted in the works by John Jandora (The March from Medina, A
Revisionist Study of the Arab Conquests), and others such as John Keegan, Steven Runciman,
and Rueben Levy, early Arab triumphs were not a result of religious zeal as many Arab
historians believe, although it was a factor. More significantly, it was due to superior martial
skills, such as experience gained in constant tribal warfare, excellent leadership, adaptability, and
rapid mobilization techniques. In the era of early conquests, Arabs were able to assimilate
European methods and weapons and retain their own advantages which were the ability to
rapidly mass and disperse, move quickly, and use surprise. They scrupulously avoided the close
direct grinding warfare found so often among the Greeks, fighting it only as a last resort.
Despite the success of the early Arabs in adapting to European warfare, the favored Arab form of
war remained traditional Bedouin methods. Culturally traditional war fighting included a
penchant for secrecy, the ability to pick and choose the time and place of the battles, and an
emphasis on individualism, the latter an attribute not part of the mass tactics of the West. The
Arab way of war was historically one of the use of deception, the avoidance of close-in warfare,
and a preference for standoff weaponry, including the near veneration of archery.
1
2. Indirection, evasion, excellent intelligence, subterfuge, and psychological operations are the
features of the Arab way of war. In particular, no aspect in the Arab way of war is more
important than psychological operations. So it has been since the opening pages of history. The
importance of the psychological was eloquently described by T. E. Lawrence in his observations
on the Bedouin strategy of winning wars without battles. In the typical ghazwa (Bedouin raid)
this included the use of bloodcurdling yells and screams in which the attackers sought to frighten
the defenders. If things were not going well on the battlefield, there was no shame in a hasty
retreat. As H. A. R. Dickson has written in his book Arab of the Desert, running away was never
considered shameful but rather smart. Arab historian Ibn Khaldun called it the “attack and
withdraw” strategy.
The early history of Arab warfare against Western empires reveals a people more innovative,
adaptable, and strategic in their thinking than their adversaries. The advanced civilization and
culture of Islamic empires atrophied, however, and along with it, their military competence. The
Muslim community was secure in it’s view that the defeated Europeans of the Crusades were a
barbarous and inferior people. As historian Bernard Lewis has so well documented in his
writings, this view held that little was to be learned from the West, complimenting a feeling of
self-sufficiency and allowing European advances in military doctrine and weapons to overtake
and outclass the Middle Eastern Islamic world.
The renaissance in the Western world rendered the Muslim’s deprecatory view of the West as
fatally flawed. An easy French victory over Ottoman forces in 1798 was shocking to both the
Europeans and the Islamic world. Ottoman Turks realized their inferiority, particularly in
military capability, and began to import Western instructors and technology. A massive
European intrusion into the Islamic world was induced by the weakness of a once powerful
Ottoman Empire.
In the Middle East the Europeans created indigenous military forces to do their bidding, in
particular assisting in maintaining security, while being controlled carefully enough to prevent a
military threat to their rule. In so doing they attempted to inculcate their culture into Middle
Eastern military establishments. In some cases a complete makeover was attempted. In the case
of Egypt, Winston Churchill wrote in his book River Wars, “… the European system was
substituted for the oriental.”
2
3. From this point on most Arab armies were trained, equipped, and organized on European
methods, albeit still maintaining their cultural attributes. In short, this has proven to be an
unsuccessful graft, as was the Soviet attempt to impose their doctrine on their client Arab states.
(See "Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: the Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab
Militaries" by Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack, Middle East Journal, Autumn, 2001)
which deals with the Soviet Union’s military patronage of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. While these
countries readily accepted Soviet hardware, Arab authoritarian political culture (strongly
reinforced by Western imports of advanced coercive tools and systems) tended to encourage
conformity and could not integrate the doctrine upon which the Soviet military system was based
(although to an extent the Soviet system was more acceptable to the recipient Arabs than
Western models). Overall, as I personally observed in Egypt while working with the Egyptian
army, the Soviet military graft failed as well.
Part II The Cultural Attributes of the Arab Insurgent
The greater effectiveness of Arabs fighting in traditional Arab ways of war has a historical basis
and more importantly is deeply rooted in their culture. In my observations of why the Arabs are
more effective in unconventional war I would posit the following reasons:
1. More in Consonance with Qu’ranic Laws of Warfare
In a widely read book, The Quranic Concept of War, Pakistani general, S. K. Malik has written
that “war is the cause of God” and not a calamity to be avoided. There is much in this book that
would promote unconventional war, including the importance of total war concepts, the use of
terror to strike fear into the hearts of the enemy, the use of psychology, using economic tools,
and as he wrote, avoiding “the kid gloves” approach to war. For many pages he details the
strategy promoted in the Qu’ran, mostly based on the early wars of the Prophet and his followers
against the “apostates.” In other passages he extols the early Muslim armies’ ability to fight on
favorable terrain, at a time of their choosing, and using deception and intelligence to gain
advantage over the enemy. Echoing a theme written by T. E. Lawrence, the principal aim in
warfare is to win “bloodless battles” by convincing the enemy of the futility of resistance. He
also details the laws on the spoils of war. All the writers on Bedouin warfare have written about
the importance of loot or spoils in typical desert warfare. As an irregular, a fighter is far more
likely to obtain his share of the spoils of war than as a foot soldier in a regular army unit in
which it is most likely that any spoils of war will be taken by the officers.
3
4. 2. The Importance of Blood Lines and Tribal Solidarity
Nothing is more important in the Arab world than tribal or family solidarity. For this reason
Arab rulers often see this solidarity (assibiyah) as a threat to be dealt with. In most Arab
countries there is a conscious effort on the part of rulers to ensure that regular army units are
generally mixed in terms of ethnicity and regional origins to ensure that there is no cohesive unit
attitudes toward the government ruling establishment. As detailed in my study “Why Arabs Lose
Wars,” the land forces of most Arab nations are the greatest existing threat to the regime. Prior
to the 1980’s, Arab history was replete with examples of military coups. All land forces are a
double-edged sword. One edge of the sword points toward the capitol. This threat is
checkmated by forces loyal to the regime for ethnic, religious, or ideological reasons. Examples
of this are the Saudi Arabian National Guard and the defunct Republican Guard of Iraq. This
works against the effectiveness of Arab conventional units. In other words it is a system which
encourages distrust and compartmentalization. Y. Harkabi examined this in his study of the
collapse of Arab conventional forces in the 1967 war (“Basic Factors in Arab Collapse during
the Six Day War,” Orbis, Fall, 1967).
Arab unconventional or insurgent forces on the other hand are almost always composed of clans,
tribes, ethnic groups, or urban sectarian neighborhoods. They know each other, trust each other
and often have blood ties and family connections. This also makes it difficult to penetrate for
intelligence or creating dissention. Blood trumps all in the Arab world, including religion.
Moreover, unlike conventional Arab forces who are often assigned to areas away from their
origins on purpose, these unconventional Arab units are in their home territory, know the terrain,
be it the desert or the urban slums. and the people are their people. They can hide among the
civilians, creating great difficulties for Western armies trained on minimizing collateral damage.
3. Casting Off the Conventional Arab Military Straitjacket
Arab conventional forces, basing their tactics and doctrine on Western models, tend to be very
predictable, with stovepipe leadership, inhibited by a top-down command structure that rewards
political loyalty to the regime and usually exhibits a wide gap between soldiers and their officer
leadership. Usually the officers are drawn from classes above the peasantry or urban poor, and in
a reflection of the Arab society in general, there is very little empathy to create the cohesiveness
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5. a professional army demands. In a Western army the non-commissioned officer is the bridge
between officer and soldier, but the Arab armies in general lack a professional NCO corps.
In Arab insurgent groups, the informal command structures are based more on traditional Arab
leadership qualities and charismatic personalities, and the concept of tribal or family loyalties
produces a far more effective fighting force than that of most Arab conventional units.
4. The Leadership
More pointedly, in conventional Arab militaries promotion and assignments are based more on
loyalty, political linkages to the regime or family connections. Prevalent in Arab conventional
forces, there is a distinct attribute that the “nail that stands up gets hammered down.” Officers
tend to avoid personal responsibility, seek consensus, and wait for orders from above. This is
much less the case in Arab unconventional forces. Leaders are responsible to their tribe or
families for the successes of their missions and lives of their unit’s members. Very often they are
considered only the first among equals and are subject to removal for incompetence or wasting
lives.
5. Weaponry and Uses
Almost every American advisor will lament the perennial problem of the lack of a systemic
logistics and maintenance capability among Arab armies. It was particularly true of the
Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi armies. The capability to keep sophisticated weapons systems
operational has always been a complaint of US advisors. It is not a symptom of lacking the
intelligence or will; it is more an aspect of Arab culture in which team work and daily
application of effort is missing. To a lesser but important degree it is also a reflection of the
nomadic influence which views menial “dirty hands” work as the responsibility of low caste
people. Officers shun it and rarely get involved in it.
On the contrary, noted Arabists, Wilfred Thesiger and Alois Musil noted the care and knowledge
with which the Bedouin handled their personal weapons. This is the advantage of the Arab
irregular. He has no heavy weaponry to maintain, only small arms and small stand-off weapons
such as rocket propelled genades (RPG) and mortars. And as Thesinger observed and I did as
well, the Arabs have a talent for jerry-rigging weapons and equipment that can be quite amazing.
With few tools or sophisticated workshops this is a prerequisite for insurgent operations. As a
corollary to this, less sophisticated education is required to handle and maintain these weapons.
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6. 6. Individualism
Ibn Khaldun, in his book The Muqaddimah, laments the nature of the Bedouin as barbaric, but
also emphasizes the individualistic nature of the Arab, the desire among them to vie for
leadership, and each one feel qualified to assume a leadership role. This trait is one of many
which has been absorbed by Arab society in general. Anyone who has spent some time in the
Arab world can relate this to a scene of an accident wherein dozens will gather, all shouting
orders to others, and no one is listening. At the American University in Beirut my sociology
professor asked the class to observe a basketball game and relate their observations. The Arab
students saw nothing of particular note but many American students noted that there was very
little passing or teamwork. A player would get the ball, dribble the length of the court and make
a shot. This overwhelming trait of individualism is a difficult obstacle in developing a smooth
functioning conventional unit. My own observation over the years has been that Arab units are
not lacking in the individual skills required for war-fighting; they are hardy, used to privation,
and tough. The basic problem on the modern battlefield is the lack of functioning combined
arms.
For the unconventional fighter these are not particular problems. In fact the Arab in a guerilla
unit is able to exhibit his imagination and initiative in a way never allowed in the conventional
unit. Conformity of the Arab military system is a result of draconian discipline imposed to get
obedience. It is not a natural Arab attribute. In opposition to the conventional military system,
the insurgent success depends on individual initiative.
7. Glory and Self-Promotion
The seemingly inbred thespian impulse found in Arabs is a remarkable and often observed trait.
General Glubb Pasha, commander of the Jordanian Army, and who worked with Arabs for
almost 50 years commented on their spirit of romance, need for the dramatic gesture, and quest
for personal glory. Eric Hoffer wrote of this trait in describing terrorists of the left-wing
ideological type in the 60’s. His descriptions of this motivation fit perfectly with the Twin-
Tower terrorists. Hoffer wrote in his book The True Believer, “Dying and killing seem easy
when they are part of a ritual, ceremonial, dramatic performance or game.” “Glory is largely a
theatrical concept. There is no striving for glory without a vivid awareness of an audience - the
knowledge that our mighty deeds will come to the ears of our contemporaries….” Obtaining
this personal glory as a foot soldier in an infantry unit is by no means impossible but hardly as
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7. likely as the Arab insurgent with face mask. kaffiya, individualized battle dress picking the time
and place for his personalized heroic act.
Conclusion
In surfacing the reasons for Arab effectiveness as an unconventional warrior I have drawn on
my own experiences as well as the observations of those who have worked with Arabs over the
past two centuries. Much of the materiel relates to the nomadic Arab. Yet today probably less
than 5% of the Arab population can be considered nomadic. The Arab world is a mostly urban
society. However this in no way diminishes the validity of the traits depicted above. As the
great Iraqi historian Ali Al Wardi has written a half century ago, nomadic traits are part of the
ethos of the Iraqi and Arab character. This has more recently been reinforced by the study of
Philip Salzman in his book, Culture and Conflict in the Middle East. Just the fact that Ibn
Khaldun’s observations can be applied today is proof of the resistance of Arab culture to
change.
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